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Hindering Peace in the Name of Peace: Case study of all U.S. Vetoes on the “question of Palestine” (1973-2023)

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University of Geneva
Faculty of Social Science
Master's in Political Science
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**Hindering Peace in the Name of Peace: Case study of all U.S. Vetoes on the
“question of Palestine” (1973-2023).**

Thesis to fulfill the requirements for the degree of Master's in Political Science
specialized in International Politics.

August / September 2024

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I- Topic and Problematic

1- Introduction

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains one of the most persistent and complex challenges in international relations, defying numerous attempts at peaceful resolution. At the heart of many diplomatic efforts to address this issue is the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the body charged with maintaining international peace and security.

The voting behavior of the United States in the UNSC regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict raises considerable concerns and questions. In fact, the U.S. stance often plays a crucial role in shaping the international community's response to the conflict particularly through its veto power. Observers and analysts have noted patterns in U.S. vetoing that has far-reaching implications for the peace process and the broader dynamics of the conflict. This behavior not only affects the immediate outcomes of UNSC resolutions but also shapes the overall diplomatic landscape surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

Since 1973, the U.S. has cast 33 vetoes on resolutions related to the Palestinian question, most recently on December 8, 2023, when it blocked a call for a ceasefire in Gaza despite the resolution being co-sponsored by nearly 100 member states and unprecedented toll of casualties. As such, understanding and analyzing U.S. voting patterns in the UNSC provides valuable insights into the challenges and potential pathways for resolving this enduring conflict. This consistent use of veto power, often justified as necessary to avoid impeding the peace process, raises in fact critical questions about the mechanisms and processes by which these actions effectively contribute to the peacebuilding efforts.

As such, this thesis aims to unravel the complex processes and dynamics surrounding U.S. vetoes in the UNSC and the hinderance of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. To achieve this objective, the study will begin with a literature review that explores the importance of the UNSC and vetoes, delves into the U.S.-Israel relationship, examines the implications for the peace process, and provides an overview of U.S. vetoes on the Palestinian question. Following this, a theoretical background will be established, discussing relevant peacebuilding concepts and applicable International Relations theories to frame our analysis.

The research will then develop a conceptual framework based on peacebuilding principles to guide the investigation. A detailed explanation of the methodology will follow, outlining the research approach and methods employed. The analysis will consist of a comprehensive examination of the 33 vetoed resolutions, divided into three distinct timelines. This analysis will consider peace pillars, real-world events, representatives' statements and perceptions, and will include a review of relevant literature.

Finally, the study will conclude by presenting findings that address the critical question: How do U.S. vetoes at the UNSC hinder the peace process in Palestine/Israel, and what are the specific mechanisms and processes through which this obstruction occurs?

Through this structured approach, the research will explore the nature of these vetoes in relation to specific diplomatic initiatives, investigate the ways in which they obstruct peace efforts, and analyze how they are perceived and justified by various stakeholders. Ultimately, this study

aims to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the mechanisms at play in the peace process in relation to Security Council dynamics, offering valuable insights into the intricate relationships between the UNSC, U.S. vetoes, and peace-building efforts in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

2- The Literature:

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) stands as a cornerstone of international peace and security, its relevance and power deeply rooted in the aftermath of World War II. To comprehend how U.S. vetoes at the UNSC hinder the peace process, it is essential to first understand the Council's importance and then examine the veto power and its challenges. This understanding will pave the way for an exploration of the exceptional American-Israeli relationship and its implications for the peace process and U.S. voting behavior on the Palestinian question in the Security Council.

i. Pillars of Power: The relevance of the UN Security Council and the Veto

In the aftermath of World War II, as world leaders sought to create a more effective international organization than the League of Nations, the concept of the Security Council emerged. President Franklin D. Roosevelt envisioned a mechanism akin to a worldwide police force to ensure efficacy in maintaining global peace (Goury, 2015). This vision aligned with classical realism, placing the primary responsibility for peace maintenance in the hands of the permanent members of the Council (P-5), each endowed with a powerful veto right.

The Security Council quickly established itself as the "aristocratic body" of the United Nations, wielding unparalleled competence and importance in matters of international security (Mahmood, 2013). The veto right, a cornerstone of the UN Charter, was not without controversy. At the Yalta Conference, it was the subject of intense debate among the major powers. Later, at the San Francisco conference, several medium-sized states voiced opposition to this privilege. However, the P-5 remained steadfast, making the veto a non-negotiable condition for their participation in the UN. This standoff exemplified the perennial tension between power politics and principles of international cooperation (Goury, 2015; Mahmood, 2013).

The UN Charter clearly delineates the role and legal competences of the Security Council. The binding legal nature of the Security Council's decisions primarily bolsters its authority (Mahmoud, 2013). Morphet (1990) outlines that UN Charter Article 24 assigns the Security Council "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security... in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations." The Security Council primarily carries out these duties through intervention under Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) and, if necessary, through Chapter VII. Chapter VII deals with actions concerning threats to peace, breaches of peace, and acts of aggression, including complete or partial interruption of economic relations, means of communication, and diplomatic relations (Article 41), or even action by air, sea, or land forces as necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security (Article 42).

Despite significant changes in the global landscape since 1945, the Council's structure has remained largely unchanged, with only one amendment in 1965 increasing the number of non-

permanent members from six to ten. Despite widespread acknowledgment that the Council should expand to better reflect contemporary geopolitical realities, Mahmood (2013) notes that this rigidity persists. The author further notes that the privileged status of the P-5 within the UN system is unparalleled in international organizations, surpassing even the weighted voting systems employed by institutions like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund that hint towards a state of great powers but still based on the equal sovereignty of states. “

Furthermore, it is impossible to overestimate the significance of UNSC resolutions. While groundbreaking resolutions may be infrequent, once passed, they remain impossible to ignore and become enduring fixtures in the landscape of international diplomacy. Morphet (1990) argues that these resolutions often serve as crucial frameworks for addressing protracted regional disputes, providing a foundation for diplomatic negotiations that might otherwise struggle to find common ground. A prime example is Resolution 242 of 1967, addressing the Arab-Israeli conflict. This resolution encapsulates the maximum possible international agreement on the issue and has become an indispensable reference point for future peace efforts in the region. He further explains that the Security Council serves not as a means of supplanting power politics but rather as a mechanism for modifying them and mitigating some of their worst effects (Ibid.).

This nuanced view highlights the complex role the Council plays in international relations. Furthermore, the intrinsic link between human rights and international peace and security has gained increasing recognition in recent years. Denny (2018) refers to UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres's 2017 assertion that genuine peace depends on the exercise and enforcement of human rights, and the UNSC holds a unique position in determining threats to peace and deciding on appropriate measures to maintain international stability. In fact, the creation of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2000 marked the origin of the concept of "responsibility to protect" (R2P).

The concept (R2P) represents a significant evolution in addressing human rights crises, committing states to collective action through the Security Council when a state fails to protect its population from grave violations such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Throughout its history, the UNSC has intervened in various human rights crises, including imposing sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in 1968 and South Africa in 1977, and more recently authorizing intervention in Libya in 2011 with a no-fly zone and other measures under Chapter VII. However, Denny notes that the Council's track record in addressing human rights abuses has been inconsistent, largely due to the veto power wielded by the P-5.

This inconsistency highlights the complex interplay between the UNSC's structure, veto power, and its ability to effectively address international conflicts and human rights issues, with the Council tasked with implementing R2P through the means provided in Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. The intersection of power politics, historical alliances, and the pursuit of peace creates a multifaceted challenge that continues to test the efficacy and relevance of the United Nations Security Council in the 21st century.

- **The Veto Power: A Double-Edged Sword in Global Governance."**

The veto power, a critical component of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), has long been a subject of debate in international relations. The Security Council grants this power to its permanent members, enabling them to cast a contrary vote, thereby significantly impacting collective actions in cases of international conflicts (Basdevant, 1956). Although the term

"veto" does not appear in the UN Charter, it is derived from the voting procedure outlined in Article 27, which states that decisions on non-procedural matters "shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members, including the concurring votes of the permanent members" (UN Charter, Article 27). This provision effectively grants permanent members the ability to nullify any resolution with a negative vote, regardless of the popular support it may enjoy (Mahmood, 2013). Moreover, the veto power extends to various areas of UNSC decision-making, including recommendations, amendments to the UN Charter, appointments to the International Court of Justice, recommendations for Secretary-General candidates, and the admission or exclusion of member states to the UN (Basdevant, 1956). This broad application of the veto has made the Security Council the most controversial organ of the United Nations (Mahmood, 2013).

Denny (2018) identifies three main factors that guide the UNSC's response to crises: moral pressure, impact on material interests, and past investments in the crisis. Moral pressure refers to the extent to which a crisis creates an imperative to intervene and protect threatened populations, as well as uphold established international norms. The impact on material interests takes into account how a crisis might negatively affect UNSC members' economic and strategic concerns, including obligations to allies. Past investments in the crisis account for the resources, both material and immaterial, that UNSC members have previously committed to addressing the situation.

Morphet (1990) outlines four primary political reasons for the use of the veto: East-West rivalry, self-protection, protection of allies, and putting an end to expressions of frustration. East-West rivalry often explained vetoes related to UN membership, especially during the Cold War. France and Great Britain exemplified self-protection during the Suez Crisis. Protection of allies has been a recurring theme, as seen in Soviet vetoes concerning Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1979 and numerous U.S. vetoes regarding Israel's actions, noting that "the isolation of the United States on Palestine/Israel issues has been apparent since the early 1970s." Finally, the use of vetoes has suppressed expressions of frustration, particularly from the Third World, as demonstrated by Namibia's triple veto in April 1981.

However, the extensive use of the veto has led to criticism regarding the efficacy and representativeness of the Security Council. Regardless of the severity of the threat to peace or security, the efficacy of the veto can hinder decision-making, as it prevents the Council from intervening unless all permanent members agree on action (Goury, 2015). This limitation led to the adoption of the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution in 1950, following the Soviet veto over the Korean War. This resolution allows for the transfer of issues threatening international peace and security from the Security Council to the General Assembly when the Council is unable to perform its function due to the threat of a veto, requiring a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly (Mahmood, 2013).

In terms of representativeness, the veto is seen as an excessive prerogative granted solely to the permanent members, which holds the Council hostage to their interests while placing them above the United Nations Charter. This dynamic has led to a perception that the world operates under a regime of dual hegemony: one of wealthy countries over poorer ones, and another of the United States over the entire world (Goury, 2015). The veto power has therefore contributed to the Security Council's inaction on several issues with serious repercussions for international peace and security. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict stands as a prime example, with the United Nations unable to resolve the issue after decades, largely due to the United States' use of its veto power (Mahmood, 2013).

Furthermore, Papalia (2017) argues that the "unqualified veto" undermines the sovereign equality of states, enables the P5 to protect their own and their allies' interests at the expense of international peace, avoids accountability for the P5, and has allowed several humanitarian crises to continue without the Council's intervention. The veto power's unpopularity was particularly evident in the 1990s, when 185 UN Member States criticized it as inequitable. The author emphasizes that the veto has created a system of "selective security," in which the Council is deeply involved in certain conflicts but remains inactive in the face of obvious and objective necessity due to geopolitics and national interests. Not all responses to humanitarian issues require the use of force or positive action by states, such as the cases of Rwanda and Darfur. Responses can include statements of condemnation or the imposition of sanctions, yet the veto has prevented even these from occurring. For instance, in 1987 and 1988, the veto successfully prevented the imposition of economic sanctions on Apartheid South Africa (Papalia, 2017).

Likewise, a recent report by the independent non-profit Security Council Report (2015) focuses on the ongoing debate surrounding the veto mechanism, highlighting the need to reconsider its role, particularly regarding Israel. It highlighted that UNSC is tasked with addressing threats to international peace and security, and its decisions, which all UN members must implement, carry significant weight, which is evident in decisions involving military force and economic sanctions. Thus, in 2015, three initiatives aimed at reforming the veto mechanism emerged: the French initiative for suspending veto powers in mass atrocity cases, the ACT Group's code of conduct against vetoing resolutions to prevent genocide and war crimes, and the Elders' Proposal for permanent members to clarify alternatives when using their veto in mass atrocity situations. However, these initiatives are not legally binding, raising doubts about their effectiveness in addressing concerns about the UNSC's performance (Hatuel-Radoshitzky, 2015).

Additionally, "The Council appears to evaluate its use as a reason to act on a case-by-case basis" (Denny, 2018). It has had major humanitarian consequences, as outlined by Papalia (2017). Major failures resulting in humanitarian crises and genocides occurred in Rwanda in 1994 and Darfur in 2004, where the Council failed to use force to protect vulnerable populations. In Darfur, China and Russia's vetoes blocked direct intervention, while in Rwanda, the USA and France prevented a robust intervention. The UN Independent Inquiry into the Rwandan genocide concluded that a force of just 2,500 could have halted or at least limited the massacres that took place following the shooting of the Rwandan President's airplane. The lack of Council reaction to the genocides in Rwanda and Darfur collectively resulted in over 120,000 deaths, representing a serious threat to international order and justice (Ibid.).

More recently, the use of the veto has been a major impediment in addressing human rights situations in Syria, Gaza-Palestine, Georgia, Crimea, Eastern Ukraine, Yemen, and Myanmar. On April 10, 2018, Russia used its veto power for the 12th time to block action directed at its Syrian ally. Similarly, from 2000 to 2018, the United States cast 12 vetoes on resolutions calling for action on Israel, leading to UNSC paralysis in the face of mass atrocities. Russia's persistent use of the veto, often in conjunction with China, not only halted UNSC efforts to stem the crisis in Syria but also contributed to the continuation of mass atrocities, resulting in 400,000 deaths and 5 million refugees by the end of 2017. This stark reminder that the Council is a political body subject to the competing interests, values, and power relations of its member states (Denny, 2018) underscores the complex and often controversial nature of the veto power in global governance. As we delve deeper into the exceptional relationship between the United States and Israel in subsequent sections, it becomes clear that this dynamic adds another layer

of complexity to the UNSC's operations, particularly concerning the Palestinian question and the broader peace process in the Middle East.

ii. Allies in Exceptionalism: The unique bond between the U.S. and Israel

In the history of international relations in the 20th century, few alliances are as privileged and enduring as that established between the United States and Israel. This alliance represents the culmination of an extraordinary historical trajectory that spans millennia. At its core lies a shared ideological and cultural framework, characterized by a common identity, values such as democracy, and the myth of a new country. This shared way of life reflects an increasing Americanization of Israeli society and a sense of belonging to the West, particularly in contrast to Arab societies (Dieckhoff, 1998). This approach aligns with Edward Said's concept of "Orientalism". Said argues that Orientalist perspectives have influenced the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, along with the destruction of Palestinian society. These views have been supported by the Jewish national movement, which has produced elites and officials who propagate ideological theses about Arab society (Said, 1985). Orientalists have formulated and mediatized U.S. policy throughout the Arab and Islamic worlds, promoting a worldview dominated by concepts of terror, preemptive war, and unilateral regime change (Ibid). Consequently, alongside neoconservatives and other pro-Israeli organizations in the U.S., they have fostered a Manichaean vision of the world, particularly regarding the Arab and Muslim realms. This perspective has become "institutionally entrenched among Washington policymakers" over the last few decades (Beinin, 2003).

Moreover, Israel has emerged as a reliable ally of the U.S. against Islamism, which both nations perceive as a common enemy. This alignment became particularly pronounced after the end of the Cold War and the events of September 11, 2001, when Islamism became seen as a more significant threat than communism (Turaev, 2019). The U.S. and Israel thus share common national interests and a vision for a reformed Middle East, with their relationship deepening through Israel's economic and military dependence on the U.S. This dynamic explains former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's assertion that "the survival and security of Israel are unequivocal and permanent moral commitments of the United States" (Usher, 2011). Furthermore, U.S. neoconservatives are also staunch defenders of Israel, advocating for decisive action concerning the implementation of their national interests in the Middle East (Turaev, 2019). Support for Israel is often promoted by the belief that it is fully responsive to U.S. interests (Ibid), representing and upholding Western influence in the region, controlling petroleum resources, and the contribution of Israeli intelligence in the region helps. But also in another way: it responds to Israeli interests, as the institutionalization of the cooperation wanted by Israel has the goal of "compelling" the US to protect it from everything (Dieckhoff, 1998).

There is extensive documentation of this alliance's historical trajectory. In Dieckhoff's (1998) analysis of the U.S.-Israel alliance, tracing the evolution of this strategic relationship from the late 1960s through the early 1990s. The author highlights three key phases in this relationship. First, he notes that Israel's strategic importance to the U.S. rose significantly following the Six-Day War, with President Nixon viewing Israel as a valuable asset against Soviet-aligned Arab states. During this period, increased aid and cooperation often accompanied Israeli concessions, ensuring Israel's strategic advantage in alignment with American interests. Second, Dieckhoff emphasizes that the alliance intensified during the Reagan administration (1981-1988) in response to perceived Soviet expansionism, leading to unprecedented U.S. support for Israel and the transformation of military aid into grants for Israel's "Star Wars"

settlements program, enjoying robust American security guarantees with minimal concessions. Finally, the author observes a significant shift in the relationship dynamics following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, which exposed Israel's potential as a strategic liability in inter-Arab conflicts. This event, according to Dieckhoff, prompted the United States under George W. Bush (1989–1993) to initiate the 1991 peace process, requiring Israel to engage in regional stabilization efforts. However, it resulted in relative autonomy for Palestinians and unintended consequences, such as Israel's increased ability to resist American pressure.

Despite this strong alliance, the U.S. has imposed economic sanctions against Israel. Eran & Calin (2014) note that instances include the 1956 threat to withhold aid during the Suez Crisis, the 1975 reassessment, the 1982 ban on the sale of cluster bombs, and the postponement of loan guarantees in 1991-1992. Among these, only the 1956 measures effectively changed Israeli policy, forcing a withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula. Eisenhower intended to cut \$50 million in government aid and \$100 million annually in private donations to Israel, stating that “it would be a complete mistake for this country to continue with any kind of aid to Israel, which was an aggressor.” During the Reagan administration, sanctions against Israel were largely perfunctory, serving as a tool for criticism rather than as a means of effecting real change. Reagan did not publicly confirm that Israel had violated arms agreements, which could have prompted a serious response. Furthermore, in 1991, the U.S. required that loan guarantees for refugee absorption be reduced by the amount spent on settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories. This strategy aimed to fundamentally alter Israel’s settlement policy but ultimately failed, as Israel continued its housing projects in these territories. The U.S. has urged Israel to accept its plans but has never applied sanctions to coerce compliance.

Moreover, Grossman, Manekin, and Margalt (2018) highlight that the BDS movement, which seeks to address Palestinian human rights through non-violent means, struggles to gain traction in the United States, despite the European Union's implementation of targeted sanctions on Israeli settlement goods. Their research indicates that the Israeli political center is significantly more likely to support policy changes when influenced by the United States. Furthermore, Eran and Calin (2014) assert that only the U.S. possesses the leverage necessary to effect meaningful changes in Israeli behavior, underscoring the critical role of U.S. diplomacy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

However, a significant focus in the literature is on the influence of the pro-Israel lobby in the U.S. Support for Israel is also promoted, and any assertive diplomacy toward Israel could have domestic political repercussions (Usher, 2011). In fact, this belief predates the establishment of the Israeli state. For instance, after five years of Zionist efforts in organization, publicity, education, and cultivating key influential figures in the press, churches, arts, and particularly in the government, President Truman, fearing for his reelection in 1948, pressured UN members to vote affirmatively for the 1947 UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (Sarsar, 2004). As a result, American leaders have historically paid considerable attention to their Jewish constituencies, recognizing their significant role in presidential and congressional elections, regardless of the democratic preferences of Jewish voters (Ibid.).

The significant support for Israel can largely be attributed to the influence of the pro-Israel lobby, which actively backs candidates with unwavering pro-Israel views. Despite its relatively small size in terms of demographics and finances, the lobby possesses considerable political clout due to its influence in key electoral states (Dieckhoff, 1998). As a matter of fact, there are several influential Zionist lobbyists in the U.S., including the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), the Center for Security Policy (CSP), the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (WINEP), and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC)

(Turaev, 2019). Moreover, figures from the Netanyahu government, such as Yossi Olmert and Dore Gold, have been associated with WINEP as authors and former allies (Beinin, 2003).

In "The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy," Mearsheimer and Walt (2007) critically analyze the influence of pro-Israel advocacy on American foreign policy, arguing that this lobby, defined as a coalition of individuals and organizations, has significantly shaped U.S. Middle East policy in ways that often prioritize Israeli interests over American strategic concerns and contradict international law. They contend that unconditional U.S. support for Israel lacks justification from a realist perspective alone and often conflicts with established international legal norms, particularly regarding settlement expansion in occupied territories. The authors explore how domestic political factors and the lobby's influence affect policy formulation in Washington, and they highlight questions about the intersection of domestic politics, international law, and foreign policy decision-making.

This study highlights the domestic political considerations, particularly the influence of the pro-Israel lobby, often drive U.S. support for Israel at the United Nations. However, broader U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East, such as securing oil supplies and containing Soviet/Russian influence, have also shaped U.S. positions (Sarsar, 2004). In conclusion, the U.S.-Israel alliance is a complex and multifaceted relationship shaped by shared cultural values, strategic interests, and significant domestic political considerations in the United States. While this alliance has endured for decades, it has also faced challenges and criticisms, particularly regarding its impact on U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and its adherence to international law.

iii. Two States, One Mediator: The U.S. approach to Israeli-Palestinian Peace

Chomsky (1997) highlights the significant role of US foreign policy in shaping the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly through its influence on UN Security Council Resolution 242, which called for Israeli withdrawal from the 1967 occupied Palestinian territories but did not recognize the Palestinians' right to self-determination, merely suggesting a "just settlement of the refugee problem." Israel's 1968 Allon Plan, supported by the US, sought to claim resources in occupied Palestinian lands while offloading responsibility for the Palestinian population to Jordan or local authorities. The 1993 Declaration of Principles (DOP), grounded in Resolution 242, marked a significant step toward peace but ignored other resolutions recognizing Palestinian rights, as the US interpreted 242 as requiring only partial Israeli withdrawal. The 1995 Oslo II accords further undermined the resolution's central tenet that military force cannot acquire rights, instead mandating Palestinians to respect Israeli legal rights in the occupied territories. This allowed Israel to maintain control over West Bank water resources, restrict Palestinian movement, and expand settlements with U.S. backing.

Likewise, Dajani (2007) argues that Resolution 242, despite being a foundational document for the Middle East peace process, has ultimately failed to facilitate a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict over the past four decades. The mediation mechanism established by Resolution 242 was too feeble and ineffective for resolving such a complex and intractable conflict. The ambiguities and omissions in the language of Resolution 242 encouraged hard bargaining by the parties involved and denied political leaders the necessary cover or justification to make the compromises required for a negotiated peace settlement. While Resolution 242 endorsed principles like the "inadmissibility of acquiring territory by war," its

procedural and substantive recommendations have proven insufficient to resolve the core issues of the conflict.

However, successive American presidents have consistently upheld US objectives in the Middle East, including reducing Soviet influence, maintaining access to Arab oil, protecting Israel's territorial integrity, and facilitating the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Naaz (1998) notes that the Clinton administration (1993-2001) viewed the previous Bush administration's policies as detrimental to Israel and pressured Bush to make one-sided concessions. Clinton opposed the creation of a Palestinian state to ensure Israel's security; its administration adapted its policy to align with Israel's Likud government, disregarding UNSC Resolution 242 and denying human rights for Palestinians. Following Israel's withdrawal from Hebron, the construction of settlements in Har Homa (1997) led to the suspension of peace negotiations, yet the US offered no public criticism during Netanyahu's visit and instead provided new funding for Israel's anti-missile system. The announcement of new settlements in Ras al-Amud sparked violence that further stalled the Oslo process. Clinton's failure to persuade Netanyahu to place additional territories under the control of the Palestinian Authority underscored the notion that "it's the connivance of the U.S. that allows Israel to get away with whatever it does" (Naaz, 1998). As a result, in 1997, Noam Chomsky already noted, "The 'peace process' should, I think, be understood as an impressive vindication of the rule of force in international affairs, by its operative significance... in the light of the broad acceptance of the rejectionist stance that Washington had maintained in virtual isolation for many years. However one evaluates the outcome, much pain and suffering surely lie ahead" (Chomsky, 1997).

Moreover, the 2000s saw Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon capitalize on the post-9/11 environment, framing the conflict as part of the broader global war on terror and positioning Israel as a frontline ally in the fight against terrorism. By equating Palestinian groups like Hamas and the PA with Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, Sharon sought to garner support from the Bush administration (2001-2005) for Israel's military actions in the Palestinian territories (Beinin, 2003). This alignment allowed Israel to pursue its agenda against Palestinian resistance movements with minimal international scrutiny or condemnation. The Bush administration, along with its neoconservative allies and pro-Israel hawks, largely embraced Sharon's narrative, which further emboldened Israel to pursue aggressive military tactics and settlement expansion in the occupied territories, undermining efforts to achieve a peaceful resolution to the conflict (Ibid). However, the Quartet (UN, US, EU, Russia) Roadmap in 2003 failed to advance any credible diplomatic plan for addressing the core political issues in the conflict. Brxnen (in T. Xall & Wyeth, 2008) notes that it led to the emergence of "Hamastan" and "Fatahland," where the construction of settlements further delegitimized the peace process and ironically limited the impact on state-building during the Oslo era because of the high premium it placed on the peace process. This approach, which tolerated the retrograde practices of the Palestinian Authority and prioritized financial compensation for the negative effects of Israeli policies over direct confrontation with Israel, led Brxnen (2008) to label it as "Palestine, building neither peace nor state."

Likewise, Turner (2015) highlights the contradiction in promoting peacebuilding and Palestinian institutions while maintaining Israeli occupation, arguing that these efforts have entrenched Israeli control, restricted Palestinian movement and agency, and undermined genuine self-determination. Instead of addressing the conflict's root causes, the peacebuilding-counterinsurgency approach in the occupied Palestinian territories has focused on managing the occupied population and preserving the status quo through techniques like security sector

reform, economic development programs, and the promotion of liberal democratic institutions, all aimed at pacifying and controlling Palestinians. She thus calls for a critical reevaluation of peacebuilding, which has functioned as a form of counterinsurgency, failing to address the core issues of occupation, dispossession, and the denial of Palestinian rights.

This approach resonates with the events following Hamas's victory in the 2006 elections. Gayan (2007) argues that Hamas won fair and transparent elections supervised by Jimmy Carter as an international observer in 2006, but the US and several EU countries refused to recognize it, leading to division in Palestine with two prime ministers in Gaza and the West Bank. The US's blind attitude in favor of Israel dismissed and ruined a historical chance to achieve a peaceful settlement of the conflict and the establishment of a two-state solution. He notes that the United States and Israel may have secretly promoted a three-state solution, desired by Ariel Sharon and other Jewish leaders, envisioning Gaza, the West Bank, and Israel as three separate states. Gayan notes that this arrangement could be seen as beneficial for Israel, raising the question of whether this fragmentation could lead to lasting peace in Palestine.

However, the growth of radical Islamist influence, internecine conflict between Hamas and Fatah, and the emergence of rival Hamas-controlled Gaza and Fatah-controlled West Bank occurred amid the near collapse of the PA. While the PA bears primary responsibility for its governance weaknesses, Israeli policies played a direct role in undermining Palestinian state-building during the Oslo era of 1994–2000 and contributed to the PA's near collapse through withholding tax transfers and targeting Palestinian infrastructure (Brxnen in T. Xall & Wyeth, 2008). The peace process has thus been deeply intertwined with the rise of Hamas, but it was also its major driving force.

Its emergence can be contextualized within the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, where a new generation led by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin advocated for defensive jihad and military preparedness for defensive aims (Hussein, 2020). The Islamic University in Gaza, founded in 1978, played a crucial role in shaping the movement's ideology and fostering competition with the PLO. Throughout the late 1970s and 1980s, Hamas consolidated its organizational structure and acquired weapons, culminating in the creation of the "Majd" security agency in 1986, which facilitated coordinated military action (Abu Amr, 1993). The First Intifada in 1987 spurred the formation of Hamas on December 15, 1987, leading to the establishment of its charter in 1988, which outlined its program of action and views on the conflict (Hussein, 2020).

Following the Madrid Conference and Oslo Accords, Hamas opposed the peace process and gained financial support from Gulf countries, emerging as a major force in the 1990s (Abu Amr, 1993). During this period, the movement boycotted the 1995 legislative elections, allowing Fatah to win overwhelmingly. However, some Hamas leaders believed that political integration could strengthen Palestine's position against Israel, leading to its participation and victory in the 2006 elections (Hassan & Hasan, 2005). Moreover, in the 2000's, the development of Al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas's military wing, was significant as it transitioned from "terrorist cells" to a semi-regular army. This transformation involved adopting guerrilla tactics combined with a hierarchical institutional structure akin to that of a regular army (Aviad, 2009).

Despite employing "legal jargon and international law norms" rather than relying solely on religious arguments, and recognizing 1967 borders, Hamas continued to be labeled a terrorist organization by the United States, the European Union, and few other countries. This designation compelled Hamas to forge alliances with countries such as Iran, Syria, Qatar, and Turkey (Hussein, 2020). Moreover, the positions of the United States, the EU, Canada, and

other allied nations largely influence the controversy surrounding the classification of Hamas as a "terrorist" group versus "freedom fighters". As Robinson (2004) argues, this labeling presents two significant problems: it overlooks the majority of Hamas's activities, which include social and political engagement beyond acts of violence, and it fails to recognize that acts of terror can be employed tactically for specific purposes. He argues that by adopting a tactical perspective on terrorism rather than viewing it as an inherent characteristic of the group, more rational and politically consistent responses could emerge (Ibid).

However, the U.S. maintained its biased position regarding Israel in the aftermath of the peace process, particularly under the Obama administration. According to Reubner (2016), the legacy of the Obama administration (2009-2016) will not be that of a peacekeeper but rather one that maintained Clinton-era policies, irretrievably extinguishing prospects for a two-state solution by vetoing the possibility of a Palestinian state. Despite Obama's rhetoric supporting Palestinian rights, there were no consequences for Israel's continued violations. The US framed the conflict as a dispute between equals, ignoring the power imbalance and excluding Gaza from negotiations. The administration's approach included efforts to mitigate the impact of the Goldstone Report (2009) on potential war crimes during Operation Cast Lead and blocking attempts to refer Israel to the International Criminal Court. Obama was also reluctant to pressure Israel to allow aid delivery or end the blockade, even while recognizing the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. The U.S additionally obstructed accountability for the Mavi Marmara flotilla attack, which aimed to break the Gaza siege, and created a separate panel for Israeli-Turkish reconciliation. This approach emboldened Israel to launch Operation Pillar of Defense in November 2012, resulting in 168 deaths, including 101 civilians. The pattern continued with Operation Protective Edge in 2014, a 51-day assault on Gaza that caused at least 2,251 deaths, including 1,462 civilians and 551 children, and injured over 11,000. The operation also damaged or destroyed 18,000 homes and 73 medical facilities. 216 Palestinians, including 115 children, died because of US-provided weapons.

Despite these extensive casualties and destruction, the US described Israel's actions as "appropriate and legitimate efforts to defend itself" at the UN. Reubner concludes that this consistent pattern of US support and protection for Israel, despite evidence of potential war crimes and human rights abuses, perpetuated a sense of impunity for Israeli actions and made the US complicit in ongoing violations of Palestinian rights. Hassan & al. (2021) further note that the United States has blocked UN resolutions with broad consensus supporting Palestinian rights, cut off funds to UNESCO for admitting Palestine as a member, conditioned contributions to multilateral bodies on the Israeli-Palestinian issue or quit those bodies entirely (such as UNRWA), attempted to prevent the creation of a UN database of settlement enterprises, and sought to discourage the EU and Ireland from labeling settlement products or prohibiting their importation to prevent accountability for Israel.

Consequently, Ayoob (2012) notes that the US is rendering itself irrelevant in finding a just and durable solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict, as Palestinians "were the objects rather than the subjects of history." He argues that American officials should give the Palestinian narrative equal weight with the Israeli one, but instead, the Oslo peace process has become "all process, no peace," reflecting Washington's failure to acknowledge the Palestinian reality in its complex historical, political, and social dimensions. This policy amnesia towards the root causes of the conflict is evident in Israel's lack of accountability, which has seen its trade relations and economy flourish despite increasingly egregious policies towards Palestinians. Israel has avoided the transparency, end-use, and human rights standards often imposed on other recipients of US assistance (Hassan et al., 2021). Mearsheimer and Walt (2007) further

argue that this unconditional support, particularly at the UN, hinders rather than advances the peace process, undermining efforts to achieve a fair resolution between Israelis and Palestinians.

iv. U.S. Vetoes on the “Palestinian Question” at the UNSC:

The United States' use of veto power in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been a critical factor influencing international relations and the dynamics of the conflict itself. This practice, which began during the 1973 Israel-Arab war, has evolved into a consistent pattern that has significant implications for both the conflict and the broader international community. During the Israel-Arab war in 1973, the U.S. recorded its first veto over the Palestinian question. Geopolitical tensions between the superpowers during the Cold War largely undermined the effectiveness of the UNSC, with the U.S. supporting Israel and the USSR backing Arab states like Syria and Egypt (Smouts, 1974). The U.S. continued to block diplomatic initiatives from the UN, Europe, the Arab states, the USSR, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), effectively eliminating the Security Council (Chomsky, 1997).

