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## **Multiculturalism, Differentiated Citizenship, and the Problem of Self-Determination<sup>1</sup>**

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Although multiculturalism cannot be considered a new phenomenon, its political relevance in western democracies seems to be increasing. The problems created by immigration, the resurgence of nationalist movements or the mobilization of disadvantaged social groups probably represent “*the greatest challenge facing democracies today*” (Kymlicka 1995a: 1). Multiculturalism raises a very large range of political questions, in particular regarding the ways liberal states address claims to recognition of cultural differences. In this paper I address this question, namely the theoretical relationships between multiculturalism and citizenship in the light of the question of national minorities’ claims to political recognition. In particular, I will examine whether differentiated citizenship is a satisfactory answers to national cultures’ claims to self-determination.

Several authors have already emphasized that differentiating the rights of liberal citizenship is the only way to realize social and political justice in multicultural societies. It is interesting to remark that differentiated citizenship has been defended by authors belonging to different normative paradigms, as – just to mention the most popular ones - Kymlicka from a liberal perspective, Taylor from a communitarian perspective and Young from a postmodern one. Thus, it is not really surprising that, even if the idea of differentiated citizenship is becoming increasingly influential, there are still many disagreements among its defenders regarding its purposes, its normative limits and the modalities of its political institutionalization. Basically, the conception of differentiated citizenship that I support in this paper relies on the principle of political equality. In my perspective, through differentiated citizenship, liberal states would ideally aim, first, to improve the political resources of the members of discriminated groups; secondly, to endow with a symbolic recognition of stigmatized or presumed abnormal cultural differences, providing them political respect and visibility; finally, to reinforce, through democratic integration, the legitimacy of representative democracy<sup>2</sup>. Such model of differentiated citizenship is based on a political understanding of multiculturalism. This means that the standard to assessing the validity of a claim to

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<sup>2</sup> For a more in-depth discussion of differentiated citizenship, see Gianni (2000).

recognition should not be the intrinsic quality of a particular culture, but the fact that individuals or groups do not have equal political power in the public realm due to their cultural difference.

Now, is this conception of differentiated citizenship useful as a possible way to settle multinational disputes ? In order to address this question, I will discuss some of the points that have been made by recent liberal nationalists regarding the importance, for liberal justice and liberal democracy, of the recognition of national cultures. My argument follows three steps : first, I provide an analytical discussion of multiculturalism. From a sociological standpoint, I present two main conceptualizations of multiculturalism, which I call respectively *broad* and *narrow* conceptions of multiculturalism. I show that these understandings of multiculturalism are based on different anthropological and normative interpretations of culture. Generally speaking, liberals and communitarians share an institutional view of culture, whereas postmodern scholars refer to a relational conception of it. Second, I show that these two conceptions of multiculturalism entail very different normative implications regarding the way to settle multicultural conflicts. More specifically, the normative solutions to nationalist conflicts principally depend on the moral, political and social relevance that it is conferred to national culture. I will basically focus on two main normative arguments : first, the anthropological argument, based on the idea that national culture is necessary to people to live a just life or to follow their own conception of the good and thus that it should be secured by political recognition. Second, the instrumental argument, based on the idea that a common culture is a fundamental precondition for the existence of a stable and democratic polity. I will show that these arguments relies on sweeping anthropological and empirical arguments and that they cannot ground specific forms of political recognition based on the ‘superiority’ of national culture. Therefore, in the last part of the paper, I suggest that differentiated citizenship might be a solution to settle multinational conflicts, but only at the condition that it is not the specificity of national culture that should be recognized, but the existence of a gap between formal and actual rights of citizenship for people belonging to a national minority.

## 1. ‘Egalitarian’ and ‘differentialist’ claims to recognition

Gutmann (1993: 171) defines multiculturalism as “ *the state of a society or the world containing many cultures that interact in some significant ways with each other* ”. This is a very broad definition, that must be specified to be operational. The question is to know what is the kind of “ *significant* ” interactions that characterize multicultural societies. In my view, the more important sociological and political characteristics of multiculturalism is the existence of conflicts of *recognition* between cultural groups and political institutions. As many scholars have shown, the national state has imposed its power through a strong normalizing process of reduction of internal cultural differences (Gellner, 1989). Indeed, multiculturalism can hardly be considered a new phenomenon. What is relatively new is thus not multiculturalism in itself, but its salience and visibility as a political problem. In the last century, the capacity of social actors to bring their identi-

ties and interests into the public sphere has considerably increased (Calhoun, 1995:216, Gitlin, 1994; Melucci, 1996). As Phillips (1995:12) points out, the relevance of multiculturalism “ *cannot be understood just in terms of an absolute or growing difference. [...] It reflects a shift in political culture and claims, where people who may be significantly less different than in some point in the past come to assert a stronger sense of themselves and their identities* ”. The rise of the politics of identity illustrates very well such a situation. Groups whose members decades ago fought for their equal political and social integration, now claim recognition of their cultural particularity.

