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Dietrich, Simone; Hardt, Heidi; Swedlund, Haley J.

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How to Make Elite Experiments Work in International Relations

Simone Dietrich, Associate Professor, University of Geneva

Heidi Hardt, Associate Professor, University of California at Irvine

Haley Swedlund, Assistant Professor, Radboud University

For decades, many international relations (IR) scholars dismissed elite experiments as a method because they viewed it as too risky, too costly or too difficult to implement. As part of a behavioral turn in IR, a growing number of scholars have nevertheless adopted the method in their own research. The shift raises important questions. Under what conditions do elite experiments add value to IR scholarship? How can scholars overcome the logistical and ethical challenges of sampling such an elusive group? This article makes an original conceptual contribution to methodological debates on the role of behavior approach by analyzing experiments on foreign policy elites. We analyze the method's strengths and weaknesses, evaluate ethical considerations and present what is, to the best of our knowledge, the most comprehensive set of implementation guidelines. Our article draws on recently published IR research and argues that the payoffs from elite experiments are well worth the effort.

Introduction

Scholars in International Relations (IR) have increasingly employed experiments on foreign policy elites despite the challenges associated with implementation (e.g. Mintz et al. 2006, Author 2017; Hafner-Burton et al. 2017; Author 2017a, Yarhi-Milo et al 2018, Busby et al 2020, Tomz et al. 2020). Previous studies have criticized the method as too costly, too difficult or simply too risky to carry out (Peabody et al. 1990, Hafner-Burton 2013). Thus, most scholarship comprising IR's growing body of experimental research—i.e., IR's 'behavioral revolution' (IO Special Issue 2017)¹—has used non-elite samples like students, the public, and Amazon Mechanical Turk (i.e., Redd 2002; Kertzer 2017; Findley et al. 2013; Bayram and Holmes 2019). However, findings from elite experiments should be better able to approximate elite behavior; research suggests that non-elite experiments do not consistently predict elites' actual decisions and actions (e.g., Druckman and Kam 2011). Given that elite experiments do have certain advantages, when then is the method worth the costs?

¹ See, for example, Hafner-Burton et al. 2017, 2018; McDermott 2011; Mintz et al. 2011; McDermott 2002. The behavioral turn has roots in psychology and subsequently behavioural economics (i.e., Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec 2005; Della Vigna 2009; Lopez, McDermott, and Peterson 2011).

In this article, we identify a set of conditions under which elite experiments add value to IR research, and we introduce what we believe to be the first set of practical guidelines for implementation. We offer IR scholars explicit guidance on navigating upfront investments, ethically accessing and recruiting a sufficiently large sample of elites, and deploying the experiment at minimum cost. Drawing on successful and ethically-conducted examples, we posit that elite experiments elicit new and important findings due to the markedly different ways that elites, relative to non-elites, behave, including how they calculate risks, make decisions and respond to incentives (Tetlock 2005, Mintz et al. 2006).

We employ Hafner Burton et al.'s definition of elites as core decision makers who a) occupy 'top positions in social and political structures', b) 'have the highest indices in their branch of authority', and c) 'exercise significant influence over social and political change' (Hafner Burton et al. 2014, 369, see also Pareto 1935 and Pakulski 2008, respectively). Examples of elites include individuals occupying high-level positions in states and international institutions (e.g., members of legislatures, senior judges, ambassadors, military representatives in foreign and defense ministries, assistant secretary generals) and individuals operating at the highest levels (e.g. presidents, prime ministers and secretary generals).

Existing methodological scholarship has not yet specified when elite experiments can help scholars address their research questions. Some related work has assessed the value and logistics of other types of experiments (e.g., cognitive neuroscience, natural experiments, etc.) (see a typology in Mintz et al. 2011, McDermott 2002, McDermott 2011, Gerber and Green 2012). Additionally, several leading journals have devoted special issues to exploring experimental research in IR (ISQ 2011, IO 2017). However, the latter body of work has not investigated elite experiments as a unique type of experimental research.

Therefore, this article makes a significant conceptual contribution to existing scholarship on methodological pluralism in IR by providing a comprehensive presentation of practical advice for employing elite experiments as a methodology. We strongly support methodological openness and encourage the use of elite experiments as complementary to traditional methods. With respect to scope, we focus mainly on

interview and survey-based experiments, excluding field experiments (e.g., those involving randomized evaluations in international institutions). (The latter are important for the field of IR, but their purpose differs [Hyde 2010].)

The article proceeds as follows. First, we articulate why surveying elites is uniquely valuable for IR scholars. Second, we specify the conditions under which elite experiments are likely to be most useful and not useful. In this section, we also discuss what elite experiments can provide that other methods cannot but also how elite experiments complement other methods. Third, we provide guidelines for IR scholars new to the method and to those scholars seeking to improve implementation of it.

A Rationale for Conducting Experiments on Elites

Historically, theories of IR have primarily focused on the behavior of states (and more recently the role of non-state actors) – largely neglecting the role of decision-makers themselves. Over the decades, however, many scholars of IR have increasingly moved away from classical paradigm debates (e.g. realism, liberalism) (Dunne et al, 2013), arguing that the field should focus on identify and testing casual mechanisms and the development of mid-range theory (Bennett 2013). Coming out of these debates, more and more IR scholars are focused on understanding of how individual-level preferences and beliefs affect decision-making (Hafner-Burton et al. 2017). In this regards, survey and interview-based experiments with foreign policy elites offer a promising tool. In addition to permitting strong causal inferences, experiments with elites can help us to better understand the effects of individual-level heterogeneity on choice processes and strategic interactions.