Post-Cold War, the U.S. emerged as the most frequent user of veto power among the permanent five (P5) members of the UNSC, predominantly in support of Israel (Mahmood, 2013). Between 1945 and September 2015, the U.S. vetoed a total of 30 UNSC resolutions related to Israel and the Palestinians, which is the largest number of resolutions vetoed by a UNSC permanent member on a single issue; the next highest number of vetoes on a single issue was 10, concerning the situation between Israel and Lebanon (Hatuel-Radoshitzky, 2015). By 2018, this number had risen to 43 vetoes in defense of Israel in general, illustrating the U.S.'s commitment to providing political cover for Israel and preventing the UNSC from condemning its actions (Denny, 2018). Therefore, the U.S. has vetoed nearly every resolution pertaining to resolving the Palestine-Israel conflict, continuing a pattern of arbitrarily exempting some nations from Council accountability (Papalia, 2017).

This pattern of vetoes has been consistent across different U.S. administrations and had profound implications for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The U.S. has actively prevented the UNSC, for instance, from adopting resolutions condemning Israeli settlement activities in East Jerusalem and the construction of the separation wall, which contravenes international law (Papalia, 2017). Hassan et al. (2021) report that from 1995 to 2019, the U.S. vetoed six out of seven resolutions condemning Israel's land expropriation and illegal settlements. By 2021, there were 145 settlements and 135 outposts in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, with the settler population rising from about 116,300 in 1993 to approximately 666,778 by 2019. Moreover, the U.S. vetoes have complicated peace negotiations with recognizing Jerusalem as Israel's capital and supporting Israel's annexation of territories, significantly preventing achieving a two-state solution (Stanislowski, 2021). The U.S. has also consistently opposed UN recognition of Palestine as a state, intending to veto such resolutions, raising concerns about potential violent escalation in the region (Ayoob, 2012; Asseburg, 2011). Washington's veto thwarted the recognition of Palestine within the 1967 borders alongside Israel, which is considered essential for peace and balancing negotiations (Asseburg, 2011).

These vetoes have been a significant feature of American foreign policy in the Middle East. By vetoing critical resolutions and reacting strongly against movements like BDS, the U.S. not only perpetuates the conflict but also reinforces the idea that such criticism is inherently anti-Semitic (Stanislowski, 2021).

Furthermore, the independent non-profit Security Council Report (2015) emphasizes the need to reconsider the role of the veto, particularly regarding Israel, highlighting the UNSC's ineffectiveness in addressing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict due to the U.S.'s protective stance towards Israel. However, Hatuel-Radoshitzky (2015) notes that despite the slim chances of these reforms being adopted, Israel need not be overly concerned. The criticism of the UNSC's performance underscores the significance of the US-Israel alliance for Israeli policymakers, who view it as crucial to maintaining their strategic position.

Moreover, Stein and Brom (2014) illustrate the complexities of U.S. foreign policy concerning Israel, particularly highlighting the pressure on the U.S. to veto a Palestinian resolution at the UN Security Council in 2016, further illustrating the U.S.'s support to Israel through vetoes by a relevant example. They describe the 2016 situation where the Israeli government urged the U.S. to veto a Palestinian resolution at the UN Security Council. Prime Minister Netanyahu discussed the matter with Secretary of State John Kerry, while France, Great Britain, and Germany drafted a resolution proposing principles for resolving the conflict and a two-year timeline for a permanent settlement. This European initiative was in line with recent European recognitions of Palestinian statehood. Netanyahu's call for new elections complicated the scenario, as a U.S. veto could reinforce his right-wing narrative of global opposition against Israel, potentially rallying right-wing support. Conversely, not vetoing the resolution might pressure Israeli political parties to confront its implications, possibly fostering a coalition more open to negotiations. The debate thus centered on whether a veto would bolster Netanyahu's campaign or lead to constructive political engagement.

Mearsheimer and Walt (2007) identify a broader pattern in this episode, arguing that the U.S. consistently uses its veto power to block resolutions critical of Israel, a unique stance not observed with other U.S. allies. They argue that his pattern undermines international law and diminishes the UN's effectiveness in conflict resolution. The U.S. also frequently finds itself isolated in these votes, often as the sole or one of very few opponents against resolutions critical of Israel, creating a stark contrast with most other nations. This isolation, driven by pressure from the Israel lobby on U.S. policymakers, not only damages America's global reputation but also conflicts with broader U.S. interests in the Middle East (Ibid).

This pattern perpetuates the conflict and hinders progress toward resolving the conflict (Stanislawski, 2021). Despite this, the U.S. often justifies its vetoes by claiming Security Council resolutions might hinder peace negotiations. For example, in 2011, after a five-year abstention from vetoes, the U.S. vetoed a draft resolution on settlements, asserting that all actions at the UN "must be measured against one overriding standard": will it move the parties closer to negotiations and peace? (Reubner, 2016). This paradox highlights the complexity of U.S. foreign policy regarding Israel and the ongoing challenges in resolving the conflict.

The use of vetoes by the U.S. in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been a subject of significant academic and policy debate. Scholars have examined the frequency, context, and potential implications of these vetoes on the broader dynamics of the conflict and peace process. This literature review provides a foundation for further analysis of how these vetoes may hinder the peace process in Palestine, exploring and understanding the mechanism at play through an aggregate analysis of all the vetoed resolutions, which will be explored in detail in the subsequent analysis and results section.

II. Theoretical background:

1. Building Peace in the Light of Realpolitik and Realism

Now that the literature review has been established, we need a theoretical background to frame, guide, and generate our primary responses to our research question, which focuses on how U.S. vetoes result in preventing peace in Palestine and Israel. Based on the findings of the literature review, which show that the US justifies most of its vetoes through peace negotiations and the peacebuilding process, peacebuilding theories appear particularly relevant for analyzing the U.S.'s vetoed resolutions. Likewise, given the US's biased voting behavior at the UNSC and its attempts to protect its interests as well as those of its allies revealed in the literature, the theory of Realpolitik and the realist approach to international organizations seem adequate to shed light on this study and frame the U.S. behavior and policy.

- **Realpolitik vs. "Ethical Foreign Policy":**

The concept of Realpolitik, which emphasizes practical considerations over moral or ethical concerns in political decisions, originates from ancient and medieval political thought. Otto von Bismarck, who played a crucial role in the unification of Germany, significantly developed this approach. During the 20th and 21st centuries, a unique "Anglo-American" version of Realpolitik emerged, balancing Western ideological and moral standards with the practical pursuit of power and national interests. Notable historical examples include the 1953 removal of Iranian Prime Minister Mosaddegh and Nixon's 1972 initiation of diplomatic relations with China, both driven by strategic necessities (Bew, 2016). This theory, rooted in the pragmatism of Bismarck's Germany, holds that in political matters, moral considerations are secondary to power dynamics, with the powerful inevitably exerting control over the less powerful to enhance their own strength (Emery, 1915).

The principles of Realpolitik continue to exert a significant influence on contemporary statesmen and leaders, especially when addressing complex geopolitical challenges such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and economic globalization. Modern diplomacy often reflects this pragmatism, prioritizing immediate outcomes over moral or ethical considerations (Bew, 2016). During Nixon's presidency, Henry Kissinger's implementation of Realpolitik in the White House was characterized by a focus on national, military, and strategic interests, often disregarding other considerations and costs. (Gayan, 2007). The "Kissinger Effect" captures the significant influence Kissinger wielded in advancing and applying Realpolitik. This influence stemmed from his background as a German immigrant, his scholarly work on 19th-century European diplomacy, and his pragmatic and realistic outlook on international affairs (Bew, 2016).

On the other hand, Gayan (2007) notes the concept of an "ethical foreign policy" is based on international legal principles, the protection of human rights, the advancement of democracy, and the endorsement of universal values. Notwithstanding their aspirations for a more favorable world, leaders such as T. Blair swiftly recognized that state decisions are primarily motivated by national interests. The author also presents instances from the U.S. Following the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, the United States has actively pursued the goal of promoting democracy in the Middle East. Paradoxically, prominent American allies such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia do not adhere to democratic principles. The non-recognition by the

United States and several European Union countries of the democratic elections in Gaza in 2006 serves as an example of the inconsistent criteria that can undermine the legitimacy of global powers reflecting **double standards** (Gayan, 2007).

- **Realpolitik and Realist Perspective of the UN:**

The influence of Realpolitik extends to the United Nations (UN), where liberals perceive the organization as a manifestation of collective security, believing that any violation of peace in one place poses a threat to global peace. Realists view the Security Council as a platform primarily for the major powers (Mahmood, 2013). Likewise, Puchala (2005) argues that the main purpose of the United Nations is to legitimize the liberal global system advocated by dominant nations, especially the United States. Its secondary function is to act as a tool for hegemonic powers to oversee and manipulate the international system in line with their own interests. The "Group of 77" developing countries assert their leadership within the UN, but the organization is economically dominated by the North and politically controlled by the West. It serves to maintain the liberal world order led by Western powers (Puchala, 2005).

Hans Morgenthau, who expressed criticism of the United Nations, influenced this approach. He believed that the UN promoted high-minded ideals but also engaged in traditional power struggles and diplomatic maneuvers characteristic of realism. He argues that it prioritizes the influence of major nations, downplays the role of other actors, and emphasizes security rather than collaboration, maintaining a skeptical perspective. Morgenthau contended that the UN Charter encompassed implicit principles that bolstered the supremacy of major powers, in contrast to the organization's explicit legal principles. The U.S.-Soviet rivalry and the ineffectiveness of legalistic reasoning in conflict resolution appeared to justify his realist critique (Uziel, 2022).

However, the UN Security Council in particular is frequently characterized as hegemonic, particularly with regards to the United States' dominance (Clark, 2011). Gayan (2007) contends that the Security Council, originally established to preserve peace, has transformed into a tool of the permanent members, frequently disregarding the broader public interest. Furthermore, Clark (2011) argues that the United States and the Security Council have a mutually dependent relationship, with each entity serving as a significant source of influence for the other. The existence of veto power in the Security Council is a result of a compromise between representation of interest and effectiveness. Clark (2011) argues that we can describe the U.S. as the dominant power within a larger coalition, rather than as part of a collective dominance. Therefore, the effectiveness of global organizations depends on their ability to influence international actors and manage conflicts. However, the uneven distribution of power among states limits their effectiveness, making hegemonic stability crucial for maintaining a liberal global economic system. These international institutions often provide legitimacy to the actions of dominant countries (Ataman, 2000).

Finally, Scott (2003) extended Morgenthau's Realist theory by examining the U.S. state's strategic use of international law, shifting the focus from states as the sole referents in classic realism to include individuals, groups, nations/states, regions, and the international community. The U.S. often uses international law selectively to maximize its power and security, aligning with Realism's emphasis on national interests over strict adherence to international norms. This is evident in its selective engagement with international legal institutions, such as its objections to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to protect U.S. military personnel and its occasional rejection of the International Court of Justice's interim measures, as seen in cases like *Breard* and the *LaGrand* brothers.

Furthermore, prominent Realist theorists John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt (2007) argue that the United States applies international law selectively in its relationship with Israel. This double standard, they contend, undermines both the international legal framework and America's credibility as a proponent of a rule-based order. By supporting actions that violate international law, the U.S. compromises its ability to advocate for legal norms globally, potentially destabilizing international relations. They highlight the tension between maintaining a strong alliance with Israel and upholding international legal principles, illustrating the broader challenges of balancing realpolitik strategic interests with commitments to global norms. This selective application of international law, the scholars assert, has significant implications for US foreign policy and the effectiveness of international legal institutions. The authors argue for a more realist approach to U.S. Middle East policy, suggesting that current policies often diverge from true national interests.

2. Peacebuilding

Peace and conflict studies is a dynamic, multifaceted field characterized by a unique symbiosis between theory and practice. This discipline exemplifies a bidirectional flow of knowledge, where theoretical constructs inform practical approaches and real-world experiences shape theoretical understanding. Its multidisciplinary nature, drawing from international relations, political science, anthropology, sociology, and psychology, creates a comprehensive approach to complex conflict situations (Firchow & Anastasiou, 2016). This theoretical background investigates the intricate, reciprocal relationship between theory and practice, highlighting the field's commitment to both academic rigor and real-world relevance while synthesizing diverse perspectives for the subsequent analyses of contemporary peace and conflict issues relating to the "Palestinian question."

- **Boutros's "Agenda for Peace" and the Emergence of Peacebuilding**

The concept of peacebuilding initially emerged within academic circles focused on peace research, significantly influencing Boutros Boutros-Ghali's "Agenda for Peace" in 1992. This agenda, formulated in response to a request from the United Nations Security Council, introduced peacebuilding as a complement to peacemaking and peacekeeping. Johan Galtung, a prominent figure in peace studies, conceptualized peacebuilding as one of three approaches to peace, alongside peacekeeping and peacemaking (Funk, 2012).

King and Matthews (2012) describe peacebuilding as a strategic process aimed at solidifying peace and preventing a relapse into conflict. It seeks to "advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people" by addressing the root causes of conflict, including economic and social injustice and political oppression. The process includes key pillars such as security, which involves disarming combatants, repatriating refugees, and training security personnel; legitimate political institutions focusing on elections and governance; economic progress aimed at development; justice, which protects human rights; and reconciliation among conflicting parties. As a distinct post-conflict effort, peacebuilding occurs after a conflict has been resolved and an agreement signed, typically requiring minimal intervention in national sovereignty. However, the authors argue that the "Agenda for Peace" emphasizes a top-down approach, highlighting the importance of building democratic institutions, often referred to as Liberal Peace, which remains a significant topic of debate in peacebuilding literature (Ibid.).

Furthermore, despite its potential, peacebuilding faces challenges. Local or international actors can co-opt its broad nature to promote programs that do not genuinely build peace. Additionally, peacebuilding knowledge and skills can be misused for warfare purposes (Firchow & Anastasiou, 2016). While many communities have benefited from international peacebuilding efforts, others have become political pawns, subjected to harmful policies imposed without their inclusion. Thus, effective peacebuilding requires knowledge of both general conflict dynamics and the unique, localized features of each conflict (Ibid.).

By 2012, two decades of peacebuilding experience since Boutros's agenda revealed that much remains to be learned about addressing the root causes of conflict and placing societies on a path to sustainable peace (Funk, 2012). Talentino (2007) notes that most peacebuilding efforts emphasize the importance of consolidating institutions and establishing effective governance, prioritizing processes over attitudes and the development of peace agreements and focusing on structures rather than individuals. External actors can thus influence conflict dynamics by concentrating on the structural aspects of conflict and identifying new methods for formal and informal interactions. However, the author notes that focusing on states rather than individuals in the peacebuilding process can allow group grievances and fears to persist, reinforcing group identities through political life. Furthermore, emphasizing the interconnection of the pillars of peace is crucial. Overemphasis on the political pillar at the expense of others, such as justice and reconciliation, can lead to state collapse, as seen in Liberia. The Rwandan case illustrates the interconnection between the political and reconciliation pillars; emphasizing unity and reconciliation without allowing political space for dissent can lead to enforced unity without genuine reconciliation (King & Matthews, 2012).

The Two Facets of Lasting Peace:

The concepts of negative and positive peace, introduced by Johan Galtung, are essential for understanding the complexity of peace and conflict resolution. Boutros Boutros-Ghali's "Agenda for Peace" emphasizes the foundational conditions and structures necessary for advancing human security, endorsing Galtung's notion of "positive peace." This concept views peace as more than just the absence of fighting or a ceasefire; it involves the presence of social, economic, and political order that enables human flourishing. Peacebuilding is seen as a holistic aggregator concept involving reconstruction, reconciliation, and long-term conflict prevention (Funk, 2012). It focuses on the normative goal of resolving conflicts and moving toward what Galtung called positive peace: "the goal of peace through legitimacy and justice, eliminating the underlying structural issues that lead to war" (Firchow & Anastasiou, 2016).

Positive peace is characterized by the establishment of social harmony, reconciliation of warring parties, justice, and economic recovery. As King and Matthews (2012) note, "the international community should never lose sight of what surely is the primary purpose of peacebuilding: the restoration of positive peace in those countries that have suffered through years of violent destruction." Galtung's work highlights that violence is often embedded in societal structures, manifesting as unequal power and life chances, which he terms structural violence. He argues, "The violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances" (Galtung, 1969, p. 171). Therefore, addressing both personal and structural violence is crucial for maintaining peace (Ibid., p. 172).

Negative peace is defined as the mere absence of violence or war. Personal direct violence refers to physical acts of aggression or harm inflicted by individuals or groups. This type of violence is often visible and immediate, manifesting in forms such as assault, murder, or warfare. It involves multilateral peace policies such as arms control, the Geneva Conventions,

and strategies for balancing power. These approaches are often seen as pessimistic and curative, focusing on short-term solutions that may not always be achieved through peaceful means... Furthermore, negative peace is akin to the absence of disease in health sciences, where the focus is on eliminating immediate threats rather than fostering long-term resilience (Grewal, 2003).

Furthermore, Galtung (1969) criticizes "law and order" approaches that focus solely on reducing personal violence while neglecting structural issues. He warns against justifying personal violence in pursuit of social justice, noting that the short-term costs of personal violence appear small relative to the costs of continued structural violence. He also highlights the challenge of comparing the suffering resulting from personal versus structural violence, given the significant magnitude of both. He argues that realizing both the absence of personal violence and social justice is pessimistic and a form of intellectual and moral capitulation.

Grewal (2003) points out that Galtung broadened the concept in the 1990s to encompass cultural violence, highlighting the use of culture to justify and legitimize direct violence. He emphasizes that "violence becomes avoidable insults to basic human needs and more generally to life," and that breaking the spiral of violence requires a spiral of peace, which flows from cultural peace through structural peace to direct peace.

Despite criticisms, such as those from Kenneth Boulding, who argued that labeling international peace studies as negative peace downgrades their importance, Galtung's work laid the groundwork for viewing peace as a positive condition. Boulding criticized the notion of structural violence, arguing that it drags peace research into development studies where they have no expertise. He introduced the concept of stable peace, which encompasses both negative and positive peace. Galtung's perspective requires transforming social structures and relationships, significantly expanding the scope of peace research and practice. His approach, reflecting Enlightenment ideals, has influenced generations of scholars and practitioners in the field (Grewal, 2003).

- **The Cruciality of Context-Sensitive and Localized Peacebuilding**

Cousens et al. (2001) emphasize the crucial role of context-sensitive and localized peacebuilding in their influential work. They argue that international actors often prioritize the "what" and "who" of peacebuilding over the "how," "why," or "to what end," neglecting the unique dynamics of each conflict. Their book, "Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies," presents five pivotal case studies—El Salvador, Cambodia, Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia—to illustrate the complexities of post-conflict reconstruction. The authors critique the internal political approach, suggesting that the international community's focus on elections and human rights may not effectively lead to de facto peacebuilding, especially in regions lacking basic infrastructure. They highlight that in war-torn areas, where clean water, sewage systems, and other essential services are unavailable, these basic needs are often more pressing than Western-centric ideas of democracy and human rights. The authors argue that the core priority should be developing legitimate political mechanisms to resolve internal conflicts without violence. Importantly, they note that peace is likely to fail once external support is withdrawn, underscoring the need to consider the entire social fabric of a society for sustainable peacebuilding efforts.

Funk (2012) criticizes the concept of "liberal peace" for preventing more flexible responses to local conditions and perpetuating historical links between North and South, West and non-West. He argues that the inflexible regimen exported to conflict areas and implanted without

local roots underscores the value of context-sensitive peacebuilding that activates local resources and energizes indigenous peacemaking. Funk emphasizes that outsiders are most likely to make positive contributions when they act as facilitators or midwives rather than headmasters, highlighting the crucial importance of localizing peacebuilding efforts.

King & Matthews (2012) expand on this perspective, suggesting that the international community may often be part of the problem rather than the solution and that the most meaningful and sustainable peacebuilding is done by those who will be its principal beneficiaries. They point to examples in Somaliland, Mozambique, and South Africa, where local efforts have been more successful than peacebuilding initiatives relying heavily on top-down intervention by the international community. King & Matthews call for a "humbler" role for the international community in peacebuilding and advocate for a balance between international and local efforts, with the international community acting as a facilitator rather than the central driving force.

Talentino (2007) warns about peacebuilding as a relationship between imposer and imposed upon, stating that "Even the most well-constructed international reform effort will be a failure if citizens do not consider it weak and ineffectual." This highlights the perception of locals as an essential building block of peace. If perception of peacebuilding is positive, it leads to legitimacy and consolidation of new procedures; if perception is negative, it results in disengagement and collapse, noting that "peacebuilding is more than a technical exercise in creating political structures; it is also about teaching people to believe." She identifies two dynamics that shape the perception of locals. First, the feeling of imposition, where imperialistic interventions are perceived as illegal and unwanted interference when locals do not want intervention. Secondly, broken promises, which usually stem from initial support that degenerates into resentment. This dynamic is particularly relevant when an ethnic or religious group is a victim of persecution, as in the case of Albanians in Kosovo, who may not be satisfied with peace terms. She further highlights critics of the international effort for doing too little, especially in punishing persecutors, protecting citizens, and providing economic improvements. Victims and families of victims want justice and expect it, but it is rarely the first concern of international actors, whose main interest is often in developing the structures of the state, which is "programmatic minimalism," focusing on the mechanism rather than substance and providing no guidance on protecting dignity and the local conception of justice. She concludes that focus should be on what citizens need most—security, justice, food—and address needs rather than identities to gather support, thereby reducing the appeal of ethnic-religious lines (Talentino, 2007).

Justice is particularly crucial for peacebuilding, with the creation of responsibility being a vital step in developing peacebuilding efforts at both local and international levels. This process involves establishing mechanisms of accountability. The promotion of responsibility fosters accountability and enhances the recognition and viability of peacebuilding initiatives, as noted by Laderach (1997). Likewise, Grabyll, & Lanegran (2004) emphasize the significance of justice in peacebuilding, arguing that support for the rule of law and human rights norms cannot be established while an ineffective judicial system allows prominent criminals to enjoy impunity. They identify two types of justice: restorative justice, which focuses on reconciliation with former enemies, and retributive justice, which emphasizes punishment. These approaches differ in their definitions of accountability and methods, with restorative justice promoting dialogue and retributive justice relying on adversarial legal processes. During transitional periods, there is a call for transitional justice structures, such as ad hoc tribunals, truth commissions, hybrid UN-funded courts, and revived traditional judicial systems. Both

retributive and restorative justice structures may coexist during transitions, as seen in examples like South Africa's Truth Commission and Rwanda's Gacaca Courts. International involvement is crucial for ensuring accountability, but expectations for transitional justice institutions should remain modest.

Furthermore, the evolving approach to peacebuilding emphasizes culture as a vital asset. This perspective recognizes peace as a locally constructed reality, viewing culture as a valuable resource rather than a constraint. Funk (2012) argues that while religious and cultural identities can sometimes incite conflict, they also provide essential beliefs that contribute to peace. He notes, "They don't determine the operative meaning of peace... but they evaluate the authenticity and worthiness of a peace process."

Notable examples include the South African principle of Ubuntu, the Islamic concept of Sulh (reconciliation) in Afghanistan, and the Somali code of conduct Xeer, all of which have significantly contributed to conflict resolution. This approach encourages outsiders to act as facilitators, helping local actors identify and utilize their cultural resources through adapted traditional methods instead of relying on imported models. Successful practices often result from "cross-fertilization among cultures," involving a "sifting through traditions and values that can be applied in new ways, providing a bridge between past and future" (Funk, 2012).

Moreover, the assertion that "the greatest resource for sustaining peace in the long term is always rooted in the local people and their culture" highlights the need for the international community to view individuals as active contributors to the peace process rather than mere recipients. Lederach (1997) emphasizes that citizen-based peacemaking must be seen as integral, stating, "In any situation of severe conflict, from Central America to the Horn of Africa, people had a vision for peace emerging from their own experience of pain." The focus should be on discovering and empowering existing resources, modalities, and mechanisms for peace, which are essential for its legitimacy. Initiatives like Mozambique's UNICEF-funded "Circus of Peace," which engages children through traditional arts and drama, exemplify this approach (Lederach, 1997). Additionally, the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in South Africa and Sierra Leone illustrate the effectiveness of local cultural practices in fostering forgiveness and accountability, ultimately promoting sustainable peace through contextually relevant and locally owned processes (Graybill & Lanegran, 2004).

- "A New Agenda for Peace"

Learning from previous successful and unsuccessful cases was essential to formulating a new agenda for peace. Peacebuilding efforts have seen both successes and challenges in post-conflict societies. Sierra Leone and Burundi are recognized as "exceptional successes" in post-war reconstruction, along with East Timor, Mozambique, and Cambodia (King & Matthews, 2012).

Graybill & Lanegran (2004) further highlight South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as a prominent example of restorative justice, offering amnesty in exchange for full disclosure of crimes. While this facilitated healing through public hearings, only about 1,000 individuals admitted to apartheid-era crimes, revealing significant challenges. In contrast, Rwanda focused on retributive justice with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and Gacaca community courts for lower-level crimes. Although innovative, this approach faced criticism for assigning collective guilt and potential manipulation by the Tutsi-led government. Sierra Leone combined both approaches by establishing a UN-funded Special Court for high-level offenders alongside a Truth and Reconciliation Commission

(SLTRC) to promote societal healing. The SLTRC aimed to address the conflict's root causes, and compensation for victims was critical, drawing lessons from South Africa's experiences (Graybill & Lanegran, 2004).

The complex landscape of peacebuilding efforts reveals a stark contrast between successful and unsuccessful cases, highlighting the intricate challenges involved in post-conflict reconstruction. Despite international efforts to resolve conflicts in Afghanistan, Rwanda (in 1993), Somalia, and Iraq, peace remains elusive. In Sudan, the so-called comprehensive peace agreement of 2005 that brought an end to almost 20 years of violent conflict was comprehensive in name only; it has been described as "peace by pieces," leading to a dysfunctional state (King & Matthews, 2012). Peace has failed in several cases in Africa and the Middle East, with war returning with a vengeance. The difficulty is compounded by people's rightful expectation that displaced persons will be able to return without fear, that human rights atrocities will be punished, and that infrastructure and economies will be rebuilt. Failed peacebuilding represents one of the worst risk factors for new wars (T. Xall & Wyeth, 2008).

Moreover, the peacebuilding agenda has often transformed into state-building efforts driven by powerful nations' foreign policy interests, potentially undermining sustainable peace. As King & Matthews (2012) note, "The peacebuilding agenda today often looks more like state-building by and for the rich and powerful states." This approach presents numerous challenges, including exacerbating local power dynamics, difficulty in establishing legitimate institutions, and the risk of being perceived as an external imposition. Even in relatively successful cases like Bosnia, East Timor, and Sierra Leone, international actors faced challenges in establishing legitimate and sustainable authority; peace has been questioned in cases like Kosovo, Haiti, Afghanistan, and Iraq, where state-building was presented as a logical and moral obligation of external interventions. As T. Xall & Wyeth (2008) observe, particularly regarding Iraq and Afghanistan, "The well-being of the peoples of these lands depends on whether effective and legitimate states emerge in these war-torn societies," highlighting The relationship between state-building and peacebuilding is complex, demanding attention to local dynamics and flexible strategies.

"A New Agenda for Peace" therefore places human security at the heart of peacebuilding. King & Matthews (2012) emphasize the need to refocus the international community's attention on human security, noting that "poverty, disease, famine, oppression, and despair abound, producing millions of refugees." They argue that "if peacebuilding actors allow their own security goals to supersede human security for those on the ground, peacebuilding will lose much of its rationale," as seen in Afghanistan. Funk (2012) calls to "localize peace, tap indigenous peace resources, and energize context-specific peace processes as a central goal of 21st-century peacebuilding efforts."

This approach acknowledges that peacebuilding operations have often marginalized local actors and failed to adequately respond to local expectations and needs. Thus, Cooper et al. (2011), in "The Last Liberal Peacebuilder," respond to Roland Paris's argument that liberal peacebuilding is the only viable solution for rebuilding war-torn societies. They note that "the commitment to implement democratization and human rights (liberal peace) has been downgraded as oil and security considerations have led to accommodation with autocratic governments and the rejection of democratic outcomes." They highlight that "even peacebuilding by consent is usually understood as the consent of key elites and rests on various degrees of coercion," citing the example of Sierra Leone, where the government agreed to the 1999 Lomé peace agreement under heavy pressure from the UK and US. They point out

"echoes of colonialism in peacebuilding," reflecting the exercise of hegemonic power and the interests of the world's most powerful countries.

Likewise, Taylor (2017), focusing on Africa, argues that the liberal peace approach has often "sidelined and ignored African input into the construction of peace." Drawing on Gramsci's concept of hegemony, he views the liberal peace security regimen as "a form of Western cultural and ideological domination, where African agency and alternative visions of peace are marginalized." Taylor calls for a shift towards a "positive peace" paradigm that focuses on improving relationships between the state, security forces, and civilians rather than solely on institutional transformation.

This new agenda for peace emphasizes the need for a more comprehensive and effective approach to security sector reform, one that prioritizes the needs and perspectives of local communities and works to heal the relationship between the state and its citizens in post-conflict scenarios (Taylor, 2017). It rejects the imposition of negotiation over what type of peace is being built and for whom, instead advocating for more inclusive and locally driven approaches to peacebuilding that take into account lessons from recent years and address the sources and consequences of conflicts requiring the highest priority from the UN (King & Matthews, 2012).

3. Conceptualization and Research question:

To analyze and understand how the United States' vetoes at the Security Council hinder the peace-building process in the Palestinian question, it is crucial to establish a comprehensive conceptual framework. This framework was constructed on the identification and understanding of key peace categories and pillars based on an integration of the essential pillars of peace as delineated in the theoretical background and the peace indicators defined by the Global Peace Index (GPI). These elements were synthesized within the context of Johan Galtung's seminal conceptualization of peace, which distinguishes between negative and positive peace. This conceptualization provides a nuanced lens through which to examine the complex relationship between U.S. Security Council vetoes and the multifaceted peace-building efforts in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. By employing this comprehensive approach, the research can effectively evaluate the mechanisms through which U.S. vetoes potentially impede various dimensions of the peace process. This includes examining effects on both the cessation of direct violence and the cultivation of statutorily justice and sustainable peace, thereby offering a holistic understanding of the peace-building process in this context.

i. Negative peace:

Is the absence of personal direct conflict, which is committed by specific actors (Galtung, 1969). it refers to physical acts of aggression or harm inflicted by individuals or groups. This type of violence is often visible and immediate, manifesting in forms such as assault, murder, or warfare. This concept presents the negative conditions for peace, and the conditions for the absence of direct violence. It is mainly related to multilateral policies such as respect of the Geneva Conventions, arms control, and balancing of power. It is a curative and short-term process, including often non-peaceful measures (Grewal, 2003).

In the frame of this study, negative peace refers to the direct physical violence and hostilities and focuses on the humanitarian and territorial dimensions of the conflict. Inspired from the

GPI's dimensions (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2024, p. 68), it will be divided into three dimensions:

- Ongoing conflict: This dimension investigates involvement in armed conflicts, their nature, means, methods, and duration.
- Human Security: refers to the protection of civilians during armed hostilities, but also under daily occupation, notably from disease, famine. It refers to the basic needs of the population, such as safety, food, water, medicine, and repatriating refugees. It represents the essentials for population survival. This dimension will be observed through: Deaths / injuries / Refugee situations /Health, food, and sanitary conditions /Medical availability and access.
- Territorial Security: While not a GPI category, territorial security was created based on literature and the crucial problem of settlements in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These settlements often result from physical assault or force and are considered illegal under international law in the context of annexation. It was deemed more logical to include this aspect in the negative peace category.

This concept will mostly highlight the role of the US vetoes in preventing the negative conditions for peace, which is the absence of direct violence, instead focusing on the humanitarian and territorial situation.

However, the absence of direct violence is essential for peacebuilding; however, it is insufficient without addressing structural violence inherent in societal frameworks. Galtung (1969) argues that both personal and structural violence are significant and must be addressed concurrently for sustainable peace. He asserts that "an extended concept of violence leads to an extended concept of peace" (p.183), highlighting the interdependence of negative and positive peace.

ii. Positive peace

Positive peace encompasses the prevention of both personal and structural violence. While personal violence is perpetrated by specific actors, structural violence is embedded within social systems. Galtung emphasizes that "the short-term costs of personal violence appear as small relative to the costs of continued structural violence" (1969). This concept of positive peace refers to the indirect, structural violence that actors merely execute. It encompasses a preventive, long-term process focusing on human and structural integration through peaceful means (Grewal, 2003), reflecting positively defined conditions for peace, including social justice and equitable distribution of power and resources.

In the context of this study, positive peace represents the root cause of the Palestinian question, namely the occupation of Palestinian territories. This occupation constitutes a structural barrier to peace, encompassing daily life attitudes, institutions, and structures that either impede or foster peaceful societies. Drawing inspiration from the literature, particularly the Global Peace Index's definition of positive peace and its eight pillars (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2020, pp. 54-55), and adapting it to the Palestinian question, this concept will focus on three key dimensions:

- State Security: Encompassing occupation, statehood, governance, and institutions. Observable through: Occupied territories - Establishment of an independent state - Well-functioning institutions – Sovereignty

- Human Rights: Including respect and promotion of fundamental human rights and freedoms as a foundational structure for peace, and equitable distribution and access to resources. Observable through: Arbitrary detentions - Torture - Deportation / Forcible transfers - Political rights - Economic rights - Cultural and religious rights
- Structures of Justice: Referring to the rule of law, behavioral norms and rules, and mechanisms for accountability in cases of violation. As Lederach (1997) argues, responsibility creates accountability and encourages recognition and viability of peacebuilding efforts. Observable through: Criminal prosecution - Sanctions - International tribunals/ measures

In the framework of this study, it is important to note that the dimensions of peace are not mutually exclusive and may overlap. This is particularly relevant given the complex nature of the Palestinian territories' occupation, which necessitates the application of occupation rules as outlined in the Geneva Conventions and, by extension, the rules of war. The concepts of negative and positive peace, along with their respective pillars, are understood as interdependent and interconnected. King and Mathews (2012) warn against an imbalanced approach to peacebuilding, cautioning that overemphasis on one pillar at the expense of others could lead to systemic failure. Galtung (1969) further illuminates this intricate relationship, stating: "The two types of violence do not seem to be more connected empirically than logically... they are continuous with each other, one shades into the other" (p.172).

