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EMERGENCE OF URBAN REGIMES IN ZURICH AND BERN

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Introduction

In Switzerland, the issue of urban power has been overlooked for decades by political scientists. First of all, since urban areas do not fit into the three levels of the federalist scale (communal, cantonal and federal), they did not raise much interest in the sphere of political science until recently. As a consequence, they had to wait until the fourth edition of the *Handbook of Swiss Politics* to get a proper chapter in it (see Kübler, 2006).

Most previous works studying Swiss urban areas focus on their cross-borders characteristics and try to understand how public policies can be conceived and implemented in a fragmented institutional framework (Leresche, Joye, 1999; Sager, 2002; Kaufmann *et al.*, 2003 ; Kübler *et al.*, 2003; Kübler, *et al.*, 2005 ; Kübler, 2006 ; Kübler, Koch, 2008; Koch, 2013). In others words, the aforementioned studies focus primarily on the issues of policy coordination. However, they hardly explain who governs Swiss urban areas.

More specifically, although both interest groups and local authorities matter in Swiss politics, most scholars have underestimated the role of private actors in local politics[1]. Since the study of Bassand and Fragnière (1978) analysing the power structure of nine Swiss French-speaking cities and underlining the key role of small and medium-sized businesses (SMBs), the power structure of Swiss cities has been understudied by political scientists.

This article aims to fulfil these gaps and applies *urban regime theory* to the Swiss context. Developed by Elkin (1987) and Stone (1989), this theory focuses on the links between public and private actors and on the ways they can govern a city together. Stone defines an *urban regime* as "the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together to make and to carry out governing decisions" (1989:179). This definition entails four core elements: a) a governing coalition including public and private actors; b) a common agenda targeting the interests of this coalition; c) the capacity to mobilize resources to sustain

[1] Kübler, Wälti (2001) and Wälti, Kübler (2003) analyse the role of private organizations in the implementation of the Swiss drug policy. However, what they consider as private organizations are mostly "non-governmental organizations (NGOs) whose budget is covered by public agencies" (Kübler, Wälti, 2001:9 [Own translation]). In this article the terms "private actors" refer to profit-oriented actors more generally.

this agenda and finally d) a scheme of long-term cooperation leading to self-confidence among involved actors (Stone, 1989, 2005:329; Mossberger, 2009:49).

Following this definition, the emergence of urban regimes remains uncertain in the Swiss political context. On the one hand, the establishment of an urban regime should be eased by the narrow links existing between state and non-state actors ensuing from the neo-corporatist model (Katzenstein, 1985; Lijphart, 1999), and by the large political and fiscal autonomy of Swiss municipalities (Horber-Papazian, 2006, Schaltegger *et al.*, 2011). On the other hand, direct democracy can reduce informal cooperation, oppose private interest (Borner, 1997) and block important urban projects (Cattacin, 1994; Kübler, 2004). Moreover, citizens activate direct democracy even more frequently at the local level (Kriesi, 1998:112).

This article tackles the puzzle coming from these institutional cross-pressures. It argues that local governments have a greater room for manoeuvring and succeed in implementing more ambitious urban projects, if they cooperate with few private actors at the local level, than if they engage in negotiations with a multitude of public actors at the intercommunal or at the intercantonal levels. In other words, urban regimes represent an optimal solution for Swiss cities to overcome the institutional fragmentation they face.

The second main argument of this article concerns direct democracy. I argue that direct democracy does not constrain the scheme of cooperation and the mutual trust public and private develop together. Therefore, it does not constrain the emergence of urban regimes as such. However, I argue that direct democracy strongly affects the agenda of any governing coalition. As the veto-power of citizens is very high, the emergence of *development regimes* prioritizing urban and economic growth on all other aspects (see Stone, 1993) is unlikely in the Swiss context. Thus, *progressive regimes* (*Ibid.)* constitute the only viable solution for the governing coalition to avoid systematic opposition from citizens.

To support my hypotheses, I compare the cases of Zurich and Bern. I analyse major developments projects aiming to create new attractive neighbourhoods in previously industrial fields in the last ten to fifteen years. In both cities, I show that an urban regime emerge in the early 2000s. These urban regimes have various origins and schemes of cooperation but they share two common points: a) they both emerge as a solution to institutional fragmentation; b) they are both strongly influenced by direct democracy and consequently pursue a progressive agenda.

My analysis unfolds as follows: first, I summarize the key concepts of urban regime theory and present a typology of urban regimes elaborated by Stone (1993). Then, I detail institutional particularities of the Swiss context and specify my hypotheses related to their effect on the formation of urban regimes. Afterwards, I analyse the urban development of Zurich and Bern in the last decades, focusing mainly on two major projects. I test my hypotheses for each case. Finally, I conclude by comparing the two cases and discussing them vis-à-vis previous literature in the field.

Theoretical framework

Urban regime theory emerge s in the late 1980s from the *community power debate* opposing the elitist approach (see Hunter, 1953) and the pluralist approach (see Dahl, 1961). It offers a

tentative synthesis between those two theoretical frameworks. As the elitists, urban regime theory conceives power as concentrated in the hands of an elite influencing the whole society. However, resources are diffused across the society. Actors compete to control them in order to gain access to power. These pluralist elements force the actors to form a coalition to govern a city.

Urban regime theory relies on three assumptions. First, a single actor cannot govern a city alone because no one owns a monopoly of resources. Second, without a governing coalition including public and private actors, it is impossible to pursue urban renewal and social change in a city. Third, informal arrangements between public and private actors are more important than formal procedures. The "second-face of power" (Bachrach, Baratz, 1962) becomes the centre of attention. Therefore, a governing coalition relies on *preemptive power*, which is able to influence the decision-making process in the long-run by "a capacity to occupy, hold and make use of a strategic position" (Stone, 1988:83).

To form a governing coalition, public and private actors have to define a common agenda composed of major urban projects such as new neighbourhoods, new transport axes or the renewal of the centre-business district (CBD). To realize such projects, resources like money, law, expertise, land or public support, have to be exchanged between public and private actors[2]. Finally, mutual trust develops between governing partners and the coalition is able to implement long-term policies to develop the city. For instance, Clarence Stone (1989) observes the presence of all these characteristics in Atlanta in the second half of the 20th century. This city represents the ideal-type of what Stone (1993) calls a *development regime* in its typology.

Urban regime theory has had a significant theoretical impact on urban politics. Nearly half of the authors contributing to the *Oxford Handbook of Urban Politics* (Mossberger et al., 2012) refer to it, despite the variety of their concerns. Stoker notices that *urban regime theory* "has succeeded in establishing a new agenda for researchers" (1995:70). Mossberger describes it as "one of the most prevalent approaches to the study of urban politics" (2009:40), whereas Imbroscio (1998) and Davies (2002, 2003:253) simply recognize it as the dominant paradigm in the field.

