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Surveillance, Control, and Management of Resistant Gram-Negative Bacteria in Community and Healthcare Settings

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**UNIVERSITÉ
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FACULTÉ DE MÉDECINE

Section de *Médecine Clinique*,
Département de Médecine
Service Prévention et Contrôle de
l'Infection

Thèse préparée sous la direction du Professeur Stephan Jürgen Harbarth

"Surveillance, Control, and Management of Resistant Gram-Negative Bacteria in Community and Healthcare Settings"

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présentée à la Faculté de Médecine
de l'Université de Genève
pour obtenir le grade de Docteur en Sciences Médicales MD-PhD
par

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18. **Martischang R**, Abbas M, Harbarth S, Huttner B, Schrenzel J. How to use microbiological diagnostic tests in a hospital setting. *Rev Med Suisse*. **2017**;13(558):792-796.

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1. **R.Martischang**, et al. Nation-wide survey of screening practices to detect carriers of multi-drug resistant-organisms upon admission to Swiss healthcare institution. *Joint annual meeting SSI SSHH SSTMP SSTTM*. **2018**
2. **R.Martischang**, P. François, A. Cherkaoui, N. Gaïa, G. Renzi, A. Agostinho, M. Perez, C. E. Graf, S. Harbarth. Epidemiology of ESBL-producing *Escherichia coli* from repeated prevalence studies over 11 years in a long-term care facility. *International Conference on Prevention and Infection Control*. **2021**. Oral presentation # 005.
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6. **R. Martischang**, M.N. Chraiti, V. Lazarevic, N. Gaïa, C. Bandiera-Clerc, H. Soule, G. Renzi, A. Iten, C. Ginet, D. Pittet, J. Schrenzel, S. Harbarth. First reported nosocomial outbreak of New-Delhi-Metallo-beta-lactamase (NDM-1) producing *Escherichia coli* in Switzerland. *International Conference on Prevention and Infection Control* **2019**. Oral presentation # 045
7. **R. Martischang**, Maria Eugenia Riccio, Mohamed Abbas, Andrew Stewardson, Jan Kluytmans, Stephan Harbarth. Co-carriage and acquisition of ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae among household members: a systematic review. *International Conference on Prevention and Infection Control* **2019**. Oral presentation # 036
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2. **R. Martischang**, Gaud Catho, Yves Martin, Gesuele Renzi, Abdessalam Cherkaoui, Valérie Sauvan, Jérôme Pugin, Stephan Harbarth. Environmental control of a long-term endemicity of multi-susceptible *Serratia marcescens* with prolonged polyclonal outbreaks among critically ill patients.
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- **Household carriage and acquisition of extended-spectrum β -lactamase-producing Enterobacteriaceae: A systematic review**
 - o *Contribution of the candidate: elaboration of the study design & protocol, data collection, data analysis, writing of the manuscript.*
- **Household acquisition and transmission of extended-spectrum β -lactamase (ESBL) -producing Enterobacteriaceae after hospital discharge of ESBL-positive index patients**
 - o *Contribution of the candidate: elaboration of the study design & protocol, review of the manuscript.*
- **Epidemiology of ESBL-producing Escherichia coli from repeated prevalence studies over 11 years in a long-term-care facility**
 - o *Contribution of the candidate: elaboration of the study design & protocol, data collection, data analysis, writing of the manuscript.*
- **Nation-wide survey of screening practices to detect carriers of multi-drug resistant organisms upon admission to Swiss healthcare institutions**
 - o *Contribution of the candidate: elaboration of the study design & protocol, data collection, data analysis, writing of the manuscript.*
- **First reported nosocomial outbreak of NDM-1 producing Escherichia coli in Switzerland**
 - o *Contribution of the candidate: epidemiological investigation, data collection, writing of the abstract*
- **An interventional quasi-experimental study to evaluate the impact of a rapid screening strategy in improving nosocomial Extended-Spectrum-Beta-Lactamase Producing Enterobacteriales and Carbapenemases Producing Enterobacteriales control in critically ill patients**
 - o *Contribution of the candidate: elaboration of the study design & protocol, data collection, data analysis, writing of the manuscript.*

I certify that this thesis and the research behind were conducted or co-conducted by myself, and any external intellectual ideas or concept were entirely acknowledged using standard referencing practices.

Romain Martischang

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"In the long history of humankind (and animal kind, too) those who learned to collaborate and improvise most effectively have prevailed."— Charles Darwin

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Résumé

Cette thèse explore les caractéristiques épidémiologiques et les stratégies de contrôle des Entérobactéries productrices de Beta-Lactamases à Spectre Élargi (EP-BLSE) ou de Carbapénémases (EPC), afin de mieux comprendre et limiter leur diffusion. Premièrement, cette diffusion est expliquée par une dynamique de transmission complexe impliquant différents réservoirs communicants et variant en fonction de facteurs propres à l'espèce, au patient, au soin, et au milieu de soin. En particulier, les établissements de soins à long terme et le domicile restent des milieux sous-étudiés requérant une attention particulière pour mieux comprendre l'épidémiologie moléculaire de certains clones à risque. Deuxièmement, la surveillance et les mesures de contrôle des EP-BLSE et EPC sont hautement hétérogènes parmi et entre les pays, avec une absence de consensus définissant les candidats appropriés pour un dépistage à l'admission, ainsi que les méthodes diagnostiques incluses dans les politiques de dépistage. Cette variation entrave non seulement un contrôle adéquat des bactéries résistantes à l'échelle institutionnelle, mais aussi un contrôle des importations et des transmissions parmi les établissements de soins à l'échelle nationale. Cette thèse essaye d'améliorer notre compréhension de la dynamique de transmission et des tendances temporelles des *E.coli* et *K.pneumoniae* producteurs de BLSE parmi les établissements de soins à long terme et les domiciles, mais aussi d'améliorer les politiques de dépistage existantes pour les bactéries Gram-négatives résistantes.

Dans une première partie, une enquête de prévalence répétée dans un établissement de soins à long cours a observé une augmentation nette de EP-BLSE ainsi qu'une fluctuation clonale des ST131H30. Malgré un court suivi, une absence d'effet rebond suite à l'arrêt institutionnel des mesures contact ciblant les *E.coli* producteurs de BLSE (EC-BLSE) en 2019 est notée, soutenant les recommandations actuelles pour le

contrôle des EC-BLSE. La découverte fortuite de l'expansion clonale d'un sous-clone ST131H89 atypique associé avec de multiples épidémies prolongées et silencieuses, ainsi que la diffusion régionale parmi différents réservoirs humains et environnementaux dans l'Ouest de la Suisse requiert une surveillance détaillée.

Une revue systématique et étude de cohorte multicentrique prospective ont évalué la dynamique de transmission des EP-BLSE à domicile, et ont confirmé des taux significatifs d'acquisition et de transmission entre les habitants du domicile, particulièrement dans les premières semaines suivant le retour à domicile des patients index manquant d'autonomie. Des taux de transmission différents ont été observés entre *E.coli* et *K.pneumoniae*, renforçant l'évidence existante en milieu hospitalier.

Dans une deuxième partie, une enquête à l'échelle nationale a observé des pratiques de dépistage à l'admission adéquates pour les bactéries multirésistantes, mais parfois déficientes et hétérogènes pour certaines bactéries, facteurs de risques, et sites de prélèvements. A noter que les établissements avec une déficience dans le dépistage des VRE se trouvaient majoritairement en Suisse de l'Est, coïncidant avec une large épidémie de VRE impliquant de nombreux hôpitaux. Ces résultats soulignent le besoin de standards harmonisés et accessibles définissant les stratégies de dépistage pour les bactéries Gram-Négatives multi-résistantes parmi les établissements de santé Suisses. Un suivi de cette enquête pourrait être assuré par de futures études pour évaluer l'impact des standards susmentionnés, et possiblement pour investiguer un lien avec les tendances épidémiologiques locales.

Une investigation d'épidémie a révélé d'importants bénéfices secondaires du dépistage universel hebdomadaire, facilitant la détection précoce d'une épidémie institutionnelle et accélérant l'implémentation des mesures de contrôle. Finalement, une étude interventionnelle quasi-expérimentale a comparé le test LAMP avec les cultures phénotypiques pour accélérer l'implémentation des mesures de contrôle. Cette étude a

observé des performances diagnostiques sous-optimales du test LAMP pour les EP-BLSE et CPE lorsque celui-ci était directement appliqué sur l'échantillon. Cette étude conclue qu'en l'absence de programme de « diagnostic stewardship », le LAMP n'apporte aucun bénéfice dans un milieu à faible endémicité, ni pour arrêter les mesures contact non nécessaires parmi les patients aux soins intensifs, ni pour implémenter les mesures contact parmi les nouveaux cas détectés.

Abstract

This thesis explores epidemiological characteristics and infection control strategies of Enterobacterales producing Extended-Spectrum beta-lactamases (ESBL-PE) or carbapenemases (CPE) to better comprehend and limit their spread. First, this spread is explained by complex transmission dynamics among intersecting reservoirs, differing among species, patients, and care settings. In particular, long-term care facilities and households remain understudied settings warranting further monitoring and research to comprehend the molecular epidemiology of clones at risk. Second, surveillance and infection control measures of ESBL-PE and CPE are highly heterogeneous within and between countries, with no consensus defining the best candidates for admission screening and diagnostic methods included in screening policies. This variation hinders adequate nosocomial multidrug-resistant organism (MDRO) control at the institutional level, but also the control of importation events and inter-facility transmissions at the national level. This thesis further aimed to better understand the transmission dynamics and temporal trends of ESBL-producing *Escherichia coli* and *Klebsiella pneumoniae* in understudied settings, and to improve screening strategies for nosocomial control of MDR-Gram-negative bacteria.

In the first section, repeated cross-sectional surveys in a university-affiliated long-term care facility observed an increasing prevalence of ESBL-EC, and a clonal fluctuation of ST131H30 from 2010 to 2020. Despite a relatively short follow-up period, the absence of a rebound effect following the discontinuation of contact precautions for ESBL-EC in 2019 supported the most recent guidelines for ESBL-PE control. The fortuitous detection of the clonal expansion of an atypical ST131H89 subclone associated with multiple silent and prolonged outbreaks, and its regional spread among different reservoirs from Western Switzerland warrants further monitoring. A systematic review and a multicentric

prospective cohort study assessing ESBL-PE transmission dynamics in household settings confirmed a significant acquisition and transmission rate among household members, especially early after discharge of index cases with impaired autonomy. Different transmission rates were observed between *E.coli* and *K.pneumoniae*, supporting available evidence from healthcare settings.

In the second section, a nation-wide survey of Swiss hospitals observed adequate MDRO admission screening practices, but highlighted the heterogeneity of risk factors and body sites used in screening strategies, and an epidemiological gap for vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE), *Acinetobacter baumannii*, and *Pseudomonas aeruginosa*. To note, deficient admission screening practices for VRE unveiled by spatial analysis in Eastern Switzerland coincided with a large multi-institution VRE outbreak. These findings highlighted the need for harmonized and accessible standards defining screening strategies targeting resistant Gram-negative bacteria among Swiss healthcare institutions. Future follow-up studies are warranted to evaluate the impact of such standards, and possibly to link current screening practices with regional epidemiological trends. An outbreak investigation revealed important side benefits from universal regular screening to facilitate early detection of a small institutional cluster of highly resistant Gram-negative bacteria and to accelerate infection control measures. An interventional quasi-experimental study compared a LAMP (Loop-Mediated Isothermal Amplification) assay against standard phenotypic cultures to accelerate the implementation of infection control measures. This study observed a suboptimal diagnostic accuracy of LAMP for ESBL-PE and CPE detection when directly performed on rectal swabs. This study also observed that under real-life conditions, and without proper diagnostic stewardship, there was no benefit of LAMP in a low-endemicity setting, neither for discontinuing unnecessary CP among critically ill patients screened at admission, nor for implementing CP among newly positive patients.

Table of Contents

Abbreviation list	19
CHAPTER One : General introduction	20
Part 1) Epidemiological characteristics of ESBL-PE and CPE	21
Part 2) Infection control program for nosocomial MDR-GNB control	28
Part 3) The role of active surveillance screenings in preventing nosocomial MDR-GNB cross-transmission.....	42
Part 4) The role of diagnostic stewardship program in active surveillance screening	47
Part 5) The importance of standardization in surveillance and infection control measures	53
Part 6) Thesis objective and specific aims.....	55
CHAPTER TWO : Nosocomial and community epidemiology of ESBL-producing E. coli and K. pneumoniae	69
Part 1) Epidemiology of ESBL-producing Escherichia coli from repeated prevalence studies over 11 years in a long-term-care facility	70
Part 2) Household carriage and acquisition of extended-spectrum β-lactamase-producing Enterobacteriaceae: A systematic review	100
Part 3) Household acquisition and transmission of extended-spectrum β-lactamase (ESBL) -producing Enterobacteriaceae after hospital discharge of ESBL-positive index patients.....	150
CHAPTER THREE : Screening strategies and infection control measures implemented to control nosocomial ESBL-PE and CPE	187
Part 1) Nation-wide survey of screening practices to detect carriers of multi-drug resistant organisms upon admission to Swiss healthcare institutions	188
Part 1) First reported nosocomial outbreak of NDM-1 producing Escherichia coli in Switzerland	202
Part 2) An interventional quasi-experimental study to evaluate the impact of a rapid screening strategy in improving control of nosocomial extended-spectrum beta-lactamase producing Enterobacterales and carbapenemases-producing organisms in critically ill patients	205
CHAPTER FOUR : General discussion	250
Introduction.....	250

Summary of results	251
Strength and limitations.....	255
Connection with existing policies, practices, and instruments.....	259
Perspective for future research	263
Conclusion	265
References.....	266
Scholarships and funding -----	251

Abbreviation list

3GC: Third-Generation Cephalosporin

3GCR: Third-Generation Cephalosporin resistant

AMR: Antimicrobial Resistance

AMS: Antimicrobial Stewardship

CDC: Center for Disease Control and Prevention

CPE: Carbapenemase-producing Enterobacterales

ECDC: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control

ESBL: Extended Spectrum Beta-Lactamase

ESBL-EC: Extended Spectrum Beta-Lactamase producing *Escherichia coli*

ESBL-KP: Extended Spectrum Beta-Lactamase producing *Klebsiella pneumoniae*

ESBL-PE: Extended Spectrum Beta-Lactamase producing Enterobacterales

GNB: Gram-Negative Bacteria

ICU: Intensive Care Unit

LAMP: Loop Mediated Isothermal Amplification

LTCF: Long-Term Care Facility

MDR: Multi-Drug Resistance

MDRO: Multi-Drug Resistant Organism

MRSA: Methicillin-Resistant *Staphylococcus aureus*

nEcESBLPE: non-*E.coli* ESBL producing Enterobacterales

VRE: Vancomycin Resistant *Enterococcus*

MGE: Mobile Genetic Elements

WHO: World Health Organization

CHAPTER ONE

General introduction

Part 1) Epidemiological characteristics of ESBL-PE and CPE

Global burden of Antimicrobial Resistance

The global burden of AMR, represented by 16 antibiotic-resistant bacteria combinations, currently estimates 671'689 infections, of which 63.5% are nosocomial, accounting for 33'110 deaths among European regions in 2015 (1). However, modelling approaches suffer from many limitations, including controversial attribution of death to AMR, counterfactual estimation of burden (infection by a susceptible organism vs no-infection), age-adjustment for risks, heterogeneous sampling frequencies and national coverage, and external residual confounding (2). Most of these issues, except the above-mentioned sampling, selection, and detection bias, as well as adjustment for age and gender have been addressed in a recent modelling study based on 471 million individual observation worldwide from literature and surveillance data, and estimating the excess risk of death associated with (versus deaths with no infection) and attributable to AMR (versus deaths with drug-susceptible infection) for 88 antibiotic-resistant bacteria combinations in 2019. Overall deaths associated with AMR and deaths attributable to AMR were respectively estimated at 4.95 million (95% CI 3.62-6.57) and 1.27 million (95%CI 0.91-1.71), mostly driven by lower respiratory infections. (3).

WHO list of critical priority pathogens

Aiming to guide the development of new active agents, WHO established a global priority list of 12 bacterial species with acquired resistance, selecting carbapenem-resistant *Acinetobacter baumannii*, carbapenem-resistant *Pseudomonas aeruginosa*, carbapenem-resistant and 3GCR Enterobacterales. (4) Of all 3GCR Enterobacterales, the heaviest community and hospital burden was attributed to *E. coli* and *K.*

pneumoniae. (4) This list also served to define targets for surveillance systems and outbreak reporting (5), and was used as a basis to select pathogens of high concern in this thesis. Importantly, among all resistance mechanisms, this thesis will focus on carbapenemases and ESBL. Penicillinases, AmpC beta-lactamases, and non-enzymatic mechanisms (loss of outer membrane porine) will not be considered.

General characteristics of Enterobacterales


Enterobacterales are enteric pathogens colonizing the digestive tract, mostly causing a large variety of community- and healthcare-acquired infections, including cystitis, pyelonephritis, peritonitis, septicemia, and device-associated infections. The feco-oral route encompasses direct human-to-human transmission, but also indirect transmission through the environmental or animal reservoir (6,7). Human-to-human transmission has been further detailed using five sequential steps, (8) starting from (A) the presence or shedding of organisms, (B) hand contamination, (C) survival of organisms for at least several minutes, (D) inefficient hand hygiene, and (E) contamination of other patients or their surroundings. As already reviewed, these conditions perfectly apply to Gram-negative bacteria. (9)

General characteristics of ESBL and carbapenemases

As described above, ESBL-PE and CPE colonize the digestive tract, and are associated with difficult-to-treat infections. Colonization by ESBL-producing *E.coli* and *K.pneumoniae* significantly increases the risk of an infection by the same pathogen. (10,11) Similarly, the relative abundance of KPC-producing *K.pneumoniae* was also associated with an increased risk of bacteremia by the same pathogen. (12) ESBL and carbapenemases define multiple bacterial enzymes hydrolyzing respectively 3GC and carbapenems (Figure 1). These enzymes are traditionally sorted based on their amino-acid sequences with the Ambler classification. Class A enzymes (ESBL, KPC) and D (OXA-48) contain

serine in their active sites, while class B enzymes (Metallo-beta-lactamases: VIM, IMP, NDM) require bivalent metal ions, such as Zinc. Class D enzymes are known for sparing 3GC and weakly hydrolyzing carbapenems.

Figure 1. Beta-lactam resistance and inactivating enzymes



Inspired from Ruppé et al. Ann. Intensive Care. 2015;5:21

Community and hospital epidemiology of ESBL-PE

The global spread of resistance genes occurs vertically by clonal replication, but also horizontally within and between species, using

horizontal gene transfers as a nested genetic mobility within transposons within plasmids within species, with a success rate depending upon all intermediaries. (13) Such horizontal transmission is known to produce plasmid-born outbreaks within hospitals, which are challenging to detect and control. (13,14)

ESBLs emerged from mutant penicillinases (TEM and SHV) in the 1980s, mostly concerning hospital-acquired *K. pneumoniae* and *Enterobacter sp.* (15) This nosocomial predominance was explained by multiple contributing exposures, including antibiotic pressure, patients' frailty, and opportunities at risk. (16,17) An epidemiological shift of third-generation cephalosporin resistance occurred from local hospital outbreaks to widespread endemicity in the community following clonal transmission of a single ESBL-producing *E. coli* clone (O25b-ST131), (18) and horizontal gene transfer of CTX-M enzymes located on plasmids within transposons or insertion sequences. (19) This *E.coli* clone is currently spreading in Southeast Asia, Europe, and Latin-America regions. (20) Factors contributing to the widespread endemicity of this clone were importation events from international travels from endemic countries, foreign hospital transfer (21,22), but also spread from the food chain. (23) The community predominance and persistence of this clone remain unexplained, but probably result from antimicrobial resistance, clonal characteristics such as virulence factors, (24–26) and plasmid characteristics, considering the richness of IncF family plasmids in toxin-antitoxin modules. (27) These characteristics might promote a competitive advantage of both strains and plasmids against normal microbiota, despite the fitness cost of antimicrobial resistance. Though unproven, this selective advantage might promote bacterial growth and increased shedding, resulting in the observed increased cross-transmission and prolonged carriage duration observed among certain clones. (28,29) Aforementioned epidemiological shifts of 3GC-R are reflected in risk factors identified for ESBL-PE acquisition or infection

among healthy participants living in the community, including antibiotic usage, diarrhea, travels, and food-related exposures. (30)

Community and nosocomial epidemiology of CPE

Similarly to ESBL, carbapenem resistance initially emerged with localized nosocomial outbreaks of *K. pneumoniae* and *Enterobacter sp.* producing VIM and KPC. (15) Major risk factors for nosocomial CPE acquisition also reflect this nosocomial predominance, including prior antibiotic use, use of medical devices, and mechanical ventilation. (31–33) No epidemiological shift towards the community has so far been observed for carbapenemases, although they have also disseminated globally, mostly by importation events from international travel activities in endemic countries and inter-hospital transfers. (22) Spread also occurs vertically and horizontally, depending on species and plasmid characteristics. For example, the combination of horizontal transmission of KPC-2 and subsequent clonal spread of *K. pneumoniae* ST258 disseminated carbapenem resistance among hospitals. (34) Alternatively, NDM first circulated horizontally between and within species, (35) and has been more recently associated with *E.coli*. (35) Community dissemination of OXA-48 *E.coli* also has been reported in North Africa, probably by foodborne acquisition or household transmission. (36) The perfect combination of a virulent community clone with a stable plasmid, such as CTX-M-15 producing *E.coli* ST131 has not been observed yet. However, the spread of CPE warrants specific monitoring, especially when carbapenemases are combined with community pathogens such as *E.coli*.

Transmission dynamics of ESBL-PE and CPE

In-depth comprehension of transmission dynamics is required to adequately quantify and predict the spread of resistance. The analysis of transmission dynamics aims to reconstruct bacterial spread in defined populations using multiple parameters, such as acquisition rates, transmission rates, environmental persistence, and carriage duration.

Transmission dynamics differ by host-, care-, species-, and settings-related factors. Concerning hosts, antibiotic consumption, diarrhea, and open wound influence bacterial shedding, increasing microbial burden, which can easily be transmitted during patient care, by the maintenance of endotracheal tubes, wound dressings, and bathing. (37)

Concerning species, non-*E.coli* ESBL-PE have been associated with higher acquisition rates compared to ESBL-EC, with respectively 7.4 and 2.6 acquisitions per 100 admissions at risk among ICU patients. (38) Based on a mathematical model, single-admission reproduction numbers were estimated for non-EC ESBL-PE and ESBL-EC at 0.17 [95%CrI 0.094-0.29] and 0.047 [95%CrI 0.018-0.098]. (38) Despite an unclear biological explanation, a potential hypothesis is the better environmental persistence for *K.pneumoniae* as compared to *E.coli*. (39) The different profile of patients colonized by *E.coli* and non-*E.coli* *Enterobacteriaceae* might also contribute to this difference, with non-*E.coli* carriers more exposed to healthcare settings (e.g. febrile neutropenia, ICU). (40)

ESBL-EC transmission rates also differ among settings. In LTCF, per-admission reproduction numbers were higher, estimated for ESBL-EC ST131 and other ESBL-EC at 0.66 and 0.56 (28) Another cohort study followed roommates of ESBL-EC positive patients after discontinuation of contact precautions and observed transmission rates of 2.6% in an acute care hospital versus 8.8% in an affiliated LTCF. (41) This difference also contributes to a higher ESBL-PE prevalence in LTCF. When comparing patients hospitalized in an Italian acute-care geriatric hospital to their pairs in five affiliated LTCF units, using a cross sectional survey in 2008, prevalence of ESBL producers was 14.5% versus 64%. (42) Effectively, LTCFs have specific characteristics compared to acute-care hospitals influencing transmission dynamics. Adherence to hand hygiene (27.3% and 46.1% before and after patient care) and gloving (44.9%) is historically low in these settings. (43,44) Patients are also vulnerable to

be colonized and develop a subsequent infection, due to comorbidities, with impaired autonomy in daily care, immunosenescence, and medical devices. (45) To note, the higher transmission rates in LTCF might predominantly result from these patient characteristics compared to healthy participants in the community or younger patients in acute-care hospitals. Effectively, similar prevalence proportions were observed between LTCF residents and their pairs living in community (11% vs 8.7%). (46) However, this study possibly suffered from a selection bias, mostly including nursing homes sufficiently staffed with good hygiene practices, in low-endemicity settings (Sweden), and might not be generalizable to nursing homes in other countries.

Other settings, including households, have demonstrated significant transmission rates. Cohort studies among household settings observed acquisition and transmission rates of CPE among 9% (16/177) and 2% (3/177) of household members, with 64% and 25% of index cases being colonized by *E. coli* and *K. pneumoniae*, with difference according to the status of household members (spouse, with an OR: 6.17 [95%CI 1.05-36.35]). (47) However, the heterogeneity of study designs, outcomes, and denominators often impeded direct comparison of the dynamics among these different settings.

Summary

Pathogens and associated resistances have different transmission dynamics and burden among various patients and care settings. Furthermore, heterogeneous colonization pressure and infection control policies also influence the available microbial burden and opportunities at risk for cross-transmission. Most of the available evidence defining transmission dynamics originates from outbreak investigations in specific settings, with impaired generalizability. Furthermore, studies evaluating transmission dynamics also faced several challenges, including heterogeneous definitions for transmission (phenotypic vs genotypic),

sampling bias, and detection bias. There is no single model explaining the spread of all ESBL-PE and CPE, nor a robust evidence to estimate this spread in non-ICU settings. This highlights the relevance of monitoring and further research to comprehend AMR transmission dynamics in understudied settings, such as LTCFs and household settings.

Part 2) Infection control strategies for nosocomial MDR-GNB control

Multi-faceted interventions preventing nosocomial MDR-GNB transmission

Infection control measures preventing the spread of nosocomial MDR-GNB transmission combine universal and targeted precautions, which both define two different multi-faceted (or bundled) interventions. Universal precautions include hand hygiene, personal protective equipment (PPE) whenever exposed to infectious material and body surfaces, and environmental hygiene. Universal precautions aim to prevent the nosocomial spread from resistant and susceptible organisms, from recognized and non recognized sources. Targeted precautions only concern patients with proven or suspected colonization and infection by certain infectious agents. They include isolation or cohorting, contact, droplet, and airborne precautions. Contact precautions traditionally include wearing of PPE (gloves & hydrophobic coat). Universal and targeted precautions are complemented by additional infection control strategies, such as diagnostic and antimicrobial stewardship, and potentially chlorhexidine bathing, decolonization strategies and development of novel vaccines. However, not all measures were proved to be efficient and are supported by the same level of evidence. This thesis focuses on the most effective measures to control nosocomial MDR-GNB spread in low endemic settings, excluding AMS, which are universal precautions, contact precautions, isolation, and cohorting.

