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Giugni, Marco; Nai, Alessandro

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Why Are Social Movement Organizations Deliberative? Structural and Cultural Determinants of Internal Decision Making in the Global Justice Movement

Marco Giugni and Alessandro Nai

Introduction

Decision making in social movements, and democratic visions and practices more generally, vary strongly from one movement organization to another. This chapter looks at possible explanations of such differences in internal decision making observed among organizations of the Global Justice Movement. Indeed, the adoption of a given democratic model varies a great deal across the organizations included in the study (Table 5.1). Based on information derived from the organizations' online and offline documents, as well as a structured questionnaire submitted to them, the last column of this table shows that the associational model is the most common, followed by the two deliberative models and, lagging far behind, the assembleary model. Thus, half of the organizations put forward deliberation as their decision-making mode; about one-quarter of them follow the deliberative participative model.

The table also shows that the use of democratic models in general and, more specifically, the deliberative participative model vary across countries as well (see Chapter 2 in this volume for a more detailed presentation of the typology of democratic models). The associational model prevails in all countries except Spain, where the deliberative participative model is more frequently used. The latter model, in contrast, is much less widespread in France, Germany, and Switzerland than in the

Table 5.1 Democratic models by country (%)

	<i>Britain</i>	<i>France</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Spain</i>	<i>Switzerland</i>	<i>Total</i>
Associational	45.0	42.9	55.2	36.6	24.5	54.8	41.3
Deliberative representative	25.0	34.3	20.7	31.7	26.5	25.8	27.6
Assembleary	0.0	8.6	6.9	4.9	8.2	3.2	5.3
Deliberative participative	30.0	14.3	17.2	26.8	40.8	16.1	25.8
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	40	35	29	41	49	31	225

Notes: Based on documents and questionnaire. Only valid cases are included (36 missing cases).

other countries, including Spain. While these differences are certainly due in part to our sampling criteria (see Introduction), they might reflect a greater sensibility towards participatory and deliberative democracy of the movement in Spain and partly also in Britain. Yet, it is difficult to interpret them as resulting from differences in national political opportunity structure, as no coherent pattern seems to emerge. In order to investigate this aspect, in our analyses we will include a more aggregated measure of country variation based on Lijphart's (1999) typology of democratic systems, in particular his distinction between majoritarian and consensual democracies.

The main purpose of this chapter, however, is not to explain cross-national variations in the adoption of a given democratic or decision-making model. Instead, we investigate some structural and cultural determinants for the adoption of a deliberative participative model by organizations active in the movement. We focus more specifically on the deliberative participative model, which is often stressed in the discourse of the Global Justice Movement. With its emphasis on the importance of consensus and broad participation in democratic processes (della Porta 2005b), this democratic model best represents the challenge to traditional forms of representative democracy (della Porta et al. 2006). Indeed, consensus and participation are two core values of the GJM.

We advance a number of hypotheses concerning the impact of three structural factors relating to the internal structuring of the organizations, and three cultural factors concerning the tradition of contention upon which their mobilization rests. In addition, we include a factor pertaining to the broader institutional setting of the country in which the organizations are located (type of democracy). We confront these

hypotheses with the results of two kinds of analysis on a pooled sample of organizations from the six countries included in the study.¹ First, we run a logistic regression to see which of the organizational characteristics have an impact and to assess their relative weights. Second, we use qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to explore multiple and conjunctural effects. Before we move to the results of the analyses, however, we need to elaborate upon our theoretical expectations and their operationalization.

Structural and cultural determinants of deliberative democracy: Some hypotheses

Our aim is not merely to describe the democratic models adopted in decision making within the Global Justice Movement, but above all to explain them. We focus on internal determinants, both structural and cultural, for the adoption of the deliberative participative model of democracy in our sample. Specifically, we examine the impact of the internal structuring of the organizations (degree of formalization, size, and territorial scope) and of the tradition of contention on which their political mobilization rests (belonging to the new social movement and Global Justice Movement area, identification with the GJM, and historical period in which the organizations were created). For each aspect, we advance a hypothesis about its impact on democratic models, specifically the deliberative participative model. However, we are in a more exploratory than a confirmatory mode. Therefore, these hypotheses are intended as a tool to guide the analysis rather than expectations to be tested against empirical evidence.

The first two aspects refer to the internal structuring of the organizations. These aspects have been given centre stage in the study of social movements by resource mobilization theory (see Edwards and McCarthy 2004 for a review). This theory has stressed the number of resources and the degree of internal structuring of social movements as crucial for movement emergence and mobilization (Jenkins 1983; McCarthy and Zald 1977). The organizations' internal structuring is also related to their development over time. For example, Kriesi (1996) proposes four parameters for the analysis of organizational development: organizational growth and decline, internal structuring, external structuring, and goal orientations and action repertoires. Here, we focus on the second aspect, namely internal structuring. Specifically, we look at the impact of two indicators: degree of formalization and size.

