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Private Security Companies in the DRC



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Abstract

The main objective of the study was to assess the socio-political factors that influence the contracting of private security companies by commercial enterprises, diplomatic missions, and International Organizations (IO) in the DRC. Specific objectives included assessing the relationship between the prevalence of private security companies and the quality of governance, investigated the influence of conflict or post-conflict context on the number of private security companies within a country, and lastly, on the influence of good governance and supply of trained personnel on the number of private security companies in the DRC.

This paper adopted both systems theory and routine activity theory as atheoretical framework, while the research design was based on a case study. The data was collected through secondary research. This paper suggests that poor governance is a paramount cause for the prevalence of PSCs in DRC, that both conflict and post-conflict in the DRC have informed their rise in number. Finally, the two elements combined, poor governance and insufficient supply of trained personnel were found to be a factor for increase in number of PSCs.

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I. Introduction

1. Motivation

In recent years, and particularly since 9/11, policymakers and researchers alike increasingly focused on the private security sector through the lens of the involvement of Private Military Companies (PMCs) in old or newly emerged wars and conflicts. Yet, beyond PMCs, the private security sector encompasses a multitude of actors with different levels of involvement and different links to governments and governmental actors.

From a policy-making perspective, the presence of the private sector in the field of security has now been acknowledged by both academics and journalists. Yet, in both Security Sector Reform and Disarmament programs, policymakers rarely dedicate enough focus to these actors, despite the undeniable fact that the environment in question sometimes relies heavily on it, and instead overlook a significant component of the security scene.

In recent years, there has been a considerable increase in the number of private security companies (PSCs) globally. These companies are legal entities entrusted with the role of providing clients with security services such as guarding and armed protection. Some of these entities also procure and install security devices. They also offer patrol services with shopping malls and gated residential areas. In some instances, they provide security along public streets. Just like their counterparts in the police service, they wear uniforms and are armed with handguns in jurisdictions such as Spain and Italy.

The popularity of PSCs is evident in the statistics so far realized on this front. In a report generated by OECD in 2017, over 40 countries including the United States, China, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom boast of more privately hired security officers compared to the number of police officers. For instance, in 2015, PSCs in the UK hired 232,000 private guards who were higher than the 151,000 police officers hired by the government. The fact that these are developed countries with stable governance structures validates an inquiry into the role of both good and bad governance in widespread demand for PSC's services (Loxa & Siagkou 2016, pp. 8-17).

In terms of revenue, in 2015, PSCs services were estimated to worth \$180 billion and were projected to grow to \$240 billion by 2020. As such, the industry's worth outweighs international donations towards the eradication of poverty which stand at \$140 billion in a year. This is also higher compared to the GDP of over 100 economies globally. Martin (2017, p. 19) echoes these growth patterns noting that unlike the global economic growth rate currently

pegged at an average of 3%, the private security sector is growing at 6% a year. The author is further concerned that expansion is faster in developing countries.

G4S turns out to be the largest PSC in terms of global operations, revenues, and employees. In 2016, the company had an employee base of 500,000. From its operations, it generated revenue worth £6.8bn of which £454 million was profits. The company also recorded a 12% expansion of its revenue in North America within the same year. Further, there was a 7% increase in operations in Latin America and Africa. Subsequently, it is essential to determine factors that inform the increasing demand for PSC services globally (de Leth 2020, pp. 2-8).

In a study on PSC trends in the United States, Barnes (2013, p. 201) found that over 50,000 contractors provided private security services in the United States in 2011 and 2012. The PSCs hire approximately 1.1 million guards, a number twice the 660,000 police officers hired by the government. This is attributed to the increased assumption of traditional state roles by private actors in developed countries, a factor associated with the need to rationalize the spending associated to governmental law enforcement. Additionally, unlike the period before WWII, most developed states have changed tactics in pursuing their interests. The end of the Cold War allowed the unlocking of diplomatic channels embodied by the United Nations and regional security pacts. The implication is a reduction in the need for armed combatants. Subsequently, PSCs are hired whenever there is a need to increase the existing security apparatus (De Nevers, 2009, pp. 169-175). Notably, States such as the US have increasingly incorporated the services of PSCs in their peace-keeping missions abroad. For instance, the current US peace-keeping missions in Iraq and Syria are composed of both government troops and PSCs. This buttresses the argument that PSCs come in handy whenever a stop-gap measure has to be undertaken in security (Nebolsina 2019, pp. 77-80). Additionally, the European Union is continuously hiring PSCs for its diplomatic and humanitarian representations abroad. United Nations agencies also tend to follow in the same path considering that most of its agencies' institutions globally are protected by international organizations (Martin 2017. p. 91).

In developing countries, the narrative is different. According to Wulf (2006, pp. 87-97), the monopoly on violence is a key responsibility of any government as per the Westphalia Treaty. In other words, the notion is that the government through its bodies and agencies should be the only provider of rule-making and rule enforcement. This principle bestows the government the responsibility to avail adequate security originating within, and outside the territory. States that are unable to guarantee their citizens such protection are classified as failed

States. There are different measures of failed statehood, including the State Fragility Index, the Freedom House Index, the World Bank Governance Indicators, and the Human Development Index. As a whole failed States will generally display one (and typically more) of the following: loss of territorial control is present, failure of legitimate authority and failure in providing services to the public is present. Finally, the State doesn't interact in the international community as a full member (Malito, 2014).

Bures and Carrapico (2018, p. 10) argue that the increased presence of private security guards within these developing countries arises from the failure of governance. As such, private investors, commercial trading corporations, and wealthy citizens tend to hire the services of PSCs in response to the lack of government-led security precautions.

In analyzing factors that have influenced the prevalence of PSCs in developing nations, Tkach and Phillips (2020, p. 104) identify poor governance as the leading cause. Governance is defined as the way a government organizes itself towards achieving its core duties to the citizens. This is usually achieved through the creation of effective decision-making structures.

There are various tenets upon which good governance is grounded. The first one is participation by citizens in decision-making processes either through their representatives or through direct participation, such as referendum. The decisions made are also expected to be consensus-oriented and to reflect accountability on the government's side. The government should also be transparent on implementation of the decisions and the citizens should benefit equitably. Most importantly, the rule of law should reign supreme (Abrahamsen 2016, pp. 286-289). As such good governance is associated with assessing how public institutions conduct public affairs and how public resources are managed. Poorly governed States tend to lack the requisite decision-making structures and institutions necessary for delivering services to citizens. Instead, they are characterized by a leader or a political party makes most decisions without involving members of the public. Institutions such as the executive, legislative, and judiciary are weak and cannot influence effective decisions. Considering that territorial integrity is one of the key roles of the government and that this is dependent on the governance structures, insecurity has been linked to poor governance. Poor governance has also been blamed for civil wars and secessionists' combatant movements within the state (Agudiegwu, Aroh & Ezeani 2019, pp. 159-163). This study seeks to establish the influence of quality of governance and prevalence of PSCs.

Another concept that comes to mind when discussing poor governance is failed States. According to Keeping (2018, p. 8), a failed state is a state that is incapable of performing

fundamental functions associated with sovereignty. It is incapable of exercising authority over its territory and the citizens. The government's capacity to exercise its administrative roles is greatly weakened. This is replicated in all aspects, including training and remuneration of police officers and military personnel. Subsequently, police officers and military personnel misuse arms, making PSCs more effective and trustworthy. Additionally, failed States are incapable of availing training for police officers to the detriment of the general public. Considering these factors, this study seeks to investigate the influence of bad governance on the supply of trained security personnel and the resultant increase in the number of private security companies in the DRC.

Weak governance and failed States can be associated with both interstate and intrastate conflicts. While interstate conflicts are fought between nation-States, intrastate and state-formation or secession conflicts are fought within the state. Civil conflict can be a result of colonial oppression, ethnic exclusion, and social injustice, and political tensions. Post-conflict, States that have experienced civil wars tend to remain tense and are likely to degenerate into war once more (Bures & Carrapico 2018, p. 18). Subsequently, there is a need to establish more sustainable institutions meant to ensure that the communities are secure in the long-term. Often, the international community takes the responsibility to assist such States, post-conflict, as a strategy for ensuring the establishment of resilient institutions. It is observable that even these foreign institutions engage the services of PSCs. In the DRC, international organizations such as the European Union and United Nations' agencies have hired the services of PSCs just as is the case with local entrepreneurial ventures (Abrahamsen 2016, p. 283). This further communicates the essence of PSCs during the post-conflict period within the state.