The theory is then extended to European countries, mainly to UK and France, with contradictory findings. Some scholars argue that the frame of *urban regime theory* is too America-centred and that it does not apply to Europe because of the preeminent influence of the national state in local politics (Le Galès, 1995; Harding, 1997; Davies, 2003). Others scholars recognize its American ethnocentric assumptions but broaden the definition of an urban regime to consider also governing coalitions where the public sector represents an important provider of resources. As a result, they observe government-led coalitions in Paris, Glasgow (Kantor et al., 1997) or in Birmingham during Thatcherism (Di Gaetano, Klemanski, 1993) as well as party-led coalitions in Naples, Milan (Kantor et al., 1997) or London's borough of Wandsworth (Dowding et al. 1999).

[2] However, URT does not precise which resources have to be exchanged. Even Stone recognizes this weakness (2005:330).

This debate is still ongoing[3], and the concept of urban regime has been largely stretched and misunderstood (Mossberger, Stoker, 2001). Certain authors use the concept of urban regime to describe much diverging schemes of cooperation and consider that the emergence of an urban regime is very common to govern a city (Kantor, *et al*., 1997; Savitch, Kantor, 2002). For others, it remains a rare phenomenon occurring only under strict conditions (Dowding *et al.*, 1999). To contribute to this debate, this article applies urban regime theory to the Swiss context. Although Switzerland shares many institutional features with the US (*e.g.* a federalist weak state, a strong autonomy of territorial entities, weak political parties), urban regime theory has hardly been applied to the Swiss context prior to this study[4].

A typology of urban regimes

Stone's (1993) typology of urban regimes includes three main types, which are taken up and further developed by others authors (*e.g.* Di Gaetano, Klemanski, 1993; Stoker, Mossberger, 1994; Kantor, *et al.*, 1997; Dowding, *et al.*, 1999; Mossberger, Stoker, 2001; Savitch, Kantor, 2002). The main variations across regimes types relate to the intensity of relationships between public and private actors, as well as priorities defined in the common agenda.

Development regimes[5] denote narrow collaboration between the business sector and local public-officials and promote both urban and economic growth. Business elites provide money and expertise. Public officials provide legal power and public support as they legitimize coalition's goals by winning the elections. Together, they pursue an activist agenda having economic development and urban growth as key priorities. The ultimate goal of a development regime is to activate a virtuous socio-economic circle called the *growth-machine* (Logan, Molotch, 1987), which functions as follows: politicians zone new constructible areas; it raises the value of land and attracts new firms; these firms create new jobs, which in turn enlarge the demand for the products of local entrepreneurs; thus, local entrepreneurs invest once again in constructible areas and it continues.

To attract investors and keep constructible areas available, governing coalitions pursuing a development agenda do not hesitate to demolish old buildings or to move low-income neighbourhoods into new areas. Stone (1989) observes such phenomena through the history of Atlanta. As the control of voters is low in development regimes, this is not problematic.

On the contrary, *progressive regimes*[6] prioritize environmental protection, heritage preservation and quality of housing over economic development. Therefore, complete destruction of old neighbourhoods or important concreting of greenfield is not possible within a progressive regime. If such projects were undertaken, the governing coalition would fall apart and a new governing coalition would emerge. Progressive regimes also entail the ability by powerful middle-class citizens to block projects using institutional veto-points. This power of voters gives strong legitimacy to elected officials who are able to constrain private actors

[3] It was also one of the most discussed issue at the urban regimes session of the 12th National Congress of the French Political Association in July 2013 in Paris.
[4] A few exceptions are listed in an upcoming section.
[5] Also called *pro-growth regimes* (Di Gaetano, Klemanski, 1993).
[6] Stone (1993) even calls it *middle-class progressive regimes* to underline the importance of this social group.

wishing to implement a growth-machine agenda. However, the level of public-private cooperation is similar to the one found under development regimes, and governing coalitions are able to achieve urban renewal.

On the contrary, within *maintenance regimes*[7] or *non-regimes*, public-private cooperation is insufficient to realize major urban projects and to create new neighbourhoods in the city. In maintenance regimes the governing coalition only succeeds in providing routine services, and is oriented towards the perpetuation of status quo. Scholars point out non-regimes to explain failures of public policies (De Leon, 1992) or absence of adaptation during a crisis (Burns, Thomas, 2006) as a result of the insufficient cooperation between public and private actors. In a nutshell, maintenance regimes and non-regimes are not fully fulfilling the four core-characteristics of an urban regime mentioned earlier. Thus, this article concentrates on development and progressive regimes.

To recapitulate Stone's typology, Table 1 synthesizes goals, key actors and main resources being specific to each type of regime.

Table 1: *Types of regime in terms of goals, actors and resources.*

Regime type	Main goals	Key actors	Main resources
Development regime	- Urban and economic growth. - Urban development and renewal projects. - Transportation infrastructure development.	- Strong participation of the private sector. - Strong involvement of local decision-makers. - Passivity or weak mobilization of inhabitants.	- Private investments. - Autonomy of local authorities.
Progressive regime	- Environmental protection. - Urban heritage preservation. - Quality of life. - Growth control. - Housing development.	- Middle-class voters. - Urban social movements (gentrification). - Strong elected officials. - Relatively constrained private actors.	- Veto power of inhabitants. - Strong legitimacy of authorities. - Capacity to constrain and control the private sector.
Maintenance regime	- Provision of routine services. - Maintenance of status quo. - Avoidance of economic development issues.	-Traditional elites forgoing opportunities for themselves.	- Few resources needed. - Low tax levels.
Non-regime	- No particular goal.	- Issued-based-coalitions form slowly to solve occasional problems. - No specific actor has power in the long-run.	- Lack of continuity. - Not able to mobilize resources quickly.

Source: Adapted by the author from Stone, 1993; Di Gaetano, Klemanski, 1993; Stoker, Mossberger, 1994; Mossberger, Stoker, 2001 and Burns, Thomas, 2006.

[7] Also known as *caretaker regimes* (Di Gaetano, Klemanski, 1993; Kilburn, 2004).

Urban regime theory in the Swiss context

Urban regime theory has been hardly used in Switzerland[8]. Master and PhD students recently changed this trend since they used *urban regime theory* to analyse urban developments in Zürich (Crivelli, Dlabach, 2006; Devecchi, 2010, 2012), Lucerne (Lucio, Ulhmann, 2006) or Montreux (Sauthier, Clivaz, 2012). However, these studies do not mobilize a cross-case comparison, nor do they tackle the puzzle arising from the institutional cross-pressures that I detail below.