According to Kymlicka and Norman (1994: 372), there are three sorts of social and cultural actors claiming recognition of their difference: (a) national minorities, claiming for self-determination rights; (b) immigrant and religious groups, claiming for polyethnic rights; (c) disadvantaged groups, claiming for representation rights. Besides the differences between the kinds of rights that are advocated, the existence of conflicts of recognition shows that citizenship is and has been called into question by social actors as the medium to realize political equality. In other words, the political mobilization of all these very different cultural groups expresses a common feature, namely the idea the liberal citizenship rights are no more considered a sufficient condition to realize an effective political integration. In fact, within democratic multicultural societies, the likelihood that social actors’ identities conflict with the values of citizenship is very high. For different reasons, these actors view their cultural loyalties as very *thick*, that is, as a set of values they cannot give up without losing their authenticity (Taylor, 1994). This leads to a process of ‘negotiation’ of citizenship, which does not represent anymore the main referent of political identity, but just one identity among others. This trend can weaken the nature of political integration on which liberal democracy should be built (Schlesinger, 1992; Beiner, 1995). The rhetoric of authenticity inherent in the ‘differentialist’ claim to recognition “ *proposes not only that I have a way of being that is all my own, but that in developing it I must fight against the family, organized religions, society, the school, the state - all the forces of convention* ” (Appiah, 1994 : 154). Considered in this perspective, such ‘differentialist’ claims to recognition virtually lead to the destruction of citizenship as a way to construct political equality. Nationalist claims (in its more dramatic expressions) can lead to the formation of strong identities, which threaten the bonds of citizenship and political integration in a given society.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to reduce claims to recognition to the only goal of the expression of cultural difference. In other words, conflicts of recognition do not necessarily arise because of the social actors’ willingness to promote and affirm their cultural identity (or authenticity). This ‘differentialist’ view of recognition is only one side of the coin. Claims to recognition also stem from the actors’ perception that their identity (or cultural specificity) is not recognized by the state and that this lack of recognition does not allow them to be treated fairly in the public space. I call ‘egalitarian’ claim to recognition the claim that the state should politically recognize a cultural group in order to realize better forms of equality. Therefore, if the ‘differentialist’ view of recognition aims to strengthen the differences between the cultural groups, the ‘egalitarian’ view aims to promote better form of political and social equality between groups. Translated into political terms, Taylor’s concept of “ *deep diversity* ” expresses the idea that what is at stake in multi-

cultural societies is not only the problem of accommodating the diversity of cultural groups, but also the diversity of political and social positions that the members of these groups occupy in the democratic system (Taylor, quoted by Kymlicka, 1995: 189). Therefore, it is not cultural difference in itself that creates conflict, but the political effects of being culturally different in a given political community. Despite their formal rights of citizenship, members of cultural groups suffering from *ascriptive humiliation* (Lukes, 1996) or political *invisibility* (Galeotti, 1994), are not treated as equal in liberal polities<sup>3</sup>. This calls for an empirical criticism of the idea that liberal citizenship is a sufficient condition to guarantee political integration.

Considered in the light of liberal citizenship, both conceptions of recognition entail a differential treatment of cultural groups. To say it with Taylor, they both imply that “ we give acknowledgement and status to something that is not universally shared ” (1994: 39). In fact, differentiated citizenship – as it is based on collective or group rights - attributes to the members of cultural groups rights that are not universally distributed among citizens. Hence, it counters the basic liberal principle that all should be treated equally, which in liberal terms often means ‘in the same way’ (Young, 1990). In this sense, the ‘differentialist’ and ‘egalitarian’ claims to recognition call into question the (presumed) universal foundations of liberal citizenship. In other words, both dynamics cast doubts on the liberal ideal of citizenship as the neutral space in which a culturally differentiated society can be unified through the attribution of a common legal status. Having said this, it is also important to notice that the normative and political aims underlying the two kinds of recognition are very different. On the one hand, the ‘egalitarian’ conception is based on the assumption that, to reach equality, cultural groups must be politically recognized. In other words, the members of such groups should benefit from a differential treatment in order to increase their political resources and hence their political integration. This claim is based on the idea that differential treatment is necessary to fulfill the egalitarian aims of liberal citizenship. Therefore, the main goal of the groups claiming such recognition is their integration in the polity and society<sup>4</sup>. On the other, the ‘differentialist’ conception is based on the assumption that the recognition of cultural differences is necessary to provide to cultural communities the opportunity to live accordingly to their conception of the good. Because community’s values are constitutive of the member’s conceptions of the good, then the members of the cultural community need the political power to preserve them. The denial of such power is understood as a form of cultural imperialism or cultural domination, phenomena that lead to the political mobilization of cultural groups. Here the purpose is not to realize better forms of equality, but to have the possibility to fully express its difference. In this case, it is not equality between groups that is at stake, but the liberty for the members of the

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<sup>3</sup> Taylor (1994: 36) argues that “ equal recognition is not just the appropriate mode for a healthy democratic society. Its refusal can inflict damage on those who are denied it [...]. The projection of an inferior or demeaning image on another can actually distort and oppress, to the extent that the image is internalized ”.

<sup>4</sup> For Kymlicka (1995: 176 ss), claims to recognition often express a demand for inclusion, and not for differentiation. In the same perspective, for Minow (1997: 355), “the willingness of a minority group to use the language of rights [...] constitutes in a profound sense a willingness to join the dominant community”.

group to live accordingly to its cultural values.