Despite providing alternative security services, there still remains a gap in the literature regarding the nature of PSCs services globally. There are concerns about how PSCs are regulated (Martin, 2017, pp. 98-99). This is despite the existence of the International Code of Conduct Association (ICOCA) regulations on the conduct of PSCs. The ICOCA focuses on reducing the risks associated with a reduction in security supply chain through monitoring the activities of their members, and certification of their operations. Additionally, the body handles complaints filed by clients. Nevertheless, these regulations are majorly upheld by PSCs in developed countries compared to their counterparts in developing countries. These concerns are often expressed at the United Nations. It is the rise in these concerns that have informed the decision by policymakers across States and international organizations to design programs that limit these actors. One of these concerns is with regards to the legality of PSC conduct,

particularly in developing countries (Wallace, 2017, p. 35). That although these companies increase safety and security, globally, there exists inadequate legislation and regulations to steer them. As such, unlike the regular state security apparatus such as the police and the military, which have a wealth of international norms and years of national and global precedence to follow, there exists limited guidance over the quality of services provided by security companies in developing countries. These assertions are also reflected in Caparini (2006), who argues that for purposes of profitability, PSCs tends to hire untrained staff whose handling weapons and professional integrity can be questionable.

In terms of access to justice, armed PSCs can be seen as a threat to a State's monopoly over the use of force. This implies that instead of helping in law enforcement, PSCs can be a hindrance to law enforcement (Richards & Smith, 2007). For instance, there are differences in access to security services between the rich and the poor, which can exacerbate social inequality. Such incidences are common in failed States, where there have been instances in which state security agencies are overshadowed by the private security providers.

According to Bures and Carrapico (2018), there is also a growing concern that unlike government-controlled security apparatus that have to be accountable before Parliament and electorate, PSCs are only answerable to weak regulatory institutions and respective boards and shareholders. Their operational independence has also resulted in an uncontrolled and unauthorized association with outlawed political formations in territories recovering from armed conflict.

2. Research Question

Though relatively new in African countries, private security companies are fast emerging as preferred security providers. This contradicts the role of the state in monopolizing the use of force within its territorial boundaries. As such, the argument that states whose jurisdictions are continuously experiencing an influx and preference for PSCs are failed States needs validation. Nevertheless, the concerns raised against these PSCs cannot be left unattended. For instance, a developing country such as the DRC is yet to develop an effective legal framework. This implies that even with the negative effects of these PSCs, various segments of wealthier individuals and investments still contract them to offer security. Considering that such countries have experienced internal strife in form of conflicts among ethnic groups and between the government and dissenting communities, it is essential to understand the influence of these

conflicts on the popularity of private security companies in the DRC. It is also essential to establish a connection between the quality of governance and the prevalence of PSCs.

What conditions bolstered the multiplication of PSCs in the DRC?

The main objective of this study is to assess the socio-political factors that influence the contracting of private security companies by commercial enterprises, diplomatic missions, and humanitarian organizations in the DRC.

Specific objectives are to:

- Explore the relationship between poor governance and the number of private security companies within a country
- Explore the influence of a conflict context on the number of private security companies within a country
- Describe the influence of poor governance, and conflict context on the number of private security companies in general and in the DRC

This study aims to inform governments, policymakers, private security personnel and other stakeholders with respect to social and political factors that can influence the establishment of private security companies within given settings. It will also be an opportunity to learn the importance of PSCs and to identify strategies that can be adopted in ensuring that these entities work in harmony with respective governments in security provision.

As such, it is expected that necessary adjustments will be made in order to accommodate the services of PSCs even as the state still undertakes its responsibility of ensuring monopoly on law and order. To the citizens, these persons will benefit from the study by gaining an enhanced understanding of the role of government in providing security. Such persons will be able to understand the dynamics that have prevented the government from achieving this end. Further, it will be an opportunity to understand how the government can reliably engage the services of PSCs. As such, the study seeks to create an enhanced understanding of the reasons behind PSCs and government's provision of security. The research will enrich the existing body knowledge of private security providers. Consequently, it will be relevant to academics pursuing enhanced understating of security management.

3. Scope of the Study

The study was conducted in the DRC, focusing on regions that have witnessed an influx in contracting private security providers. PSCs within these regions are hired by international organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union agencies involved in the provision of integral services to segments of DRC's populations affected by civil wars. PSCs are also contracted by wealthy individuals and businesses to guard both homes and enterprises.

There exist various services offered by these PSCs in DRC. These PSCs can be classified depending on the type of services they offer to their clients. Often, they offer more than one service to attract a wider customer base. The first type of PSCs are those that offer non-combat security services. Such companies offer uniformed officers who are hired to deter criminal activities such as burglary and vandalism. They also offer short-term security especially for punctual events meant to last for short periods. For instance, during the distribution of relief food by international organizations in volatile areas, PSCs offer security for humanitarian organizations. These companies also conduct routine security patrols just to ensure the safety of their clients. This can be of great help in instances of need for emergency security response. In playing this role, PSCs can also install various security devices such as CCTVs, security scanners and alarms. In some instances, they have also been engaged in handling dogs as a security enhancement measure within the protected area. They can also offer security consultation services for the businesses and the agencies represented in such countries. Through this advisory role, it becomes possible to incorporate measures necessary for protecting property, employees and business. There are also PSCs involved in the provision of armored transportation services. Such PSCs are engaged in transporting cash in transit and valuables. In the post-conflict period, it is hardly possible to transport supplies to staff working for international organizations. This challenge also faces commercial ventures trying to have goods delivered to them from various regions. The second broader category of PSCs are those engaged in providing armed-combat services. Such companies tend to work in regions where there are ongoing conflicts. This study will however focus on PSCs involved in provision of non-combat services in the DRC.

II. Literature Review

1. Existing literature

Despite the adoption of more diplomatic means of resolving disputes internationally, insecurity still emerges as a leading global challenge. According to (Keping 2018, p. 7), this can be attributed to the evolving nature of criminal activities. Today's nation-States experience civil wars more. These arise considering ethnoreligious differences, economic inequality, poor governance, and misunderstandings arising from conflicting land uses. Further, there have arisen relatively new security threats, including terrorism and cyber-crimes (Barnes, 2013, p. 212). Subsequently, there has been a higher demand for competence in these contemporary crimes among security officers globally. In this period, PSCs have also emerged to address the shortage of security personnel that characterizes States globally (Büscher & Vlassenroot 2010, p. 275).

However, it is noteworthy that States' demands for additional security apparatus differ. While some States experience enormous shortfalls in the number of police officers leading to a larger demand for private security personnel, other States need much little assistance (Martin 2017, p. 189). This is often explained using the concept of good governance. That with effective decision-making processes, structures, and institutions, governments can manage their citizen's security better. This does not imply that PSCs services are unnecessary in such States. Instead, they equally buttress the States' security apparatus. According to De Nevers (2009, p. 170), PSCs' relevance in such developed States is informed by the fact that the government tends to hire fewer officers considering the relatively satisfactory achievements that have been recorded. Nevertheless, there are instances in which additional security personnel is required. Further, there is an ever-increasing demand for special security services that are not offered by the government considering their effort towards economic rationalization. Such include armored transport and installation of security surveillance devices. The role of PSCs in developing countries, on the other hand, seems obvious. This is because a majority of such States are characterized by incompetence in governance, often characterized by high incidences of insecurity. As such, PSCs offer security to businesses, homes, and international missions. The subsequent sections of this chapter discuss literature on the socio-political differences among States and the implication of these differences on the proliferation of private security companies in the DRC. The political aspect that this section focuses on is governance, while the social aspect is conflict. Governance is directly linked with public funds management. By using PSCs, governments allow other economic actors to sustain the cost of security.

a. Poor Governance and Private Security

Since the end of the Cold War, the concept of state failure has increasingly become popular in governance discourse. The concept is associated with the inability of governments to perform its core roles to citizens. According to Bures and Carrapico (2018, p. 17), following the Westphalia Treaty, States' governments are charged with the responsibility of ensuring the territorial integrity of its boundaries. Governments are also expected to guarantee their citizens' security through the creation of justice systems. However, this is unachievable without appropriate governance structures and decision-making processes, ideally: democracy. As such, while States with good governance are characterized by state-run effective security services, States with poor governance, on the other hand, are characterized by ineffective security institutions. This has warranted their classification as failed States.