On the one hand, Switzerland is known as a corporatist country where private interests are strongly embedded in the political structure. Katzenstein defines Switzerland as the ideal type of liberal corporatism, with public-private negotiations having a large scope of bargaining (1985:129). Lijphart considers Switzerland to be "the pure example of consensus democracy" (1999:33) and rates it at the fourth place in his ranking of corporatists countries, including 36 democracies. Armingeon (1997) shows that corporatism in Switzerland is relatively stable and has not decreased over time. Last but not least, a recent study confirms that the Swiss political system is still highly integrated and characterized by a strong interpenetration between state and non-state actors (Sciarini, 2013:16). This corporatist structure should ease the formation of urban regimes.

Moreover, Swiss communes have large competences in international comparison, and the federal Constitution guarantees their autonomy (art. 50). With regard to town and country planning, cantonal laws define many construction norms but communes still play the leading part for the implementation of projects over their own territory[9]. With regard to fiscal policy, communes can set the effective tax burden on incomes by applying a multiplier to the progressiveness of the tax schedule set at the cantonal level (Schaltegger *et al.* 2011:455-56)[10]. Finally, some scholars show that communes intervene in many ways in public policies at the regional, the cantonal or the federal level (Horber-Papazian, 2004; 2006, 245ff).

These extensive competences of communes associated with the smallness of the federal administration (Varone, 2006) avoid the issue of local authorities having no insights to look for cooperation with the business sector, since national states provide them with sufficient resources (Le Galès, 1995; Harding, 1997; Davies, 2003). Such competences should rather ease the emergence of urban regimes.

On the other hand, direct democracy is certainly the most specific and most important Swiss institutional feature. It profoundly transformed the whole political system (Kriesi, 1998:90; Linder, 1994:145ff; 2005:242ff; Vatter, Lutz, 2006:118ff). At the national level, Switzerland has cast more ballots than the sum of all other countries in the world (Gallagher, Uleri, 1996). This indirectly lengthens the legislative process (Sciarini, 2006:501) since the threat of a referendum acts as a "Damocles sword" and forces the elites to achieve a consensus

[8] Kühne (1997) being here a noteworthy exception.

[9] Except in Geneva and Basle, where planning competences are centralized at the cantonal level since they are small cantons constructed around a single city.

[10] Moreover, Schaltegger, Somogyi and Sturm (2011) prove that fiscal competition and Tiebout's (1956) model of "voting with its feet" also work between Swiss communes and not only between cantons.

(Neidhart, 1970), especially in urban and metropolitan policy making (Papadopoulos, 1998:146).

Offering citizens a crucial veto-point, direct democracy embodies a danger for private interests. Using it, citizens often reject promising development projects at an advanced stage of planning (Cattacin, 1994; Bassand *et al.*, 2001; Kübler, 2004). More generally, direct democracy shrinks public-private cooperation (Borner, 1997) and is activated more frequently at the local level (Kriesi, 1998: 112). Thus, direct democracy has significantly influenced the urbanization process (Hitz et al., 1995). All in all, there are serious reasons to argue that direct democracy should prevent, at least partly, the emergence of urban regimes.

Another interesting feature relates to Switzerland's high degree of institutional fragmentation (Kübler, *et al.*, 2003:266). Nowadays, Switzerland contains 2'352 communes (FOS, 2014). Although this number has been decreasing over the last decades due to fusion of communes, Switzerland still has a high number of communes in comparison to other OECD countries and there is no correlation between the size of a Swiss commune and its population (Horber-Papazian, 2006:235). Urban areas are constructed over several cantons and dozens of communes, sometimes more than one hundred (Kübler, 2006:263). Thus, functional spaces of Swiss urban areas highly diverge with their institutional boundaries. It creates important spill-over effects. In the same vein, some authors argue: "Metropolitan areas are the lost dimension in Swiss federalism" (Linder, 1994:77, Kübler *et al.*, 2005:173).

In addition to this institutional fragmentation, cities are not formally represented at the national level, and their specific interests are rarely taken into account in federal policies (Schenkel *et al.*, 1992; Sager, 2002:23-24). To counter this trend, a tripartite conference including the Conference of Cantonal Governments (CCG) the Union of Swiss Cities (USC), the Association of Swiss Communes (ASC) and federal high-civil servants was founded in 2001. The tripartite conference generated a new federal policy for agglomerations that was confirmed in 2006. However, communes perceive the policy either as a symbolic measure, and it has not solved the issue of institutional fragmentation (Horber-Papazian, 2006:247). The exodus of city-centres inhabitants into suburban communes (Kaufmann, *et al.*: 2003:12) and the globalization-process (Kübler, *et al.*, 2003) rather contribute to an increase in institutional fragmentation and a need for intergovernmental collaboration in urban areas.

Research hypotheses

My first hypothesis connects urban regime theory to the literature focusing on the institutional fragmentation facing Swiss cities and metropolitan areas. I argue that cooperation with private actors represents a more suitable and pragmatic solution for local governments to realize major urban projects than intergovernmental-cooperation at various level of the federalist scale.

H1: Local governments form urban regimes to overcome the institutional fragmentation they face.

My second hypothesis pertains to direct democracy. Although direct democratic institutions have significant effects on urban development and public-private cooperation, I postulate that the emergence of urban regimes is still possible in the Swiss context (see H1). However, according to Stone's (1993) typology, a development regime emerges only if the power of voters is low. If their influence is high, the governing coalition should implement a more incremental urban development and prioritize environmental and heritage preservation on economic development. As popular ballots have strongly influenced urban development in Swiss history (Cattacin, 1994; Hitz *et al.* 1995; Bassand *et al.*, 2001; Kübler, 2004) my second hypothesis argues:

H2: The emergence of developments regimes is impossible in the Swiss context because of direct-democracy giving strong veto-power to citizens.

As a consequence, I postulate that the progressive regime is the most accomplished form of public-private cooperation occurring in the Swiss context.

To test these hypotheses, I analyse urban development in Zurich and Bern in the last two decades. I chose these two cities following three criteria. First, they constitute the centre of the two most populated Swiss agglomerations that are non-located in cross-border regions (see Koch, 2013:405-06). Second, they reacted to the issue of institutional fragmentation in different ways: Zurich centralized many competences at the cantonal level, whereas Bern put the emphasis on inter-communal cooperation (Kübler, Koch, 2008). Third, direct democracy has stronger impacts in Bern than in Zurich as institutional rules differ.