'Egalitarian' and 'differentialist' claims to recognition should be seen as two ideal-typical categories. The empirical reality is much more complex and contradictory than what these two types might suggest. For example, the identity of the group can be positive, in the sense that the group affirms the value of its own subculture, or negative, as the by-product of an external categorization and stigma inflicted on the members of one group (Goffman, 1963; Hagendoorn, 1994). Positive and negative identities are strongly connected. The politics of identity can be seen as the results of the mobilization of social movements which aim to transform a negative identity into a positive one. For example, the black nationalist movement in the United States constitutes a powerful process of transformation of a stigmatized identity into a positive affirmation of a specific cultural heritage. The projection of an external identity defines the conditions of existence experienced by the members of these cultural minorities. As Honneth (1995: 162) puts it, "*we are dealing here with a practical process in which individual experiences of disrespect are read as typical for an entire group, and in such a way that they can motivate collective demands for expanded relations of recognition*". The search for better forms of equality or the expression of difference are two possible strategies to overcome this lack of social and political resources.

The distinction between the 'egalitarian' and 'differentialist' dimensions provide an analytical tool in order to empirically apprehend cultural groups' claims to recognition. From a normative level, nevertheless, the main question is: do 'differentialist' and 'egalitarian' claims to recognition have the same normative weight according to the liberal theory of citizenship? The two kinds of claim cannot be treated in the same way because they raise very different normative implications. More specifically, from a liberal perspective, there is an enormous difference between these two statements: 'groups should be politically recognized to be able to express their difference' and 'groups should be politically recognized to reach better forms of political equality'. These two claims imply very different views of political recognition. In order to assess the specificity of these two kinds of claims, it is crucial to define *why* a cultural group should be recognized. To do this, it is necessary to point out the reasons that are supposed to give to cultural membership the moral power that legitimize its recognition. As we will see below, the way we understand and construct culture determine substantially the normative weight of culture and the political modalities of recognition.

## **2. Conceptions of multiculturalism and national identity**

If we go through the existing literature, it is possible to distinguish between two main analytical conceptions of the sociological meaning of multiculturalism. I will name them *broad* and *narrow* conceptions. Even if it cannot be considered as logically exhaustive, I believe that this distinction can help elucidate part of the complex relationships between the multiculturalism, citizenship and the politics of recognition. The most important opposition between the two conceptions regards the different understandings

of culture. The *narrow* conception refers to an anthropologically *thick* view of culture. This idea is well captured by what Kymlicka (1995: 76) calls a 'societal culture', namely a "*culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres. These cultures tend to be territorially concentrated, and based on a shared language*". Thus, for the adherents to the narrow conception of multiculturalism, multicultural states are marked by the presence of cultural based on strong cultural affiliations and identities. National minorities are the cultural groups of reference of such approach (Taylor, 1994, Walzer, 1994, Raz 1994; Margalit and Raz, 1995). Therefore, this view excludes from the multicultural dynamics several groups which do not constitute a societal culture, such as gays, disabled, women and – partly- immigrant or ethnic groups.

In contrast, the *broad* conception of multiculturalism takes into account groups that do not form a societal culture but whose members are supposed to share some characteristics that define them as different from the members of majority(is) culture(s) with respect to values, life styles and interests. These symbolic elements are embodied in social and political institutions, and this is precisely the reason why cultural difference affects the political resources of these individuals. The notion of culture is here defined in a sociological perspective, that is, in a relational and pragmatic way<sup>5</sup>. What is at stake is not - like in the narrow conception - to start from a formal definition of culture and then to find the groups which fit with it, but to focus more directly on what is socially and politically *done* by individuals having different cultural loyalties and particularities<sup>6</sup>. Considered in this perspective, multiculturalism does not only concern the relations between members of diverse societal cultures, but also between the members of subcultures in a given societal culture. Therefore, if the narrow conception focuses mainly on national minorities, the broad one considers also differences, such as sex, sexual orientation, or disability and even age, class, family, street gangs, crime and popular cultures, as part of the multicultural dynamics<sup>7</sup>. The members of these groups share an identity which is considered 'significant' with regard to the construction of their autonomy, preferences, choices and conceptions of the good.

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<sup>5</sup> For Young (1995: 161), for example, "a group exists and is defined as a specific group only in social and interactive relation to others. Group identity is not a set of objective facts, but the product of experienced meanings". For her, culture 'refers to all aspects of social life from the point of view of their linguistic, symbolic, affective, and embodied norms and practices. Culture includes the background and medium of action, the unconscious habits, desires, meanings, gestures and so on that people grow into and bring to their interactions' (ibid.: 86).

<sup>6</sup> Tully employs a similar perspective on culture when he writes that "the diverse ways in which citizens think about, speak, act and relate to others in participating in a constitutional association (both the abilities they exercise and the practices in which they exercise them), whether they are making, following or going against the rules and conventions in any instance, are always to some extent the expression of their different cultures" (1995: 5).

<sup>7</sup> Young (1990:40) proposes a long list of oppressed groups in the US such as "women, Blacks, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans and other Spanish-speaking Americans, American Indians, Jews, lesbians, gay men, Arabs, Asian, old people, working-class people, and the physically and mentally disabled". See also Dumm (1994: 172), who considers "African American Nationalism, the problem of street gangs and urban disintegration, gender inequality, gender identity, and queer politics, Latino identity, and the role of popular culture in the transformation and dissemination of culture" as part of the problematic of multiculturalism. See also Berger (1995: 26-28).