The question is whether the organizations' internal structuring can plausibly be linked to the democratic model they follow in decision making, in particular to the deliberative participative model. We hypothesize that organizations with a lower degree of *formalization* (for example, in terms of paid staff, budget, and formal membership) will be more likely to follow the deliberative participative model (see Clemens and Minkoff 2004 for a review of work on the role of organization in social movement research). More formalized organizations, in contrast, will tend to delegate the most important decisions to a small group of leaders. This is partly because these organizations are more professionalized and therefore have a small, professional committee to take and implement decisions. Therefore, formalized organizations would favour representation over participation and majority voting over deliberation. In addition, we can expect a lower degree of formalization to be associated with a consensual rule of decision making rather than a majority rule, which better reflects the routines of a professional board and of formal organizations more generally (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Thus, if we combine the two dimensions, we expect organizations with a lower degree of internal structuring to adopt a deliberative participative model of democracy.

Similar reasoning can be applied to *organizational size* (see also Chapter 6 in this volume). Again, for pragmatic reasons, larger organizations can be expected to be more favourable to delegation of power in the decision-making body and less favourable to consensus as a decision-making method than smaller ones. Participation and deliberation are more difficult to attain in larger groups. Therefore, we expect smaller organizations to follow the deliberative participative democratic model.

Degree of formalization and size are internal characteristics of the organizations *strictu sensu*. A third aspect can also be considered as being part of the organizations' internal structuring: the *territorial scope* of the organizations (see also Chapter 4 in this volume). Here, we distinguish between organizations with an international/transnational scope and those with only a domestic scope (that is, local and/or national). Although it is more difficult to advance a clear-cut hypothesis for this aspect, one may argue that domestic organizations are more likely to adopt the deliberative participative model, as they can afford to be more open to participation and deliberation to the extent that they have a more limited reach. International/transnational organizations, in contrast, are more complex and therefore necessitate more effective decision-making procedures, which only a high degree of

delegation and a majority rule can provide. Furthermore, the multilevel game implied by being active on both the domestic and the international/transnational levels makes consensus and broad participation more difficult to attain.

While the first three aspects are all structural conditions of the democratic models adopted by organizations, the remaining two can be seen as cultural conditions as they refer to their cultural roots. Students of social movements, especially in the European tradition, have stressed the role of social and cultural cleavages for the emergence and mobilization of social movements (for example, Kriesi et al. 1995). In particular, many have pointed to the different cultural underpinnings of the new social movements with respect to 'older' movements, above all the labour movement (see Buechler 1995 and Pichardo 1997 for reviews). Others have looked at the social basis of the new social movements, arguing that they reflect a division within the new middle class and that their mobilization potential is largely based on this line of conflict (for example, Kriesi 1989). In this perspective, the new social movements are ultimately rooted in the structural and cultural transformations that have characterized the European countries in the postwar period.

Here, we follow this line of reasoning to investigate the impact of the *movement area* to which the studied organizations belong on their propensity to follow a given democratic model (see also Chapter 1 in this volume). This gives us a measure of the organizations' broader position as resulting from their underlying cultural cleavage. In this regard, we can hypothesize that the organizations that reflect the cultural cleavage embodied by the new social movements should be more inclined to adopt a participative and deliberative mode of decision making. The new social movements have been characterized as promoting participation by civil society actors and 'softer' ways to take collective decisions (Polletta 2002). As a result, we may expect them to be more likely to accept the idea that decision making should be obtained through a lower degree of delegation and to more frequent use of consensus. Organizations not belonging to this tradition of contention, in contrast, should be more oriented towards delegation and towards majority rule in decision making. This should be particularly the case for traditional parties and unions, which tend to privilege representation rather than participation and are usually less prone to seeking consensus.

The *degree of identification with the Global Justice Movement* points in the same direction. The more an organization identifies with the movement, the more it can be said to share its values and claims. Therefore, we can expect organizations that display a strong degree of

identification to be more likely to adopt a deliberative participative model of democracy, as they will be closer to participation and consensus as organizational values.

Furthermore, we look at the *year of foundation* of the organizations. This is meant to measure the impact of the historical period in which the organizations emerged. Although this aspect has been somewhat under-studied in the social movement literature, we think it is likely to influence the characteristics of the organizations studied and above all their visions of democracy (see Chapter 9 for a discussion of the relationship between time and democratic models). We distinguish between organizations created before 1989 and those founded after 1989. This year represents a watershed in the history of Europe and therefore also in the history of political contention. Organizations and movements that emerged after the fall of the Berlin wall clearly faced a totally different environment, less constrained by ideological cleavages and more open to work within cross-cutting cleavages. Most important for our present purpose, what we today call the Global Justice Movement can be said to have emerged around that time. We hypothesize that organizations created more recently (that is, after 1989) will be more inclined to adopt a deliberative participative model of democracy. These are the organizations that emerged within the protest wave carried by the GJM. Since this movement emphasizes the need for an open and inclusive democracy, we may expect the organizations that form the backbone of this movement to implement such a view of democracy in their internal functioning as well.