Sampling foreign policy elites makes intuitive sense since, in IR research, these elites are often a scholar's population of interest. However, scholars have cautioned against elite experiments because of perceived and, sometimes, actual barriers to access and costs associated with implementation. For example, Hafner-Burton et al. argue that it is hard to conduct experiments on experienced elites, "because they are generally busy, wary of clinical poking, and skittish about revealing information about their decision-making processes and particular choices" (2013, p.368). Additionally, Peabody et al. argue that because elites are farther up than local or regional elites in a government's

chain of command, accessing them may be even ‘more difficult’ in the subfield of IR than other political science fields (1990, p.452). Given the potential risks and costs, why not exclusively sample non-elites (e.g. college students, mTurk respondents, etc.)? We believe that scholars should consider investing in elite experiments precisely because research suggests that elites behave fundamentally differently from non-elites. Consequently, elite experiments can and should be able to provide us new, different and interesting results relative to those conducted on non-elite samples.

1. Elites as Agents of Disproportionate Influence

There are several reasons to believe that the behavior of foreign policy elites is different from the general public. First, as agents of foreign policy, elites have an advantage over non-elites in their ability to make decisions. Their extensive practical experience makes them highly efficient decision-makers. Unlike non-elites, such experience aides them in selecting appropriate heuristics that are tailored to their specific circumstances and improves their credibility in signaling (Hafner-Burton et al. 2013, p.374).

Second, because they are ‘less prone to loss aversion’, elites appear to be better at taking risks. Years of experience as a politician—whether as an ambassador or prime minister—hone one’s skills in politics (Hafner-Burton et al. 2013). Not all elites, however, are likely to behave in the same way. The ability to use bargaining skills to successfully predict future outcomes is tempered by the type of elite one is. Building on Berlin’s distinction between so-called hedgehogs and foxes, Tetlock (2005), for example, argues that elites who are experts in many areas and draw from many sources of knowledge are more likely to be able to correctly predict events than those who more specialized in their expertise.

Third, relative to non-elites, elites are confronted with significantly more information inputs. According to Axelrod (2015), this can lead elites to consider ‘more relevant beliefs than they can handle’, limiting cognitive capacity and resulting in elites ‘simplifying’ how they perceive policy decisions. Relative to non-elites, elites may in fact be no better at making predictions than non-experts (Tetlock 2005). However, the consequences of their overconfidence can be deadly (Jervis 1976; Blainey 1988).

Fourth, beyond elites' different ways of approaching and taking political decisions, elites also have agent-centric differences in terms of their attitudes and interactions with different types of groups. Previously, scholars found that, on most issue-areas, elites tend to be more tolerant than non-elites because of their experience with socialization (Sullivan et al. 1993; Stouffer 1956). However, the election of more conservative and far-right governments in the US and Europe suggest that IR scholars may need to seek new methods for assessing elites' tolerance. Nevertheless, elites' political attitudes inform scholars about elite behavior, because attitudes signal how the elites interpret actions. These interpretations indicate how elites 'guide the definition of problems' in their respective organizations (Aberbach et al. 1975).

2. Unique Structural Constraints on Elite Behavior

In addition to inherent differences in elite behavior, foreign policy elites are also likely to face different structural constraints than the general public. Within states, governing elites must maintain the support of and satisfy the preferences of key groups that are critical for those elites to stay in power (i.e., nominal selectorate, the real selectorate, and the winning coalition) (Mesquita et al. 2003). The type of political regime in which an elite is situated can significantly alter his or her behavior. In democracies, political elites' careers are dependent on reelection, which constrains their ability to act independently. The field of American politics has extensively examined how responsive political elites are to constituent communication, for example (Costa 2017). Yet, just as democracies constrain elite behavior (Rohrschneider 1994), autocracies do too (Weeks 2014).

Elites also face structural constraints in international institutions. In IOs, ambassadors and military representatives have a limited bargaining range, which is constrained by instructions provided by state capitals (Abbott et al. 2015; Author 2014). Even though states delegate certain functions to IO secretariat staff, elites such as secretary-generals and assistant secretary-generals remain beholden to the shifting preferences of the IO's member states (Hawkins et al. 2006; Author 2016; Hooghe & Marks 2014). Authority may exist but is nevertheless limited by the design of the IO itself. In non-governmental organizations (NGOs), elites such as the heads of the International Red Cross or Doctors without Borders must pursue their mandates under the constraints of the preferences of donors, since they hold the purse strings (Milner 2006).

Finally, norms can have a powerful influence on elite behavior. Changes in norms can affect elite attitudes toward human rights, strategies in war, the nature of war and international law compliance (i.e., Simmons 2009, Sandholtz and Stiles 2009, Fortna 2015). Relative to non-state citizens, state elites (e.g. presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers, ambassadors) may also be relatively more responsive to international norms due to their increased interaction with other elites through international organizations (IOs) (Finnemore 1993, Risse and Sikkink 1999, Simmons 2009 footnote 94 on 138, Checkel 2001, 2005). Busby et al (2020), for example, find that US foreign policy elites are more responsive to multilateral approval than the US public. Additionally, institutional biases against certain groups (e.g. women, ethnic minorities, religious minorities), which are embedded in laws and norms, can affect how elites lead (Caprioli and Boyer 2001, Reynolds 1999, Jalalzai 2008). For example, in Afghanistan, gendered norms of men as belligerents and women as pacifists have limited US foreign policy elites' ability to prevent terrorist attacks by female ISIS recruits (Bloom 2012).

The Methodological Value of Elite Experiments

When and where *do* we expect elite experiments to be most useful to scholars? Elite experiments should add the most value to studies aimed at explaining the behavior of the elite decision-makers themselves in state and international institutions. For example, questions that address racial or gender-biases in international institutions are often difficult to address with conventional methods because they require elites to be forthcoming and aware of these biases. List experiments and scenario-based experiments with elites can allow scholars to indirectly assess such potential biases. Examining international organizations and NGOs, an elite experiment could help address questions such as whether or not bureaucrats are truly objective or whether they are supporting the national interests of their countries of origins. Such experiments can also be useful for examining conditions under which elites practice compliance (e.g., with international law or international norms). Scenario-based experiments with elites could also help testing competing theories for when institutions do and do not cooperate with one another. Additionally, elite experiments can also be run on diplomats to determine conditions under which international negotiations are more or less likely to break down.