The distinction between *broad* and *narrow* understandings of multiculturalism entails important methodological and normative consequences. To put it straightly, scholars who adopt a narrow conception of multiculturalism start from the assumption that national culture is morally relevant and hence it should occupy an important place in a liberal conception of democracy<sup>8</sup>. In contrast, scholars working with a broad understanding of multiculturalism basically consider national identity as one identity among others. This does not mean that they do not consider it as important, but they do not reduce the analysis of multiculturalism to the question of multinational states and multinational conflicts. Moreover, they tend to approach the question of nationalist claims to recognition within a broader normative framework that should be able to address also the claims to recognition articulated by other cultural minorities. In other words, to adopt a narrow conception of culture often entails a differentiation of the normative solutions supported to settle multicultural disputes, while adopting a broad conception often leads to the search for solutions that can address the conditions experienced by very different cultural groups. The reflection on the ‘particularity’ or ‘superiority’ of national cultures is therefore strongly dependent on the conception of multiculturalism one adopts.

### 3. The normative relevance of national identity

According to the dominant theoretical and empirical analysis – inspired by a narrow conception of multiculturalism - national identities are considered as *thicker* than other forms of collective identities. In other words, they are supposed to have a greater symbolic and political weight than other kinds of identity. This is probably one of the results of the symbolic and ideological strength of the national-state model<sup>9</sup>. Now, in order to decide about the legitimacy of policies of cultural preservation or protection of national communities, the validity of the argument of the intrinsic value of national identities must be assessed<sup>10</sup>. To put it differently, the justification of the superiority of national communities over other kinds of minorities is necessary to normatively ground self-determination as a specific form of political recognition. The ‘superiority thesis’ relies basically on three main arguments:

- The empirical argument (‘it is true that people consider their national identity as more important than other forms of identity’).
- The philosophical-anthropological argument (‘national identity is the precondition for social actors to live a good life or to make autonomous choices; outside the frame provided by a national culture, individuals are not able to autonomously determine their conception of the good’).

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<sup>8</sup> The recent works of several authors, as for example Tamir (1993), Miller (1995), Raz (1994), Taylor (1994) and Kymlicka (1995), seems to corroborate this interpretation.

<sup>9</sup> As Levy (1998) rightly argues “the word nation is so normatively loaded that who invokes it typically invokes loyalty to it”.

<sup>10</sup> As Margalit and Raz (1995: 79) rightly write, “the justification of the law rests ultimately on moral considerations, and therefore those considerations should also held shape the contours of legal principles”

- The instrumental argument ('in liberal polities, some forms of pre-political attachments are necessary to sustain political stability, solidarity and civic participation')<sup>11</sup>.

Several political theorists have recently endorsed these three arguments. For example, national culture is viewed as the precondition for autonomy (Kymlicka, 1995), for a healthy self identity and good life (Raz, 1994 ; Taylor 1986 ; 1994; Margalit and Raz, 1995), and for the implementation of a liberal and republican polity (Tamir, 1993 ; Miller, 1995). Despite of their differences, all these authors maintain that national culture establishes the symbolic structure necessary for the realization of liberal ideals. Thus, in some ways, national cultures ought be protected by liberal states. Now, in order to justify the political recognition of national communities, we need to ascertain the validity of the three kinds of arguments mentioned above. This task is crucial, because its result entails important methodological implications. In fact, if we fail to justify the normative and anthropological superiority of national cultures over other kinds of social identities, the argument according to which we need to determine specific forms of political recognition that suit particular cultural groups crumbles<sup>12</sup>. In other words, if it is not possible to demonstrate that there are differences in the anthropological and political importance between national cultures, ethnic cultures, and social disadvantaged groups' cultures, the idea that the claims of these groups should be considered through different normative lenses would be hard to sustain. Obviously, this does not mean that all these groups should be provided with the same rights or forms of recognition: given the differences existing between the conditions experienced by all this groups, such conclusion would be meaningless. What is at stake, is the determination of the principle grounding the politics of recognition. If we fail to demonstrate that national cultures have a moral superiority given by their specificity, then it becomes compelling to determine another grounding principle for the politics of recognition, principle that might address the claims of other kind of cultural groups. Before discussing such principle, let look more precisely to the question of the specificity of national cultures. To assess their normative relevance, I am going to focus mainly on the second and third arguments.

### 3.1 *The anthropological functions of national identity*

With regards to the anthropological perspective, I consider two kinds of justifications, namely the liberal autonomy thesis and the communitarian social thesis. Several authors have emphasized that the realization of liberal autonomy presupposes a wide range of cultural options: "*cultures are valuable, not in and of themselves, but because it is only through having access to a societal culture that people have access to a range of meaningful options*" (Kymlicka, 1995: 83). Options are provided by culture, which gives them a meaning. Kymlicka (1991 ; 1995), for example, argues that a secure cultural context of choice is necessary for the autonomy of individuals. In his view, a secure cultural context of choice is provided by a 'societal culture'. Kymlicka is not clear about the meaning of the expression 'to have a secure cultural context of choice'. For him "[A]

<sup>11</sup> I owe the concept of 'instrumental argument' to Moore (1998).

<sup>12</sup> See for example, Kymlicka (1995 : 19).