Finally, we control our results with a variable pertaining to the broader institutional setting of the country in which the organizations are located. Specifically, we want to see whether differences in the *type of democracy* characterizing the country can explain how some organizations are more likely to adopt more deliberative practices than others. To do so, we use Lijphart's (1999) well-known typology of democratic systems, which distinguishes between majoritarian and consensual democracies. Among the countries included in our study, France and especially Britain are examples of majoritarian democracies, while Germany and especially Switzerland are examples of consensual democracies. To these two 'pure' types, the authors add mixed cases, intermediary situations in which the country has a high score on the executive-parties dimension and a low score on the federal-unitary dimension, or vice versa. In our data, this is the case for Italy and Spain. The rationale behind the use of this typology is that we may expect those organizations coming from consensual democracies to be more inclined to adopt a deliberative

participative decision-making model given that the broader institutional setting is already attuned to inclusive, consensual, and horizontal forms of governance. Conversely, we expect organizations from majoritarian democracies to be less likely to follow this democratic model as they are located in more exclusive, unitarian, and vertical systems. Organizations in mixed democracies should stand somewhere in between.

In sum, we have advanced a number of hypotheses concerning the conditions that might lead an organization to adopt a deliberative participative model of democracy in internal decision making (that is, one that stresses the search for consensus and broader participation to arrive at a 'good' decision). Specifically, we expect such a democratic model to be adopted by recently created, smaller organizations with a low degree of formalization, a domestic territorial scope, a position close to the cultural cleavage embodied by the new social movements, and strong identification with the GJM. In addition, we expect organizations that are located in consensual democracies to be more likely to follow the deliberative participative model and, conversely, those located in majoritarian democracies to be less likely to do so.

A multivariate regression analysis allows us, in a first step, to confront these expectations with the empirical evidence at our disposal. Our analysis, however, does not simply aim to address these hypotheses separately or, as in a more traditional statistical approach, to look for the 'net effect' of each of the five variables under control of all the others. We are also interested in exploring the configurations of conditions that lead organizations to opt for consensus and participation (rather than majority rule and delegation) in internal decision making. In doing so, we go beyond a linear and additive logic in explaining democratic models in the GJM and follow instead a logic and method that allow us to identify possible combinations of factors leading to the choice of a given democratic model as well as different possible paths leading to such a choice. QCA is particularly suited to studying such multiple conjunctural causation (Ragin 1987).

Data and methods

The data were collected by means of a structured questionnaire submitted to a sample of organizations active in the Global Justice Movement in each of the six countries (see Chapter 1 for more details). Of the 225 organizations in our sample, only 168 were used in our empirical analyses.² In order to correctly apply the QCA, we need non-missing data on each variable. This is not the case for 57 organizations, which are

therefore excluded from the analyses. Although the number of cases lost is relatively high (about one-quarter of the initial sample), this should not negatively affect our analyses. First of all, our initial sample of 225 organizations is not considered to be statistically representative. Even if the cases dropped are not randomly distributed among the variables (which is a problem for representative samples), this is not statistically relevant in our research. Second and most important, the missing cases are randomly distributed among the main variables. We can therefore assume that the removal of the missing cases does not affect the overall importance of particular kinds of organizations.

As discussed earlier, our model includes seven explanatory factors (six for the QCA). Most of them are simply operationalized directly through the data from the structured questionnaire. However, for some variables, there was too much missing information. In order to avoid excluding too many cases, missing information was replaced through data from other variables or with data retrieved in the documents produced by the organizations. Next, we present the operationalization of the variables included in the analysis, starting from the dependent variable.

Democratic models

To classify the selected organizations according to the typology of democratic models, we used both the information coming from the structured questionnaire and information derived from the organizations' internal documents, starting from the former and retrieving missing information from the latter. This allowed us to include as many cases as possible in the analysis. The definition of a given organization as assembly, associational, deliberative representative, or deliberative participative (the type in which we are interested) is based on a complex operationalization involving a number of indicators allowing us to classify the organization on the two dimensions of the typology (delegation of power vs. participation in the decision-making body, and consensus vs. majority rule as a decision-making method).

Degree of formalization

To create the measure for the degree of formalization of the organization, we took into account three aspects: the size of the organization's staff (number of paid members), its budget, and the existence of a membership card. All three aspects were first computed as dummy variables with the following values: a paid staff of more than 30 people, a budget of more than 10 000 euros, and the existence of a membership card. The

threshold concerning paid staff and budget was based on the median value on each aspect. We then created an additive index with the three indicators. The index thus obtained was finally recoded into a dummy variable (high/low degree of formalization).

Size

The size of the organization was computed through a variable measuring the number of individual members. If the number of members is higher than the median value (775 members), the organization is considered as large. When available, missing information on this variable was replaced by a variable measuring the number of people participating in the assembly (if higher than 100, then the size is considered as large) and two variables created based on the information retrieved from the documents produced by asking for information directly from the organizations: one measuring the number of individual members (large size if higher than the median value of the distribution) and another measuring the number of collective members (large size if higher than the median value). This was done for 123 cases.

Territorial scope

The territorial scope of the organization was operationalized through the highest level of its campaigns. The latter was measured through a direct question asking for the highest territorial level of the campaigns the organization usually conducts (local, national, or international/transnational). We distinguished between the domestic (local and/or national) and the international/transnational level. When available, missing information on this variable was replaced through a variable asking if the organization had some form of collaboration with international institutions (if yes, we consider the highest campaign level to be the international/transnational one).³ This was done for 101 cases.