Multiple guidelines offer guidance to control nosocomial MDR-GNB, including the Centers for Disease Control and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (CDC and AHRQ, 2007 (48)). To note, the discontinuation of contact precautions and universal glove wearing were considered as unresolved issues. Eight years later, ESCMID offered an evidence-based guidance listing the most effective interventions to control nosocomial ESBL-PE and CPE. (9) While CDC guidelines distinguished specific settings such as LTCFs, ESCMID guidelines distinguished epidemic from endemic settings, accounting for different risks and resources. If initial recommendations concerned both ESBL-PE and CPE, guidelines specifically addressing CPE control were published later by CDC with a toolkit (2015) and by ECDC and WHO (2017). (49–51) These recommendations highlighted the importance of hand hygiene, active surveillance cultures to monitor colonization and infection, contact precautions, and patient isolation. More specifically for CPE, they also recommended patient and staff cohorting, enhanced environmental cleaning, preemptive contact precautions combined with thorough admission and contact screening, but also highlighted the importance of inter-facility communications. WHO adapted later its multimodal hand hygiene improvement strategy in 2019 to facilitate the implementation of multifaceted interventions for CPE control. (52)

Multi-faceted interventions combined universal and targeted precautions and proved to be efficient to control nosocomial ESBL-E spread. (53) Of note, most of the evidence is based from before-and-after studies occurring in the midst of outbreaks. Considering CPE, a recent systematic review and reanalysis using interrupted time series analysis observed that multifaceted recommendations using complementary infection control measures, classically active case finding, contact precautions, cohorting or isolation, hand hygiene, staffing education, and hospital hygiene, were efficient to control epidemic or endemic CRE, carbapenem-resistant *A. baumannii*, and carbapenem-resistant *P. aeruginosa*. (54)

Specifically addressing multidrug resistant *P. aeruginosa* and *A. baumannii*, represents a complex challenge because of the variability of their genome and diversity of resistance mechanisms. However, outbreak investigations in an Israeli hospital observed that such infection control measures, including cohorting, dedicated equipment and staffing can effectively control the nosocomial spread of carbapenem-resistant *A. baumannii*. (55)

Effectiveness of hand hygiene

Currently, scientific consensus considers hand hygiene as one of the core measures to control susceptible and resistant Gram-negative bacteria. However, despite robust evidence confirming hand hygiene effectiveness to control nosocomial MRSA, (56) only few studies evaluated in-vitro and in-vivo efficacy of ABHR on Gram-negative bacteria. (57,58) Kaier et al. used time-series analysis to evaluate the ecological impact of alcohol-based hand rub (ABHR) volumes on ESBL-PE incidence from 2005 to 2007, adjusting for community importation and antimicrobial consumption while keeping constant other infection control measures. (57) Though most of nosocomial ESBL-PE were influenced by community importation, ABHR volume had a negative temporal relationship with ESBL-PE incidence (6.73% decrease of ESBL-PE incidence every ABHR litres per 1'000 patient-days after 4 months). Despite hardly interpretable lags, their model explained 75% of the monthly variations of nosocomial ESBL-PE incidence. To note, no studies evaluated the specific efficacy of hand hygiene on CPE, this intervention always being included in larger multifaceted bundle approaches.

Specific challenges of contact precautions

Contact precautions imply wearing a gown and gloves upon entry in patients' rooms. It is also recommended to use dedicated or single-use non-critical care equipment when caring for patients. Preemptive contact precautions apply when these measures are implemented in the absence

of microbiological confirmation. Usually preemptive contact precautions are implemented at admission of patients at risk to be colonized and discontinued after sequential consecutive screening tests.

However, contact precautions and isolation are not trivial measures, associated with noninfectious and infectious adverse events. As noninfectious adverse events, contact precautions were observed to potentially increase the risk of depression and anxiety, but also to decrease the contact time between patients and physicians with an uncertain impact on care. (59,60) Mental health issues were explored by small underpowered studies, with findings potentially confounded by the status of MDRO carriers, more susceptible to experience co-morbidities or extended length of stay. Morgan DJ et al. (2013) covertly observed 7'743 healthcare workers over 1'989 hours, and reported 36.4% decreased hourly HCW visits rates (4.37 to 2.78 visits per hour), 17.7% decreased patient contact time (16.98 to 13.98 minutes per hour), and 23.6% fewer visitors. (61) Harris et al. (2013) also covertly observed 6'988 HCW visits in ICU during 1'473 hours, and observed a significant decrease of hourly HCW visits from 5.24 (4.46-6.16) to 4.28 (3.95-4.64) hours ($p=0.02$) following universal gloving and gowning for all patient contact. (62) Interestingly, both studies observed an increased adherence to hand hygiene when exiting patients' rooms (47.4% to 63.2% with contact precautions, and 62.9% to 78.3% with contact precautions). Effect of contact precautions on patient care is more controversial, with increased preventable adverse events (falls, electrolyte disorders) and worsening process of care measures (documentation of vital signs, days without a physician or nursing note). (63,64) However, larger studies using standardized tools to measure adverse events related to the quality of care (IHI Global Trigger tool) observed either no difference or fewer adverse events when applying contact precautions. (62,65) Whether this tool is sensitive enough to capture relevant adverse events and whether potentially undetected

adverse events are clinically relevant remains to be determined. Additional challenges include the limited hospital capacity in single-bed room patients, and overall costs incurred by additional isolation material, cleaning and disinfection material, additional working time, and single-use material. In 2017, these costs were estimated at 158.90\$ [95%CI 124.90-192.80] following 24 hours of detailed observation of 10 patients under contact precaution in acute care wards of a Swiss University Hospital. (66)

First, gloves and gowns potentially constituting a transmission vector, infectious adverse events might occur during failures to comply with adequate doffing and donning, for example with deviations from recommendations (intentional), process or procedural mistakes (non intentional), slips or lapses (non intentional). (67) Outbreaks reporting a direct association with gloving are scarce, (68) but microbiological confirmation of glove-related outbreaks remain methodologically difficult and certainly impeded reporting. Second, an inverse relationship between the number of indications and adherence to contact precautions has been observed, which might yield negative ecological consequences. In 2009, Dahr et al. conducted 1'013 covert observations HCW, and observed a dropping adherence with contact precautions from 31.5% to 6.5% when isolation burden increased from less than 20% to more than 60%. (69)

Due to noninfectious and infectious side effects, as well as considering the resources, infrastructural constraints, and costs incurred by contact precautions, adequate evaluation of their specific efficacy for each indication is important. However, such evaluation is scarce, limited by impaired generalizability, residual confounding, and detection bias. First, the generalizability of existing evidence is impaired by the number of confounding exposures related to settings, patients, and infection control measures. Effectively, contact precautions are often evaluated as a part of a bundle, which makes it difficult to disentangle the relative efficacy of

this measure. Second, traditional weekly screening schedules are insufficient to capture all acquisition or transmission events, resulting in detection bias. Admission and discharge screening should ideally be implemented in such studies. Despite these limitations, there is a growing evidence following discontinuation of universal contact precautions, targeted contact precautions for ESBL-PE, or targeted contact precautions for non-*E.coli* ESBL-PE.

Effectiveness of universal contact precautions

Effectiveness of universal gloving and gowning trials against targeted contact precautions for MRSA and VRE control has been evaluated by the BUGG study (Table 1), a cluster-controlled trial including 20 American ICUs in 2012. (62) Ten ICUs were randomized to universal gloving and gowning, and the other half was randomized to standard of care (targeted measures). Using robust methods, the authors implemented admission and discharge screening, and closely monitored acquisition rates, healthcare related infections, hand hygiene adherence, and adherence to contact precautions. To note, chlorhexidine bathing was performed in five and seven ICUs in the control and intervention arm, respectively. A later nested study of this trial specifically evaluated the effectiveness of universal contact precautions on MDR-GNB control, including 20'246 patients. (70) Following a generalized linear mixed model, universal contact precautions resulted in an overall rate ratio (RR) for MDR-GNB acquisition of 0.90 [95%CI, 0.71-1.12, p=0.34], with no specific benefits on CPE (RR 0.86 [95%CI 0.60-1.24, p=0.43], ESBL-PE (RR 0.94 [95%CI 0.71-1.24], p=0.67), carbapenem-resistant *Acinetobacter* [RR 0.81 [95%CI 0.52-1.27, p=.36], carbapenem-resistant *Pseudomonas* [RR 0.88 [95%CI 0.55-1.42, p=0.62], and with no change after adjustment for colonization pressure. This finding is supported by prior evidence, with multiple quasi-experimental studies and a mathematical model observing no change in MDRO incidence density, acquisition, and ICU-acquired MDRO infection rates. (71–74) To note, all these studies were performed

in ICU settings with low-to-medium endemicity levels (France, USA), with heterogeneous definitions for contact precautions, various screening strategies, and unclear percentage of available single-bed rooms, probably adding residual confounding. Such estimates might differ in high-endemicity settings; however in this case, hand hygiene and cohorting would probably be preferred as universal measures, considering the effect of isolation burden on adherence. (69)

Table 1. Studies evaluating universal versus targeted contact precautions to control nosocomial MDRO spread

	Design & control	Settings & No. patient	Intervention Bundle ?	MDRO	Contact precaution definition	Screening cultures	Gloves & gowns adherence	Hand hygiene adherence	Major findings
Furuya EY et al. (2018)	QE ; historical & 3 concomittant ICU controls	3 ICU (..% single room)	I: 8Y Universal CP C: 1Y Targeted CP	MRSA VRE CRKP	...	Admission (MRSA, VRE) ^a	No significant change in hospital-acquired MDRO incidence density rate
Djibré M et al. (2017)	QE post-test control	1 ICU (100% single room)	I: 6M universal preemptive CP C: 6M targeted preemptive CP	MDRO	Glove + gown + isolation	Admission Weekly	No significant change in MDRO acquisition rate
Kardas-Sloma et al. (2017)	Dynamic stochastic transmission model	Simulated ICU	I1: 1Y CP C: 1Y HH (80% HH adherence among all ICU patients)	ESBL-PE	CP defined as 80% HH adherence among carriers	N/A	N/A	N/A	Higher overall costs compared to hand hygiene strategy
Ledoux et al. (2016)	QE ; post test control	1 ICU (100% single room)	I: 12M universal preemptive CP C: 12M targeted preemptive CP	MDRO	Glove + gown + isolation	Admission Weekly	...	Similar ABHR consumption (not shown)	No significant change in ICU-acquired MDRO infection
Harris et al. (2013)	Nested analysis of prior cluster randomized trial	30 ICUs (...% single room)	I: 9M universal CP C: 9M targeted CP	CR-PSA, CR-ABAU, ESBL-PE, CPE	Glove + gown	Admission Discharge	<u>Gloves</u> (I) 86.2% (C) 84.1% <u>Gowns</u> (I) 85.1% (C) 81.2%	(C) 62.9 – (I) 78.3% ^b	No significant change in MDR-GNB acquisition rate

^a: Not all ICUs performed screening

^b: Hand hygiene adherence evaluated when exiting rooms

Effectiveness of contact precautions targeting non-*E.coli* ESBL-

PE

The growing prevalence and related control efforts of ESBL-EC in particular due to the community clone ST131 increasingly strained staffing resources and hospital capacity in single-bed rooms. (29) To address this issue specific to ESBL-EC, several centers attempted to discontinue contact precautions for this species (Table 2). Tschudin et al. evaluated transmissibility of ESBL-EC in a cohort study among an acute-care hospital and affiliated LTCF, using discharge screening for all contacts of an index case. (41) This study observed low ESBL-EC transmission rates in acute-care hospitals (2.6%) and LTCFs (8.8%). Similar transmission rates for ESBL-PE were observed in the same acute-care hospitals during implementation of contact precautions for all ESBL-PE (1.5% among 133 contact patients). (75) Authors also observed similar rates among other acute-care hospitals and LTCFs. (41) Interestingly, ESBL-PE positive roommates had superior contact time compared to negative roommates (median 13 days (IQR 10-15) vs 8 days (IQR 5-12), $p=0.006$). (41) In 2015, Biehl et al. observed similar results in a prospective cohort study including 1'386 and 1'582 patients from two hematology and oncology sites, respectively, implementing single-room contact precautions in addition to standard precautions for F3GCR-EC. (76) Admission and discharge screening were complemented by whole genome sequencing to ascertain transmission events. Despite the large sample size and the robust screening strategy, only three transmission events were observed. Interestingly, the authors estimated the number of patients needed to screen to prevent one transmission event at 3'729. Another cohort study performed by Zahar et al. retrospectively compared ESBL-EC incidence between two French hospitals from 2006 to 2010, one implementing standard precautions and another implementing contact precautions targeting ESBL-EC. (77) Concomitant increase in ESBL-EC incidence was observed in both intervention and control groups, without any clear difference. However, the different age of patients (median age

of 61 vs 9 years-old patients) hospitalized in interventional and control hospitals might have confounded the effect of contact precautions. Nevertheless, sufficient evidence with reproducible results is now available from different healthcare settings to support the discontinuation of contact precautions for ESBL-EC.

Table 2. Studies evaluating contact precautions targeting non-*E.coli* ESBL-PE vs ESBL-PE

	Design & control	Settings & No. patient	Intervention Bundle ?	MDRO	Contact precaution	Screening	Gloves & gowns adherence	Hand hygiene adherence	Major findings
Biehl et al. (2019)	Prospective cohort study	4 (2xI & 2xC) haematological and oncological departments	I: 12M CP C: 12M SP	F3GCR-EC	Single room + glove + gown	Admission + discharge	...	>80%	Same rate of hospital-acquisition and transmission
Tschudin et al. (2016)	Prospective cohort study	Acute care hospital (91.3% rooms with 1-2 beds) LTCF (52.5% rooms with 1-2 beds)	18M: no CP for ESBL-EC	ESBL-EC	...	Contact screening (once before discharge, swab & cultures)	...	>90%	Transmission with 2.6% (acute care) and 8.8% (LTCF) of contacts.
Zahar et al. (2015)	Retrospective cohort study	2 (I & C) University Hospitals	5Y: CP for ESBL-EC 5Y: SP for ESBL-EC	ESBL-EC	Private room + dedicated material + gown for long and close care	Admission and weekly screening ^a	...	Similar consumption of ABHR	No significant change in ESBL-E incidence between the two hospitals

^a: only in ICUs. Only clinical cultures were considered in the ESBL-E incidence

Effectiveness of contact precautions targeting ESBL-PE

As detailed above, certain species such as *K.pneumoniae* may spread more easily. However, some centers discontinued contact precautions not only for ESBL-EC but for all ESBL-PE regardless of the species, and provided the opportunity to evaluate the specific effectiveness of contact precautions for all ESBL-PE (Table 3). (75,78–80) The largest available trial is a cluster randomized cross-over trial (R-GNOSIS) including 11'368 patients screened at least twice from 20 non-intensive care units in four hospitals from 2014 to 2016. (78) This trial aimed to compare contact and standard precautions against standard precautions to control ESBL-

PE acquisition events, using admission, weekly, and discharge screening. Maechler et al. also collected several meaningful confounders, such as antibiotic consumption, colonization pressure (ESBL-PE burden at admission), screening rates, and hand hygiene adherence, which were all similar in both periods. Incidence densities of ward-acquired ESBL-PE were not different in interventional vs control periods (6.0 [95%CI 5.4-6.7] versus 6.1 [95%CI 5.5-6.7] per 1'000 patient-days at risk). This finding did not change after adjustment for length of stay, screening rate, and colonization pressure. Interestingly, the isolation burden significantly decreased during the control phase from 58.9% to 11.2% of patients under contact precautions, but among them, adherence with isolation in a single-bed room drastically increased from 50.3% to 81.4%. We can hypothesize that increased availability of single-bed rooms contributed to a reallocation of resources toward more critical patients. Other studies adopted a quasi-experimental design, were implemented in ICUs and non-critical wards, had various screening strategies and definitions for contact precautions, and did not systematically report hand hygiene adherence. (79,80) Tschudin et al. described in a cohort study very low transmission rates of ESBL-PE among roommates of a positive carrier (n=579) despite a median unprotected time of 3 days (range, 1-37 days). (75) Despite this heterogeneity, the same conclusion was reproduced by several studies with different study designs and patient populations, which supports the discontinuation of ESBL-PE in critical and non-critical wards in low endemicity settings, under the condition of high adherence to standard precautions.

Yet, multiple factors should be considered before deciding to discontinue contact precautions for ESBL-PE. According to Lucet et al., (81) patient-, epidemiology, infection control-, and resource-specific data have to be considered to individualize this decision making. Potential patient-level exposures include shedding high bacterial loads (diarrhea, UTI, wounds), for patients requiring intensive care (increased opportunities at risk), for vulnerable patients (e.g. transplant units). Epidemiological and

microbiological exposures would include epidemic settings, extensively resistant pathogens, ease and route of transmission. Infection control information includes hand hygiene adherence and active surveillance cultures. Resource-related information includes hospital infrastructure (crowded multiple-bed rooms, availability of single-bed rooms), human workforce (dedicated staffing, additional time for donning & doffing), and financial resources.

Table 3. Studies evaluating contact precautions for ESBL-PE

	Design & control	Settings & No. patient	Intervention Bundle ?	MDRO	Contact precaution	Screening	Gloves &-gowns adherence	Hand hygiene adherence	Major findings
Maechler F et al. (2020)	Cluster randomized crossover trial	20 non intensive care units	C: 12M SP I: 12M CP	ESBL-E	Isolation (when possible) + glove + gown	Admission + weekly + discharge	Gowns I: 84% Gloves I: 89%	C: 61% I: 62%	Similar ESBL-PE incidence density
Thompson et al. (2019)	QE ; post test control	1 University hospital	I: 22M CP C: 20M SP	ESBL-E	...	No screening	Increased incidence of healthcare associated ESBL-PE infections with CP
Renaudin et al. (2017)	QE ; post test control	1 ICU (100% single room)	I: 25M CP C: 25M SP	MRSA ESBL-PE	Isolation + gown	Admission + weekly	75% ^a	81% ^a	Lower incidence rate of ICU-acquisition in SP period
Tschudin et al. (2012)	Prospective cohort study	University hospital	I: 12Y SP ^b	ESBL-PE	N/A	Contact screening	N/A	...	Transmission with 1.5% of contacts.

Effectiveness of contact precautions targeting CPE

The current effectiveness of contact precautions targeting CPE has been scarcely described, due to its continuous and almost mandatory application among healthcare facilities. A retrospective cohort study including multiple hospitals totalizing 21,000 beds from 2010 to 2015, described multiple importation events associated with a subsequent outbreak (involving at least one secondary case among contact patients with a defined epidemiological link and with similar species and resistance genes). (82) Upon 655 importation events at admission, 51 (8%) were followed by an outbreak. If implemented in the two days following admission of the index case, contact precautions had a protective effect

(OR 0.41 [95%CI 0.22-0.74], $p < 0.001$). Thus, contact precautions as part of the interventional bundle to control nosocomial CPE seems effective. To note, *K. pneumoniae* was again associated with a higher risk to generate outbreaks (OR 4.98 [95%CI 1.16-21.45]). Furthermore, CPE importations remain associated with large-scale hospital outbreaks, with significant human and economic cost, estimated at €1.1m (range 0.9-1.4) for a 10-months outbreak. (83) In summary, considering the significant burden of CPE and their association with large scale nosocomial outbreaks, no attempt in discontinuing contact precautions has yet been recommended in any national or international guideline. Even infection control nihilists still continue to advocate active screening and contract precautions for CPE control, despite weak evidence and absence of controlled trial data.

Effectiveness of patient or staff cohorting, and isolation in single-bed rooms

Current recommendations suggest to isolate non-*E.coli* ESBL-PE and CPE carriers in endemic settings, and to cohort patients and staff in epidemic settings. (9) The additive effect of isolation in single-bed rooms on effectiveness of contact precautions has recently been quantified. In a large cluster-randomized, cross-over study including 16 Dutch hospitals from 2011 to 2014, Kluytmans et al. compared the efficiency of contact precautions in single-bed room versus multiple bed-rooms to control ESBL-PE. (84) This study included a total of 312 and 304 index patients for respectively 4'790 and 4'578 roommates for both single-bed and multiple-bed room strategies. To note, 88% and 62% of index patients were adherent to the assigned strategy. When regarding per-protocol populations, ESBL-PE transmission rates to at least one roommate were similar between single-bed and multiple-bed room strategies (crude risk difference 3.4% [90%CI -0.3-7.1]). Though data on complementary infection control measures were not collected (hand hygiene adherence), and despite a low adherence to multiple-bed room strategy, this study

used a robust design and statistical methods to observe no difference between contact precautions with isolation versus contact precautions without isolation. However, this study was not able to include a third group without contact precautions, but observed an increased risk of ESBL-PE transmission with unprotected ward stay. These findings were supported by another study by Repessé et al. evaluating the effectiveness of contact precautions without isolation on ESBL-PE transmission rates, using an ICU with only twin-bed rooms. (17) To note, gloves were not included in the definition of contact precautions. Despite the absence of single-bed rooms, the authors observed 4.1% ESBL acquisition and only 2 cross-transmission events among 470 patients from 2014 to 2015. In contrast, Prevel et al. observed in 2015 only 1% ESBL-E acquisition event and only 1 ESBL-E cross-transmission event among 608 ICU patients screened at admission and weekly in ICU applying contact precautions and isolation for all known ESBL-E carriers. (85) The reproducibility of these studies, along with the low frequency of ESBL-PE transmission events in hospitals argue against an additive effect of isolation during application of contact precautions in non-epidemic settings.

Table 3. Studies evaluating the additive effect of isolation on contact precautions

	Design & control	Settings & No. patient	Intervention Bundle ?	MDRO	Contact precaution	Screening	Gloves &-gowns adherence	Hand hygiene adherence	Major findings
Kluytmans-van den Bergh et al. (2019)	Cluster-randomized cross-over study	16 hospitals	I1: CP in multiple bed-room I2: CP in single bed-room	ESBL-PE	Glove + gowns	Baseline weekly	Similar ESBL-PE transmission rates
Repressé et al. (2017)	Prospective cohort study	1 ICU (0% single room)	C: 11M CP	ESBL-PE	Gown	Admission Weekly	...	135-137 L/1'000 patient days	4.1% ESBL acquisition & 2 transmission events

Considering CPE control, the importance of patient isolation or cohorting has been strongly emphasized, despite the scarcity of evidence. A selection of outbreak investigations reporting staggered interventions

failed to control the spread until cohorting of patients and staff. (86) In Israel, the implementation and strict adherence to isolation of CR-K. *pneumoniae* carriers successfully controlled large institutional outbreaks, (87) and decreased monthly nationwide incidence of clinically diagnosed CRE carriers from 55.5 patients per 100'000 patient-days to 11.7 patients per 100'000 patients-days ($p=0.001$). (88) This measure should apply to patients and staff, and ideally would include dedicated medical devices. Cohorting CRE patients is more appropriate in epidemic settings, and proved to be efficient in reducing the rate of CRE acquisition in highly endemic settings. (89)

Effectiveness of alternative MDRO control measures

While complementary infection control approaches are outside the scope of this thesis, they might also contribute to control nosocomial ESBL-E and CPE spread, including AMS. A recent retrospective study evaluating the impact of a comprehensive hospital-based AMS on healthcare-associated versus community-associated MDRO using interrupted time series analysis, observed that the mean monthly incidence of HA-MDRO infections decreased by 13% (IRR 0.87 [95%CI 0.73-1.04]), while CA-MDRO simultaneously increased by 68% (IRR 1.68 [95%CI 1.57-1.82]). (90) Though this intervention might have failed by itself to prevent spread of MDRO, (48) it probably contributed to the overall effect from bundled interventions and remains recommended in several guidelines. (9,48) However, AMS benefits might depend on the type of AMS implemented, species and resistance considered. (91)

Hospital hygiene with adequate environmental cleaning also participates in controlling nosocomial MDRO spread, though evidence is currently insufficient to quantify its importance for MDR-GNB. (92) Aquatic reservoirs and especially hospital sinks are increasingly recognized in waterborne outbreaks. From 2014 to 2017, 134 of 620 (21.6%) consultations with 1'380 patients involved transmission of water-related

organisms in healthcare. (93) Splashing effects to medication preparations were identified as a frequent pathway.

Finally, ESBL and CPE decolonization by topical antibiotic regimens has been suggested as possible additional measure, as done for MRSA decolonization for several decades. However, hypothesized benefits of decolonization regimens for 3GCR-E and CRE carriers have been refuted by several recent randomized controlled trials (94). Thus, based on an exhaustive systematic review, current guidelines do not recommend using decolonization regimens for these pathogens. (95)

Summary

In summary, although bundled preventive interventions are efficient to control CPE and ESBL-E, specific benefits from each individual component remain poorly studied and influenced by various species-, patient-, care-, organizational-, and epidemiological factors. Evidence is encouraging but remains scarce when discontinuing contact precautions in different settings (e.g. LTCFs, highly endemic settings) for all ESBL-PE. Considering the burden related to CPE, and large scale CPE outbreaks reported in hospitals, disentangling efficient bundled interventions by discontinuing contact precautions is not an option for CPE.

Part 3) The role of active surveillance in preventing nosocomial MDR-GNB cross-transmission

Active surveillance remains a core component of bundled interventions for controlling both epidemic and endemic nosocomial MDR-GNB. This surveillance can be either targeted or universal, implemented at admission or by regular weekly screenings. Few hospital units even

perform discharge screening. Active surveillance yields individual and ecological benefits. At the individual level, the surveillance supports timely and adequate implementation of infection control measures. It may also allow more appropriate empiric therapy in MDRO carriers with clinical infections, or may help to adjust perioperative surgical prophylaxis. At the ecological level, surveillance cultures may help to monitor the local MDRO epidemiology, unveil silent outbreaks, and contribute to improved care by monitoring the effect of interventions. Surveillance can be implemented universally among all hospitalized patients at admission and by a regular basis (weekly), or targeted among patients presenting predefined risk profiles. This surveillance can be implemented either institutionally or in high-risk units such as ICUs.

Effectiveness of universal screening to control nosocomial ESBL-PE and CPE

Targeted vertical control measures based on universal screening were compared against universal horizontal control measures to control MDR-GNB by Derde et al. using a cluster randomized trial among 13 ICUs. (96) Enhanced hand hygiene (adherence, 77%), chlorhexidine bathing, and contact precautions were compared to a strategy of universal admission and weekly phenotypic screening and contact precautions targeting known carriers. No significant difference was observed between both phases in steps and trend changes for MDRO acquisition (weekly IRR 0.63 [%95CI 0.35-1.15] and 1.02 [95%CI 0.99-1.03]). Thus, universal surveillance screening failed to improve ESBL control in ICUs. However, alternative transmission pathways such as environmental reservoirs were not considered and could have contributed to MDRO acquisitions. Another study attempted to quantify the specific benefits from universal surveillance, by Jalalzai et al., which discontinued universal admission and weekly screening in a single ICU, including 524 and 545 patients in the surveillance and non-surveillance phases during two periods of 12 months. (97) The authors observed no difference regarding ICU-acquired

ESBL-PE infections (1.1 versus 1.5%, $p=0.64$), but a decrease in antibiotic consumption during the non-surveillance phase (75 to 61 carbapenem days per 1'00 patient-days, $p=0.01$). However, if these two studies advocate against universal surveillance screening to control ESBL-PE, they may have overlooked some of its significant side-benefits.

Effectively, active surveillance can contribute in unveiling hidden reservoirs, ultimately improving epidemiological understanding of unknown transmission chains. Otter et al. implemented enhanced CPE screening, with resulting increased number of screenings (4'530 to 10'589 from July 2015 to March 2018), but similar proportion of positive screening (0.4%) and an increased rate of CPE detection. (98) These findings suggested prior under-detection of CPE acquisitions and contributed to guiding more aggressive infection control policies. Another side-benefit is the detection of institutional cross-transmission events, facilitating early outbreak management. Also, regular screening can improve the detection of certain cases previously missed at admission. An increased detection rate of Gram-negative bacteria carriage has been observed in early hospitalization days for unclear reasons, probably due to unmasked carriage following antibiotic treatment, or nosocomial acquisition. (99)

Effectiveness of targeted screening to control nosocomial ESBL-PE and CPE

Targeted screening specifically focuses on patients presenting defined risk profiles, which can be similar for both ESBL-PE and CPE carriers. Traditional risk profiles consider the previous exposure to healthcare settings, transfer and repatriation from abroad, prior antibiotic exposure, known carriage, and prior procedures (dialysis, invasive procedures) (31,50,100) The risk from prior healthcare exposure depends on the epidemiological situation of the healthcare facility and country. (22) Travels in foreign countries with high endemicity might also constitute a

risk depending on patient characteristics (immunosuppression, co-morbidities) and exposure related to this travel (hospital, diarrhea). (50) However, the complexity of risk profiles might result in a significant information bias, which requires to simplify history taking by including only the most significant exposures (i.e. overnight stay in a healthcare setting, hospitalization abroad (22)).