*cultural community continues to exist even when its members are free to modify the character of the culture, should they find its traditional ways of life no longer worth while*” (1991: 167). The problem inherent in this statement is the following: if a cultural community is just a structure, why should its preservation to be a necessary condition for the realization of autonomy? Does an individual who is not embedded in a cultural structure exist? Where there is human life, there is a cultural structure. Therefore, to be consistent with his anthropological assumptions, Kymlicka should state that liberal states should protect a *particular* cultural structure, characterized by a *particular* symbolic content, and not any kind of cultural structure<sup>13</sup>. Moreover, Kymlicka should explain how membership in societal cultures that do not value autonomy would allow individuals to become autonomous. The danger faced by Kymlicka is to fall into a circular argument, namely that only societal cultures that value autonomy are suited to the realization of members’ autonomy. But then, it is not only a general cultural structure that should be protected, but a specific cultural structure, namely the one in which autonomy is a central value.

In addition, Kymlicka does not provide adequate arguments to support the thesis that *only* societal cultures are able to provide the social and anthropological conditions for autonomy (Weinstock, 1996). Other forms of identity, built around sexual or gender differences, also contribute to create the options necessary to individuals to be autonomous. As well as national communities, other cultural groups provide a context in which members can obtain mutual recognition, gaining self-respect and mutual respect. Self-respect and mutual respect are very important preconditions for autonomy. To be respected - that is, to be treated as an autonomous moral being - implies the opportunity to choose freely between different options regarding her own life. In contrast, a lack of self-respect or of mutual respect leads to the situation where the autonomous action of individuals is limited by the attitudes and perceptions of others<sup>14</sup>. It is not clear then why national communities should be the only cultural groups providing mutual respect to its members. In this sense, Kymlicka (and liberal nationalists in general), fails to show that nations are ‘specials’ in some ways (Moore, 1998: 5). His anthropological argument cannot support the idea that political recognition of national cultures has priority over the recognition of other cultural groups.

From a communitarian perspective, Taylor argues that nations have a moral character that should be preserved by the liberal state. The argument is the following: the ‘embeddedness’ of individuals in national cultures allows them to define and pursue their conception of the good. Thus, the liberal states should protect the values that are constitutive of the identity of the community’s members. As Taylor puts it, “[...] *living within such strongly qualified horizons is constitutive of human agency, [while] stepping outside*

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<sup>13</sup> Such a lack of clarity is well captured by Tomasi, for whom “cultural membership is a primary good only in the same uninteresting sense as is, say, oxygen: since (practically) no one is differentially advantaged with respect to that good, it generates no special rights” (1995: 589).

<sup>14</sup> As Margalit and Raz (1995: 87) put it, “individual dignity and self-respect require that the groups, membership of which contributes to one’s sense of identity, be generally respected and not be made a subject of ridicule, hatred, discrimination, or persecution”. I agree with this statement. Nevertheless, it seems to me that it does not only concern national minorities, but also to other sorts of minority groups.

*these limits would be tantamount to stepping outside what we would recognize as integral, that is, undamaged human personhood*” (Taylor, 1986 : 27)<sup>15</sup>. In other words, taking Taylor literally, to stepping outside a national culture means to damage its own human personhood. Shared meanings and values provide the standards to determine individual options. But these options are not the result of the self-reflexivity of social actors ; they are the cultural and cognitive basis structuring individual preferences and self-reflexivity. Thus, in this perspective, ends are given but people can find different ways to reach them. In this sense, the protection and reproduction of national culture is the prerequisite for implementing a politics of the common good. Political institutions ought not to be neutral regarding cultural values, but they should defend them against the threat of excessive internal cultural differences. Self-determination is probably the most powerful way to reach such goal, but this implies a threat for other minorities to be fully integrated into the new polity (Horowitz, 1997).

The communitarian anthropological thesis is highly problematic. For example, it is not clear why the moral development in a homogeneous national community would be more effective than the moral development in a heterogeneous culture<sup>16</sup>. Moreover, the anthropological thesis according to which ceasing to belong to his own original national community entails disastrous effects on one’s identity is “*surely false*” (Hartney, 1995: 206). From an empirical perspective, Taylor does not take into account the internal differences of national communities and thus he does not fully consider the potentiality of ‘hybridity’ for autonomy and self-reflexivity about conceptions of the good. Taylor’s approach ultimately relies on a hierarchy among significant cultural attachments. But, as Kymlicka, he does not provide convincing arguments to support the thesis that national culture is enough ‘special’ to deserve a moral right to recognition. Even if we accept the idea that to belong to one cultural group is an important feature for individuals to live a good life, this does not mean that *only* national identity can accomplish this anthropological function.

### 3.2. *The instrumental functions of national identity*

The instrumental thesis is based on political rather than anthropological considerations. The general argument rests on the idea that the preservation of national culture is instrumental to democratic governance, social solidarity, and citizenship. According to Miller (1995a: 450), for example, “*a common sense of nationality is an essential background*” to a republican politics. Thus, “*nationality must be something more than de facto citizenship. It must amount to a common identity that grounds citizenship*” (1988)<sup>17</sup>. Republican citizenship is demanding because it requires citizens to act responsibly: “*they*

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<sup>15</sup> My emphasis.

<sup>16</sup> For a criticism of this thesis, see Waldron (1995: 106), for whom “meaningful options may come to us as items or fragments from a variety of cultural sources”. See also Horowitz (1997).

<sup>17</sup> Emphasis added. In a quite similar perspective, even if he does not explicitly refer to nationality, Barber (1984: 216-217) emphasize the importance of ‘common consciousness’ to realize a republican polity (that he calls strong democracy): “without loyalty, fraternity, patriotism, neighborliness, bonding, traditional mutual affection, and common belief, participatory democracy is reduced to crass proceduralism” (ibid.: 242).