By contrast, we can also consider the types of studies where elite experiments likely would *not* add much value. These would include research aimed at explaining any or all individuals' political behavior. In these cases, sampling from the general population would be sufficient. Similarly, elite experiments may also not be particularly useful for studies assessing directly observable state behavior (e.g. voting in UN General Assembly, economic sanctions, conflict initiation). In the latter situations, scholars could collect data from voting records, government websites and archives, and existing conflict and war databases. Finally, we recognize that certain elites may often be too inaccessible (e.g. presidents, prime ministers), but one should note that access will vary dramatically depending on the country in question. In most instances, other types of elites (e.g. presidential advisors, diplomats, cabinet members, high-level military officials) can serve as useful proxies. Below, we discuss in detail five ways in which experiments with elites add value to the field of IR.

1. Facilitating theory-testing on an essential sample

First, elite experiments allow scholars to test hypotheses on a sample that is often an essential sample for questions regarding state and IO behavior. As Sasley notes, research on foreign policy has often focused on public perceptions and thus the *impact* of foreign policy, rather than the actual *decisions* of foreign policy elites (2010, 687). Although often efficient, lab experiments with student samples or convenience sampling (for example, via Amazon Turk) can challenge inferences in at least three ways: (1) the causal effect of the treatment; (2) the effect size, and (3) the heterogeneity of effects (Druckman and Kam 2011). Levitt and List (2007) demonstrate that lab subjects' knowledge of being evaluated in the lab, coupled with the self-selection of volunteers for experiments limit our ability to infer to a wider population. Furthermore, as shown by Hafner-Burton et al (2012) and Fehr and List (2004), there are significant differences between undergraduate subjects and more realistic subject populations.

Particularly worrying is the practice of 'perspective-taking', which asks ordinary citizens to 'act as if' they assumed a leading role in decision-making. Rather than mirroring decision-making by elites, citizen subjects have been found to act in ways that represent an exacerbation of their pre-existing attitudes. In a study by Renshon and Kertzer (2014), this meant that hawkish subjects towards the use of force became more

hawkish, while their dovish counterparts became more dovish. In other words, in the lab, members of the public tend to act *more* like themselves, rather than mirroring decision-makers.

When asked to engage in perspective taking, subjects confront decisions for the very first time with only limited knowledge and response time at their disposal. One example is Bayram and Graham`s (2017) study of governmental funding patterns across IOs. The study tests hypotheses on the determinants of governmental funding choices in IOs on a student convenience sample. Presumably for the first time in their lives, student subjects are asked to take the perspective of a “top-level foreign policy advisor to the President,”² and make funding recommendations when confronted with a hypothetical information about the alignment of U.S. preferences over the affordability and policy substance of IO activity with those held by other IO member states. The design of the treatments is oversimplified, presumably to enable decision-making for student subjects in the first place, and the results are perhaps not surprising.³ We would expect information limited to "disagreement" between U.S. and other members to push unexperienced subjects to select more restrictions in funding choices, all else equal. While the study provides a disclaimer about external validity, the scholars make inferences about elite behavior based on a convenience sample of students invited to reflect on a complex, removed subject.⁴

Strategic decision-making on global issues requires elites to have sufficient knowledge and experience of not only the issue area but also the decision-making process. Students and/or members of the general public are simply not likely to have such knowledge. A recent study involving an elite experiment on current and former members of Israel`s legislature illustrates the advantage in knowledge and experience that elites have over members of the general public. When seeking to study decision makers` beliefs about resolve in international crises, Yarhi-Milo et al. argue that, “the most direct way to do so is to sample from exactly that population: leaders who have had to wrestle with these

Quoted from introductory text to Bayram and Graham`s (2017) survey experiment.

³ In their vignettes, the scholars manipulate whether students learn about agreement or disagreement between the U.S. and other IO member states about policies of the organization and budget size.

⁴ In this case, an experiment on officials from the U.S. Treasury (who lead U.S. engagement in multilateral organizations) or the U.S. State Department (e.g., in the department`s Bureau of International Organization Affairs or U.S. Mission to the UN) could have provided more external validity.

issues outside the lab. This is, after all, what is unique about studying leaders rather than the general public...our elite participants have repeatedly encountered these issues...' (2018, 2159).

While there are many advantages of a drawing on an elite population, elite samples certainly do not guarantee external validity. In another study with Israeli parliamentarians, Tomz et al. (2020) investigate the role of public opinion in shaping foreign policy decisions, capitalizing on experiments with both Israeli parliamentarians and Israeli and U.S. citizens. The study provides empirical data on an important but controversial question in foreign policy: does public opinion matter for foreign policy? While incredibly informative, the study's findings may or may not transfer to political contexts beyond Israel or the U.S. To ensure generalizability, the study would need to be replicated in other contexts.

2. Expanding Access to Evidence by Overcoming Social Desirability Bias

Second, elite experiments can allow scholars to access evidence about elites' true biases and preferences that would be otherwise difficult to reveal. Elites, typically acting in an official capacity, are frequently under significant pressure to represent themselves, their state and/or their institution in a positive light. Therefore, when asked directly about sensitive topics using non-experimental measures (e.g., surveys, questionnaires, interviews, focal groups), elites are likely to be hesitant to reveal pertinent information that, while accurate, would risk their reputations, let alone their careers. As Aberbach and Rockman observed, elites 'do not like being put in the straightjacket of close-ended questions' (2002, 674). Questions on politically sensitive subjects (e.g. sexual violence in the military, government responses to environmental disasters, preferences in trade negotiations, gender bias in peace negotiations) are to be answered with 'no comment', if a scholar is lucky enough to succeed in securing a meeting with the elite in the first place.