Movement area

To measure the belonging of the organization to a specific movement area, we used a variable that classifies the organizations on the basis of various sources (online and offline documents as well as the structured questionnaire). This variable distinguishes among six main areas: Old Left; New Left, anarchism, autonomy; new social movements; solidarity, peace, human rights; new global; and other issues (see Chapter 1). We created a dummy variable by merging the third, fourth, and fifth categories (new social movements; solidarity, peace, and human rights;

and new global), which we consider as belonging to the same broad area we may call 'new social global movements,' as opposed to all the other categories.⁴

Year of foundation

The year of foundation of the organization was operationalized in a simple fashion by using 1989 as a threshold. Organizations founded before 1989, which represents a watershed in the history of contention in Europe and in contemporary history more generally, are considered as 'old', while organizations created after 1989 are considered as 'new'.

Identification with the Global Justice Movement

The variable measuring the organization's degree of identification with the Global Justice Movement was operationalized through a question asking if the group considers itself as part of the overall movement. When available, missing information on this variable was replaced through a variable measuring whether the organization actively participated in events carried by the GJM (if yes, it is considered as identifying with the movement).⁵ This was done for 83 cases.

Type of democracy

Variations in the institutional settings in which the organizations are located are operationalized through Lijphart's (1999) distinction between majoritarian and consensual democracies. In his perspective, countries may be classified according to a two-dimensional map built on two axes: the executive-parties and the federal-unitary axes. We used the scores he calculated in his analysis for each country on these two dimensions to place our countries in one type or the other. Thus, Britain and France are considered as majoritarian democracies, Germany and Switzerland as consensual ones, and Italy and Spain as 'mixed' cases (see Lijphart 1999 for more details).

Given that our analyses are carried out on what is sometimes called a 'medium-sized sample' (formed, in our case, by 168 valid observations), we test our hypotheses through a triangulation of logistic regression and QCA. The logistic regression helps us to determine the relative importance of each explanatory factor on the democratic model adopted by the organizations. However, given the size of our sample, in general we do not expect highly significant results. QCA provides a more reliable tool when working with a limited number of cases (Ragin 1987). In addition, it has important logical and methodological advantages,

especially for small to medium-sized samples such as ours (Harkreader and Imershein 1999). First, the method is based on an easily accessible logic, constructed on simple algebraic bases (the Boolean logic). The variables are entered in the model in the simplest possible form: the binary form.⁶ Furthermore, QCA results are presented in a parsimonious yet comprehensive way, by distinguishing between necessary and sufficient conditions for the presence of a given outcome (Ragin 1987). This allows for direct and immediate understanding of the results. Second, QCA aims to integrate the complexity of the context into the core of the analysis. To do so, it integrates interaction effects among causal or contextual variables. As noted by Scharpf (1997), this method, by focusing on combinations of variables, not only stresses multi-causality, but also does not necessarily assume that variables are independent. Moreover, QCA has an equifinal or functional equivalent view, meaning that different configurations of the context can produce the same outcome (Scharpf 1997; Hall 2003; Mahoney and Goertz 2006).

The problem with QCA in our case is that our sample is not small enough. As reported in the literature on the subject, too small a sample increases the likelihood that no deterministic solution will be found (Hicks 1994). In such a configuration, the number of conflictive combinations is too high to allow a parsimonious solution. Second, a high number of independent variables increases exponentially the number of potential combinations of factors, again increasing the risk that no deterministic solution will be found (Scharpf 1997). We propose in this chapter an empirical solution allowing us to cope (at least in part) with these two problems that occur when the sample is not small enough. We present this solution in the discussion of the results below.

Regression analysis

Our main goal is to explore some of the structural and cultural factors that lead organizations active within the Global Justice Movement to adopt a deliberative participative model of democracy in internal decision making. Since we deal with a binary dependent variable (presence or absence of a deliberative participative model), in this first step we use logistic regression. In order to assess the explanatory power of each set of factors taken separately, we ran three separate models: one with only the three structural variables, another in which we added the three cultural variables, and a full model that includes the control by type of democracy (Table 5.2).

Table 5.2 Estimate of effects of selected independent variables on two contrasting decision models (odds ratios)

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Full model</i>
Degree of formalization (low)	2.41	0.28	0.35
Size (small)	29.12***	39.59***	39.96***
Territorial scope (domestic)	1.34	1.33	1.30
Movement area (new social global)	–	4.46*	4.37*
Identification with the global justice movement (strong)	–	13.34 ⁺	10.89 ⁺
Year of foundation (after 1989)	–	4.18*	3.62*
Type of democracy (ref.: mixed)			
Majoritarian	–	–	0.39 ⁺
Consensual	–	–	0.45
Nagelkerke R ²	0.40	0.49	0.51
-2 Log likelihood	140.985	125.808	122.249
N	168	168	168

Notes: ⁺ p ≤ .10, *p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, ***p ≤ .001.

If we compare the first two models, we can see that structural factors (model 1) have much more explanatory power than cultural factors do (model 2). Indeed, the explained variance for the former set of variables equals 40 per cent, while adding the latter only increases it by less than 10 per cent. The full model adds little to the explained variance but yields a significant effect concerning the institutional variable. Specifically, organizations located in majoritarian democracies are less likely to follow a deliberative participative model, as compared to those in mixed systems (category of reference). Certainly, the effect is significant only at the 10 per cent level and, moreover, the odds for the category of consensual democracies is also lower than 1, thus pointing to a negative relationship. Yet, this finding suggests that institutional setting influences the adoption of a deliberative participative model of democracy in the expected direction.