In each city, I selected one major development project, namely *Europaallee* in Zurich and *Wankdorf-City* in Bern. I applied causal-process-tracing (CPT) to reconstruct the causal-link between each step of these projects over the last 20 years (see Blatter, Blume, 2008; Blatter, Haverland, 2012). To collect information, I relied on project websites, press articles and official documents such as project conventions, vote-information brochures, legislature programs, and annual reports. I complemented these primary sources with literature focusing on the same project at different stages[11]. Last but not least, I conducted 22 semi-structured interviews with key actors involved in the projects between April 2013 and January 2014. The names of the interviewees appear in the appendix.

Zurich

The largest Swiss city and metropolitan area has always been of particular interest for urban planners. Zurich is often acknowledged and lauded for its dynamism (Eisinger, *et al.*, 2007), and most previous studies applying *urban regime theory* to the Swiss context focus on this city (Kühne, 1997; Crivelli, Dlabach, 2006; Devecchi, 2010; 2012). However, Zurich's development has been characterized by conflicts with inhabitants of alternative neighbourhoods who repeatedly manifested their opposition against the size of certain projects (Hitz, *et al.*, 1995; Kühne, 1997:19ff; Schmid, 2006). These conflicts led to a territorial compromise. To preserve the city-centre without altering economic activity,

[11] Mainly Wolff (2012) for *Europaallee* or Sager (2002) and Gerber (2008) for *Wankdorf-City*.

necessary infrastructures were built in the periphery (Hitz *et al.*, 1995; Schmid, 2006:162). The anarchic planning of the *Glattvalley*, known as Europe's most expensive lawn (Hitz, *et al.*, 1995:261), or the inconsistency of the planning in new Oerlikon (*Ibid.*: 156ss; Devecchi, 2010:43) reflects this territorial compromise.

A first notorious example of the veto-power of citizens is the popular rejection of Zurich's subway in 1973. Cantonal authorities planned the subway as the main axe of a transport network constructed around Zurich's city-centre and perceived it as a crucial step to become a global city. However, city-voters refused it. They feared a rapid gentrification and a dense urbanisation of centre-neighbourhoods (Kübler, Koch, 2008: 115). The subway example also illustrates a broader conflict between communal and cantonal authorities, especially regarding transport policy (Kühne, 1997: 10ff). Over the course of several decades, the city of Zurich has not received adequate financial compensation for the centrality costs it has had to assume, despite it decreasing population (Hitz *et al.*, 1995:222; Kühne, 1997:47ff). A solution emerged finally in the 1990s with the creation of the ZVV (Zürcher Verkehsverband). The ZVV is led by the canton and includes all municipalities of the agglomeration (Kübler, Koch, 2008; Koch, 2013). Others financial burdens for the city, such as the opera, have also been transferred to the cantonal level, but the city of Zurich remains the key player regarding urban development, especially for the creation of new neighbourhoods.

A second notorious example of public opposition towards urban development concerns the development of Zurich's main station and its surroundings, whose planning "[…] has been one of the most contested issue in Switzerland's economic capital" (Wolff, 2012:94). Many projects have been developed from the 1960s onwards. Some idealistic ones foresaw skyscrapers in the middle of the lake (Schilling, 1982: 19). Others planned a platform over the railways to construct huge buildings including housing and offices. I focus on this second example to show that the emergence of an urban regime at the turn of the millennium provided a successful solution to an issue contested for more than 40 years.

HB-Südwest - Eurogate

The first project to renew Zurich's main station was conceived in 1969, when the municipality, the canton, the Swiss Federal Railways (SBB) and the Federal Post organized an international architectural competition. This first project was abandoned after the rejection of the subway in 1973. The architects Bersin-Schilling-Baenziger won the second international competition in 1978. Their project called *HB-Südwest* met resistance from local citizens who collected the necessary signatures for a communal initiative submitted to the people in September 1985. As the initiative was clearly rejected (70% of no votes), the investors, mainly the SBB looking for more rentable surfaces, saw an opportunity to enlarge their initial project and chose to submit a new building authorization. This was a major strategic mistake since the revised project led to a new vote three years later (Wolff, 2012:98). Although the project was accepted, the very low majority (50.7%) led to discussion among the investors who disagreed on the next stages of planning. After the economic downturn at the beginning of the 1990s, many investors left the project but Ralph Baenziger refused to surrender. He

developed an alternative project named *Eurogate.* In 1997, Eurogate received a conditional building authorization. However, the number of parking lots had to be reduced by two (643 parking lots instead of 1'250). Investors, including this time UBS as a leader, appealed against this decision to the cantonal government who split the difference and allowed 891 parking lots. This decision opened a juridical battle involving the city of Zurich and the VCS (Verkehrsclub Schweiz). Finally, UBS announced the withdrawal of the project in April 2001 in a "dramatic showdown" (Wolff, 2012:104), accusing the VCS and the SBB of lack of flexibility. All in all, 80 million CHF have been invested in a unfruitful planning (*Ibid.*:105).

« Eurogate war architektonisch nicht gut. Es war plump, veraltet, zu gross und wirtschaftlich unrentabel. Ich war froh wenn Eurogate gescheitert ist, weil es sehr unangenehm ist an etwas zu arbeiten, mit dem es keine grosse Chance gibt. »

Franz Eberhard, director of the office for urban development[12] between 1997 and 2009.

The story of Eurogate reflects the absence of an urban regime in many ways. First, public-private cooperation was notably absent. Planning was organized by diverse groups of investors including the SBB, major construction entrepreneurs such as Steiner AG or Göhner Merkur AG, and asset-managers bankers such as UBS. The city of Zurich was only consulted to obtain building authorizations. Local authorities entered the planning process at a very late stage, namely in 1998 after the election of Elmar Ledergerber. The new mayor wished to save the project to contrast with the view of its predecessor Ursula Koch who was highly skeptical about further urban development. Ledergerber advanced a new project in order to respect VCS demands regarding parking lots, but did not succeed in implementing a real dynamic of cooperation with the investors.

Second, a common vision of the project never emerged among the diverse groups of investors. The platform represented a huge financial risk, as the whole complex had to be built at the same time, and investors disagreed with the profitability of the project. Therefore, the composition of the group of investors often changed, following the economic conjuncture.

Third, the project was perceived as too gigantic by citizens, and there was no political consensus to support it. In the 1980s, a referendum and a popular initiative put the project into question. In the 1990s, the repeated resorts of the VCS activating the juridical right for environmental associations, led the project to its death. This sequence of events shows that institutional veto-points played a major role in the failure of Eurogate.

The role of the canton was not insignificant. At the early stages of planning, the cantonal government was involved in the jury of international architectural competitions. Its role became decisive in the final downturn when the cantonal government believed that it had enabled a compromise by allowing 891 parking lots. On the contrary, this decision led to a juridical battle with the VCS.