Targeted screening was compared against universal screening by Dananché et al. by a quasi-experimental study with concomitant controls. No increase in 3GCR-E related healthcare-associated infection incidence rates was observed after replacing universal screening by screening targeting patients transferred from other units or hospitals. (101) However, targeted screening depends on risk profiles considered and adherence of healthcare workers to thoroughly extract the relevant information. Lusignani et al. observed in a retrospective case-control study from 2011 to 2016 in a European academic hospital using admission screening among patients at-risk that 37 (63.8%) of the 58 CPE carriers were not identified by their risk-based screening (0.12/1000 admissions were CPE carriers). (102)

The importance of sequential screening

Importation events are mostly driven by a subpopulation of patients either hospitalized abroad or known for prior carriage, with a high pre-test probability to be colonized. For example, an observational study assessing MDRO prevalence among patients hospitalized abroad between 2010 and 2019 observed that colonization rates in patients transferred from Asia were 71.9% (69/96) versus 18.9% (99/524) from Europe. (22) Overall, 23% (163/698) were colonized by ESBL-E, and 2% (14/698) by CPE. Prevalence was even higher when these patients had prior ICU stays or antibiotic treatments. Thus, among patients with hospitalization abroad, up to two sequential screening cultures may be recommended to account for the risk of false negative results, originating from multiple

factors, including pre-analytical (sampling quality), and analytical determinants (test under-performing, bacterial load under the detection threshold in patients under efficient antibiotic treatment). Similarly, sequential cultures are also required to report decolonization of known ESBL-E and CPE carriers. In this context, up to five negative screening cultures may be recommended. ESCMID guidelines recommended to stop contact precautions after at least three consecutive negative screening cultures targeting the organism over a week or two among patient not receiving antibiotics. (9) However, considering the complexity of factors influencing both risk profiles and diagnostic performances, an ECDC guidance suggested to act at a case by case basis (at least for known carriers). (50) The indication and methods defining sequential screenings remain largely arbitrary and could benefit from further research. Sequential screening practices are thus highly heterogeneous among countries and might consequently delay the time under contact precautions or isolation, and increase screening-related costs. To note, the pertinence of sequential screening samples among known carriers is intrinsically related to the clearance of carriage, which depends on re-acquisition events, and the definition of carriage duration, frequency of intermittent or persistent carriage, as it was previously defined for MRSA. (103) However, there is not a single screening strategy adequate for all types of MDR-GNB and patients. Furthermore, risk factors for intermittent or persistent carriage are not well defined yet, and might depend on patient and setting characteristics.

Summary

In summary, although universal, systematic active surveillance screening is not efficient to control MDR-GNB acquisition and transmission rates compared to targeted screening, its side-benefits should not be ignored, including fortuitous detection of institutional clusters, and epidemiological monitoring of pathogens of concern. Targeted screening remains a core measure to control importation events, but is highly dependent on the

correct, rapid, and exhaustive identification of the subpopulation targeted. Sequential screening for certain subpopulations at high risk remains an important but understudied parameter.

Part 4) The role of diagnostic stewardship programs in active surveillance screening

Screening strategies might be complemented by diagnostic stewardship, which is defined according to GLASS as the “*coordinated guidance and interventions to improve appropriate use of microbiological diagnostics to guide therapeutic decisions. It should promote appropriate, timely diagnostic testing, including specimen collection, and pathogen identification and accurate, timely reporting of results to guide patient treatment.*” (104) Diagnostic stewardship encompasses pre-analytical, analytical, and post-analytical processes to contribute to more rapid, robust, and actionable diagnostic procedures. This includes the identification and optimization of target populations, sampling methods and processing, the selection of appropriate screening tests, and the timely notification and interpretation of accurate results.

Identification of patients at-risk in active surveillance screening

The rapid identification of candidates for admission screening also accelerates the delay before screening and overall turn-around times. Based on several outbreak reports and following ESCMID recommendations, readmission alerts are currently suggested to facilitate identification of known carriers. (9) Other risk factors are either standardized (overnight stay in a healthcare facility) or dynamic and assessed with IPC specialists (e.g. transfer from a unit with a reported outbreak). Though not included in current guidelines, an evidence-based list of relevant risk factors, which need to be regularly updated, should contribute to rapid and adequate admission screening. Ideally, these risk

factors should be simplified and harmonized to facilitate the early identification of patients at-risk.

Sampling methods in active surveillance screening

Several pre-analytical factors influence the diagnostic performances and turn-around-times until result notification. Such factors include screening sites and sampling methods. Regarding screening samples, intra-anal or rectal swabs are usually preferred to stool cultures or peri-anal swabs to facilitate sampling and processing, and to collect more fecal material. Effectively, rectal sampling was more performant compared to perianal sampling. (105) To note, the performance of peri-anal swabbing is possibly influenced by gender and species, with higher yield observed in males and higher performances for *A. baumannii*. Furthermore, screening samples are not always indicative for colonization at other body sites and should be complemented by clinical cultures when indicated.

A prospective cohort study sampled at various sites (including skin, nasopharynx, urine, rectum, and wounds) all inpatients with ESBL-producing organism related infection. Eighty-eight among 100 patients had no positive clinical cultures outside the primary site of infection. (106) Considering sampling methods, polyurethane-cellular-foam and nylon-flocked swabs observed superior recovery compared to classical rayon swabs used. (105)

Phenotypic and genotypic methods for active surveillance screening

Antimicrobial resistance can either be assessed phenotypically by using Minimal Inhibitory Concentrations (MIC) or genotypically by identifying resistance genes. ESBL and CPE screening methods classically follow a multi-step hybrid strategy based on both phenotypic and genotypic tests, including screening culture, confirmation testing, pathogen identification, and antibiotic susceptibility testing.

Screening cultures are most frequently performed using selective agar supplemented by antibiotics. Addition of chromogens targeting specific enzymes (β -galactosidase, β -glucuronidase and deaminase) allows the early identification of certain pathogen groups, such as ChromID ESBL (Bio-Mérieux, France) or Brilliance ESBL agar (Oxoid, UK) with observed sensitivity values of 97.5% and 98.6%. (107) Selection of CPE is more challenging regarding the various hydrolytic activity of carbapenemases. For instance metallo-beta-lactamases (e.g. NDM, VIM) have a high and broad enzymatic activity, while OXA-48 poorly hydrolyzes carbapenemases and spares 3GC (e.g. ceftazidime). Additional selective agar were developed for CPE (Brilliance CRE (Oxoid, UK), chromID CARBA and chromID OXA-48 (bioMérieux, France), and McConkey agar supplemented with ertapenem and cloxacillin). ESBL selective media can also contribute to CPE screening, with 3GC hydrolysis by carbapenemases, though they have a reduced sensitivity. (107) Diagnostic performances of selective ESBL and CPE media are particularly low for OXA-48, which requires a specific medium (e.g. ChromID OXA-48). (108) The susceptibility profile of each isolate for different antibiotic classes is then measured by disc diffusion method using defined MIC breakpoints (either EUCAST or CLSI), commercially available semi-automated assays (Vitek 2, BioMérieux ; Phoenix, BD Diagnostics), or broth micro-dilution. To note, CLSI breakpoints have recently been lowered to improve sensitivity of tests. (109) Phenotypic confirmation testing for ESBL includes double-disc synergy tests (DDST) and combined disc tests (CDT), which often uses beta-lactamase inhibitors to preclude non-ESBL mediated resistance (hyperproducing K1 penicillinases and high level AmpC production). Phenotypic confirmation testing for carbapenemases also uses specific inhibitors. Modified Hodge tests have been historically used as confirmation assay, but were recently discarded due to poor diagnostic performances. (107) Biochemical confirmation testing for ESBL and CPE might use colorimetric tests, using a pH indicator on isolates to detect carboxylic acid following hydrolysis

reactions. ESBL-NDP and Carba NP tests observed adequate sensitivity and specificity on isolates. (107) Genotypic ESBL and CPE confirmation testing can also be performed by the characterization of targeted resistance genes present in samples or subsequent isolates using multiplex PCR, microarrays, or Loop-Mediated Isothermal Amplification Assay (LAMP).

Phenotypic methods are efficient and inexpensive for detecting the most frequent pathogens. (110) However, their performance remains dependent on the sampling quality, (111) and their results are often delayed by 36-48 hours. (112) Thus, current microbiologic culture methods are slow and not adapted to the rapid turnover in busy ICU settings. Molecular methods address some of these pitfalls, sparing the culturing effort, and resulting in a reduced turn-around time. (113,114) Genotypic methods are more discriminant, and thus more useful in informing epidemiology and infection control, helping to ascertain cross transmission events. They can also decrease the required volume of sampling because of their improved sensitivity. (115) However, molecular methods also suffer from several limitations. First, their breadth is limited to the selected molecular targets, which could result in insufficient coverage of emerging or rare resistance genes. Second, the poor specificity might impact the clinical pertinence of notified results. Third, their cost-effectiveness is still unclear, but might become attractive when compared to the cost of unnecessary isolation. (116)

In order to improve effective ESBL-PE control strategies in the ICU setting, there is a need for a fast, sensitive, and reasonably specific but also cost-effective screening test.(117) Currently, most of genotypic methods are validated and performed on isolates, reducing the expected time benefits. However, effectiveness of multiplex PCR, and Loop-Mediated Isothermal Amplification Assays (LAMP) were recently measured when directly applied on screening specimen.

Rapid screening strategy based on multiplex PCR applied on screening specimen

Recent studies observed poor positive predictive values when comparing multiplex PCR directly performed on screening specimen against selective media. Engel et al. evaluated the Check-Direct ESBL Screen for BD MAX (Check-Points Health BV, Netherlands) directly on 573 rectal swabs from Dutch hospitals and compared with a combination of culture (Brilliance agar) and Check-MDR CT103XL (Check-Points). (118) The qPCR assay yielded poor positive predictive values varying between 58.3% and 84.2%, with 26 discordant results (8 culture positive and qPCR negative, and 18 culture negative, qPCR positive). Another study by Jin Ko et al. compared positive Xpert Carba-R assays (Cepheid, USA) against chromID CARBA media (bioMérieux, France) for CPO detection among 30 admission screenings in ICU patients in South Korea. The authors found a positive predictive value of 53.6% [95%CI 40.4-66.4] for this test. (119) However, no study evaluated the clinical effectiveness of using a multiplex PCR directly on screening specimens to accelerate the implementation of infection control measures.

Rapid screening strategy based on LAMP applied on screening specimens

LAMP is a molecular amplification method using a DNA polymerase, Bst polymerase, providing self-replication and strand displacement through the formation of a loop with the help of 4 primers spanning 6 locations on the original DNA target. (120) Details of the LAMP method can be found at: <http://loopamp.eiken.co.jp/e/index.html>. (121) This technique does not use thermal cycles as PCR (122) and its enzyme is less susceptible to inhibitors than the Taq polymerase, (123,124) faster, (122) and as sensitive (125) and specific as home-made qPCR assays. (124) As a basis, the LAMP technology has already proved to be robust, (124) cost-effective, (125) speedy (124,126) and performant for detecting ESBLs and carbapenemases on screening isolates. (127) The

specific LAMP Eazyplex Superbug CRE assay also showed solid performances in the literature for the detection of various ESBLs- and CPE on different types of isolates. (128) A UK study compared in 2015 the diagnostic performance between the Eazyplex SuperBug Complete A kit performed on the GENIE II platform with a reference standard using PCR assays and a commercial microarray (Check-MDR CT102) on 450 clinical isolates with various bacterial species. The overall test sensitivity and specificity were reported as 95.5% and 100%, respectively, although it missed the detection of 18/102 OXA-48 variant carbapenemases genes. The delivery of a modified test "Eazyplex SuperBug complete B kit" resolved later this issue and identified the 18 OXA-181 producers.(129) Another Spanish study compared the Eazyplex SuperBug CRE kit performed on the GENIE II platform with phenotypic methods to identify carbapenemases and ESBLs, but also with conventional PCR assays and sequencing to characterize these enzymes. This study performed on 94 genotypically characterized carbapenemase-producing strains and 45 clinical isolates observed a 100% agreement between the Eazyplex SuperBug CRE system results and the PCR and sequencing results. Another 100% agreement was found between the inferred phenotype of clinical isolates and the Eazyplex SuperBug CRE system results.(127) LAMP demonstrated similar performances on isolates and cultures, for the direct detection of *E.coli* on urine samples.(123) To date, the only study evaluating effectiveness of LAMP to inform infection control measures was recently published by Yamamoto et al. (130) in a quasi-experimental study from Thailand to control carbapenem-resistant *A. baumannii* in ICUs. During 3-months observational and 9-months interventional periods including respectively 187 and 866 patients, and using an universal admission, weekly, and discharge screening (rectal swab & bronchial aspirates), the authors implemented contact precautions based either on culture results (control period) or LAMP results (interventional period). The implementation of LAMP tests was associated with a decreasing incidence rate of CRAB infection from 35.2 to 20.9 per 1'000 patient-days

($p < 0.02$). However, the positive predictive values of this test when performed on bronchial aspirates and rectal swabs remained weak, with respectively 65 % [95%CI 56-73%] and 62% [95%CI 55-69%]. Furthermore, the effect from enhanced screening implemented in the control period could have participated in decreasing the incidence rate during the interventional period. Additionally, the high-endemicity of *A. baumannii* in this setting might impair the generalizability of findings.

Summary

Performances and turn-around-times of the screening strategy are highly impacted by pre-analytical and analytical parameters, including the methods and delay to identify the target population, the selection of sampling methods, sampling sites, and screening tests. Phenotypic tests remain superior for detecting emerging resistance, by delivering key information, such as viability, linking resistance and species identification, and phenotypical susceptibility, but remain slow and delay timely infection control measures. Genotypic tests are rapid and sensitive to identify epidemiologically-relevant information, but have a poor positive predictive value when applied directly on screening specimens and their effectiveness to support infection control measures remains understudied. Nevertheless, there is potential that genotypic surveillance methods might deliver actionable results to accelerate infection control measures in certain settings, such as ICUs.

Part 5) The importance of standardization in surveillance and infection control measures

Indications and application of active surveillance cultures is highly heterogeneous within and between countries. Pathogens targeted by screening vary, with only 21.9% on 329 German hospitals reporting ESBL screening in 2014. (131) Screening strategies also depend on varying risk profiles considered for targeted screening. In The Netherlands, four

among 18 (22.2%) hospitals did not implement admission screening for MDR-GNB targeting patients with an overnight stay in a foreign hospital. (132) As described above, if certain exposures are changing over time (e.g. reported outbreak in a unit), others are constant and could be homogenized and simplified using evidence-based standardized lists. This would ultimately influence sensitivity and specificity of screening strategies but also incurred costs. Variation of screening tests was also observed by Berry et al. in 2016 after surveying acute National Health Service hospital trusts in England. All hospitals performed CPE screening using rectal swabs, but screening tests varied with selective agar, molecular, and other techniques in 76%, 4% and 20% of the cases. (133) Half of hospitals performed local confirmatory CPE testing, among them 56% used phenotypic methods, while others used biochemical or genotypic methods. Echoing these findings in 2019, Tschudin-Sutter et al. observed a consensus between Swiss, German and French tertiary care centers to use phenotypic screening cultures. (134) However, the German center was not using NAAT-based diagnostic approaches for CPE, preferring to provide phenotypic criteria of resistance.

Variation of infection control measures was also observed with heterogeneous definitions of contact precautions among studies. Similarly, patient isolation may differ by (1) placing the patient in multiple-bed rooms, (2) placing the patient in single-bed rooms without designated personnel, (3) placing the patient in single-bed rooms with designated personnel, (4) cohorting all colonized patients with designated personnel. Coppéré et al. observed among 73 French ICUs in 2016 that preemptive isolation at admission was implemented for 60 (82%) ICUs, and only 42 of them (71%) implemented targeted preemptive isolation among patients at-risk. (135) Few ICUs included gloving in the definition of contact precautions, with 18 (25%) and 38 (52%) requiring gloves at room entry or before patient contact. Gown use was defined as part of contact precautions at room entry or before patient contact in 30 (41%)

and 67 (92%) of ICUs. Heterogeneous measures were also observed by Vuichard Gysin et al. when questioning infection control specialists across 213 European (EU) and non-EU countries. Twenty-three percent and 35% of EU and non-EU countries discontinued contact precautions for non-*E.coli* ESBL, and more alarmingly 8.2% and 18.4% of EU and non-EU hospitals did not implement contact precautions for carbapenem resistant non-*E.coli*. (136) The insufficient number of isolation rooms was one of the major encountered barriers impeding correct implementation of isolation. This heterogeneity highlights the need for stronger evidence to build a consensus and homogenize practices to improve MDR-GNB control in the healthcare sector.

Part 6) Thesis objectives and specific aims

This thesis aimed to better understand the transmission dynamics and temporal trends of Gram-negative resistant bacteria, and more specifically of ESBL-producing *E. coli* and *K. pneumoniae* in understudied settings, such as long-term care facilities and the community. Secondly, this thesis aimed to improve active surveillance screening strategies by measuring existing gaps and barriers, and by evaluating innovative screening methods in accelerating infection control measures and controlling MDR-GNB among high-risk patients.

Specific aims for this study include :

ESBL-PE epidemiology in the community

- To assess the proportion of co-carriage and transmission of ESBL-producing *E.coli* and *K.pneumoniae* among household members.

ESBL-PE epidemiology in a long-term care facility

- To assess the temporal trends in the prevalence of ESBL-EC clones in a long-term care facility

- To estimate the epidemic potential of emergent ESBL-EC subclones in a long-term care facility

Implementation and efficacy of screening strategies to control antibiotic-resistant Gram-negative bacteria

- To evaluate current MDRO admission screening practices in Swiss hospitals and barriers impeding their implementation
- To compare traditional phenotypic methods with rapid screening strategies to accelerate the discontinuation of unnecessary preemptive CP for negative patients screened at admission, and the implementation of infection control measures for newly identified carriers.

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CHAPTER TWO

Nosocomial and community epidemiology of ESBL-producing *E. coli* and *K. pneumoniae*

Part 1) Epidemiology of ESBL-producing *Escherichia coli* from repeated prevalence studies over 11 years in a long-term-care facility

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Abstract

Background:

Escherichia coli sequence type (ST) 131 H30 is an emerging multidrug resistant subclone, known to spread and cause outbreaks in long-term care facilities (LTCFs).

Objectives and Methods:

From 2010 through 2020, we performed 11 yearly surveillance studies for determining the prevalence of digestive carriage of ESBL-producing *E. coli* (ESBL-EC) among residents in a university-affiliated LCTF. Sequencing and genotyping of selected isolates were performed to characterize temporal trends in the prevalence and epidemic potential of ESBL-EC subclones, and for evaluating a potential rebound effect following discontinuation of contact precautions for ESBL-EC carriers in January 2019.

Results:

This study included 2'403 LTCF residents, with 252 (10.5%) positive for ESBL-EC. Among the 236 ESBL-EC isolates available for typing, 58.0% belonged to the ST131 lineage, including 94/137 (68.6%) ST131 H30 isolates. An increasing yearly prevalence was observed for ESBL-EC (from 4.6% to 9.4%; $p=0.11$), but not for the ST131 H30 subclone, which peaked in 2015 and declined thereafter. Multiple previously unnoticed ESBL-EC outbreaks occurred in the LTCF. Since 2018, we noted the clonal expansion of a rare ST131 H89 subclone (O16:H5) harboring CTX-M-14 and CTX-M-24. No rebound effect was observed in ESBL-EC prevalence nor in the different subclones following discontinuation of contact precautions for ESBL-EC carriers since 2019.

Conclusion:

Clonal fluctuation was observed for ST131 H30 ESBL-EC with a current decline in prevalence. Surveillance should include the evolution of ST131 non-H30 subclones, which may spread in LTCFs. Our findings suggest that discontinuation of contact precautions for ESBL-EC carriers in LTCFs may be safely implemented, in support of European recommendations to limit ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae control measures in endemic settings to non-*E.coli*.

Introduction

The global spread of extended-spectrum beta-lactamase producing *Escherichia coli* (ESBL-EC) is driven by the emergence of successful clones such as *E.coli* ST131, particularly transmissible in long-term care facilities (LTCFs) [1,2]. For instance, between 1996 and 2014, an increase of ESBL-EC was noticed in French LTCFs, reflecting clonal spread, with a 18.1% prevalence of ST131 clones [3,4]. In Swiss nursing homes, the proportion of ESBL-EC increased from 5% to 22% between 2007 and 2017 [5].

The increasing prevalence of *E.coli* ST131 among LTCFs is mostly explained by the clonal expansion of emerging multi-resistant clades of ESBL-EC [6], responsible for silent clusters among residents in LTCFs [7], including the fluoroquinolone-resistant clades C1 (C1/H30-R) and C2 (C2/H30-Rx) [8]. The reasons behind this apparent success are still controverted, but recent genomic and proteomic studies suggest that an improved anaerobic metabolism, as well as other human colonization and virulence factors helped this clone outcompeting the gut commensal niche, [9–11] with consecutive prolonged colonization. [12] This lineage particularly fostered the community spread of CTX-M, by the maintenance of clade-restricted MDR plasmids. [13] A nested cohort study of a large clinical trial recently observed the dominance of C1/H30-

R ESBL-EC in participating European LTCFs [14]. In that study, 49% (16/33) of all ESBL-EC ST131 carriers in Geneva were positive for C1/H30-R, compared to 20-39% in the 3 other centers outside Switzerland.

Considering the excess mortality and hospital stay associated with third-generation-cephalosporin-resistant *E.coli* [15,16], the epidemic potential of these ESBL-EC clades represents an infection control challenge in LTCFs, in particular in institutions without contact precautions for ESBL-EC carriers [17]. Effectively, many LTCFs around the world have discontinued contact precautions for ESBL-EC carriers, in light of recent studies on low nosocomial ESBL-EC transmission rates and endemic community carriage [17].

Specific aims

In our university-affiliated LTCF, yearly prevalence surveys were conducted from 2010 to 2020 as routine surveillance strategy to monitor the epidemiology of ESBL-producing Enterobacterales (ESBL-PE). In the present study, we sought to (i) characterize the temporal trends in the prevalence of ESBL-EC subclones among LTCF residents; (ii) combine epidemiological information with sequencing approaches to estimate the epidemic potential of emergent ESBL-EC subclones; and (iii), determine a potential rebound effect after de-implementation of contact precautions for carriers of these subclones.

Methods

Design and setting

This 11-year retrospective study was constituted by yearly prevalence surveys from 2010 through 2020, performed during January-February of each year, among all LCTF residents. Eight long-term care wards from a

same geographical site, representing 216 beds were included. From 2018 onwards, we added four long-term care wards from a second site, representing 73 beds.

Outcomes

The primary outcome included the overall prevalence of ESBL-EC carriage and abundance of different subclones across years, defined as the total number of positive cases per 100 screened residents. Secondary outcomes included the overall prevalence of ESBL-PE, the number of clusters (i.e. at least two residents sharing a ST131 H30, ST131 non-H30, and non-ST131 strain in the same ward the same year), the prevalence of subclones in the wards concerned by these clusters, and the proportion of clonally related strains among these clusters. Clonal relatedness was defined based on genomes, using a threshold in the pairwise distance of ≤ 10 SNP differences, as suggested elsewhere [18].

Infection control practices

In addition to standard precautions, until December 2018, all identified ESBL-PE carriers were placed under contact precautions, including gloves, hydrophobic coats, and, whenever possible, isolation in single-bed rooms. Contact precautions were abandoned for ESBL-EC from January 2019 onwards, with simultaneous reinforcement of standard precautions using routine observation and feedback from infection control nurses, in particular hand hygiene.

Health-related data

Epidemiological information was prospectively collected for each participant during the surveys, including ward location, admission date, date of sampling, previous positive cultures, age, and gender. We collected yearly hand hygiene adherence of healthcare workers in LTCFs from 2014 to 2020 according to WHO methods, as well as the length of

stay of all residents in the concerned wards during January and February, from 2010 to 2020.

Microbiological methods

Rectal swabs (E-swab, Copan) or stool cultures were collected for all participants, and processed using selective chromogenic agar (ChromID ESBL; bioMérieux). All colonies that met the expected chromogenic features provided in the manufacturers' specifications were identified by matrix-assisted laser desorption ionization–time of flight (MALDI-TOF) mass spectrometry (Bruker Daltonics, Bremen, Germany) and the antibiotic susceptibility profiles of each isolate was determined by the disk diffusion method using EUCAST breakpoints and recommendations [19]. Double-disk synergy tests (DDST20 and DDST30) were used for ESBL confirmation, ensuring a high sensitivity and specificity for ESBL-PE detection [20]. Assessment by ESBL + AmpC Screen Kit 98008 (Rosco Diagnostica, Denmark) was also performed to identify the partially de-repressed AmpC whenever the results of the DDST20 and ceftioxin tests were not conclusive.

Molecular typing

Allelic discrimination qPCR assays were performed on all newly detected ESBL-EC to ascertain ST131 lineages and H30 subtypes. For known carriers, we only retained the first ESBL-EC strain if isolated in the prior 12 months. Five single nucleotide polymorphism assays targeting specific positions in 2 genes used for MLST and constituting a unique signature of ST131 were selected and validated against a collection of >90 sequenced strains from highly diverse genetic backgrounds, as previously described [21]. The 6th assay was created from an existing *in silico* PCR and targets H30 through a coding point mutation in *FimH* sequence. Subclades ST131 H30 were then defined according to fluoroquinolone resistance (C1/H30-R) and additional presence of the *bla* gene CTX-M-15 (C2/H30-Rx).

Sequencing and assembly

Candidate strains for sequencing included ST131 H30 strains observed in large clusters since 2010 (with at least 4 positive cases from the same ward), and in all clusters since 2018 (with at least 2 positive ward mates). Moreover, all non-ST131 and ST131 non-H30 isolates from 2018 onwards were sequenced. Only the first isolate per patient and one morphotype per plate were considered for typing and sequencing. Purified genomic DNA (DNeasy, Qiagen) of selected isolates was sequenced using Illumina HiSeq2500 device using 100 base pairs (bp) paired-end reads and bar codes strategy according to the Nextera XT kit (Illumina), following the manufacturer's recommendations. Read quality was assessed with the Fastqc program (<http://www.bioinformatics.babraham.ac.uk/projects/fastqc/>) and filtered using the FastqMcf program (Ea-utils; **Erreur ! Référence de lien hypertexte non valide.**). Genome assembly was performed using Spades assembler v 3.12.0. Assembled genomes were submitted individually to the Center for Genomic Epidemiology (<https://cge.cbs.dtu.dk/>) for confirmation of serotypes by using FimTyper 1.0 and SerotypeFinder 2.0.

Core genome multi-locus sequence typing target genes

The task template "E. coli cgMLST v1.0" was used in a multi-locus sequence typing (cgMLST) scheme with Ridom SeqSphere+ software version 5 (Ridom GmbH, Germany) using default settings. The final cgMLST scheme consisted of 2'513 genes covering roughly 45% of the genomic sequence of E. coli. From each isolate, the complete sequence of each gene was analyzed according to the cgMLST scheme and a numerical allele type was assigned to that given locus. The allelic profile was therefore determined by combining alleles of all cgMLST loci for each strain. A minimum spanning tree (MST) was inferred by neighbor joining

method on the allelic profiles. The remaining genes were used for pairwise-comparisons.


Statistical methods

Proportions were compared using χ^2 tests, or two-tailed Fisher's exact test when appropriate. The prevalence curve was segmented based on seeming inflection points for statistical comparison, as defined elsewhere [22]. A chi-square test for linear trend across these segments assessed prevalence shifts over time [23]. Genetic diversity was estimated using the number of ST divided by the number of strains sequenced. All analyses were conducted using R.4.0, including the package "lme4".

Results


From January 2010 through February 2020, 11 yearly cross-sectional surveys of ESBL-PE carriage included 2'403 LTCF residents, with a median age of 83 years (IQR 75-89), and 61.4% of women. Yearly hand hygiene adherence improved from 72% to 77% from 2016 to 2020 (Suppl. Figure 1). The median length of stay of patients hospitalized in January and February from 2010 to 2020 decreased from 138.0 days (IQR 60.9-321.0) to 33.8 days (18.0-74.4.0). The total prevalence of any ESBL-PE carriage was 13.3% (n=319) and doubled from 7.1% to 13.8% over 10 years (p=0.04). Among ESBL-PE positive patients, 79.0% (n=252) and 18.8% (n=60) were respectively colonized with *E. coli* and *K. pneumoniae*. Over the study period, ESBL-EC prevalence increased from 4.6% to 9.4% (p=0.11), with a peak of 14.2% in 2018 (Fig. 1).