Globally, failed States tend to be the common market place for private security companies. According to Richards and Smith (2007, p. 9-11), over the past two decades, private security companies have been supplying various security services to governments that are unable to fulfill their role of enhancing territorial integrity and law enforcement. The authors are, however, concerned that despite the widespread use of PSCs in such countries, there is yet to be a consensus on whether they aggravate the situation or are dependable players in restoring appropriate governance. This study will seek to assess the impact of governance on the increase in the number of PSCs in the DRC.

One of the measures popularly used in assessing the effectiveness of a state's governance, as mentioned, system is the Fragile States Index. This yearly assessment is produced by the Fund for Peace upon several attributes. A fragile state is defined as one whose central government is weak and ineffective, leaving it with minimal control over the territorial boundaries. Such States' governments are unable to provide public services and are characterized by prevalent corruption in the public sector. These States also tend to report higher incidences of criminality and refugee movements (both internal and external). For instance, due to the absence of effective security apparatus, there is a prevalence of militias and terrorist groups within them. Additionally, they tend to experience economic implosion, a factor that further aggravates criminal tendencies in a bid to bridge economic inequality (Carlsen & Bruggemann 2017, pp. 3-6). In the 2020 report, Yemen turns out to be the most fragile state internationally. Other States in the top five categories include Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, and the DRC. The best performing States globally include Finland and Norway. Comparatively, the fragile States have a heavier PSCs' presence compared to their less fragile counterparts (Fund

for Peace 2020, pp. 6-9). This necessitates a further interrogation of these fragile States' experiences with PSCs.

In his study on security challenges in Yemen, Al-Shami (2015, p. 1) argues that safety and security turn out to be the most persistent challenge in Yemen. The author cites factors such as national and local conflicts as the causes of this persistence. Similar sentiments are captured in Clausen's (2019, p. 489-501) secondary research on the association between insecurity and bad governance in Yemen. The study established that factors such as revenge, desire to control national resources, and power struggles have consistently hindered institutional capacity within the gulf nation. For instance, due to corrupt practices, the government has been unable to provide necessary training and operational facilitation for the police force (Clausen 2018, p. 560-578). Consequently, there has been a drop in confidence in the state in providing security. Considering this existing security void, vigilante groups and militias have been the order of the day, and this has implied an unprecedented increase in insecurity. As such, individuals, businesses, and international organizations have resorted to PSCs for security. The themes discussed in these pieces of literature are an indication that Yemen, a failed state, has been unable to provide security for its citizens due to poor governance.

In 2012, the Arab Spring spread fast across States in Northern Africa and Asia. It was characterized by a popular uprising against various political regimes in countries such as Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria. This destabilized the security of some of these States to date (Akpınar 2016, p. 2288-2291). One such state is Syria which earlier, only engaged PSCs in guarding malls and banks. With President Assad's government affected by the uprising considering the battles fought in streets by citizens and in hiding by militias, there was an amplified necessity for legal armed forces (Baresh 2020, p. 6-11). This informed the formulation of the government's regulations under the *Legislative Decree No. 55*. However, even with these regulations, Syrian allies, including countries such as Iran and Russia, misused this opportunity meant to enhance Syria's security. As recommended in the legislation, they registered PSCs in Syria. Iran, for instance, used its PSCs to further its interests. This was achieved by maintaining their presence in key decision-making activities within the state. Most significantly, it was able to gain control of the Baghdad-Damascus highway. Through this, it was able to control interstate trade within this area, an indication of how private companies can be used in exploiting the interests of other States when governance structures fail in the state receiving the security services (Østensen & Bukkvoll 2018, p. 1-7). Russian PSCs, on the other hand, exploited the legislation to employ militia fighters that had previously fought against the

Assad-led government. Their rationale was that there was a need to increase the number of officers available. These studies contradict earlier assertions that PSCs are a solution to a state's failed security apparatus considering that they offer security to citizens. The current study will seek to establish the nexus between PSCs and quality of governance with a focus on the DRC.

Another country classified as a fragile state and has attracted research on the influence of governance quality on PSCs is Somalia. Since the ouster of Said Barre in 1991, Somalia has undergone an everlasting security turmoil. These factors have curtailed the formation of a stable government. As such, the citizens have been faced with insecurity. In his study of Somalis as a market for private military and security companies, Cunha (2013, p. 78-89) notes that piracy and state weakness has created a favorable condition for PSCs. Considering that various activities are being undertaken by governments, international organizations, and transnational corporations within Somalia, there has been an increased demand for PSCs' services. Some of the notable PSCs operating in the country include DynCorp International, PAE, and AECOM. Notably, some of these companies have been involved in equipping the state's security agencies and deploying troops to fight for the government against terrorist networks in the country, such as the Al-Shabaab. Such companies have also been involved in training the state's troops (Reno 2017, p. 32-27). Equally, they provide logistics and maintain equipment for the Somalia forces. Somali's security forces are on the verge of collapse and as such, ineffective in playing their role in enhancing territorial integrity and internal security for citizens. These studies are an indication that PSCs can effectively be engaged in boosting a States' security apparatus through training of the local forces. Similar results are evident in a study conducted by Hansen (2008, p. 585-598). The study was informed by the hypothesis that continued engagement of private security services in Somalia is responsible for the persistently eroded state power, and that it also prevents national institution building.

Focusing on territories within Somalia, such as Puntland, Somaliland, and the Federal Government of Somalia, the author assessed the continued engagement of security companies working in Somalia. It was concluded that the engagement of PSCs in Somalia was supporting security. There were instances in which PSCs assisted in strengthening the resilience of local institutions. Subsequently, this study investigates the nexus between PSCs and good governance in the DRC. Equally, the study will focus on the effectiveness of PSCs in enhancing the government's capacity to offer security to citizens as discussed in the case of Somalia. As such, policymakers' will be able to design policies to steer interactions and coordination

between States' security apparatus in instances where the quality of governance has dropped with regards to fragility index.

b. Conflict and Private Security

The reshuffling of international security power balance's caused an increased number of intrastate conflict since the end of the Cold War and its induced stalemate. Notably, unlike in the past centuries, where wars were common in the global north, civil wars are common in the global south (Cilliers & Schunemann 2013, p. 24). According to Kalyvas and Kenny (2010, p. 1), the prevalence of these wars in the global south can be attributed to both historical and sociological legacies arising from state formation. The author argues that unlike western States that were formed based on ideologies, statehood was imposed on third world countries by colonial regimes. As such, the States have been characterized by conflicting interests of the ethnic communities that form them. Some of these conflicting interests are based on mineral resources, political power struggles, inequality in national resource distribution, and cultural differences. Due to these conflicts governments in these countries are unable to effectively undertake their core mandates in maintaining law and order (Stewart, Holdstock & Jarquin, 2002; Taydas, Peksen & James, 2010).

In their study on the rise of civil wars in developing countries, Aliyev (2017, 1976-1981) argues that conflicts allow various non-state actors to intervene. This is more prevalent in instances where these States have degenerated into armed conflicts (Williamson 2007, p. 91-93). Apart from international humanitarian organizations, PSCs, and private military companies tend to exploit such opportunities. In such instances, the PSCs offer protection services to international humanitarian organizations, diplomatic missions, transnational corporations, local businesses, and individuals (Berndtsson 2012, p. 308-313). Notably, considering institutional failures due to the conflicts, the respective governments caught in this situation are unable to employ adequate numbers of security officers. Subsequently, PSC officers tend to outnumber the national police forces. As such, the influence of conflict on the emergence of these companies cannot be ignored, considering that they provide an alternative security solution to various institutions and individuals within the country. Equally, they are relevant in the post-conflict period.