Research Question:

Both concepts will be the lenses through which the analysis will be conducted to answer our research question,

- How do the U.S. vetoes at the Security Council hinder the Israeli-Palestinian peace-process?
 - o How did the U.S vetoes impede peace efforts in the pre-peace era?
 - o How did the vetoes hinder negative and positive peace in the Peace-process era?
 - o How did the vetoes obstruct absence of personal and structural violence in the aftermath of the peace process?

III. Methodology:

1. The Case of the U.S. Vetoed Resolutions on the “Palestinian Question”

This research adopts a qualitative approach to examine how American vetoes impede peacebuilding within a specific context, interaction, and setting. As Merriam (2015) suggests, this methodology is suitable for providing a comprehensive and holistic understanding of the phenomenon, rather than predicting outcomes. Vromen (2010) supports this approach, arguing that qualitative methods are appropriate for investigating how political institutions, events, or processes occur. The study employs a process-tracing approach to analyze the mechanisms by which vetoes hinder peacebuilding, focusing on "interpretation of meaning and to provide understanding, rather than explanation," it involves the mechanisms and capacities that lead from cause to an effect, or outcome or event rather than a quantitatively oriented focus on measuring causal effects (Ibid, p. 256) This method allows for the examination of how data relates to its broader social, political, and cultural framework.

Specifically, the research takes the form of a case study, aiming for an "in-depth description and analysis of a 'bounded system'" (Merriam, 2015). It examines 33 vetoed resolutions in parallel with real-world events in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories, spanning from July 1973 to December 2023. The study is divided into three chronological periods to enhance context-sensitive analysis:

1. **Pre-peace process era (1973-1990):** 16 vetoed resolutions
2. **Peace-process era (1995-2006):** 12 vetoed resolutions
3. **Peace-process aftermath (2011-2023):** 5 vetoed resolutions

This case study design is chosen because it allows for the investigation of a "contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context" (Merriam, 2015, p.37-8), recognizing the inseparability of the vetoed resolutions from their contextual circumstances. Furthermore, this approach facilitates the identification of patterns and routines in both the vetoing process and its outcomes, which are central to understanding the processes and dynamics of U.S. vetoes in relation to peacebuilding efforts.

2. Qualitative Mixed Method Design:

Qualitative research, as Merriam and Sharan (2015) assert, is not a linear progression but rather an interactive and flexible process where data collection and analysis occur concurrently. As the draft vetoed resolutions were collected, their content was systematically categorized into negative and positive peace domains as illustrated in table 1, 2, and 3¹. However, it's important to note that the process of devising categories is highly intuitive, informed not only by theoretical background but also by the study's specific purpose (Merriam & Sharan, 2015). Thus, the categorization was iteratively refined based on the resolutions' content and the theoretical underpinnings of peace studies.

This methodological approach aligns with recent critiques of peace measurement systems. While top-down approaches and indicators like the Global Peace Index (GPI) are valuable for

¹ Appendix

identifying large-scale trends in peace and conflict, they often fall short in capturing the full complexity of these phenomena. Firchow and Ginty (2017) argue that such approaches need to be complemented by bottom-up, inductive, and localized indicators to provide a more comprehensive understanding.

The initial conceptualization therefore underwent a process of review, modification, and adaptation. This iterative refinement was guided by the elements of peacebuilding identified within the resolutions themselves, ensuring that the analytical framework remained grounded in both theory and empirical data.

Negative Peace			
Dimensions	ongoing conflict	Human Security	Territorial Security
Descriptors / indicators	disproportionate force / ceasefire / violence cessation / Humanitarian pause/ collective punishment / Terrorism / suicide bombing / destruction of property and infrastructure/ UN force /emergency assistance / humanitarian access / siege and attacks on towns	Deaths/ injuries/ / Hostages / refugees / / children / /journalists / medical personnel / Food -electricity- water- fuel supplies / medical and humanitarian aid / /	Settlements- dismantlement- Freez /withdrawal / land expropriation / settlers / acquisition of territory by force/ de facto annexation /

Positive Peace			
Categories	Human Rights	State Security	Justice
Descriptors / indicators	curfews / administrative detention / deportation / home demolition / schools and education / confiscation of property / freedom of expression. assembly and protest /	Statehood / sovereign-functioning institutions / Dismissal – violence- detention of officials / status of Jerusalem/ Holy Places/ secured and recognized boundaries/ separation wall	Responsibility of the Occupying Power / responsibility of the High contracting Parties / rescinded decisions/ implementation / UN special measures / independent / investigations / accountability

This revised conceptualization enhances the study's focus on the categories and indicators within the resolutions, guiding subsequent data collection and analysis. As Vromen (2010) notes, this interactive process contributes to the production of credible and trustworthy findings.

However, while primarily qualitative, the study incorporates quantitative data to provide context for indicators such as casualties, settlements, and home demolitions. As Merriam (2015, p.48) suggests, "*what began as a qualitative case study becomes a qualitative mixed method case study, but the qualitative data remains primary.*" The numerical data supports qualitative findings derived from textual analysis, with emphasis on interpreting these figures within the context of vetoed Security Council resolutions. The study's core objective remains a deep understanding of how vetoed texts impede peace, with quantitative data complementing rather than dominating the qualitative aspect.

This mixed-method approach facilitates triangulation, enhancing the credibility and validity of findings through multiple data sources (Merriam, 2015). The research process involves identifying recurring indicators of negative and positive peace in the resolutions, categorizing them, and analyzing them in both the resolutions and real-world contexts. As Vromen (2010) argues, political analysis should engage more closely with the real world of politics. Guided by existing literature on US vetoes, the study also examines the justifications provided by US representatives and statements from Palestinians, Israelis, and other different parties. This approach helps elucidate diverse understandings, representations, and attributed meanings following significant vetoed resolutions. Ultimately, the case study aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the aggregate role US vetoes play in hindering peace regarding "the Palestinian question."

3. Data collection and sources:

In this case study focusing on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and their real-world impact, document analysis emerges as the most suitable method for a comprehensive and context-sensitive examination. As Merriam & Sharan (2015, p.182) assert, "if one were interested in a historical case study of an institution or program, documents would be the best source of data."

The research employs content analysis, a systematic approach to analyzing and interpreting data by identifying themes, trends, and patterns within their context to discern core consistencies and meanings (Zhang & Wildemuth, 2005). Additionally, the study incorporates a historiographical approach, which Thies (as cited in Vromen, 2010, p.263) describes as "writing of history based on a selective, critical reading of sources that synthesizes particular bits of information into a narrative description or analysis of a subject." This approach is particularly apt for explaining real-world outcomes and the influence of institutions, specifically the Security Council veto, on political processes.

The study analyzes a wide range of written documents, including vetoed draft resolutions, UN and NGO reports, academic literature, press articles, and textual and statistical databases. This comprehensive approach allows for a rich, inclusive, and detailed understanding of vetoes and their patterns without directly interfering with the data or its creators (Merriam & Sharan, 2015).

Both primary and secondary sources are utilized in this research. Primary sources, which in political science typically consist of original documents produced by political actors (Vromen, 2010), include UNSC vetoed draft resolutions, their public records, and field survey reports from international organizations. These sources are crucial for reconstructing the historical sequence of events. Secondary sources, comprising scientific papers, books, press articles, and publications from various organizations, provide analyzed and summarized data derived from primary sources, offering additional context and interpretation to the study.

Below is a primary list of the sources, (this list is not exhaustive and may be completed along the analysis):

- **UNSC vetoed draft resolutions:**
 - Database of the vetoed resolutions on the "Palestinian question" (UNSC):<https://www.un.org/unispal/document-category/vetoed-draft-resolution/?wpv-wpcf->
 - Database of the vetoed resolutions written records Archives (UN Archives): https://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact_veto_table_en.htm
- **Real-world events and facts:**
 - Existing literature and scientific papers
 - UN bodies reports and publications on "the Palestinian Question".
 - Amnesty International (AI) publications on Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/search/?sort=date-asc&qlocation=2031,2032%2C2315>
 - Human Rights Watch (HRW) publications on Israel/ Palestine: <https://www.hrw.org/news?country%5B0%5D=9638&created=&keyword=&news-type%5B0%5D=9438&page=2>

- Interactive Encyclopedia of the Palestinian question (IEPQ) “Thematic chronology” since 1973: <https://www.palquest.org/en/overallchronology?nid=146&chronos=146>
- Institute for Palestinian Studies Database:
 - § Settlement Monitor: https://www.palestinestudies.org/en/journals/explorer?f%5B0%5D=field_blog_date%3A%5B1994-01-01%20TO%202017-12-31%5D&f%5B1%5D=field_digital_sections%3A3258
- Database of the Jewish Virtual Library (JVL)
 - § Israel Defense Forces, “Wars and Operation” section : <https://web.archive.org/web/20201012221518/https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/israel-s-wars-and-operations>
- B’TSELEM publications and databases:
 - § Fatalities Database : <https://statistics.btselem.org/en/all-fatalities/by-date-of-incident?section=overall&tab=overview>

The selection of documents for analyzing vetoes in real-world scenarios will focus on their relevance to the historical context of vetoed resolutions. This process will prioritize empirical observation and description, particularly for periods following significant vetoes. The analysis will concentrate on indicators and categories found in vetoed resolutions to understand the veto’s concrete role in peace processes. Document selection will balance between inclusive reports (e.g., general UN or NGO reports covering multiple peace categories) and specific documents (focusing on single categories or indicators). This approach ensures a comprehensive yet detailed analysis.

Finally, using texts in research offers key advantages such as nonreactivity and accessibility, providing authentic insights grounded in real-world contexts (Merriam, Sharan, 2015). However, significant challenges exist. The selection process of documents often prioritizes some sources over others based on accessibility, requiring systematic justifications to ensure reputable historical research (Vromen, 2010). Thus, documents may be incomplete from a research perspective, lacking necessary detail for comprehensive analysis. Even though inexistent data can offer crucial insights into the context under investigation (Merriam, Sharan, 2015), it remains a major challenge to this study, it remains a significant challenge for this study, particularly regarding the pre-peace era where documentation is scarce. Consequently, the initial part of the analysis will be primarily descriptive. This approach is further justified by the fact that the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process only began in the 1990s.

Additionally, the form and clarity of available information may not always be useful or easily understandable, further complicating the research process. The selection of documents must adhere to crucial criteria such as authenticity, credibility, and representativeness (Vromen, 2010), which are not always straightforward to determine. In fact, authenticity and accuracy can be problematic, as even public records may contain inherent biases (Merriam & Sharan, 2015).

IV. Analysis

1. Pre-Peace and Cold War Era 1973-1990:

From 1973 to 1990, the most intensive use of U.S. vetoes on the "Palestinian question" occurred, with 16 resolutions vetoed coinciding with the Cold War. Significant geopolitical tensions marked this era, including the Yom Kippur War and the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973, which aimed to pressure Israel to withdraw from occupied territories and restore Palestinian rights. The embargo influenced the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 338, calling for a ceasefire and peace negotiations. During this time, the analysis of vetoed resolutions in Table 1 reveals two distinct phases. From 1973 to 1982, the primary focus was on the dimensions of positive peace while also addressing two indicators of negative peace: refugees and settlements. From 1983 to 1990, coinciding with the first Palestinian Intifada, the focus shifted towards dimensions of negative peace, with resolutions increasingly addressing indicators of ongoing conflict and direct violence, as well as highlighting dimensions of structural justice.

i. Enhancing Barriers to Positive Peace (1973-1982)

Between 1973 and 1982, dimensions of state security dominated the first seven U.S. vetoes on the "Palestinian question." During this period, three draft resolutions mentioned human rights, and three fell within the category of justice. Notably, the U.S. exercised its veto power three times consecutively in early 1976. This era coincided with the Palestinians' efforts to institutionalize their cause, marked by the formation of the Palestine National Front (PNF) in August 1973. As a PLO affiliate, the PNF coordinated political activities in the West Bank and Gaza, organizing strikes and demonstrations between the October 1973 war and the 1976 municipal elections. These activities often coincided with significant events, such as Yasser Arafat's 1974 UN appearance, and were met with harsh repression by Israeli authorities, resulting in numerous casualties (Rabbani, Hajjar, 1988).

- **Human Rights:**

The 1973 draft resolution first mentioned human rights, which the U.S. swiftly vetoed despite backing from France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. Smouts (1974). The resolution addressed the "political and other fundamental rights of all the inhabitants" in relation to territorial changes (UNSC, 1973).

Smouts (1974) emphasizes that Henry Kissinger's exceptional mediation and advocacy for secret diplomacy overshadowed potential peace initiatives from the UN, transforming the Security Council into a mere recording chamber due to U.S.-Soviet connivance. Henry Kissinger was also the figure of realpolitik, which further explains the U.S. foreign policy. Similarly, the March 1976 draft resolution called on Israel to refrain from measures against Arab inhabitants pending the end of its occupation (UNSC, 1976b). These instances highlight the interdependence of peacebuilding dimensions, particularly the interconnection of human rights and state security.

- **State Security:**

The Peace dimension of State Security is a central theme in the vetoed resolutions concerning Palestine, with key indicators being occupation, statehood, and, to a lesser extent, institutions. These vetoes often center on the rights and aspirations of the Palestinian people, including their right to self-determination, national independence, and sovereignty. In 1973, the vetoed resolution emphasized "respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity," and "the rights and legitimate aspirations of Palestinians" (UNSC, 1973). By January 1976, another draft resolution reaffirmed the "inalienable national right of self-determination" for Palestinians to live "within secure and recognized boundaries" (UNSC, 1976a). A month later, the Council further affirmed "the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine" (UNSC, 1976c). Likewise, in 1980, a vetoed draft resolution recognized "the right to establish an independent state in Palestine" (UNSC, 1980).

The January 1976 resolution was particularly notable as it incorporated UNSC Resolution 242, reflecting an international majority and underscoring the importance of the issue. According to Noam Chomsky (1997), the resolution received widespread support from the global community, including Arab states and the PLO. Israeli UN Ambassador Haim Herzog contributed to its preparation. However, he notes that Israel did not attend the session, and the United States ultimately vetoed the resolution. The veto occurred in the context of Israeli attacks on the PLO in Lebanon, with the PLO invited to participate in Security Council debates, which also led the US to also veto (IEPQ, 1973-82). The PLO representative, however, welcomed the invitation to participate, noting Israel's absence and suggesting it was due to the presence of Palestinian representatives (UN, 1976).

Paradoxically, during the SC debates, the American ambassador argued that the draft resolution would undermine the negotiation framework established by UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338, claiming it would harm the peace-making process. He stated that the veto was not due to antipathy towards Palestinian aspirations but rather a belief that the resolution would not effectively address their future (UNA, 1984). The sponsor of the resolution, Tunis's Ambassador, emphasized that negotiations were no longer convincing and had "demonstrated to us a continued deterioration of that situation and an escalation of provocations that are apparently impossible to control, including provocations by the very ones who have been preaching patience to us" (UNA, 1984, p. 11). However, the U.S. cast its veto on the resolution, despite the fact that it essentially reproduced the recommendations of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. The resolution's sponsor, Tunisia's Ambassador Essaafi, confirmed that the Committee itself drafted it, thereby contradicting the U.S. position (Ibid.). The Security Council's role is vital for the recognition of Palestinian statehood. The General Assembly lacks the legal competence to grant full UN membership to Palestine without its vetoed recommendations.

The US consistently blocked diplomatic initiatives at the UN from various international actors, effectively eliminating the Security Council's role through its vetoes (Chomsky, 1997).

The vetoed text also mentioned Jerusalem. In March 1976, another resolution condemning Israeli settlements in Jerusalem, deploring "Israel's failure to put a stop to action and policies tending to change the status of the City of Jerusalem" and calling on Israel to respect "the inviolability of the Holy Places" (UNSC, 1976b). Concerns about Israeli policies in Jerusalem, perceived as attempts to modify the city's religious character, led to this resolution. Despite these concerns, the US vetoed the resolution, arguing that Israel's administration had reduced tensions, and that the resolution would hinder the peace process (UN, 1976). In April 1982, the

Security Council draft text further deplored “any act or encouragement of destruction or profanation of the Holy Places, religious buildings, and sites in Jerusalem as tending to disturb world peace” following the Israeli shooting at al Aqsa Mosque (UNSC, 1982). Such violent events suggested that the vetoes might have facilitated Israeli policies in Jerusalem, potentially hindering the peace process and endangering world peace (UNSC, 1982b).

Amid high tensions during the debates, Turkey's ambassador stated that, despite Israeli condemnations and the soldier acting alone, Israel remains responsible for its obligations to holy sites, noting this was not the first instance of "criminal profanity" against them. The Sudanese ambassador added that the massacre occurred on a day sacred to Christians and at a shrine holy to Muslims, arguing that dismissing it as mere lunacy would not be credible (UNA, 1982). In contrast, the Israeli ambassador attempted to deflect attention by raising unrelated issues not on the Security Council's agenda. He questioned whether King Khaled Ibn Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia, as Chairman of the Islamic Summit Conference, had called for a work stoppage across Islamic countries in protest against the desecration of mosques in Syria (UNA, 1982). The issue of occupation is particularly prominent, mentioned in three out of seven draft resolutions. This refers to Israel's capture of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in June 1967 and its continued control, in one form or another, over these territories and their populations (B'Tselem, 2017).

In the 1973 draft resolution, in the first draft resolution of 1973, the Security Council starts at the first article by highlighting the “no progress in carrying terms of resolution 242(1967),” which calls for the Israeli withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied in 1967. And in the second article, the Council “strongly deplores Israel’s continuing occupation of the territories” (UNSC, 1973). Interestingly, this continued occupation led three months later to the Arab-Israeli October War of 1973 and the Arab Oil Embargo, further intensifying the conflict rather than laying the groundwork for the upcoming peace process. The 1973 American veto appears to have played a clear role in this process.

In January 1976, the Security Council reiterated in its first article "that Israel should withdraw from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967" (UNSC, 1976a). Despite this, the U.S. vetoed the resolution, even though the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People had recommended establishing a timetable for complete withdrawal by June 1, 1977. The committee also recommended that the Council should provide temporary peacekeeping forces if necessary to facilitate the withdrawal process (UN, 1976). This underscores the pressing need to end the occupation, the fundamental source of the conflict. The second article of a 1980 draft resolution (UNSC, 1980), which the U.S. again vetoed, contained the exact wording from Article 1 of the vetoed 1976 resolution. Since 1971, the US has consistently supported Israel's expansion in response to Kissinger's call for "stalemate: force, not diplomacy." Since then, the US has interpreted UN242 as requiring only a partial Israeli withdrawal from the OPT (Chomsky 1997). Additionally, Israeli researcher Avi Raz (2013) highlights that Israeli leaders deliberately missed opportunities for peace after 1967, preferring to retain the territories rather than negotiate their return. From 1967 to 1993, two distinct territorial strategies emerged: the Labor Party sought to retain most territories while being open to peace treaties, whereas the Likud Party aimed to fragment the territories, suggesting possible population transfers to ensure territorial autonomy (Aviraz, 2013, in Meier, 2024).

Finally, two vetoed United Nations Security Council resolutions in 1982 prominently featured Palestinian institutions. Despite the Palestinian National Front winning 18 of 24 city councils in the 1976 elections, nationalist mayors faced deportation or house arrest, with bomb attacks in 1980 severely injuring Shak'a and Khalaf (Rabbani & Hajjar, 1988).

In 1982, Israeli authorities shut down Birzeit University following student harassment of Israeli education official Zion Gabai, sparking protests in several West Bank towns. On March 11, the National Guidance Committee was banned for being a "de facto arm of the PLO," leading to the dismissal of al-Bireh's municipal council and its mayor, Ibrahim Tawil. The mayors of Nablus and Ramallah were also removed on March 25. Demonstrations and general strikes throughout March resulted in clashes and Palestinian casualties. On April 2, the Security Council called on Israel to "rescind its decision disbanding the elected municipal council of El Bireh and its decision to remove from their posts the Mayors of Nablus and Ramallah" (UNSC, 1982a).

Eighteen days later, on April 20, the U.S. vetoed a resolution urging Israel to "refrain from causing any hindrance to the discharge of the established functions of the Higher Islamic Council in Jerusalem" (UNSC, 1982b). The discharge of this council came after it called for a general strike in response to an Israeli soldier's shooting at the Al Aqsa Mosque. People perceived the one-week general strike as an effort to prevent further clashes in Jerusalem (Shipler, 1982). The U.S. vetoed the resolution despite the growing tensions, implicitly signaling approval of Israeli actions and disrupting Palestinian institutional functions.

- **Justice:**

The pursuit of justice and adherence to the rule of law are fundamental principles that underpin international relations and the actions of states. In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, these dimensions were also spotted in the U.S. vetoed resolutions on the matter. In March 1976, the Security Council called twice on Israel to "desist" from actions that included the expropriation and encroachment upon Arab lands and property, as well as other policies aimed at altering Jerusalem's legal status. The UNSC urged Israel "to rescind measures already taken to that effect" (UNSC, 1976b). However, the United States effectively blocked the adoption of these measures as legally binding by opposing the resolution's adoption. The veto also contributed to spreading violence. On March 30, 1976, just five days after the U.S. veto, a general strike and widespread demonstrations erupted across Palestinian towns and villages in Israel. These protests were against Israel's extensive expropriation of land and resulted in the deaths of six Palestinians, over 100 injuries, and hundreds of arrests, despite Israeli countermeasures (IEPQ, 1976).

In April 1982, the UNSC once again called on Israel, the occupying power, to "rescind its decision" regarding the dismissal of Palestinian elected officials and the functioning of the Higher Islamic Council in Jerusalem (UNSC, 1982). The Council reaffirmed that "all the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons continue to apply in full to all of the occupied territories" and urged Israel to "observe and apply scrupulously" these provisions (UNSC, 1982). The 1976 report by the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People has also emphasized that Israel should comply with the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and recognize its applicability in the OPT.

Israel, as a High Contracting Party, has a duty to uphold the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which it ratified in July 1951. Article 54 of the Convention prohibits the alteration of the status of public officials or judges in occupied territories and protects them from coercion or discrimination should they abstain from fulfilling their duties for reasons of conscience (Fourth Geneva Convention, 1949). The occupying power is also responsible for protecting and preserving holy sites. Finally, as shown, the U.S. veto has consistently hindered efforts to hold Israel accountable as the occupying power for grave violations of international law, prioritizing negotiations over the enforcement of international law.

ii. Obstacles to negative peace 1973-1982

During this period, three of the seven resolutions mention refugees and the right to return (1976 - 1976 - 1980), and one of them mentions the Israeli settlements (March 1976).

- Human Safety and the omission of the refugee problem:

During this period, the issue of human security was epitomized by the persistent problem of Palestinian refugees and one draft resolution referring to the killing of Palestinians in April 1982. The displacement of over 700,000 Palestinians during the 1948 Nakba, often referred to as "the original sin" of the Israeli state, is the source of this problem. This event presents a significant challenge to the Zionist narrative of "a land without people for a people without a land" (Bocco, 2009). The Nakba resulted in the displacement of more than half of Palestine's Arab population, with 60 percent losing their livelihoods (Rabbani & Hajjar, 1988).

As Bocco (2009) notes, the establishment of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in 1950 highlighted the critical importance of the refugee issue. UNRWA, uniquely focused on the Palestinian refugee crisis in Gaza, the West Bank, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon, undertook the task of facilitating the economic reintegration of refugees. Despite its humanitarian mission, UNRWA faced challenges related to donor objectives and the political implications of resettlement, reflecting international hesitations towards a two-state solution. These complexities have been central to UNRWA's continued relevance, symbolizing both hope and criticism in the quest for a just resolution to the Palestinian refugee crisis. The international community is aware of this issue, as evidenced by the 1976 Report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Palestinian People's Inalienable Rights. It affirmed Palestinians' right to return and proposed a two-phase plan. The first phase called for enforcing Resolution 237 (1967) to return those displaced by the 1967 war. The second phase focused on facilitating the return of those displaced between 1948 and 1967, in accordance with UN resolutions, especially General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) (UN, 1973).

Therefore, Article one of the January 1976 resolutions emphasized "the right of Palestinian refugees wishing to return to their homes" and "the right of those choosing not to return to receive compensation for their property" (UNSC, 1976a). Similarly, U.S. Vetoed resolutions in June 1976 and 1980 reiterated Palestinian refugees' "right of return" (UNSC, 1976c; UNSC, 1980). However, the United States used its veto power three times between 1976 and 1980, undermining international recognition and respect for Palestinian refugees' rights, despite the report's recommendations and the critical importance of refugee return for building peace. The context of the U.S. vetoes was characterized by a systemic increase in the number of Palestinian refugees, rather than the necessary decrease for peace. Between 1975 and 1980, the total number of refugees increased by 211,611, reaching 1,844,318 (UNRWA: Jewish Virtual Library, n.d.). This period coincided with the U.S. casting three vetoes on draft resolutions

acknowledging Palestinian refugees' rights. Consequently, these vetoes seem to have played a significant role in preventing the resolution of the refugee problem in the late 1970s, directly linking to conditions of negative peace.

During this period, other than refugees, the only draft resolution concerning human safety was on April 20, 1982. It expressed deep concerns “*over the sacrilegious acts perpetrated against the sanctity of al-Haram al-Shareef in Jerusalem on the 11th of April 1982 and the criminal acts of shooting at worshippers, particularly inside the sanctuary of the Dome of the Rock and the Al-Aqsa Mosque*” (UNSC, 1982b).

According to reports from The New York Times, an Israeli soldier affiliated with Rabbi Kahane’s extremist group shot at worshippers at the Al-Aqsa Mosque, resulting in at least two Palestinians killed and nine injured. This group advocated for the expulsion of all Arabs from Israel and the replacement of the mosques on the Temple Mount with a Jewish temple. The attack sparked widespread Arab demonstrations across East Jerusalem, with hospitals treating 25 people for gunshot wounds and about 150 for other injuries from the attack and ensuing clashes (Shipler, 1982). This incident occurred against a backdrop of escalating tensions in 1981-1982, marked by strikes and protests against the Begin/Sharon "civil administration" that began in November 1981. After a brief lull, these protests erupted again in the spring of 1982, coinciding with the Al-Aqsa events, with similar intensity. Schools and university campuses became key battlegrounds, with many students killed or seriously wounded by army gunfire (Rabbani, Hajjar, 1988).

During the Security Council meeting, the PLO representative emphasized the need for better crowd control measures, stating, "There must certainly be better ways of dispersing even violent crowds of young protesting students than shooting at them. However, if the strict discipline for the use of arms is relaxed, even a lone soldier on guard could easily become trigger-happy and denounce the commander of the Israeli forces in the occupied territories. When ordering his soldiers, he said: "Anyone you catch outside, you first beat with the clubs all over his body except the head. Have no mercy. Break all his bones. Give no explanations. First of all, beat. Do not treat this beating as a privilege; it is a duty. They understand no other way." (UNA, 1982). Despite these concerns, the U.S. vetoed the resolution on April 20, seeming to effectively absolve Israel of responsibility. However, this sharp repression, which included numerous arrests, beatings, and house demolitions, partly accounts for the relative quiet in the Occupied Territories during the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which aimed to eliminate the PLO (Rabbani, Hajjar, 1988).

- **Territorial security:**

Settlements and annexation have a significant impact on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The first mention of Israeli settlements in Jerusalem at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) occurred in a draft resolution in March 1976, highlighting their centrality to the Palestinian problem. In June 1967, Israel annexed approximately 70 square kilometers of the West Bank into Jerusalem, applying Israeli law in violation of international law. This action resulted in the expansion of Jerusalem's boundaries to encompass land from 28 Palestinian villages, depriving absent Palestinians of their right to return and classifying those present as "permanent residents" who could not vote in national elections (B'Tselem, 2019).

Meier (2024) observes that religious Zionist beliefs, particularly those of Rabbi Kook, who viewed Israel's establishment as "the dawn of redemption," primarily drive the expansion of Israeli settlements. The 1967 victory, perceived as a divine miracle, reinforced Gush's political stance against any territorial concessions. The 1974 inclusion of the National Religious Party in the Rabin government further propelled Gush Emunim's agenda to restore the biblical borders of Greater Israel, leading to settlements in Judea and Samaria, even in densely populated Palestinian areas, surpassing the Allon Plan and further fragmenting Palestinian territories. However, the U.S. vetoed text from March 1976 first mentioned the term "settlements" twice: in the second paragraph of the preamble, where it expressed concerns about "the establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories," and in article 3, where it called on Israel to "desist from the establishment of Israeli settlements thereon in the occupied Arab territories." (UNSC, 1976b).

Following a U.S. veto, Israeli settlement construction surged, establishing 26 settlements in 1977 alone. (UN, 1984), Israelis received 90% of the new housing designations in East Jerusalem from 1977 to 1983, while Palestinians only received 230 units per year (Settlement Monitor, 1994). The veto undermined the March 1976 draft resolution, the first international condemnation of Israeli settlements, allowing settlement expansion to continue unchecked. The rise of the Likud party under Prime Minister Menachem Begin from 1977 to 1983 further strengthened the settlement expansion. According to Meyer (2024), Begin rebranded the "occupied territories" as "liberated territories," promoting settlements as the Jewish people's "natural rights." Agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon supported Gush Emunim's plan to expand the borders of biblical Israel, which involved fragmenting Palestinian areas and hindering the creation of a Palestinian state. Meanwhile, Matityahu Drobless's strategy aimed to bolster Jewish settlements to enhance Israel's negotiating position.

iii. Deteriorating Conditions for Negative Peace" 1983-1989:

During the 1980s, the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians escalated, leading to a notable increase in violence reflected in the United Nations Security Council's vetoed resolutions. This period was characterized by a dominant focus on negative peace, particularly concerning physical violence, while dimensions related to structural justice were also present, as presented in Table 1. During this time, the United States vetoed nine draft resolutions, eight of which addressed negative peace. Positive peace domains were identified as well, with the human rights domain appearing in five resolutions and the state security domain in three. All vetoed texts included the domain of justice. Notably, the draft resolutions from April 1988 and 1983 were inclusive, covering the six dimensions of peace, although the latter lacked the ongoing conflict category.

This analysis reveals a trend in which the U.S. reduced vetoes related to state security and, more generally, structural justice in favor of vetoing resolutions that addressed direct physical violence. The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which aimed to eliminate the PLO and gain control over the West Bank and Gaza, sets the backdrop for this trend. After 75 days of resistance, the PLO lost both its military front in South Lebanon and its base in Beirut. Following the PLO's evacuation, the Sabra and Shatila massacre occurred by the Phalange allied with Israel, killing hundreds of Palestinian and Lebanese civilians in the camps. The Israeli "Kahan Report" attributed direct blame to the Phalangists and indirect responsibility to Israeli leaders, holding Defense Minister Ariel Sharon personally accountable for not preventing the bloodshed. Israel's cabinet later approved the report's recommendations.

However, from 1983 to 1987, the PLO faced internal divisions and factional fighting (IEPQ, 1982-89).

- **Human Safety:**

Two hand grenades thrown at an Israeli military vehicle on July 1 heightened tensions in Hebron, prompting the Israeli army to impose a five-day curfew. A settler's fatal stabbing in the marketplace on July 7 exacerbated the situation, prompting the imposition of another curfew and the dismissal of Mayor Mustafa al-Natsha and the City Council. On July 10, Israel's Cabinet approved plans to restore the old Jewish Quarter, further escalating the tensions in the region (IEPQ, 1982-87). The violence peaked on July 26 when armed Jewish settlers launched a brutal attack on the Islamic College, resulting in the deaths of three Palestinians and injuries to 40 others (Ibid.). This tragic event drew international attention and prompted the United Nations Security Council to convene on August 2 to discuss a resolution addressing the escalating violence. The draft resolution condemned the attacks on civilians, specifically denouncing "*the killing and wounding of students at the Islamic College of the Arab city of Ar-Khalil on July 16, 1983*" (UNSC, 1983).

However, the United States, maintaining its historical stance, exercised its veto power, marking its eighth veto on the Palestinian question since 1973. This veto was particularly significant as it directly followed a similar veto on the draft resolution condemning the shooting at the Al-Aqsa Mosque in April 1982. Thus, we can link the pattern of U.S. vetoes to the ongoing cycle of violence, highlighting the complexities and challenges of achieving peace in the face of direct violence that the veto shields.

In December 1987, the first Palestinian Intifada, known as the "Stones Intifada," erupted. According to the UN Secretary-General (1988), this uprising was a reaction to 20 years of occupation and the lack of hope for an early resolution, supported by Palestinians of all ages and backgrounds. It expressed the despair and hopelessness of those living under occupation, leading to tragic confrontations between young unarmed Palestinians and Israeli soldiers (UNSG, 1988, p. 15). The Israeli narrative, however, suggested that false rumors of Israeli atrocities, such as a stabbing in Gaza and a traffic accident in Jabalya, sparked mass rioting on December 9, 1987. The killing of a Palestinian by an Israeli soldier during the riots further fueled unrest. Hamas, a fundamentalist group opposed to peace negotiations with Israel, challenged the PLO's leadership, leading to internal violence, including the killing of Palestinians accused of spying (Bard, 2021).