[12] Author's translation for *Amt für Städtebau.* Note that the city of Zurich also has an *Amt für Stadtentwicklung* whose task relates to city planning as a whole. Therefore, I translate it "office for city planning".

Finally, the SBB were still a fully public actor and the Federal Office of Transport (FOT) determined its real estate policy. As a consequence, SBB's intentions were often opaque and contradictory (Wolff, 2012:104). For a long time, the SBB associated Eurogate with the railway line solving the bottleneck of Zurich's main station called *Durchmesserlinie*. They imagined that the first project could bring long-term cash-flow to finance the second one. On the contrary, at the end of the 1990s, the SBB clearly prioritized the *Durchmesserlinie* and saw Eurogate as an obstacle to its realization, since the two projects were in conflict in terms of investments and timing of construction.

Europaallee

Despite the dramatic downturn of Eurogate, a new project started only two years later. Two major changes on the side of the SBB explain such rapidity. First, the SBB were liberalized in 1999. Although the Swiss Confederation remains its only shareholder, this change brought a new philosophy to the transport firm. To separate profit-oriented and non-profit-oriented activities, the SBB created a new real estate division in 2003 resulting from the split of their infrastructure division. The main task of the new division is to generate profit from the various stations and buildings located at the city-centre of Swiss cities. The creation of this real estate division is also a way to overcome pension funds deficits of the SBB. Therefore, the real estate division has to allocate 40% of its annual profit to pension funds.

« Nach dem Scheitern von Eurogate haben wir drei Erfolgsfaktoren für eine neue Planung identifiziert. Erstens machen wir nichts gegen den Wille der Stadt und suchen den Konsens über eine gemeinsame Strategie. Zweitens müssen wir selber aktiver sein und drittens verzichten wir über die Geleise zu bauen, weil wir nicht alles auf einmal bauen können. »

Andreas Steiger, SBB project manager of Europaallee since 2003.

The SBB real estate division was still convinced by the very high profitability of building next to Zurich's main station. The SBB wished to start a new project as soon as possible. Municipal politicians faced a similar time pressure as the Eurogate fiasco was hardly sustainable. Moreover, the local authorities had a vested interest in achieving a city enlargement in the core-business district after the development of various peripheral districts. Together, the SBB and the municipal office for urban development started a cooperative planning similar to the one of *Züri-West*[13]. They invited three architect teams to collect ideas about the architectural quality of buildings and public places. At the end of the test planning, the architect Kees Christiaanse was selected to elaborate a master plan for the new neighbourhood next to the railways. The platform over the station was abandoned. This choice brought two main advantages. First, the high financial risk linked to the platform disappeared. Second, planning could be separated in different stages extending until 2020 and did not contradict the construction of the *Durchmesserlinie*.

The master plan was accepted unanimously by the municipal Parliament in January 2006. However, left parties obtained a doubling of the proportion of housing in the entire area from

[13] For details about this project, see Güller, Schenkel, 2002 or Crivelli, Dlabach, 2006

20% to 40%. This modification created a broad political consensus which was absent in the case of Eurogate.

« Das Hauptargument war 40% Wohnanteil. Dieser 40% Wohnanteil hat vor allem die Linken und Grünen einigt gebracht. Und der rechten politischen Seite war froh, dass eine Erweiterung des Projekts kommt. »

Elmar Ledergerber, Zurich mayor between 2002 and 2008.

Despite this consensus, the extreme left party and inhabitants of the neighbouring 4th district collected signatures to force a referendum. Opponents criticized the high percentage of offices as well as the attitude of the SBB generating high benefits on land parcels obtained for trivial prices at the end of the 19th century. Ralph Baenziger joined them and they paraded in the streets with wooden donkeys representing the SBB. On the other side, the governing coalition argued that the project would create a new lively neighbourhood at the core of the city. The announced arrival of the cantonal high school for education supported the coalition's arguments. The SBB and the municipality also used the voting campaign to show their unity and to magnify the cooperative planning process (Stadtrat Zurich, 2006:9). Finally, voters accepted the masterplan by 65.5% on 24th September 2006.

« Das ist klassische Widerstand vom Kreis 4, aber man hat nie damit gerechnet, dass das Referendum erfolgreich sein könnte. Die Stimmung war eigentlich positiv. »

Brigit Wehrli, director of the office for city planning between 1997 and 2012

Figure 1 : *Location of Europaallee and Zollstrasse.*

Source: Europaallee website- www.europaallee.ch [Author's modifications].

The master plan represents a perimeter of 7.8 hectares. It foresees 6'000 new workplaces, 300 apartments and 100'000 m^2 of commercial surfaces. The SBB assume all construction costs investing a total amount of 1.5 billion CHF. The city has only been involved in funding the

planning and will assume the upkeep costs of public places, as soon as construction work is finished. The other side of the coin is that the city of Zurich did not profit financially from Europaallee. On the contrary, the SBB received an estimated amount of 320 million CHF only with the master plan allowing a higher exploitation surface rate (*Tages-Anzeiger,* 18.11.2013).

After the vote on the master plan, Ralph Baenziger and a small group of remaining opponents appealed to the cantonal administrative court. Their resort was rejected in October 2007. Afterwards, architectural competitions and building authorizations followed one another. Construction work started in 2009 and first buildings including the cantonal high school for education, a commercial centre and offices for Credit Suisse and UBS were inaugurated in September 2012. In parallel the cooperation between the SBB and the city government continued on similar projects in Zurich-Alstetten where new housing was inaugurated in 2013, or on the other side of the main station, where the project *Zollstrasse* is currently waiting for the approval of the municipal Parliament.

« Die SBB haben viele Grundstücke neben die Geleise, auch Zollstrasse und das geht bis Altstetten. Deshalb ist es sehr wichtig was die SBB machen und es war aus diesem Zeitpunkt [2003] *ganz entscheiden diese Kooperation zu schaffen. Wir haben ein Vertrauen gefunden. Wir waren wieder Freunde. »*

Kathrin Martelli, member of the municipal government between 1994 and 2010.

Test of hypotheses on the case of Zurich

The story of Europaallee clearly reflects the emergence of an urban regime in Zurich with a governing coalition involving the SBB real estate and the municipality of Zurich. After the failure of Eurogate, the emerging coalition was able to define a common project through the cooperative planning process and agreed on a planning calendar. This corresponds to Stone's agenda. Two important factors explain this success. First, the SBB had clear development goals and the new real estate division benefited from greater autonomy towards the rest of the transport firm. Second, the municipality of Zurich was the only public actor remaining. The cantonal government was excluded from the planning process and only played a minor role with the decision to implement the high school for education in the new neighbourhood. Since the SBB had been liberalized, the Federal Office of Transport was totally absent. The diachronic comparison shows that the city of Zurich and the SBB formed an urban regime as a reaction to the fragmented framework of Eurogate. This narrow coalition successfully carried through the new project Europaallee. This is in line with my first hypothesis.