Among the three structural indicators we have included in our analysis, organizational size is by far the most important (model 1). In fact, it is the only one that displays a statistically significant effect. Furthermore, the odds of the occurrence of the deliberative participative model are extremely high: small organizations are nearly 40 times more likely to adopt this democratic model than are large ones, when controlling for the other factors (full model). Also, the effect is robust, as it remains significant across the three models. This finding is consistent with

our hypothesis with regard to this factor. Larger organizations may be seen as posing a material obstacle to effectively deliberative and fully-inclusive decision making, insofar as the higher the number of members (which is an indicator of organizational size), the more difficult it is to include each one in a decisional process aiming to take into account the opinions of all. In contrast, degree of formalization and territorial scope have no effect. Thus, more loosely structured organizations and organizations focusing on the domestic level in their campaigns are not more likely to follow a more inclusive internal decision-making process.

Cultural factors play a smaller role, but their effect is still important, and all three of them are statistically significant (model 2). The strongest effect is shown by identification with the Global Justice Movement, as organizations that strongly identify with the movement are about ten times more likely to follow a deliberative participative model than are the others (full model). This effect, however, is significant only at the 10 per cent level. Belonging to the new social global movement area and creation after 1989 also show a statistically significant and strong effect. All three effects are robust and remain significant when controlling for type of democracy. Most important, they are all consistent with our hypotheses: confirming our expectations, organizations whose mobilization rests on the tradition of contention first carried by the new social movements and more recently by the GJM are more likely to adopt the deliberative participative model in their internal decision making.

In order to better understand the importance of the role of the statistically significant factors yielded by the regression analysis, we have transformed the results of the logistic models into predicted probabilities of occurrence (Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3).⁷ More precisely, we show the predicted probabilities of the deliberative participative model under the interactive effect of size with, respectively, movement area (Figure 5.1), identification with the GJM (Figure 5.2), and year of foundation (Figure 5.3). By doing so, we intend to set the structural factor found to be significant in the logistic regression in interaction with each of the three cultural factors for which we also observed a significant effect.

The pattern is very similar in all three cases. Starting with the effect of movement area and size (Figure 5.1), we can see that both small size and belonging to the new social movement and Global Justice Movement area strongly increase the likelihood of using a deliberative participative democratic model, which is what we found in the logistic regression. The impact of organizational size, which is particularly strong, can be seen by comparing the two categories on the horizontal axis, while that

of movement area can be observed by comparing the two segments of the vertical axis. However, the most important result here is the presence of a strong interactive effect insofar as the difference between organizations belonging to the new social movement and Global Justice Movement area, on one hand, and those belonging to other movement areas, on the other, is particularly important for smaller organizations. Indeed, among larger organizations, there is almost no difference, while among smaller ones the predicted probabilities of the deliberative participative model range from around 20 per cent to more than 50 per cent. In other words, the likelihood of adopting this democratic model is much higher for small organizations that belong to the new social global movements, as compared to large organizations belonging to other movement areas.

A similar interactive effect can be observed in the case of identification with the Global Justice Movement (Figure 5.2). The predicted probabilities of the occurrence of the deliberative participative model are highest for small organizations with strong identification with the GJM and lowest for large organizations with only a weak identification with the movement. Again, size plays the bigger role, and the difference




Figure 5.1 Predicted probability for a deliberative participative democratic model according to movement area and size




Figure 5.2 Predicted probability for a deliberative participative democratic model according to identification with the Global Justice Movement and size




Figure 5.3 Predicted probability for a deliberative participative democratic model according to year of foundation and size

between organizations that identify with the movements and those that do not is virtually only present for those that are small.

Finally, the interaction between organizational size and year of foundation displays virtually the same pattern (Figure 5.3). Once again, size has a very strong effect, but only for smaller organizations, while the difference between recently created organizations and older ones is marginal for larger organizations. Thus, just as in the two previous situations, organizational size intertwines in a specific way with the historical period in which it was created to explain the adoption of the deliberative participative model, namely by increasing its likelihood among small organizations, but not so much among large ones.

Qualitative Comparative Analyses

The regression analysis gives us some hints as to the impact of the various explanatory factors on the adoption of a deliberative participative model of democracy. However, it is weakened by the relatively low number of cases for this kind of analysis. In addition, it tells us nothing about the joint effects of the selected variables. Therefore, the findings obtained through logistic regression need to be complemented and strengthened by means of alternative techniques. One way to do so is by applying QCA to our data. Built on a non-linear logic, QCA is particularly suited for small-N samples in which a set of explanatory factors is expected to jointly explain the presence or absence of a given outcome (in our case, a deliberative participative democratic model).