In December 1987, during the first month of the Intifada, Israeli security forces killed 22 Palestinians (B'Tselem, n.d.). By April 1988, the United Nations Security Council addressed the situation with a draft resolution condemning the Israeli forces' use of force, "*which resulted in the killing and wounding of defenseless Palestinian civilians*" (UNSC, 1988b).

However, the United States vetoed the resolution. In response, Algeria's Deputy, Mr. Djoudi, remarked, "*Palestinian peoples are condemned to be the recipients of American vetoes. Mention has often been made of the impotence of the Security Council. That impotence results from abuse of the veto. On 1 February, the Zionists perceived the veto as an encouragement and as an invitation to persecute Palestinians*" and "*encouraged the policy of annihilation being practiced by the Tel Aviv authorities in the occupied Palestinian territories.*" (UNA, 1988). He referred to the U.S. vetoed resolution of January 28, in which the Council called on Israel to "*desist forthwith from its policies and practices that violate the human rights of the Palestinian people*" (UNSC, 1988a). By the end of 1988, Israelis had killed 310 Palestinians,

with 290 of these deaths attributed to Israeli security forces. This perception of encouragement may have contributed to the continued violence. In contrast, Palestinians killed 10 Israelis during the same period, including 4 civilians (B'Tselem, n.d.).

Over the years, Israeli security forces have killed thousands of Palestinians during routine enforcement activities like arrests or crowd control, while others have died in rounds of fighting, according to B'Tselem (2017b). Thousands more have been injured, many with serious and lifelong repercussions, including physical or mental disabilities. The Security Council convened again at the start of 1989. On February 17, it debated a draft resolution condemning Israeli open fire "that has resulted in injuries and deaths, including children" in its first article (UNSC, 1989a).

The consequences of the first Intifada were particularly devastating for children. A UN (1999) report highlights that Palestinian children endured significant physical and psychological harm, often with lifelong consequences. Under military occupation, they faced harsh regulations and a climate of fear, placing them in an inferior legal position compared to non-Palestinian children in the occupied territories. Between December 1987 and September 1988, 32 children were reported killed, including over two dozen infants. Among these, two children under five died from gunshots, and 26, mostly infants, succumbed to tear gas exposure. Amal Qseisa, from Gaza, was the youngest victim, just five days old. Furthermore, in June 1989, another draft resolution expressed "*concern and alarm over the increasing sufferings of the Palestinian people*" and deplored the attacks against Palestinian towns and villages (UNSC, 1989b). All other Security Council members supported both resolutions, emphasizing the urgency and importance of the situation, but the United States vetoed them. U.S. Ambassador Pickering explained the latter vote by stating that there was no reference to acts of violence directed by Palestinians against Israelis and among Palestinians themselves. He emphasized that the United States was not willing to support unbalanced resolutions (UN, 1989), seemingly overlooking the imbalance of force and casualties.

Likewise, in November 1989, the Security Council draft resolution recognized "*the immediate need to consider measures for the impartial and international protection of the Palestinian civilian population under Israeli occupation*" (UNSC, 1989c). However, the U.S. vetoed the draft, marking 1989 as the second year with three consecutive U.S. vetoes on the Palestinian Question, alongside 1976. During the debates, the PLO representative criticized the U.S. stance, stating, "*Of course, while billions of dollars are given to the occupying power to persist in its policies—inhuman, atrocious acts of state terrorism—a resolution calling for peace would be considered an exacerbating element*" (UNA, 1989).

In 1989, 9 Israelis were killed, including 4 civilians, while over 300 Palestinians were reported killed, with more than 289 of these deaths caused by Israeli Security Forces, including over 80 minors under 17 (B'Tselem, n.d.). Consequently, the 1990 Security Council draft resolution sought to establish a commission to issue "*recommendations on ways and means for ensuring the safety and protection of the Palestinian civilians*" (UNSC, 1990). However, it was vetoed by the U.S. again, and by the end of 1990, 145 Palestinians had been killed, with 125 deaths attributed to Israeli Security Forces. In contrast, 7 Israelis were killed by Palestinians, including 3 Security Forces personnel (B'Tselem, n.d.).

- **Ongoing conflict:**

The Palestinian popular uprising, known as the Intifada, marked an unprecedented period of resistance characterized by its decentralized, spontaneous, and largely non-military nature. During the first year, Palestinians in the occupied territories experienced a high degree of confrontation and repression, which became a defining aspect of their daily lives (UN, 1999). Since December 9, Palestinians, including children, have staged daily demonstrations, often throwing stones, petrol bombs, and other missiles at Israeli soldiers and settlers.

The Israeli authorities have responded with force, frequently excessive and indiscriminate, using live ammunition, rubber and plastic bullets, tear gas, and gravel cannons (AI, 1989). Given the nature of this uprising of popular resistance rather than armed conflict, descriptors of ongoing conflict were not frequently included in resolutions.

However, for some Israelis, the nature of the Israeli operations and its methods were highlighted in the vetoed text. In April 1988 and February 1989, the U.S. vetoed condemning “the opening of fire by the Israeli army” (UNSC, 1988b; UNSC, 1989a). In June 1989, the vetoed resolution deplored “vigilante attacks against Palestinian towns and villages” (UNSC, 1989b). Likewise, the Secretary-General reported that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had used disproportionate force, resulting in fatal casualties (UNSG, 1988). According to B’Tselem (2017b), Israeli security forces' open-fire policy, intended to limit firearm use during policing tasks like dispersing demonstrations and making arrests, allows live ammunition only in immediate life-threatening situations or as a last resort during arrests. Soldiers, on the other hand, frequently violate these regulations by receiving orders that expand the definition of “life-threatening” to include non-lethal threats such as stone throwing. Additionally, soldiers may be allowed to aim at the upper body instead of the legs and to target almost any Palestinian as a suspect.

Humanitarian access was also a concern. In January 1988, the vetoed text called on Israel to “facilitate the task of the International Committee of the Red Cross and of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees,” urging all members to support these organizations fully (UNSC, 1988a). However, the Secretary-General reported that Israeli authorities generally prevented the ICRC from intervening in law-and-order measures that violated the Fourth Geneva Convention (UNSG, 1988).

In April 1988, the Council’s vetoed resolutions referred to Israel's actions as a “persistent policy of taking measures of collective punishment” against Palestinians (UNSC, 1988b).

Collective punishment is considered unlawful under international law, as outlined in Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention. For instance, Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention explicitly states: “No protected person may be punished for an offense he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and all measures of intimidation or terrorism are prohibited” (UN, 1999). The Secretary-General also called on Israel to ensure the rapid evacuation of wounded individuals to medical care, maintain the efficient functioning of hospitals, and not obstruct the delivery of essential food and medical supplies (UNSG, 1988).

Paradoxically, the U.S. representative justified its veto by arguing that the Security Council was being asked to intervene in an ad hoc manner in the complex issues of the Middle East. He claimed that the text neither contributed to easing tensions in the occupied territories nor promoted peace, criticizing it for its broad condemnation of Israel without balance or a call for calm. In response, the PLO representative questioned, “What has his government contributed to ease the tension in the occupied territories other than supplying more sophisticated toxic gas

and hundreds of millions of dollars to the occupying power and giving it all the protection that it needs?" He emphasized that it might be more helpful if the U.S. stopped sending support altogether (UNA, 1988). However, Israel persisted in its collective punishment measures, endangering children, particularly by lending to shortages of fresh food and milk for infants. The situations exacerbated the social and psychological damage inflicted on Palestinians, primarily children (UN, 1999). The year 1990 symbolized the beginning of the peace process, yet the context remained marked by the violence of the First Intifada.

- **Territorial Security:**

The issue of Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) has been a focal point of international debate, particularly during the 1980s when the United States repeatedly used its veto power to block United Nations Security Council resolutions addressing the matter. Three vetoed resolutions between 1983 and 1988 mentioned these settlements, highlighting the contentious nature of the topic. The Israeli regime prioritizes land as a resource for Jewish communities, often leaving Palestinians in fragmented, overcrowded enclaves, according to B'Tselem (2021). In 1983, Israel announced plans to establish new military settlements in the West Bank and expand existing ones, aiming to increase the Jewish population in the occupied territories significantly (IEPQ, 1983). By the end of that year, Israel had established around 160 settlements and posts, marking a shift in settlement intensity (UN, 1984).

In August 1983, a Security Council draft resolution sought to reaffirm that Israeli settlement practices in the OPT "have no legal validity" and "constitute a major and serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in the Middle East." The resolution called for Israel to halt the transfer of its civilian population into occupied territories and to dismantle existing settlements (UNSC, 1983). Despite the increase in settlements and resolutions, the U.S. vetoed the text, and the Palestinian People's Committee on Rights highlighted settlements as major obstacles to peace in the Middle East. The "Geneva Declaration on Palestine and a Programmed Action" Key Guidelines included opposing the establishment of settlements and reaffirming that all Israeli measures altering Jerusalem's character and status, including land expropriation and proclaiming Jerusalem as Israel's capital, are null and void (UN, 1984). However, in 1986, the US vetoed a draft resolution on Jerusalem in which the SC reconsidered Israel's policy of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in the OPT as a flagrant violation of international law and "a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in the Middle East" (UNSC, 1986).

The U.S. vetoes appeared to encourage further settlement construction. Between 1983 and 1986, The Hundred Thousand Plan aimed to establish 23 new communal and rural settlements and 20 NAHAL army settlement sites in the West Bank, along with 300-450 kilometers of new roads. By 1986, the number of new settlements was achieved, but the population reached only 51,000, falling short of the 100,000 targets (B'Tselem, 2002). The April 1988 U.S. veto was particularly alarming as it blocked the first draft resolution to mention Israeli settlers.

In the Occupied Territories, Israeli settlers are subject to Israeli law, while Palestinians are governed by military occupation law, leading to significant disadvantages in legal processes, residency rights, and access to resources (UN, 1990). Unauthorized outposts receive state support, including military protection and financial subsidies, with assistance from various government ministries and the Settlement Division of the World Zionist Organization (B'Tselem, 2021). Furthermore, the draft text particularly condemned settler violence, expressing alarm that "Israel has continued to transfer its civilian population into the territory

it occupies” and “has equipped those settlers with arms that have been used against the civilian Palestinian people” (UNSC, 1988). Yet, U.S. objections prevented the resolution from adoption, despite its significance.

According to B'Tselem (2021), "when the violence occurs with permission and assistance from the Israeli authorities and under its auspices, it is state violence." The settlers are not defying the state; they are doing its bidding." The state uses official means such as military orders, declaring land as "state land," "firing zones," or "nature reserves," and expropriating land to take over areas. Settlers also seize land through violent acts against Palestinians and their property. This violence is part of Israel's strategy to expand control over the West Bank, supported and facilitated by the state, making settler violence a form of government policy.

iv. Obstructing Positive Peace

- Human Rights:

Palestinian human rights were central to a vetoed resolution concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reflecting real-world events. In 1983, Israeli military authorities intensified pressure on West Bank Palestinian universities, leading to the arrest and detention of students. The Emergency Powers (Detention) Law, enacted in March 1979, allowed the Minister of Defense to issue detention orders based on "reasonable cause" for security reasons, with proceedings conducted in camera (AI, 1989). On May 20, 1985, negotiations resulted in the release of 1,150 Palestinian and Lebanese detainees in exchange for three Israeli soldiers. Following this, Israel adopted an "iron fist" policy, reviving the 1945 Emergency Regulations to suppress Palestinian resistance and permit administrative detention and deportations (IEPQ, 1982-87). Public criticism of the May 1985 prisoner exchange influenced this decision. With these laws, detention orders become based on "reasonable cause" for security reasons. While detention was limited to six months, it could be renewed indefinitely, and proceedings deviated from the normal rules of evidence by being conducted in camera (AI, 1989). The Israeli newspaper Davar stated: "So long as there is occupation, there will be constant revolution," emphasizing that oppression could not prevent the next wave of resistance (UNA, 1955). In fact, as "strong-arm" policies intensified, groups of young Palestinians, known as *Shabibah*, began to confront military forces in the Gaza Strip, defying threats to their lives in a bid to end the occupation (UN, 1999).

Furthermore, in the first week of September 1985, more than 60 Palestinians were administratively detained. In that same month, the U.S. vetoed a resolution referring to Israeli "repressive measures" in two articles of its resolution, calling on Israel to immediately stop "curfews, administrative detentions, and forceful deportation" (UNSC, 1985). By December 1987, over 300 Palestinians had been detained, including community leaders, often without specific reasons (AI, 1989), and by April 1989, more than 5,000 Palestinians had been administratively detained (UN, 1999). However, during the debates, the U.S. representative justified the veto of resolutions condemning Israel, stating: "*The United States Government cannot support a draft resolution that singles out the condemnation policies of Israel... without equally condemning... acts of terror against Israeli civilians.*"

Mansour of the PLO criticized this stance, arguing "*this position of the United States goes against the minimum standard of human rights because it supports the oppression, and the iron-fist policy pursued by Israel.* He warned that the U.S. position "*will encourage our people*

to go in only one direction: to step up its struggle and end the occupation of our territory.” (UNA, 1955). Mansour drew a direct connection between human rights violations, particularly the iron fist policy, and the start of the intifada. He also linked the U.S. veto to the escalation of the first intifada, suggesting that the U.S. vetoes on human rights in 1985 contributed to the outbreak of violence three years later.

Since December 9, 1987, Palestinians have staged daily demonstrations against Israeli forces, often throwing stones at Israeli soldiers and settlers. The Israeli authorities have frequently responded with excessive and indiscriminate force (AI, 1989). The Secretary-General noted that Palestinians complained bitterly about the practices of Israeli security forces, highlighting “random and capricious violence against individuals” (UNSG, 1988). In January and April 1988, the Security Council attempted to adopt resolutions condemning Israeli policies that violated the human rights of Palestinians, specifically mentioning home demolitions and deportations in April (UNSC, 1988a/b).

During the first year of the intifada, 56 deportation orders were issued, and curfews were imposed on villages and towns, often lasting weeks (AI, 1989). They significantly increased in the late 1980s, escalating during the first Intifada. (OHCHA, 2004). Likewise, reports from Israeli reservists highlighted acts of vandalism and ill-treatment of Arab civilians and properties by soldiers “have become a norm that no one was trying to combat” (UN, 1999).

Trees were uprooted, crops ruined, and numerous Palestinian homes were demolished or sealed as punishment. Prolonged curfews were imposed on villages, towns, and refugee camps, sometimes lasting a month or more, during which basic utilities like electricity and water were often disconnected (AI, 1989). The disturbances drew global attention to the already dire living conditions in many refugee camps, particularly in the Gaza Strip, where basic amenities were severely lacking (UNSG, 1988).

In its report "Punishing a Nation," Al-Haq documented that during the uprising, military authorities imposed at least 1,600 curfews, with a significant number lasting from 3 to 40 days (UN, 1990). These measures rendered the lives of Palestinian children intolerable, severely restricting their ability to move (UN, 1999). Furthermore, in 1989, the Security Council condemned ongoing human rights violations on two occasions. In June, the U.S. vetoed a resolution that specifically condemned the “desecration of the Holy Koran” and the prolonged closure of schools, calling for their immediate reopening (UNSC, 1989b). The U.N. also emphasized that “the occupying power facilitates the proper working of all institutions devoted to the care and education of children” (UN, 1999).

In November, the Security Council further condemned “the ransacking of the homes of inhabitants, as has happened at Beit Sahur, and the illegal and arbitrary confiscation of their property and valuables” (UNSC, 1989c). U.S. representative Mr. Pickering stated that concerns had been raised directly with the Israeli government regarding issues such as the blockade of Beit Sahur and school closures, explaining that the veto was necessary as “such resolutions and debates exacerbate tensions and distract the parties from the critical issues that need to be addressed in the region” (UNA, 1989). This reflected a protective stance towards Israel, emphasizing concerns over condemnation.

In the same sense, PLO representative stated, “*Our people “will only learn that the United States Government does not urge Israel to return illegally and arbitrarily confiscated property to its owners. Our people will only understand the position of the US as giving blessings to what Israelis are doing”* (UNA, 1989).

- **State security:**

During 1983-1990, three vetoed draft resolutions contained the dimension of state security, which saw a significant decline during this time but remained present in the texts. In August 1983, the U.S. vetoed resolution was introduced concerning Jerusalem, which called on Israel to “desist from taking any action which results in changing the legal status and geographical nature” of the occupied territories (UNSC, 1983). This resolution highlighted the need to maintain the status quo in Jerusalem to avoid escalating tensions.

Later, in January 1986, another vetoed resolution focused heavily on state security. It reaffirmed that any measures taken by Israel to alter the character and status of Jerusalem, including legislative and administrative actions, were devoid of legal validity. The resolution condemned provocative actions that violated the sanctity of the Haram Al-Sharif, emphasizing that such actions were null and void (UNSC, 1986). The same January 1986 resolution also addressed institutional matters, asserting the necessity to “prevent any hindrance to the discharge of the established functions of the Supreme Islamic Council in Jerusalem” (UNSC, 1986). Additionally, in April 1988, a more comprehensive draft resolution condemned the assault on Sheikh Saad Eddin El-Alami, the Head of the Supreme Islamic Council, who was attacked on April 1, 1988 (UNSC, 1988). This incident exemplified the continuous violence Palestinian officials faced just before the commencement of the peace process, significantly influencing the negotiations. However, the U.S., by casting the veto, showed its continuous disapproval to the Palestinian officials.

The landscape shifted in 1988, when the PLO declared the independence of a Palestinian state and accepted UNSC Resolution 242, indicating a willingness to establish the state within the occupied territories. Furthermore, regional dynamics, such as Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, which significantly supported the PLO, weakened the Organization, leading to the 1991 Madrid Conference, which marked the beginning of negotiations between Israel and the PLO, initially conducted indirectly and later through secret channels (IEPQ, 1987-93). These vetoed resolutions and the subsequent political developments reflect the intricate relationship between international diplomacy, regional politics, and the ongoing quest for Palestinian statehood amidst significant challenges due to the U.S. veto, which set the ground for unbalanced negotiations.

- **Justice:**

Between 1982 and 1989, justice emerged as the predominant dimension of positive peace in the vetoed resolutions concerning the OPT. During this period, the United Nations Security Council consistently reaffirmed the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the OPT and urged Israel to comply "scrupulously" with its obligations as the occupying power. Israel has been accused of violating the Convention since 1970, as noted in the annual reports of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (UNSG, 1988). In 1983, the Security Council condemned attacks against civilians and reaffirmed that "Israeli settlements are in contravention with article 49 (6) of the Geneva Convention." It called upon all states not to provide Israel with assistance related to settlements in the occupied territories and sought "to examine practical ways and means" to ensure compliance with the resolution, as outlined in the UN Charter (UNSC, 1983). However, these represented the most pronounced measures of accountability in a SC draft resolution and were blocked by the US veto.

Similarly, in September 1985, amid Israel's "Iron Fist" policy, which led to the First Intifada, a draft resolution called on Israel to fulfill its international obligations and "release forthwith all

detainees and refrain from further deportations" (UNSC, 1985). During the debates, the US representative justified the veto by arguing that many members' confrontational language did little to promote peace, asserting that "one-sided draft resolutions such as this one" will "encourage the spiral of violence and retaliation." In contrast, the PLO representative, Mansour, contended that "everyone knows who is hindering the attainment of peace in the Middle East," criticizing the hypocrisy of condemning hypocrisy (UNA, 1995).

In January 1988 and June 1989, the Council reiterated calls for Israel to accept "the de jure applicability" of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the OPT, recognizing Israel's international responsibility for the treatment of protected persons (UNSC, 1988a; UNSC, 1989b). Despite Israel's de facto adherence to the humanitarian provisions of the Convention, the ICRC and the international community insisted on its de jure application. Instead of assisting in these efforts, the U.S. veto further hampered efforts to persuade Israel to accept the Convention's applicability (UNSG, 1988).

All other SC members supported the U.S.-vetoed resolution in April 1988, which called on Israel to "abide immediately and scrupulously by the Geneva Convention" and urged the revocation of deportation orders for Palestinian civilians. The resolution also requested periodic reports on the situation in the occupied territories (UNSC, 1988b). The Security Council led an urgent international effort to address the issue, despite Israel consistently rejecting findings of violations from various sources, including UN commissions (UNSG, 1988). In contrast, the US representative, Mr. Okan, expressed concern over the repeated recourse to the Security Council, deeming it "redundant and inappropriate" (UNA, 1988). The Algerian deputy highlighted severe human rights violations, quoting a Guardian article describing "horrifying violence" and "clear outrageous acts against humanity." Djoudi criticized the US veto as an obstacle to a just settlement of the Middle East problem, centered on Palestine. The PLO representative expressed gratitude to the 14 other Council members who took a firm stand, noting that "there is always a rotten apple in the barrel." He emphasized the Council's duty "to maintain peace and security," criticizing the US for its actions and questioning its respect for "the norms of international law and international consensus" (UNA, 1988).

Finally, in 1990, the SC reaffirmed the applicability of the fourth Geneva Convention and urged the establishment of "a commission consisting of three members of the Security Council, to be dispatched immediately to examine the situation relating to the policies and practices of Israel" (UNSC, 1990). The vetoed resolution's very first article reflected the undeniable importance of order. However, the U.S. didn't allow the implementation of these measures by casting its veto. Therefore, between 1982 and 1989, efforts to enforce accountability in the Occupied Palestinian Territories were repeatedly thwarted by US vetoes in the Security Council. Despite reaffirmations of the Fourth Geneva Convention's applicability and calls for Israel to comply with its obligations, legal binding measures to hold Israel accountable were consistently blocked. This obstruction highlighted the challenges of enforcing international law and underscored the need for a unified global effort to ensure justice and accountability in the region.

To conclude, Between 1973 and 1990, U.S. vetoes played a pivotal role in shaping the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with distinct impacts during two key periods. From 1973 to 1982, these vetoes focused on obstructing conditions for positive peace, emphasizing state security and geopolitical interests over human rights and justice. This veto also omitted critical negative peace conditions like the Palestinian refugee problem and facilitated territorial insecurity by allowing Israeli settlement expansion to continue unchecked. Consequently, these vetoes

undermined international recognition of Palestinian rights and hindered efforts to address violence and religious tensions in Jerusalem.

In the subsequent period from 1983 to 1990, U.S. vetoes continued to complicate the non-born peace process, this time focusing on deteriorating conditions for negative peace amidst escalating violence, particularly during the first Palestinian Intifada. These vetoes frequently shielded acts of direct violence and obstructed efforts to achieve positive peace, prioritizing strategic interests over the enforcement of international law and undermining accountability for violations in the occupied Palestinian Territories. This period highlighted the increasing tensions and the challenges of achieving peace in the region. Overall, U.S. vetoes during these years consistently prioritized geopolitical interests over peacebuilding, significantly shaping the trajectory of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and leaving lasting challenges for achieving a just and lasting peace. Which strongly recalls the realist and neorealist eras marked by Realpolitik.

2. The Era of Peace 1995-2006:

The U.S. did not cast a veto during the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations and the Oslo peace process from 1990 to 1995. The end of the Cold War and the Gulf War led to the 1991 Madrid Conference, where Israel and Arab countries, including Palestinians, began negotiations. The PLO, weakened by its Gulf War stance, was revitalized through informal talks in Norway, resulting in the Declaration of Principles and the Oslo Accords (Meier, 2024). Signed on September 13, 1993, the Oslo Accords established the Palestinian Authority and outlined a five-year transition to statehood but deferred major issues like Jerusalem's status and refugee rights (Durrieu, 2024).

The accords, however, prioritized political solutions over human rights, leading to ongoing violations, as noted by Human Rights Watch (2003). Violence, including the 1994 Cave of the Patriarchs massacre and Yitzhak Rabin's assassination in 1995, aimed to disrupt the peace process. Extremists viewed such violence as necessary to prevent the peace process, which they believed threatened their religious vision (Meier, 2024). Furthermore, following the accords, Israel, with U.S. support, expanded settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Chomsky, 1997). Likewise, on February 1, 1995, Israeli authorities approved Rabin's plan for the construction of 6,500 houses for a new neighborhood in southern Jerusalem, requiring the confiscation of 2,000 dunams of Palestinian land (IEPQ, 1993-2000).

The first U.S. veto on the "Palestinian question" since 1990 occurred in 1995, amid land exploitation. Notably, the most frequent U.S. vetoes occurred twice in March 1997 also regarding Israeli settlements, followed by two vetoes each year in 2001, 2003, 2004, and 2006. Between 1995 and 2006, 11 resolutions were vetoed in total, with negative peace dimensions being dominant, though positive peace dimensions were also present, as shown in table 2. The study of U.S. vetoed resolutions in this period will analyze these dimensions, starting on settlements, ongoing conflict, and human safety, and then addressing state security and justice, which is common to all resolutions.

i. Fueling Direct Violence

Settlements

Since a 1979 Israeli High Court ruling made it illegal to expropriate private Palestinian land for settlements, Israel has shifted to building on land designated as 'state land.' This land, meant for Palestinian use under occupation law, has largely been allocated to settlers. Israel reinterpreted, in fact, the Ottoman land code to classify around 90,000 hectares in the West Bank as 'state land,' including private Palestinian properties. Critics argue these practices, along with reforestation efforts by the Jewish National Fund, aim to erase the Arab presence and obscure the destruction of Arab villages (Meier, 2024).

However, in May 1995 Israeli officials approved the largest land confiscation in 15 years, taking 535 dunams in East Jerusalem for a new Jewish neighborhood, aiming to increase the Jewish population by 10,000 (IEPQ, 1993-2000). Consequently, On May 30, 1995, the UN Security Council debated a resolution expressing concern over Israeli expropriation orders of 53 hectares in East Jerusalem, highlighting its negative impact on the peace process. The resolution declared the expropriation "invalid" (UNSC, 1995). Despite unanimous support from other members, the U.S. vetoed the resolution. Dieckhoff (1998) argues, "Once again, Washington found itself side by side with Israel against the whole international community." Naaz (1998) notes it was the U.S.'s 30th pro-Israeli veto since 1973 and its first in 5 years, occurring under the Clinton administration (1993-2001).

U.S. representative Mrs. Albright justified the veto as a principled stance, stressing that "direct talks between the parties" are the only path to peace, calling the expropriation "unhelpful" but arguing that involving the Council would "merely compound the problem" (UNA, 1995). All other Security Council members, particularly France, condemned the expropriation as a violation of international law. The UK representative regretted the U.S. veto, stating, "We do not believe this will be helpful to the peace process" (Ibid).

The Palestinian representative cautioned that the veto would "complicate the peace process." Mr. Al Kidwa emphasized that U.S. neutrality "would definitely contribute to the success of the peace process" and warned that deviating from this neutrality "will only lead to its loss of credibility." (Ibid). Mearsheimer and Walt (2007) also note that U.S. support for Israeli settlement expansion contradicts international law and harms its credibility.

In May 1996, Right-Wing Netanyahu won the elections, with Likud's nationalist hardliners opposing Palestinian self-determination. He announced eight new West Bank settlements and began revoking Palestinian residency permits in East Jerusalem to maintain a 70% Jewish majority, leading to what B'Tselem called a "silent expulsion" (Meier, 2024). Netanyahu also oversaw the construction of thousands of housing units, including in Har Homa (Jabal Abu Ghneim) in Jerusalem (Naaz, 1998). France, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom sponsored a draft resolution in March 1997, which expressed deep concerns "at the decision...to initiate new settlement activities in the Jabal Abu Ghneim area in East Jerusalem" and urged Israel to refrain from settlement activities that "pre-empt...final status negotiations." However, the U.S. vetoed the resolution, continuing its pattern of shielding Israeli settlements.

The U.S. representative warned that Security Council intervention could worsen tensions, arguing that the involved parties should resolve negotiations themselves. The French representative disagreed, stating, "We consider that the Security Council ought to be able to carry out its responsibilities in respect of decisions that endanger the Middle East peace

process" (UNA, 1997, p. 6). The U.S. clarified its opposition to the draft resolution, calling construction at Jabal Abu Ghneim "not helpful to the peace process" (UNA, 1997, p. 5), yet contradicted itself by casting another veto days later the same issue.

On March 21, 1997, the U.S. vetoed a resolution demanding "that Israel immediately cease construction of the Jabal Abu Ghneim settlement in East Jerusalem" (UNSC, 1997b). In March 2001, the U.S. vetoed another resolution expressing concern over settlement expansion at Jabal Abu Ghneim and calling for a full cessation of settlement activities (UNSC, 2001a). Paradoxically, the U.S.-commissioned Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee, known as the Mitchell Report, called for a "freeze on all Israeli settlement activity" and the "dismantling of outposts" established since March 2001 (Mitchell, 2001, p. 22). HRW (2003) emphasized that Israeli settlement activities, prohibited under international law, are a major obstacle to peace. Therefore, these activities should adhere to international law, not just align with political or interim reports like the Mitchell Report.

It is important to note that the Security Council consistently condemned and attempted to halt each stage of the settlement process. On March 7, the draft resolution aimed at stopping the decision to initiate settlements was vetoed. The text on March 21, which called for the cessation of already initiated actions, also faced a veto. It sought to stop settlement expansion after their establishment in 2001 but faced a veto. Thus, the U.S. vetoes seem to effectively enable Israel to continue its illegal activities, as emphasized by Hassan et al. (2021). This reinforced Palestinian beliefs that Israel aimed to create fragmented, dependent "bantustans" in the OPT, contributing to violence and harsh Israeli responses (Meier, 2024). In fact, Naaz (1998) notes that settlement politics are fundamentally palliative. Following the Hebron withdrawal agreement, Netanyahu's decision to construct Har Homa settlements served as a palliative measure to offset the concessions made in Hebron. The U.S. accepted this offer, resulting in the suspension of negotiations and "strengthened the Israeli claim to unilaterally determine the scope of its withdrawals" (Naaz, 1998).

- Ongoing Conflict:

In July 2000, the Camp David negotiations failed over unresolved issues such as territorial disputes, the status of Jerusalem, and Palestinian refugees, with Yasser Arafat being blamed for the breakdown (Durrieu, 2024). The situation worsened in September when Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount, triggering the Second Intifada, which led to significant violence and the collapse of the peace process despite President Clinton's efforts (IEPQ, 2000-6). Following Sharon's election in 2001, there was an escalation in military actions, and Arafat faced increasing diplomatic isolation, particularly after the assassination of Israeli Minister Ze'evi (Ibid). Moreover, during President George W. Bush's administration, the attacks of 9/11 led to increased U.S. support for Israel against the common enemy of terrorism and Islamism (Turaev, 2019). The U.S. repeatedly vetoed resolutions characterized by ongoing conflict descriptors concerning methods, intensity, and duration. This aspect of negative peace was evident in 8 out of 9 draft resolutions from March 2001.

Human Rights Watch (HRW, 2000) documented Israeli forces' excessive lethal force against unarmed Palestinian demonstrators posing no imminent danger. Beginning in October 2000, Israeli forces positioned themselves advantageously, used live ammunition and rubber bullets in Ramallah and Haifa, and used medium-caliber bullets at the Netzarim Junction in Gaza, causing severe trauma and exemplifying the excessive nature of the IDF's response. On March 26, 2001, the Security Council resolution called "for the immediate cessation of all

acts of violence, provocation, and collective punishment” and urged international donors to extend economic and financial assistance to the Palestinian people (UNSC, 2001a). By blocking the resolution, the U.S. prevented the implementation of measures that could have deescalated tensions and halted the cycle of violence. Following the veto, HRW (2001) reiterated condemnations of Israel's arbitrary killings and willful destruction of property, stating, “Israeli security forces have committed by far the most serious and systematic violations.” Likewise, the U.S.-commissioned Mitchell Report (2001) highlighted “retaliatory cycles of violence” and excessive force. The report called for an “immediate cessation of violence.”

However, violence escalated, with Israel breaking off diplomatic links and bombing Gaza, Ramallah, and Nablus after suicide bombings in December 2001 (IEPQ, 2000-6). Amnesty International (2001) further reported that Israeli roadblocks in the West Bank imprisoned inhabitants, constituting collective punishment. On December 14, 2001, the Security Council text reiterated its call for “the immediate cessation of all acts of violence, provocation, and destruction,” condemning excessive use of force and wide destruction of properties (UNSC, 2001b). Despite recommendations from HRW, the Mitchell Report, and Amnesty, the U.S. vetoed the draft resolution, prolonging violence and military operations.

In March 2002, a month after the veto, Israel initiated Operation Defensive Shield, resulting in extensive destruction of Palestinian property. The IDF employed bulldozers and rocket attacks in populated areas. The IDF damaged over 2,800 refugee housing units, demolished 878 homes, and left more than 17,000 people homeless. Nablus suffered significant destruction, particularly in its Old City, which held culturally significant buildings (UNSG, 2002). According to Amnesty (2002c) from April 3, the IDF targeted the Jenin refugee camp, using tanks, F-16s, and Apache helicopters with Hellfire missiles. The camp faced a five-day siege, causing a humanitarian crisis as food and water supplies dwindled. Many casualties occurred when ambulances were unable to reach the wounded due to IDF-imposed closures and movement-restrictions.

The Secretary-General's report highlights serious allegations against the IDF from March 1 to May 7, 2002, including use of human shields, disproportionate force, and denial of medical treatment. Additionally, there were prolonged delays in medical attention for wounded Palestinians; humanitarian agencies sought access but were unsuccessful. Notably, an Israeli tank shell killed the head of the Palestinian Red Crescent Society Emergency Medical Service in Jenin on March 4, while he was in a marked ambulance (UNSG, 2002).