Experimental approaches, such as list experiments or scenario questions, allow researchers to get at these topics in less confrontational ways and can be fruitful in circumventing social desirability pressures. We briefly discuss one example from a study seeking to explain when foreign aid agencies were likely to suspend aid for political reasons (Swedlund 2017a). Prior research had only been able to study this issue

indirectly by examining whether or not annual foreign aid disbursements increase or decrease in response to general trends in national-level governance measured by indexes such as Freedom House or Polity. However, this approach is not able to capture how foreign aid agencies respond to specific political transgressions.

An original survey of high-level donor officials working across twenty countries in sub-Saharan Africa presented Swedlund with the opportunity to directly query elites about the likelihood of aid suspensions. Still, Swedlund was concerned that respondents would not voluntarily provide information that painted their agency in a bad light. Therefore, in order to elicit truthful responses about the conditions under which donors are willing to suspend foreign aid, she devised a list experiment, which she embedded into her survey (Lavrakas 2014). The approach, which has been used by political scientists to address other sensitive topics like race and gender, allowed Swedlund (2017a) to estimate that over 45% of respondents believed their agency would not suspend aid following severe repression, including suspected assassinations of opposition leaders, if the recipient country remained compliant in other ways. Combined with additional survey data, the list experiment allowed her to test key hypotheses on the willingness of donor agencies to enforce political conditionality. Testing these hypotheses would not have been possible without directly querying elites, and the experimental approach helped limit concerns about social desirability bias.

Another example of elite experiments overcoming social desirability bias is Bayram's (2017) study of the relationship between German parliamentarians' cosmopolitan identities and the extent to which they feel obligated to comply with international law. If the scholar were to interview parliamentarians one-on-one or as part of a focal group, they would likely feel inclined to state that they of course support compliance with international law. Respondents would likely want to protect the reputation of their government, resulting in limited variation. Therefore, Bayram provided parliamentarians with surveys in which scenarios varied by conditions (as embedded treatments). Asking parliamentarians to respond to hypothetical scenarios allowed for testing the impact of cosmopolitan social identity on compliance – without putting elites in a situation in which they felt obligated to provide a certain type of response.

3. Encouraging the specifying of theories

Third, elite experiments can compel scholars to fully specify the theories that they seek to test in at least two ways. On one hand, elite experiments encourage scholars to understand and test the individual-level implications for their argument. On the other hand, they allow scholars to test theories that consider the public to be an important driver of foreign policy and IR. In an elite experiment in foreign policy, Mintz et al. (1997) sought to specify existing theories about the decision strategies that elites use in times of crisis. In a computer-based experiment involving 44 top-ranking U.S. Air Force officers, the authors presented the subjects with a dynamic choice set and were ultimately able to theorize and specify which types of strategies are used in a decision process at which times and the order in which they were used. The authors found that alternative-based expected utility strategies tend to operate more in the second stage of a decision process.

As another example, Dietrich (2016) studied the effect of donor political economies on donor decisions about how to deliver foreign aid abroad. The study sought to understand why, given that recipient countries' institutions experience corruption and inefficiencies, 'some foreign aid donors outsource the delivery of aid to non-state actors' whereas 'other donors continue to support state management of aid' (2016, 65). Dietrich theorized that differences in national orientations concerning what the state's role should be in public service delivery could explain variation in donor decisions. In addition to using dyadic time-series cross-section aid allocation data, the author employed a within-subject elite survey experiment among elites from six donor states to test the theory's individual-level implications. Results indicated that decision-makers across the two types of political economies proposed significantly different time horizons with which they assessed project success within their agencies.

In the aforementioned study, empirical support for individual-level implications corroborated the plausibility of the theory since it specified expectations across different levels of analysis. Once state theories are specified at the level of the individual decision-maker, scholars can derive additional empirical implications from the results of such elite experiments; these implications may reveal interesting variation in how preferences are aggregated across agencies to explain state-level or system-level outcomes.

Relatedly, elite experiments can inform and help us test theories that consider the public to be an important driver of foreign policy and IR. In studies of foreign economic policy, for instance, scholars often assume that the ‘median voter’ plays an important role in determining national preferences, or that stylized economic interests determine policy, as they may be filtered through a simple representation of legislative-executive relations. At the same time, ample evidence exists suggesting that the public does not have (strong) preferences and/or are not well informed on global issues (Eichenberg 2016, 18).

The latter raises several questions. Do voters punish incumbents at the ballot box for policy on global issues? Do elites believe that they will be punished by the electorate, if they do not take the public’s preferences seriously? Research with elites is essential to help us answer these types of important questions. Currently, we are aware of only one study that examines elite perceptions towards the role of the public in foreign policy (Tomz et al 2020). Experimental studies of decision-makers can help improve our understanding of the conditions under which public preferences matter to decision-makers across global issue areas, allowing us to test theories about the role of public opinion in foreign policy decision making.

4. New Hypotheses from Experimental Results

Fourth, elite experiments can contribute to the development of new hypotheses that would not be plausible if the focus was only on institutions, rather than elite preferences and behavior. As an example, one study sought to identify which sources influenced NATO elites (i.e. the population of interest) to be more or less likely to pass on knowledge of past strategic errors to their supervisors, colleagues, and successors (Hardt 2017). The author theorized about two sources of knowledge (i.e. treatments), the NATO secretariat and the United States government, and conducted one-on-one meetings with 120 NATO civilian (e.g. ambassadors, secretariat staff) and military (e.g. high-level representatives) elites over six months. In each meeting, the elite completed a five-minute long paper-and-pen survey experiment and then answered interview questions for the remaining time. Results indicated that, despite the United States’ dominant role in NATO, knowledge received from the United States deterred the elites from passing the knowledge down across time and space. Such findings prompted new hypotheses about why one would see a consistent negative effect across multiple

models. In the work, the author suggests that elites were reticent because the US had politicized intelligence in the past (e.g. vis-à-vis weapons of mass destruction in Iraq). The scholar was then able to testing new hypotheses on the coded responses to the interview questions that followed the experiment (Hardt 2018).