QCA is theoretically less stable and reliable when the number of observations is not small enough (the so-called medium-sized sample). In such a configuration, the likelihood that no deterministic solution will be found is much higher (Hicks 1994) owing to the increase in the number of conflictive paths (that is, identical configurations of independent factors that lead to different outcomes). In spite of the fact that our sample suffers precisely from this problem, we explore the role of structural and cultural determinants for the adoption of a deliberative participative model using QCA. However, in order to reduce the risk of non-determination due to the fact that our sample is not small enough, we need to adapt the classical crisp-sets QCA. We do so by introducing a pseudo-probabilistic approach that takes into account the probability for each conjunctural path to produce the outcome (Giugni and Nai 2008).

Following this approach, two scores are computed for each path composing the final causal equation: likelihood (L) and occurrence (O).

Likelihood measures the probability that the path leads effectively to the outcome predicted by the QCA and is calculated on the weighted ratio in conflictive combinations between the two different solutions the combination produces. For example, if a combination is composed by 9 cases leading to 1, and 1 case leading to 0, then the likelihood that the combination leads to 1 is 90 per cent. If a minimization occurred, likelihood is calculated through a simple weighting procedure based on the number of cases associated with each path that produced the minimization.⁸ Occurrence simply measures the quantitative importance of each path. For example, if a path is built on ten cases in an $N = 40$ analysis, then we say that the path has a 25 per cent occurrence (O). Both scores, which are presented in a standardized form, provide better results when they are close to 1 (that is, 100 per cent). Similarly to what is done in standard probabilistic statistics, a threshold can then be set for the acceptance or refusal of a causal path. In this analysis, we decided that a path that does not lead to the predicted outcome in at least 50 per cent of the cases on which the path is formed ($L \leq 0.5$) and that is not based on at least 20 per cent of the cases entered in the model after resolution of the contradictions ($O \leq 0.2$) cannot be reliably accepted as relevant. These thresholds are consistent with what can be found in the literature (Ragin 2006) and are used to better understand the results provided by the QCA.

These two scores have several advantages. First, they provide a simple and intuitive way to assess the relative importance of each causal path that composes the QCA solution. This helps the researcher to better interpret the results and to single out the most important conditions for the outcome. Second, they allow us to increase the number of cases on which the QCA models are run. As we said earlier, a large number of cases increase the likelihood that no deterministic solution will be found owing to the increase in the number of conflictive combinations (Hicks 1994). Our solution avoids many of the problems posed by too large a number of conflictive cases, as the contradicting cases are directly integrated into the calculation of a likelihood score through a weighting procedure.⁹ In brief, our solution allows the researcher to run QCA models with not-too-small samples by counterbalancing some of the major problems that typically emerge in such situations.¹⁰

We performed a first QCA in order to assess the conjunctural effect of the selected variables on the presence or absence of a deliberative participative model. The first QCA (not shown) did not yield any outcome, even after our procedure of resolution of contradictions. This is probably due to too low a ratio between the number of cases and the number of

conditions. One solution to this problem is to exclude the variables of the lowest empirical and/or theoretical interest. Since we have included it in the logistic regression only as a control variable, although one based on specific theoretical expectations, we decided to exclude the variable pertaining to the institutional setting of the country in which the organizations are located. The results for QCA without this variable are much more satisfactory and can be summarized as follows:¹¹

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{DELPART} = & \textit{SIZE} * \textit{YEAR} * \textit{IDGJM} * \textit{NSGM} * \textit{SCOPE} <L=0.69; O=0.30> \\
 & + \\
 & \textit{YEAR} * \textit{IDGJM} * \textit{NSGM} * \textit{scope} <L=0.63; O=0.20> \\
 & + \\
 & \textit{SIZE} * \textit{year} * \textit{nsgm} * \textit{scope} * \textit{formal} <L=0.66; O=0.02> \\
 & + \\
 & \textit{SIZE} * \textit{year} * \textit{scope} * \textit{FORMAL} <L=0.35; O=0.03>
 \end{aligned}$$

The causal equation produced by the QCA is made up of four distinct causal paths (that is, combinations of conditions leading to the predicted outcome, in our case the presence of a deliberative participative democratic model), each composed of a unique combination of conditions. In order to assess the relative importance of each path, likelihood and occurrence scores are shown in brackets. If we take into account the thresholds proposed above ($L \leq 0.5$ and $O \leq 0.2$), which are quite restrictive, only the first two paths (indicated in italics) should be considered as sufficiently reliable given our data.

In the first path (*SIZE*YEAR*IDGJM*NSGM*SCOPE*), the presence of a deliberative participative model is the outcome of the joint presence of five conditions: small organizational size, recent foundation (after 1989), strong identification with the Global Justice Movement, belonging to the new social global movement area, and domestic (local and/or national) territorial scope (in terms of campaigns). This path is fully consistent with our expectations and shows very well the joint effect of structural and cultural factors for the adoption of the deliberative participative model. The only explanatory factor, among those we are investigating, that does not appear as a condition for this democratic model is degree of formalization, which was also not significant in the logistic regression. It is important to stress that only the simultaneous presence of these conditions leads to the outcome, as indicated by the logical operator ‘and’ (*). Taken individually, they do not represent conditions for this democratic model to exist. This first causal path has quite

a high likelihood of producing the desired outcome ($L = 0.69$) and is built on a sufficient number of cases ($O = 0.30$).