Israel framed Operation "Defensive Shield" as a necessary IDF campaign to regain control and dismantle terrorist networks. Sharon launched the operation, declaring, "The Palestinians must be hit, and it must be very painful... We must cause them losses, victims, so that they feel a heavy price." He insisted, "We must wage an uncompromising fight against this terror, uproot these weeds, and smash their infrastructure." (JVL, 2000-6). However, a second operation, “Determined Path”, was launched in June 2002 after a Hamas suicide bombing.

The IDF reoccupied parts of the West Bank, conducted targeted assassinations, curfews, and set up checkpoints. In Gaza, the conflict escalated when Israel killed Hamas military chief Salah Shehadeh in July after Fatah militants approved a cease-fire, triggering further attacks. (IEPQ,2000-6).

The situation escalated further with the deliberate demolition of a UN World Food Program (WFP) warehouse in Gaza by Israeli forces on November 30, 2002. The warehouse, clearly

marked with WFP flags, stored essential food aid for 41,300 people affected by the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. WFP country director called for a thorough investigation and accountability from Israel (WFP, 2002).

In December 2002, the UNSC resolution aimed to address the situation, called on Israel to “refrain from the excessive and disproportionate use of force,” and firmly condemned “the deliberate destruction by the Israeli occupying forces of a United Nations WFP warehouse in Beit Lahiya,” in which 537 metric tons of donated food had been stored (UNSC, 2002). However, the United States vetoed the draft resolution, despite its support from all other Security Council members (Cameroon and Bulgaria abstained).

U.S. Ambassador John D. Negroponte explained that the draft did not urge action to minimize threats to UN personnel and facilities, arguing that the resolution's focus was more on condemning Israeli occupation. He stated that the resolution would not foster an environment conducive to a peace Roadmap for Israel and Palestine (UNA, 2002, p. 2). In contrast, Mr. Al-Kidwa (Palestine) criticized the U.S. veto due to references to the Fourth Geneva Convention and Israel as an occupying power. He warned, “If this is true it would mean that the United States is about to cause a historic new disaster... by opting to take positions that would only lead to support of the extreme Israeli right.” He emphasized, “We will not accept to put the rights of the Palestinian civilians under the Fourth Geneva Convention on the bargaining table” (Ibid, p. 5).

Furthermore, as highlighted by HRW (2003), the Roadmap for Peace, a “performance-based and goal-driven” plan, risks undermining human rights and humanitarian law by treating them as negotiable rather than binding. HRW stresses that real progress requires agreements to explicitly enforce these standards. In the same sense, Cousens et al. (2001) emphasize that international political trade-offs are not relevant to peacebuilding in a situation where war-destroyed basic infrastructure and clean water and sewage are unavailable, which are much more important. However, on September 24, 2002, the Security Council adopted a resolution condemning violence and terrorist acts by both Palestinians and Israelis, which, coupled with international pressure, led Israel to lift the siege on most Palestinian areas by September 29, 2002 (IEPQ, 2000-6), demonstrating the impact of such resolutions when the U.S. abstains from vetoing.

Yet, the U.S. vetoed subsequent resolutions in December 2002, September 2003, and March 2004, reinforcing its consistent voting pattern at the Security Council. In September 2003 and March 2004, the vetoed resolutions called for the “complete” and “unconditional cessation of all acts of violence, including all acts of terrorism, provocation, incitement, and destruction” (UNSC, 2003a; UNSC, 2004a). The U.S. vetoed these resolutions, despite the September 2002 resolution's condemnation of both parties. These vetoed texts' repeated calls to cease all acts of violence highlight how the veto contributed to prolonging the conflict. This extension of violence ultimately intensified hostilities, leading to the escalation of war in Gaza in 2004. As noted by Kamal (2021), the unwavering support of the United States for Israel obstructs the

internationalization of peacebuilding efforts in Palestine and promotes Israel's disproportionate use of force against Palestinians (Kamal, 2021).

- **Destroying Gaza 2004-2006:**

Following the killing of five Israeli soldiers on May 12, Israel launched incursions into Rafah, Gaza, destroying 298 houses and committing systematic violations. This was a significantly

higher number than in any previous month. The IDF demolished over 2,500 Palestinian houses in Gaza between 2000 and 2004, with nearly two-thirds in Rafah, leaving 16,000 people homeless, many of whom were refugees dispossessed multiple times. HRW (2004) concluded that the IDF intended the destruction in Rafah as a show of strength and retaliation, not military necessity. It emphasized that the ICRC prohibits indiscriminate attacks on civilian objects during incursions. If the targeted object is normally used for civilian purposes, like a house, it is presumed not to be a legitimate target (HRW, 2004). In fact, the incursion occurred despite U.S. support for the Gaza disengagement plan following Sharon's refusal to implement the Road Map. In April 2004, President Bush assured Israel of support for a new Palestinian leadership, recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, rejection of the return of refugees, and adherence to the 1949 Armistice Line, in exchange for Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Gaza and evacuation of four West Bank settlements (IEPQ, 2000-6).

Thus, during regular nighttime raids in May, Israeli forces used armored Caterpillar D9 bulldozers to raze blocks of homes in Rafah with little or no warning. The IDF also destroyed 29.8 hectares of agricultural land in Tel al-Sultan, devastating "areas once filled with greenhouses, now barren and covered with dirt mounds and metal frames." According to HRW (2004), the IDF exaggerated the threat from smuggling tunnels to justify these actions, which aimed to create an "empty border buffer zone" based on the assumption that every Palestinian is a potential suicide bomber and every home a potential base for attack, violating the IHL principle of distinction. The destruction exacerbated food insecurity, with 89.6% of Rafah's population relying on aid, and food insecurity rates in Gaza nearly doubling to 66%, the highest in the region (HRW, 2004).

Consequently, on October 5, 2004, the Security Council met around a resolution on Gaza that condemned "all acts of violence, terror, excessive and indiscriminate use of force, and physical destruction." In the first article of the draft resolution, it reiterated "the immediate cessation of all military operations" in Gaza and the withdrawal of Israeli occupying forces from the area. It also underlined the "respect of the inviolability of the facilities of the United Nations agencies in the field, including UNRWA." (UNSC, 2004b). However, the American veto once again led to the dismissal of these measures.

Despite withdrawing from Gaza in September 2005, Israel maintained effective control over Gaza's borders, airspace, and territorial waters, restricting movement by not allowing a seaport and destroying the airport in 2001 (AI, 2005). Moreover, following Yasser Arafat's death, Mahmoud Abbas sought a truce and to rebuild PA institutions, but Hamas's January 2006 electoral victory shifted the landscape toward increased Israeli unilateralism and limited recognition of Hamas (IEPQ, 2000-6; Durrieu, 2024). To this regard, Turner (2006) argues that in Palestine, democratization and state-building have led to the election of an armed group opposed to peace with Israel. This outcome challenges the liberal peace theory that democratization guarantees peace, especially in contexts of ethnic conflict and colonial domination as in Palestine.

Furthermore, from the 2005 disengagement until November 2006, the Israeli military fired about 15,000 artillery shells and conducted over 550 air strikes in Gaza, while Palestinian militants launched at least 1,700 Qassam rockets into Israel, contributing to high civilian casualties (UN, 2008). Although Palestinian Qassam rockets injure a few but generally cause no casualties and land in open areas, they should also cease (A.I., 2006c). Amnesty International expressed concern in March 2006 over a looming humanitarian crisis due to the

prolonged closure of the Gaza crossing, causing unprecedented rationing of bread and food for 1.3 million residents. The extensive destruction of homes and infrastructure, combined with reduced international aid after Hamas's victory, exacerbated the situation. Amnesty condemned the restrictions as disproportionate and a form of collective punishment, calling for their removal (AI, 2006a).

In June, the situation further escalated following the abduction of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit by the Al-Qassam Brigade and Israel's operation "Summer Rain" on Gaza. Therefore, the Security Council seized the situation on July 12 and called on the first article of its draft resolution "for the immediate and unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldier." The text also called on the Occupying Power to withdraw its forces and "halt its military operations and its disproportionate use of force." The Council also specifically condemned "the destruction of property and civilian infrastructure, notably Gaza's main power station," demanding Israel to restore and maintain the continuous and uninterrupted supply of fuel to Gaza (UNSC, 2006a). However, none of these measures has become legally binding because the United States once again objected to the resolution's adoption.

In fact, these measures were much needed. Israeli forces launched deliberate air strikes against civilian infrastructure in Gaza, including electricity and water systems, roads, educational institutions, and private property. This destruction had severe humanitarian consequences for Palestinians, whose situation had already deteriorated due to sanctions (AI, 2006b). The US veto was perceived by Israel as approval for its operations and "green light" leading to the launch of "Autumn Clouds" in October 2006.

This military incursion severely traumatized the population, involving 239 artillery shells and 66 air-to-ground missiles. It weakened medical services, obstructed freedom of movement, and caused over \$23 million in damage, affecting more than 1,000 housing units. The primary healthcare system in Beit Hanoun ceased to function due to the impact on health infrastructure, as staff were unable to reach their workplaces. The newly inaugurated hospital struggled without water, telephone, and electricity, and up to 1,500 people sought refuge there on November 3, straining its resources (UNHRC, 2008). This dire humanitarian situation reached the Security Council's agenda on November 11. The council prepared a draft resolution containing the same measures as in October's text, and specifically "Condemning the military operations in Gaza in Beit Hanoun on 8 November 2006" (UNSC, 2006b). However, the U.S. once again vetoed the draft resolution, thereby approving Israeli methods and operations, despite their flagrant violation of international law.

As a matter of fact, On November 8, 2006, about 24 hours after the Israeli military withdrew, shelling began in Beit Hanoun at 5:35 a.m. Twelve 155 mm shells struck a 1.5-hectare area within 30 minutes, causing extensive damage to six houses. The densely populated city, home to over 35,000 inhabitants, 70% of whom are registered refugees, faced widespread destruction of property and agricultural land. The UN fact-finding mission concluded that the artillery firing was "a deliberate act in the context of the long-term occupation of Gaza and of the deaths of civilians and destruction of property in Autumn Clouds" (UNHRC, 2008).

- **Human Security**

In the context of the second Intifada, In 2000, Israeli forces used disproportionate force against demonstrators in Um al-Fahm, resulting in deaths and injuries. In Gaza, the globally known case of 12-year-old Muhammad al-Durrah's fatal shooting occurred on September 30. while seeking cover with his father, with ambulances delayed by ongoing fire and eyewitnesses

confirming no Palestinian gunfire. In October, 14-year-old Ala Mahfouz was shot dead by an Israeli soldier in Hebron. After throwing a stone, Ala was shot in the forehead from fifteen meters, with the soldier bragging about the killing (HRW, 2001). Overall, from September 29, 2000, to December 2001, over 700 Palestinians were killed by Israeli security services, including at least 50 victims of state assassinations. Palestinian armed groups killed more than 200 Israelis, including 150 civilians. The casualties included at least 150 Palestinian and 30 Israeli children (AI, 2001).

However, in March and December 2001, the Security Council debated two draft resolutions regarding the “tragic and violent events that have taken place since September 2000, resulting in many deaths and injuries, mostly among Palestinians,” underlining its determination to protect Palestinian civilians (UNSC, 2001a). It further condemned ““all acts of extrajudicial executions,” urging “the safety and well-being of all civilians” (UNSC, 2001b).

The veto acted as a green light for Israel to continue the killing of protected persons, despite high civilian casualties. In 2001, over 450 Palestinians were killed, doubling the more than 250 killed in 2000. Israeli casualties also increased from approximately 60 in 2000 to 200 in 2001 (B’Tselem, n.d). This trend highlights a historic disparity, with Palestinians consistently paying a higher price in blood. Moreover, the veto not only exacerbated this imbalance but also could undermine the safety of both parties.

During December 2001 resolution debates, the U.S. representative stated, "No one is working harder than we are to end the terror, violence, and suffering" in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He criticized the draft resolution for not addressing terrorism against Israelis and for isolating one party. He urged the Palestinian Authority to arrest those behind terrorist attacks and Israel to consider the repercussions of its actions and vetoed the resolution, citing concerns it would impede peace efforts (UNA, 2001, p. 10). His position appears to disregard the disproportionate human losses borne by Palestinians.

The difference in tone, approach, and demands highlights a significant disparity in treatment, with Israel not being held accountable for the actions of its security forces and military. Conversely, Mr. Al Kidwa (Palestine) emphasized that the Israeli occupation of Palestinian land and people “remains the main problem and the source of all of these disastrous events,” criticizing Ariel Sharon's opposition to a final settlement and preference for a temporary cessation of hostilities. He affirmed Palestinian commitment to agreements and the Mitchell report, condemned suicide bombings as harmful to Palestinian interests, and firmly rejected attempts to label Palestinian resistance as terrorism. “That position remains clear and fair in spite of all the crimes and all the state terrorism perpetrated against our people by official Israel,” asserting that “resistance to foreign occupation has been, and it remains, a legitimate right under international law and international humanitarian law” (Ibid., p. 4). Furthermore, the U.S. position reflects a disregard for the value of context-sensitive peacebuilding that seeks to activate local resources and energize indigenous peacemaking. (Funk, 2012). Ultimately, the December 2001 veto led to a more violent and bloody year in 2002, which became the bloodiest of the entire Second Intifada.

In early 2002, Operation Defensive Shield led to significant Palestinian casualties in the Jenin refugee camp. Amnesty International reported that "Israeli armed forces have reportedly killed scores of Palestinian civilians and injured hundreds more" (AI, 2002c). British journalist Yvonne Ridley (2020) described it as "one of the darkest days in my career as a journalist. Every time I recall it, the unmistakable odor of rotting flesh from corpses hidden under mounds of rubble by the Israelis fills my nostrils." She also recalled the emotional toll on survivors,

including a man named Marwan whose wife bled to death in his arms after being denied medical assistance by Israeli soldiers.

The UN Security Council met on December 19 to discuss the situation, particularly the Jenin events. Alarming, this vetoed resolution condemning the targeting of a UN warehouse in Beit Lahiya and the killings and destruction also condemned "killing by the Israeli occupying forces of several United Nations employees, including the recent killing of one international staff member in the Jenin refugee camp" (UNSC, 2002). This included UNRWA employee Iain Hook, killed on March 7 while in an UNRWA ambulance. Israel claimed ambulances were used to transport terrorists and weapons (UNSG, 2002). Sarsar (2004) noted that the veto blocked the condemnation of Israel, and the U.S. even called for Israel to withdraw from the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to civilian protection.

2002 was, however, the deadliest year of the second intifada, with over 1000 Palestinian and 400 Israeli casualties (B'Tselem, n.d). In early 2003, violence escalated further. From January 27 to March 6, 2003, a series of Israeli operations and Palestinian retaliations escalated violence. These events, including incursions in Gaza, assassinations of Hamas members, and raids on refugee camps, resulted in a total of 60 Palestinian and 23 Israeli deaths, with at least 260 Palestinians injured.

Consequently, the Security Council was seized in September 2003. It aimed at adopting a resolution deploring "the escalation in extrajudicial executions and suicide bombing attacks, all of which have caused enormous suffering and many innocent victims" (UNSC, 2003), directly underscoring the escalation since December, the date of the last vetoed resolution. However, the US rejected the resolution despite the increasing human casualties and the direct threat to the lives of civilians, and even though the resolution condemns both illegal acts of both parties. Similarly, in March 2004, the U.S. vetoed a resolution condemning a recent extrajudicial execution by the occupying power, killing six other Palestinians in Gaza City, but also equally "all terrorist attacks against any civilians" (UNSC, 2004a). As mentioned in the Ongoing Conflict part of the analysis, this veto seemed like a greenlight for Israel to intensify its military operations in Gaza.

- Gaza: Historic Heart of Palestinian Casualties

In May 2004, Israel launched Operation "Rainbow" on Gaza, resulting in the deaths of 32 civilians, including 10 minors (HRW, 2004). Since the start of the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000 through August 2004, Gaza saw a stark disparity in casualties, with Palestinians killed at a rate approximately ten times higher than Israelis—1,642 Palestinians, including 360 children, compared to 113 Israelis killed by Palestinians in Gaza, including 85 soldiers and 28 civilians. Human Rights Watch reported that the IDF's actions systematically violated international humanitarian law, amounting to war crimes (HRW, 2004).

Therefore, the October 2004 draft resolution addressed what has become the exacerbation of the "dire humanitarian situation in Gaza" and condemned the Israeli attacks "resulting in extensive human casualties and destruction." The council was also concerned with the safety of the other protected persons and called on the Occupying Power "to ensure the unfettered access and safety of United Nations personnel and all medical and humanitarian aid workers" (UNSC, 2004b).

Despite the critical humanitarian situation and documented systemic Israeli targeting of civilians and humanitarian workers, the U.S. vetoed the draft resolution. Human Rights Watch

(2001) reported a consistent pattern of IDF targeting Palestinian medical personnel and ambulances in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Amnesty International noted that 17 doctors and nurses were killed during the first two years of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, including nurse Fadwa Abdullah, who was killed by tank fire in Jenin in April 2002. The destruction of seven ambulances led to further deaths, delays, and injuries, severely impacting medical services and humanitarian aid essential for the population's safety and survival (AI, 2002b).

However, during the debates, the U.S. ambassador criticized a draft resolution as "lopsided and unbalanced" and "dangerously disingenuous", arguing it unfairly condemned Israeli actions while ignoring Palestinian attacks. He emphasized Israel's right to self-defense, noting that as long as Palestinians engage in "indiscriminate acts of terror", "Israel will likely continue to track down terrorists wherever they may hide, often with a tragic but unintended result of civilian casualties." (p.3) In contrast, the Palestinian representative, Al-Kidwa, accused the Council of failing to "call for an end to bloodshed and destruction" and highlighted the disproportionate suffering of Palestinians, emphasizing that Palestinian casualties often go unacknowledged. Al-Kidwa argued that while both sides target civilians, Israeli actions constitute "war crimes and state terrorism" due to their official nature. He referred to the ICJ's advisory opinion of 2004, stressing that "given that it is an occupying Power, attempts to exonerate Israel from its responsibilities as such a power are unacceptable, neither now nor in the future." He concluded that these actions serve neither Palestinian nor Israeli interests in the long term (UNA, 2004 p. 7).

However, the year 2004 marked the second deadliest year of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, with casualties reaching more than 800 Palestinians and approximately 100 Israelis killed (B'Tselem, n.d), indicating the growing disproportion in civilian casualties as argued by Al-Kidwa.

Furthermore, Sarsar (2004) highlights how the U.S. has consistently opposed resolutions critical of Israel and supportive of Palestinian rights at the UN, often voting against the majority, undermining the UN's role as an impartial arbiter, "alienating Palestinians and much of the international community." Sarsar emphasizes that the close U.S.-Israel relationship has shaped U.S. voting patterns in ways that have obstructed progress on the Palestinian question. She concludes that "until the U.S. demonstrates more evenhandedness at the UN regarding Palestinian rights, prospects for a just resolution to the conflict remain dim."

Following Israel's withdrawal from Gaza, military hostilities and casualties persisted. Between the withdrawal and September 2006, the Gaza Strip experienced over 550 air strikes, resulting in approximately 525 deaths and 1,527 injuries (UNHRC, 2008). In June 2006, Israel launched Operation Summer Rains, leading to 48 Palestinian and 1 Israeli soldier deaths, with over 100 Palestinians (including many children) injured (IEPQ, 2000-6). Amnesty International (2006b) reported that Israeli forces responded to a soldier's abduction with "repeated deliberate air strikes on Gaza's civilian infrastructure", worsening the humanitarian crisis. From January to June 2006, Israeli forces killed about 150 Palestinians, including more than 25 children. A tragic incident involved seven-year-old Hadeel Ghaban, who was killed when Israeli artillery targeted her home in Beit Lahia, injuring her mother and siblings (AI, 2006b).

Consequently, in July 2006, the UNSC draft resolution condemned the military assault on Gaza, "which has caused the killing and injury of dozens of Palestinian civilians," and the killing and abduction of Israelis. It urged "the international community to provide emergency assistance to the Palestinian people" (UNSC, 2006a).

Riyad Mansour, of Palestine, expressed "disappointment and frustration following the veto with the UNSC's inaction, criticizing it for fostering a "culture of impunity" that allowed Israel to turn Gaza into a "wasteland of death, rubble and misery." He called for "immediate concerted action" to prevent further violence. In contrast, Israel's representative highlighted Israel's disengagement from Gaza and Lebanon, asserting that it would not tolerate its territory being used as "breeding grounds for terror" by Hamas and Hezbollah, which he framed as part of an "axis of terror" involving Iran and Syria (UN, 2006). Furthermore, following Operation "Summer Rains," Israel launched Operation "Autumn Clouds" against Gaza on October 1, resulting in at least 82 Palestinian deaths and 262 wounded, including 67 children and 58 women. One Israeli soldier was also killed, and three were wounded (IEPQ, 2000-6; OHCHR, 2009).

On November 6, Israel began withdrawing troops from Beit Hanoun but intensified shelling on November 8. According to the UN OHCHR (2998) fact-finding mission, the shelling led to the immediate death or mortal wounding of 19 civilians, including seven children and six women, most from the Al-Athamna family. As residents fled to the street, more shells struck, killing and injuring dozens more. Witnesses described gruesome scenes: children were decapitated, the street was "strewn with limbs," and one child tried to scoop his intestines back into his abdomen. Beit Hanoun hospital, overwhelmed with blast injury victims, declared an emergency and called for more ambulances, but the first one on the scene came under fire. Following these atrocities, the Security Council draft resolution of November 2006 condemned the Israeli operation in Gaza "Beit Hanoun on 8 November 2006" which has caused "extensive loss of civilian Palestinian life and injuries, including among children and women." It further called for "emergency assistance" for them (UNSC, 2006b). Those measures, however, were not adopted due to the American veto.

The U.S. representative criticized the resolution as "biased against Israel and politically motivated," arguing that it equated legal military actions with terrorist attacks and made inappropriate legal judgments. Palestinian representative Riyad Mansour expressed regret, stating, "The Security Council today has conveyed two wrong messages. It has conveyed to Israel that it can continue to behave as though it were above international law. It has conveyed to the Palestinian people that, with regard to their issue, the Security Council is not dealing with justice in the proper way" (UNA, 2006). Likewise, Papalia (2017) argues that the U.S. veto created a system of 'selective security' where the Council is deeply involved in certain conflicts but not in the face of obvious and objective necessity due to geopolitics and national interests.

Eventually, the Fact Finding Mission on Beit Hanoun reported that the attack caused severe physical and mental injuries, destroyed homes, and traumatized the population (OHCHR, 2009). Overall, 2006 ended with 665 Palestinian civilians killed, including 140 minors, and 17 Israeli civilians and 6 Israeli forces killed (B'Tselem, n.d.). This further highlighted a growing disproportion in civilian casualties between both parties, reaching its peak that year.

ii. Neglecting Structural violence

- State Security

The second intifada severely destabilized Palestinian institutions, particularly economic ones. In 2002, the World Bank reported an "unsustainable" situation in the OPT, with the Palestinian Authority facing tax revenues dropping to one-fifth of previous levels due to Israel's

withholding of over \$500 million in tax revenues since December 2000 and rising emergency expenditures. The report concluded that economic recovery depended on Israel lifting internal restrictions, releasing withheld tax revenues, and resuming regular clearances (WB in UN, 2002).

In March 2001, the US vetoed a UN Security Council resolution that condemned violence and Israeli settlements and also urged Israel to “transfer all due revenues to the Palestinian Authority” (UNSC, 2001a). This veto negatively contributed to the economic situation and undermined recovery and development, which are crucial for positive peace and addressing underlying structural issues that lead to war (King and Matthews, 2012). The situation also highlights the dependency of Palestinian institutions on Israel, revealing that the Oslo Accords failed to provide real sovereignty or economic independence to Palestinians, a major weakness of the peacebuilding process (Brxnen; T. Xall & Wyeth, 2008). Tensions escalated between October and November 2003, with Israel killing 11 leaders, mainly from Hamas. On August 21,

In late 2003, tensions rose as Israel targeted Palestinian leaders, including the killing of senior Hamas figure Ismail Abu Shanab on August 21, which led to resumed rocket attacks from Hamas and Islamic Jihad (IEPQ, 2000-6). The situation worsened when Israeli Chief of Staff Weisglass discussed Yasser Arafat's expulsion in Washington on September 4. By September 11, Israel had intensified its operations against Arafat, labeling him an obstacle to peace and conducting raids on militants, while an Israeli F-16 unsuccessfully targeted Hamas leaders Ahmad Yasin and Mohammed Deif. Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas resigned, citing lack of US support and Israeli provocations (Ibid).

The Security Council debated resolution in September 2003 also condemned "escalation in extrajudicial executions" and urged Israel to "desist from any act of deportation and cease any threat to the safety of the elected President of the Palestinian Authority" (UNSC, 2003a). Despite Israel sending tanks to Ramallah and intensifying the siege on Arafat's offices since September 2002, the US vetoed the resolution. In fact, Operation "Defensive Shield" then besieged Arafat's compound, with Sharon calling Arafat an "obstacle to peace" (JVL, 2002). The UN Secretary-General reported extensive damage to Palestinian Authority property, some of which was unrelated to military objectives. While the IDF denied systematic destruction, it admitted to some acts of vandalism (UNSG, 2002).

However, during the debates, the U.S. Representative criticized the draft resolution for lacking a "robust condemnation of acts of terrorism" and failing to name Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups. He emphasized that the Palestinian Authority (PA) must act to curb these extremist groups and dismantle their infrastructure, advocating for diplomatic isolation of Yasser Arafat rather than his elimination or forced exile. Yet, the U.S. reaffirmed its commitment to the road map for peace and a two-state solution. In response, Mr. Al-Kidwa expressed disappointment over the U.S.'s lack of communication and transparency regarding the veto. He lamented the longstanding U.S. bias towards Israel, which he argued has evolved into an almost complete acceptance of Israeli positions. This, he stated, casts a "heavy, dark shadow" over the peace process and undermines the U.S.'s ability to act as an unbiased mediator. Al-Kidwa warned that the veto's use could be misinterpreted by Israel's government, placing the responsibility on the United States. (UNA, 2003a).

Negotiations were thus conducted under highly asymmetrical conditions, with the primary Palestinian negotiator, Arafat, under siege and other Palestinian parties not recognized as

interlocutors but rather labeled as terrorists. This situation highlights the problematic nature of these negotiations and exemplifies what King and Matthews (2012) describe as an inflexible regime exported to conflict areas and implemented without local roots. Such an approach fundamentally disregards the principle that the most meaningful and sustainable peacebuilding efforts are those undertaken by the principal beneficiaries themselves. This scenario underscores the limitations of externally imposed peace processes that fail to adequately engage and empower local stakeholders, potentially undermining the long-term viability of any resulting agreements. However, on March 22, 2004, Israel succeeded where it failed in 2003, and despite the retaliation and violence it could cause, it assassinated Hamas' founder and spiritual leader. Consequently, two days later, on March 24, the Security Council resolution condemned in its first article the recent extrajudicial execution "that killed Sheikh Ahmed Yassin along with six other Palestinians outside a mosque in Gaza City" (UNSC, 2004a). Not surprising, the resolution resulted in the 25th US veto on the Palestinian question since 1973.

In January 2006, Hamas won the Palestinian elections, leading to Israel freezing tax transfers to the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the U.S., EU, Russia, and Canada suspending aid. This followed a period of tension starting in 2002, during which Israel imposed unrealistic demands on Arafat while targeting PA institutions (Meier, 2024). The Israelis began a campaign against Hamas-affiliated Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) members, detaining 450 individuals involved in the elections. Following the elections, the IOF detained 8 ministers and 26 PLC members, accusing them of supporting the pro-Hamas Change and Reform Party (ADDAMEER, 2018).

In this context, in July 2006, the Security was impeached by the US veto of condemning the detention and urging the "immediate and unconditional release of all detained Palestinian ministers, members of the Palestinian Legislative Council, and other officials." And from concretely emphasizing "the need to preserve the institutions of the Palestinian National Authority and Palestinian infrastructure and properties » in the fourth article (UNSC, 2006a). A few months later, the same emphasis and formulation of article four was reintroduced in article six of the November 2006 draft resolution (2006b). But it also had the same rejection faith by the US. These actions align with Cooper et al.'s (2011) findings that U.S. peace efforts have been compromised by oil and security considerations, leading to accommodation with autocratic governments and rejection of democratic outcomes like Hamas's election. The shift from 'peacebuilding by consent' post-Oslo Accords to 'peacebuilding by coercion' after Hamas's election reflects Israel's collective punishment strategy. This situation underscores the colonial echoes in peacebuilding and emphasizes Cooper et al.'s (2011) assertion of "a need to reject the imposition of negotiation over what type of 'peace' is being built and for whom," highlighting the importance of local agency in peace processes.

Palestinian statehood was a crucial issue during the political crisis, with the U.S. vetoing resolutions related to it. Meier (2024) notes that the Oslo Accords divided the West Bank into three zones: Zone A with full Palestinian autonomy, Zone B with limited autonomy under Israeli military control, and Zone C under full Israeli control, including military infrastructure. Rabin stated during the Oslo II accords' ratification that Israel would not return to pre-1967 borders, maintaining control over key territories. Israel also imposed stringent control mechanisms, including checkpoints and a sophisticated permit system to tightly regulate Palestinian movement (Ibid). However, on June 22, 2002, President Bush delivered a significant speech where he called for new Palestinian leadership, supported a provisional Palestinian state, and urged Israel to help create a viable Palestinian state (IEPQ, 2000-6).

Paradoxically, the establishment of the Palestinian State was mentioned consecutively in UNSC October (2003b) and March (2004a) US vetoed resolutions.

In October 2003, the draft resolution was dominated by the State Security dimension of positive peace. The council emphasized the need to end the occupation and “to achieve peace based on the vision of two States,” Israel and Palestine, living side by side with secure and recognized borders (UNSC, 2003b). Furthermore, this resolution was particularly significant as it stated in its first article that "the construction by Israel, the occupying power, of a wall in the Occupied Territories departing from the armistice line of 1949 is illegal under relevant provisions of international law and must be ceased and reversed" (UNSC, 2003b).

Backmann (2009) details how the Israeli separation barrier, initially proposed by the Labor Party to follow the Green Line, was significantly altered under Ariel Sharon's leadership. The 730 km barrier, primarily consisting of fences and surveillance equipment, encircles Palestinian cities like Qalqilya and Tulkarem while linking major Israeli settlement blocs. Its construction has severely impacted Palestinian land, affecting 51 villages, freezing 5,000 hectares, destroying 100,000 trees, and isolating 10,000 hectares of agricultural land. This approach aligns with Jabotinsky's "iron wall" concept, reflecting a "villa in the jungle" mentality that views Arabs as inferior (Meier, 2024), which corresponds to Said's Orientalism. Despite providing a sense of security for Israelis, the wall exacerbates the conflict by deepening divisions, concluding that sustainable peace requires mutual recognition and respect rather than physical separation and occupation (ibid).

The U.S. representative criticized the draft resolution for being "unbalanced and not explicitly condemning terrorism," emphasizing that all resolutions should reflect the balanced approach of the Quartet's Roadmap, and that ending terrorism must be the highest priority. In contrast, Mr. Al-Kidwa (Palestine) expressed regret over the Security Council's failure to take a firm stand on a matter of strategic importance, the "expansionist separation wall," calling it "very alarming" for the region's future and the prospects for Palestinian-Israeli peace (UNA, 2003b, p. 3). However, due to the US blockage of the Security Council, the problem passed to the General Assembly. In an emergency session held on December 8, 2003, after the Secretary-General reported that Israel had not complied with demands to halt construction of the wall,. The GA expressed serious concern over the wall, which has led to confiscation of Palestinian land, disruption of civilian lives, and de facto annexation of territory. In response to the international community's unanimous opposition, the GA decided to seek an urgent advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice regarding the wall's legal implications (IEPQ, 2000-6).

On the 9th of July 2004, the Court delivered its advisory opinion. The ICJ (2004) concluded that Israel's construction of the wall violated international humanitarian law and human rights law, impeded the Palestinian people's right to self-determination, and could not be justified by military exigencies or national security needs. The Court outlined that Israel was obligated to cease construction of the wall, dismantle the parts already built, and make reparations for damage caused. Other states were required not to recognize nor assist the illegal situation resulting from the wall's construction. And most importantly, it urged the General Assembly and Security Council to consider further action to terminate the illegal situation resulting from the wall's construction.

In response to the U.S. veto in the Security Council, the issue of Israel's separation wall was brought to the UN General Assembly. In an emergency session on December 8, 2003, the GA

expressed serious concern over the wall's impact on Palestinian land and civilian lives, leading to a request for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ, 2000-6). On July 9, 2004, the ICJ delivered its opinion, which represented a significant legal assessment of Israel's actions in the OPT, even if it's not legally binding as a security council resolution. The court concluded that the wall violated international humanitarian law, impeded Palestinian self-determination, and could not be justified by security needs. The Court called for Israel to cease construction, dismantle existing sections, and make reparations for damages. It also urged other states not to recognize the illegal situation created by the wall and recommended that the General Assembly and Security Council consider further action (ICJ, 2004). The court thus recognized the role of the Security Council in this matter, a role that the Council was impeached from fulfilling because of the US veto in October 2003. However, despite this legal opinion, U.S. support for Israel's divisional measures continued, including funding for the Gaza barrier and advanced security measures, which have exacerbated regional challenges and restricted Palestinian movement and development (Meier, 2024).