Similarly, the post-conflict period is usually characterized by state fragility and susceptibility to relapse into conflicts. Ault and Spicer (2014, pp. 1818-1814) attribute this to

the complex nature of conflicts that arise within States. For instance, in developing States, conflicts can arise based on factors such as inequality in resource allocation, cultural differences, and poor governance. Often, peace negotiations tend to provide a solution to the immediate factor that led to the outbreak of the conflict. However, the other underlying issues remain unresolved and pose a risk of a resurgence of more conflicts (Williamson 2007, p. 91-93). This implies security uncertainty within the affected state. As a precautionary measure, various players tend to hire the services of PSCs. These arguments are also echoed in Bjork and Jone's (2005, p. 778-782), contribution in which they focus on the post-conflict period in the Middle East. The authors argue that the possibility of a resurgence of conflict can only be achieved through an enhanced understanding of the cause of conflict within the affected state. The solutions offered have to be sustainable, and this is only achievable if it enhances equity among the conflicting parties. As such, the governments of the affected States will have an opportunity to enhance security, considering that a long-term solution will have been found (Cilliers & Schunemann 2013, p. 24). With these factors in mind, this study sought to establish whether the conflicts and post-conflicts in the DRC have influenced the emergence of PSCs within the country's territory.

The conflict effect can be seen in different settings. Over the years, Iraq has experienced recurrent intrastate conflicts often arising from religious and political differences. According to Kaplan (2019, p. 29-31), these conflicts can be traced back to the Iraqi-Kurdish war, which started in 1918 and has persisted over the years. In the conflict, Iraqi Kurds have protested against the government intending to secede to form their state. The recurrence of this conflict has been detrimental to the establishment of institutionalism by successive governments in Baghdad. In their study on civil wars in Iraq, Waisy and Region-Iraq (2015, pp. 222-229) established that the resulting instability had undermined the ability of the government to secure its citizens from persistent attacks orchestrated by Kurdish factions. Additionally, various security threats have been posed to international organizations offering humanitarian services to the affected segments of the country's population. The increased demand for security officers arising from the conflicts and lack of capacity within the government to create a resilient police force has implied a security void (Kaplan, 2019, pp. 31-33). Subsequently, PSCs have emerged to offer armored logistical solutions, security for individuals and businesses, and protection for offices and projects run by international companies.

Additionally, international humanitarian missions, such as the United States mission have contracted the services of PSCs to secure their premises. In buttressing these arguments, Taylor

(2011, p. 447) observes that post-conflict periods in Iraq have been characterized by continued tensions and relapse to war. This is further aggravated by the lack of adequate security personnel. As such, the United States government has engaged the services of private security contractors to enhance the local police and military's capabilities. Some of the companies contracted to offer these services include Blackwater, DynCorp, and Triple Canopy (Joachim & Schneiker 2014, p. 247-260). This demonstrates the levels of vulnerability that a state is subjected to during and post-conflict periods considering that other States' proxies engage in confidential affairs such as offering protection against internal and external insurgency (Taylor, 2011, p. 449). These studies on Iraq indicate the role of conflicts and post-conflict periods on the mushrooming of PSCs. DRC has been experiencing civil wars over the years and this study sought to establish whether these factors are likely to increase the emergence of more PSCs within its territory in the future.

Another well-known conflict zone has been Libya. The north African nation has been in political turmoil since the Arab Spring in 2011. Previously, the country had experienced relative peace under the dictatorial leadership of Muammar Gaddafi. Although Libya conducted its first democratic elections in July 2012, the struggles for the transition towards a democratic regime weakened the executive structures that had previously managed the national police and military effectively (Aslan 2020, p. 39). Further, the cease-fire agreed upon by the warring parties during the peace negotiations did not help achieve the intended security goals. This is evidenced in the fact that militias have dishonored the autonomy of the current regime and disrupted peace and stability in various regions of the state. According to Liu (2011, pp. 293-319), the conflict is multifaceted considering that the parties involved are interested in controlling the oil reserves within the country and political leadership, which is considered a tool for allocating oil proceeds to the benefit of these parties. As such, a political solution does not necessarily imply a solution for oil interests. This explains the tensed post-conflict periods that have characterized Libya since the ouster of Gaddafi's government (Aslan, 2020, p. 41). Equally, DRC has experienced conflicts since its independence. This necessitates an investigation into the role of conflict and post-conflict on the emergence of PSCs in DRC.

Western oil and gas companies have always sought to take root in the Libyan desertic areas considering their rich oil deposits. This implies foreign investment which is essential in the state's post-conflict economic recovery. Nevertheless, the continued activities of the militias and the weakened police service have necessitated the need for alternative security apparatus. This has necessitated Libya's leadership to permit PSCs to protect these companies (Maru,

2012, pp. 69-72). Some of the regions within the country with the highest presence of PSCs are those with the highest incidences of militia attacks. One such area is the southern Fezzan region that is characterized by a porous border. However, there are also concerns over the proliferation of PSCs in areas where government security personnel are adequately represented. According to Zoubir and Rozsa (2012, p. 1267-1283), PSCs operating in such areas are mercenaries and continuously aggravate the situation in Libya to the advantage of their masters. This is seen to be counterproductive to the efforts to enhance security in Libya. Although these studies also focus on the use of PSCs in advancing the interests of other States to the detriment of Libya, this study focuses on the impact of conflict and post-conflict on the mushrooming of PSCs in DRC.

South Sudan is the youngest state in Africa. Formed in 2011, the state has been associated with civil conflicts that have informed a rise in the number of PSCs in the country. According to Justin and Van Leeuwen (2016, p. 419), previously, the state experienced prolonged conflicts before gaining independence from Sudan. Such conflicts informed the formation of various militias, including the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) that would later form the government. Such militias were formed based on ethnicity and political ideologies. The conflicts also informed an upsurge in refugees within the Horn of Africa. On achievement of independence, ethnic groups including the Dinka and Nuer have constantly fought over the political leadership of the country and oil, the main economic resource in South Sudan. Considering that the military and the state's police force was drawn from previously distinct militia groups, they have tended to be partisan during the conflicts. This has exuberated insecurity within the state, leading to a higher demand for alternative sources of security. According to Calissendorff, Brosché, and Sundberg (2019, pp. 37-41), there seems to be no end to such conflicts in the near future considering that ethnic differences cannot be changed and tolerance among these communities seems elusive. Aware of this fact, international organizations engaged in offering humanitarian services within South Sudan, such as the European Union and Oxfam have resorted to hiring PSCs. Further, following its declaration as a sovereign state, diplomatic recognition has implied the establishment of foreign missions in Juba. These missions equally rely on PSCs for security (Portada, Riley & Gambone 2014, p. 158). These works go some way to demonstrating how deeply-rooted conflicts have influenced the performance of the security apparatus in South Sudan, necessitating the need for PSCs. This study equally interrogates the likely influence of conflicts and post-conflict period on the emergence of PSCs in the DRC.

c. Supply of Trained Security Personnel

Globally, States differ in terms of training availed to security personnel. According to Fagel, Fennelly, and Perry (2020, p. 34-36), the rationale behind security officers' training is to ensure enhanced performance of individual officers and the force at large. This is achieved through the imparting of different skills consistent with emerging security concerns globally. Similar sentiments are echoed by Saeed and Johnson (2016, p. 39) who in their research on the role of security agencies in containing global terrorism found that there is for training officers on contemporary threats. Onuoha and Ezirim (2013, p. 9) also emphasize the need for global coordination in addressing transnational crimes. Basing their research on money laundering in Nigeria, the authors discovered that there is a higher probability of international crimes within States whose police training programs are not updated regularly. The study also concluded that concern with incompetency among local police officers, transnational financial companies operating in Nigeria have always contracted PSCs to address this shortfall. These studies focus on the essence of training for security personnel. However, their mandate does not go into establishing the influence of bad governance on the supply of trained security personnel.

Good governance is characterized by functional and effective governance structures. States that practice good governance is characterized by enhanced responsiveness to citizens' needs, one of which is security. In response to this responsibility, training is offered to those recruited into the police force. In developing countries that practice good governance, the government often fills the loopholes in training by sending their officers to police and military academies abroad for specialized training. According to Goede (2013, p. 11-19), this implies that such States appreciate the need for a diversely trained security apparatus. Nevertheless, this is not achievable without appropriate planning, a role played by the government's administrative structures. Similar sentiments are reflected in Akwara, Enwuchola, Adekunle, and Udaw (2013, p. 4-9) study. In the study, it was realized that the most fragile States also tend to be the most insecure. The results of the study imply that weaker governance structures are more unlikely to support better facilitation for security apparatus activities. This study seeks to establish the influence of bad governance on the supply of trained security personnel in DRC.