*have not merely to get involved in public decision-making, but they have to try to promote the common good*". (Miller, 1995: 8). Perfectionist liberals, as for example Gals-ton (1991) or Macedo (1991), claim that liberal states ought not to be neutral regarding the conception of the good. Because it is a form of community, the state should foster the civic virtues necessary to the preservation of liberal values and liberal community. This implies that individuals have an emotional identification with the state and with its members (Moore, 1998 : 9). Thus, according to this argument, the state must promote some forms of liberal nationalism to protect liberal community and to provide individuals with the social and political means for their flourishing as liberal citizens.

Hence, some forms of nationalist policies are seen as worthy for the stability of liberal political systems. The idea is that participation, solidarity and trust in political institutions arise from a community within which co-nationals share a common history and common values. Although plausible, this point is difficult to assess from an empirical perspective. For example, according to some empirical research on European Union, it is not possible to demonstrate that there has been a significant decline in the public's trust towards institutions during the 1980s (Listhaug and Wiberg, 1995). Given the supra-national status of European Union, this empirical result supports the idea that liberal democracy can be secured in the absence of a shared national identity (Mason, 1999). But, besides empirical considerations, the question is : is national culture the *only* kind of symbolic framework allowing members to develop positive attitudes and trust towards democratic institutions ? If, with Newton (1997 : 3), we consider that "*trust involves the belief that others will, so far as they can, look after our interests, and not take advantage of us*", it is possible to maintain that it is easier to trust (and to be trusted by) members of associations such as gays, women, ethnic minority groups, etc. than co-nationals. In the absence of actual social interactions, the representation of a 'co-national' remains at an abstract level. But the representation of a fellow-member of a, say, gay community is more real, because of the regular interactions in the community (or association). It is social proximity that makes trust, not the formal belonging to a national community. Therefore, according to this argument, to foster trust and democratic participation, the liberal states should not strengthen national identity, but find ways to increase associative democracy (Hirst, 1994) and to make civil society stronger (Lehning, 1998 ; Barber, 1998).

This argument does not entail a denial of all the plausibility of the instrumental thesis. In fact, nationality is an identity that is more broadly shared than other kinds of more specific identities. Moreover, the strong normative link between nationality and citizenship (that underlies almost all the naturalization's policies) makes national identity a very important referent. None the less, it seems to me that this thesis is not strong enough to be the normative justification for liberal nationalist policies. Putting it differently, there is not enough evidence to support the idea that only national communities deserve political recognition because of their moral, anthropological and instrumental superiority over other kinds of identities. This means that it is not possible to support the idea that political recognition of national cultures has priority over the recognition of other cultural groups. In my view, this aspect shows the epistemological and normative limits of the narrow conception of multiculturalism and of its model of recognition: it is not able to address much of the demands claimed by the members of groups that face cultural

discrimination in liberal polities. In other words, solutions to conflicts of recognition taken on the basis of a narrow conception of culture and aiming to preserve a shared national culture will inevitably lead to other forms of conflicts of recognition with those internal minorities of the community that have been recognized. For these reasons, I believe that to ground differentiated citizenship on anthropological or instrumental arguments about national culture does not lead to adequate policies to settle multicultural conflicts. This argument does not entail that the *broad* conception of multiculturalism do not rise important problems. As I explained before, this conception of multiculturalism is concerned with the realization of better forms of equality in liberal democratic polities. Due to its relational and pragmatic conception of culture, it considers a larger range of cultural groups as being part of the multicultural reality. The problems with this framework are opposite to the ones raised by the narrow conception. While the latter assumes a too much restrictive understanding of culture, the former virtually expands culture to all forms of collective meaning and agency<sup>18</sup>. Then, scholars working with the broad conception are confronted with the task of defining precise criteria necessary to assess which cultural groups should be politically recognized and which should not.

#### **4. Self-determination and differentiated citizenship**

The fact that national communities are not superior to other kinds of identity does not entail that they cannot be politically recognized. It just means that we should ground such recognition on a different principle than the moral superiority of national cultures. I suggest this principle to be political equality. Therefore, I argue that it is mainly ‘egalitarian’ claims to recognition that should be taken into account by liberal states. In other words, ‘differentialist’ positions ought to be considered only if the recognition of difference is meant to promote better forms of political equality. The balance between the search for equality and the right to the expression of difference is inherent in any form of differentiated citizenship. Nevertheless, some normative and political limits shall be established in order to keep the dynamics of expression of difference compatible with citizenship and democracy. I believe that, in order to make a step further in the discussion of differentiated citizenship, it is also important to focus on the aspect represented by citizenship and not only on difference. In other words, thinking about differentiated citizenship, we should not only conceive ways to reinforce the expression of difference, but also procedures to strengthen citizenship.