- **Justice:**

The responsibility of the Occupying Power is central to each US-vetoed resolution, echoing the pre-peace era. The applicability of international law, especially the Fourth Geneva Convention, is crucial to the justice dimension of these drafts. Additionally, the resolutions propose measures for accountability, including deploying international and UN forces and unilateral actions by the Occupying Power. As such, in 1995, the security council vetoed resolution and ordered directly the OP to "rescind the expropriation orders and to refrain from such action in the future" (UNSC, 1995), referring to the start of the settlement crises in Jerusalem in the second half of the 90's.

The veto was justified by Mrs. Albright, who stated that "the Council sought to declare itself on a permanent-status issue—Jerusalem—and thus violated this principle," insisting that "these issues must be resolved by the parties, with the support of the international community, but without its interference." In contrast, the French representative condemned the expropriations, asserting that they are "contrary to international law and violate, in particular, provisions of the Geneva Conventions." Palestinian representative Mr. Al Kidwa criticized the veto, arguing that it "will cause harm to the Security Council itself and to the pattern of prevailing international relations," as well as to the U.S. commitment to international law and its role in the peace process (UNA, 1995).

Following the March 1997 veto on Israeli settlements, the U.S. representative stated again that "voting 'no' on the draft resolution is not an endorsement of the construction but a stance against the interference of the Council" in the peace process. In contrast, the French representative argued again, "France believes that the Security Council should be able to address decisions that endanger the Middle East peace process and have garnered widespread international disapproval," highlighting the divide even between the U.S. and its allies. As highlighted by Mearsheimer and Walt (2007), U.S. vetoes on resolutions regarding Israeli settlements, deemed illegal under international law, isolate the U.S. and undermine its credibility by protecting actions that violate the prohibition on occupying powers transferring civilians into occupied territories.

However, in March 2001, the U.S. vetoed resolution called "to set up an appropriate mechanism to protect Palestinian civilians, including through the establishment of a United Nations observer force" (UNSC, 2001a). The following day, Human Rights Watch urged the UN

Commission on Human Rights to establish a permanent international presence in the West Bank and Gaza, stating, "We regret Tuesday's veto by the United States in the Security Council to such a proposal and urge it to reconsider its position" (HRW, 2001). Yet, the US vetoed the following SC resolution of December 2001. The text urged Israel to abide by its legal obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention and to "immediate implementation of the recommendations made in the Report of the Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee (Mitchell Report)" (UNSC, 2001b).

The Mitchell Report called for ending violence and implementing "international monitoring" mechanisms to ensure compliance (Mitchell, 2001). Despite commissioning the report, the U.S. rejected the resolution adopting its findings. Al-Kidwa (Palestine) emphasized the international community's responsibility, stating, "The responsibility of the international community and the Security Council is clear in addressing the Israeli occupation and its disastrous effects." He asserted that "an end to the occupation and the realization of Palestinian rights, including the establishment of an independent state with East Jerusalem as its capital, is the only solution." Al-Kidwa criticized the Security Council's inaction and condemned attempts to "provide cover for the Israeli government's destructive policies" (UNA, 2001, p. 4).

In 2002, the deadliest year of this era, the U.S. also vetoed the SC December resolution condemning the destruction of a UN warehouse in Gaza and the killing of UN staff in the Jenin Refugee camp. The text also called in its second article the Occupying Power to "comply fully with its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention... and refrain from the excessive and disproportionate use of force" (UNSC, 2002). Despite the worsening humanitarian situation and gross violations of international law, the U.S. cast its veto. Amnesty International (2002c) urged "the Security Council in particular, to support necessary measures for the effective protection of human rights and international humanitarian law." The organization also supported the UN Secretary-General's proposal to send an international force, highlighting the contrast between international law and humanitarian concerns and the U.S. position in the Security Council.

Al-Kidwa criticized Israel's "systematic approach" of attacking UN personnel and accused Israel of relying on "automatic protection" from a permanent Security Council member. He warned of potential disasters in the Middle East and highlighted restrictions on Palestinian leadership, including President Arafat's year-long siege (UNA, 2002). Likewise, British journalist Yvonne Ridley (2020) recounted the Jenin refugee camp events in April 2002, where at least 52 Palestinians were killed. She witnessed bodies being pulled from rubble, including "children, women, and a man in a wheelchair," contradicting claims of only targeting "terrorists." Ridley criticized US Secretary of State Powell's statement that he had "seen no evidence of mass graves" or a massacre, noting he never visited Jenin. Noting that the anniversary of the Jenin massacre comes just days after the Deir Yassin massacre in 1948. She concludes, "Terrorism, death and destruction has been the modus operandi of Israel since its earliest days, and it continues to be so today." (Ridley, 2020).

This situation corresponds to what was described by HRW (2005) as "promoting impunity" for the Israeli military's failure to investigate wrongdoing. noting that between September 2000 and November 2004, over 1,600 Palestinian civilians were killed by Israeli security forces, with only 5% of cases investigated. The report highlights systemic issues in the investigative process, including a change limiting routine investigations and a reliance on soldiers' accounts rather than independent reviews. This approach falls short of international humanitarian law

requirements for thorough investigations of potential unlawful killings. HRW recommends establishing an independent body for complaints and mechanisms for victims to address the accountability gap and ensure responsibility for human rights abuses. (2005)

In 2004, the US vetoed two UN Security Council resolutions addressing the Occupying Power's responsibility and accountability. The March resolution called for "cessation of all illegal measures and practices and for respect for and adherence to international humanitarian law" (UNSC, 2004a), while the October resolution urged Israel to "abide scrupulously by its legal obligations and responsibilities" and to immediately implement their obligations under the Road Map (UNSC, 2004b). However, Human Rights Watch (HRW, 2005) argued for enforcing these obligations as non-negotiable and explicitly addressing accountability in the Road Map. Despite Security Council Resolution 1544 in May 2004, no concrete steps ensured Israel's compliance. Instead, U.S. funding to Israel continued through the 2004 Foreign Appropriations Act, allocating substantial assistance, some used for equipment involved in actions criticized by HRW (HRW, 2004).

However, the U.S. representative justified vetoing the draft resolution by arguing it would encourage terrorists and provoke Israeli counterattacks, stating, "The draft resolution before the Council today not only encourages the terrorists, it will not do anything to prevent the predictable Israeli response." In response, Mr. Al-Kidwa criticized this stance, highlighting the imbalance in the discussion, "referring to rockets launched against Israel, as if they were transcontinental missiles or weapons of mass destruction being fired by the Palestinian side against Israel." He also pointed out the absence of mention of "the tanks, bulldozers, military gunships and fighter jets made in the United States" used against Palestinians. Al-Kidwa condemned the U.S. vetoes, asserting, "The fact that 29 vetoes have been cast sums up the entire tragedy of the Middle East. These vetoes have prevented the Security Council from fulfilling its duties and have shielded Israel from accountability" (UNA, 2004, p. 4). The exchange highlights the ongoing imbalance in the discourse surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with U.S. vetoes shielding Israel from accountability. This dynamic continues to hinder the Security Council's ability to fulfill its responsibilities under international law.

In 2006, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continued to escalate, marked by ongoing violence from both sides, the blockade, and a subsequent military assault on Gaza. During this period, the international community remained actively engaged, as evidenced by the presence of two vetoed draft resolutions in the SC. These draft resolutions prominently featured themes of responsibility, accountability, and international mechanisms for civilian protection. The vetoing of these resolutions underscores the complex political dynamics at play in international efforts to address the situation because of the strategic interests of the US. They also reflect the persistent attempts by the international community to establish frameworks for responsibility and accountability, systematically obstructed by the US veto.

In 2006, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict escalated amid ongoing violence, a blockade, and a military assault on Gaza. The international community remained engaged, as evidenced by two vetoed Security Council draft resolutions addressing responsibility, accountability, and civilian protection mechanisms, which were obstructed by the U.S. veto. In fact, Amnesty International (2006a) urged the UN to deploy international experts to investigate the rising killings of Palestinians by Israeli forces and the rocket fire from Palestinian groups, emphasizing the inadequacies of Israel's internal inquiries. Notably, the killing of seven members of the Ghalia family in Gaza Beach on June 9, 2006, highlighted Israel's refusal to conduct impartial investigations despite substantial evidence. Furthermore, in July, Amnesty International

(2006b) called on the Security Council to formulate concrete proposals to “ensure effective protection of the human rights of all -- Palestinians and Israelis -- caught up in the current crisis.”

The July 12 resolution (UNSC, 2006a) called for all parties to respect international humanitarian law and refrain from violence against civilians. The November resolution (UNSC, 2006b) reiterated obligations under the Geneva Convention and requested the Secretary-General to establish a fact-finding mission regarding the attack in Beit Hanoun, while emphasizing the need for an international mechanism to protect civilian populations. Human Rights Watch (2005) reported that the IDF justified its lack of investigations into civilian deaths by citing similar U.S. practices in Iraq and Afghanistan, claiming practical challenges. The report noted that the U.S. itself did not follow best practices, leading to similar consequences in Iraq as seen in the occupied territories. This stance and parallel can further explain the U.S. veto that significantly hindered efforts to hold Israel accountable for its violations.

Mr. Bolton, the U.S. representative, expressed regret regarding the Beit Hanoun tragedy, acknowledging the injuries and loss of life. He noted that Israel was conducting an investigation and had agreed to suspend all artillery fire into Gaza. However, Bolton criticized the draft resolution, arguing that the proposed fact-finding mission was unnecessary and that considering an international mechanism for civilian protection was both unwise and unnecessary, as it could raise false hopes. (UNA, 2006). This position, however, disregarded calls from Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International for international impartial investigations due to concerns about the transparency of Israel's mechanisms.

Following the Security Council's prevention of creating a fact-finding committee to investigate Israeli military operations in Beit Hanoun, the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) took up the matter. It's important to note that, as previously demonstrated, U.S. vetoes often shift discussions on international peace from the Security Council—the preeminent body whose resolutions are considered legally binding "hard law"—to other UN organs that lack this competence. This pattern underscores the direct impact of U.S. vetoes on the efficiency of international interventions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The OHCHR (2008) mission's findings contradicted the U.S. position and confirmed concerns by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty. The mission criticized Israel's investigation of the Beit Hanoun shelling as "highly disturbing" due to its lack of transparency. Despite Israeli military claims of a "rare and severe failure," survivors questioned how "one shell fired in error" could be believed, let alone 12. The mission suggested that "the shelling of Beit Hanoun constituted a war crime" and criticized the international community's silence as complicity. The lack of accountability was deemed "unacceptable from both legal and moral perspectives." The mission stressed that accountability requires remedy and redress for victims, which Israel had not provided. “The victims and survivors conveyed a clear message: they seek justice above all else,” urging the international community to address violations in Gaza. Similarly, Talentino (2007) argues that justice is essential for peace, but international actors often overlook local demands and needs, leading to failed peace-building efforts.

However, the mission's findings on the Beit Hanoun shelling vividly illustrate ongoing issues of justice, accountability, and a pervasive culture of impunity. The international community's silence, particularly from the U.S., exacerbates these problems, seeming to make them complicit in the continued suffering of Palestinians in Gaza and beyond. Finally, this analysis confirms Hatuel-Radoshitzky's (2015) assessment that U.S. vetoes in July and November 2006

prevented the Security Council from taking stronger action against Israel's military operations in Gaza. Without these vetoes, the Council might have established sanctions against Israel. More broadly, it supports the view that "UNSC action on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is considered constrained by the US, which traditionally protects Israel's interests, thus making the adoption of decisions critical of Israeli conduct hard to achieve.

3. The aftermath of the Peace Process 2011-2023.

From 2006-2011 and 2011-2017, the U.S. had the longest period without using its veto in the UN Security Council since 1973, allowing several resolutions on the Palestinian question to pass (e.g., 1850 in 2008, 1860 in 2009, 2334 in 2016). Despite this decrease in vetoes, a troubling pattern emerged: most vetoed resolutions during this time involved issues of physical violence, aligning with previous trends. These vetoes, falling under the Negative Peace category, hindered the peace process and indirectly sanctioned continued hostilities. Although some vetoes addressed State Security, all were centrally related to Justice, indicating that even fewer vetoes still contributed to prolonging both physical and structural violence.

i. When Peace Shatters: The explosion of direct Violence

- illegal settlements:

After a period of abstention, the U.S. cast its 29th veto in 2011 on a resolution about Israeli settlements, similar to its 1995 veto after five years of abstention. This veto occurred during key developments: the release of the Palestine Papers, revealing Palestinian willingness to negotiate, Israeli intransigence, dismissive U.S. attitudes, and the rise of a Palestinian youth movement inspired by the Arab Spring. Despite U.S. pressure, the PLO submitted a UN Security Council draft resolution declaring Israeli settlements illegal and a major obstacle to peace (IEPQ, 2011).

On February 18, 2011, the UN Security Council addressed Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). A draft resolution, supported by 14 of the 15 Security Council members and 120 member states, condemned the settlements as "illegal" and a major obstacle to peace, demanding their immediate cessation (UNSC, 2011). Despite this broad support, the U.S. vetoed the resolution. U.S. rep. rejected the legitimacy of the settlements, arguing they "undermined Israel's security and corroded hopes for peace" (UNA, 2011). However, the U.S. avoided labeling the settlements "illegal," focusing instead on Israel's security concerns.

Reubner (2016) observes that while the Obama administration criticized Israel, it prevented the UN from doing so. The Obama administration's first veto in defense of Israel at the UN (2009–2017) faced criticism from Palestinian officials and Arab states for undermining peace efforts. The vetoed resolution was notably mild, lacking punitive measures against Israel, which heightened controversy (Usher, 2011).

Palestinian representative Mr. Mansour criticized the veto for failing to enforce global consensus against Israeli settlements, calling the situation "intolerable" and "untenable" and stressing the need for urgent action (UNA, 2011). Hassan et al. (2021) argue that settlement projects aim to prevent a sovereign Palestinian state, fostering a belief among Israelis that maintaining the occupation is simpler than achieving a two-state solution.

Following the February veto, Israel swiftly approved over 4,200 new housing units in the West Bank and East Jerusalem from March to August 2011, underscoring its commitment to settlement expansion with U.S. political support (IEPQ, 2011). Hanafi (2023) recounts Palestinian officials acknowledging the omission of a clause on Israeli settlements in the Oslo Accords as a major obstacle in negotiations. He cites UN statistics showing that the number of illegal settlers in the West Bank tripled from 110,000 to 450,000 between 2000 and 2007, with current estimates reaching 800,000. This growth underscores the ongoing challenges to the peace process and highlights the international community's failure to effectively address settlement illegality through the Security Council, hindering progress toward a just and lasting peace.

- **Ongoing conflict:**

Between 2011 and 2017, the U.S. refrained from using its veto on Palestinian-related resolutions in the UN Security Council. This changed in 2017 with a veto on Jerusalem's status, followed by another on violence in Gaza, which had been escalating.

Over the past decade, Gaza and Israel faced three major conflicts: Operation Cast Lead (2008-2009) with nearly 1,400 Palestinian and 13 Israeli deaths, a 2012 conflict with 174 Palestinian and 6 Israeli deaths, and Operation Protective Edge (2014) with 2,251 Palestinian and 71 Israeli fatalities, highlighting significant casualties on the Palestinian side (OHCHR, 2018). The lack of vetoes during these years may be due to successful resolutions or the deterrent effect of potential U.S. vetoes, warranting further investigation.

In 2018, tensions surged with mass protests along the Gaza fence starting on March 30, known as Land Day, demanding the Right of Return and an end to the blockade. Israeli forces' response with live ammunition and tear gas resulted in numerous Palestinian casualties, prompting diplomatic actions from countries like Turkey and South Africa and leading the ICC Chief Prosecutor to consider investigating alleged war crimes (IEPQ, 2018).

A Kuwait sponsored resolution addressing the escalating situation in Gaza seized the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on June 1, 2018. The resolution garnered support from 10 Security Council members, including France and Sweden, while Ethiopia, the Netherlands, Poland, and the UK abstained. The preamble of the proposed resolution highlighted the "exacerbation of the dire humanitarian crisis in the Gaza strip" and condemned "all acts of violence against civilians, including acts of terror, provocation, and destruction" (UNSC, 2018).

Gaza, a densely populated area with about 2 million residents, including many children, has suffered significantly since Hamas's 2006 election victory and Israel's subsequent blockade. By 2015, the blockade had "halved Gaza's GDP," creating severe aid dependency and high unemployment (OHCHR, 2018). In response to protests, Israeli military chief Lt. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot ordered a heavy military presence, stating that "the orders are to use a lot of force." Human rights groups criticized this approach, with B'Tselem urging soldiers to disobey unlawful orders, while Netanyahu supported the military's actions, asserting, "We will give [Israeli soldiers] all the backing they need" (HRW, 2018).

The vetoed UNSC resolution condemned "the use of any excessive, disproportionate, and indiscriminate force by the Israeli forces against Palestinian civilians" and denounced "the firing of rockets from the Gaza Strip against Israeli civilian areas" (UNSC, 2018). Human

Rights Watch documented instances of Israeli forces shooting individuals who posed no imminent threat, often targeting upper bodies, which suggested an intent to kill. The military's policy permitted live ammunition against those approaching fences, despite most protesters being unarmed. International law allows live ammunition only as a last resort, which Israel contested, claiming it was needed to prevent fence breaches.

Since 2014, the ICC has been investigating potential war crimes in Palestine, and Human Rights Watch has called for a formal probe due to strong evidence of war crimes (HRW, 2018). Additionally, the UN fact-finding mission on the 2018 Gaza events reported that high-velocity weaponry used at close range by Israeli forces resulted in disproportionate killings and severe injuries (OHCHR, 2019). The Commission reported that Hamas and other authorities in Gaza "failed to prevent and sometimes encouraged" the use of incendiary devices, causing "fear and significant damage in southern Israel." It also noted an incident on May 14 where a gunman fired from near unarmed demonstrators, violating international law (Ibid.).

U.S. Rep. defended the veto by condemning the resolution as "a grossly one-sided view" of Gaza, blaming Hamas for Gaza's conditions and violence, and claiming such resolutions harm the UN's credibility. The U.S. proposed an alternative resolution condemning Hamas for actions like firing rockets at Israeli civilians and endangering Palestinians (UNA, 2018, p. 3). Israeli Ambassador D. Danon echoed this stance, criticizing the draft resolution for failing to hold Hamas accountable and labeling it "a text born in sin." He supported the U.S. resolution, which identified Hamas and other terrorist groups as the primary conflict drivers, asserting, "Residents of Gaza need protection from Hamas, the same organization that the Council cannot name" (Ibid., p. 15).

Both parties appear to continue prioritizing political positions over international law, with the vetoed resolution also calling for "immediate and unimpeded humanitarian assistance" and a "durable and fully respected ceasefire" (UNSC, 2018).

However, Gaza's closure and funding issues have severely impeded medical aid, with Israeli authorities denying medical exit permits (HRW, 2018). The UN Commission of Inquiry later found that Gaza's blockade restricted access to essential medical supplies, safe drinking water, electricity, and sanitation, violating fundamental rights to life and health, especially for wounded demonstrators (OHCHR, 2019). The Danish Ambassador criticized the U.S.-sponsored resolution for lacking important language on humanitarian law and access, emphasizing the need for "full respect by all parties of international human rights law" and condemning "excessive, disproportionate, and indiscriminate force by Israeli forces" and rocket fire from Gaza (UNA, 2018, p. 10).

This criticism highlights the U.S. and Israeli positions' failure to address Gaza's broader context, including the ongoing violence and loss of life. Similarly, Palestinian representative Mansour rejected attempts to label their situation as terrorism, stating, "We also firmly reject the renewed attempt today to classify our situation as one of terrorism. It is not." He highlighted the existential threats faced by Palestinians under Israeli occupation, referencing Israeli Minister Yuval Steinitz's alarming declaration about the potential conquest of Gaza. Mansour criticized the U.S. for ignoring these realities, asserting that the current administration "refuses to see, refuses to understand, or, in any way properly address" the ongoing crisis (Ibid).

The implications of U.S. veto power in this context have raised concerns about human rights and humanitarian conditions in Palestine. As Denny (2018) notes, "Clearly, the use of the veto

power by the United States to protect its ally, Israel, has led to substantial and continuing human suffering and abuses as well as a seemingly unending humanitarian crisis in Palestine.”

- **The “Decimation” of Gaza:**

On October 7, 2023, Hamas launched an unprecedented bloody attack on Israel from Gaza, killing around 1,200 Israelis and escalating the conflict into a full-scale war. Despite the ongoing framing of the situation as the "Israel-Hamas war," it is part of the larger Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which began in 1948. Durrieu (2024) states that "the Israeli-Palestinian conflict thus originated from the creation of a new state claiming sovereignty over a land and the expulsion of the people who inhabited that land." Likewise, Amnesty International underscores that "nothing can justify war crimes" and calls for addressing the root causes of the conflict, dismantling Israel's apartheid system, and ending Gaza's blockade (Amnesty, 2023).

However, Hanafi, while condemning all attacks against villains, argues that Palestinian resistance groups have chosen to fight for justice rather than accept humiliation, a perspective often overlooked in the West. As he notes, they prefer to die fighting for justice than endure a slow death in humiliation. As a matter of fact, Israeli violence has escalated since 2005, marking the current conflict as the sixth major military operation involving Israel and Gaza-based armed groups (Amnesty, 2023). Furthermore, on October 9, Gaza was effectively declared an "extermination camp" as the Israeli regime cut off essential resources, leading to a severe humanitarian crisis characterized by shortages of food, fuel, water, and electricity (Hanafi, 2023).

The UN Security Council discussed the crisis on October 18, 2023. The proposed resolution condemns all terrorism and expresses concern for Gaza's humanitarian situation (UNSC, 2023a). Israel has faced criticism for targeting civilian infrastructure and disregarding human life in Gaza (Euro-Med, 2023). Agnès Callamard of Amnesty International stated, "A civilian bloodbath in Gaza and collective punishment will not achieve security nor justice." Additionally, the resolution condemned the "atrocious acts of terrorism by Hamas" on October 7, 2023 (UNSC, 2023a).

Amnesty reported that Hamas and other Palestinian groups committed "inhumane and savage acts," including mass murders, hostage-taking, and rocket attacks on Israel, deliberately targeting non-combatants and taking captives on the first day. These attacks, which killed both Israeli and Palestinian citizens, included the assault on the Nova Music Festival near Gaza, resulting in at least 260 deaths (AI, 2023). However, Haaretz reported that security assessments suggested Hamas had no prior knowledge of the event, indicating it was spontaneous. Additionally, an IDF helicopter responding to the scene may have inadvertently hit festivalgoers while targeting "terrorists" (Breiner, 2023).

Despite the resolution condemning Hamas attacks, the U.S. vetoed it. Ambassador Greenfield highlighted efforts to release hostages, prevent conflict spread, protect civilians, and support Israel. She criticized the resolution for not mentioning Israel's right to self-defense, stating, "That is not complicated, and it is not controversial" for members to "condemn Hamas's terrorism" (UNA, 2023a, p. 5). The order in her statement prioritized hostage release and support for Israel, framing the humanitarian crisis as a defense issue. Notably, it omitted Palestinians' legal right to resist occupation, equating Hamas, Gaza's elected governing body, with global terrorist organizations like ISIS and Al-Qaida, despite key differences. This further reflects ignorance of local culture and realities, posing a threat to peace, as noted by Grabyll & Lanegran (2004): sustainable peace is rooted in local people and their culture.

Moreover, the draft resolution's Article 7 called for "humanitarian pauses" and "corridors" for aid delivery (UNSC, 2023a). Israel's intensified blockade, cutting off essential supplies, worsens Gaza's humanitarian crisis and constitutes collective punishment, a war crime (Amnesty, 2023). Save The Children urged Israel to end its 16-year illegal blockade, starting with lifting recent restrictions, as the 'total siege' escalates needs with no aid access (Save The Children, 2023).

Despite massive UN and partner efforts, using the pedestrian Rafah crossing to bring in trucks of goods fails. In December, a few days before the Security Council debated another resolution, OHCHA said Gaza's humanitarian response space was shrinking. Their teams and trucks can no longer use the coastal or Salaheddin roads, which limits their rescue efforts. The World Food Program therefore also urged that "humanitarians must have safe, unimpeded, and sustained access, so we can distribute life-saving assistance throughout the territory" (UN, 2023). Furthermore, in his letter to the Security Council, UN Secretary-General António Guterres said, "I expect public order to completely break down soon due to the desperate conditions," which could halt humanitarian aid and cause epidemic diseases and mass displacement. He also confirmed that supplies are insufficient. "Lack of fuel, interrupted communications, and growing insecurity" hinder humanitarian efforts (Guterres, 2023).

On the same day, UNRWA chief called for an end to the siege and a humanitarian ceasefire, stating that aid agencies cannot meet the needs of more than two million people and that all crossings must allow commercial goods into Gaza (UN, 2023).

Additionally, the ninth article of the vetoed resolution required "protection of medical and humanitarian means of transport and equipment, as well as hospitals and other medical facilities" (UNSC, 2023a). In fact, UNRWA chief called for an end to the siege and a humanitarian ceasefire, stating aid agencies cannot meet Gaza's needs and all crossings must allow commercial goods (UN, 2023).

Likewise, the draft resolution's ninth article required protection of medical facilities and equipment (UNSC, 2023a). Al Ahli Arab Hospital in northern Gaza, housing patients, healthcare workers, and internally displaced people, faced an attack on October 17, the day before debating the resolution. The WHO strongly condemned the attack, arguing that the Israeli military ordered the hospital and 20 others to evacuate, but they have been unable to proceed due to insecurity, patient criticality, and a lack of ambulances, staff, and shelters (WHO, 2023). The Al Ahli explosion killed 471 people, mostly women and children. Israel denied the attack despite independent investigations disproving its evidence (Euro-Med, 2023). Hanafi (2023) argues that Western media and politicians repeated the Israeli claim that the explosion was not theirs, despite independent verification from the Washington Post and Liberation.

During debates, Thomas-Greenfield condemned the Al Ahli Arab Hospital explosion, stating, "The United States is horrified and saddened by yesterday's explosion... We mourn this tragic loss of life." However, she emphasized Hamas's role in worsening Gaza's humanitarian crisis and called for unity in protecting civilians and supporting Israel's self-defense (UNA, 2023a, p. 5).

The medical situation continued to worsen. By December and 48 days in, the hostilities had resulted in the destruction of 22 hospitals, 55 clinics, and 46 ambulances (Euro-Med, 2023). At least 88 UNRWA facilities also suffered damage (UN, 2023). Therefore, UN Secretary-General António Guterres wrote to the Security Council on December 6 that Gaza's healthcare system is failing. With only 14 of 36 hospitals partially operational, hospitals had become battlegrounds. While housing thousands of displaced people, south Gaza's two major hospitals

have three times their bed capacity and are running out of supplies and fuel. “Under these circumstances, more people will die untreated in the coming days and weeks” (Guterres, 2023). On November 2nd, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2712, which called for a humanitarian pause in Gaza but did not immediately implement it. Egypt and Qatar mediated a November 24-30 truce. This period saw humanitarian aid and Hamas hostages exchanged for Israeli detainees.

Violence resumed on December 1 after the humanitarian pause. The UNRWA Commissioner described the resumption of hostilities as “the darkest chapter yet” of the war (UN, 2023). Later, on December 6, UN Secretary-General António Guterres warned of the Gaza threat to international peace and security under Article 99 of the UN Charter. Article 99 of the UN Charter allows the Secretary-General to notify the Security Council of threats to peace and security. This highlights the crisis's urgency and scope. Guterres said, "Nowhere is safe in Gaza," threatening a collapse of the humanitarian system and lasting effects on Palestinians and regional peace. “Such an outcome must be avoided at all costs” (Guterres, 2023).

By the end of November, Israel had demolished 59,240 homes and damaged 165,300. Over 266 schools, 140 press headquarters and media offices, 91 mosques, and 3 churches were damaged or destroyed. Euro-Med (2023) reported damage to 1,040 industrial facilities. The damage has destroyed nearly half of all homes and displaced 80% of the 2.2 million people (Guterres, 2023). On December 4 and 5, OHCHA and WFP reported a lack of relief delivery

infrastructure and the need for a humanitarian ceasefire to prevent disaster. WFP stated, “Only a lasting peace can end the suffering and avert the looming humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza. Additionally, UNRWA Commissioner Lazzarini said the horrific war, with continuous bombardments, creates inhumane and degrading conditions of life. Israeli forces continue to direct residents south while simultaneously bombing the infrastructure of the Gaza Strip. Lazzarini said, “An end to the fighting is imperative if we are to avert the decimation of Gaza and contain the spillover of this crisis ” UN (2023).

The Secretary-General's letter invoking this article typically leads to convening an urgent session of the Security Council to address the issue raised. 87 state members co-sponsored the draft resolution on December 8. The draft resolution expressed "grave concern over the catastrophic humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip" and demanded an immediate humanitarian ceasefire in its first article, as well as ensuring humanitarian access in its second article (UNSC, 2023b). The U.S. vetoed the draft resolution, consolidating its pattern of vetoing Security Council resolutions regarding ongoing conflicts, thereby extending their durations and intensifying hostilities and destruction. This study demonstrated the systemic nature of the U.S. veto in preventing a ceasefire or complete cessation of violence in the OPT.

The cessation of hostilities or a ceasefire, especially during humanitarian crises and when unlawful methods and means are being committed, including war crimes and crimes against humanity, is the fundamental condition for negative peace, referring to the absence of direct physical violence. In the same vein, the Palestinian Ambassador emphasized, following the veto: "Instead of allowing the Council to uphold its mandate by finally making a clear call, after two months of massacres, for the atrocities to end, the war criminals are now given more time to perpetuate their crimes." How can that be justified? How can anyone justify the slaughter of an entire people?" Those who support the attack but oppose the atrocities should comprehend the inextricable link between extending the war and further atrocities, resulting in "the loss of more innocent lives and more destruction." (UNA, 2023b).

Likewise, Mearsheimer, and Walt (2007) analyze U.S. support for Israeli military actions, questioning compliance with international laws on armed conflict. They highlight potential violations of proportionality and distinction laws, civilian casualties, and Gaza infrastructure destruction. Despite these legal concerns, the U.S. often supports or fails to condemn these actions through a veto, reflecting debates about U.S. foreign policy and international humanitarian law.

However, in Gaza, Euro-Med chairman Dr. Abdu stated that if the war ended today, it would take decades for Gaza to return to its pre-October 7 state, which was already unlivable. He highlighted the deliberate destruction in Gaza, citing Israeli officials, including an IDF spokesperson prioritizing damage over accuracy and an agriculture minister calling the conflict a second 'Nakba' (Euro-Med, 2023).

- **Human safety and the “Plausible Genocide”**

The vetoed resolutions in the aftermath of peace focused on negative peace indicators, including human safety and the right to life.

Israel's disproportionate force during the 2018 Gaza protest killed 15 Palestinians on the first day. On May 14, marking the Nakba's 70th anniversary and the US embassy's move to Jerusalem, Israeli forces killed at least 60 Palestinians and injured over 1,000 (IEPQ, 2018).

The U.S.-vetoed June 2018 resolution expressed alarm at the "high number of casualties" in Gaza, emphasizing the "need to take appropriate steps to ensure the safety and well-being of civilians" and deploring "the use of live ammunition against civilian protesters, including children, as well as medical personnel and journalists" (UNSC, 2018).

Between March and June, Israeli forces killed 118 people, including 14 children, and wounded 3,895 with live ammunition, resulting in at least 40 amputations. Most protesters were unarmed, but some used rocks, Molotov cocktails, and slingshots. On May 14, the deadliest day of protest, Dr. Ayman al-Sahabani reported that al-Shifa Medical Complex received 500 bullet-wounded patients, 18 of whom died. Over 250 people with severe tissue and bone damage received MSF treatment (HRW, 2018).

The UN fact-finding mission on Gaza protests confirmed severe violence on May 14. For instance, a bullet struck footballer Mohammad Obeid in both legs 150 meters from the fence, bringing an end to his career. A 16-year-old schoolboy, who was distributing food, sustained a permanent injury to his face 300 meters from the fence. An international journalist covering the demonstrations described the scene to the UN Commission as surreal and shocking, with methodical shooting that continued for hours, creating a constant stream of bloody bodies. The journalist, who had covered conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and Libya, remarked that he had never witnessed anything like the slow, deliberate shooting he observed that day (OHCHR, 2019). However, on May 15, an Israeli military spokesperson said there was "no dilemma" in using lethal force to "defend Israeli communities immediately behind the [Gaza perimeter fences]." (HRW, 2018).

Overall, between March 30 and December 31, 189 Palestinians died at protest sites, including 29 from armed groups. The demonstrations saw 23,313 Palestinians injured by Israeli forces, the highest number since 2005 (OHCHR, 2019). Additionally, four Israeli soldiers sustained injuries (HRW, 2018).

Among the Palestinians killed were 35 children and two journalists. In fact, journalists faced significant risks while covering the protests. Nine journalists, including Farhan Abu Hadayed, who wore a "Press" flak jacket, sustained injuries on May 14. Tragically, on April 6, journalist

Yasser Murtaja was fatally shot in the abdomen as he documented the events. HRW notes that these attacks were part of a broader pattern of intimidation and violence aimed at suppressing media coverage of the protests (HRW, 2018).