Fig 1. Prevalence of ESBL-producing *Escherichia coli* carriage among all residents of a university-affiliated long-term care facility from 2010 to 2020, before and after de-implementation of contact precautions in January 2019, and stratified between previously known and newly detected carriers.



We observed an increase of prevalent (previously known) cases from 11.1% to 43.0% of ESBL-EC from 2010 to 2020, with a stable proportion of incident (newly identified) cases. Of note, this increase was partly driven by nosocomial clusters throughout multiple wards in 2012, 2013, 2018, and 2019 (Fig. 2).

Fig 2. Yearly prevalence and clustering of ESBL-producing *Escherichia coli* carriers within 12 wards of a university-affiliated long-term care facility, Geneva (2010 to 2020). From 2018 onwards, 4 long-term care wards were added from a separate facility.



Overall, 58.0% (137/236) of typed ESBL-EC isolates belonged to the ST131 lineage, with 68.6% (94/137) positive for ST131 H30. The prevalence of this subclone remained stable until 2015 (Figure 3A), with a subsequent downward slope deflection from 2015 to 2020 (76.5% to 33.3%, $p < 0.001$). No rebound effect was recorded neither for ESBL-EC, nor specifically for ESBL-EC ST131 H30 following de-implementation of contact precautions for ESBL-EC carriers in January 2019. In contrast, we observed an increase of ST131 non-H30 subtypes from 2016 to 2020 ($p = 0.04$), which peaked in 2018 (Fig. 3A). In total, 82 of 236 (34.7%) typed ESBL-EC were sequenced, including 11 ST131 H30 strains from large nosocomial clusters in 2010-2017, 10 ST131 H30 strains from clusters in 2018-2020, as well as 24 ST131 non-H30 and 37 non-ST131

strains, isolated since 2018 (Suppl. Table 1). Among ST131 H30 isolates, 12 belonged to the clade C2/H30-Rx (57.1%), and 8 to the clade C1/H30-R (38.1%; Figure 3B).

Fig 3. Prevalence of the different subclones among typed ESBL-producing Escherichia coli (ESBL-EC), and number of clades identified among sequenced ESBL-EC from participants of a university-affiliated long-term care facility from 2010 to 2020. (A) Subclones of typed ESBL-EC. Test for linear trends over segmented or continuous periods are indicated for the three subclones. Number of isolates per year are shown below the x-axis. (B) Subclones & clades of sequenced ESBL-EC ST131 since 2015.




Of note, whereas the majority of C2/H30-Rx strains (58.3%) were detected in 2015, C1/H30-R strains were only detected from 2017 onwards. Among ST131 non-H30, we observed the emergence and expansion of 22 (91.7%) isolates belonging to the ST131 H89 strain (O16:H5) associated with both CTX-M-14 and CTX-M-24. Among the 37

non-ST131 isolates, 31 different sequence types were identified, precluding possible monoclonal spread. Among ST131 H30, the most common resistance genes were CTXM-15 (72.2%), OXA-1 (55.6%), and CTXM-27 (22.2%). Among ST131 non H30, the most common resistance genes were CTXM-14 (91.7%), CTXM-24 (91.7%), and TEM-1B (75.0%). Among non-ST131, the most common resistance genes were CTXM-15 (43.2%), TEM-1B (32.4%), OXA-1 (13.5%), and CTXM-14 (13.5%).

When considering epidemiological information from 2010 to 2020, we observed 27 nosocomial clusters of patients positive for ESBL-EC ST131 H30. Almost all (20/21) ESBL-EC ST131 H30 strains available for sequencing were genotypically related (Fig. 4). C2/H30-Rx strains dominated in 2015, while C1/H30-R was present in more recent clusters. Sixteen of these 21 (76%) strains were isolated from 2 wards (unit F and H) between 2015 and 2020. Twenty of 24 (83%) ST131 non-H30 strains available for sequencing were genotypically related and identified as ST131 H89 with the serotype O16:H5, which expressed the same CTXM-14 and CTXM-24 genes; We observed 5 clusters of patients positive for ST131 H89 in three wards (wards G, H, and I), with an attack rate of 12% (17 of 139 susceptible patients, Fig. 3). Finally, only 18% (5/27) of sequenced non-ST131 strains were genotypically related (Fig. 4).

Fig 4. Dendrogram of sequenced ESBL-producing Escherichia coli, with epidemiological information and molecular data on ESBL genes; PCRH30 represent the results from the multi-array PCR, with non-ST131, ST131 H30, and ST131 non-H30.



Discussion

The findings of these 11 yearly cross-sectional surveys support five main conclusions: (1) ESBL-EC prevalence increased over time in this

university-affiliated LTCF, mainly driven by an increased proportion of previously known carriers; (2) after 2015, a decreasing prevalence of ST131 H30 subclones was observed over time, despite small localized outbreaks; (3) clonal expansion of ST131 H89 (O16:H5) subclones occurred since 2018, driven by multiple silent outbreaks; (4) no emerging non-ST131 clone was observed; and (5) no rebound effect in ESBL-EC or specific subclones was observed following discontinuation of contact precautions, though longer follow-up periods are needed to validate this finding.

LTCFs are well-known reservoirs for multiresistant ESBL-EC clones, with specific patient- and care-related exposures facilitating the spread of certain clades, including vulnerable and dependent patients with prolonged lengths of stay [24–29], as well as recognized challenges in implementing infection control measures [24,28]. Many outbreaks report silent transmission of ESBL-EC ST131 in LTCF, especially belonging to the clade C2 (C2/H30-Rx-CTX-M-15) [1,2,6]. The rapid clonal expansion of this C2 clade through nosocomial outbreaks in LTCFs has already been observed to displace preexisting E.coli clades [6]. Thus, clonal fluctuance has been a recognized phenomenon with emergence and decline of temporarily successful clones. The persistence of certain E. coli clones, sporadically carrying carbapenemases genes, warrants a careful surveillance. [30]

Until now, few studies have reported nosocomial outbreaks associated with E.coli ST131 non-H30 clades. Population genomics on 4'071 globally sources genomes observed a dominance of the clade C, co-circulating worldwide at stable frequencies [31]. In 2018, a single Spanish LTCF of 300 residents observed only 6 ST131 non-H30 associated with CTX-M-14 on 55 typed ESBL-EC isolates [32]. Our study observed that neither E.coli C2/H30-Rx, nor C1/H30-R, seem to drive the recent changing epidemiology of ESBL-EC in our LTCF, but rather a ST131 H89 harboring

CTX-M-14 and CTX-M-27. This strain was sub-typed based on its fimH typing region, which is closely related and often associated to the H41 group of E.coli ST131 (1 SNP difference) [33–35]. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no outbreak report of this ST131 H89 E.coli subclone, which is anecdotally reported in population genomics [31,35,36].

The findings of this study are also in line with currently available evidence, which supports the discontinuation of contact precautions for ESBL-EC carriers, as suggested by European recommendations to limit ESBL-PE control measures in endemic settings to non-E.coli ESBL-PE [17]. Clonal outbreaks already occurred before discontinuation of contact precautions, and were not catalyzed by this decision. The observed recent clusters might not be an effect from lack of strict contact precautions, but rather direct consequences of the LTCF infrastructure, among other factors related to this specific setting [28,37].

Though this study includes a large sample size and long-term surveillance data, we acknowledge the presence of several limitations. First, we could not quantify transmission and acquisition events due to the study design. Second, we acknowledge a potential bias in the selection of E.coli strains sequenced. Third, generalizability of our findings is impacted by the unicentric approach. Fourth, potential lack of genomic discrimination between highly similar E.coli clades was not possible due to the sequencing methods used (short reads). Fourth, the decreased length of stay could impact ESBL-EC prevalence by lowering the probability of ESBL-EC acquisition and the proportion of known carriers. However, the acquisition risk in relation to the length of stay has been observed to be similar between ST131 and non-ST131 E.coli, and did not differ between 6 and 8 months of stay in LTCF. [12] Furthermore, ESBL-EC prevalence appears similar between LTCFs and among elderly in community. [38]

For these reasons, the decreasing length of stay probably did not influence ESBL-EC prevalence.

Conclusions

The changing ESBL-EC epidemiology, emergence of novel clones, and related clusters in LTCF, though not impacted by discontinuation of contact precautions, should be monitored by a comprehensive screening and surveillance strategy.

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
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Supplementary Appendix

Supplementary Figures

Figure S1. Hand Hygiene Adherence of healthcare workers in Long Term Care Facilities from 2014 to 2021



Supplementary Tables

Table S1. Epidemiologic and genotypic characteristics of sequenced ESBL-producing Escherichia coli

Strain	Unite	Year	ST ^a	PCR H30	fimH	Serotype	ESBL	Quinolone/Nalidixique
MR1	F	2015	131	1			CTX-M-15;OXA-1	
MR2	I	2018	131	0	89	H5O16	CTX-M-14;CTX-M-24;TEM-1B	gyrA (p.S83L)
MR5	G	2019	131	0	89	H5O16	CTX-M-14;CTX-M-24;TEM-1B	gyrA (p.S83L)
MR6	L	2019	131	0	41		CTX-M-15	gyrA (p.S83L)
MR7	H	2015	131	1			CTX-M-15;OXA-1	gyrA (p.S83L), gyrA (p.D87N)
MR8	H	2015	131	1			CTX-M-15	gyrA (p.D87N), gyrA (p.S83L)
MR9	H	2015	131	1			CTX-M-15	gyrA (p.D87N), gyrA (p.S83L)
MR10	H	2015	131	1			CTX-M-15	gyrA (p.S83L), gyrA (p.D87N)
MR11	F	2015	131	1			CTX-M-15;OXA-1	gyrA (p.S83L), gyrA (p.D87N)
MR12	F	2015	131	1			CTX-M-15;OXA-1	gyrA (p.S83L), gyrA (p.D87N)
MR13	F	2015	131	1			CTX-M-15;OXA-1	gyrA (p.D87N), gyrA (p.S83L)
MR14	F	2017	131	1			CTX-M-27;TEM-1B	gyrA (p.S83L), gyrA (p.D87N)
MR15	F	2017	131	1			CTX-M-27	gyrA (p.S83L), gyrA (p.D87N)
MR16	F	2017	131	1			CTX-M-14;TEM-1B	gyrA (p.D87N), gyrA (p.S83L)
MR17	J	2018	131	1			CTX-M-27	gyrA (p.S83L), gyrA (p.D87N)
MR18	J	2018	131	1			CTX-M-15;OXA-1	gyrA (p.D87N), gyrA (p.S83L)
MR19	I	2018	131	0	89	H5O16	CTX-M-14;CTX-M-24;TEM-1B	gyrA (p.S83L)
MR20	J	2018	10	0	435		CTX-M-15;OXA-1	gyrA (p.D87N), gyrA (p.S83L)

MR21	I	2018	131	0	89	H5O16	CTX-M-14;CTX-M-24;TEM-1B	gyrA (p.S83L)
MR22	J	2018	73	0	10		SHV-2	
MR23	J	2018	1193	0	64		CTX-M-27	gyrA (p.D87N), gyrA (p.S83L)
MR24	L	2018	410	0	24		CTX-M-15	gyrA (p.D87N), gyrA (p.S83L)
MR25	L	2018	5926	0	158		CTX-M-1	
MR26	G	2018	131	0	89	H5O16	CTX-M-14;CTX-M-24;TEM-1B	gyrA (p.S83L)
MR27	G	2018	131	0	89	H5O16	CTX-M-14;CTX-M-24;TEM-1B	gyrA (p.S83L)
MR28	G	2018	131	1			CTX-M-15;OXA-1	gyrA (p.S83L), gyrA (p.D87N)/aac(6')-Ib-cr (aac(6')-Ib-cr_DQ303918) gyrA (p.S83L)
MR29	H	2018	131	0	89	H5O16	CTX-M-14;CTX-M-24;TEM-1B	gyrA (p.S83L)
MR30	J	2018	1431	0	32		CTX-M-15	gyrA (p.D87N), gyrA (p.S83L)
MR31	G	2018	131	0	89	H5O16	CTX-M-14;CTX-M-24;TEM-1B	gyrA (p.S83L)
MR32	G	2018	131	0	89	H5O16	CTX-M-14;CTX-M-24;TEM-1B	gyrA (p.S83L)
MR33	G	2018	131	0	89	H5O16	CTX-M-14;CTX-M-24;TEM-1B	gyrA (p.S83L)
MR34	G	2018	131	0	89	H5O16	CTX-M-14;CTX-M-24;TEM-1B	gyrA (p.S83L)
MR35	H	2018	104	0	2		CTX-M-14	

MR36	H	2018	131	0	89	H5O16	CTX-M-14;CTX-M-24;TEM-1B	<i>gyrA</i> (p.S83L)
MR37	G	2018	131	1			CTX-M-27	<i>gyrA</i> (p.D87N), <i>gyrA</i> (p.S83L)
MR38	G	2018	131	0	89	H5O16	CTX-M-14;CTX-M-24;TEM-1B	<i>gyrA</i> (p.S83L)
MR39	G	2018	131	1			CTX-M-27	<i>gyrA</i> (p.D87N), <i>gyrA</i> (p.S83L)
MR40	G	2018	131	0	89	H5O16	CTX-M-14;CTX-M-24;TEM-1B	<i>gyrA</i> (p.S83L)
MR41	E	2018	617	0	29		CTX-M-15;OXA-1	<i>gyrA</i> (p.S83L), <i>gyrA</i> (p.D87N)
MR42	E	2018	38	0	ND		CTX-M-14b	
MR43	C	2018	224	0	61		CTX-M-1	<i>gyrA</i> (p.S83L), <i>gyrA</i> (p.D87N)
MR44	D	2018	57	0	27		SHV-12	<i>gyrA</i> (p.D87N), <i>gyrA</i> (p.S83L)
MR45	D	2018	10	0	54		TEM-1B;OXA-1	<i>gyrA</i> (p.D87N), <i>gyrA</i> (p.S83L)
MR46	A	2018	538	0	46		CTX-M-1	
MR47	F	2019	8149	0	ND		CTX-M-15;TEM-1B	
MR48	J	2019	191	0	38		CTX-M-15;TEM-1B;OXA-1	<i>qnrB1</i> (<i>qnrB1_DQ351241</i>), <i>aac(6')-Ib-cr</i> (<i>aac(6')-Ib-cr_DQ303918</i>)
MR49	G	2019	14	0	27		SHV-12;TEM-1B	<i>gyrA</i> (p.S83L)
MR50	L	2019	131	1			CTX-M-15;OXA-1	<i>aac(6')-Ib-cr</i> (<i>aac(6')-Ib-cr_DQ303918</i>) <i>gyrA</i> (p.S83L)
MR51	I	2019	6448	0	60		CTX-M-55;TEM-1B	<i>gyrA</i> (p.S83L), <i>gyrA</i> (p.D87N)
MR52	G	2019	167	0	ND		CTX-M-14;TEM-1B	<i>gyrA</i> (p.D87N), <i>gyrA</i> (p.S83L)

MR53	G	2019	131	0	89	H5O16	CTX-M-14;CTX-M-24;TEM-1B	gyrA (p.S83L)
MR54	G	2019	167	0	ND		CTX-M-14;TEM-1B	gyrA (p.D87N), gyrA (p.S83L)
MR55	G	2019	10	0	27		CTX-M-14	
MR56	E	2019	925	0	54		SHV-12	qnrS1 (qnrS1_AB187515)
MR57	F	2019	38	0	5		CTX-M-15;TEM-1B;TEM-104;TEM-198;TEM-234	gyrA (p.S83L)
MR58	I	2019	3877	0	27		CTX-M-15	qnrS1 (qnrS1_AB187515)
MR59	I	2019	226	0	41		CTX-M-15;CTX-M-27;OXA-1	gyrA (p.S83L), gyrA (p.D87N)/qnrS13 (qnrS13_LUYD01000008) gyrA (p.S83L)
MR60	L	2019	46	0	34		CTX-M-15;TEM-33;TEM-35;TEM-77;TEM-169	qnrS1 (qnrS1_AB187515)
MR61	L	2019	131	1			CTX-M-15;OXA-1	aac(6')-Ib-cr (aac(6')-Ib-cr_DQ303918) gyrA (p.S83L)
MR62	I	2019	131	0	89	H5O16	CTX-M-14;CTX-M-24;TEM-1B	gyrA (p.S83L)
MR63	A	2019	3268	0	54		CTX-M-15;CMY-2	qnrS1 (qnrS1_AB187515)
MR64	B	2019	120	0	237		TEM-1B;TEM-15;CMY-2;CMY-61;CMY-130;CMY-153	qnrB19 (qnrB19_EU432277)
MR65	C	2019	131	0	22	H4O25	CTX-M-1	
MR66	E	2020	1722	0	153		CTX-M-15;TEM-1B	qnrS1 (qnrS1_AB187515)
MR67	F	2020	131	1			SHV-12;TEM-1B	gyrA (p.S83L), gyrA (p.D87N)
MR68	B	2020	1380	0	47		CTX-M-3;TEM-1B	gyrA (p.S83L)

MR69	E	2020	131	0	89	H5O16	CTX-M-14;CTX-M-24	<i>gyrA</i> (p.S83L)
MR70	E	2020	5150	0	65		CTX-M-27;TEM-1B;CMY-2	<i>gyrA</i> (p.S83L)
MR71	F	2020	131	1			CTX-M-15;OXA-1	<i>gyrA</i> (p.S83L), <i>gyrA</i> (p.D87N) - <i>aac(6')-Ib-cr</i> (<i>aac(6')-Ib-cr_DQ303918</i>) <i>gyrA</i> (p.S83L)
MR72	F	2020	131	1			CTX-M-27	<i>gyrA</i> (p.S83L), <i>gyrA</i> (p.D87N)
MR73	J	2020	636	0	ND		CTX-M-15	<i>gyrA</i> (p.S83L)
MR74	J	2020	636	0	ND		CTX-M-15	<i>gyrA</i> (p.S83L)
MR75	I	2020	131	0	89	H5O16	CTX-M-14;CTX-M-24	<i>gyrA</i> (p.S83L)
MR76	I	2020	349	0	54		CTX-M-55	-
MR77	C	2020	131	0	89	H5O16	CTX-M-14;CTX-M-24	<i>gyrA</i> (p.S83L)
MR78	J	2020	636	0	ND		CTX-M-15	<i>gyrA</i> (p.S83L)
MR79	J	2020	681	0	3		CTX-M-14	
MR80	I	2020	69	0	27		CTX-M-27	<i>gyrA</i> (p.S83L)
MR81	I	2020	131	0	89	HXO16	CTX-M-14;CTX-M-24;TEM-1B	<i>gyrA</i> ;; <i>bvzc</i> (p.S83L)
MR82	L	2020	131	0	89	H5O16	CTX-M-14;CTX-M-24;TEM-1B	<i>gyrA</i> (p.S83L)
MR83	K	2020	1446	0	30		CTX-M-15	<i>qnrS1</i> (<i>qnrS1_AB187515</i>)
MR84	H	2020	131	0	89	H5O16	CTX-M-14;CTX-M-24	<i>gyrA</i> (p.S83L)

Footnote to Suppl. Table 1.

a Sequence types were determined based on the allelic discrimination qPCR assays described in the methods to ascertain ST131 lineages, and based on MLST for negative ST131 results.

Part 2) Household carriage and acquisition of extended-spectrum β -lactamase-producing Enterobacteriaceae: A systematic review

A similar version of this chapter was published under the following reference:

Martischang R, Riccio ME, Abbas M, Stewardson AJ, Kluytmans JAJW, Harbarth S. Household carriage and acquisition of extended-spectrum β -lactamase-producing Enterobacteriaceae: A systematic review. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol. 2020;41(3):286-294. DOI: 10.1017/ice.2019.336.

Abstract

Objective:

While the epidemiology of ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae (ESBL-PE) has been extensively studied in hospitals, data on community transmission is scarce. We conducted a systematic review to assess ESBL-PE co-carriage and acquisition in households.

Methods:

A systematic literature search was conducted to retrieve cross-sectional or cohort studies published between 1990 and 2018 evaluating co-carriage proportions and/or acquisition rates of ESBL-PE among household members, without language restriction. We excluded studies focusing on animal-to-human transmission or non-household settings. The main outcomes were ESBL-PE co-carriage proportions and acquisition rates, stratified according to phenotypic or genotypic assessment of strain relatedness. Co-carriage proportions of clonally-related ESBL-PE were transformed via the double-arcsine method and pooled using a random-effects model. Potential biases were assessed manually.

Results:

We included 13 studies. Among 863 household members of ESBL-PE positive index cases, prevalence of ESBL-PE co-carriage ranged from 8% to 37%. Overall, 12% (95%CI: 8-16%) of subjects had a clonally-related strain. Those proportions were higher for *Klebsiella pneumoniae* (20-25%) compared to *Escherichia coli* (10-20%). Acquisition rates of clonally-related ESBL-PE among 180 initially ESBL-PE free household members of a previously identified carrier ranged between 1.56 - 2.03 events per 1000 person-weeks of follow-up. We identified multiple sources of bias and large heterogeneity (I^2 : 70%) between studies.

Conclusions:

ESBL-PE household co-carriage is frequent, suggesting intra-familial acquisition. Further research is needed to evaluate the risk and control of ESBL-PE household transmission.

Introduction

The prevalence of extended-spectrum β -lactamase-producing *Enterobacteriaceae* (ESBL-PE) in the general population has now reached endemic levels in most countries.(39) This is worrisome, since ESBL-PE are frequent causes of difficult-to-treat infections, with substantial health-economic burden.(40)

ESBL-PE may spread by transfer of bacteria or mobile genetic elements. Some biologically fit phylogenetic groups particularly drive the emergence and persistence of virulence traits and acquisition of ESBL-PE.(41) Persistence of ESBL-PE in the community might be further amplified by various risk factors such as antibiotic exposure,(42–45) previous hospitalization,(43,46) recurrent urinary tract infection,(43) travel activities,(46,47) having children attending daycare centers,(48) as well as chicken meat consumption.(49) Overcrowded households also appear to increase the risk of ESBL-PE carriage.(50) Furthermore, intra-household transmission may play an important but understudied role. Several studies have shown that antibiotic-susceptible and resistant *Escherichia coli* are transmitted between household members,(51) suggesting that both susceptible and resistant *Enterobacteriaceae* compete for niches within the gastrointestinal tract. This competitive balance is influenced by multiple factors including antibiotic exposure, which favors resistant *Enterobacteriaceae* and their intra-household transmission.(42)

Specific aims

Despite the potential relevance of ESBL-PE cross-transmission among household members on persistence and spread of ESBL-PE in the community, evidence on this topic is scarce. We therefore aimed to systematically review epidemiological studies on ESBL-PE co-carriage and acquisition among household members.

Methods

Data sources and search strategy

We searched the Cochrane Library, PubMed, Embase and CINAHL databases for observational studies published between January 1990 and June 2018, without language restriction. Systematic manual reference search was performed from eligible articles' bibliography. Duplicate studies with the same title and authors were automatically deleted by the «Distiller» SR software (Evidence Partners, Ottawa, Canada). Core search strings, assembled Boolean operators, included: « household OR community OR family OR outpatient » and « animal OR pet » for the study population; « extended-spectrum beta-lactamase OR lactamase OR cephalosporin OR beta-lactam resistance » for exposures; and « transmission OR carriage OR acquisition OR colonization OR microbiota OR molecular epidemiology » for outcomes. The full search strategies are available in the Supplementary Appendix. This study was conducted according to the MOOSE and PRISMA statements.(52)


Selection criteria and definitions

This systematic review includes cohort or cross-sectional studies evaluating co-carriage proportions and acquisition rates of ESBL-PE in households, focusing mainly on intestinal carriage of *E. coli* and *Klebsiella pneumoniae*. ESBL-PE were defined phenotypically by presence of 3rd

generation cephalosporin resistance and a positive double-disk synergy test, and/or genotypically by an identified ESBL-PE resistance gene. Studies were eligible if they included isolates sampled from human subjects. Co-carriage was defined as simultaneous carriage by two or more household members of a related ESBL-PE strain at a certain point in time or during a pre-defined follow-up period. Acquisition was defined as newly identified carriage of a related strain in another household member who was previously ESBL-negative. Relatedness definition depended on the level of microbiological discrimination employed. Co-carriage and acquisition rates were stratified considering the level of microbiological discrimination: “closely-related” pathogens were phenotypically similar bacteria, sharing the same phenotypic or genotypic resistance profile; “clonally-related” pathogens were bacteria assessed for relatedness through genotyping methods.

Studies were stratified according to their sampling scheme. In index-case-based study (category A), recruitment of families derived from a previously identified ESBL-PE index-case. In population-based study (category B), household members were not recruited based on a previously known index case, but from the general population. In category A, co-carriage proportions were calculated as the number of household members of a colonized or infected index case simultaneously carrying a closely-related or clonally-related ESBL-PE, among the total number of household members (excluding the index case). In category B, all household members presenting simultaneous ESBL-PE-related carriage among the total number of household members were considered (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Examples for the evaluation of co-carriage estimates in studies based on their sampling schemes



We excluded single-household case reports, studies focusing on animal-to-animal or animal-to-human transmission only, as well as studies focusing on the environment (e.g. surface water) or non-household settings (e.g. child-care facilities). Studies focusing on international travelers, indigenous populations with a specific way of living, farms, or food-borne community outbreaks were excluded. Due to specific exposures and an extensive literature on the topic, studies on mother-to-newborn transmission were also excluded.

Study screening and data extraction

Title and abstract screening was done independently by two authors (R.M., M.E.R.). All discrepancies were solved by consensus, involving a third investigator (M.A.) if needed. Concordance was checked by Cohen's kappa coefficient. One author (R.M.) performed full-text screening and data extraction, with any uncertainties resolved by discussion with another author (M.E.R.). We extracted the following data: study characteristics (study dates, design, outcomes, follow-up), study population (characteristics of index cases and families, number of

household members, potential biases addressed) and microbiological methods. As primary outcome, ESBL-PE co-carriage proportions and acquisition rates were calculated based on available information. Preferably, co-carriage proportions of longitudinal studies were generated at baseline as a point-prevalence, to be able to compare them with cross-sectional studies. However, if no such information was available, co-carriage proportions of the overall follow-up period were reported as a period prevalence. Both study screening and data extraction were performed using standardized electronic forms through DistillerSR software. Potential clinical and microbiological confounders were specifically reported, both for index cases and their household members. Characteristics of household members, sampling methods, loss to follow-up, hospital stay, antibiotic exposure, travel activity, food intake, day-care centers and socio-economic status were considered as clinically relevant. The number of colonies analyzed per morphotype and the use of broth enrichment were considered as microbiologically relevant.

Statistical analysis

The main outcomes of interest were the proportion of co-carriage and rate of acquisition among household members, stratified by the study type, which was defined by its sampling scheme, and microbiological discrimination level (as detailed above). Co-carriage proportions of closely-related and clonally-related Enterobacteriaceae were compared. Co-carriage proportions of household members with clonally-related ESBL-PE from index-case based studies were pooled using meta and metafor packages.(53,54) Double-arcsine transformation was applied on raw proportions to estimate a normal distribution before pooling.(55) Transformed individual effect sizes were then pooled using a random-effects model to account for between-study variance. Heterogeneity among effect size was estimated using the Q test and I² test. Subgroup comparisons were performed to explore relationships and heterogeneities, by stratifying individual-based co-carriage among the

proportion of species isolated from index cases (> or <15% of *K. pneumoniae*). Potential publication bias or small-study effects were examined by funnel plot. All analyses were performed using the R open-source software environment, version 3.4.4 (R code available in the Appendix).