PSCs are usually profit-driven a factor that informs the need for higher levels of competence as a strategy for widening customer bases. As such, compared to developing countries, most of the PSCs originating from the west tend to offer better training to their personnel (Berndtsson 2012, p. 306-316). Focusing on the growing number of PSCs contracts with international

organizations such as the United Nations and the European Union during foreign engagements, Joachim and Schneiker (2014, p. 249-256) argue that this demonstrates a lack of confidence in developing countries' security apparatus. According to the authors, compared to developing nations' security apparatus, are more competent in the installation of security devices, armored logistics, securing premises, and response in times of emergency. This also validates their continued engagement by diplomatic missions abroad. Although these studies demonstrate the prevalence of PSCs in developing countries, the current study focuses on the influence of bad governance on the supply of trained personnel.

2. Hypotheses

H1: If the quality of governance worsens, chances for the multiplication of PSCs increase.

H2: If the conflict in a country intensifies, chances for the multiplication of PSCs increase both during conflict and in post-conflict.

H3: The combination of both bad governance and conflict context further increases the chances of the multiplication of PSCs.

III. Theoretical Framework

This study was anchored on the systems theory and routine activity theory. The selection of these theories was based on their assumptions and previous application in enhancing understanding of security management in developing countries.

2. Systems Theory

The systems theory was developed by Immanuel Wallerstein in 1979 and explained the hierarchical interactions between States globally. The system ensured that while some countries benefited, others were exploited. This theory assumes that the world's States are classified as core States, periphery States, and semi-periphery States. The theory also assumes that the core States deliberately exploit peripheral States for labor and raw materials and that the peripheral States depend on the core States for capital. The last assumption is that the semi-peripheral States have the attributes of both the core States and the peripheral States. From these assumptions, the theory is based on the concept of global inequality (Martínez-Vela 2001, pp. 1-5). From these assumptions, in terms of security, the core States have stronger military power

and are not dependent on any state for their protection. This can be attributed to their economic dominance courtesy of exploitation of mineral resources and brain drain from the peripheral countries. As such, they can afford the latest technology and weapons for their security personnel. The peripheral States, on the other hand, are poor due to the exploitation by the core States. Consequently, they are incapable of affording the latest technology and weapons needed to enhance security within their boundaries. This implies inequality in responsiveness to security threats posed against their citizens.

Further, considering that the core States benefit from the peripheral States' political and economic instability, they tend to aggravate conflicts within these States as a strategy for optimum exploitation. Subsequently, in times of civil conflicts, they quickly intervene through proxies such as private security and military companies to promote their interests. This is evident in instances where contracted private security companies intervening in conflicts in developing countries have concentrated in areas with vast natural resources, such as minerals, leaving out areas that are truly affected by these conflicts. As the conflict continues, the peripheral state sees the need to engage the core States for assistance, while the core state sees the need to advance the conflict for optimal exploitation. As such, a vicious cycle of exploitation is created.

This theory has also attracted various criticisms considering that it overly concentrates on economic parameters in describing the relationship between States. Critiques argue that a wholesome approach that would include factors such as cultural differences and various aspects of globalization would better explain the relationship between core and peripheral States. Additionally, in recent years, States tend to form bilateral relations whose details can be deduced from these generalizations. Nevertheless, previous studies have indicated that this theory is applicable in various contexts, including in PSCs' operations (Kihlström 2012, pp. 287-299).

In Wood's (2013, p. 2) study on PSCs' roles, the author argues that these companies are the modern mercenaries used by core States in advancing their interests in peripheral States. In the core States too, PSCs help in buttressing governments' security capacity. This is because they are invited as a stop-gap measure to address shortages in personnel. The implication of this is that PSCs are designed to promote the interests of the core States even in instances that they operate in periphery States. Similar conclusions were also evidenced in Warner's (2020, p. 12-16) study that adopted systems theory. The study concluded that PSCs are exploitation vehicles adopted by core States in worsening conflicts in their peripheral States counterparts to their

advantage. In so doing, the PSCs assume mercenary roles as was the case during the Cold War (Gaston 2008, p. 221).

2. Routine Activity Theory

The routine activity theory was developed by Cohen and Felson in 1979. Borrowing from the application of rational choice theory in criminology, the theory focuses on the attributes of crime as opposed to the attributes of the offender. The theory is based on three assumptions. The first assumption is that there has to be a motivated offender. The second assumption is the existence of a suitable target, while the last assumption is the absence of a capable guardian (Cohen & Felson 1979, p. 588-608). For criminal activity to be conducted, then these three aspects have to come together. In most instances, the occurrence of these three aspects is most common in developing countries compared to their developed counterparts.

Developing States are usually characterized by poor governance and inequality in access to resources. There are also cultural differences compounded with competing uses of natural resources such as land (Goede 2013, p. 4). These factors collectively inform animosity among citizens making them likely offenders. Such States are likely to experience more conflicts. Considering the multifaceted nature of such conflicts, the post-conflict period is marred with security uncertainties further creating "motivated offenders."

Inequality in the distribution of resources usually implies the creation of a privileged minority within a state. While the majority of citizens are unable to access basic services such as healthcare and sanitation, the privileged classes can afford the luxury. The privileged class is usually composed of elites such as politicians and businesspersons. Due to the inequality, they automatically become suitable targets for motivated offenders (Cilliers & Schunemann 2013, p. 24).

However, the absence of a capable guardian turns out to be the most worrying concern. It implies the absence of effective security structures and security officers. This demonstrates state failure as reflected in Thomas Hobbes' *Leviathan*. Hobbes emphasizes the need for the government to fulfill the social contract between it and the citizens (Gauthier 1977, p. 130-164). One key aspect of the government's side of the social contract is to ensure territorial integrity through protection against external aggression and to guarantee the safety of citizens' property within the state. As such, the absence of a capable guardian signifies the inability of the government to fulfill its social contract. Businesses, individuals, international organizations,

and diplomatic missions tend to fill this security void by hiring the services of PSCs. Together with the systems theory, routine activity theory was used in incorporated into the study.

IV. Methodology

Since achieving its independence in 1960, the DRC ('the DRC') has experienced both politically and socially instigated conflicts. The basis of the politically instigated conflicts arises from the differences in political ideologies that have characterized the country over the years. Socially, the country's population is multiethnic. This too has often resulted in conflicts. In recent years, there has been a considerable increase in the number of private security companies within the country. According to Büscher and Vlassenroot (2010), this increase is a result of various conflicts and rebellions that have been experienced in the country. In contextualizing the conflicts, the authors focus on the Katanga insurgency. Having started in 1960 to the present, the Katanga region has rebelled against the government in Kinshasa intending to secede from the Kinshasa-led government. This has implied insecurity despite the numerous economic activities going on within the region given its richness in minerals. Some of these minerals include copper, diamond, cobalt, and uranium. Naturally, such minerals attract companies that engage in their extraction and processing. Without adequate security, they are likely to experience losses occasioned by vandalism of property and stealing (Richards and Smith, 2007). This study will assess the socio-political factors that influence the contracting of private security companies by commercial enterprises in the DRC.

Socially, the Ituri conflict represents a culture-instigated conflict in the DRC. In this conflict, the agriculturalist Lendu ethnic group, and their pastoralist Hema ethnic neighbor have fought overuse of land. This has resulted in an increase in insecurity within the region. Considering that the DRC government's security apparatus has not been able to address this conflict, it has presented an opportunity for private security companies (Hönke, 2009). The Kivu conflict, on the other hand, has been an armed conflict between DRC's military and the Hutu Power group Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda. The failure of the government to end this conflict since 2004 is an indication of failed security apparatus within DRC. This study will focus on exploring the relationship between the prevalence of private security companies and the quality of governance across different settings. It also focuses on the relationship between the prevalence of private security companies and the quality of governance. Further, the study focuses on the influence of conflict and post-conflict contexts

on the number of security companies. Lastly, it focuses on the influence of trained security providers in DRC.

1. Case-Study Research Design

This study adopted a descriptive case study research design. Yin (1984, p. 3) defines a case study research design as "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context." This is most relevant in instances where there are no clear boundaries between the phenomenon and the context. For instance, the phenomenon in this study is the prevalence of PSCs in Congo, while the context includes factors such as poor governance, conflict and post-conflict, and inadequate training for security personnel due to due to bad governance. This creates a suitable scenario in which case study research can be adopted to establish the phenomenon.