In another example, Sheffer et al. (2018) were also able to derive new hypotheses that would otherwise be unlikely to be uncovered without having experimented on elites. The study involved conducting a series of experimental decision tasks and interviews on two samples: incumbent legislators from three democratic states and citizens from the same states. The study found surprisingly that – while politicians do make decisions differently from nonpoliticians, they are not always good at it. In fact, they may be even more subject to making known choice anomalies as non-politicians. Findings like this spurred new hypotheses about elite decision-making, which can be tested in future research. For example, the author hypothesizes that a politician’s conduct in office ‘may be the result of selection effects that increase the likelihood of specific types of people winning office and subsequently exhibiting more (or less) of a certain bias or heuristic in their decision making’ (Sheffer et al. 2018, 317-8).

Here it is important to note that one drawback of elite experiments is that smaller sample sizes often prevent the inclusion of a number of cross-cutting treatments to test additional hypotheses. At the same time, promises to guarantee anonymity—which are often necessary to garner participation—may prevent researcher’s from testing additional hypotheses. For example, in the aforementioned study on aid suspensions, Swedlund (2017a) was unable to test for variation between different donor agencies because sample-sizes across the different agencies were too small. Moreover, in order to convince respondents to complete the survey, she had to promise that she would not identify their institution in her research.

5. Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Practice

In addition to methodological benefits, elite experiments can also bridge the communications gap between academics and policymakers. More than two decades ago Alexander George`s (1993) "Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy" called for the need to bring together academia and the policy world, while highlighting the methodological, political, and psychological obstacles in doing so. In 2002, Putnam,

while cognizant of existing challenges, bemoans the academy's focus on theory and modeling and warns that political scientists risked marginalization, if they did not become more engaged with policymakers. Data from the 2011 and 2014 Teaching, Research and Policy (TRIP) survey of IR scholars in the United States and in 19 other countries show that academics have become more engaged with members of policy circles. 37 percent of scholars would like to be more engaged, with the demand to foster linkages being highest among scholars who study foreign aid and development, international political economy and international security (Schneider 2014).

We believe that testing hypotheses about state-behavior on a sample of elites, who are relevant to the research question at hand, can contribute to bridging the gap between the academy and policy in two ways: first, it provides a platform for communication and exchange between the two camps, which, ideally, would create trust and possibly open up opportunities for substantive collaboration in research and consulting. Elite experiments force researchers to communicate their research plans and needs to policymakers, opening up a line of communication. Second, if the paper is about elites making foreign policy decisions, an empirical test of the theory on decision-makers makes the insights of the paper more relevant to the policy community. If elites do not find the questions and/or scenario in the experiment relevant to their day-to-day lives as decision-makers, the experiment will likely fail because elites may either decline to participate half-way through the experiment or may provide responses that lack meaning or not relevant to one's research question.

Practical Advice for Ethically Conducting Elite Experiments

In this section, we provide scholars with practical guidelines on how to implement elite experiments while respecting and protecting human subjects. Scheduling meetings and successfully convincing elites to participate in surveys and/or answer verbal questions requires significant time, resources and patience (Aberbach & Rockman 2002; Tansey 2007). However, we believe that most barriers to accessing and carrying out experiments with elites are surmountable, if scholars employ appropriate techniques.

1. Investing Time and Resources to Ensure Sufficient Sample Size

For most elite experiments, and unlike convenience samples, investing significant time and resources into ensuring a sufficient sample size will be essential. A sufficient

sample size is necessary for properly evaluating the treatment effects of the experiment. Consequently, for cases where travel is needed, for example if the experiment is embedded within in-person interviews, scholars should apply for funding well in advance. Similarly, scholars will need to set aside sufficient time in the field, at least a few months, in order to provide adequate time to ensure a medium-sized N. This advantages scholars with more resources, including more research time.

Few elites in international institutions have contact information available online. Therefore, it may be necessary to start with whatever contact information is available and then send many emails, faxes, phone calls and in person requests in order to obtain a composite picture of the relevant sample. Moreover, it is inevitable that securing a sufficient sample size will require significant outreach, including sending multiple emails after a few days to non-respondents and following up with phone calls. (Depending on the type of institution [e.g. government], scholars should also consider sending their requests on letterhead by fax, in addition to email.) Overall, we have found that subject recruitment is likely to be most time intensive part of the research process.

One option to increase recipient buy-in is to work with a well-established member of the policy community. In order to access a cross-section of US foreign policy elites for their experiment on multilateralism and the use of force, Busby et al (2020) worked the Chicago Council on Global Affairs-Texas National Security Network. Working with members of the policy community may help increase response rates by lending greater policy credibility to the survey. However, collaboration with a policy institution can also present challenges, as policymakers will almost certainly have their own ideas about the content. This could make it more difficult to design the survey exactly as the researchers would like.

Offering financial and/or informational incentives at the time of subject recruitment may also help scholars achieve a sufficiently large sample size. In accordance with IRB, scholars may wish to consider providing elites with Amazon gift cards, for example, to help boost response rates in the case of online or by mail survey experiments. However, many elites, particularly administrative elites, are not allowed to accept payments in accordance with anti-corruption rules or laws. Alternatively (or in combination with a financial incentive), scholars can provide informational incentives to encourage

participation in the experiment. In our research, we found elites were eager to hear back about the results of our respective experiments. Often, elites explicitly asked us about when results would be ready even before the study began and indicated frustration about failed past attempts of trying to find out about study results from researchers. The main motivation for elite participation in research is often a belief that such research will help improve the functioning of their organization. Therefore, we encourage researchers to tap-into this to encourage participation.