Furthermore, Article 11 of the resolution specifically called for an end to "violence and intimidation directed against medical and humanitarian personnel" (UNSC, 2018). In fact, medics faced severe risks while performing their duties. Several medics, clearly marked as medical personnel, fell victim to targeted killings. Musa Abu Hassainen, Razan Najjar, and Abed Abdullah Qotati were among those who lost their lives while tending to the wounded. Musa was shot in the chest from a distance of 300 meters, Razan was hit in the chest at 110 meters from the fence, and Abed was killed while assisting an injured demonstrator. These attacks on medics were also part of a broader pattern of violence that hindered their ability to provide life-saving assistance (OHCHR, 2019).

During the debates, Palestinian representative Mansour emphasized Palestinians' right to protection under international law, urging the Security Council to uphold commitments to protect civilians and ensure Gaza crossing points' access. Israeli representative Danon countered, claiming bias against Israel, stating, "When the Palestinians are concerned, the international community never misses an opportunity to blame Israel." He highlighted past abuses of Palestinians in other countries and sought support for a U.S. resolution condemning Hamas (UNA, 2018, p. 15). This reflects Israel's systemic use of distraction politics, shifting focus to other violations against Palestinians while disregarding its own, as in the case of mentioned Al Aqsa shooting in the 80's. However, the UN Commission found reasonable grounds to believe Israeli actions in Gaza in 2018 may constitute war crimes (OHCHR, 2019).

- The "Plausible Genocide" in Gaza:

After approximately 1,200 Israelis were killed on October 7, Israel initiated a large-scale military operation on Gaza by air, sea, and land, leading to significant and unprecedented human casualties. With the death toll reaching thousands, Israel has been accused of committing the crime of genocide before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). South Africa, a country that has experienced apartheid and severe oppression, initiated this legal action, drawing on its historical experiences to underscore the gravity of the situation.

Hanafi (2023) notes that during previous hostilities in the 2000s, Israeli casualties were minimal compared to the massive number of Palestinian deaths, suggesting an intention to launch a genocidal war as part of the Israeli colonial project. On October 9th, Israeli Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant made the country's intentions clear by declaring, "We are imposing a complete siege on Gaza. No electricity, no food, no water, no fuel. Everything is closed. We are fighting human animals, and we will act accordingly." Israeli President Isaac Herzog echoed similar sentiments, stating, "There are no innocent civilians in Gaza." Consequently, many scholars and practitioners of international law and genocide studies have released a public statement warning of genocide in Gaza (Hanafi, 2023).

Likewise, the U.S. vetoed resolution on October 18th highlighted "heavy civilian casualties" and the "grave effect for the civilian population, largely comprised of children" in Gaza. While condemning the "October 7 terrorist attacks," the resolution emphasized protecting civilians in both Israel and the OPT (UNSC, 2023a).

Amnesty International verified in fact videos showing shocking images from the October 7th attacks, where armed men shot at civilians at close range (Amnesty, 2023). Initial estimates of the October 7th death toll ranged from approximately 1,400, with revisions to 1,151 by

December 4th. This included 282 IDF soldiers, 764 civilians, and various security personnel (Bard, 2023).

By October 17, UNRWA (2023) reported 2,670 Palestinian deaths in Gaza with an average of 267 deaths per day and 9,600 injured. Save the Children (2023) reported that over 1,000 children were killed in Gaza within 11 days, urging an immediate ceasefire to protect children's lives. By December 4, the conflict had claimed over 15,000 Palestinian lives, with children making up more than 40% of the casualties (UN, 2023). Euro-Med Monitor (2023) reports that at least 20,031 Palestinians, including 8,176 children and 4,112 women, have died, accounting for over 4,800 individuals presumed dead under the rubble. The organization described the Israeli assault as a "genocide in the making," aimed at "leaving permanent mental and physical damage on most of Gaza's population and creating conditions that render the enclave incapable of sustaining organized human life."

Moreover, the U.S. vetoed resolution disposed in its third article "the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages, and for their safety, well-being, and humane treatment" (UNSC, 2023a).

According to verified footage from Amnesty International (2023), Hamas fighters abducted and intentionally killed civilians in Israeli communities on October 7, with Amnesty emphasizing that hostage-taking is a war crime and demanding the immediate release of all civilian hostages. The hostage crisis involves over 242 individuals, including 33 children and several foreign nationals. However, notable releases occurred on October 20 and 23, and a ceasefire agreement between 24 and 30 November facilitated the release of 30 children, eight mothers, and 12 other women, with Israel agreeing to release 150 Palestinian prisoners in exchange. The ceasefire ended with the release of 105 hostages. However, tensions persisted, with tragic incidents like the accidental killing of three hostages by IDF soldiers (Bard, 2023).

The vetoed text also advocated for "continuous, sufficient, and unhindered provision of essential goods and services to civilians" (UNSC, 2023a). WHO spokesperson Jasarevic highlighted in fact the dire situation in Gaza, where a severe fuel shortage is crippling hospitals. Despite sending 80 metric tons of supplies to the Rafah border, aid remained blocked. Jasarevic emphasized that only ending hostilities will prevent further loss of life (M-E Monitor, 2023). Additionally, Gaza's hospitals had approximately 48 hours of fuel left for backup generators, putting thousands of patients, including babies in incubators, at imminent risk (Save the Children, 2023).

Likewise, UNRWA warned of dwindling clean water supplies and severe dehydration threatening lives, especially among children, stating that "water pumps reliant on power remain inoperative due to a four-day electricity outage." Save the Children (2023) emphasized that "humanitarian operations cannot be kept on a drip feed of fuel," as it is essential for maintaining social services, desalination plants, clean drinking water, and sanitation.

Furthermore, World Food Programme stated that the resumption of hostilities will exacerbate the hunger crisis threatening Gaza's civilian population, whose lifeline is food assistance (UN, 2023). Save the Children (2023) highlighted the dire conditions in shelters, which lack capacity, clean drinking water, sanitation, and adequate nutrition for people already mentally and physically exhausted, describing it as "a textbook formula for epidemics and a public health disaster."

Finally, the ninth article stressed "protection of all medical personnel and humanitarian personnel" (UNSC, 2023a). By October 17, 41 attacks on Gaza's healthcare services killed 11 healthcare workers on duty and injured 16 others (WHO, 2023). UNRWA reported 14 staff deaths and airstrikes on their installations. By December 6, at least 130 UNRWA colleagues

had died (Guterres, 2023). The UNRWA Commissioner-General reported over 250 deaths and 900 injuries among those seeking protection under the UN flag (UN, 2023). In his letter to the Security Council on December 6, invoking Article 99 of the UN Charter to address the catastrophic situation in Palestine. Guterres emphasized the severe toll on Palestinian civilians, urging for "immediate measures to protect civilians" and ensure humanitarian access (Guterres, 2023).

With the support of 97 member states, the Security Council debated the resolution expressing "grave concern over the suffering of the Palestinian civilian population" and calling for the "immediate and unconditional release of all hostages" (UNSC, 2023b).

The U.S. vetoed it, deeming it "unbalanced." In contrast, Mr. De Rivière (France) expressed concern over the humanitarian crisis in Gaza, supporting the resolution but lamenting its failure to condemn Hamas's October 7 attacks due to disunity within the Council. Likewise, Malta's representative supported the resolution as a necessary humanitarian pause but was disappointed it did not pass, believing it could have addressed immediate needs. China expressed disappointment over the U.S. veto, highlighting the destruction from two months of fighting and calling for an immediate ceasefire (UNA, 2023b).

The urgency of the situation was starkly illustrated by the Palestinian Ambassador statement during the debates, which highlighted the dire consequences of inaction: "*Hundreds of people will be killed by this time tomorrow, then hundreds more, and then thousands. Children will be killed, orphaned, wounded, or disabled for life, not by mistake but by design... The humanitarian catastrophe will reach new and terrifying depths. Who can justify this?*" (UNA, 2023b). The day after, on December 19, Israel continued its bombing campaign, killing 33 people in Rafah, most from the same family, and later striking the Orthodox Church of Saint Porphyrius in Gaza, killing 18 people seeking refuge there. Simultaneous airstrikes in northern Gaza resulted in at least 21 deaths and 41 injuries (Euro-Med, 2023).

By December, the conflict had claimed 1,200 Israeli lives (22 children) and nearly 30,000 Palestinian lives (11,000+ children in Gaza). Hanafi (2023) argues that Netanyahu's call for ethnic cleansing as Israel wages a "second war of extermination was facilitated by the perception of Palestinian resistance and Western support.

ii. Abandoning Structural Justice

- State security:

Territorial issues deeply intertwine with the conflict's major stages (Durrieu, 2024), and draft resolutions from this period prominently feature direct physical violence and positive peace dimensions, as shown in Table 3. The dimension of state security appeared in 4 out of 5 vetoed texts. According to Stein & Brom (2014), the Palestinian decision to approach the Security Council stems from a political deadlock, failed Israeli-Palestinian talks, and a belief that a breakthrough is unlikely. Mahmoud Abbas aims to leverage rising tensions to gain international recognition for a Palestinian state and impose a solution on Israel without direct negotiations while also challenging the U.S. tradition of vetoing related resolutions.

In February 2011, the draft resolution condemning settlements, co-sponsored by 120 member states, also included statehood descriptors. The preamble reiterated the Security Council's

vision of "two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in peace within secure and recognized borders" and urged both parties to act according to international law and previous agreements, including the Roadmap, which emphasizes establishing a Palestinian state as central to the Peace Process (UNSC, 2011). However, President Obama, by casting a veto, deviated from his 2011 stance on freedom and democracy following the Arab Spring, viewing Palestinian statehood recognition as delegitimizing for Israel. He later stated at AIPAC, "No vote at the United Nations will ever create an independent Palestinian state." A State Department official remarked, "Sometimes I feel like I work for the Israeli government" after contacting 150 diplomats to prevent the Palestinian statehood initiative (Reubner, 2016).

Vidmar (2013) notes that on November 29, 2012, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 67/19, granting Palestine non-member observer state status at the UN due to the Security Council's blockage. While this status allows Palestine to enter international treaties and participate in organizations, it does not confirm statehood, as the General Assembly lacks the authority for recognition. Additionally, Palestine was able to bring cases to the ICJ with the two-thirds majority in the UNESCO General Conference, but UNESCO's vote or treaty-making capacity alone cannot create states. Thus, although Palestine can act like a state internationally, this does not establish Palestinian statehood (Vidmar, 2013). This further underscores the Security Council's essential role in recognizing statehood, which requires its recommendation and the absence of a veto.

On December 17, 2017, Trump announced the US recognition of Jerusalem and plans to move the US embassy there, claiming it was in the best interests of the US and peace. This sparked protests in Palestinian communities and Arab countries. Likewise, on December 13, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation condemned the decision, urging states to recognize Palestine with East Jerusalem as its capital and calling for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 478 (IEPQ, 2017). However, the US vetoed the resolution of December 18, 2017, despite support from all other 14 Security Council members. The text emphasized the "specific status of the Holy City of Jerusalem" and declared changes to its character or status as "null and void," warning that these actions imperil the two-state solution (UNSC, 2017).

During the debates, U.S. Ambassador Nikki Haley defended the American veto as a matter of sovereignty and Middle East peace. She stated that "Jerusalem has been the political, cultural, and spiritual homeland of the Jewish people for thousands of years" and emphasized the U.S.'s "sovereign right to determine where and whether we establish an embassy." Haley dismissed claims that the decision harmed peace prospects as "a scandalous charge," arguing that recognizing Jerusalem as Israel's capital only highlights "a fundamental reality" (UNA, 2017, p. 4). It seems therefore that much more effort is needed to overcome cultural and religious divisions, curb their drive for violence, and recognize local roots and culture as valuable resources for peace, as was fundamental in the most successful peacebuilding cases such as South Africa, Sri Lanka, and Rwanda (Grabyll & Lanegran, 2004).

The UK Ambassador, on the other hand, criticized the unilateral US decision, highlighting its negative impact on peace and the hardships faced by Palestinians due to restricted access: "Many Palestinians living outside East Jerusalem... are effectively cut off from it." He emphasized the importance of maintaining the status quo at holy sites, stating, "*We recognize that Jerusalem holds huge significance and holiness for Jews, Muslims, and Christians*" (Ibid, p.5). likewise, the Palestinian Ambassador condemned the US stance, asserting, "*Jerusalem will always remain the heart of Palestine*" and criticizing the US for standing "*in opposition to the rest of the world*" (Ibid, p.12).

Trump's decision led to protests and violent clashes, resulting in 14 Palestinian deaths and 4,500 injuries by December 2017 (IEPQ, 2017). Denny (2018) argues that the 2017 U.S. veto provided political cover for Israel, preventing UNSC actions and leading to violence and human rights violations. Similarly, Suci and Yehuda (2011) discuss how recognizing Palestinian statehood could enforce Israel's human rights obligations and increase Palestinian authorities' responsibilities, potentially impacting the conflict's nature, and the prosecution of war crimes and HR violations. Recognition based on the 1967 boundaries, including East Jerusalem, could significantly alter the legal framework for Israel's actions.

Furthermore, Mearsheimer and Walt (2007) argue that U.S. support for Israel often conflicts with international human rights law, particularly in the treatment of Palestinians in occupied territories, citing issues like movement restrictions, access to resources, and due process violations. However the debate between “de facto annexers” and “two-staters” frequently overlooks the severe human rights violations resulting from the occupation, including killings, forced displacement, and discriminatory settlement policies (Denny, 2018).

The June 1, 2018, Kuwait draft resolution regarding Gaza protests also addressed crucial issues related to state security, including statehood, occupation, and institutions. In its preamble, the UNSC emphasized for the first time that "the Gaza Strip constitutes an integral part of the Palestinian territory occupied in 1967." Furthermore, Article 10 of the resolution called for "immediate steps towards ending the closure and the restrictions imposed by Israel on movement and access into and out of the Gaza Strip" (UNSC, 2018).

During the debates, the Danish Ambassador underscored the significance of the resolution by emphasizing its call to end the closure of Gaza, stating, "We have repeatedly called for the lifting of restrictions and full and sustained access for all donors" (UNA, 2018). Similarly, the UN fact-finding mission on Gaza urged Israel to "lift the blockade on Gaza with immediate effect" (OHCHR, 2019).

Moreover, this draft resolution was the first to call for "tangible steps towards intra-Palestinian reconciliation, including concrete steps to reunite the Gaza Strip and the West Bank under the legitimate Palestinian government and ensure its effective functioning in the Gaza Strip." And Article 16 required "urgent efforts to end the 1967 Israeli occupation," calling for “two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, to live side by side in peace with secure and recognized borders” (UNSC, 2018). Thus, the U.S. veto served once again as what Panganiban (2021) called “a political barrier” to the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian state, allowing further fragmentation and division.

Panganiban (2021) defends that political factors hinder the recognition of Palestinian statehood more than legal criteria. Political dynamics heavily influence Palestine's pursuit of recognition, despite meeting the Montevideo Convention's requirements—permanent population, defined territory, government, and the ability to engage in international relations. The United States, prioritizing its alliance with Israel, has consistently used its veto power at the UN Security Council to block resolutions supporting Palestinian statehood (Panganiban, 2021). In the same sense, Vidmar (2013) speculates that "Palestine would have been a UN member if veto power did not exist in the Security Council."

While the U.S. argues that unilateral Palestinian actions could hinder peace negotiations, the peace process that created the PA as a temporary measure has, three decades later, resulted in the PA losing legitimacy, with Israel controlling 60% of the West Bank and Gaza under siege.

Hanafi (2023) highlights that these 30 years have resulted in daily violations of international law by Israeli occupation forces, armed settlers, and their global allies.

- Navigating Justice and Accountability

The rule of law and conditions of justice are fundamental for establishing peace, and were central to the discussions surrounding and the texts of all vetoed resolutions during this period.

In 2011, the globally supported draft resolution called the occupying power to "immediately cease all settlement activities" and to "fully respect all of its legal obligations in this regard" (UNSC, 2011). However, the U.S. representative argued that resolving the conflict should occur through "direct negotiations between the parties, with the active and sustained support of the United States and the international community," cautioning against direct intervention by the Security Council. Mr. Mansour criticized in contrast the UNSC for its failure to uphold its responsibilities, stating, "*The proper message that should have been sent by the Security Council to Israel, the occupying power, is that its contempt of international law and the international community will no longer be tolerated.*" He expressed concern that the vetoes might encourage further Israeli intransigence and impunity, insisting it was "high time to send a clear and firm message to Israel" to comply with international legal obligations (UNA, 2011).

Usher (2011) highlights the U.S. vetoes of draft resolutions condemning Israeli settlements in May 1995 and February 2011, despite unanimous support from other members. These vetoes forced the U.S. to balance its international credibility against domestic political pressures, ultimately prioritizing credibility. He explains it occurred following Democratic midterm losses and was criticized by Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen as a concession to Israel's enemies. Reubner (2016) also argues that during Obama's presidency, the U.S. initially called for a freeze on Israeli settlements but quickly retreated, reinforcing the perception of UN bias and U.S. protection of Israel. This stance, coupled with support for the Gaza blockade and increased military aid, perpetuated impunity for violations of international law and hindered Palestinian efforts for international backing.

In 2017, the draft resolution on Jerusalem, supported by all 14 UNSC members, stated that decisions altering the city's status "must be rescinded in compliance with relevant resolutions of the Security Council." (UNSC, 2017). U.S. Ambassador Nikki Haley criticized perceived bias against Israel, stating, "When the Palestinians are concerned, the international community never misses an opportunity to blame Israel" (UNA, 2017, p. 4). This rhetoric, however, mirrored Israel's arguments in 2018 resolution debates. Defending the U.S. embassy move to Jerusalem, Haley declared, "Today, for the simple act of deciding where to put its embassy, the United States was forced to defend its sovereignty" (Ibid).

In response, the Palestinian Ambassador condemned the U.S. decision, arguing that it undermined its role as a peace broker and asserting, "With this veto, the United States has missed an opportunity to rectify its illegal decision with regard to the city of Jerusalem, remaining on the wrong side of history." He emphasized the legal binding nature of the previous SC resolutions on Jerusalem and the rights of Palestinians, asserting, "We refuse to accept that Palestine be the exception to every rule" (Ibid). Mansour once again highlighted the U.S. paradox of acting as a "peace broker" in the name of peace, while the local perception of Palestinians, needed for consolidating peace, remains ignored.

Moreover, the same year, a UN ESCWA report accused Israel of establishing an "apartheid regime" over Palestinians but faced backlash from Israel and the United States, leading to its

withdrawal. The ESCWA Executive Secretary resigned, stating, "It is only normal for criminals to pressure and attack those who advocate the cause of their victims" (Reuters, 2917). This emphasized her belief that the pressure indicates broader issues of Israel's accountability for human rights violations and the U.S.'s efforts to perpetrate them internationally.

However, In the 2020s, international organizations continued to label Israel's regime as apartheid. B'Tselem's Executive Director (2021) argued that the Nation State Basic Law enshrined discrimination against Palestinians constitutionally, characterizing the situation as "a single regime between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, deserving of recognition as apartheid." Amnesty International (2023) detailed Israeli actions violating international law, describing them as part of a systematic attack aimed at maintaining oppression and domination over Palestinians.

The June 1st, 2018 vetoed resolution on indiscriminate shooting at Gaza protests is particularly significant, as it is the first text in which the expression "accountability" appears in a Security Council vetoed resolution on the Palestinian Question. From its preamble, the text underscores "the need to pursue measures of accountability, stressing in this regard the importance of ensuring independent and transparent investigations in accordance with international standards." Moreover, in the second article, the Council urged the protection of civilians and emphasized the need "to ensure accountabilities for all violations." And the subsequent article called on Israel to "fully abide by its legal obligations and responsibilities under the Fourth Geneva Convention" (UNSC, 2018).

During the debates, Israeli representative Danon praised the U.S. support, stating, "We acknowledge the United States and all who did not support the draft for their moral clarity." The U.S. emphasized that "a necessary precondition for peace is recognition of reality," specifically that Hamas is a major impediment to peace and urged the Council to vote against Kuwait's draft resolution, asserting, "Everyone at this table has a choice—either to support Hamas or not. This vote will tell the story." (UNA, 2018). U.S. position reflects the argument by Cousens et al. (2001) that international actors often focus on the 'what' and 'who' of peacebuilding while neglecting the 'how,' 'why,' and 'to what end.' By ignoring the unique dynamics of each conflict, risking the inevitable outcome of collapsed peace efforts once external support diminishes.

However. Sweden commended the Kuwaiti delegation for their "good faith, inclusiveness, flexibility, and transparency" and stressed the urgent humanitarian situation in Gaza, stating, "We must not abdicate our responsibility under the Charter." The Palestinian Ambassador further condemned the Council's inaction and Israel's shielding from accountability declaring, "We deplore the use of the veto to continue shielding Israel from censure and accountability for its crimes against our people." (UNA, 2018). In the same sense, Human Rights Watch (2018) stated that "the international community needs to rip up the old playbook, where Israel conducts investigations that mainly whitewash the conduct of its troops and the US blocks international accountability with its Security Council veto, and instead impose real costs for such blatant disregard for Palestinian lives."

Furthermore, the commission established by the UN Human Rights Council' following the U.S. veto investigated Gaza protest violations. The commission found that Israeli security forces potentially committed war crimes and crimes against humanity, including murder and "other inhumane acts." The commission emphasized that, in spite of these discoveries, the Israeli government has persistently neglected to adequately investigate or prosecute those responsible or compensate the victims (OHCHR, 2019). Likewise, B'Tselem (2017) notes that Israel

evades accountability for its security forces' actions in the Occupied Territories, creating a semblance of law enforcement while selectively leveraging its powers. The military law enforcement system "whitewashes violations," and most cases close with no action, legitimizing the occupation and deflecting criticism.

Moreover, the 2018 situation underscores the systemic issue with the veto: it prolongs the duration of international measures and mechanisms to address the crisis, shifting responsibilities from the Security Council, the most competent UN body for adopting binding resolutions, to other bodies such as the Secretary-General or the Human Rights Council, which issue non-binding recommendations. The veto provides political cover and protection for Israel, as Denny (2018) emphasizes, and actively prevents the UNSC from condemning and taking actions against Israel.

Hatuel-Radoshitzky (2018) argues that Israel's special relationship with the United States, particularly in the UN Security Council, remains strong, as recent developments have demonstrated U.S. shielding of Israel from international criticism, notably vetoing a Kuwait draft resolution following the Gaza protests, marking the Trump administration's second veto on Israel's behalf in six months. Additionally, he mentions the U.S. withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council, citing its disproportionate focus on Israel, which further underscores this protective stance.

Mearsheimer and Walt (2007) criticize this selective application of international law, highlighting the inconsistency between U.S. positions on Israel and its approach to other international issues. This selective security has significant consequences. As Stanislawski (2021) notes, it has not only resulted in a lack of accountability for Israel's actions, but has also contributed to the perception that criticizing Israel equates to anti-Semitism.

- **Selective Justice: seeds of “Plausible Genocide?”**

The world was shocked by brutal civilian attacks and the sudden reactivation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on October 7, 2023. Durrieu (2024) argues that Netanyahu's strategy of downplaying the Palestinian issue had caused this surprise. This denial, according to Durrieu, "was an additional suffering for the Palestinian people, who lived with daily despair." It was so deep-rooted that Israelis held a rave near Gaza while bombing the enclave. She concludes that the October 7 attacks broke this denial, reviving global interest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, arguing "The issue is not new; we just noticed it again" (Durrieu, 2024).

Hanafi (2023) disputes that Hamas represents a significant portion of the Palestinian people, with support in occupied Palestine and the diaspora. Voters understood Hamas' ideology of resistance when they elected the group in 2006. West Bank university student body elections have favored Hamas for the last five years. Their popularity stems from the fact that there is no political solution to the genocidal Israeli regime, "while there's the added necessity of inflicting a cost on the ongoing Israeli settler colonial project," which leaves Hamas as the only group serving these Palestinian interests. He stressed that attention should be turned to why the "moderate" Palestinian Authority, which relied on renouncing violence for aid, failed to end the occupation. He concludes that After 30 years of nonviolence since Oslo, Palestinians have seen no results.

Hanafi's argument underscores the complexity of the discussion of Palestinian representation and the international community's approach. Xall & Wyeth (2008) further point out that peacebuilding efforts face crucial challenges due to the rightful expectations of the affected

population, such as the safe return of displaced persons, accountability for human rights atrocities, and the rebuilding of infrastructure and economies. In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, these expectations remain largely unmet, further fueling support for groups like Hamas that promise resistance and change.

In October 2023, the U.S. vetoed resolution urged in its fourth article "all parties to fully comply with their obligations under international law, including international human rights law and international humanitarian law" (UNSC, 2023a). However, during debates, the U.S. representative argued that the resolution was biased, blaming Hamas for the humanitarian crisis and emphasizing Israel's right to self-defense under the UN Charter. Thomas-Greenfield called for condemnation of Hamas's terrorism while supporting Israel's defense. In contrast, Mrs. Frazier (Malta) stressed the importance of protecting civilians and praised the resolution's balanced approach on this crucial issue (UNA, 2023a). Furthermore, the U.S. continues to fund Israel's right to self-defense and a "blind revenge war" on Gaza. Omer-Man (2023) notes that U.S. military aid should comply with laws like the Leahy Law, which requires vetting to prevent aid to human rights violators. However, the vetting process for Israel is considered excessively resource-intensive, resulting in a special procedure that overlooks violations. Before the Hamas attacks, the State Department instructed embassies to monitor civilian harm from American-made weapons, and Section 620(i) of the Foreign Assistance Act prohibits sending arms to countries restricting humanitarian aid. The Biden administration, vocal about Ukraine's occupation, faces criticism for double standards in military aid, continuing arms transfers to Israel, and emphasizing the need for uniform application of arms export laws (Omer-Man, 2023).

Finally, on December 6th, the Secretary-General's letter to the Security Council emphasized, "*The international community has a responsibility to use all its influence to prevent further escalation and end this crisis,*" urging the members of the Council to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. "*I reiterate my appeal for a humanitarian ceasefire to be declared. This is urgent.*" (Guterres, 2023). On the same day, UNRWA Commissioner-General Lazzarini warned that Gaza was approaching a "point of no return," where the "blatant disregard for international humanitarian law scars our collective conscience." He urged states to find the political will to end the tragedy, emphasizing that failure to act would "forever stain our credibility" and perpetuate cycles of violence, stating that the law "must be truly respected, not reinterpreted" (UN, 2023).

The U.S.-vetoed resolution, despite broad international support on December 18th, called for a ceasefire and reiterated that "*all parties comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, notably with regard to the protection of civilians*" (UNSC, 2023b). However, Mr. Wood (U.S.) criticized the short concise text as "hastily prepared" and "unbalanced," lacking proper consultation and failing to address crucial issues, such as condemning Hamas's October 7 attack. He emphasized Israel's right to self-defense and argued that the call for an "unconditional ceasefire" was unrealistic and would allow Hamas to regroup, which he deemed a "recipe for disaster."

In contrast, Ms. Gatt (Malta) endorsed the resolution and affirmed Israel's right to self-defense, while underscoring that military actions must comply with international humanitarian law, focusing on principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution (UNA, 2023b). Furthermore, in a striking statement, the Palestinian representative declared, "*This is the moment of truth. This is a turning point in history, and it is disastrous that the Security Council was again prevented from rising to the moment to uphold its clear responsibilities.*" He urged

opposition to the war, stating, “*Whoever is against war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide must stand against this war.*” Mansour further emphasized that “*millions of Palestinian lives hang in the balance*” and condemned the “*double standards, bias, racism, Israeli exceptionalism, and supremacy*” affecting Palestinians in Gaza (UNA, 2023b).

The resignation of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights' New York office on October 31, along with a scathing resignation letter blasting the UN and Western complicity in Israeli abuses, further demonstrates the gravity of this bias (Hanafi, 2023). Furthermore, the Chinese representative also criticized justifying the continuation of fighting while professing concern for the lives and safety of people in Gaza, describing such positions as “self-contradictory.” Zhang urged Israel to stop its “collective punishment” of Gaza's population and called for increased diplomatic efforts to facilitate hostage release and end the hostilities (UNA, 2023b).

Thus, this study further confirms findings by Hassan & al (2021) emphasizing that U.S. vetoes block third parties and international organizations from holding Israel accountable for violations of international law. This impunity prevents significant changes in Israeli policies and is further deepened by the U.S. Israel's security assistance accounts for almost 60% of all U.S. foreign military financing worldwide. The U.S. has never held Israel accountable, serving as a guarantor of impunity that has not encouraged Israel to change its policies, especially towards Palestinians. “Without accountability, the center of gravity of Israeli discourse shifted and peace-supporting policies were further marginalized” (Hassan & al., 2021). B’Tselem (2017) also draws a direct link between abuses and impunity, stating that Israel evades accountability for its actions, leading to “profound disregard for the lives, physical wellbeing and property of Palestinians,” resulting in impunity for serious human rights abuses. and slim chances for Palestinian justice.

The consequences of this impunity are far reaching. Hanafi (2023) explores the moral complexities arising from this situation, discussing how some justify Hamas's resistance in light of Israel's actions. He argues for condemning attacks on civilians while acknowledging the right to resist colonization, posing the challenging question: “We can't know how we would act or react if we lived in a concentration camp under the same horrendous conditions.” Likewise, Grabyll & Lanegran (2004) emphasize the importance of international involvement in ensuring accountability, arguing that support for the rule of law and human rights norms is crucial for peace. They stress “the necessity of international involvement in ensuring accountability for the abuses and balancing the roles of domestic and international actors in this process.”

The escalation of this impunity is evident in South Africa's recent action at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). On December 29, 2023, South Africa initiated proceedings against Israel, accusing it of violating the Genocide Convention in its actions towards Palestinians in Gaza. This case represents a significant attempt to use international legal mechanisms to address the long-standing issues of accountability and human rights violations in the region. However, it is tragically notable that only after thousands of Palestinian deaths in such a short period did international legal action occur. This underscores the urgent need for effective accountability mechanisms. The requirement of such a devastating toll to prompt a response from the International Court of Justice highlights systemic failures in addressing human rights violations and enforcing international law.

V. Findings and Conclusion:

This comprehensive study examined U.S. vetoes on Palestinian-related UN Security Council resolutions from 1973 to 2023, aiming to understand how these vetoes hindered the peace process. The research contextualized the measures contained in vetoed texts alongside real-world events, guided by the interpretations and perceptions of the involved parties, including the U.S. and Palestinian representatives, while drawing on existing literature and theoretical insights. The study found that the U.S. vetoes consistently obstructed efforts for conflict resolution, undermined international law and accountability, and perpetuated cycles of violence and impunity. The vetoes occurred on texts addressing both major facets of peace: negative peace, referring to the absence of direct physical violence, and positive peace, referring to structural justice and social harmony.

To answer the research questions, in the Pre peace era, the U.S vetoes hindered peace efforts by enhancing Barriers to Positive Peace (1973-1982): primarily State Security, but also settlements, and refugee rights. And by deteriorating conditions for Negative Peace (1983-1989), while still covering Human Rights in resolutions, with Justice being the dominant domain.

This period (1973-1982) saw intensive U.S. vetoes on the "Palestinian question," with 16 vetoes. These vetoes obstructed positive peace by blocking resolutions affirming Palestinian rights to self-determination and human rights, while also addressing negative peace issues like settlements and refugee rights. This pattern potentially influenced subsequent peace processes, notably omitting the refugee problem.

From 1983 to 1990, vetoed resolutions shifted focus. The State Security dimension was mentioned in 10 resolutions (7 from 1973-1982 and 3 from 1983-1990), while the Human Rights dimension became more prominent in 8 resolutions (3 from 1973-1982 and 5 from 1983-1990). Justice remained a common dimension. Human rights issues included administrative detention, deportation, and home demolitions. Notably, this was the last period with significant human rights mentions in vetoed resolutions.

As the first Intifada unfolded, U.S. vetoes focused more on negative peace, addressing Human Safety (9 resolutions: 1 from 1973-1982 and 8 from 1983-1990), Ongoing Conflict (8 resolutions, all from 1983-1990), and Territorial Security (4 resolutions: 1 from 1973-1982 and 3 from 1983-1990). These vetoes blocked resolutions condemning violence against civilians and obstructed accountability for violations. Throughout, U.S. actions consistently worked against immediate conflict resolution and structural justice, prioritizing geopolitical interests and maintaining power asymmetries, which influenced the setting for future negotiations, including the Oslo accords.

Likewise, in the Peace process era 1995 to 2006, the U.S vetoes impeded peacebuilding by objecting negative peace aspects, addressing physical violence and Human Safety. But also, by neglecting structural justice.

However, the 12 U.S. vetoed resolutions in this era marked a decrease in U.S. vetoes on the "Palestinian question." Resolutions also shifted their focus. The State Security dimension was mentioned in 7 resolutions, while the Human Rights dimension became less prominent, appearing in only 2 resolutions. Justice remained a common dimension across all vetoed texts. The resolutions during this period primarily addressed issues related to Israeli military

operations, settlement activities, and the construction of the separation wall. As the Second Intifada unfolded, U.S. vetoes concentrated more on negative peace aspects, addressing Human Safety (7 resolutions), Ongoing Conflict (9 resolutions), and Territorial Security (5 resolutions). These vetoes blocked resolutions condemning violence against civilians, calling for the withdrawal of Israeli forces, and demanding a halt to settlement expansion, including the 3 consequent vetoes on Har Homa settlement in 1997 and 2001, where the council aimed to halt each stage of construction.