With regard to direct democracy, the project had to face the obstacle of a popular ballot, but this ballot turned out to be rather a plebiscite for the project. The governing coalition used the voting campaign to show its unity and legitimize its development goals. As the general public perceived Eurogate or the subway project as far too ambitious, the emerging coalition put a special emphasis on the quality of architecture in the case of Europaallee and the referendum did not prevent the success of the project. Thus, direct democracy does not prevent the emergence of urban regimes as such.

However, referendums put Eurogate seriously into question. Applying counterfactual reasoning, I argue that this would have been the case as well with Europaallee, had the project not been reduced and reoriented towards more public uses. All in all, the diachronic comparison clearly reflects the emergence of a progressive agenda and confirms my second hypothesis. Let me now turn to the case of Bern.

Bern

The Swiss capital is the centre of the fourth most populated agglomeration (FOS, 2010) and the fifth most populated commune (FOS, 2011) of the country. Among the major Swiss cities, Bern is the only one with more workers than inhabitants (Gemeinderat Bern, 2009:8) and the 21%-ratio between the two numbers is impressive. Such a particularity might be attractive for the economy. Nevertheless, Bern is often singled out for its lack of dynamism and ambition, mostly in comparison to Zurich (NZZ, 26.03.2012).

This disparity is partly due to more developed direct democratic institutions. In the city of Bern, citizens have to approve the budget and tax rates every year. The same voting procedure holds when a government's decision generates public expenditure exceeding 7 million CHF or modifies either the construction law or land policy regulations (Gemeindeordnung Bern, art. 36). Moreover, public expenditure exceeding 2 million CHF is submitted to optional referendum (*Ibid.*, art. 37). In comparison, a referendum is mandatory in the city of Zurich only if a public expenditure exceeds 20 million CHF (Gemeindeordnung Zurich, art. 10) and there is no systematic popular vote on the budget.

Such a low threshold of direct democratic institutions explains historically that local authorities have frequently postponed important development projects. A first famous example relates to the tram Bern West, which regularly featured on the political agenda throughout the 20th century, but was always abandoned, since politicians considered it too costly (Sager, 2008:175). The tram was finally accepted in 2007 with a mixed funding by the Confederation, the canton and the city of Bern. A second example of political timidity concerns the regional railway stations of Bern-Ausserholigen and Bern-Wankdorf. In 1989, the canton defined both neighbourhoods as urban development poles (UDP)[14]. However, authorities realized only the Ausserholigen station in the early 1990s (Sager, 2002:130). The Wankdorf neighbourhood had to wait until December 2004 to get its own station.

A few citizen decisions directly influenced Bern's development. One of the major backlash against municipal authorities relates to the reject of the *H-Lösung* in September 1970. After a decade where automobiles were perceived as the modern mode of transport and highly structured urban planning (Hehl, 1998), this vote marked a turning point in the transport policy of the city. As a 54% majority of citizens showed that the preservation of the old town was more important than the fluidity of automobile traffic at the city-centre, a new transport policy emerged. It concentrated automobiles on major road axes, redeveloped public transport, and planed residential streets following the Dutch model (Steiner, 1998).

[14] Auhtor's translation of the terms *Entwicklungsschwerpunkt (ESP)* in German or *Pôle de développement économique (PDE)* in French.

However, popular votes generally confirmed the decisions of local authorities. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, voters accepted four credits representing a total amount of 70 million CHF to buy new fields and pursue an active land policy against speculation (Arnet, 1998:129). In 1984, 72% of the population approved the creation of a fund for land and housing policies[15] giving more room of manoeuvre to the local government (*Ibid.*: 132). In the 1990s, plebiscites came out of the ballot box for the planning of two major city extensions, namely Brünnen in 1991 and Wankdorf in 1997. Finally, the only veto of citizens in the last decade concerned the creation of a new neighbourhood in *Viererfeld*, an agrarian field of 190'000 m^2 located in the North-West. After a negative vote in May 2004, a new project is currently underway.

The development of the Wankdorf required many others ballots, and is precisely the major project I focus on in this article. With this example, I show that the main issue facing local authorities was not a lack of popular support but rather a high degree of institutional fragmentation as the planning process involved many public entities. To overcome this issue, local authorities formed an urban regime at a second stage of planning.

From Wankdorf UDP to Wankdorf-City

In the late 1980s, the canton of Bern noticed that many areas that were well-connected to public transport did not concentrate a sufficient amount of jobs. As a reaction to this issue, the canton created the Urban Development Pole (UDP) program. (Sager, 2002:128). To stimulate economic development in UDPs, the canton mainly finances transport infrastructure and coordinates the planning process (Gerber, 2008:18). The city of Bern has three different UDPs. Figure 2 shows their location and situates other development projects mentioned in this article.

The Wankdorf is the largest cantonal UDP. It lies mainly over the territory of the city of Bern but also includes two small suburban cities: Ittigen and Ostermundigen. The UDP perimeter houses the football stadium, the ice hockey arena, and the Bern Expo, where several internationally renowned exhibitions take place. Two green spaces called *Allmende*, and two military barracks complete the picture. Major landowners in the UDP-Wankdorf include the Swiss Confederation, the canton and the city of Bern, the Bern bourgeoisie[16] and the SBB (see figure 3 in the appendix).

All these public actors[17] were included in the general planning initiated by the canton in the early 1990s. They produced an initial agreement in December 1996. However, although the UDP-planning was conceived as a coordination procedure (Sager, 2002:129), this first general plan was the result of a top-down procedure with the canton in the driver's seat. The plan lacked flexibility for implementation and stipulated that all surfaces would remain artisanal zones with a low exploitation rate (Gerber, 2008:12 and 41). Moreover, this common

[15] Author's translation for *Fonds für Boden- und Wohnbaupolitik.*

[16] In canton Bern, bourgeoisies are recognized by the cantonal constitution as public entities (art. 107) and contribute to social and cultural prosperity. In the city of Bern the bourgeoisie is particularly relevant since it owns about one third of land property over the communal territory (Arnet, 1998:125).

[17] At that time, the SBB were still fully public.

planning did not prevent conflicts. An obvious example of this outcome can be seen in the disagreement between the communes of Bern and Ostermundigen on the *Schermenweg*, a street going from one commune to the other.