One option for scholars is to provide elites with policy briefings (either electronically, by phone and/or in person) that summarize the results of the study and policy recommendations. As we discuss in more detail below, scholars can also offer to provide presentations and/or just be a point of contact for policymakers on a given topic. Of course, scholars can simply send elites' copies of their articles and/or books once the experiment is published. However, elites do have preferences when it comes to the types of academic materials they are likely to read (e.g. Avey and Desch 2014). Moreover, keep in mind that paywalls often prevent practitioners from accessing scholarly research. Therefore, full-copies should be distributed (in line with copyright laws). Finally, scholars should be transparent with elites about how long it may take for a given study to be published.

2. Pre-specifying Treatments in Experimental Design and Ensuring a Representative Sample

Depending on their design, elite interviews allow scholars to take a more inductive approach. In contrast, elite experiments should be explicitly designed to test a pre-specified theory. Their value, like experiments more broadly, is precision in the treatment condition, allowing for strong causal inference. Therefore, scholars need to spend sufficient time considering which treatments to include and which will be excluded. Conducting the experiment ahead of time on a pilot sample is extremely beneficial. As already mentioned, relative to experiments embedded in public opinion surveys, elite experiments will have a much smaller N. The researcher will thus be limited in their ability to apply cross-cutting treatments during the analysis phase. This makes it all the more important that the necessary treatments conditions are pre-specified from the outset and power analyses are conducted to ensure that the sample size is large enough to test the treatment conditions the researcher is most interested in.

For elite experiments, the composition of an elite sample is as important as the sample size. Scholars should aim to create a representative sample by researching the demographics of the population (e.g. institution where the elites work) at length before beginning subject recruitment. In the cases of legislatures, the UN General Assembly or other bodies in which elites are elected or appointed officials, scholars can often easily determine the size of the population and which elites comprise it. However, an elite population may not always be known and/or information about the population (e.g. a phone book, registry, office directory, etc.) may not be publicly available. In these cases, scholars can contact the institution's human resources office and request information about the population. Here we have found it extremely beneficial to already have contacts within a given population before undertaking a survey.

Having a breakdown of the population's characteristics (e.g., gender, age, nationality, years of experience, etc.) is important because certain covariates may affect experimental results. Scholars should consider which characteristics matter and research these ahead of time so that they can work to ensure that their sample approximates the population as much as possible. If a scholar knows, even in general terms, what the population's characteristics are then the scholar can apply a sampling strategy that targets specific members of the population.

3. Ethical Considerations and Protecting Elites as Human Subjects

We strongly recommend that scholars register their study with their academic institution's IRB (or other relevant national ethics board) before beginning subject recruitment.⁵ As APSA's Guide on Professional Ethics notes, 'under certain conditions, political scientists are also legally required to assess the risks to human subjects' (APSA 2012, 28). Unlike other types of human subject research in political science (e.g. interviews, surveys), experiments sometimes involve strategically omitting information and/or deception, which has prompted concerns regarding the impact on participants (e.g. voters receiving mailers prior to an election) (Basken 2015). Even participating in

⁵ Some scholars work at institutions without an IRB, some have limited awareness of existing IRB procedures, and some choose not to register with existing IRBs for different reasons (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2008). If a scholar has limited or no access to an IRB, we recommend consulting other universities' IRBs and the appendix in Gerber and Green's book (2012).

a study without deception can sometimes put an elite in a vulnerable situation in terms of his or her employment or safety depending on the political and economic context in that country.

There are also a number of other ethical questions scholars out to consider before deciding to proceed with an experiment on elites: How much time will the experiment take away from the elite's primary responsibilities? How, if any, will this affect a politician's responsibilities to meeting the needs of his constituents? Will the elite or his/her constituents benefit in any way from learning more about the topic of the study? Anecdotes circulate about local legislator fatigue from scholars sending list experiments that took time away from the needs of their office. Research also should be conscientious about lingering suspicions about experiments following several highly-publicized cases of political science experiments that were condemned and/or retracted for unethical practices, such as the Montana voters study (Bartlett 2014) or the study on canvassers and voters' views on same-sex marriage (McNutt 2015).

If the experiment is being conducted orally, scholars might consider the option of providing verbal informed consent rather than requiring written, signed consent forms.⁶ The former involves reading the elite a brief script that summarizes the research, tells him or her how the data will be used and reminds him or her that participation is voluntary. If written consent is required, it is important to keep the consent form free of jargon so that the elite understands to what he or she is agreeing.

There also exist multiple outlets for IR scholars to pre-register experiments online. Such websites allow scholars to upload an analysis plan, including the hypotheses, treatments, controls and other research design information, before conducting the experiment. As part of broader discussions on transparency in the social sciences, there exists an active scholarly debate on the utility of pre-registration (Kern and Gleditsch 2017, Lin and Green 2016, Coffman and Niederle 2015). One of the costs of such a plan is that it may limit the scholar's ability to garner and implement new ideas for new hypotheses in the course of fieldwork (Olken 2015, 62). However, Lin and Green argue

⁶ An experiment may be eligible for IRB exempt status, which often does not require written consent.

that such plans can limit scholars from ‘tilting’ a study ‘toward a desired result’ (2016), lending more creditability to the findings.

4. Researching elites and institutions before beginning subject recruitment

When designing their study, scholars should spend a lot of time reading existing formal documentation, the website of the relevant institution(s), and relevant bodies of international law. Scholars should be as informed as possible about the elite, the elite’s position in the institution, the structural constraints that the elite is likely to experience. They should also understand the role of different agencies within the international institutions. This requires that the researcher looks beyond the scholarly literature. In carrying out an elite experiment one needs to avoid scholarly, technical jargon. Researching the institution ahead of time will better prepare a scholar for designing language in the experiment (be it a hypothetical scenario or questionnaire) that is clear, concise and relevant to the elite’s day-to-day work experience.