The second path (YEAR*IDGJM*NSGM*scope) is made up of the joint presence of four conditions: recent foundation, strong identification with the Global Justice Movement, belonging to the new social global movement area, and an international/transnational territorial scope. While the first three conditions are once again consistent with our expectations, the fourth is not. Here, we find that having activities that reach beyond the national level combines with the other three factors to lead to the adoption of the deliberative participative model, which contradicts what we found in the first path. The fact that size does not matter here may give us a clue to explaining this apparent contradiction: small organizations probably tend to focus more on the domestic level, so when (small) size is not part of the causal path, having an international/transnational territorial scope enters the explanation.

Yet, the important point here is that, if we compare the factors appearing in the first two paths, we can see that the result of the QCA points to three necessary conditions for an organization to adopt a deliberative participative model of democracy:¹² creation after 1989, identifying with the GJM, and belonging to what we called the new social global movements. The joint presence of these three conditions (YEAR*IDGJM*NSGM) is needed for a deliberative participative model to be adopted. In other words, this means that this democratic model is not adopted without the joint presence of these three factors, although it does not exclude the possibility for other factors to combine with them.

All three conditions are consistent with our hypotheses. We expected organizations created more recently to be more inclined to adopt a deliberative participative model of democracy, as they emerged within the protest wave carried by the Global Justice Movement. Since this movement emphasizes the need for an open and inclusive democracy, we expected the organizations that form its backbone to implement such a view of democracy in their internal functioning as well. This is confirmed by the results of the QCA. Similarly, we expected that the more an organization identifies with the GJM, the more it can be said to share its values and claims. A strong identification with the movement was therefore expected to increase the chances that a deliberative participative model of democracy is followed, as the organization will be closer to consensus and participation as organizational values. Again, the results of the QCA support this hypothesis. Finally, organizations belonging to the new social global movement area, which emphasize consensus and broad participation, were expected to be more inclined to adopt the

deliberative participative democratic model. Here, too, the results of the QCA confirm our prediction.

All three factors comprising the necessary condition (YEAR*IDGJM*NSGM) belong to what we have defined as the cultural determinants of democratic models. This is consistent with the results we found earlier in the regression analysis. Indeed, the logistic regression models showed that all three cultural determinants have a statistically significant effect, going in the expected direction, on the presence of a deliberative participative model. These factors therefore seem crucial for this democratic model to be adopted by organizations of the Global Justice Movement. Furthermore, the necessary condition (YEAR*IDGJM*NSGM) combines in the first causal path with the presence of small organizational size. This is again in line with the results found in the regression analysis, where organizational size was found to be the strongest predictor for the deliberative participative model of democracy. In contrast, the QCA suggests that that territorial scope of the organizations also matters in one way or the other. This factor was found not to be statistically significant in the logistic regression. Finally, the QCA confirms the lack of impact of degree of formalization, and therefore that our prediction with regard to this aspect was incorrect. Just as in the logistic regression, this factor does not appear in the QCA as a condition leading to the deliberative participative model (meaning that a minimization has occurred), at least if we consider only the first two causal paths.

However, the QCA results look different if we do not take into account the two relevance scores (L and O) and we therefore interpret all four causal paths as yielded by the analysis. In fact, the third and fourth paths are far more complicated to understand, as they provide counterintuitive results. For example, if we look at the third path, the deliberative participative model seems to be the outcome of the presence of small organizational size (as expected), but jointly with earlier year of foundation, belonging to another movement area, international/transnational territorial scope, and high degree of formalization. All of the latter four conditions seem to work against our hypotheses and are not consistent with the results of the regression analysis. Similarly, the fourth path points to the impact of two factors in line with our predictions (small organizational size and low degree of formalization), but again in combination with two unexpected conditions: an earlier year of foundation and an international/transnational territorial scope. Furthermore, if we do not take into account the relevance scores, no necessary condition emerges from the results of the QCA. As we said, however, we think that failing to consider them would put our conclusions on shaky ground. In particular, occurrence is in both cases extremely low. This means that

the outcome is based on only 2 per cent (third path) and 3 per cent (fourth path) of the cases. In addition, likelihood for the fourth path is quite low. Under these conditions, it is obviously difficult to draw firm conclusions.

Conclusion

Deliberative democracy has become fashionable in recent years. Yet, while normative discussions of this concept abound in the political theory literature (e.g. Habermas 1996b; Dryzek 2001; Benhabib 1996), there is a lack of knowledge about how deliberation works in concrete settings (see Steiner et al. 2004 for an exception). In particular, we still know little about the reasons pushing social movement organizations to stress consensus and participation in internal decision making. This is all the more important insofar as the Global Justice Movement and the new social movements before it have put much emphasis on these aspects.