Results

Study selection and features of included studies

The literature search identified 2,353 articles. After duplicate removal, 2,141 articles were screened for eligibility. A total of 151 articles underwent full-text screening (Kappa, 0.80). Finally, 13 studies(42,56–67) were selected for data extraction and bias assessment (Figure 2). Two publications initially classified as population-based studies qualified as an index-case study, since we were able to extract household co-carriage and acquisition rates with at least one colonized member from the crude data.(42,60) Thus, sampling schemes were population-based and index-case-based for 2 and 11 studies, respectively. The 2 population-based studies were considered as cross-sectional,(59,63) and of the 11 index-case based studies, 7 were longitudinal cohort studies (42,58,62,64–67) and 4 were cross-sectional studies.(56,57,60,61) Two longitudinal studies were considered as nested cross-sectional studies for the purpose of our review, because after a first baseline sampling at home subsequent follow-up happened only in a hospital setting.(56,63) Co-carriage data were not collected for one index-case based study which only included previously negative household members.(62) Another index-case based study, only reporting co-carriage of closely-related bacteria,(42) was excluded from the meta-analysis, which focused only on those 9 studies with data on co-carriage of clonally reported pathogens. Acquisition rates were extracted and calculated from 5 of the 7 index-case based cohort

studies, excluding two studies with unknown ESBL-PE status of household members at baseline.(58,67)

Figure 2. Systematic review flow-chart detailing the study selection procedure



Footnote to figure 2: *only studies evaluating co-carriage of clonally-related Extended-Spectrum β -lactamases Producing Enterobacteriaceae (ESBL-PE) were included in the meta-analysis

Study population

The main characteristics of the included studies are displayed in Table 1. For index-case based studies, sample sizes ranged from 46 to 286 household members, and for population-based studies, from 225 to 753 household members. The 9 studies based on index cases defined them by being colonized(56,58,62,64,65) or infected(57,61) with ESBL-PE, or both.(66,67) The four population-based studies recruited household members from inpatient,(59,63) outpatient(42,59) or healthy community settings.(60) Of the 13 studies, 3 recruited an entire family(59,64,66) and 10 recruited a convenience sample of at least 2 household participants.(42,56–58,60–63,65,67)

1 Table 1. Study population and characteristics of included studies

Bibliography	Country	ESBL species isolated (for the index cases if not specified)	Follow up duration	Category of participants	ESBL-PE status at inclusion	Population size	Age (median, IQR)	Gender (Female, %)	Co-carriage considered
Cross-over population based studies without index cases									
Lo WU, et al. 2010 ²¹	China	81% <i>E.coli</i> , 19% <i>K. pneumoniae</i> (Among all participants)	NA	First group of household members	Unknown	53	2 years (0.8-3)	21 (40%)	<u>Closely related:</u> CTXM-PE
				Second group of household members	Unknown	172	5 years (29 infants) (2.3-8) 35 years (143 adults) (31-43)	104 (60%)	<u>Clonally related:</u> CTXM strain
Kurz MS, et al. 2017 ²⁵	Rwanda	48% <i>E.coli</i> , 36% <i>K.pneumoniae</i> , 16% <i>Enterobacter cloacae</i> (Among the first group of household members)	NA	First group of household members ^a	Unknown	392	29 years (range: 0-94)	252 (64%)	<u>Closely related:</u> ESBL-PE partially concordant
				Second group of household members ^a	Unknown	361	36 years (range: 10-76)	289 (80%)	
Cross-over index-case based studies									
Rodriguez-Bano J, et al. 2008 ¹⁹	Spain	100% <i>E. coli</i>	NA	Index cases (<i>Outpatients</i>)	Identified infection	53 ^b	69 years (52-75)	37 (70%)	<u>Closely related:</u> ESBL species
				Household contacts	Unknown	73	43 years (23-63)	41 (56%)	<u>Clonally related:</u> ESBL strain
Valverde A, et al. 2008 ²³	Spain	99% <i>E.coli</i> , 1% <i>K.pneumoniae</i>	NA	Index cases (<i>Outpatient</i>)	Identified infection	40	63.6 years (mean) (range: 2-96)	34 (85%)	<u>Closely related:</u> ESBL species
				Household contacts	Unknown	54	NA	NA	<u>Clonally related:</u> ESBL strain
Adler A. et al. 2014. ¹⁸	France, Italy, Spain, Israel	43% <i>E.coli</i> , 27% <i>K.pneumoniae</i> , 16% <i>P.mirabilis</i> , 6% <i>Citrobacter spp.</i> , 5% <i>Enterobacter spp.</i> , 3% others	NA	Index cases (<i>Inpatient</i>)	Known colonization	194	65.9 years (mean) (range: 18-99)	98 (50%)	<u>Closely related:</u> ESBL species
				Household contacts	Unknown	286	52 years (42.7-60.2)	204 (71%)	<u>Clonally related:</u> ESBL strain
Liakopoulos A, et al. 2018 ²²	Netherlands	93.7% <i>E.coli</i> , 3.75% <i>Klebsiella pneumoniae</i> , 2.5% <i>Enterobacter cloacae</i>	NA	First group of household members ^c	Known colonization	66	2.4 years (1.5-3.3)	NA	<u>Closely related:</u> ESBL species sharing the same resistance genes
				Second group of household members ^c	Unknown	66	34 years (31-37)	NA	<u>Clonally related:</u> ESBL strain
Longitudinal Index-Case based cohort studies									

Tande D, et al. 2010 ²⁶	France	56% <i>E. coli</i> , unknown proportion of <i>S. enterica</i>	12 months (Period prevalence)	Index cases (<i>Outpatient, post-adoption</i>)	Known colonization	22	NA	NA	<u>Closely related:</u> ESBL-PE
				Household contacts	Unknown	49	NA	NA	<u>Clonally related:</u> ESBL strain
Hilty M, et al. 2012 ²⁹	Switzerland	88% <i>E. coli</i> , 12% <i>K. pneumoniae</i>	12 months (Period prevalence ^d)	Index cases (<i>Inpatient & Outpatient</i>)	Known colonization or infection	82	49 years (mean)	52 (63%)	<u>Closely related:</u> ESBL-Ec and ESBL-Kp
				Household contacts	Unknown	96	NA	NA	<u>Clonally related:</u> ESBL strain
Löhr I.H., et al. 2013 ²⁷	Norway	100% <i>K. pneumoniae</i>	23 months (Period prevalence)	Index cases (<i>Inpatient, post-outbreak</i>)	Known colonization	28	Neonates	26 (51%)	<u>Closely related:</u> CTXM-15 species
				Household contacts	Unknown	60	NA	NA	<u>Clonally related:</u> CTXM-15 strain
Strenger V, et al. 2013 ²⁰	Austria	44% <i>K. oxytoca</i> , 28% <i>S. marcescens</i> , 24% <i>K. pneumoniae</i> , 4% <i>E. coli</i>	12 months (Period prevalence ^d)	Index cases (<i>Inpatient</i>)	Known colonization	25	Neonates	13 (52%)	<u>Closely related:</u> ESBL-PE
				Household contacts	Unknown	49	NA	NA	<u>Clonally related:</u> ESBL strain
Arcilla MS, et al. 2017 ²⁴	Netherlands	<i>Enterobacteriaceae</i> (no detail)	12 months (Not considered for co-carriage)	Index cases (<i>Outpatient, returning travellers</i>)	Known colonization	152	NA ^e	NA ^e	<u>Closely related:</u> ESBL-PE- sharing the same group of resistance gene
				Household contacts	Not colonized by ESBL-PE	168	NA ^e	NA ^e	
Haverkate MR, et al. 2017 ²⁸	Netherlands	66,7% <i>E. coli</i> , 17.9% <i>K. pneumoniae</i> , 12.8% <i>Enterobacter cloacae</i> , 2.6% <i>Citrobacter freundii</i>	18 months Period (closely-) and point (clonally-related ESBL PE) prevalence	Index cases (<i>Inpatient</i>)	Suspicion of colonization or infection	74	54 years (mean) (SD: 24)	36 (49%)	<u>Closely related:</u> ESBL-PE
				Household contacts	Unknown	84	43 years (mean) (SD: 23)	45 (54%)	<u>Clonally related:</u> ESBL strain
Stewardson AJ et al. 2018 ⁴	Belgium, Poland, Switzerland	100% <i>E. coli</i>	36.5 days (Point-prevalence)	Index cases considered for co-carriage ^f	Known colonization	33	30 years (19-55)	21 (64%)	<u>Closely related:</u> ESBL species
				Household contacts considered for co-carriage ^f	Unknown	46	39 years (27.2-49)	26 (56%)	
				Index cases considered for acquisition rates ^f	Known colonization	36	NA ^e	NA ^e	
				Household contacts considered for acquisition rates ^f	Free of ESBL-PE at baseline	55	NA ^e	NA ^e	

2 CTXM: Specific family of genes coding for Extended-Spectrum Beta-Lactamase

3 CTXM-15: Specific gene coding for Extended-Spectrum Beta-Lactamase

4 ESBL: Extended-Spectrum Beta-Lactamase

5 ESBL-PE: Extended-Spectrum Beta-Lactamase Producing *Enterobacteriaceae*

6 ESBL Ec: Extended-Spectrum Beta-Lactamase Producing *E.coli*

7 ESBL Kp: Extended-Spectrum Beta-Lactamase Producing *K.pneumoniae*

8

9 *Footnotes to the table 1:*

10 ^a Caregivers and not household members were concerned.

11 ^b 13 index cases lived alone.

12 ^c Data were extracted based on the crude microbiological data from the study "Van den Bunt et al." Epidemiological
13 information on this sub-population (household members of a known carrier) is missing.

14 ^d Longitudinal cohort study not considered for acquisition rates because unknown proportion of previously negative household
15 members.

16 ^e Nested cohort from the main study population, with missing epidemiological information.

17 ^f Co-carriage: One household member positive at baseline per household. Acquisition rates: One household member positive
18 with negative household members.

19 Co-carriage proportions or acquisition rates were assessed for closely-related and
20 for clonally-related pathogens in 13/13 and 10/13 studies, respectively. Closely-
21 related pathogens were defined as the sharing of same ESBL-PE
22 species,(42,56,57,60,61,65,67) or ESBL-PE without species identification.
23 (58,59,62–64,66) Pathogen characteristics, as well as main features of the applied
24 microbiologic methods are described in Supplementary Table 1. Supplementary
25 Table 2 summarizes reporting practices of the included studies. Potential
26 confounders and biases were mainly reported for index cases at baseline, especially
27 for previous antibiotic intake (12/13 studies) and previous hospital stays (10/13
28 studies). However, risk factors were often heterogeneously defined, and poorly
29 reported during follow-up of household members. Considering potential
30 microbiological biases (Supplementary Table 3), only 3 studies used broth
31 enrichment,(60,62,65) and 4 analyzed more than one colony per
32 morphotype.(42,57,59,60)


33 34 *Index-case based studies evaluating co-carriage of ESBL-producing* 35 *Enterobacteriaceae among household members*

36 Co-carriage proportions of closely-related pathogens were collected as a point-
37 prevalence (either in cross-sectional studies or at baseline of longitudinal studies)
38 in 5 studies and as a period prevalence (with varying follow-up from 12 to 23
39 months) in 5 longitudinal studies. When considering co-carriage of closely-related
40 pathogens at the species level, point prevalence and period prevalence of ESBL-PE
41 co-carriage among household members of a previously identified index case
42 ranged between 8-27% and 14-34%, respectively. When considering co-carriage
43 of closely-related pathogens at the *Enterobacteriaceae* level, period prevalence of
44 co-carriage among household members of an index case ranged between 18-37%.

45
46 In the nine studies assessing co-carriage of clonally-related pathogens, including
47 817 household members of index cases colonized or infected by ESBL-PE, the
48 proportion of co-carriage with a clonally-related strain ranged between 5.6% and
49 23% (cf. Supplementary Table 4). The pooled estimate was 12% (95%CI : 8-16%;

50 Figure 3). Large heterogeneity was observed among studies (I^2 : 70%), with a Q-
 51 test for heterogeneity rejecting the hypothesis of homogeneity ($P < .001$).


52
 53 *Figure 3. Forest plots for prevalence of co-carriage of clonally-related Extended-*
 54 *Spectrum β -lactamases Producing Enterobacteriaceae (ESBL-PE)*



55
 56
 57 Co-carriage proportions of clonally-related *K.pneumoniae* or *E.coli* were evaluated
 58 respectively by 2 and 3 studies and ranged between 20-25%(65,67) and 10-
 59 20%(57,61,67) revealing important differences after stratification by species. In a
 60 subgroup analysis stratifying studies that included $<15\%$ vs $>15\%$ of index cases
 61 colonized by ESBL-producing *Klebsiella spp.*, co-carriage proportions were
 62 observed to increase for studies including more *Klebsiella spp.* (13%, with 95%CI
 63 7-21% compared to 10% with 95%CI 6-14%, respectively). Inspection of the
 64 funnel plot (Figure 4) was not suggestive of any reporting bias for the primary
 65 outcome.

66
 67
 68
 69
 70

71 *Figure 4. Evaluation of potential publication bias, funnel plot for prevalence of co-*
72 *carriage of clonally-related Extended-Spectrum β -lactamases Producing*
73 *Enterobacteriaceae (ESBL-PE)*



74
75 *Population-based studies evaluating co-carriage of ESBL-producing*
76 *Enterobacteriaceae among multiple families*

77 Co-carriage at the population-level was evaluated by 2 studies for closely-related
78 ESBL-PE (prevalence, 15% and 14%), and by a single study for clonally-related
79 ESBL-PE (6%; Supplementary Table 5).

80
81 *Acquisition rates of ESBL-PE*

82 Follow-up periods in the 5 prospective cohort studies evaluating ESBL-PE
83 acquisition rates ranged from 36 days to 23 months, with a variable frequency
84 between screening time points. Acquisition rates of closely-related ESBL-PE among
85 household members of a previously identified carrier were reported by 2 studies,
86 and ranged between 1.5 and 17.39 events per 1000 person-weeks, by following
87 up 223 initially ESBL-PE free household members. When restricting to clonally-
88 related ESBL-PE reported in 3 studies, the rates ranged between 1.56 and 2.03
89 events per 1000 person-weeks of follow-up among 180 initially ESBL-PE free
90 household members (Supplementary Table 6). Acquisition rates were slightly
91 higher when expressed as person-weeks at risk, excluding the follow-up time after
92 an acquisition of a related ESBL-PE. In the 3 studies providing detailed data on
93 person-time at risk, the corresponding rates ranged between 1.69 and 19.21

94 events per 1000 person-weeks at risk versus respectively 1.56 and 17.39 events
95 per 1000 person-weeks of total follow-up.

96

97 **Discussion**

98

99 ESBL-PE spread dominates in the community setting, mainly driven by specific
100 subclones of ESBL-producing *E. coli*.(68) Through the sharing of well-recognized
101 risk factors for community ESBL-PE carriage(46–49) and through their daily
102 proximity, household contacts of ESBL-PE carriers are at risk of ESBL-PE
103 acquisition. Household transmission of ESBL-PE has been described, but knowledge
104 of its extent remains scant. This is to our knowledge the first systematic review
105 performed on co-carriage and acquisition of ESBL-PE in private households.

106

107 Higher carriage proportions were observed among household members of a
108 colonized or infected index case compared to ESBL-PE carriage prevalence in the
109 general population. For instance, carriage of ESBL-producing *E.coli* and
110 *K.pneumoniae* was 4.5% in the Dutch population,(69) but 18% among such
111 household members.(60,66) In Switzerland, community carriage of ESBL-
112 producing *E.coli* was 5.3%,(70) but up to 34%(67) when considering household
113 members. In France and Spain, community carriage of ESBL-producing *E.coli* was
114 between 2-7%,(71,72) but 14-27% among household members.(57,61,64) When
115 focusing on ESBL-producing *K.pneumoniae*, community carriage was 0.3%(73) in
116 Norway, and 20% in household members of a colonized index case.(65) Thus,
117 families and households may serve as ESBL-PE amplification platforms.

118

119 Co-carriage proportions decreased when considering only co-carriage of clonally-
120 related ESBL-PE, with a pooled prevalence of 12%. These findings underline the
121 importance of genotyping methods to elucidate the epidemiology of ESBL-PE in
122 household settings. Moreover, they suggest that multiple sources of ESBL-PE
123 introduction (e.g. food, travel) into households may exist beyond transmission via
124 ESBL-PE index cases that may explain the polyclonal ESBL-PE picture observed in
125 many households.(74)

126 Confidence intervals of pooled proportions for clonally-related pathogens, as well
127 as the range of prevalence proportions and rates, suggest important variations in
128 co-carriage and acquisition of ESBL-PE between household members.
129 Unfortunately, considering the small sample size and number of studies, there was
130 too much risk of overfitting for subgroup analyses. Several hypotheses might
131 explain, however, this heterogeneity. First, there were substantial differences in
132 study populations, risk factors and microbiological features. For instance, index
133 cases with an ESBL-PE related infection, recruitment after an outbreak with a
134 particularly transmissible strain, as well as antibiotic exposure may all increase the
135 likelihood of ESBL-PE cross-transmission.⁽⁴²⁾ Additional characteristics of
136 household members, such as healthcare exposure, travel activities and food habits
137 may have influenced ESBL-PE acquisition risks.^(42,43,48,49,62) Second, the
138 various study designs lead to different estimates. Co-carriage evaluated during
139 cross-sectional studies and at baseline during longitudinal studies was considered
140 as a point-prevalence proportion. This contrasts with co-carriage evaluated during
141 the whole follow-up of a cohort study, considered as a period-prevalence.
142 Comparability of such proportions might be questionable and may have caused
143 methodological heterogeneity.³⁷ Third, included studies originated from different
144 regions of the world. However, European households were overrepresented; thus,
145 acquisition rates and co-carriage proportions might differ in other settings,
146 especially in low- and middle-income countries. Clearly, the geographic and socio-
147 economic context influences ESBL-PE colonization pressure, antibiotic exposure,
148 way of living, proximity of household members and ultimately ESBL-PE household
149 acquisition rates.

150
151 We identified multiple potential biases in the included studies. Several studies only
152 included two members in household members, introducing selection bias and
153 possibly missing transmission chains. At isolate levels, relatedness analysis was
154 often performed on the basis of a unique isolate per morphotype to determine co-
155 carriage of clonally-related pathogens. Acknowledging co-existence of sensitive
156 and resistant ESBL-PE in our microbiota, some related strains and thus co-carriage
157 has possibly been missed. Another detection bias might have missed resistant

158 pathogens in the absence of broth-based methods, in case of very low bacterial
159 load. Finally, despite genotyping performed in more than half of included studies,
160 the applied methods were not discriminative enough to assess strain relatedness
161 among isolates, in order to distinguish acquisition from external sources versus
162 cross-transmission. Of utmost importance, none of the included studies performed
163 advanced bacterial or plasmid sequencing using whole genome sequencing to
164 elucidate the exact transmission pathways of ESBL-PE, as already done in hospital-
165 based studies.(76) Only 3 studies examined the spread of plasmids to other species
166 in the gut across family members, in the absence of clonally related pathogens
167 (Supplementary appendix 7). However, the methods were not discriminative
168 enough to ascertain horizontal transfers of mobile genetic elements. Only sporadic
169 sharing of plasmid profiles among household members were observed, but
170 available data were not sufficient to measure the influence of mobile genetic
171 transfer in acquisition rates of antibiotic resistance.

172
173 Differences in cross-transmission risk between *Klebsiella* spp and *E. coli* have been
174 described in hospital-based studies.(77) We identified a similar trend in the
175 included household studies. If *Klebsiella* is more transmissible, *E. coli* seems to be
176 a more successful colonizer of humans. This dominance might be explained by the
177 presence of more transmission pathways (food chain, environment), and
178 successful dissemination of particularly virulent sub-clones.(78)

179

180 **Conclusions**

181

182 In summary, the observed ESBL-PE co-carriage prevalence and acquisition rates
183 are concerning and may explain in part ESBL-PE spread and persistence among
184 families, along with other determinants. The observed heterogeneity in study
185 designs and populations has contributed to the variability of results and limited the
186 precision of our estimates. The methodological limitations of included studies
187 therefore highlight the need for further research evaluating ESBL-PE co-carriage,
188 acquisition and cross-transmission in households, with standardized selection and
189 follow-up of participants. Furthermore, novel sequencing approaches are required

190 to ascertain exogenous acquisition of bacteria and plasmids. Such research output
191 could help to provide a broader understanding of ESBL-PE transmission dynamics
192 in a One Health perspective, and ultimately could drive future preventive measures
193 to control ESBL-PE in the community.

194

195

196

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198

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355 **Supplementary Appendix**

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358 *Search concepts*

359 Search concepts included in study type hedges were identified using the PICO
360 format.

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362 **Population:**

363

- Household*, communit*, famil*

364

- MeSH:

365

- Medline: household, community, family caregiver, household and family, outpatient

366

367

- Embase: 'family', 'community car', 'household', outpatient

368

- Cochrane: Family, Residence Characteristics, outpatient

369

- Animal*

370

- MeSH:

371

- Medline: "Animals, Domestic", Pets, "animal, companion"

372

- Embase: "companion animal", "pet animal"

373

- Cochrane: Pets

374 **Exposure:**

375

- ESBL, lactamase

376

- MeSH:

377

- Medline: cephalosporin beta lactamase, beta lactamase, cephalosporin resistance

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379

- Embase: 'extended spectrum beta lactamase producing enterobacteriaceae', 'extended spectrum beta lactamase', 'cephalosporin resistance'

380

381

382

- Cochrane: beta-Lactam Resistance

383 **Outcome:**

384

- Transmiss*, carriage, acquisition, coloniz*, microbiota, molecular AND epidemiolog*

385

386

- MeSH:

- 387 ○ Medline: communicable disease transmission, "disease transmission,
- 388 infectious", microbiota, molecular epidemiology
- 389 ○ Embase: 'microbial colonization', 'acquisition', 'disease transmission',
- 390 microflora, risk factor, molecular epidemiology
- 391 ○ Cochrane: "Disease Transmission, Infectious", Microbiota, Molecular
- 392 Epidemiology

393 **Design: all types of observational studies were included**

394 *Search strategy*

395 **For Medline the following terms were used:**

Search

h Query

- #6 #3 AND #4 AND #5 (filter 1990-2018)
(no filter about HUMAN studies because might discard some pertinent studies (SATURN))
- #5 (ESBL OR lactamase OR cephalosporin beta lactamase[MeSH Terms] OR beta lactamases[MeSH Terms] OR cephalosporin resistance[MeSH Terms])
- #4 (Transmiss* OR carriage OR acquisition OR coloniz* OR microbiota OR molecular epidemiolog*
OR communicable disease transmission[MeSH Terms] OR disease transmission, infectious[MeSH Terms]
OR microbiota[MeSH Terms] OR molecular epidemiology[MeSH Terms])
- #3 #1 OR #2
- #2 (Animal* OR animal, domestic[MeSH Terms] OR pets[MeSH Terms] OR animal, companion[MeSH Terms])
- #1 (Household* OR communit* OR famil* OR household[MeSH Terms] OR community[MeSH Terms] OR family caregiver[MeSH Terms] OR household and family[MeSH Terms])

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398 **For EMBASE the following search strategy was used (after a search for**
399 **index terms of relevant records):**

400	No. Query Results
401	#31. #12 AND #18 AND #30 (filter 1990-2018 + embase)
402	#30. #19 OR #20 OR #21 OR #22 OR #23 OR #24 OR #25 OR #26 OR #27
403	OR #28 OR #29
404	#29. 'molecular epidemiology'/exp
405	
406	#28. 'microflora'/exp
407	#27. 'disease transmission'/exp
408	#26. 'acquisition'/exp
409	#25. 'microbial colonization'/exp
410	
411	#24. 'molecular epidemiolog*':ti,ab,kw
412	
413	#23. 'microbiota':ti,ab,kw
414	#22. 'coloniz*':ti,ab,kw
415	
416	#21. 'acquisition':ti,ab,kw
417	#20. 'carriage':ti,ab,kw
418	#19. 'transmiss*':ti,ab,kw
419	#18. #13 OR #14 OR #15 OR #16 OR #17
420	#17. 'extended spectrum beta lactamase'/exp
421	#16. 'extended spectrum beta lactamase producing enterobacteriaceae'/exp
422	#15. 'cephalosporin resistance'/exp
423	#14. 'lactamase':ti,ab,kw
424	#13. 'esbl':ti,ab,kw
425	#12. #7 OR #11
426	#11. #8 OR #9 OR #10
427	#10. 'companion animal'/exp
428	#9. 'pet animal'/exp
429	#8. 'animal*':ti,ab,kw

- 430 #7. #1 OR #2 OR #3 OR #4 OR #5 OR #6
- 431 #6. 'family'/exp
- 432 #5. 'famil*':ti,ab,kw
- 433 #4. 'community care'/exp
- 434 #3. 'communit*':ti,ab,kw
- 435 #2. 'household'/exp
- 436 #1. 'household*':ti,ab,kw

437

438 **For the Cochrane database, the following MeSH terms were used :**

439 ID Search

- 440 #1 "household*":ti,ab,kw
- 441 #2 "communit*":ti,ab,kw
- 442 #3 "famil*":ti,ab,kw
- 443 #4 MeSH descriptor: [Family] explode all trees
- 444 #5 MeSH descriptor: [Residence Characteristics] explode all trees
- 445
- 446 #6 #1 or #2 or #3 or #4 or #5
- 447 #7 "animal*":ti,ab,kw
- 448 #8 MeSH descriptor: [Pets] explode all trees
- 449 #9 #7 or #8
- 450 #10 #6 or #9
- 451 #11 "ESBL":ti,ab,kw
- 452 #12 "lactamase":ti,ab,kw
- 453 #13 MeSH descriptor: [Cephalosporin resistance] explode all trees
- 454
- 455 #14 MeSH descriptor: [beta-Lactam Resistance] explode all trees
- 456
- 457 #15 #11 or #12 or #13 or #14
- 458 #16 "transmiss*":ti,ab,kw
- 459 #17 "acquisition":ti,ab,kw
- 460 #18 "carriage":ti,ab,kw
- 461 #19 "coloniz":ti,ab,kw

- 462 #20 "microbiota":ti,ab,kw
463 #21 "molecular and epidemiolog*":ti,ab,kw
464 #22 MeSH descriptor: [Disease Transmission, Infectious] explode all trees
465
466 #23 MeSH descriptor: [Microbiota] explode all trees
467
468 #24 MeSH descriptor: [Molecular Epidemiology] explode all trees
469
470 #25 #16 or #17 or #18 or #19 or #20 or #21 or #22 or #23 or #24
471
472 #26 #10 and #15 and #25 (1990 - 2018)
473
474

475 **Importation of references:**

476 All data were imported in DistillerSR using RIS format. Txt format for Central and
477 Pubmed have been adapted in a RIS-friendly format by
478 <https://eppi.ioe.ac.uk/cms/er4/RISExport/tabid/2934/Default.aspx>
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496 **Pilot-test of the search strategy:**
497 The search strategy was pilot-tested with a subset of relevant studies:
498 <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29331548>
499 Effect of outpatient antibiotics for urinary tract infections on antimicrobial
500 resistance among commensal Enterobacteriaceae: a multinational prospective
501 cohort study.
502 <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27596534>
503 Quantifying within-household transmission of extended-spectrum β -lactamase
504 producing bacteria.
505 <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18641033>
506 Faecal carriage of extended-spectrum beta-lactamase-producing Escherichia coli:
507 prevalence, risk factors and molecular epidemiology.
508 <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20233775>
509 Intrafamilial transmission of extended-spectrum-beta-lactamase-producing
510 Escherichia coli and Salmonella enterica Babelsberg among the families of
511 internationally adopted children.
512 <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22718774>
513 Transmission dynamics of extended-spectrum β -lactamase-producing
514 Enterobacteriaceae in the tertiary care hospital and the household setting.
515 <https://academic.oup.com/jac/article/72/2/589/2374137>
516 ESBL/AmpC-producing Enterobacteriaceae in households with children of
517 preschool age: prevalence, risk factors and co-carriage
518 <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18562591>
519 High rate of intestinal colonization with extended-spectrum-beta-lactamase-
520 producing organisms in household contacts of infected community patients.
521 <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20144898>
522 Fecal carriage of CTXM type extended-spectrum beta-lactamase-producing
523 organisms by children and their household contacts.
524 <https://academic.oup.com/jac/article/68/5/1043/682782>

525 Long-term faecal carriage in infants and intra-household transmission of CTX-M-
526 15-producing *Klebsiella pneumoniae* following a nosocomial outbreak

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		Relevant studies
Search strategy (Pubmed)	Studies retrieved	9
	Studies not retrieved	0
		9

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531 Sensitivity of the search strategy: 100%