This shows a paradox: instead of the peace process decreasing direct violence and negative peace and focusing on structural justice with the Oslo Accords, it maintained the tendency of growing resolutions dominated by ongoing conflict and Human Safety rather than Human Rights. This trend contradicts the expected outcomes of a peace process, highlighting the persistent challenges in addressing the root causes of the conflict. Furthermore, the Hamas election in 2006, following the two intifadas, can be understood through Talentino's (2017) concept of "broken promises." This concept suggests that initial support for a peace process can degenerate into resentment, especially when an ethnic or religious group that has been a victim of persecution is not satisfied with peace terms. In this context, Palestinians criticized international efforts for doing too little, particularly in punishing persecutors, protecting citizens, and providing economic improvements. While victims and their families expected justice, it was rarely the first concern of international actors. This disconnection between local expectations and international priorities contributed to the growing disillusionment with the peace process and the shift in the Palestinian political landscape.

Finally, in the era of the Aftermath of Peace 2011 to 2023, the U.S vetoes obstructed peacebuilding by exacerbating direct violence and blocking measures to protect civilians safety. And also, by abandoning positive peace conditions : State security, and justice, the common dominant dimension to all vetoed texts.

The U.S. vetoed five resolutions during this period, marking a continuing decrease of vetoes. However, these vetoes enabled Israeli settlement expansion (UNSC, 2011), prolonged military operations (UNSC, 2018, 2023a, 2023b). The vetoes also supported controversial infrastructure projects, as evidenced by the veto against a resolution on Jerusalem's status (UNSC, 2017). Simultaneously, these vetoes obstructed Palestinian statehood efforts and economic stability (UNSC, 2011, 2017, 2018), reinforcing structural violence. By shielding Israel from accountability and preventing the application of international law, these vetoes created an environment of impunity.

This pattern of vetoes documented how U.S. actions systematically worked against both immediate conflict resolution (negative peace) and the establishment of conditions necessary for lasting peace (positive peace), effectively maintaining power asymmetries and complicating the path to a two-state solution.

Furthermore, the growing prominence of the Ongoing Conflict dimension, rather than its decrease following the peace process, suggests that peacebuilding is likely not the prevailing situation in Palestine. Especially since the Second Intifada and subsequent military operations in Gaza, the situation appears to more closely resemble peacekeeping, which is typically the stage preceding peacebuilding. This shift indicates that the region has not yet progressed to a stable enough state for comprehensive peacebuilding efforts to take root.

This pattern also seems to exemplify failed peacebuilding, as "failed peacebuilding represents one of the worst risk factors for new wars" (T. Xall & Wyeth, 2008). The situation underscores

the need for the international community to prioritize human security over state-centric goals. Amid widespread poverty, disease, famine, oppression, and despair, producing millions of refugees, it becomes clear that "If peacebuilding actors allow their own security goals to supersede human security for those on the ground, peacebuilding will lose much of its rationale" (King & Matthews, 2012). The U.S. approach, marked by "programmatic minimalism" (Talentino, 2007), focuses on mechanisms over substance, neglecting dignity and local justice. The prioritization of geopolitical interests, in line with Realpolitik, over humanitarian needs—evidenced by vetoes obstructing aid and conflict cessation—reflects a failure to prioritize human security in the peacebuilding process.

Furthermore, this study reveals a critical issue with the UN Security Council's veto power, as highlighted in 2018. This mechanism prolongs crises by shifting responsibilities from the Security Council, which can issue binding resolutions, to other UN bodies that often provide non-binding recommendations. This pattern is evident in the 2004 ICJ Wall Advisory Opinion, the 2002 Jenin Investigation, and the 2006 Beit Hanoun Fact-Finding Mission, where U.S. vetoes led to less authoritative actions, demonstrating how veto power undermines the international community's ability to effectively address and resolve conflicts, especially in the Israeli-Palestinian context.

However, the study, while focusing on vetoed UN resolutions, might not fully capture the broader scope of U.S. policy or the full range of UN actions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Reliance on official documents could overlook the complexities of diplomatic negotiations, and the selected time frame might miss long-term trends or recent developments. With these limitations, the study could be completed by conducting a quantitative analysis to examine the frequency and timing of U.S. vetoes in relation to key peace process events, creating a timeline to visually and statistically explore how these vetoes align with significant milestones. Additionally, it could analyze correlations between vetoes and conflict developments, such as increases in casualties and settlements, using regression analyses to quantify their impact on peace efforts. A counterfactual approach would compare vetoed resolutions with adopted ones to reveal patterns in their content and outcomes. To enrich the analysis, including interviews with U.S. officials, Israeli representatives, and Palestinian leaders would provide qualitative insights into the decision-making processes and the perceived impact of the vetoes. This combined approach would offer a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the influence of U.S. vetoes on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

To conclude, The U.S approach to conflict resolution in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, has been characterized by systematic hindrances that have obstructed lasting peace and maintained power imbalances.

A key issue in this approach is the prioritization of state-centric goals over human security. This focus neglects the widespread suffering and displacement experienced by affected populations, particularly in Gaza. By failing to adequately address issues of human dignity and justice, the U.S. has undermined crucial peacebuilding efforts. Instead, Realpolitik have taken precedence over addressing humanitarian crises, needs and justice.

The need for accountability in this context is paramount for enhancing peacebuilding efforts, with the ongoing situation in Gaza, where a plausible genocide is occurring with more than 40,000 deaths by August 2024, underscores the consequences of continued impunity. As Lederach (1997) argues, addressing this failure requires establishing mechanisms for responsibility and accountability at local and international levels, as it is crucial for recognizing and enhancing the viability of peacebuilding efforts.

Despite these alarming developments, including the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issuing several orders on provisional measures in the South Africa v. Israel case, and the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor requesting arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and others for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity, the United States continues to stand with “Israel's right to self-defense” politically, economically, military, and diplomatically. The U.S. continues in fact to exercise its veto power in the Security Council, culminating in two vetoes in the first half of 2024, further exacerbating the ongoing catastrophe.

To what extent and for how long will the United States continue to prioritize its domestic and geopolitical interests over Palestinian lives and dignity, and what are the potential consequences of this approach? Given that the human and physical toll appears to be comparable in scale and intensity to historical genocides, is this an acceptable price for achieving peace? Has humanity failed to learn from its historical experiences to such a significant degree? How does this situation reflect on the international community's collective capacity to prevent and respond to large-scale humanitarian crises, and what implications does it hold for the future of international law, conflict resolution mechanisms, and, most importantly, our shared common humanity?

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Table1

Date	Symbol	Conflict	Human Security:	Territorial Security: Settlements	Human Rights	State Security:	Justice
d1 26-Jul-1973	S/10974				6. "occupied territories no changes which may obstruct a peaceful and final settlement or which may adversely affect the political and other fundamental rights of all the inhabitants »	<p>1. no progress in carrying terms of resolution 242(1967), and that nearly six years after its adoption, a just and lasting peace.. still not been achieved;</p> <p>2 "Strongly deplores Israel's continuing occupation of the territories"</p> <p>5. "respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity, the rights of all States in the area and for the rights and legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians;"</p>	
2 26-Jan-1976	S/11940		b- "The right of Palestinian refugees wishing to return to their homes.. to receive compensation for their property;			<p>1a-"exercise its inalienable national right of self-determination, including the right to establish an independent state in Palestine"</p> <p>1c- "That Israel should withdraw from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967 »</p> <p>1d- "the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all states in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;"</p>	
nn3 25-Mar-1976	S/12022			3-"desist from the expropriation of or encroachment upon Arab lands and property the establishment of Israeli settlements thereon in the occupied Arab territories"	2-"Calls on Israel, pending the speedy termination of its occupation, to refrain from all measures against the Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories; »	<p>1-"deplores Israel's failure to put a stop to action and policies tending to change the status of the City of Jerusalem and to rescind measures already taken to that effect;"</p> <p>3-"to respect and uphold the inviolability of the Holy Places which are under its occupation"..</p>	"desist from all other actions and policies designed to change the legal status of the City of Jerusalem and to rescind measures already taken to that effect;"
4 29-Jun-1976	S/12119		2, the right of return			2-« Affirms the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine, "	
5 30-Apr-1980	S/13911		b-"the right of Palestinian refugees »			<p>1a- « exercise its inalienable national right of self-determination, including the right to establish an independent State in Palestine;"</p> <p>2-"Israel should withdraw from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967, including Jerusalem;"</p>	

						3-“the sovereign independent State of Palestine, and the right to live in peace	
						within secure and recognized boundaries;”	
6 02- Apr- 1982	S/14943					1-« denounces .. dismissal of elected mayors by Israeli authorities, as well as the violation of the liberties and rights of the inhabitants of the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip” 4- “ <u>calls upon</u> Israel to cease forthwith all measures applied in the West Bank, including Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and the Syrian Golan Heights, which contravene the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention”	2- “ <u>Calls on</u> Israel, the occupying Power, to rescind its decision disbanding the elected municipal council of El Bireh and its decision to remove from their posts the Mayors of Nablus and Ramallah;” 3- “all the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian.. continue to apply in full to all of the occupied territories;”
7 20- Apr- 1982	S/14985					« 2- Deplores any act or encouragement of destruction or profanation of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Jerusalem as tending to disturb world peace;” 3- refrain from causing any hindrance to the discharge of the established functions of the Higher Islamic Council in Jerusalem;”	« 3-Calls upon Israel..to observe and apply scrupulously the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention and the principles of international law governing military occupation”

<p>8</p> <p>02- Aug- 1983</p>	<p>S/15895</p>		<p>“6- Condemns the attacks against civilian population .. especially the killing and wounding of students at the Islamic college of the Arab city of Ar-Khalil on 16 July 1983;”</p>	<p>« 2- policies and practices of Israel in establishing settlements in the Palestinian, have no legal validity, constitute a major and serious obstruction to peace</p> <p>« 3- not to transfer parts of its own civilian population .. force transfers of Arab populations from these territories;”</p> <p>“4- to dismantle the existing settlements, to desist the planning, construction and establishment of new settlements.”</p>	<p>“5- rejects all Israeli arbitrary and illegal actions, especially those which result in the expulsion, deportation and forcible transfers of Arab populations”</p>	<p>« 3- to desist from taking any action which result in changing the legal status and geographical nature and materially affecting the demographic composition of the Arab territories occupied in 1967 »</p>	<p>2. Israeli settlements are in contravention with article 49 (6) of the Geneva Convention”</p> <p>« 3- Calls once more upon Israel, the occupying Power, to abide scrupulously by the provision of the above-mentioned Geneva Convention”</p> <p>“7- Calls upon all States not to provide Israel with any assistance to be used specifically in connection with settlements in the occupied territories;”</p> <p>“8- Reaffirms its determination, in the event of non-compliance by Israel with the present resolution, to examine practical ways and means in accordance with relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations to secure the full implementation of the present resolution;”</p> <p>6- Condemns the attacks against civilian population .. especially the killing and wounding of students</p>
<p>9</p> <p>13- Sep- 1985</p>	<p>S/17459</p>				<p>« 1- Deplores the repressive measures taken by Israel since 4 August 1985 against civilian Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza”</p> <p>“2- calls upon Israel, to immediately stop all repressive measures including curfews, administrative detentions and forceful deportation and to release forthwith all detainees and refrain from further deportations;</p>		<p>2: to immediately stop all repressive measures and to release forthwith all detainees and refrain from further deportations;</p> <p>“3- Further calls upon Israel to abide scrupulously by the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian”</p>

10 30- Jan- 1986	S/17769			“3- settling parts of its population and new immigrants .. flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention.. constitute a serious obstruction to peace;”		« 1- <u>Strongly deplores</u> the provocative acts which have violated the sanctity of the sanctuary of the Haram Al-Sharif in Jerusalem;” “3- <u>once more</u> that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the Palestinian territories, including Jerusalem, or any part thereof, have no legal validity » “4- reiterate that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel , the occupying Power, which have altered or purport to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem and in particular the "basic law" on Jerusalem are null and void and must be rescinded forthwith; “5- prevent any hindrance to the discharge of the established functions of the Supreme Islamic Council in Jerusalem , including any co-operation that the Council may desire from countries with predominantly Muslim populations and from Muslim communities in relation to its plans for the maintenance and repair of the Islamic Holy Places;	“5- call the OP to observe scrupulously the norms of international law governing military occupation, in particular the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, “6- <u>urgently calls on</u> Israel, the occupying Power, to implement forthwith the provisions of this resolution and the relevant Security Council resolutions;”
11 29- Jan- 1988	S/19466	“5- to facilitate the task of the International Committee of the Red Cross and of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees.. requests all Members to give them their full support; »			« 4- desist forthwith from its policies and practices which violate the human rights of the Palestinian people; »		« 2. <u>Calls upon</u> Israel, OP and as a High Contracting Party to the Geneva Convention.., to accept the <u>de jure</u> applicability of the Convention to the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and fully to comply with its obligations under that Convention;*” “3. Recalls the obligation of all the High Contracting Parties , under article 1 of the Convention, to ensure
							respect for the Convention in all circumstances;” “6- <u>Requests</u> the Secretary-General to continue to monitor the situation in the occupied territories by all means available to him and to make regular and timely reports to the Council;

12 14- Apr- 1988	S/19780	persistent policy of taking measures of collective punishment,	4-. In particular the opening of fire by the Israeli army, resulting in the killing and wounding of defenceless Palestinian civilians;	Israel has continued to transfer its civilian population into the territory it occupies and has equipped those settlers with arms which have been used against the civilian Palestinian people,	4. policies that violate the human rights of the Palestinian people in the OPT. Such as the recent demolition of homes in the village of Beita, deportation of eight civilian Palestinians on 11 April 1988	Sheikh Saad Eddin El-Alami, Head of the Supreme Islamic Council, who was assaulted and beaten on 1 April 1988	“1- to abide immediately and scrupulously by the Geneva Convention” 2- rescind the order to deport Palestinian civilians and ensure the safe and immediate return to the occupied Palestinian territories of those already deported 4- condemn policies that violate the human rights of the Palestinian people in the OPT.. 3. desist deportation “6- Requests the Secretary-General to submit periodic reports on the situation in the occupied territories, including those aspects relating to endeavors for ensuring the safety and protection of the Palestinian civilians under Israeli occupation;”
13 17- Feb- 1989 (Uni)	S/20463		« 1- the violation of human rights, and in particular the opening of fire that has resulted in injuries and deaths of Palestinian civilians, including children; ”				“2. <u>Strongly depl</u> ores also the continuing disregard by Israel, the occupying Power, of the relevant decisions of the Security Council;” “4- he occupying Power, to abide by the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, as well as to comply with its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention “
14 09- Jun- 1989 (Uni)	S/20677				Grave concern and alarm over the increasing sufferings of the Palestinian people “1-violate the human rights of the Palestinian people in the occupied territory as well as vigilante attacks against Palestinian towns and villages and desecration of the Holy Koran; ” 4 “desist forthwith from deporting Palestinian civilians from the occupied territory and ensure the safe and immediate return of those already deported;”		“2- to accept the <u>de jure</u> applicability of the Convention to the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and fully to comply with its obligations under that Convention and in particular its "responsibility for the treatment accorded to the protected persons by its agents"; 4--“desist forthwith from deporting Palestinian civilians from the occupied territory “3- obligations of all the High Contracting Parties, under

					5” the prolonged closure of schools in parts of the occupied territory, with all its adverse consequences for the education of Palestinian children, and calls upon Israel to permit the immediate reopening of those schools:” “		article 1 of the Convention, to ensure respect for the Convention
15*	S/20945				1”- violate the human rights of the Palestinian people. In particular the siege of towns, the ransacking of the homes of inhabitants , as has happened at Beit Sahur, and the illegal and arbitrary confiscation of their property and valuables:”		2- “desist from such practices and lift its siege” 3- return the illegally and arbitrarily confiscated property” 4- reaffirm Geneva Con is applicable in the OPT. 5- “occupying Power, to abide immediately and scrupulously by the Geneva Convention” 6- “the High Contracting Parties to ensure respect for it.. treat population of the occupied territory humanely at all times and in all circumstances’
16*	30- May- 1990 S/21326	Bearing in mind that any deliberately planned act of violence in the region is a blow to peace, (following statement of Arafat)	2-« Commission to submit its report to the security Council by 20 June 1990, containing recommendations on ways and means for ensuring the safety and protection of the Palestinian civilians ”				Reaffirming the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian is applicable in OPT 1-« <u>Establishes</u> a Commission consisting of three members of the Security Council, to be dispatched immediately to examine the situation relating to the policies and practices of Israel,

Table2

		Conflict	Human Safety	Territorial safe	Human Rights	State security	Justice
17*	17- May- 1995 S/1995/394			<u>Expressing concern over</u> the recent declaration of Israeli expropriation orders of 53 hectares of land in East Jerusalem , (negative impact of the above-mentioned expropriation on the Middle East peace process, which started in Madrid) - “Confirms that the expropriation of land by Israel, the occupying Power, in East Jerusalem is invalid..”			reaffirming the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian is applicable in OPT 2- Israel to rescind the expropriation orders and to refrain from such action in the future; 4.Urges the parties to adhere to the provisions of the agreements reached and to follow up with the full implementation of those agreements;

18*	S/1997/199			Israel to initiate new settlement activities in the Jabal Abu Ghneim area in East Jerusalem, recent measures that encourage or facilitate new settlement activities ,.. settlements are illegal and a major obstacle to peace, measures and actions to alter the status of Jerusalem are invalid and cannot change that status, 1- “to refrain from all actions or measures, including settlement activities, which alter the facts on the ground, pre-empting the final status negotiations »			2-« to abide scrupulously by its legal obligations and responsibilities under the Geneva Convention »
19	S/1997/241			1-« Demands that Israel immediately cease construction of the Jabal Abu Ghneim settlement in East Jerusalem, as well as all other Israeli settlement activities »			2. Calls upon Israel, the occupying Power, to abide scrupulously by its legal obligations and responsibilities under the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilians
20	S/2001/270	5-(b)”an end to the closures of the occupied Palestinian territories to permit resumption of full normal activities of daily life; 1- “1. <i>Calls for</i> the immediate cessation of all acts of violence,	tragic and violent events that have taken place since September 2000, resulting in many deaths and injuries, mostly among Palestinians, determination to.. protecting Palestinian civilians	“4. <i>Expresses</i> grave concern at recent settlement activities, in particular the recent decision to expand the settlement at Jabal Abu Ghneim and calls for full cessation of settlement activities;”		(c) the transfer by Israel to the Palestinian Authority of all revenues due	reiterating the need for Israel, the occupying power, to abide scrupulously by its legal obligations and its responsibilities under the Fourth Geneva Convention support of all commitments made at Sharm El-Sheikh and of this resolution;
		provocation and collective punishment,” 7- “The international donor community to extend, as rapidly and as generously as possible, economic and financial assistance to the Palestinian people, »					6. Expresses full support for the work of the Fact-Finding Committee established at Sharm El-Sheikh 8-“to set up an appropriate mechanism to protect Palestinian civilians, including through the establishment of a United Nations observer force; ”
21	S/2001/1199	condemning in particular all acts of violence and terror 1-“ <i>Demands</i> the immediate cessation of all acts of violence, provocation and destruction , as well as the return to the positions and arrangement which existed prior to September 2000;” 3- “all acts of extra judiciary executions , excessive use of force and wide destruction of properties	safety and well-being of all civilians and condemning in particular all acts of violence and terror resulting in the deaths and injuries among Palestinian and Israeli civilians, . 2. <i>Condemns</i> all acts of terror, in particular those targeting civilians 3- “all acts of extra judiciary executions , ;				the occupying Power, to abide scrupulously by its legal obligations and responsibilities under the Fourth Geneva Convention 4-“immediate implementation of the recommendations made in the Report of the Sharm El-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee (Mitchell Report) »

22 19-Dec-2002	S/2002/1385	the deliberate destruction by the Israeli occupying forces of a United Nations World Food Program warehouse in Beit Lahiya... , in which 537 metric tons of donated food supplies intended for distribution to needy Palestinians had been stored, 2. refrain from the excessive and disproportionate use of force "	killing by the Israeli occupying forces of several United Nations employees , including the recent killing of one international staff member in the Jenin refugee camp, 1-" <i>Condemns</i> the above-mentioned killings and destruction;				2- occupying Power, comply fully with its obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention and refrain from the excessive and disproportionate use of force "
23 16-Sep-2003	S/2003/891	1-“complete cessation of all acts of violence, including all acts of terrorism, provocation, incitement and destruction;”	the escalation in extrajudicial executions and suicide bombing attacks, all of which have caused enormous suffering and many innocent victims,			2-“desist from any act of deportation and cease any threat to the safety of the elected President of the Palestinian Authority »	Reiterating also the need for respect in all circumstances of international humanitarian law, including the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, calls for 3.increased efforts to ensure the implementation of the road map by the two sides
24 14-Oct-2003	S/2003/980			- he principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force		-the need to end the occupation that began in 1967	-call upon Israel, the occupying Power, to fully and effectively respect the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, “2. Requests the Secretary-General to report on the compliance, with this
				-opposition to settlement activities and to any activities involving the confiscation of land , disruption of the livelihood of protected persons and the de facto annexation of land ,		vision of a region where two States, Israel and Palestine , live side by side within secure and recognized borders, the need to achieve peace based on the vision of two States mentioned above , 1-“ <i>Decides</i> that the construction by Israel, the occupying Power, of a wall in the Occupied Territories departing from the armistice line of 1949 is illegal under relevant provisions of international law and must be ceased and reversed;	resolution periodically, with the first report to be submitted within one month;”

25 24 Mar- 2004	S/2004/240	1. and calls for a complete cessation of extrajudicial executions; 2. 3-“an unconditional cessation of acts of violence , including all acts of terrorism, provocation, incitement and destruction;”	1-« Condemns the most recent extrajudicial execution committed by Israel, the occupying Power, that killed Sheikh Ahmed Yassin along with six other Palestinians outside a mosque in Gaza City 2-“ all terrorist attacks against any civilians as well as all acts of violence and destruction;”			5-“both parties to fulfil their obligations under the road map endorsed by Security Council resolution 1515 (2003) achieve the vision of the two States living side by side in peace and security; ”	4-“4. <i>Calls</i> for the cessation of all illegal measures and practices and for respect for and adherence to international humanitarian law; ”
26 05- Oct- 2004	S/2004/783	-condemning all acts of violence terror, excessive and indiscriminate use of force, and physical destruction , 1-“Demands the immediate cessation of all military operations in the area of Northern Gaza and the withdrawal of the Israeli occupying forces from that area;” 3”- for the respect of the inviolability of the facilities of the United Nations agencies in the field, including (UNRWA);”	<i>Condemning attacks</i> by the Israeli occupying forces in the area of Northern Gaza Strip’s Jabaliya refugee camp, resulting in extensive human casualties and destruction and exacerbating the dire humanitarian situation , , 3-“on Israel, the occupying Power, to ensure the unfettered access and safety of United Nations personnel and all medical and humanitarian aid workers to provide emergency assistance to the civilian population;”				abide scrupulously by its legal obligations and responsibilities under the Fourth Geneva Convention 4- “both parties to immediately implement their obligations under the Road Map”
27 12- Jul- 2006	S/2006/508	<i>Condemning Military assault on Gaza also the firing of rockets from Gaza into Israel</i> and the abduction of an Israeli soldier by Palestinian armed groups from Gaza, 1-“ <i>Calls for</i> the immediate and unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldier	- <i>Condemning</i> military assaulting the Gaza Strip, which has caused the killing and injury of dozens of Palestinian civilians the destruction property and civilian infrastructure notably Gaza’s main power station		- immediate release of illegally detained Palestinian civilians;	- and <i>condemning also</i> the detention of democratically elected Palestinian and other officials , 2-“or the immediate and unconditional release of all detained Palestinian ministers, members of the Palestinian Legislative Council and other officials;”	- <i>Reaffirming</i> the applicable rules and principles of international law, including international humanitarian law and all relevant human rights laws ; 6-“ll concerned parties to abide by their obligations and respect in all

		<p>3-“to withdraw its forces to their original positions outside the Gaza Strip;” 3- “OP to halt its military operations and its disproportionate use of force endangering pal civilians</p> <p>5- Palestinian Authority to take immediate and sustained action to bring an end to violence, including the firing of rockets on Israeli territory;</p>	<p>-and the recent abduction and killing of an Israeli civilian in the West Bank,</p> <p>2- immediate release of illegally detained Palestinian civilians;</p> <p>7-“<i>Calls on the international community to provide emergency assistance</i> to the Palestinian people to meet the dire humanitarian situation;”</p> <p>7- “Israel to restore and maintain the continuous and uninterrupted supply of fuel to Gaza, and to act expeditiously to replace the destroyed equipment at the Gaza power plant;</p>		<p>4-“the need to preserve the institutions of the Palestinian National Authority and Palestinian infrastructure and properties;”</p> <p>»</p>	<p>circumstances the rules of international humanitarian law, and refrain from violence against civilian population;</p>
<p>28 11- Nov- 2006</p>	<p>S/2006/87 <u>8</u></p>	<p>The excessive and disproportionate use of force <i>Condemning also</i> the firing of rockets from Gaza into Israel,</p> <p>1-1-“ <i>Calls upon</i> Israel, to immediately cease its military operations that endangers the Palestinian civilian population “to immediately withdraw its forces from within the Gaza Strip to positions prior to 28 June 2006;</p> <p>5-“Palestinian Authority to take immediate and sustained action to bring an end to violence;”</p>	<p>extensive loss of civilian Palestinian life and injuries, including among children and women,</p> <p><i>Condemning</i> the military operations in Gaza in Beit Hanoun on 8 November 2006, which have caused loss of civilian life and extensive destruction of Palestinian property and vital infrastructure,</p> <p>7-“grave concern dire humanitarian situation of the Palestinian people and calls for the provision of emergency assistance to them;</p>		<p>“6. <i>Emphasizes</i> the need to preserve the Palestinian institutions, infrastructure and properties;”</p>	<p><i>Reaffirming</i> the applicable rules and principles of international law..</p> <p>3-“ <i>Requests</i> the Secretary-General to establish a fact-finding mission on the attack that took place in Beit Hanoun</p> <p>4-“abide by its obligations and responsibilities under the Geneva Convention”</p> <p>8-“through the possible establishment of an international mechanism for protection of the civilian populations;”</p>

Table3

		Ongoing Conflict	Human Safety	Territorial integrity	HR	State security	Justice
29 18-Feb-2011 (120 state)	S/2011/24			<p>- “All Israeli settlement activities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, are illegal and constitute a major obstacle to the achievement of peace..”</p> <p>“-<i>Condemning</i> the continuation of settlement activities by Israel.”</p> <p>“- Bearing in mind also the obligation under the Quartet Roadmap, endorsed by its resolution 1515 (2003), for a freeze by Israel of all settlement activity, including “natural growth”, and the dismantlement of all settlement outposts erected since March 2001, « 1. <i>Reaffirms</i> that the Israeli settlements are illegal and constitute a major obstacle to the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace” 2”- immediately and completely ceases all settlement activities in the OPT”</p>		<p>Condemning all other measures aimed at altering the demographic composition, character and status of the Territory, two democratic States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side in peace within secure and recognized borders, . Calls upon both parties to act on the basis of international law and their previous agreements and obligations, including under the Roadmap, aimed, inter alia, at improving the situation on the ground, building confidence and creating the conditions necessary for promoting the peace process;</p>	<p>2- OP ceases settlements immediately and it fully respect all of its legal obligations in this regard;</p>
30 18 dec 2017	S/2017/1060					<p>“Bearing in mind the specific status of the Holy City of Jerusalem...and the need for protection and preservation of the unique spiritual, religious and cultural dimensions of the City. - Expressing in this regard its deep regret at recent decisions concerning the status of Jerusalem, 1. Affirms that any decisions and actions which purport to have altered, the character, status or demographic composition of the Holy City of Jerusalem have no legal effect, are null and void... calls upon all States to refrain from the establishment of diplomatic missions in the Holy City of Jerusalem “ 3. Reiterates its call for the reversal of the negative trends on the ground that</p>	<p>Stressing that Jerusalem is a final status issue to be resolved through negotiations in line with relevant United Nations resolutions. Decisions and actions altering the status of Jerusalem must be rescinded in compliance with relevant resolutions of the Security Council, 2. Demands that all States comply with Security Council resolutions regarding the Holy City of Jerusalem, and not to recognize any actions or measures contrary to those resolutions;</p>

are imperiling the two-State solution”
and for acceleration of

international efforts aimed at achieving,
peace”

Stressing that the Gaza Strip constitutes an integral part of the Palestinian territory occupied in 1967,
10- or immediate steps towards **ending the closure and the restrictions imposed by Israel on movement and access into and out of the Gaza Strip,**
13- encourages tangible steps towards **intra-Palestinian reconciliation,** including **concrete steps to reunite the Gaza Strip and the West Bank** under the legitimate Palestinian government and ensure its effective functioning in the Gaza Strip

16- calls for renewed and urgent efforts to create the conditions necessary to launch credible negotiations end to the Israeli occupation that began in 1967.
- two democratic States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side in peace with secure and recognized borders.

Emphasizing the need to pursue **measures of accountability,** stressing in this regard the importance of ensuring **independent and transparent investigations** in accordance with international standards.
1-“ civilians and ensure their protection, as well as to ensure **accountability for all violations;**
3-“fully **abide by its legal obligations and responsibilities** under the Fourth Geneva Convention”

15- requests Secretary-General to examine the present situation and to submit a written report, proposals on ways and means for ensuring the safety, protection and well-being of the Palestinian

31 01- Jun- 2018	S/2018/516	<p>- “Condemning all acts of violence against civilians, including acts of terror, provocation, and destruction “</p> <p>- “exacerbation of the dire humanitarian crisis in the Gaza strip</p> <p>- “2. Deplores the use of any excessive, disproportionate and indiscriminate force by the Israeli forces against Palestinian civilians”</p> <p>5-“ Deplores the firing of rockets from the Gaza Strip against Israeli civilian areas</p> <p>.6. call for urgent steps to ensure an immediate, durable and fully respected ceasefire;</p> <p>7-situations.. humanitarian assistance to civilians is being deliberately obstructed,</p> <p>11- “all parties cooperate with medical and humanitarian personnel to allow and facilitate unimpeded access to the civilian population, cease violence and intimidation directed against medical and humanitarian personnel”</p>	<p>alarm at the loss of civilian lives and the high number of casualties among Palestinian civilians, in Gaza Strip, including casualties among children</p> <p>1-“ need to take appropriate steps to ensure the safety and well-being of civilians and ensure their protection”</p> <p>2- deplores use of live ammunition against civilian protesters, including children, as well as medical personnel and journalists, and expresses its grave concern at the loss of innocent lives</p> <p>8- respond to situations of armed conflict where civilians are being targeted</p> <p>-11 and cease violence and intimidation directed against medical and humanitarian personnel”</p> <p>12- “provision of immediate and unimpeded humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian civilian critical medical, food, water and fuel needs,”</p>				

32 18- Oct- 2023 Bra	S/PV.9442	<p>Reaffirming that any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable regardless of their motivations,</p> <p>-Expressing deep concern for the humanitarian situation in Gaza</p> <p>and underlining the need for full, rapid, safe and</p>	<p>-humanitarian situation in Gaza resulting heavy civilian casualties...</p> <p>-emphasizing that civilians in Israel and in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, must be protected.</p> <p>-concerns for the humanitarian situation in Gaza and for its grave effect for the civilian</p>			<p>Vision of a region where two democratic States, Israel and Palestine, live side by side in peace within secure and recognized borders,</p>	<p>.4. Urges all parties to fully comply with their obligations under international law, including international human rights law and international humanitarian law, including those related to the conduct of hostilities.</p> <p>6. Calls for the rescission of the order for civilians and UN staff to evacuate</p>
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		<p>unhindered humanitarian access,</p> <p>-encouraging efforts aiming at a cessation of hostilities.</p> <p>1. Firmly condemns all violence and hostilities against civilians and all acts of terrorism;</p> <p>2-Unequivocally rejects and condemns the heinous terrorist attacks by Hamas that took place in Israel starting 7 October 2023 and the taking of hostages</p> <p>-7. Calls for humanitarian pauses to allow full, rapid, safe and unhindered humanitarian access for United Nations humanitarian agencies and their implementing partners, the International Committee of the Red Cross-</p> <p>- The establishment of humanitarian corridors and other initiatives for the delivery of humanitarian aid to civilians</p> <p>-9-Protection medical humanitarian “means of transport and equipment, as well as hospitals and other medical facilities”</p>	<p>population, largely comprised of children,</p> <p>3. Calls for the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages, demanding for their safety, well-being, and humane treatment in compliance with international law;</p> <p>-5. Strongly urges the continuous, sufficient and unhindered provision of essential goods and services to civilians, including electricity, water, fuel, food, and medical supplies, stressing the imperative, under international humanitarian law, to ensure civilians are not deprived of objects indispensable to their survival</p> <p>9- Protection of all medical personnel and humanitarian personnel</p>				<p>all areas in Gaza north of the Wadi Gaza and relocate in southern Gaza;</p>
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<p>33</p> <p>8 dec -2023 97 States</p>	<p>S/2023/970</p>	<p>Expressing Grave concern over the catastrophic humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip</p> <p>1-Demands an immediate humanitarian ceasefire</p> <p>3: demands ensuring humanitarian access;</p>	<p>Grave concern over the suffering of the Palestinian civilian population, and emphasizing that the Palestinian and Israeli civilian populations must be protected</p> <p>3. Demands the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages,</p>				<p>Taking note of and acting upon the letter dated 6 December 2023 of the Secretary-General, under Article 99 of the Charter of the United Nations, addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2023/962),</p> <p>2. all parties comply with their obligations under international law, including international humanitarian law, notably with regard to the protection of civilians;</p>
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