When carrying out elite experiments, having a clear organizational chart can be immensely helpful. This will allow one to target the specific agencies within an institution that are most relevant to the study. If an international institution does not have an organizational chart publicly available, contact the institution to request one, research existing scholarship to see if one can be found, and/or consult with experts on the institution to create one’s own chart. Understanding the organization of the relevant organization is essential for accessing the correct sample, as well as having a sufficient understand of the constrains faced by the study population.

5. Considering elites’ interests and constraints at the time of subject recruitment

Access to elites will be much improved if scholars are considerate of elites’ interests and the constraints they face in participating in research. Gaining access remains one of the biggest challenges to conducting elite experiments. Yet the validity of the results rests on the sample being an accurate reflection of the type of decision-makers on are interested in. If one’s elite sample is not representative, it may lack external validity. In elite experiments, it is difficult to identify the composition of the sample, and then to gain access to them.

Identifying the correct sample can be difficult for several reasons. First, not all staff of government agencies or international organizations are transparently listed online. Second, even when names are identifiable, there is a great deal of turnover among staff, rendering information outdated and in need of thorough vetting. Third, even when names are available and correct, contact information needs to be obtained. Thus, the acquisition of whom to contact and how requires a sustained effort.

One practical tip to identify contact information is to research the domain names for all relevant institutions (e.g. agencies, delegations, member states, etc.). One can then combine publicly available lists of elite names with knowledge of standard email domain name formats (e.g. `firstname.lastname@hq.nato.int`) to contact participants. For each of us, combining this approach with publicly available data resulted in higher sample and response rates. Of course, personal contacts can be tremendously useful. However, even if direct contacts do not exist, reaching out for help to colleagues in the discipline who have worked with elites and who could establish important contacts can be a feasible strategy to start the process of costly elite sample recruitment.

Sample recruitment and the implementation of elite experiments can also be facilitated by conducting interviews with elites who work in the relevant field of study. These interviews can provide in-depth knowledge about the epistemic communities that scholars target and can be essential for gaining access. In our own experiences in research, we found that some elites would only agree to participate in paper or online experiments if we traveled to meet them in person. Since they often work with classified or at least private information and in secure buildings (e.g. parliaments, IO and NGO headquarters, etc.), elites have legitimate cybersecurity and identity concerns. They wonder who is actually on the other end of an email exchange or who would be monitoring any online responses to a survey (e.g. a foreign government, perhaps). With respect to identity concerns, authors of this study have arrived at many meetings with elites to find them holding print outs of the author's photo and CV. Such experiences reiterate the need for scholars to establish a professional online presence (e.g. university or personal website), preferably with a photo, before conducting fieldwork. Other ways to increase response rates and ensure a positive experience for both scholar and elite is to keep the survey instrument as brief as possible (i.e. five to ten minutes in length) and that to couple it with an interview. Elites are often eager to verbally share their thoughts

and experiences, and they are accustomed to such a format (Aberbach and Rockman 2002).

6. Framing research in ways that are both accurate and appropriate to the sample

The good news is that once the relevant sample is identified and contact information acquired, the willingness of potential respondents to participate appears high. It is true that elites are very busy (Hafner-Burton et al. 2013). However, this does not mean elites will not take the time to answer a survey or participate in an interview. One study (Author 2017a) had a 53 percent response rate to an online survey experiment, and over 90% of the elite respondents expressed a desire to be kept informed about the results of the research. Another survey experiment study had an 85 percent response rate, and, similarly, nearly all of the elite respondents indicated interest in the findings of the study (Author 2016). Elites are busy, but if you are asking relevant and important questions to their work, they will find the time to participate in your research. In contrast, members of the general public as non-elites are not likely to be as intrinsically motivated to participate.

When initially approaching the elite, we advise putting your request directly in the subject line of your e-mail: i.e., ‘Meeting or Interview Request’ or ‘Request to participate in survey’. We also recommend that you mention any overlapping institutional affiliations or connections you might have (as long as you have permission to do so). Elites are often a tightly dense network. Once you have infiltrated this network, you should not be afraid to use it to your advantage with IRB permission. Finally, do not be put off by a lack of response, and do not be afraid to send your request multiple times. While you should always be polite with your requests and acknowledge that you are asking for a participant’s valuable time, you should also not assume that a non-response is a no. It is also important to make sure the relevance of the research is very clear. Doing so can get buy-in from elite respondents. It is best to avoid academic jargon or narrow theoretical concepts when approaching an elite - instead focusing on the big-picture implications of the research. Focusing on these also helps to avoid biasing your research since one must balance informed consent while not revealing too much information about what it is you are testing.

Research framing matters particularly at two crucial points: first, during subject recruitment (i.e. the initial request) and second, during informed consent (e.g. paper handout or a script read aloud by the scholar). The latter reiterates information in the initial request, tells the subject how the experiment will proceed and invites the subject to say yes or no to participating. (Consult with your institution's IRB for examples.) Here, we focus on the initial request since this can make or break response rates and since the experiment itself will vary widely depending on the research question. Most importantly, the written request (e.g. email, letter, fax) should be no longer than a paragraph to increase likelihood of receiving a response.

We suggest the following template. First, address the elite with his or her full current and formal title (e.g. Minister, Colonel, Dr., etc.). Civilian and military ranks can change in just a few years so one needs to be sure that the title listed online is from a recent website. Second, one should introduce one's self, citing name, academic status (e.g. researcher, professor, etc.) and institutional affiliation. If available, one should add here a sentence that helps with credibility, such as a reference to a shared professional contact, shared institutional history (e.g. alumnus/a of ABC university) or relevant professional experience (e.g. worked as an intern at XYZ organization). Third, one should state the request for a meeting, interview or appointment and state what it would include (e.g. survey or other experimental instrument). It is also important to specify dates and times when one would be available rather than suggesting that one is perennially available. Fourth, one should provide a one-sentence description of the research project. Fifth, there should be a sentence explaining the purposes of the research and how it will be used (e.g. scholarly article, scholarly book, etc.). Sixth, the scholar should specify if and how he or she would like to use the elite's name in publications or if and how the elite's identity will be anonymized. Finally, the email should thank the elite and conclude with a signature giving the scholar's full academic title, email address, personal/professional website or LinkedIn profile, twitter handle and a link to a recent publication if/where one is available.