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Bibliography	Sample	Broth	Species discrimination	Target pathogen or organism for the index case	Method of resistance determination	Resistance profile included	Technique used to assess relatedness
Rodriguez-Bano J et al. 2008 (57)	rectal swab	no	genotypic	100% <i>E. coli</i>	genotypic	ESBL	PFGE, rep-PCR
Valverde A. et al. 2008 (61)	stool culture	no	genotypic	99% <i>E.coli</i> , 1% <i>K.pneumoniae</i> ^A	genotypic	ESBL	PFGE, multiplex-PCR
Lo W.U. et al. 2010 (59)	stool culture	no	genotypic	Among all participants: 81% <i>E.coli</i> , 19% <i>K. pneumoniae</i>	genotypic	CTXM	PFGE
Tande D. et al. 2010 (64)	stool culture	no	genotypic	56% <i>E. coli</i> , unknown proportion of <i>S.enterica</i>	genotypic	ESBL	PFGE
Hilty M. et al. 2012 (67)	stool culture	no	genotypic	88% <i>E.coli</i> , 12% <i>K. pneumoniae</i>	genotypic	ESBL	PFGE, MLST, rep-PCR
Löhr I.H. et al. 2013 (65)	rectal swab, stool culture	yes	genotypic	100% <i>K. pneumoniae</i>	genotypic	CTXM-15	PFGE
Strenger V. et al. 2013 (58)	stool culture	no	genotypic	44% <i>K. oxytoca</i> , 28% <i>S.marcescens</i> , 24% <i>K. pneumoniae</i> , 4% <i>E.coli</i>	phenotypic	ESBL	rep-PCR
Adler A. et al. 2014 (56)	rectal swab	no	genotypic	43% <i>E.coli</i> , 27% <i>K.pneumoniae</i> , 16% <i>P.mirabilis</i> , 6% <i>Citrobacter spp.</i> , 5% <i>Enterobacter spp.</i> , 3% others	genotypic	ESBL	PFGE, MLST
Arcilla MS et al. 2017 (62)	stool culture	yes	phenotypic	<i>Enterobacteriaceae</i> (no detail)	genotypic	ESBL	N/A
Haverkate MR, et al. 2017 (66)	stool culture	no	genotypic	66,7% <i>E.coli</i> , 17.9% <i>K.pneumoniae</i> , 12.8% <i>Enterobacter cloacae</i> , 2.6% <i>Citrobacter freundii</i>	genotypic	ESBL	rep-PCR
Kurz M.S. et al. 2017 (63)	rectal swab	no	phenotypic	48% <i>E.coli</i> , 36% <i>K.pneumoniae</i> , 16% <i>Enterobacter cloacae</i> ^B	phenotypic	ESBL	Partial concordance
Liakopoulos A. et al. 2018 (60)	stool culture	yes	genotypic	93.7% <i>E.coli</i> , 3.75% <i>Klebsiella pneumoniae</i> , 2.5% <i>Enterobacter cloacae</i>	genotypic	ESBL / AmpC	PFGE, MLST, resistance gene, replicon type and subtype
Stewardson AJ et al. 2018 (42)	Stool culture	no	Phenotypic	100% <i>E.coli</i>	phenotypic	ESBL	N/A

538 AmpC: AmpC Beta-Lactamase
539 CTXM: Specific family of genes coding for Extended-Spectrum Beta-Lactamase
540 CTXM-15: Specific gene coding for Extended-Spectrum Beta-Lactamase
541 ESBL: Extended-Spectrum Beta-Lactamase
542 ESBL-PE: Extended-Spectrum Beta-Lactamase Producing Enterobacteriaceae
543 MLST: MultiLocus Sequence Typing
544 PCR: Polymerase Chain Reaction
545 PFGE: Pulsed-field Gel Electrophoresis
546 Rep-PCR: Repetitive element palindromic Polymerase Chain Reaction
547
548 *Footnotes to the Supplementary table 1:*
549 A Population based study, pathogens isolated from all study participants
550 B Population based study, pathogens isolated from one cohort of the original study
551 (patients recruited at hospital admission)
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556 *Supplementary table 2. Reporting practices of potential biases and confounders in the included studies*

Reference	Study design	Study population	Sampling criteria	Previous hospital stay		Antibiotic exposure		Travel		Foodborne		Children in Day care centers		Socio-Economic Status	Loss to follow up
				baseline	follow up	baseline	follow up	baseline	follow up	baseline	follow up	baseline	baseline		
Rodríguez-Bano J et al. 2008 (57)	cross-sectional study	Index case (Outpatient)	ESBL-PE infection	19/53 ^A (36%)	na	38/53 ^B (72%)	na	-	na	7 ^C	na	-	na	-	NA
		Household member	Convenience sample	6/73 ^A (8%)	na	8/73 ^B (11%)	na	-	na	8.55 ^C	na	-	na	-	
Valverde A. et al. 2008 (61)	cross-sectional study	Index case (Outpatient)	ESBL-PE infection	-	na	18/36 ^B (50%)	na	-	na	-	na	-	na	-	NA
		Household member	Convenience sample	-	na	-	na	-	na	-	na	-	na	-	
Lo W.U. et al. 2010 (59)	cross-sectional study	Household members (population based study)	Children with acute respiratory or non-febrile illness	13/53 ^D (24.5%)	na	24/53 ^E (45%)	na	-	na	-	na	-	na	-	NA
			Whole family	7/172 ^D (4.1%)	na	40/172 ^E (23%)	na	-	na	-	na	-	na	-	
Tande D. et al. 2010 (64)	longitudinal cohort	Index case (adopted children)	ESBL-PE carriage	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Not detailed (mean follow time available)
		Family member	Whole family	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Hilty M. et al.	longitudinal	Index case (Inpatient &	Newly detected ESBL-PE	11/82 ^F (13%)	-	69/82 ^E (84%)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Not detailed

2012 (67)	cohort	Outpatient)	carriage or infection												
		Household member	Convenience sample	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Löhr I.H. et al. 2013 (65)	longitudinal cohort	Index case (Inpatient, after an outbreak)	ESBL-PE carriage	na ^G	-	33 ^H (79%)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Not detailed (median follow time available)
		Household member	Convenience sample	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Strenger V. et al. 2013 (58)	longitudinal cohort	Index case (Inpatient)	ESBL-PE carriage	na ^G	11 ^I (44%)	15/25 ^J (60%)	4/25 ^K (16%)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Detailed
		Household member	Convenience sample	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Adler A. et al. 2014 (56)	cross-sectional study	Index case (Inpatient)	ESBL-PE carriage	190/194 ^F (98%)	na	99/194 ^L (51%)	na	-	na	-	na	-	na	-	NA
		Family member	Convenience sample	28/286 ^D (9.8%)	na	17/286 ^L (6%)	na	-	na	-	na	-	na	-	
Arcilla MS et al. 2017 (62)	longitudinal cohort	Index case (Travellers) ^M	ESBL-PE carriers	- ^Q	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Not detailed
		Household member	Convenience sample	-	-	25/215 ^E (12%)	-	188/215 (87%)	-	-	-	-	-	78/215 ^N (36.4%)	
Haverkate MR, et al. 2017 (66)	longitudinal cohort	Index case (Inpatient)	Suspicion of ESBL-PE colonization or infection	43/74 ^A (58.1%)	-	53/71 ^O (75%)	74.6% ^O (53/71) - 10.5% (4/38)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Detailed
		Household member	Whole family	4/83 ^A (4.8%)	-	4/79 ^O (5%)	5.3% ^O (4/75) - 1.5% (1/66)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	

Kurz M.S. et al. 2017 (63)	cross-sectional study	Household members (population based study)	Recruited at hospital admission	69/392 ^A (18%)	na	98/390 ^E (25%)	na	-	na	221/365 ^P (60.5%)	na	-	na	117/389 ^N (30.1%)	NA
			convenience sample	-	na	-	na	-	na	-	na	-	na	-	
Liakopoulos A. et al. 2018 (60)	cross-sectional study	Household members (population based study) ^Q	Children	-	na	77/1000 ^R (8%)	na	-	na	58/1999 ^S (5.7%)	na	4.6% (95IC: 2.7-6.4)	na	2.2% ^T (95IC : 0.6-3.9)	NA
			Parents	-	na	32/1000 ^R (3%)	na	-	na	675/996 ^U (67.8%)	na	5.8% (95IC: 3.9-7.8)	na	4.7% ^T (95IC : 2.4-7.1)	
Stewardson AJ et al. 2018 (42)	longitudinal cohort	Household members (population based study) ^Q	With an antibiotic exposure	33/300 ^D (11%)	-	119/300 ^V (40%)	-	30/300 ^W (10%)	-	4/300 ^X (1%)	-	38/300 ^Y (13%)	-	7/300 ^Z (2%)	Detailed
			Without antibiotic exposure	56/416 ^D (13%)	-	97/416 ^V (23%)	-	56/416 ^W (13%)	-	10/416 ^X (2%)	-	38/300 ^Y (13%)	-	7/300 ^Z (2%)	

ESBL-PE : Extended-Spectrum Beta-Lactamase Producing *Enterobacteriaceae*

Footnotes to the Supplementary table 2:

A	Healthcare facility in the last 3 months	J	Cefuroxime/ampicillin exposure during hospital stay	S	Vegetarians in the households
B	Antibiotic exposure in the last 2 months	K	Antibiotic exposure (without detail)	T	Low SES score
C	Av. days of chicken consumption in the previous month	L	Antibiotic exposure in the last previous month Data available from the main study population, but not for this nested cohort	U	Chicken consumption more than 4 times per month
D	Healthcare facility in the last year	M	No education	V	Antibiotic exposure in the last year
E	Antibiotic exposure in the last 3 months	N	ESBL-selecting antibiotic exposure in the last 3 months (non-including carbapenems)	W	High risk travel reported in the last year
F	Referral from another healthcare facility	O	Eating meat at least once per month	X	Number of vegetarians
G	Neonatal Intensive Care Units admission	P	Data not available for the cohort derived in our review, but available for the original cohorts of studies	Y	Children <5 years that attend day-care
H	Antibiotic exposure during hospital stay	Q	Antibiotic exposure in the last 6 previous months	Z	Households with only primary education
I	Re-hospitalization during follow-up	R			

559 *Supplementary table 3. Potential microbiological biases of the included*
 560 *studies*
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Bibliography	study design	Potential selection bias	Potential detection bias	
		Colonies analyzed per morphotype	Broth use	sampling
Rodriguez-Bano J et al. 2008 (57)	cross-sectional study	>3 colonies and each distinct morphotype	no	not defined
Valverde A. et al. 2008 (61)	cross-sectional study	1 colony	no	not defined
Lo W.U. et al. 2010 (59)	cross-sectional study	<5 colonies	no	not defined
Tande D. et al. 2010 (64)	longitudinal cohort	1 colony	no	not defined
Hilty M. et al. 2012 (67)	longitudinal cohort	not defined	no	not defined
Löhr I.H. et al. 2013 (65)	longitudinal cohort	1 colony	yes	self-collected
Strenger V. et al. 2013 (58)	longitudinal cohort	not defined	no	not defined
Adler A. et al. 2014 (56)	cross-sectional study	1 colony	no	not defined
Arcilla MS et al. 2017 (62)	longitudinal cohort	1 colony	yes	self-collected
Haverkate MR, et al. 2017 (66)	longitudinal cohort	1 colony	no	not defined
Kurz M.S. et al. 2017 (63)	cross-sectional study	not defined	no	not defined
Liakopoulos A. et al. 2018 (60)	cross-sectional study	<5 colonies	yes	self-collected
Stewardson AJ et al. 2018 (42)	longitudinal cohort	10 colonies	no	self-collected

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564 *Supplementary table 4. Index-case based studies evaluating co-carriage of closely-related and clonally-related*
 565 *ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae among household members*

Reference	Study period	Study design	Country	Broth use	Target pathogen for the index cases	Resistance included	Type of prevalence	Discrimination	Proportion	Co-carriage of
Rodriguez-Bano J et al. 2008 (57)	2005-2006	Cross-sectional study	Spain	no	100% <i>E. coli</i>	ESBL	Point prevalence	Closely-related	27.4% (20/73)	ESBL species
								Clonally related	9.6% (7/73)	ESBL strain
Valverde A. et al. 2008 (61)	2004-2005	Cross-sectional study	Spain	no	99% <i>E.coli</i> , 1% <i>K.pneumoniae</i>	ESBL	Point prevalence	Closely-related	16.7% (9/54)	ESBL species
								Clonally related	11.1% (6/54)	ESBL strain
Tande D. et al. 2010 (64)	2002-2005	Prospective cohort study	France	no	56% <i>E. coli</i> , unknown proportion of <i>S.enterica</i>	ESBL	Period prevalence (12 months)	Closely-related	14.3% (7/49)	ESBL-PE
								Clonally related	8.16% (4/49)	ESBL strain
Hilty M. et al. 2012 (67)	2008-2009	Prospective cohort study	Switzerland	no	88% <i>E.coli</i> , 12% <i>K. pneumoniae</i>	ESBL	Period prevalence (12 months)	Closely-related	34.4% (33/96)	ESBL-Ec and ESBL-Kp
								Clonally related	22.9% (22/96)	ESBL strain
Löhr I.H. et al. 2013 (65)	2008-2009	Prospective cohort study	Norway	yes	100% <i>K. pneumoniae</i>	CTXM-15	Period prevalence (23 months)	Closely-related	20.0% (12/60)	CTXM-15 species
								Clonally related	20% (12/60)	CTXM-15 strain
Strenger V. et al. 2013 (58)	2007-2008	Prospective cohort study	Austria	no	44% <i>K. oxytoca</i> , 28% <i>S.marcescens</i> , 24% <i>K. pneumoniae</i> , 4% <i>E.coli</i>	ESBL	Period prevalence (12 months)	Closely-related	18.4% (9/49)	ESBL-PE
								Clonally related	8.2% (4/49)	ESBL strain
				no		ESBL	Point prevalence	Closely-related	8.0% (23/286)	ESBL species

Adler A. et al. 2014 (56)	2007-2008	Nested cross-sectional study in a prospective cohort study	France, Italy, Spain, Israel		43% <i>E.coli</i> , 27% <i>K.pneumoniae</i> , 16% <i>P.mirabilis</i> , 6% <i>Citrobacter spp.</i> , 5% <i>Enterobacter spp.</i> , 3% others			Clonally related	5.6% (16/286)	ESBL strain
Haverkate M.R. et al. 2017 (66)	2010-2013	Prospective cohort study	Netherlands	no	66,7% <i>E.coli</i> , 17.9% <i>K.pneumoniae</i> , 12.8% <i>Enterobacter cloacae</i> , 2.6% <i>Citrobacter freundii</i>	ESBL	Period prevalence (18 months) Point prevalence (baseline)	Closely-related	36.9% (31/84)	ESBL-PE
								Clonally related	14.3% (12/84)	ESBL strain
Liakopoulos A. et al. 2018 (60)	2013-2015	Cross-sectional study	Netherlands	yes	93.7% <i>E.coli</i> , 3.75% <i>Klebsiella pneumoniae</i> , 2.5% <i>Enterobacter cloacae</i>	ESBL / AmpC	Point prevalence	Closely-related	18.2% (12/66)	ESBL species sharing the same resistance genes
								Clonally related	10,6% (7/66)	ESBL strain
Stewardson AJ et al. 2018 (42)	2011-2013	Prospective cohort study	Belgium, Poland, Switzerland	no	100% <i>E.coli</i>	ESBL	Point prevalence (baseline)	Closely-related	10.9% (5/46)	ESBL species

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567 *CTXM-15: Specific gene coding for Extended-Spectrum Beta-Lactamase*

568 *ESBL: Extended-Spectrum Beta-Lactamase*

569 *ESBL Ec: Extended-Spectrum Beta-Lactamase Producing E.coli*

570 *ESBL Kp: Extended-Spectrum Beta-Lactamase Producing K.pneumoniae*

571 *ESBL-PE: Extended-Spectrum Beta-Lactamase Producing Enterobacteriaceae*

572

573 *Supplementary table 5. Population-based studies evaluating co-carriage level of closely-related and clonally-related*
 574 *ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae among multiple families*

Author	Study date	Design	Country	Prevalence type	Broth	Pathogen included	Resistance included	Strain relatedness	Proportion	co-carriage of
Lo W.U. et al. 2010 (59)	2007-2008	Cross-sectional study	China	Point prevalence	no	Among all participants: 81% <i>E.coli</i> , 19% <i>K. pneumoniae</i>	CTXM	Both phenotypic (speciation) and genotypic (susceptibility testing)	13.6% (83/225)	CTXM-PE
								Clonally related	5.8% (13/225)	CTXM strain
Kurz M.S. et al. 2017 (63)	2014	nested cross-sectional study in a prospective cohort study	Rwanda	Point prevalence	no	Index case: 48% <i>E.coli</i> , 36% <i>K.pneumoniae</i> , 16% <i>Enterobacter cloacae</i>	ESBL	closely-related	15.4% (116/753)	ESBL-PE partially concordant

575
 576 *CTXM: Specific family of genes coding for Extended-Spectrum Beta-Lactamase*

577 *ESBL: Extended-Spectrum Beta-Lactamase*

578 *ESBL-PE: Extended-Spectrum Beta-Lactamase Producing Enterobacteriaceae*

579

580

581

582

583

584 *Supplementary table 6. Index-case based studies evaluating acquisition rates of closely-related and clonally-*
 585 *related ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae among household members*

Author	Study design	Country	Follow up frequency	Follow up time	Broth	Pathogen included	Resistance included	Strain relatedness	Acquisition rate (among person-days)	Acquisition rate (among person-days at risk)	Acquisition of :	Acquisition event	Household members followed
Tande D, et al. 2010 (64)	Prospective cohort study	France	1M	12 M (median follow up time)	no	<i>E. coli</i> , <i>Salmonella enterica</i> <i>Babelsberg</i> (56%, unknown proportion of <i>S. enterica</i>)	ESBL	clonally related	1.56 acquisitions per 1000 person-weeks	1.69 acquisitions per 1000 person-weeks at risk	ESBL strain	4	49
Löhr I.H., et al. 2013 (65)	Prospective cohort study	Norway	1M,3M	23 M (median follow up time for infants and household contacts)	yes	<i>K.pneumoniae</i>	CTXM-15	clonally related	2.03 acquisitions per 1000 person-weeks	NA	ESBL strain	12	60
Arcilla MS et al. 2017 (62)	Prospective cohort study	Netherlands	1-2W, 1M, 3M, 6M, 12M	12	yes	Index case: <i>Enterobacteriaceae</i> (no detail)	ESBL	closely-related	1.50 acquisitions per 1000 person-weeks	NA	ESBL-PE-sharing the same group of resistance gene	13	168
Haverkat MR, et al. 2017 (66)	Prospective cohort study	Netherlands	3M, 6M, 12M, 18M	18M	no	Gram-negative bacteria (Index case: 67% <i>E.coli</i> , 18% <i>Klebsiella pneumoniae</i> , 13% <i>Enterobacter cloacae</i>)	ESBL	clonally related	2.01 acquisitions per 1000 person-weeks	2.90 acquisitions per 1000 person-weeks at risk	ESBL strain	11	71

Stewards on AJ et al. 2018 (42)	Prospectiv e cohort study	Belgium, Poland, Switzerla nd	Day 8, day 36	36.5 (days)	no	100% <i>E. coli</i>	ESBL	closely-related	17.39 acquisitions per 1000 person - weeks	19.21 acquisitions per 1000 person- weeks at risk	ESBL species	5	55
--	---------------------------------	--	------------------	-------------	----	---------------------	------	-----------------	---	--	--------------	---	----

586

587 *CTXM-15: Specific gene coding for Extended-Spectrum Beta-Lactamase*

588 *ESBL: Extended-Spectrum Beta-Lactamase*

589 *ESBL-PE: Extended-Spectrum Beta-Lactamase Producing Enterobacteriaceae*

```

590 R code
591 library(metafor)
592 library(meta)
593 library(readxl)
594 library(ggpubr)
595 library(ggplot2)
596 library(boot)
597 #GENOTYPIC DISCRIMINATION
598 dat <- read_excel("O:/UPCI/Romain_UPCI/Revue systematique
599 household transmission/R_outcome 13.02_RM.xlsx", sheet =
600 "cocarriage_geno2")
601 #individual estimates with transformation (double-arcsin
602 transformation)
603 #WHY double-arcsin ? => low proportions, small sample size
604 ies.da=escalc(xi= case, ni= total, data=dat, measure="PFT", add=0)
605 #pooled estimates using random effects, with estimation of between-
606 study variance estimator using restricted maximum-likelihood estimator
607 pes.da=rma(yi, vi, data=ies.da, method="REML")
608 #conversion to original data
609 pes=predict(pes.da, transf=transf.ipft.hm, targ=list(ni=dat$total))
610 print(pes)
611 #taux-squared, I-squared, and their 95IC, Q-statistic
612 print(pes.da, digits=4)
613 confint(pes.da, digits=8)
614 #forest plot
615 pes.summary=metaprop(case, total, bibli, data=dat, sm="PFT",
616 method.tau="REML", method.ci="NAsm")
617 precision=sqrt(ies.da$vi)
618 forest(pes.summary,
619       xlim=c(0,35),
620       pscale=100,
621       rightcols = FALSE,

```

```

622     leftcols = c("studlab", "event", "n", "effect", "ci"),
623     leftlabs = c("Study", "Cases", "Total", "Proportion (%)", "95%
624 C.I."),
625     xlab = "Proportion of co-carriage \namong household members",
626     smlab = "",
627     weight.study="random", squaresize=0.5, col.square="navy",
628     col.square.lines = "navy",
629     col.diamond = "maroon",
630     col.diamond.lines = "maroon",
631     pooled.totals = FALSE,
632     comb.fixed=FALSE,
633     fs.hetstat = 10,
634     print.tau2=TRUE,
635     print.Q=TRUE,
636     print.pval.Q=TRUE,
637     print.I2=TRUE,
638     digits=1,
639     sortvar = pubdate)
640 #Funnel plot avec 95 et 99IC
641 funnel(pes.da, attransf=transf.ipft.hm, targ=list(ni=dat$total),
642     level=c(95, 99), shade=c("white", "gray"))
643
644
645
646

```

647 *Title and Abstract screening form*

648

Question Text	Answer Text
Type of the study:	Research article (observational, interventional, experimental)
	Review article, recommendation, guideline
Does it include Third-Generation Cephalosporin Resistant (3GC-R) Enterobacteriaceae ?	Yes
	No
	Unclear
Is it a study of human subjects? (non animal, non in-vitro...)	Yes
	No
Are multiple members (including pets) taken from more than one household or family in community?	Yes
	No
	No but case report of one household
	Unclear
I still want to include this study in the background material	Yes
	No

649

650 *Full-reading screening form*

Question Text	Answer Text
Language barrier (if non-EN indicate the language in comments)	Possible to read
	Impossible to read
Type of the study:	Research article (observational, interventional, experimental)
	Review article, recommendation, guideline
Is it a study of human subjects ? (non animal, non in-vitro...)	Yes
	No
Does it include 3rd-Generation Cephalosporin Resistant (3GC-R) <i>E. coli</i> and/or <i>K. pneumoniae</i> ?	Yes

	No
	Unclear
Are multiple members (including pets) taken from more than one household or family in community?	Yes
	No
	Unclear
	Yes but case report of a single household
Does it only concern: (choose what apply)	Only animal – human transmission but with other animals than pets
	Only animal - human transmission with domestic animals
	Only non-household settings (pig farms, child care facilities, travel, etc...)
	Only mother-to-child transmission (neonatal ≤ 1 month)
	Community outbreak (foodborne...)
	Nothing of the above
Does it analyze prevalence, acquisition, co-carriage or transmission rate between household members and/or pets-household members of 3GC-R <i>E. coli</i> and/or <i>K. pneumoniae</i> ?	Yes
	No
	Unclear
Any other comment:	

651

652

653

654

655 *Plasmidic transfer*

656 *Haverkate et al:*

657 **Method:** PCR-based replicon typing

658 **Definition:** different strains sharing the same plasmid incompatibility
659 group and ESBL gene

660 **Results:** Among 84 household members at baseline, one shared with
661 an index case the same plasmid incompatibility group and ESBL gene on
662 an unrelated *Klebsiella*. Impossible to determine plasmid acquisition
663 during the follow up because species are not specified in the article.

664 *Liakopoulos et al:*

665 **Method:** extraction, PCR-based replicon typing, PCR-based replicon
666 sub-typing, PCR-based typing of frequent insertion sequences (ISCR1,
667 ISEcop1, IS26)

668 **Definition:** sharing between two different strains of the same
669 ESBL/AmpC gene on the same genetic location on a plasmid belonging
670 to the same replicon type and subtype.

671 **Results:** No plasmidic co-carriage between two different strains
672 observed.

673 *Tandé et al:*

674 **Method:** extraction, electrophoresis

675 **Definition:** different strains sharing the same plasmid profile and ESBL
676 gene

677 **Results:** no observed plasmid transfer between two different strains
678 observed.

679

680

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Part 3) Household acquisition and transmission of extended-spectrum β -lactamase (ESBL) - producing Enterobacteriaceae after hospital discharge of ESBL-positive index patients

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696 *A similar version of this chapter was published under the following*
697 *reference:*

698
699

700 *Riccio ME, Verschuuren Tess, Conzelmann N, Martak D, Meunier A,*
701 *Salamanca E, Delgado M, Guther J, Peter S, Paganini J, Martischang R,*
702 *Sauser J, de Kraker MEA, Cherkaoui A, Fluit Ad C, Cooper BS, Hocquet*
703 *D, Kluytmans JAWK, Tacconelli E, Rodriguez-Baño J, Harbarth S,*
704 *MODERN WP2 study group. Household acquisition and transmission of*
705 *extended-spectrum β -lactamase (ESBL) -producing Enterobacteriaceae*
706 *after hospital discharge of ESBL-positive index patients. Clin Microbiol*
707 *Infect. 2021;7: 1198-743X(20)30784-9. DOI:*
708 *10.1016/j.cmi.2020.12.024.*

709
710
711
712

713 **Abstract**

714

715 *Objectives:*

716 This study aimed to determine rates and risk factors of ESBL-producing
717 *Enterobacteriaceae* (ESBL-PE) acquisition and transmission within
718 households after hospital discharge of an ESBL-PE-positive index patient.

719

720 *Methods:*

721 2-year prospective cohort study in 5 European cities. Patients colonised
722 with ESBL-producing *Escherichia coli* (ESBL-Ec) or *Klebsiella pneumoniae*
723 (ESBL-Kp), and their household contacts were followed up during 4
724 months after hospital discharge of the index case. At each follow-up,
725 participants provided a faecal sample and personal information. ESBL-PE
726 whole genome sequences were compared using pairwise Single
727 Nucleotide Polymorphism (SNP)-based analysis.

728

729 *Results:*

730 We enrolled 71 index patients carrying ESBL-Ec (n=45), ESBL-Kp (n=20)
731 or both (n=6), and 102 households contacts. The incidence of any ESBL-
732 PE acquisition among household members initially free of ESBL-PE was
733 1.9/100 participant-weeks at risk. Nineteen clonally related household
734 transmissions occurred (case to contact: 13; contact to case: 6), with an
735 overall rate of 1.18 transmissions/100 participant-weeks at risk. Most of
736 the acquisition and transmission events occurred within the first 2 months
737 after discharge. The rate of *ESBL-Kp* household transmission (1.16/100
738 weeks) was higher than of *ESBL-Ec* (0.93/100 weeks), whereas more
739 acquisitions were noted for *ESBL-Ec* (1.06/100 weeks) compared to
740 *ESBL-Kp* (0.65/100 weeks). Providing assistance for urinary and faecal
741 excretion to the index case by household members increased the risk of
742 ESBL-PE transmission (adjusted prevalence ratio, 4.3; 95%CI 1.3-14.1).

743

744 *Conclusions:*

745 ESBL-PE cases discharged from the hospital are an important source of
746 ESBL-PE transmission within households. Most acquisition and
747 transmission events occurred during the first 2 months after hospital
748 discharge and were causally related to care activities at home,
749 highlighting the importance of hygiene measures in community settings.