Figure 2 : *Location of UDPs and other important development projects in the city of Bern.*



Source: http://map.geo.admin.ch Swisstopo data. [Author's modifications].

The *Schermenweg* is a secondary street parallel to the highway, coming from *Wankdorf-Platz* and leading to a residential neighbourhood. To protect this neighbourhood, the city of Bern decided to enforce one-way traffic on the *Schermenweg*. This decision ran counter Ostermundigen interests since it cancelled many parking lots. Although discussions took place between the two communes in the context of the general planning, a cantonal authority had to settle the disagreement in August 1999 (Sager, 2002:191-92). This anecdote also illustrates the leading role of the canton in the planning of the Wankdorf during the 1990s.

Two main factors changed the situation in the early 2000s. First, preparing for the arrival of the new regional train station, the city and the canton of Bern zoned parcels of land in new service areas, allowing higher exploitation rates. Second, cantonal authorities introduced a new policy instrument to regulate traffic flows (*Fahrleistungsmodell* in German). This instrument fixes a contingent of daily flows to each constructible area. If a future construction generates traffic flows exceeding the contingent, the building authorization is blocked until the landowner proposes adequate compensatory measures.

Traffic flows contingents created competition between landowners. This was especially the case for the UDP-Wankdorf, since the new football stadium inaugurated in 2004 already consumed a majority of the traffic contingent (Gerber, 2008:29).

« Jeder Grundeigentümer will natürlich als erstes bauen können, weil er Angst hat, keine Fahrten mehr zu haben, wenn er zu spät baut ».

Daniel Conca, high-ranking civil servant at the real estate office of the city of Bern.

At this point, the city of Bern became much more proactive in the planning process in order to keep the advantage of being the first to build next to the new railway station. The local government prioritized the zoning of areas where it also owned parcels of land (Gerber, 2008: 44). Its strategy consisted of starting the planning on its own to gain time and then securing lease contracts with private investors for further development. To concretize its strategy, the local government reimbursed the bourgeoisie having an acquisition right on one of the parcel[18]. As a result, the municipality became the only landowner of the whole area. Then local authorities elaborated a master plan to specify construction norms and street architecture, and started looking for potential investors.

In the meantime, the SBB sought a potential headquarter location for their new real estate division and wished to concentrate many activities on a single place. Losinger-Marazzi, an important Swiss sole contractor, had left Bern, after failing to find an appropriate building for its headquarters. After long negotiations, land lease contracts were concluded with the two firms in November 2007.

« Wir haben auch bei allen Wohnüberbauungen [so geplant]. Wir stellen das Land zur Verfügung im Baurecht, aber wir selber gehen nicht ins Risiko mit Investitionen wo wir dann auch die Mieter suchen müssen, die Nutzung suchen müssen. […] Wir bereiten alles vor mit Zonenplan und Überbauungsordnung aber dann führen wir es im Baurecht an Investoren, weil wir selber kein Investor sind ».

Barbara Hayoz, member of the local government between 2005 and 2012.

However, land lease contracts relate only to future buildings and not to outdoor areas, which remain the full property of the city of Bern. Indeed, instead of leaving the investors to finance the connection to the distribution networks (water, electricity, gas) as it is normally the case in such planning procedures, the city financed all connections itself. Thank to that, the leasing interest paid by Losinger and the SBB is significantly higher than it would have been if they had financed these infrastructures themselves.

Another reason for the city to finance outdoor infrastructures was to remain a key player in the planning process and to participate actively in the various architectural competitions financed by the SBB and Losinger-Marazzi.

In the summer of 2014, the SBB, Losinger-Marazzi and the Swiss Post[19] will inaugurate their new headquarters in Wankdorf-City. The new neighbourhood houses a total amount of 3'000

[18] The Bern bourgeoisie sold the Wankdorf-City area to the city of Bern at the beginning of the 20th century to construct a slaughterhouse. The selling contract allowed no other use of the parcel. To reimburse the bourgeoisie, the local authorities accepted that the bourgeoisie did not finance road infrastructures at the price foreseen in the UDP general planning (see Gerber, 2008:40).

[19] The Swiss Post rents one of the two buildings built by Losinger-Marazzi.

jobs. Afterwards, Losinger and the SBB are both going to sell their leasing contracts and rent their offices, since it is not profitable for them to pay the leasing interest during decades.

Further planning of Wankdorf-City is currently ongoing. In this second phase, the city of Bern kept its active role. For instance, it paid 3 million CHF to invalidate the lease contract of an industrial entrepreneur running until 2015, only to destroy the building rapidly and avoid planning delays. A second master plan was presented last year. It foresees further buildings for the SBB, a hotel and small apartments for singles or couples without children. The city is currently seeking new investors to sign other land lease contracts.

Test of hypotheses on the case of Bern

The story of Wankdorf-City clearly illustrates the emergence of an urban regime with a governing coalition including local authorities, the SBB, and Losinger-Marazzi. This urban regime emerged as a way to rapidly develop a new neighbourhood and safeguard jobs in a period of time when many firms considered Bern as unattractive. This was especially true for the Swiss Post and the SBB. Having left the federal administration, they did not have to stay in the Swiss capital anymore. Wankdorf-City allowed local authorities to keep them in Bern even as private actors.

The cooperation with the SBB real estate continues for the second phase of Wankdorf-City. With regard to Losinger-Marazzi, local authorities have recently assigned the whole planning of the *Gaswerkareal*, an industrial brownfield in the South of the city, to the construction firm.

In the 1990s, the planning of the UDP-Wankdorf took place in a fragmented institutional framework, as different public actors had to cooperate. These public actors pursued diverging interests, as the story of the *Schermenweg* illustrates. To solve these issues and under the pressure of the new cantonal traffic flows regulation, the city of Bern engaged in negotiations with the SBB and Losinger-Marazzi. Therefore, urban regimes can represent a solution to institutional fragmentation. This confirms my first hypothesis.

Time and again, popular ballots largely confirmed the development strategy of the city. The zoning of Wankdorf-City into a service area was accepted by 86% of the population in February 2003. Two popular plebiscites related to land lease contracts and infrastructure credits followed in November 2003 (90.6%) and September 2005 (87.6%). Finally, although outdoor infrastructures were more expensive than initially planned, 70.2% of the population legitimated the government's strategy to pursue long-term profitability and granted a second credit of 25.64 million CHF in September 2010

According to members of the local government, these successes are explained mainly by the lack of popular attachment linked to the Wankdorf-City area, since it was a slaughterhouse for decades. The small amount of residents living next to the future quartier is certainly also a relevant success-factor. However, *Viererfeld* remains the last popular failure on planning issues for local authorities. This reveals that the control of voters mainly exerts an indirect pressure in the city of Bern.