In their study on the emergence of case study as a preferred approach in sociology, Crossley and Vulliamy (1984) argue that this popularity is based on the fact that various limitations have been cited in the application of quantitative research approaches. Specifically, quantitative approaches are unlikely to offer in-depth explanations. For instance, statistical analyses can indicate a consistent prevalence of crime over some time but fail to explain the reasons for this increase. However, through a case study, it is possible to determine whether crimes and the reasons for the prevalence are prevalent. This makes a case study a more holistic approach compared to statistical approaches.

Yin (1984, p. 4) on the advantages of the case study, argues that in the case of studies, both qualitative and quantitative data can be adopted. In this sense, quantitative data can always inform hypotheses that necessitate further investigations. This can at times imply running another round of quantitative data collection. Subsequently, qualitative data can also be included to ensure that the study holistically addresses the phenomenon. Such an approach is applicable in case studies.

Further, case studies are characterized by detailed qualitative accounts. This usually helps in describing the data in a real-life environment. Further, the detailed descriptions are essential in explaining complexities that characterize real-life situations. For instance, in the case of DRC, the conflicts are usually compounded with complex rivalry over natural resources. These rivalries cannot be understood without detailed first-hand information. Case studies come in handy in addressing this challenge.

Yin (1984, p. 21) also highlights some of the disadvantages associated with the adoption of a case study as a research methodology. First, there is the concern that case studies lack rigor. The author argues that in some instances, researchers' biased views tend to undermine the outcomes of these studies. To mitigate this bias, the study relied on previous peer-reviewed literature form an opinion on the research questions. This was used in addition to auto-ethnography.

The other disadvantage of case studies according to Yin (1984, p. 21) is that it is a weak basis for scientific generalization considering that it is based on a very small number of subjects or a single subject. Subsequently, questions have arisen on how such researches can be used in explaining a global phenomenon. However, it is noteworthy that case studies are usually used in enhancing phenomena that have been investigated but with broader methodological approaches.

Lastly, case studies have also attracted criticism for being too long and difficult to undertake (Yin 1984, p. 5). This also coincides with Crossley and Vulliamy's (1984, p. 197) concern that such hurdles also attract large quantities of documentation. These concerns are elicited by the fact that case studies can either be ethnographic or longitudinal. Nevertheless, with appropriate management of the data generated and effective data analysis, case study researches become more manageable.

According to Yin (1984, p. 4), there are various parameters that researchers should incorporate when identifying a case for their studies. First, it is essential to ensure that the case identified aligns with the topic of research. This is only achievable if the research objectives are clear. These observations are buttressed by Chan and Lee's (1984, p. 184) argument that upon the achievement of clarity of the research, it is much easier to identify case studies that complement the research theme. This study's objective was to assess the socio-political factors that influence the contracting of private security companies. As such, the identification of DRC, as its case, was justified considering that contextually, the state has experienced and continues to experience both social and political challenges. Further, the phenomenon under investigation, contracting of PSCs has been on an upward trajectory in recent years.

The second parameter involves ensuring that the case study can be applied globally. This parameter is rationalized by the fact that case studies are supposed to act as a sample for the study. As such, selecting a case that cannot be applied to the whole phenomenon is unlikely to bear success (Johansson 2007, p. 48). To achieve this end, this study first identified States that have experienced an upsurge in PSCs contracting. It then narrowed down to the most fragile

ones, as indicated in the Fragility Index, 2020. Apart from being fragile, the States were also expected to have had prolonged conflicts and recurrent post-conflict periods. Additionally, the States were expected to be poorly governed and as such, poor or no training from the law enforcers. It is this criterion that was adopted in selecting DRC as the case-study.

The third parameter entailed ensuring that the case study is a contemporary issue as opposed to a historical one. According to Noor (2008, p. 1604), relevance is an essential aspect of a study. Relevant case studies allow for the optimal benefit of the research to academia and individuals. As mentioned, the study required that the case state should have experienced the conflict in the near past. Better still, States with ongoing conflicts and fragility were prioritized.

The last parameter usually involves picking the appropriate approach in case study selection. This parameter usually involves ensuring that either a single case or multiple cases have been adopted for the study. This study adopted a single case, DRC. Subsequently, aspects such as state fragility, conflicts and post-conflict, and state failure and the inability to train security personnel were interrogated.

2. Secondary Data Analysis

In a study on the adoption of case study as a research methodology, Zainal (2007, p. 1) argue that in some instances, case studies can be conducted from previous reports and studies. This makes a study robust, in-depth and holistic, and as such, can be applied in enhancing understanding community-based problems. As such, this study adopted secondary data analysis in its methodology. A literature review involves evaluation of existent publications on the problem being investigated. Such publications include books, peer-reviewed journals, and other relevant sources. It is through such an analysis that the investigator is able to identify and demonstrate research gaps for the readers (Fink 2014, p. 16).

Specifically, this study adopted systematic literature review in establish the impact of factors such as poor governance, conflict and post-conflict, and lack of training for security personnel on contracting of privates security companies. The approach is associated with various benefits, first of which is that, it helps a researcher deliver a clear overview of studies that have previously been conducted on the phenomenon. For the purposes of this study, the researcher focused studies on conflict, and post-conflict globally. Further, the concept of good governance and its role in ensuring that security personnel get appropriate training were discussed.

V. Results

The main objective of this study to assess the socio-political factors that influence the contracting of private security companies in the DRC. The study first assessed the influence of quality of governance on the prevalence of private security companies. The study also investigated the influence of conflict or post-conflict on the contracting of private companies within DRC. The last mandate of the study was to assess the impact of the quality of governance on the supply of trained security personnel, and subsequently, the number of PSCs. With the adoption of case-study as the research design.

1. Poor Governance and Private Security in the Congo

The characteristics of the DRC imply a need for stable governance structures as a measure for ensuring contentment and equality among the diverse ethnic communities inhabiting the country. Nevertheless, the state has been led by authoritarian and corrupt regimes over the years. This can be traced back to Mobutu's regime and successive governments of Laurent Kabila and Joseph Kabila. The economic situation of a state usually impacts on its governance and vice versa. The economic mainstay of DRC has been its minerals, such as cobalt, gold, and copper, which are mainly found in the Katanga region. Considering that these mineral resources have a global market that attracts revenues, lack of accountability among government officials, and corruption have hindered a trickle-down of these resources to the general public. For instance, citizens' economic wellbeing is constrained by poor infrastructure, considering that the DRC has the shortest paved road network compared to countries of its size. Further, literacy levels still stand at a paltry 77% while from time to time, the government is unable to fund public service. This has limited access to self-employment opportunities within the state, resulting in the 36% unemployment rates. This can be further linked to the 72% poverty rates, especially in the northern parts and the Kasai region. This corresponds with the 71.5% crime rate that currently characterizes the state.

Notably, DRC still maintains diplomatic ties with other States globally. Additionally, international organizations have been running various projects in the country. Such projects are aimed at enhancing the livelihood of the locals. Some of these organizations include the European Union, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) International, and various UN agencies. Equal security threats have been posed to multinational corporations operating within the

region. Considering that the operations of these organizations and businesses are mainly conducted in the rural area, security has been a consistent challenge considering the high prevalence of militia groups within the communities and the high crime levels. Both the challenges reflect incompetence in governance. As a result, international organizations have lost faith in government-provided security forces considering their inability to guarantee citizens' safety. Consequently, the organizations have continuously hired PSCs for security services. Some of these services include installation of security appliances, guarding of premises, protection of staff, and armored logistical solutions. This demonstrates that the mushrooming of PSCs is influenced by good governance. That by adopting practices such as accountability, and transparency, DRC is likely to experience stability in its governance structures, and that this is likely to translate into effective police and military forces. This will curtail the prevalence of PSCs.

2. Conflict Context and Private Security in the Congo

Both the literature analysis experience indicated that conflicts in the DRC have been multifaceted. The study further revealed that more often than not, the post-conflict periods are characterized by continued animosity among the factions. In some instances, post-conflict has also implied the emergence of conflicts in other regions. The mineral resources have, however, been the main cause of these conflicts. Other causes have been the rise of secessionist movements, such as the ones experienced in the Katanga region, power struggles, mainly fought by militia groups. Regardless of the cause, there has been an increase in insecurity among the local communities, international humanitarian organizations, and transnational companies.