750

751 **Introduction**

752

753 While transmission of extended-spectrum β -lactamase-producing
754 *Enterobacteriaceae* (ESBL-PE) in the clinical setting has been extensively
755 studied (1), little is known about the risk and pathways of transmission
756 in the community. A recent systematic review evaluating human-to-
757 human ESBL-PE transmission between household contacts highlighted
758 important limitations of previous studies (2): low discriminatory power of
759 previously applied typing methods for identifying ESBL-PE transmission
760 events (3); cross-sectional study design preventing the assessment of
761 transmission dynamics over time; and not systematic assessment of
762 ESBL-PE transmission paths and possible epidemiological determinants.
763 Furthermore, only two studies focused on the likelihood of household
764 transmission of ESBL-PE after hospital discharge of an ESBL-positive
765 patient (4).

766

767 **Specific aims**

768

769 The aim of this study was to investigate ESBL-PE acquisition and
770 transmission in household settings in five European cities with varying
771 ESBL-PE baseline prevalence. Specifically, we attempted to determine the
772 incidence and risk factors of ESBL-PE acquisition and transmission within
773 families after hospital discharge of an ESBL-PE carrier.

774

775 **Methods**

776

777 *Study design*

778 We conducted a prospective multicentre cohort study including ESBL-PE
779 positive patients and their household contacts from five university
780 hospitals (Geneva, Sevilla, Tübingen, Utrecht, Besançon). The
781 recruitment target was 20 households by centre (appendix 1, incl. sample
782 size calculation).

783

784 *Population*

785 Index cases were defined as intestinal ESBL-PE carriers discharged home
786 into a household shared with at least 1 household contact. Household
787 contacts were identified as any person sharing the same household with
788 the index case at least 3 nights a week.

789

790 *Inclusion and exclusion criteria*

791 The inclusion criteria for the index cases were: to be ≥ 18 years old; to
792 have a rectal swab or faecal sample at hospital discharge confirming
793 intestinal colonisation with ESBL-producing *Escherichia coli* (ESBL-Ec)
794 and/or *Klebsiella pneumoniae* (ESBL-Kp); and to provide informed
795 consent. Patients were excluded if they were permanently
796 institutionalized or impossible to be followed up. After inclusion, index
797 cases were excluded if they had negative rectal samples during the first
798 2 visits. Enrolled participants who dropped out before collecting the first
799 stool sample were also excluded.

800 *Data collection*

801 All participants were followed up for four months: at hospital discharge
802 (baseline visit #1), 1 week (visit #2), 2 months (visit #3) and 4 months
803 (visit #4). Questionnaires were filled out by all participants at visit #1,
804 #2, #3, and #4. Collected variables concerned participants' health
805 status, antibiotic intake, household conditions, dietary habits and

806 lifestyle. All participants collected stool samples or rectal swabs by
807 themselves (or a household contact) with Procult™ 500 kit (Ability
808 Building Centre, Rochester, MN, USA) and faeces containers or Eswabs
809 (Copan Diagnostics, Brescia, Italy) at visit #1, #2, #3 and #4 (± 3 days).
810 Collected information was transferred into a centralized REDCap
811 database. The study was approved by each centre's institutional review
812 board.

813

814 *Microbiologic methods*

815 Selective culturing, enrichment broth, bacterial identification and
816 antimicrobial susceptibility testing were performed for each stool sample
817 or rectal swab at each centre's microbiology laboratory, using
818 standardized methods (as described in Appendix 2).

819

820 *Sequencing analysis*

821 The full genome of ESBL-PE isolates was sequenced with NextSeq
822 sequencer (Illumina). DNA extraction was performed with DNeasy
823 UltraClean Microbial Kit (Qiagen). The sequence type (ST) of each isolate
824 was identified by using 7 housekeeping genes, using MLST version 2.10
825 (<https://github.com/tseemann/mlst>). ESBL-encoding genes were
826 identified by Resfinder version 2.1 of the Center for Genomic
827 Epidemiology (5). Neighbor-joining core genome multi-locus sequence
828 typing (cgMLST) trees were constructed with SeqSphere+ (Ridom) using
829 the Enterobase scheme
830 (<https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6961584/>) for E.coli
831 (2513 genes) and sensu lato scheme for K.pneumoniae (2358 genes).
832 After removing genes not present in all strains, trees were built by
833 comparing 1'863 and 2'088 genes, respectively. For strains presenting
834 the same cgMLST alongside a strong epidemiological link, pairwise single
835 nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) distances were estimated by using the
836 CFSAN pipeline (6).

837

838 *Definitions*

839 Genomes of ESBL-PE isolates were considered clonally related and closely
840 related, when having respectively a pairwise distance of ≤ 10 , or 11-25
841 SNP differences (7). Acquisition was defined as newly identified carriage
842 of an ESBL-Ec or ESBL-Kp strain during follow-up, not previously detected
843 in the gut flora of the concerned participant. Transmission was defined as
844 the newly detected intestinal carriage of ESBL-Ec and/or ESBL-Kp of a
845 clonally related isolate previously identified in another household
846 member. Co-carriage was defined as the simultaneous carriage by two or
847 more household members of a clonally related isolate at the same
848 sampling time point.

849

850 *Data analysis*

851 Overall and species-specific incidence rates of acquisition and
852 transmission were estimated at the genotypic level. Time at risk of ESBL-
853 PE acquisition was estimated as the number of days between baseline
854 and the acquisition of the corresponding pathogen in a participant
855 previously free of it, or the dropout of the participant, or end of follow-
856 up, whichever occurred first. The time at risk of a possible ESBL-PE
857 transmission was estimated as the time between baseline (for index
858 cases) or the date of the first positive sample (for household contacts),
859 and the first detection date of a clonally-related isolate previously
860 identified in another household member. Incidence rates were calculated
861 as the total number of acquisition or transmission events divided by the
862 total number of participant-weeks at risk multiplied by 100.

863

864 Risk factors of acquisition and transmission were evaluated by univariable
865 and multivariable mixed-effects Poisson regression models to compute
866 prevalence ratios (8, 9), accounting for the lack of independence between
867 repeated samples and multiple clustering effects. The multilevel structure

868 of the data was composed by three levels: participant (4 samples per
 869 participant), household, and study site. Potential confounders were
 870 chosen on the basis of existing evidence, and were only scored if
 871 exposure preceded the event, with final model selection performed using
 872 stepwise backward model selection based on Akaike's information
 873 criterion (10). Analyses were performed using R (version 3.6.3.) and
 874 STATA version 15 (StataCorp., USA).

875

876 **Results**


877

878 *Recruitment and household characteristics*

879 Between November 2017 and April 2019, 71 households were included in
 880 the study, with 71 index cases and 102 of 127 eligible household contacts
 881 (participation rate, 80%). During the 4-month follow-up, 35 participants
 882 from 14 households dropped out (Figure 1). Important characteristics of
 883 participating households are shown in Table 1. The mean age of all
 884 participants was 53±21 years; 47% were female.

885

886 *Figure 1. Study flow diagram of study participants, by centre and overall.*



887

888

889

890

891

892 *Table 1. Characteristics of households included in the study.*

	ESBL- <i>E. coli</i>	ESBL-K. <i>pneumoniae</i>	<i>ESBL-E. coli</i> & <i>ESBL-K.</i> <i>pneumoniae</i>
	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)
Total N	45	20	6
Study site			
Besançon	7 (15.6)	3 (15.0)	0
Geneva	12 (26.7)	6 (30.0)	4 (66.7)
Sevilla	9 (20.0)	6 (30.0)	0
Tübingen	11 (24.4)	2 (10.0)	2 (33.3)
Utrecht	6 (13.3)	3 (15.0)	0
Number of participating household members			
2	33 (73.3)	14 (70.0)	5 (83.3)
3	7 (15.6)	3 (15.0)	1 (16.7)
>4	5 (11.1)	3 (15.0)	0
Children in the household			
<18 years	9 (20.0)	7 (35.0)	1 (16.7)
<5 years	3 (6.7)	4 (20)	0
Household exposure to at least 2 antibiotics during follow-up			
T60	7 (15.6)	3 (15.0)	0 (0)
T120	7 (15.6)	1 (5.0)	0 (0)
Number of toilets in household			
>2	17 (39.5)	8 (40.0)	3 (60.0)
Bath separated from toilet	16 (36.4)	3 (15.0)	2 (33.3)
Surface of living space, m² (median, SD)	122.2 (69.7)	154.2 (82.3)	132 (45.7)
Vegetarians in household	1 (2.3)	1 (5.0)	0

893 Data are reported in N (%), unless stated otherwise.

894 *Profile of index cases and household contacts*

895 Baseline characteristics of index cases and household contacts are
 896 presented in Table 2 and Supplementary Table 1. During hospital stay,
 897 32% (n=23) of index cases had an ESBL-PE infection and 39% (n=28)
 898 received antibiotics at hospital discharge.

899 Table 2. Main characteristics of ESBL-PE positive index cases included in
 900 the study.

	ESBL-<i>E. coli</i> (n=45)	ESBL-<i>K. pneumoniae</i> (n=20)	ESBL-<i>E. coli</i> & ESBL-<i>K. pneumoniae</i> (n=6)
Demographic			
Age (median, range)	62 (21-89)	64 (28-96)	57.5 (51-83)
Female gender	16 (35.6)	9 (45.0)	2 (33.3)
Highest education			
Primary school	11 (24.4)	7 (35.0)	0
Secondary school	11 (24.4)	8 (40.0)	0
Technical school	11 (24.4)	4 (20.0)	0
University	5 (11.1)	1 (5.0)	5 (83.3)
Other/unknown	7 (15.6)	0	1 (16.6)
Antibiotic exposure in previous 12 months			
	19 (42.2)	8 (40.0)	1 (16.7)
Travel abroad last 12 months			
	23 (52.3)	5 (25.0)	4 (66.7)
Dietary habits			
Omnivore	42 (97.7)	19(95)	5(83.3)
Weekly meat consumption	38.5 (86.0)	20 (100)	4 (67)
Vegetarian	1 (2.3)	1 (5.0)	0
Hospital length of stay			
1-7 days	19 (42.2)	3 (15.0)	3 (50.0)

	10		
8-14 days	(22.2)	6 (30.0)	1(16.7)
15-28 days	8 (17.8)	6 (30.0)	0
>28 days	8 (17.8)	5 (25.0)	2 (33.3)
Comorbidities	40	18 (90.0)	5 (83.3)
	(88.9)		
Auto-immune disease	0	2 (10.0)	0
Cardio-vascular disease	20	7 (35.0)	2 (33.3)
	(44.4)		
Chronic dermatologic disease	4 (8.9)	1 (5.0)	1 (16.7)
Chronic renal failure	7 (15.6)	1 (5.0)	0
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease	3 (6.7)	2 (10)	0
Diabetes	14	3 (15.0)	0
	(31.1)		
Gastro-intestinal disease	7 (15.6)	3 (15.0)	0
Chronic diarrhoea	1 (2.2)	0	0
Hepatic disease	4 (8.9)	2 (10.0)	0
Inflammatory bowel disease	3 (6.7)	2 (10)	0
Hemiplegia	0	1 (5.0)	0
Immunosuppression	5 (11.1)	4 (20.0)	1 (16.7)
Malignancy	14	9 (45.0)	1 (16.7)
	(31.1)		
Other	19	10 (50.0)	4 (66.7)
	(42.2)		
ESBL-PE infection during hospitalisation			
Yes	15	5 (25.0)	3 (50.0)
	(33.3)		
No	26	13 (65.0)	3 (50.0)
	(57.8)		
Unknown	4 (8.9)	2 (10.0)	0
Antibiotics at discharge			
Yes	19	8 (40.0)	1 (16.7)
	(42.2)		
No	26	11 (55.0)	4 (66.7)
	(57.8)		
Unknown	0	1 (5.0)	1 (16.7)
Incontinence	6 (13.3)	6 (30.0)	0

Urinary incontinence	3 (6.7)	4 (20.0)	0
Faecal incontinence	2 (4.4)	2 (10.0)	0
Both	1 (2.2)	0	0
	34		
Indwelling device at discharge	(75.6)	12 (60.0)	5 (83.3)
Intravascular	4 (8.9)	4 (20.0)	1 (16.7)
Urinary	1 (2.2)	2 (10.0)	0
Other	7 (15.6)	2 (10.0)	0
Patient autonomy			
	19		
Not completely autonomous	(42.2)	11 (55.0)	3 (50.0)
Needs support by family members	12 (26.7)	8 (40.0)	2 (33.3)
Help required for urinary or faecal excretion	2 (4.4)	6 (30.0)	0
Home care by healthcare personnel	12 (26.7)	5 (25.0)	1 (16.7)

901 Data are reported in N (%), unless stated otherwise.

902

903 *ESBL-PE carriage and acquisition*

904 At baseline, index cases were carrying ESBL-Ec (n=45, 63%) or ESBL-Kp
905 (n=20, 28%) or both (n=6, 8%). Among household contacts already
906 positive at baseline (n=29, 31%), 79% (23/29) were carrying the same
907 ESBL-PE as their corresponding index case. Twenty-six percent (17/65)
908 of household contacts with complete follow-up acquired ESBL-PE (ESBL-
909 Ec, 11; ESBL-Kp, 6). Most ESBL-PE acquisitions occurred during the first
910 2 months (1st week: 41%; 2nd-8th week: 29%). One third of index cases
911 (n=27) were ESBL-PE negative at the end of follow-up.

912

913 *Genetic profiles*

914 Overall, 38 different STs were observed for ESBL-Ec and 29 for ESBL-Kp
915 (Suppl. Figure 1). Among ESBL-Ec strains, ST131 was the most frequent
916 ST (46%). Less frequent STs were ST38 (6.9%), ST1193 (4%), and ST10

917 (3.6%). STs from ESBL-Kp showed a large heterogeneity (Suppl. Figure
918 2). Of 44 different ESBL-encoding genes identified, the most frequent was
919 blaCTX-M-15, detected in 142 ESBL-Ec and 79 ESBL-Kp isolates.

920

921 *Clonally related co-carriage and transmission of related isolates*

922 At baseline, 14 out of 29 positive household contacts had isolates clonally
923 related to the index case. The overall prevalence of co-carriage of clonally
924 related isolates was 34% (32/94) over the entire study period.

925

926 By combining epidemiological information with WGS data (Figure 2), 19
927 clonally related transmission events were identified showing two possible
928 directions: from the index case to his/her household contacts (n=13) and
929 vice versa (n=6). Two additional closely related transmission events were
930 identified for household BE07 from Besançon (18 to 24 SNP differences).
931 The isolates belonged to ST80 and the intra-individual genome variability
932 of the ESBL-Ec isolates retrieved from the index case throughout all
933 sampling points ranged from 7 to 11 SNP differences. Most of the
934 transmissions involved ESBL-Ec (14/21), with 9 of them transmitted by
935 the index case (Table 3 and Suppl. Table 2). Fifteen of 21 (71%)
936 transmission events occurred during the first 2 months of follow-up. The
937 phylogenetic trees of retrieved ESBL-Ec and ESBL-Kp strains are shown
938 in Suppl. Figures 3 and 4.

939

940 *Figure 2. Transmission events of clonally related and closely related*
941 *isolates of ESBL-producing E. coli and K. pneumoniae, with direction of*
942 *the transmission pathways. The Figure gives the ST of the transmitted*
943 *strains and pairwise SNP differences between the concerned isolates.*

944

945 *Each line of the table contains the information for a single household.*
946 *Each square box represents a sample from a participant at a given*
947 *sampling time point (i.e. #1, #2, #3, #4). Red and green colours*
948 *correspond to samples positive with ESBL-producing E. coli and K.*

949 *pneumoniae*, respectively. Grey colour corresponds to samples negative
 950 for ESBL-PE. Transmission events were identified in two directions: from
 951 index case (A) to household members (B to E) and from household
 952 contacts to index case. Red boxes (with *) represent clonally related
 953 ESBL-*E. coli* strains and green boxes (with *) represent clonally related
 954 ESBL-*K. pneumoniae*.

	Sample #1					Sample #2					Sample #3					Sample #4					Index case to household contacts	Household contact to index case	MLST	Pairwise SNPs differences
	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E	A	B	C	D	E				
BE02	■	■				■	■				■*	■				■*	■*				A#3 to B#4		ST45	0
* BE07	■*	■*				■*	■*				■*	■*	■*	■*		■*	■*				A#3 to B#3 and D#3		ST80	18-24
BE09	■*	■*				■*	■*		■*		■*	■*				■*	■*				A#1 to E#2		ST3268	3
GE02	■*	■*				■*	■*				■*	■*				■*	■*				A to B#3		ST1193	0
GE04	■*	■*				■*	■*				■*	■*				■*	■*					B#1 to A#2	ST405	0-1
GE05	■	■				■	■*				■	■				■*	■					B#2 to A#4	ST405	0
GE08	■*	■*				■*	■*				■*	■*				■*	■*					B#1/2 to A#3	ST127	4-6
GE10	■*	■*				■*	■*				■*	■*				■*	■*				A to B#3		ST1193	2-4
GE12	■*	■*	■*	■*		■*	■*	■*	■*		■*	■*	■*	■*		■*	■*				A#1 to B#2 & C#2		ST1537	0
GE15	■*	■*				■*	■*				■*	■*				■*	■*				A to B#3		ST1537	2-3
GE17	■*	■*				■*	■*				■*	■*				■*	■*					B#1 to A#3	ST131	4-6
GE21	■*	■*				■*	■*				■*	■*				■*	■*				A#1 to B#2		ST31	8
SE06	■*	■*	■*			■	■				■*	■*	■*			■*	■*					C#1 to A#3	ST17	8
SE08	■*	■*				■*	■*	■*			■*	■*	■*	■*		■*	■*	■*			A/B to C#4		ST131	4
SE09	■*	■*				■*	■*				■*	■*				■*	■*					B#1 to A#2	ST131	0
SE10	■*	■*	■*	■*		■*	■*	■*	■*		■*	■*	■*	■*		■*	■*				A to D#2		ST323	0
SE14	■*	■*				■*	■*				■*	■*				■*	■*				A to B#4		ST469	7
TU06	■*	■*				■*	■*				■*	■*				■*	■*				A to B#4		ST131	4
TU12	■*	■*				■*	■*				■*	■*				■*	■*				A to B#4		ST131	1

955

956 *Incidence rates of household acquisition and transmission of ESBL-PE*

957 The overall ESBL-PE acquisition rate was 1.9/100 participant-weeks at
 958 risk (Table 3). ESBL-Ec had a higher rate of acquisition than ESBL-Kp.
 959 (1.06 vs 0.65/100 participant-weeks at risk; RR 1.65; 95%CI 0.69–
 960 3.95). The rate of any clonally related ESBL-PE transmission within
 961 households was 1.18 events/100 participant-weeks of follow-up, with the
 962 corresponding figure for transmissions only from the index case to
 963 household contacts of 0.8/100 weeks (Table 3). Although not statistically
 964 significant, a higher overall transmission rate was observed for ESBL-Kp
 965 than for ESBL-Ec (1.16 versus 0.93 per 100 participant-weeks at risk; RR
 966 1.25; 95%CI 0.42–3.44) considering all possible transmission paths. A
 967 higher rate of ESBL-Kp transmission was also observed from index cases
 968 to household contacts (RR 1.87; 95%CI 0.52–6.49).

969

970 *Table 3. Crude numbers and incidence rates of acquisition and*
 971 *transmission events, based on cgMLST with pairwise SNP differences.*
 972 *ESBL-Ec: ESBL-producing Escherichia coli; ESBL-Kp: ESBL-producing*
 973 *Klebsiella pneumoniae*

974

	Acquisitions from any source			Transmissions in any direction			Transmissions from index case to household contacts		
	ESBL-Ec	ESBL-Kp	ESBL-PE	ESBL-Ec	ESBL-Kp	ESBL-PE	ESBL-Ec	ESBL-Kp	ESBL-PE
Crude number	13	12	17	12	7	19	7	6	13
Incidence rate (per 100 participant weeks at risk)	1.06	0.65	1.90	0.93	1.16	1.18	0.53	1.00	0.80

975

976 *Risk factors for ESBL-PE acquisition and transmission*

977 By univariable, mixed-effects Poisson regression, multiple explanatory
 978 factors were significantly associated with the risk of acquiring ESBL-PE
 979 among previously ESBL-PE-free household contacts (Suppl. Table 3): (1)
 980 index case determinants: hemiplegia, faecal incontinence, previous
 981 abdominal infection, proton pump inhibitor therapy, ≥ 3 antibiotic courses
 982 after discharge, additional hospitalizations, and assistance provided by
 983 household members, in particular for urinary and faecal excretion; (2)
 984 household member determinants: age > 50 years; travel abroad;
 985 assistance provided by healthcare personnel; help requested for various
 986 activities; regular contact with domestic animals; meat and seafood
 987 exposure; as well as the number of antibiotic courses. By multivariable

988 analysis in a parsimonious model, assistance provided by family members
989 to the index case (adjusted prevalence ratio [aPR], 2.9; 95%CI 1.1-8.0)
990 showed the strongest association with ESBL-PE household acquisition,
991 whereas frequency of meat consumption (aPR, 1.4; 95%CI 0.4-5.3) and
992 antibiotic exposure (aPR, 1.4; 95%CI 0.4-4.2) showed only weak
993 evidence of a positive association.

994 Fourteen variables were found to be significantly associated with the risk
995 of ESBL-PE transmission from the index case to household members in
996 the univariable analysis (Suppl. Table 4): (1) index case determinants:
997 higher education (protective), full autonomy (protective), malignancy,
998 faecal incontinence, previous abdominal infection, urinary catheter,
999 proton pump inhibitor therapy, ≥ 3 antibiotic courses, ≥ 2
1000 hospitalizations, and assistance provided by family members, in
1001 particular for urinary and faecal excretion; (2) household member
1002 determinants: spouse of index case, antibiotic intake and active helper of
1003 index case. In the final multilevel Poisson regression model, assistance
1004 provided by household members for urinary and faecal excretion was
1005 strongly associated with increased risk of ESBL-PE transmission (aPR,
1006 4.3; 95%CI 1.3-14.1), while household antibiotic exposure showed
1007 weaker evidence of a positive association (aPR, 2.1; 95%CI 0.7-7.0).

1008

1009 **Discussion**

1010

1011 The principal findings of this international cohort study were: (1) clonally
1012 related ESBL-PE household transmission after hospital discharge of an
1013 ESBL-PE carrier occurred in 19 of 94 participants; (2) most acquisition
1014 and transmission events were observed during the first 2 months; (3)
1015 other household members were potential sources of cross-transmission,
1016 but to a lesser degree; (4) the ESBL-PE acquisition rate was higher than
1017 the transmission rate; thus, exogenous acquisition events occurred even
1018 without intra-household transmission; (5) the rate of household
1019 transmission was higher for ESBL-Kp than for ESBL-Ec; and (6)

1020 assistance provided by family members for urinary and faecal excretion
1021 of the index case was the most important risk factor for ESBL-PE
1022 transmission.

1023

1024 A recent meta-analysis examining clonally related ESBL-PE among
1025 household members documented co-carriage proportions of 12%
1026 [95%CI, 8 – 16%], and acquisition rates ranging from 0.16 to 0.20
1027 events/100 participant-weeks of follow-up (2). In contrast, our study
1028 observed higher co-carriage proportions (34%) and 10-fold higher
1029 acquisition rates (1.9 events per 100 weeks at risk). The higher
1030 proportion of co-carriage in the present study might have been influenced
1031 by sampling and detection methods, since the use of enrichment broths
1032 and selection of multiple colonies per sample might have improved the
1033 yield. Furthermore, it may reflect a higher risk of ESBL-PE transmission
1034 within enrolled households prior to study participation. The differences in
1035 acquisition rates depend on the length of follow-up: longer follow-up
1036 periods result in smaller rates. Indeed, 12-month follow-up studies found
1037 lower acquisition rates in contrast to shorter follow-up studies, which
1038 reported acquisition rates of up to 1.74 closely-related ESBL-PE/100
1039 person-weeks (2, 8, 11). Furthermore, the higher proportion of infected,
1040 dependent and antibiotic-treated index cases in our study might have
1041 increased early transmission risk for household members compared to
1042 previous studies.

1043

1044 The incidence of ESBL-Ec acquisition was higher than the rate for ESBL-
1045 Kp. In contrast, household transmission rates were higher for ESBL-Kp
1046 compared to ESBL-Ec. This apparent contradiction is explained by the
1047 acquisition of ESBL-Ec from a wide range of sources (e.g. food, animals,
1048 travel) (12, 13), while transmission, as defined here, only involved
1049 human-to-human transfer. Similar observations have also been described
1050 for healthcare settings, suggesting that biological differences between
1051 bacterial species could explain higher ESBL-Kp transmission rates (14,

1052 15). An alternative explanation might be the slightly higher intra-species
1053 diversity of ESBL-Ec within households (mean number of different STs
1054 observed per family: 1.6 in ESBL-Ec versus 1.3 in ESBL-Kp).
1055 Furthermore, the frequency and intensity of human interactions may
1056 facilitate transmission of ESBL-KP, especially among elderly patients
1057 (16). Indeed, in our study, index patients carrying ESBL-Kp were sicker
1058 and more dependent on external care, leading to increased proximity and
1059 risk of transmission.

1060

1061 As Enterobacteriaceae are colonisers of the intestinal tract, the faecal-
1062 oral route plays an important role in the transmission chain. As in
1063 healthcare settings, where hand hygiene has been shown to be a key
1064 factor to reduce pathogen transmission (17), general hygiene measures
1065 rather than decreased intake or inappropriate handling of contaminated
1066 food may become an important preventive measure to reduce ESBL-PE
1067 transmission within households, especially if family members provide
1068 assistance to a sick relative (18).

1069

1070 Hitherto, no previous study with these design characteristics and high-
1071 resolution typing methods has been conducted in high-income settings to
1072 ascertain putative transmission events within entire families, although
1073 ESBL-PE acquisition and transmission in the community or low-income
1074 settings has previously been investigated (11, 12, 19-24). Therefore, the
1075 present study provides a solid methodological foundation for future
1076 studies and prioritization of infection control interventions in the
1077 community setting.

1078

1079 Several limitations of this study merit consideration. First, not all
1080 members living in the same household participated in the study, omitting
1081 possible transmission events. Fortunately, the participation rate was high
1082 enough (80%) to draw meaningful conclusions. Second, by choosing not
1083 more than 4 colonies from a faecal sample, clonally distinct strains might

1084 have been missed, introducing a possible selection bias and
1085 underestimating the true transmission rate. As observed in few
1086 participants (16%), each host may carry several ESBL-E.coli strains
1087 simultaneously. However, we hypothesise that isolates not retrieved
1088 might present a low inoculum with lower transmission risk compared to
1089 dominating ESBL-E.coli strains. Third, we did not yet conduct plasmid
1090 typing, which is part of a complementary investigation, providing a more
1091 comprehensive picture of ESBL transmission in the community, especially
1092 for E. coli. Fourth, the role of intermediate vectors (i.e. animal) or
1093 environmental reservoirs (i.e. surfaces, water, etc) in ESBL-PE
1094 transmission was not directly examined, but assumed as a part of direct
1095 human-to-human transmission. However, fomite-mediated transmission
1096 was accounted for in the estimation of exogenous risk factors by
1097 collecting relevant epidemiologic information. Fifth, participants'
1098 intestinal load of ESBL-PE was not quantified preventing the consideration
1099 of the inoculum effect as an independent risk factor. However, the
1100 bacterial load is influenced by several factors that were collected and
1101 accounted for in the analysis (e.g. antibiotic exposure, hospital length of
1102 stay).

1103

1104 **Conclusions**

1105

1106 In summary, ESBL-PE carriers discharged from the hospital were an
1107 important source of ESBL-PE transmission within households. Most
1108 acquisition and transmission events occurred during the first two months
1109 after hospital discharge. They were associated with care activities at
1110 home, highlighting the importance of hygiene measures to prevent
1111 community spread.

1112

1113

1114 **References**

1115

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1211

1212

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1216

1217 **Supplementary Appendix**

1218

1219 *Appendix 1 (sample size calculation):*

1220 The sample size was determined for the primary outcome without a pre-
1221 specified a priori hypothesis for the risk factor analysis. We assumed an
1222 ESBL-PE transmission rate of 10-20% among household members, a
1223 cluster size (i.e. number of individuals per household) of 3 and an
1224 intraclass correlation coefficient of 0.20 due to the clustering of
1225 individuals within families. With a ratio of 1:1 of ESBL-*E. coli* and ESBL-
1226 *K.pneumoniae* cases, the planned sample size of 100 index patients (with
1227 at least 1 household member) was considered sufficient for the purpose
1228 of this observational cohort study.