As I explained above, both ‘egalitarian’ and ‘differentialist’ claims to recognition imply a differential treatment of cultural groups, namely that some sorts of collective rights should be attributed to the group in order to rectify a situation of injustice. To be considered as liberal, differentiated citizenship should entail an

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<sup>18</sup> In some respects, Kymlicka is right when he maintains that «[Young] list of ‘oppressed groups’ in the United States would seem to include 80 percent of the population [...]. In short, everyone but relatively well-off, relatively young, able-bodied, heterosexual white males » (1995 : 145).

enrichment of rights for the members of some disadvantaged groups, but never a diminution of individual rights because of membership in a cultural group. In the Rawlsian terminology, there should be a lexical priority of the individual universal rights of citizenship over the rights attributed to a collective subject, namely the cultural group. In this sense, differentiated citizenship should not promote the possibility of increasing the “internal restrictions” regarding the liberty of the members of a cultural group (Kymlicka 1995), because this would mean that what is at stake is not the purpose of their better integration, but the protection of given forms of culture. Differentiated citizenship does not concern cultures, but the empowerment of the members of disadvantaged cultural groups<sup>19</sup>. There is a huge difference between providing the members of a cultural groups with the political instruments which might enable them to preserve their culture and protecting a culture by administrative decisions<sup>20</sup>. Considered as a mean to promote better forms of political equality, differentiated citizenship is based on the assumption that one of the risks that members of liberal societies must assume is the fact that some cultural identities might disappear or become so highly ‘hybrid’ that they might substantially change their character<sup>21</sup>.

This view of differentiated citizenship contrasts with the one supported by Taylor, Raz and – in part – Kymlicka. The conceptions of differentiated citizenship that – explicitly or implicitly – arise from their narrow approach to multiculturalism focus too much on the preservation of national culture as a precondition for individual autonomy or the common good. In other words, the politics of recognition they support relies too much on sweeping anthropological assumptions regarding the functions of national culture. With regards to the instrumental thesis, it is plausible to think that a polity whose members can mutually recognize as fellows is more stable and peaceful than a polity marked by deep conflicts of recognition. Nevertheless, as Mason (1999) points out, there is a difference between ‘belonging to a polity’ and ‘belonging together’. The idea of ‘belonging together’ involves a shared culture and a shared history. What is at stake, here, is the mechanism of horizontal recognition, that is, the whole processes fostering mutual social recognition. The notion of ‘belonging to a polity’ refers to vertical recognition, that is, mutual recognition between political institutions and citizens. In other words, ‘belonging together’ refers to a pre-political identity, while ‘belonging to a polity’ defines a kind of political identity. The claim to self-determination is often based on the attempt to create a conjunction between these two sorts of belonging: it is because we belong together that we must create a new polity which will enable us to protect and preserve our common cultural and political belonging.

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<sup>19</sup> Young (1990: 251) defines empowerment as the “participation of an agent in decision-making through an *effective* voice and vote. Justice requires that each person should have the institutionalized means to participate *effectively* in the decisions that affect her or his action and the conditions of that action”. Phillips’ conception of the “politics of presence” is similar to this perspective.

<sup>20</sup> See also Habermas (1994).

<sup>21</sup> On this point, see also Waldron (1995), Habermas (1994) and Walzer (1994: 72), for whom “confronted with modernity, all the human tribes are endangered species; their thick cultures are subject to erosion [...] We can recognize what might be called a right to resist these effects [...]; we cannot guarantee the success of the resistance”.

If we consider that one of the main tasks of liberal states is to protect the citizenship rights of individuals and not to interfere in the private liberties of individuals, then the priority of the state should be to strengthen the 'belonging to a polity' instead than 'belonging together'. This does not mean that the dimension of 'belonging together' is not normatively important; it means that 'belonging to a polity' is the precondition for individuals to obtain the resources that would allow them to find out ways to perpetuate their 'belonging together'. The fact is that, in multicultural polities, the members of some cultural groups lack the social and political resources to fully realize their 'belonging to the polity'. In other words, the members of some cultural groups, despite their formal rights of citizenship, are not fully integrated into the political system. This means that, for them, actual political equality has not been successfully realized. This power asymmetry stems in part from economic and social factors, but it also depends on the cultural bias of liberal states. Communitarians, postmoderns and (some) liberals have rightly stressed the empirical impossibility for the liberal state to be neutral regarding cultural values. Even if, according to liberal philosophy, it *ought* not to be, the liberal state *is* a fundamental actor in the symbolic and cultural sphere. Through public policies, it can actively promote or modify cultural values and shared meanings. Therefore, a polity is not culturally neutral. To belong to a polity means to be confronted to a given set of cultural values embedded in political institutions (Parekh, 1992). However, the analytical distinction between 'belonging to a polity' and 'belonging together' is not so clear: 'belonging to a polity' entails a certain symbolic construction of a 'belonging together'. Such cultural overdetermination of 'belonging to a polity' leads to two problems for the members of cultural minorities: first, they can be confronted with cultural discrimination or marginalization due to the gap between their values and the polity's values; second, because of their discrimination, they do not have the political resources enabling them to modify this situation.