The literature also reveals that due to political instability arising from the state's poor governance, there have been continued armed clashes, and human rights violations. For instance, in 2016, the conflict in the Kasai region involved five provinces located in the middle of the country. The conflict was fought between the government forces and ethnic militias, leading to the displacement of some 2.1 million citizens. Subsequently, the number of internally displaced people within the country rose to over 4.5 million. This further worsened the insecurity levels experienced in the country, considering that more people were disposed of their income. Conflict and insecurity as a theme also became evident in the literature that discussed the Grand Kasai conflict that arose following the murder of a traditional leader by

the government's security forces. It became evident that the post-conflict period was characterized by increased animosity among the communities that had been displaced, and that this had predisposed the state to further future conflicts. These reflections were valid, considering that the country has had more than 70 armed militias that are associated with the ethnic formations. Subsequently, this was an assurance that retaliatory attacks could easily arise in the post-conflict period. This also demonstrated a lack of faith by the members of the public in the government's security apparatus.

Further analysis also revealed that due to the constrained capacity of the DRC government to secure far-flung provinces of Katanga, Kasai, and Kivus, the local communities had resorted to form their security forces. However, considering that members of these local forces are not bounded by the regulations that apply to the government's forces, the rule of law has been indispensable as these officers misuse their arms. In a province characterized by vast mineral resources, such as Katanga, this has posed security threats to multinational corporations involved in mining activities within the area. Similarly, in the Eastern region, over 100 militias have taken control of securing the communities, in a move that has only increased insecurity levels.

These security uncertainties arising from the absence of dependable security forces have increased the need for additional security strategies especially among businesses with high stakes in the mining industry. In recent years, mining companies such as Katanga Mining Company, and Glencore Company have hired international PSCs to protect their mines and processing installations. The rationale behind this approach has been that unlike the local forces that are ill-trained and ill-equipped, the international PSCs are competent and guarantee the countries, the needed security. From the analysis, it is evident that the prevalence of PSCs within a state can be attributed to both conflicts and post-conflict periods.

3. Supply of Trained Security Personnel in the Congo

The state, by Westphalian theory, has a responsibility to monopolize violence by ensuring that security forces such as the police and the military are available. In the DRC, the quality of governance has been characterized by incompetence arising from lack of transparency and accountability, and the resulting corruption. This is evident in the ever-rising discontentment with the government's unequal distribution of national resources and the emergence of militias.

It is also observable that due to corruption, the institutions have continuously been weakened or are non-existent. Some of these institutions are those involved in the provision of national security such as the nations' police force and military. Subsequently, there have been instances in which security personnel lack the requisite training and equipment necessary in deterring criminal activities.

The theme of the supply of trained security personnel is evident in the literature on the invasion of government forces by the Kamwina Nsapu rebels in 2017. During the attack, the rebels ambushed and killed more than 40 police officers who were on a convoy to their hideout. The fact that a militia could ambush a contingent of police officers is a demonstration of investigative and intelligence incompetency of the DRC government's forces. When the insurgency further spread to the neighboring Kasai and Tanganyika regions, the government resorted to establishing military zones in the area. Nevertheless, factors such as poor pay and inappropriate training worked against the efforts.

Still, on the theme of trained security personnel, there have been instances where the government forces join ethnic militias to defend their communities. This too, has been linked to failing governance structures that are unlikely to remunerate officers appropriately leading to disloyalty. There are also instances in which the capacity of the government forces has been undermined to the extent that cooperative militias are incorporated to augment the government's forces. One of the militias that have participated in such activities is the Bana Mura. This is often interpreted as recognition of activities of such militias, and this has contributed to further insecurity. For instance, the Bana Mura has engaged in the destruction of villages, arsonist attacks, and shootings. Despite these failures, the government has continuously integrated rebels in the army, a factor that still contributes to violence. With these considerations, it was concluded in the analysis that due to poor governance the structures have been unable to support the supply of trained security personnel and that this has translated into a state of anarchy within the country. As usual, diplomatic missions, international humanitarian organizations, and international businesses have had to sort for extra security for both their property and staff members. This also applies to the country's indigenous businesses and the country's elites. PSCs have filled this security void. As such, both literature and auto-ethnographic analysis revealed that quality of governance and the supply of trained personnel impacts the number of PSCs within a state.

II. Discussion

1. Quality of governance

The end of the Cold War marked a new era in assessing the wellbeing of citizens. One such measure was the adoption of democratic leadership in many nations, which is usually linked to good governance practices. Governments adopting the principles of good governance make decisions based on participation and consensus. Further, they are accountable for their actions and transparent in their management of national resources. Such governments are also responsive to the needs of the citizens and are effective and efficient in the delivery of services. Regimes practicing good governance also ensure that citizens have equitable access to national resources and uphold the rule of law (Akwara et al. 2013; Goede, 2013). According to Keeping (2018, p. 1-4), States adopting good governance practices are found in the global north and are relatively secure compared to their counterparts in the global south. However, considering the natural and human resource endowment, multinational companies find a reason to establish operations in developing States (Wallace 2017, p. 69). The concern with the security of their staff and property, the source for alternative security service providers. This has necessitated the prevalence of PSCs globally. These assertions reflect the results of this study that the quality of governance influences the number of PSCs within a country.

In an analysis on the prevalence of PSCs in developed countries, Baresh (2020, pp. 12-19) found that from 2015-2019, the private security industry in the US grew by 3% per year. Moreover, it was found that at least a 10% growth in the next decade was predicted. In the UK, the study reported that in 2015, the private security industry grew by 5% and that 11% growth was recorded in the years 2016 to 2019. The industry is expected to grow further in the coming decades. For Canada, the study revealed that between the years 2015-2019, the private security industry revenues grew by an average of 1.2% to \$5.6 billion. This growth was attributed to the fact that over the period, PSC services have increasingly become popular among corporate and government services. Similar trends are also reported in Oztig's (2020, pp. 330-346) study, in which the author investigated the growth of the private security industry in the United States. Unlike it has been reflected in this study's results that the poor governance informs an increase in the number of PSCs, these previous studies hold a contrary opinion. Nevertheless, these contradictions are addressed in Tkach and Phillips's (2020) study on different needs for PSCs by developed and developing States. In their investigations, the researchers established that in the developed States, PSCs come in handy whenever there is a need to augment governments' forces. This is usually considered a cheaper alternative considering that compared to the period

before the world wars, the States in the global north have been engaged in fewer conflicts. Subsequently, there is never a need to maintain a big army. Also, the nature of security threats posed are minor and can be handled by private security firms. In buttressing these arguments, Taylor (2011, p. 456) also observes, in a previous study conducted in Iraq, that have reduced their military human resources, developed States are no longer capable of intervening in such wars without the assistance of private military companies. Considering that these conflicts continue to erupt, the prevalence of private military and security companies is a guarantee. Similar sentiments are also captured in Akpınar's (2016) study, in which the author argues that the rise in PSCs in developed countries can be attributed to conflicts arising in the global south, which have always implied an increased demand for military interventions.

Still on the rise of PSCs, in countries with good governance, Aliyev (2017, p. 1973) in a study on the increased use of PSCs by European Union in foreign engagements, attributes the prevalence of such companies to on-going conflict in developing nations. Aliyev argues that most of the PSCs hired to provide security services to missions in Africa are sourced from Europe and the United States. However, Patey's (2017) study seems to differ from these assertions. With a focus on Chinese construction companies with operations in Africa, the authors opine that concerned with the rising insecurity within the States, investors have seen an opportunity to provide localized private security services to construction companies at a profit. From the interviews conducted with the management of indigenous security companies, insecurity usually arises from high unemployment levels and inequality in the distribution of national resources.