In this chapter we have focused on a number of structural and cultural factors that may explain why organizations active within the Global Justice Movement in several European countries adopt a deliberative participative model of democracy, which stresses the search for consensus and broad participation in internal decision making. We conducted two types of analysis that follow different underlying logics, also with the idea of triangulating them: regression analysis, based on a linear logic and looking at the 'net effect' of each variable, on one hand; and QCA, in order to examine multiple and conjunctural causation, on the other. The findings show that both the internal structuring of the organizations (structural factors) and the tradition of contention upon which their mobilization rests (cultural factors) should be taken into account to explain the adoption of this democratic model. On one side, the logistic regression suggests that organizational size matters most. Specifically, small organizations are more likely to adopt a deliberative participative democratic model. It also shows that organizations belonging to what we called the new social global movement area (that is, close to the new social movements and the Global Justice Movement), that have a strong identification with the GJM, and that were created after 1989 are more likely to follow the deliberative participative model. All of this is in line with our hypotheses. On the other side, again confirming our expectations, the QCA points above all to the importance of the cultural factors. In particular, we have found the joint presence of the three cultural factors to be a necessary condition for the adoption of the deliberative participative model.

The results of the QCA are consistent with those yielded by the regression analysis: the three cultural factors are all important determinants of the choice of a given model of democracy in internal decision making. However, while the regression analysis also suggests that one of the structural factors, namely organizational size, has the strongest impact in quantitative terms, the QCA adds to the explanation by showing that the cultural factors combine qualitatively to lead the organizations to opt for the deliberative participative democratic model.

To conclude, we should stress a finding that was not at the core of our study, but that deserves to be mentioned. We are referring to the fact that organizations located in majoritarian democracies, according to Lijphart's (1999) typology, are less likely to adopt the deliberative participative democratic model in internal decision making. Certainly, this effect does not stand the contrast with the other type of democracy singled out by Lijphart, as organizations located in consensual democracies are less likely to follow this democratic model. Yet this finding suggests that there might be some kind of institutional isomorphism between social movement organizations and their broader institutional setting.

Notes

1. We exclude from our analysis the transnational organizations. Since we look, among other factors, at the impact of the international/transnational scope as well as the type of democracy of the country in which the organizations are located, including purely transnational ones would bias the analysis.
2. By combining data from the structured questionnaire and from the documents produced by the organizations (and sometimes from information presented on the organizations' Web sites), we obtained a sample of 225 (non-transnational) organizations that included information about their democratic model of decision. Of these, only 168 are included in the analysis owing to missing information.
3. This is not only theoretically, but also empirically justified: among organizations that qualified their highest level of campaigns as international, the majority also declared having partial or full collaboration with international institutions.
4. Following previous work (e.g. Kriesi et al. 1995), we think that solidarity, peace, and human rights organizations belong to the new social movements, although they might have certain specificities such as, for example, religious roots, the involvement in project development, and a strong international orientation.
5. Again, this is not only theoretically, but also empirically justified: among organizations that consider themselves part of the GJM, nearly all declared having participated in events carried by the movement.
6. The dichotomization of the variables is not a sine qua non condition. For example, 'fuzzy-set' QCA uses more fine-grained measures (Ragin 2000).

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Similarly, Cronqvist (2003) has proposed an approach using categorical variables. Here, however, we prefer to stick with the original version of QCA in order to keep our analysis as simple as possible.

7. Predicted probabilities refer to the likelihood, expressed in percentages, for an observed unit (here, an organization) to display the characteristics to be explained (here, to adopt the deliberative participative model) under the effect of one or more explanatory variables. They are calculated through the following equation (Menard 2002):

$$P(Y = 1) = [e^{(\alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \dots + \beta_k X_k)}] / [1 + e^{(\alpha + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \dots + \beta_k X_k)}],$$

where Y is the outcome to be predicted, X_1 to X_k are the independent factors, α is the intercept of the model, and β_1 to β_k are the unstandardized regression coefficients.

8. Minimization refers to the process by which QCA aims to identify regularities among a medium number of cases. The researcher starts with a maximum level of complexity, then Boolean algebra allows for a systematic minimization of this complexity to varying degrees (depending on the inclusion or exclusion of 'logical cases'), so that one or several configurations of conditions are identified as leading to a given outcome.
9. Simply put, when a conflictive situation exists while explaining an outcome, it is resolved: (1) by eliminating all cases leading to the opposite outcome, and (2) by integrating a measure of the relevance of the combination of conditions that takes into account the ratio between kept and eliminated combinations (likelihood).
10. It should be noted that the likelihood score and the occurrence ratio are roughly equivalent to the notions of consistency and coverage in QCA (see Ragin 2006).
11. In QCA, upper case usually indicates the presence of a condition and lower case its absence. In our case, we use upper case for conditions that meet our hypotheses and lower case for conditions that go counter to the hypotheses. Thus, 'SIZE' indicates a small organization and 'size' a large one; 'YEAR' indicates an organization created after 1989 and 'year' one created before 1989; 'IDGJM' indicates an organization that considers itself as part of the Global Justice Movement and 'idgjm' one that does not; 'NSGM' indicates an organization belonging to the new social global movement area and 'nsgm' one that belongs to another movement area; 'FORMAL' indicates a poorly formalized organization and 'formal' a highly formalized one; 'SCOPE' indicates an organization whose campaigns are prevalently domestic (local and/or national) and 'scope' one that has at least some campaign activity on the international level. The logical operator 'and' (*) means that two or more conditions need to be present jointly for the outcome to occur (conjunctural causation, in the QCA jargon). The logical operator 'or' (+) means that there is more than one path leading to the outcome (multiple causation, in the QCA jargon).
12. Perhaps better: one necessary condition, which is the joint presence of three conditions.