As we already mentioned, self-determination (through secession, namely the creation of an autonomous state) or political autonomy (for example, through a federalist state) are the forms of recognition claimed by national communities to preserve and secure their cultural identity. Such recognition would lead to the modification of the borders of citizenship and to the implementation of new public policies aiming at the protection of the community's cultural values. In this sense, following the conceptual categories discussed above, as a product of secession, self-determination consists in the realization of a 'differentialist' claim to recognition. In the case of secession, the result is not differentiated citizenship, but the creation of new citizenship rights, while in the case of federalism of partial autonomy, the result is a form of differentiated citizenship. This means that secession does not necessarily lead to better political equality. All depends on the way authorities will deal with the subcultures that are part of the new political entity. Federalism might be the easiest institutional way to settle multinational disputes, but the success of this solution depends on the real power that the different political entities have to secure their national culture. In other words, it is not possible, without the reference to a specific political and cultural context, to determine an institutional solution to national claims to self-determination that is by definition successful<sup>22</sup>. For example, theoretically

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<sup>22</sup> For instance, one think is to consider the case of the french speaking minority in Canada, another to think

speaking, it is also possible to conceive self-determination as the *ultima ratio* through which a cultural community can develop better forms of equality. Political autonomy would give cultural minorities the opportunity to establish forms of equality that could not be implemented in a situation characterized by the subordination of the cultural majority to the political will. Therefore, self-determination might be in this case a possible solution, but the standard of political equality will put some limits to the policies of cultural reproduction implemented by the new national authorities. This means that real political equality is the criteria on the basis of which oppressive and assimilationist policies that recreate the phenomena of discrimination that claims to self-determination wanted to avoid, might be assessed and criticized.

Solutions to conflict of recognition taken on the basis of a narrow conception of culture and aiming at the preservation of a shared national culture will inevitably lead to other form of conflicts of recognition with the internal minorities of the community that has become independent. To ground differentiated citizenship on anthropological or instrumental arguments concerning the ‘superiority’ of national culture will not allow to determine the adequate policies to settle conflicts between other kind of cultural minorities. There is an unavoidable tension in the very idea of liberal nationalism. An excessive emphasis on the protection of national cultures risks to overwhelm important liberal principles. In certain cases, the framework of differentiated citizenship can provide an answer to nationalist claims to recognition. But this only if it is the particular cultural situation of citizens that is politically recognized, and not the anthropological depth of cultures. Then, I believe that differentiated citizenship should be based on a broad understanding of the dynamics of creation of identity and creation of difference (Connolly, 1991) that characterize any polity. The evaluation of the claims to recognition should be inspired by political considerations, and not by cultural or instrumental arguments. I believe that the only way to fruitfully approach multicultural conflicts is to adopt a political perspective. This means to displace the discussion from the anthropological (and eternally controversial) questions “What is a culture ?” or “Which culture does deserve to be recognized ?” to the more political ones: “What are the effects of cultural membership on citizenship rights ?” and “Could a political recognition of the group improve the integration of their members into citizenship, providing the political resources that allow them to participate actively and successfully in the determination of common values ?”<sup>23</sup>. In this perspective, the fulfillment of citizenship rights, and not the intrinsic value of a given culture, should be taken as the standard to assess claims to recognition. Such an approach does allow the determination of the result of the recognition’s process, but can contribute to define a criteria on the basis of which liberal states can assess the validity of demands raised by the members of minority groups.

It would be misleading to conceive differentiated citizenship as a final solution to conflicts of recognition. Post-structuralist authors have emphasized the impossibility to find a final solution to conflicts of identity simply with political or legal decisions<sup>24</sup>.

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about the situation of Kurds, whose ‘nation’ is located on the territory of several states.

<sup>23</sup> See Gianni (1998).

<sup>24</sup> Honig argues that « to take difference [...] seriously in democratic theory is to affirm the inescapability

Even if I am not convinced about the validity of their normative conclusions<sup>25</sup>, I think that these scholars have made good arguments about conceiving politics as a never-ending conflicting process rather than a way to constantly pacify, through specific procedures, the ‘mess’ of society. This does not mean that politicians and theorists should not try to think about decisions and procedures that might regulate the worst effects of political and social disruption. What is at stake here, is the difference between differentiated citizenship as an institutional solution and differentiated citizenship as a social and political process. In my view, differentiated citizenship should not be considered only as a set of extra-rights, but also - and above all- as a process which., even if sometimes contradictory or unstable, aims to a progressive political and social integration of cultural groups into the polity. We should not conceive solutions to conflicts of recognition as institutional zero-sum game in which what is obtained by some actors (as for example rights) is necessarily lost by others. Taken as a process, through the recognition of political disadvantages due to cultural reasons, differentiated citizenship is a way to promote a dynamic that might allow the members of cultural group not only to benefit from new entitlements, but also to actively participate in the determination of new political and legal values that might challenge the causes of their marginalization<sup>26</sup>. National claims to self-determination should be assessed within this general framework. Considered in this way, they can be compatible with a version of liberalism that is based on the idea that the state is legitimate if it gives to individuals the best possible opportunities to be politically equal in the political community.

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of conflict and the ineradicability of resistance to the political and moral projects of ordering subjects, institutions and values » (1994: 567).

<sup>25</sup> Basically, it is strange to notice that, if we consider the works of Mouffe, Connolly and even Young, the normative solutions proposed are often very close to traditional liberal positions. In my view, it exists a gap between the epistemological assumptions of the post-structuralist model of citizenship or democracy and the normative conclusions that are suggested. For a more detailed discussion of this aspect, see Gianni (1999).

<sup>26</sup> I completely agree with Phillips that “when policies are worked out *for* rather than *with* a politically excluded constituency, they are unlikely to engage with all relevant concerns” (1995: 13). In the same perspective, for Young (1997 : 370) « ensuring the representation of multiple perspectives gives voice to distinctive experiences in the society and relativizes the dominant perspectives which are assumed as normal and neutral ».

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