In their study on the influence of governance on the prevalence of PSCs in Libya, Aslan (2020, p. 130) adopted triangulation in the methodology. First, the researcher compared the prevalence of these companies during the leadership of Muammar Gaddafi, and again during the post-2011 period. The author found that during Gaddafi's regime, PSCs formed 1% of the security agencies. After the uprising, the state has experienced rapid growth of the industry to 43%. In the in-depth interviews conducted post the quantitative analysis, the authors established that although Gaddafi's regime was authoritarian, citizens had benefited from state-funded projects necessary for their basic livelihoods. This had contributed to low poverty levels among the citizens and enhanced security. However, post the conflict, these services are yet to be restored by the democratically elected government. Due to this inefficiency, security within the state has considerably plunged. Subsequently, companies in the oil industry have resorted to hiring the services of PSCs. These outcomes are consistent with this study's results that poor

governance contributes to an increase in the number of private security companies in the DRC. Similar results are also evident in a qualitative study conducted by Yıldız (2020, p. 265) in Libya. During the study, the authors interviewed international oil companies with operations in the Fezzan region. The choice of the Fezzan region was informed by the fact that it has experienced the highest incidences of insecurity due to border porosity. The study concluded that oil companies had resorted to hiring PSCs because the Libyan government failed to provide security against militias operating from border States. Similar results are also evident in South Sudan's studies, where inequalities in the distribution of national resources arising from oil have contributed to ethnic conflicts. In these conflicts, staff working for international organizations have been killed leading to the current preference for PSCs among these organizations (Calissendorff, Brosché & Sundberg, 2019; Justin & Van Leeuwen, 2016; Portada, Riley & Gambone, 2014). These studies on Libya and South Sudan validate the findings that poor governance leads to the accelerated emergence of PSCs.

2. The Influence of Conflict

The post-Cold War period has been characterized by fewer interstate wars. Nevertheless, States in the global south have been characterized by multiple intrastate conflicts. Based on this, Martin (2017, p. 89-108) conducted a study to assess the prevalence of PSCs globally. The study adopted secondary data analysis in its methodology. The results indicated that countries in the global south are prone to more internal conflicts. The proneness is blamed on the multifaceted nature of the conflicts considering that they are compounded with secessionist struggles, lack of transparency and accountability by the government, community disagreements over land use, and poverty. Subsequently, the wars are sporadic, considering that no single solution can address all the causes. The author noted that it is this lack of a single solution that had informed tense post-conflict periods throwing such countries into a constant state of insecurity. As such, there is never adequate security personnel to address these challenges. To support security, state elites opt for PSCs. This also applies to international missions represented in these countries and international organizations with operations within these States. These findings augment this study's results that conflict and post-conflict are likely to inform an increase in private security companies within a state.

Similar results are evident in Kaplan's (2019, pp. 29-31) study, in which the author investigated the relationship between the Iraqi-Kurdish war and the emergence of private military and security companies in Iraq. The choice of Iraq was informed by the fact that since

1918, the country has consistently experienced both conflict and post-conflict periods. The author established that due to these conflicts, it has been impossible to create stable government structures and that this had informed insecurity. It is this factor that has an informed deployment of American PSCs such as Blackwater, DynCorp, and Triple Canopy. These results are in tandem with Aslan's (2020, p. 39-51) study, in which it was established that the high incidences of insecurity and the resulting contracting of PSCs in Libya arose from the conflicts and tensed post-conflict that has characterized the country since 2011.

However, contrasting findings are evident in Pascucci's (2017), study. Focusing on the Middle-East and North Africa, the study adopted secondary data analysis in determining the influence of oil on military interventions and the prevalence of PSCs. The author concluded that the prevalence of PSCs is only common within countries with mineral deposits and that conflicts and post-conflicts were excuses for optimal exploitation of the affected States. Further, the researchers noted that PSCs were the previous mercenaries that had characterized the Cold War seasons. Just like mercenaries, the PSCs are usually representatives of western countries, sent to spy and create disharmony within target countries. However, the failure of the research to account for the rise of indigenous PSCs validates the results of this study that conflict and post-conflict informs the emergence of PSCs within a state.

3. The Supply of Security Personnel

The study's result that the quality of governance on the supply of trained security personnel is supported by Fenneli and Perry's (2020) findings. In their study, the pair assessed the essence of police training in various States in the United States and established that through training, officers gain performance competence. Consequently, they are well prepared to handle security risks that might arise to the advantage of the citizens. Nevertheless, this is only achievable if the necessary government structures are in place. This implies that in situations where these structures are unavailable, then security is not a guarantee. In a previous study by Saeed and Johnson (2016, p. 39-46), the authors focused on the role of security personnel training in deterring international terrorism. The results indicated that States experiencing political instability are unlikely to deter international crimes such as terrorism considering that they cannot avail the requisite training for their security personnel. As such, there is a continued need to hire PSCs with the required resources and training to deter such crimes. Although the study focused on terrorism, it still supports this study's assertions that the prevalence of PSCs arises from poor quality of governance and supply of trained personnel.

Onuoha and Ezmir (2013, p. 1-9) also tend to emphasize training for security personnel. Based on money-laundering in Nigeria, the study realized that over the years, that the most populated African nation had been losing billions of dollars in tax evasions and money laundering. One of the causes of this phenomenon was found to be the lack of requisite training needed in investigating international crimes. From the interviews conducted, the researchers realized that over the years, money allocated for security personnel had been misappropriated by successive governments in the country, leaving the economy susceptible to criminals. Subsequently, PSCs have been contracted to assist with investigations and to establish the necessary buffers in private sector institutions, and government departments. Although the study focuses on transnational economic crimes, its results emphasize that quality of governance and supply of trained personnel determines the prevalence of PSCs within a country.

III. Conclusion

From the results of the study, good governance is likely to inform a decrease in the number of PSCs. In DRC, poor governance has been exemplified in a lack of transparency and accountability by the successive regimes. Additionally, the government has been unresponsive and has failed to ensure equal distribution of resources obtained from economic activities. Subsequently, there have been high rates of poverty within the state which resulted in high levels of criminality. For private businesses, individuals, multinational corporations, and diplomatic missions, this has implied a need for additional security sources, a factor that has necessitated PSCs' services.

The results also indicate that conflict or post-conflict informs the rise or decline in the number of PSCs. The study has demonstrated that the prevalence of PSCs can be attributed to the numerous conflicts that have characterized DRC. The post-conflict periods are characterized by animosity and retaliatory attack threats considering the high numbers of militias that defend community interests. This has increased insecurity within the communities and various regions within the state. Additionally, the causes of the conflicts are many and intertwined, a factor that prevents the actualization of a lasting peace agreement. As such, the country has been in a perpetual state of war. Consequently, there is a need for additional security. This has created relevance for PSCs in the DRC.

Lastly, the quality of governance and supply of trained personnel is a key determinant of PSCs' prevalence in DRC. From the results of the study, DRC's government has failed to institutionalize its functions due to corruption. As a result, it has been incapable of adequately financing the security organs. Subsequently, there has been a lapse in security officers' training and remuneration, a factor that has considerably undermined government forces' loyalty. Due to these inadequacies, there are instances in which security personnel has resigned to join forces with militias. Consequently, the insecurity levels have increased, a factor that has necessitated the prevalence of PSCs in the country.

The main limitation of the study is that it adopted a case study as its research design. The limitation of this approach is that it generalizes the results to the wider population. Subsequently, future studies must adopt a multiple case study. Preferably, the multiple countries identified should be drawn from different regions of the world, such as Europe, Asia, and Africa. This will help in the attainment of nuanced results that reflect a wider population.

Future studies should also consider adopting purely adopting quantitative approaches in this topic. This will prevent the likelihood of the researcher's subjective views that might have influenced the current study. Such an approach will also guarantee the researchers the ease of replication, and reduced expenses.

States' governments globally should work towards ensuring that they practice good governance. The implication would be a contented citizenry and a more peaceful and secure country. This is likely to reduce the demand for PSCs, as individuals, businesses, and investors feel more secure. As a result, indigenous businesses will flourish, more foreign direct investments will be witnessed and more international organizations will be attracted to the DRC.

Additionally, there is a need to ensure that conflicts are solved satisfactorily and that the government builds the capacity to deter them. This can be achieved through the establishment of dependable community policing structures and functional police and military services. With this strategy, there will be a decline in the demand for PSCs. It will also limit the likelihood of espionage within the DRC. Subsequently, there will be fewer externally-influenced wars.

Lastly, the DRC's government should enhance the performance of its administrative structures, especially those that affect the police service. This will be the right step towards ensuring that adequate training is available to security personnel. Additionally, this will help ensure that security personnel is adequately remunerated and that the number of officers hired is consistent with the security needs of the nation. This will enhance loyalty among security personnel and guarantees the country of consistency in combating criminal activities. These factors are likely to enhance the achievement of national goals as there will be peace.

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