« *Ich bin seit 35 Jahren in der Politik. […] Ich glaube, dass ich in der Zwischenzeit etwas kenne, wo die Bürgerinnen und Bürger noch mitmachen und wo sie einfach nicht mehr mitmachen. So einigermassen kann man sagen wo die Grenzen liegen* ».

Alexander Tschäppät, Bern's mayor since 2005.

In the case of Wankdorf-City, this indirect pressure prompted the local government to have a high-level of control on the planning process. Before searching for potential investors, local authorities elaborated a master plan to specify construction and architectural norms. Therefore, they constrained private actors arriving at an advanced stage of planning with a precise legal framework. Moreover, to keep control after the signature of land lease contracts, they financed outdoor infrastructures themselves to ensure the quality of public uses in the future neighbourhood. These elements are in line with my second hypothesis, as they reflect the emergence of a progressive regime induced by the indirect effect of direct democracy.

Conclusion

This article studied the urban power structure of the cities of Zurich and Bern. Its goal was to elucidate the institutional puzzle regarding the emergence of urban regimes in the Swiss context. Having retraced the planning of two major development projects in the last 20 years, this article suggests that urban regimes emerge as a solution to institutional fragmentation. In other words, public-private cooperation at the local level seems more appropriate for developing new neighbourhoods in a city than broad intergovernmental cooperation. Thus, the mechanism of non-state actors bringing innovative solutions to a deadlocked situation on drug policy observed by Kübler and Wälti (2001, 2003[20]), seems also applicable to urban development.

This article also shows that direct democracy does not prevent the emergence of urban regimes. However, this veto-point strongly influences the agenda pursued by the governing coalition, and development regimes seem highly unlikely in the Swiss context. On the contrary, the cases of Europaallee and Wankdorf-City reflect progressive agendas putting important emphasis on public uses and environmental standards. This result contradicts previous studies observing development regimes in Zurich (Crivelli, Dlabach, 2006; Devecchi, 2010).

A major difference between the two urban regimes observed in this article relates to the actor having the leading role in the governing coalition. In Zurich, the SBB are the leader. They successfully adapted the legal basis to their needs, since the master plan allowed higher exploitation rates and higher buildings. In Bern on the contrary, the municipality led the planning as it elaborated the master plan on its own before integrating private actors. This major difference can be easily explained by land possession. In both cases, the landowner initiates the cooperation.

Another difference relates to the effect of direct democratic institutions. As their threshold is lower in the city of Bern, local authorities further internalize potential resistances. In the

[20] For this publication Sonja Wälti is mentioned as the first author.

history of Bern, authorities undergo less public backlashes regarding urban development than in the history of Zurich. This suggests that Neidhart's hypothesis also applies to urban development. However, this reasoning requires quantitative analysis of further cases in order to be confirmed.

All in all, this article suggests that the role of private actors at the local level should be considered more seriously. Private actors are essential to achieving urban renewal, particularly in times of crisis, when public authorities lack financial resources. They also play a key role in a small country like Switzerland, which lacks empty surfaces for further development. In this vein, real estate strategies of formerly public agencies such as the SBB, the Swiss Post, or Swisscom also deserve further attention. To grasp the political influence of private actors, urban regimes offer a stimulating theoretical framework, and its application to other Swiss cities would be fruitful.

Appendix

Figure 3 : *Distribution of property among the four major landowners in UDP-Wankdorf.*

Source: Gerber, 2008: 60.

Yellow fields belong to the Bern bourgeoisie. Blue fields to the city of Bern. Orange fields to Bern canton and brown fields to Armasuisse (Swiss Confederation). The SBB own the railway infrastructure crossing the area.

List of interviewees

Zurich - Europaallee

Ralph Baenziger, lead architect of Eurogate and opponent to Europaallee. Interviewed on 27th June 2013 in Zurich.

Kees Christiaanse, architect, developer of the master plan of Europaallee. Interviewed on 28th June 2013 on the phone.

Franz Eberhard, director of the office for urban development from 1997 to 2009. Interviewed on 12th June 2013 in Zurich.

Thomas Gehrig and Angelo Moser, UBS representatives. Interviewed on 24th June 2013 in Zurich.

Elmar Ledergerber, member of the city government head of the urban development office from 1998 to 2002, mayor from 2002 to 2008. Interviewed on 21st June 2013 in Zurich.

Kathrin Martelli, member of the city government from 1994 to 2010, head of the urban development office from 2002 to 2010. Interviewed on 27th June 2013 in Zurich.

Niklaus Scherr, member of the city parliament since 1978. Leader of the referendum committee against Europaallee. Interviewed on 13th June 2013 in Zurich.

Emil Seliner, member of the city parliament from 2002 to 2010. President of the special commission working on the master plan of Europaallee. Interview on 17th June 2013 in Zurich.

Andreas Steiger, SBB employee since 1993 and project manager of Europaallee since 2003. Interview on 24th May 2013 in Zurich.

Alexander von Teufenstein, executive representative of the real estate division of the Swiss Post. Interviewed on 19th June 2013 in Bern.

Brigit Wehrli, director of the office for city planning from 1997 to 2012. Interviewed on 23rd April 2013 in Zurich.

Bern - Wankdorf-City

Regula Buchmüller, director of the office for city planning since 2005. Interviewed on 4th November 2013 in Bern.

Daniel Conca, high-ranking civil servant at the real estate office of the city of Bern since 2008. Interviewed on 13th November 2013 in Bern.

Alec von Graffenried, director for sustainable development for Losinger-Marazzi since 2007. Interviewed on 4th December 2013 in Bern.

Jacqueline Hadorn, high-ranking civil servant in the office for urban development since 1993. Interviewed on 19th November 2013 in Bern.

Barbara Hayoz, member of the local government from 2005 to 2012, head of the financial and real estate office from 2007 to 2012. Interviewed on 13th November 2013 in Bern.

Lorenz Held and Stefan Holzinger, SBB real estate representatives, interviewed on 20th November 2013 in Bern.

Christoph Lerch, prefect of the Bern-Mittelland region since 2010. Interviewed on 22nd November 2013 in Ostermundigen.

Rudolf Muggli, member of the executive commission of the fund for land and housing policies from 1998 to 2010. Interviewed on 2nd December 2013 in Bern.

Stéphanie Pehner, member of the local parliament and of the urban planning commission since 2007. Interviewed on 18th November 2013 in Bern.

Bruno Riedo, manager of the land property of the Bern bourgeoisie. Interviewed on 7th January 2014 in Bern.

Alexander Tschäppät, member of the local government since 2001, mayor since 2005. Interviewed on 16th December in Bern.

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