Regarding persistence, one of the authors has a strict three-day rule. If an elite (or an assistant) does not reply within three days, the author sends another email and continues to send an email every three days until the scholar either receives a reply or has sent a total of three emails. If a phone number is publicly available, the author then begins

follow-up phone calls four days after the initial email interview request. Scholars should be prepared to, upon request from elites or their assistants, provide additional evidence of who the scholar is (e.g. copy of passport), provide any sample questions from the interview and/or experiment and provide any formal documentation (e.g. IRB approval, a grant award, etc.) from the scholar's university that indicates that the project is legitimate and registered with the university. In some cases, an elite may even ask for a reference, such as a supervisor or colleague at the university who his/her assistant can call to verify the scholar's identity. Members of the general public would not likely ask for these additional steps.

If one is using a verbal informed consent, it should be a short and straightforward memorized script that one is prepared to say upon sitting down in an elite's office (or beginning the conversation over the phone). Many IRB offices have suggested scripts that scholars can employ and edit. The verbal informed consent involves the scholar saying out loud essentially everything that was in the interview request email so the elite is fully informed of the project and how his/her identity and information will be used. The only difference is that at the end the scholar asks the elite if he or she may proceed with the interview and/or survey.

7. Providing Elites the Assurance of Anonymity

When conducting research with elites, researchers need to make sure that the respondent knows that they will be kept anonymous, as there may be professional costs for participating in the research. Such risks will be substantially mitigated if anonymity is guaranteed and the respondent is sufficiently assured that their inputs will be securely recorded. Anonymity gives the respondent space to be forthcoming about the challenges both they and their organization face. At times, it may also be important to keep the respondent's agency anonymous. Although researchers prefer to be as transparent as possible about the study subjects and where they work, insisting on identifiable information could be costly insofar as it could result in significant delays, or it bias the research. It may encourage respondents to answer the survey according to how they think their agency would *want* them to respond, rather than based on their actual experiences working for the agency.

8. Sending Tailored Follow-up Emails

Finally, after the research has been conducted, we encourage scholars to follow up with respondents. Send your participants a thank you in which you offer to keep in touch and share your results. If a respondent asked to be kept informed about the results of the study, actually do so. Let them know about key publications. Offer to present your research for their colleagues. Be a point of contact for them about the scholarly findings in your field. One simple way to ensure that one can be in contact years later – particularly when scholarship may take a year or more to publish – is to submit a LinkedIn contact request to the elite after the meeting. Additionally, it is important to follow through with any requirements of one’s IRB office or Ethics Board. For example, some offices require that scholars send a follow up email explaining the study in greater detail if any deception or omission of information was involved.

Following up with and maintaining contact with respondents is important to not only doing your due diligence as a scientist, but it also has important practical benefits for future research projects. Scholars may want to sample these individuals again in a future study, or need their help to identify other relevant participants. As a scholar, one has likely invested a lot of time, and perhaps money, into identifying their sample. Do not simply abandon this knowledge when the project is complete. Instead, build on it to help streamline the process in the future.

Conclusion

In this article, we argued that foreign policy elites, as subjects, deserve closer inspection in International Relationship, and that elite experiments offer scholars a unique opportunity to better understand their behavior and preferences. To specify when scholars should use the method, we have identified types of research that could most benefit from the method and other types that would not. Importantly, we provided a detailed set of guidelines for scholars who are considering using the method for the first time and for scholars who already use the method but are seeking ways to improve response rates while still ensuring ethical considerations.

Our article justifies the use of elite experiments by noting that samples of specific elites who relate directly to one’s research question are fundamentally different from other types of samples, such as convenience samples of elites or samples of non-elites (e.g. college students, etc.). That is, elites have disproportionate influence over foreign

policy outcomes and experience unique structural constraints – meaning that studies involving targeted elite samples can lead different results than non-elite samples. We argue that the value of the method lies in several factors. Scholars can use it to better specify their theories. The method can facilitate theory-testing on a sample highly relevant to one’s research question and can help overcome the social desirability bias. Using elite experiments can also reveal new hypotheses for subsequent studies and help bridge the academic-policy divide.

Moving forward, we recommend several directions for future research on elite experiments in IR. First, scholars interested in questions of the legitimacy of international institutions – from IOs to NGOs to international regimes – can conduct elite experiments to see how elites’ opinions of their own institutions contrast with those of domestic publics. Are there gaps in perceptions of legitimacy? Second, scholars can also adopt a comparative approach by conducting elite experiments. How does elite decision-making vary across different international institutions under different structural constraints? Third, scholars can also employ elite experiments to test existing theories about how elites perceive different policy issues. Do elites’ private preferences vary significantly from their public preferences? How does this variation affect policymaking? Fourth, scholars can assess elites’ private preferences in relation to their foreign policy behavior – from UN voting behavior to military interventions to human rights records. Fifth, there exists substantial room for future scholarship on how an elite’s identity (e.g. gender, race, ethnicity and sexual orientation) affects elite behavior in foreign policy (O’Brien 2015, Anievas 2015).

Ultimately, elite experiments can provide scholars with an alternative means of exploring key research questions on elite samples that most closely approximate elite populations of interest. The approach, however, is not without drawbacks. In support of methodological pluralism, our article stresses that elite experiments complement existing, well-established methodological approaches and help us answer important questions for the field of IR—but they are more useful in some research domains than others. We call on more IR scholars to consider adopting the method as an additional useful strategy for studying and explaining elite behavior and preferences.

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