1229

1230 *Appendix 2 (microbiologic methods):*

1231 Faecal samples and swabs were streaked directly on ChromID ESBL agar
1232 (bioMérieux, Marcy l'Etoile, France) plus additionally in MacConkey broth
1233 supplemented with vancomycin 64 µg/mL and 32 µg/mL cefuroxime,
1234 incubated for 24 h at 35°C. Centres using rectal swab had verified visually
1235 the presence of faecal material in sampling tubes (i.e. white swab tips
1236 having brownish stains). As stated by several expert sources, correctly
1237 performed rectal swabs remain « an acceptable and practical proxy for
1238 the collection of faecal specimens for stool microbiota analysis » (Basis
1239 CM et al. Comparison of stool versus rectal swab samples and storage
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1241 10.1186/s12866-017-0983-9). Ten µl of the broth was then streaked on
1242 ChromID ESBL agar and further incubated for 48 h at 35°C. Each colony
1243 morphology was identified using matrix-assisted laser
1244 desorption/ionization time-of-flight (MALDI-TOF). ESBL production was
1245 confirmed by double disk synergy tests (DDST20 and DDST30) and by
1246 the determination of the β-lactamase inhibition profile (ESBL + AmpC
1247 Screen ID Kit, Rosco Diagnostica, Taastrup, Denmark). Based on distinct

1248 colony morphology, each centre stored at -80°C 1 to 4 isolates per
1249 sample in bead-containing cryotubes (Microbank, PRO-LAB Diagnostics,
1250 ON, Canada) until further analysis.

1251

1252 *Supplementary table 1. Main characteristics of participating household*
 1253 *contacts.*

	ESBL- <i>E. coli</i>	ESBL- <i>K. pneumoniae</i>	ESBL- <i>E. coli</i> & ESBL- <i>K. pneumoniae</i>
	(n=63)	(n=32)	(n=7)
Demographics			
Age (median, range)	54 (2-79)	41 (1-92)	55 (26-84)
Female gender	36 (57.1)	16 (50)	3 (42.9)
Highest educational level			
Primary school	16 (25.4)	12 (37.5)	0
Secondary school	11 (17.5)	7 (21.9)	0
Technical school	15 (23.8)	6 (18.8)	0
University	9 (14.3)	5 (15.6)	5 (71.4)
Other/unknown	12 (19.1)	2 (2.3)	2 (28.6)
Healthcare and antibiotic exposures in previous 12 months			
Hospitalization	1 (1.6)	1 (3.1)	2 (28.6)
Antibiotics last 12 months	19 (30.2)	5 (15.6)	1 (14.3)
Antibiotics at enrolment	2 (3.2)	0	0
Travel abroad last 12 months	30 (48.4)	9 (28.1)	5 (71.4)
Dietary habits			
Omnivore	57 (90.5)	29 (90.6)	6 (85.7)
Vegetarian	1 (1.6)	2 (6.2)	0
Relation to the index case			
Spouse	38 (60.3)	17 (53.1)	6 (85.7)
Daughter/son	20 (31.8)	14 (43.8)	1 (14.3)
Parent	1 (1.6)	0	0
Sibling	1 (1.6)	0	0
Grand-parent	1 (1.6)	0	0
Parent in law	0	1 (3.1)	0
No relationship	2 (3.2)	0	0

1254 Data are reported in N (%), unless stated otherwise.

1255 *Supplementary Table 2. Clonally (n=19) or closely (n=2) related*
 1256 *transmission events confirmed by analysis of cgMLST and SNP*
 1257 *differences. For each centre, it shows the number of ESBL-PE*
 1258 *transmission events identified for ESBL-E. coli (ESBL-Ec) and ESBL-K.*
 1259 *pneumoniae (ESBL-Kp), at first week (#2), two months (#3) and four*
 1260 *months (#4) of follow-up.*

1261

Genotypically confirmed transmission		Sample #2		Sample #3		Sample #4		Total
		ESBL-Ec	ESBL-Kp	ESBL-Ec	ESBL-Kp	ESBL-Ec	ESBL-Kp	
Besançon	TOTAL	1		2			1	4
	index case to members	1		2			1	4
	members to index case							0
	members to members							0
Geneva	TOTAL	2	2	4	1	1		10
	index case to members	1	2	2	1			6
	members to index case	1		2		1		4
	members to members							0
Sevilla	TOTAL	1	1	0	1	1	1	5
	index case to members		1			1	1	3
	members to index case	1			1			2
	members to members							0
Tübingen	TOTAL	0	0	0	0	2		2
	index case to members					2		2

	members to index							0
	case							0
	members to							0
	members							0
	TOTAL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	index case to							0
	members							0
Utrecht	members to index							0
	case							0
	members to							0
	members							0
	TOTAL	4	3	6	2	4	2	21

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1265 *Supplementary Table 3. Risk factors of acquisition of ESBL-PE by*
 1266 *previously ESBL-free household contacts (n=17), stratified by index*
 1267 *patient versus household variables, including characteristics present at*
 1268 *baseline and during follow-up, analysed by univariable mixed effects*
 1269 *Poisson regression.*

1270

		Exposure variable	Prevalence ratio	Std. Err.	z	P> z 	95% Conf. interval	
Household characteristics		Household surface >100m ²	0.99	0.40	-0.03	0.98	0.45	2.18
		More than 1 toilet per household	1.09	0.71	0.13	0.89	0.30	3.94
		≥3 Household members	0.61	0.34	0.88	0.38	0.21	1.81
		Presence of children ≤3 years old	0.92	0.26	0.30	0.77	0.53	1.59
Index case	At baseline	Age of index case > 50	1.17	0.24	0.75	0.45	0.78	1.74
		Gender (male)	0.80	0.33	-0.53	0.60	0.36	1.80
		Nationality (non-Swiss)	2.69	1.40	1.90	0.06	0.97	7.46
		Higher education	0.79	0.18	1.02	0.31	0.50	1.24
		Absence of comorbidities	0.64	0.87	0.33	0.74	0.05	9.07
		Chronic renal failure	1.15	0.43	0.38	0.70	0.56	2.38
		Cardio-vascular disease	1.36	0.84	0.50	0.62	0.41	4.59
		Diabetes	1.83	0.79	1.39	0.16	0.78	4.26
		Hemiplegia	5.35	1.14	7.87	<0.001	3.52	8.13
		Chronic dermatologic disease	0.62	0.47	0.64	0.52	0.14	2.71
		Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease	1.29	1.22	0.27	0.79	0.20	8.24
		Immunosuppression	1.03	0.50	0.05	0.96	0.39	2.67
		Gastrointestinal disease	0.36	0.38	0.98	0.33	0.05	2.80
		Malignancy	1.45	0.82	0.67	0.50	0.48	4.37

	Inflammatory bowel disease	0.84	1.01	0.14	0.89	0.08	8.86
	Any incontinence	1.97	0.99	1.36	0.18	0.74	5.28
	Faecal incontinence	3.00	0.71	4.66	<0.001	1.89	4.76
	Urinary incontinence	1.15	0.32	0.51	0.61	0.67	1.98
	No indwelling device at hospital discharge	0.65	0.22	1.29	0.20	0.34	1.25
	Urinary catheter at hospital discharge	1.79	0.81	1.30	0.20	0.74	4.33
	Intravascular catheter at hospital discharge	0.83	0.46	0.33	0.74	0.28	2.48
	Complete autonomy	0.92	0.27	0.30	0.77	0.52	1.62
	Infection with ESBL-producing organisms during the last hospitalization	0.72	0.30	0.78	0.44	0.32	1.65
	Infection site: urinary tract	0.82	0.17	0.97	0.33	0.55	1.22
	Infection site: abdominal tract	1.75	0.40	2.45	0.01	1.12	2.73
	Antibiotic therapy at discharge	1.64	0.51	1.59	0.11	0.89	3.01
During follow-up	1 additional antibiotic course	1.90	0.90	1.35	0.18	0.75	4.83
	2 additional antibiotic courses	1.03	0.80	0.03	0.98	0.22	4.74
	3 additional antibiotic courses	2.43	0.99	2.19	0.03	1.10	5.38
	Proton pump inhibitors	1.90	0.45	2.70	0.01	1.19	3.02
	H2-receptor antagonists	0.71	0.95	0.26	0.80	0.05	9.95
	Oral corticosteroids or other immunosuppressive drugs	0.76	0.63	0.33	0.74	0.15	3.92
	1 additional hospitalization	2.03	0.78	1.84	0.07	0.95	4.32
	2 additional hospitalizations	2.43	1.03	2.10	0.04	1.06	5.57
	Urinary incontinence	1.47	0.73	0.78	0.44	0.56	3.90
	Faecal incontinence	2.25	1.03	1.78	0.08	0.92	5.51
	Indwelling device	2.50	1.22	1.87	0.06	0.96	6.52
	Urinary catheter	2.17	0.99	1.70	0.09	0.89	5.33
	Completely autonomous	0.29	0.25	1.43	0.15	0.05	1.57
	Help provided by healthcare professional	3.02	2.32	1.44	0.15	0.67	13.58

		Help provided by family members	2.91	1.26	2.48	0.01	1.25	6.78
		Help needed for food preparation	1.11	0.65	0.19	0.85	0.36	3.48
		Help needed for feeding	1.29	0.51	0.65	0.51	0.60	2.81
		Help needed for medication intake	1.96	1.14	1.16	0.25	0.63	6.15
		Help needed for urinary and faecal excretion	3.00	1.18	2.79	0.01	1.39	6.50
		Help needed for dressing	0.97	0.73	0.04	0.97	0.22	4.21
		Help needed for bed position shift	2.11	1.07	1.46	0.14	0.77	5.73
		Shared bath towel with other family members	1.16	0.35	0.51	0.61	0.65	2.10
		Prepared food for the other household members	0.83	0.33	0.46	0.64	0.38	1.81
		Cleaned hands before and while cooking meat products	0.65	0.60	0.46	0.64	0.11	4.00
		Stored separated raw and cooked food	0.56	0.37	0.88	0.38	0.15	2.05
		Cleaned surfaces and materials used to cook between each meat preparation	0.54	0.51	0.65	0.52	0.09	3.43
		Used different cooking utensils for raw and cooked food	0.48	0.22	1.58	0.11	0.19	1.19
	Household member	Baseline	Gender (male)	1.14	0.40	0.37	0.71	0.57
Age household member > 50			1.61	0.18	4.16	<0.001	1.29	2.01
Higher education			0.84	0.13	1.13	0.26	0.63	1.13
Spouse of index case			1.35	0.54	0.74	0.46	0.62	2.94
Son/daughter of index case			0.54	0.18	1.82	0.07	0.27	1.05
Vegetarian			1.08	0.29	0.26	0.79	0.63	1.84
Number of travels outside Switzerland			1.16	0.09	1.98	0.05	1.00	1.34
Follow-up		Helper of the index case during follow-up	1.74	0.93	1.03	0.30	0.61	4.97
		Help provided by healthcare professional	3.71	0.76	6.37	<0.001	2.48	5.55
		Help provided by family member	1.79	1.30	0.80	0.42	0.43	7.44
		Help needed for food preparation	2.75	1.33	2.08	0.04	1.06	7.11
	Help needed for feeding	3.71	1.42	3.41	<0.001	1.75	7.87	

Help needed for urinary and faecal excretion	2.75	1.76	1.58	0.11	0.78	9.64
Help needed for dressing	2.17	1.36	1.24	0.21	0.64	7.42
Help needed for any mobility	3.71	1.42	3.41	<0.001	1.75	7.87
Regular contact with domestic animals	0.64	0.11	2.55	<0.001	0.45	0.90
Regular contact with cat	1.41	0.24	2.01	0.04	1.01	1.97
Swim in a river or lake	0.92	0.65	0.12	0.90	0.23	3.66
Share towel	0.97	0.16	0.18	0.86	0.71	1.33
Eat at least once per week: beef	1.50	0.66	0.93	0.35	0.64	3.54
Eat at least once per week: lamb	3.14	0.44	8.24	<0.001	2.39	4.12
Eat at least once per week: pork	1.50	0.27	2.28	0.02	1.06	2.14
Eat at least once per week: poultry	1.41	0.25	1.89	0.06	0.99	2.00
Eat at least once per week: fish	1.91	0.68	1.81	0.07	0.95	3.85
Eat at least once per week: other seafood	2.56	0.72	3.33	<0.001	1.47	4.46
Spent time cooking meat products	1.12	0.81	0.16	0.88	0.27	4.61
Prepare food for other household members	1.07	0.59	0.13	0.90	0.37	3.15
Use different cooking utensils for raw and cooked food	1.02	0.51	0.05	0.96	0.39	2.71
Number of antibiotic courses	2.18	0.38	4.44	<0.001	1.55	3.07

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1274 *Supplementary Table 4. Risk factors of clonally related ESBL-PE*
 1275 *household transmission from index case to household contacts (n=13),*
 1276 *analysed by univariate mixed-effects Poisson regression, stratified by*
 1277 *index patient versus household variables, including characteristics*
 1278 *present at baseline and during follow-up*
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
Potential risk factors of transmission		Prevalence ratio	Std. Err.	z	P>z	[95% Conf. Interval]		
Household characteristics	Age	0.78	0.26	0.74	0.46	0.40	1.51	
	Household surface <100m ²	1.03	0.51	0.07	0.95	0.40	2.69	
	Main bathroom separated from the toilet	0.52	0.29	1.17	0.24	0.17	1.55	
	Number of toilets in the household	1.43	0.37	1.39	0.17	0.86	2.36	
	Number of household members	0.85	0.14	0.94	0.35	0.62	1.19	
	Presence of infants ≤ 3 years old	1.35	1.14	0.35	0.73	0.26	7.09	
Index case	At baseline	Absence of comorbidities	0.43	0.57	0.63	0.53	0.03	5.72
		Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease	1.85	1.66	0.69	0.49	0.32	10.76
		Cardio-vascular disease	1.03	0.55	0.06	0.95	0.36	2.93
		Chronic dermatologic disease	0.89	0.64	0.16	0.87	0.22	3.64
		Diabetes	2.79	1.67	1.72	0.09	0.87	8.99
		Malignancy	2.63	1.29	1.97	0.05	1.01	6.90
		Inflammatory bowel disease	1.22	1.62	0.15	0.88	0.09	16.46
		Gastro-intestinal disease	0.51	0.61	0.56	0.57	0.05	5.22
		Immunosuppression	0.69	0.38	0.67	0.51	0.23	2.04

	Faecal incontinence	4.72	0.91	8.04	<0.001	3.23	6.89
	Urinary incontinence	0.77	0.55	0.36	0.72	0.19	3.11
	Help provided by healthcare professional	1.15	0.39	0.41	0.68	0.59	2.22
	Help provided by family member	2.35	0.76	2.65	<0.001	1.25	4.42
	Antibiotic prescribed at hospital discharge	1.20	0.66	0.33	0.75	0.41	3.51
	Higher education	0.16	0.08	3.45	<0.001	0.05	0.45
	Infection with ESBL during last hospitalisation	1.63	0.80	1.00	0.32	0.62	4.28
	Abdominal infection site	5.45	1.15	8.04	<0.001	3.61	8.25
During follow-up	1 additional antibiotic course	2.13	1.70	0.95	0.34	0.45	10.15
	2 additional antibiotic courses	2.49	1.95	1.16	0.25	0.54	11.58
	3 additional antibiotic courses	5.90	2.35	4.47	<0.001	2.71	12.86
	Oral corticosteroids or other immunosuppressive drugs	0.52	0.48	0.71	0.48	0.08	3.17
	Proton pump inhibitors	2.99	1.24	2.64	0.01	1.33	6.75
	H2-receptor antagonists	1.04	1.57	0.02	0.98	0.05	20.1
	Faecal incontinence	3.42	1.45	2.91	<0.001	1.49	7.84
	Urinary incontinence	1.36	1.05	0.40	0.69	0.30	6.17
	Indwelling device	3.94	2.91	1.86	0.06	0.93	16.76
	Urinary catheter	3.26	1.58	2.44	0.02	1.26	8.42
	Diarrhoea	1.60	0.63	1.21	0.23	0.74	3.45
	Autonomous	0.18	0.11	2.88	<0.001	0.06	0.58
	Help provided by family member	3.97	1.83	3.00	<0.001	1.61	9.79
	Help provided by healthcare professional	3.00	1.86	1.77	0.08	0.89	10.12
	Help needed for dressing	1.44	1.14	0.46	0.65	0.30	6.82

		Help needed for urinary and faecal excretion	4.73	2.04	3.60	<0.001	2.03	11.01
		Help needed for food preparation	1.70	1.11	0.81	0.42	0.47	6.10
		Help needed for personal hygiene	1.23	0.98	0.26	0.79	0.26	5.84
		Help needed for medication intake	2.98	1.46	2.23	0.03	1.14	7.78
		Help needed for mobility	1.52	1.23	0.52	0.60	0.31	7.45
		Help needed for bed position shift	3.01	1.62	2.05	0.04	1.05	8.65
		Help needed for feeding	1.84	0.82	1.38	0.17	0.77	4.41
		≥ 2 hospitalisations after discharge	3.59	1.26	3.64	<0.001	1.80	7.15
		Spent time cooking meat products	0.53	0.19	1.75	0.08	0.26	1.08
		Prepared food for other household members	0.53	0.20	1.70	0.09	0.26	1.10
		Shared bath towels with other contacts	1.13	0.39	0.35	0.72	0.57	2.24
		Household member	Baseline	Age	1.06	0.28	0.23	0.82
Current antibiotic intake	3.86			4.14	1.26	0.21	0.47	31.59
Higher education	0.94			0.48	0.11	0.91	0.35	2.53
Spouse of index case	3.65			1.50	3.14	<0.001	1.63	8.19
Antibiotic intake	2.59			0.48	5.11	<0.001	1.80	3.73
Follow-up	Proton pump inhibitors		2.96	1.34	2.39	0.02	1.21	7.20
	Active helper of index case		3.84	1.75	2.95	<0.001	1.57	9.39
	Spent time cooking meat products		1.11	0.71	0.17	0.87	0.32	3.90
	Prepare food for other household members		1.78	1.08	0.94	0.35	0.54	5.87
	Shared towel with index case		1.10	0.28	0.38	0.71	0.67	1.82

1281 *Supplementary Figure 1. Sequence type distribution of ESBL-producing*
 1282 *E. coli* *isolates per centre. Two new MLST were identified in Geneva*
 1283 *(belonging to the clonal complex CC394) and Tübingen (belonging to*
 1284 *CC131).*

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
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1289 *Supplementary Figure 2. Sequence type distribution of ESBL-producing*
 1290 *K. pneumoniae* *isolates per centre. Two new MLST profiles were*
 1291 *described in Geneva, named New-ST-A and New-ST-C.*

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


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
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1296 *Supplementary Figure 3. Neighbour joining core genome phylogenetic*
 1297 *tree of ESBL-producing E. coli isolates collected during the 4-month*
 1298 *follow-up in the 5 study centres, constructed with SeqSphere+ using the*
 1299 *Enterobase scheme. Colour code indicates the respective MLSTs (see the*
 1300 *legend for details).*



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
1303 Supplementary Figure 3. (cont.)



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1306 *Supplementary Figure 4. Neighbour joining core genome phylogenetic*
 1307 *tree of ESBL-producing K. pneumoniae isolates collected during the 4-*
 1308 *month follow-up in the 5 study centres , constructed with SeqSphere+*
 1309 *using the Enterobase scheme. Colour code indicates the respective MLST*
 1310 *(see the legend for details).*



1311 ● Besançon ● Geneva ● Sevilla ● Tübingen ● Utrecht

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CHAPTER THREE

1331

Screening strategies and infection control measures to control nosocomial ESBL-PE and CPE

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Part 1) Nation-wide survey of screening practices to detect carriers of multi-drug resistant organisms upon admission to Swiss healthcare institutions

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1355 *A similar version of this chapter was published under the following*
1356 *reference:*

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1358

1359 *Martischang R, Buetti N, Balmelli C, Saam M, Widmer A, Harbarth S.*
1360 *Nationwide survey of screening practices to detect carriers of multi-drug*
1361 *resistant organisms upon admission to Swiss healthcare institutions.*
1362 *Antimicrob Resist & Infect Control. 2019;8(37). DOI: 10.1186/s13756-*
1363 *019-0479-5.*

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1368 **Abstract**

1369
1370 As emergence and spread of multi-drug resistant organisms (MDRO)
1371 requires a standardized preventive approach, we aimed to evaluate
1372 current MDRO admission screening practices in Swiss hospitals and to
1373 identify potential barriers impeding their implementation.

1374
1375 In early 2018, all Swiss public and private healthcare institutions
1376 providing inpatient care were contacted with a 34-item questionnaire to
1377 investigate current MDRO admission screening policies. Among 139
1378 respondents representing 180 institutions (response rate, 79%), 83%
1379 (149) of institutions implemented MDRO admission screening, while 28%
1380 of private and 9% of public institutions did not perform any screening.
1381 Targeted high-risk screening included carbapenemase producers,
1382 extended-spectrum beta-lactamase producers and methicillin-resistant
1383 *Staphylococcus aureus* at the institutional level for respectively 78 %
1384 (115), 81 % (118) and 98 % (145) of screening institutions. Vancomycin-
1385 resistant enterococci (44 % of institutions), multi-resistant *Acinetobacter*
1386 *baumanii* (41 %) and *Pseudomonas aeruginosa* (37 %) were
1387 systematically searched only by a minority of screening institutions. A
1388 large diversity of risk factors for targeted screening and some
1389 heterogeneity in body sites screened were also observed. Admission-
1390 screening practices were mostly impeded by a difficulty to identify high-
1391 risk patients (44 %) and non-compliance of healthcare workers (35 %).

1392
1393 Heterogeneous practices and gaps in small and privately-owned
1394 institutions, as well as a mismatch between current epidemiologic MDRO
1395 trends and screening practices were noticed. These results highlight the
1396 need for uniform national MDRO screening standards.

1397
1398

1399 **Introduction**

1400
1401 Early detection of multi-drug resistant organisms (MDRO) carriage upon
1402 admission could allow timely implementation of infection control
1403 measures and the appropriate selection of empiric antimicrobial
1404 therapy.(1) Few nationwide surveys investigated real-life MDRO
1405 screening practices upon admission.(2–5) In 2010, an unpublished
1406 survey conducted in Swiss intensive care units (ICUs) revealed
1407 heterogeneous MDRO screening practices. Endemicity among MDROs in
1408 Switzerland differs according to community or hospital settings. ESBL-
1409 producing *Escherichia coli* is considered as endemic in the general
1410 population, especially in the institutionalized elderly (ESBL *E.coli*
1411 prevalence of 22% among clinical isolates from nursing homes in
1412 2017)(6), whereas acute care hospitals also consider MRSA - despite
1413 decreasing trends - (prevalence of 8% among clinical *S. aureus* isolates
1414 in 2014)(7) and ESBL-producing *Klebsiella pneumoniae* as endemic
1415 (7.7% of ESC-R invasive isolates in 2017).(8) The emergence and spread
1416 of MDRO requires a standardized preventive approach on a national scale.

1417

1418 **Specific aims**

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1420 We therefore evaluated current MDRO admission screening practices in
1421 Swiss hospitals and identified potential barriers impeding their
1422 implementation.

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1425 **Methods**

1426

1427 From January to March 2018, a nation-wide 34-item questionnaire was
1428 sent to 228 Swiss public and private healthcare institutions providing
1429 inpatient acute care. Psychiatric institutions, nursing homes, palliative

1430 care and pain therapy centers were excluded. Three reminders as well as
1431 a phone call were addressed to each non-responding institution.

1432
1433 The survey was translated in the three official languages, pre-tested
1434 locally and shared through the online platform SurveyMonkey® (see
1435 French and German versions of the Online Survey, additional file 1 and
1436 2). We collected information about the characteristics of each hospital, in
1437 addition to current practices concerning universal and targeted MDRO
1438 screening for patients at-risk at admission, risk factors considered for
1439 targeted screening, body sites for sampling swabs and cultures,
1440 preemptive contact precautions for high-risk patients, the presence of
1441 local guidelines and problems faced to implement on-admission
1442 screening.

1443
1444 All analyses were institution-based (n=180) and not respondent-based
1445 (n=139), since some respondents were in charge of several institutions.
1446 Data were extracted from the online platform to an Excel® spread-sheet,
1447 checked for accuracy and exported for descriptive analysis using RStudio
1448 and STATA 15.0® (StataCorp LLC, College Station, TX).

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
1450 **Results**

1451

1452 Overall, 139 respondents, mainly nurses (56%) and physicians (37%)
1453 replied for 180 institutions (response rate, 79%), with 57 % from public
1454 institutions and 61 % from small-size (< 200 beds), 21 % medium-size,
1455 and 18 % large-size institutions (> 500 beds). All non-responders were
1456 small-size institutions. The majority of hospitals (72%) was located in the
1457 Swiss-German part. Eighty-three percent of institutions (149)
1458 implemented some type of MDRO admission screening, while 28% of
1459 private and 9% of public institutions did not perform any screening
1460 (Figure 1).

1461

1462 *Figure 1. Implementation of admission screening for at least one MDRO*
1463 *among public and private institutions*



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1465

1466 Universal methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* (MRSA) screening
1467 of all admitted patients was not performed on an institutional level by
1468 any hospital, except for a few specific units in 6% of screening
1469 institutions. Targeted high-risk screening at the institutional level
1470 included carbapenemase-producing *Enterobacteriaceae* (CPE), extended-
1471 spectrum beta-lactamase (ESBL)-producing *Enterobacteriaceae* and
1472 MRSA, which were monitored by 78 % (n=115), 81 % (n=118) and 98
1473 % (n=145) of hospitals, respectively (Table 1, Figure 2 & 3).

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
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
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Figure 2. Implementation of admission screening for ESBL-PE among public and private institutions



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Figure 3. Implementation of admission screening for CPE among public and private institutions



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Vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE) (44%), multi-resistant *Acinetobacter baumannii* (41%) and *Pseudomonas aeruginosa* (37%) were systematically searched only by a minority of institutions with on-admission screening programs, without differences between small and large institutions.

1501 *Table 1. Targeted high-risk MDRO screening among public and private*
 1502 *hospitals in Switzerland*

	ESBL	CPE	MDR- <i>Acineto</i> <i>bacter</i>	MDR- <i>Pseudo</i> <i>monas</i>	VRE	MRSA
Targeted screening (%)						
Public (n=102)¹:						
Institutional:	82 (89%)	77 (83%)	37 (40%)	36 (39%)	38 (41%)	93(100%)
Only in certain units:	0	0	1 (1%)	2 (2%)	4 (4%)	0
None:	10 (11%)	16 (17%)	55 (59%)	55 (59%)	51 (55%)	0
Private (n=78)²:						
Institutional:	36 (67%)	38 (70%)	23 (43%)	18 (33%)	27 (50%)	52 (95%)
Only in certain units:	4 (7%)	4 (8%)	2 (4%)	8 (15%)	3 (6%)	3 (5%)
None:	14 (26%)	12 (22%)	28 (53%)	28 (52%)	24 (44%)	0

1503

1504 *Abbreviations:*

1505 *ESBL: Extended-spectrum beta-lactamase*

1506 *CPE: Carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae*

1507 *MDR: Multi-Drug Resistant*

1508 *VRE: Vancomycin Resistant Enterococcus*

1509 *MRSA: Methicillin Resistant Staphylococcus aureus*

1510

1511 *Footnote to Table 1:*

1512 ¹*Missing values for: ESBL = 10, CPE= 9, Acinetobacter baumannii = 9,*
 1513 *Pseudomonas aeruginosa = 9, VRE = 9 and MRSA= 9.*

1514 ² *Missing values for: ESBL= 24, CPE= 24, Acinetobacter baumannii = 25,*
 1515 *Pseudomonas aeruginosa = 24, VRE = 24 and MRSA= 23.*

1516

1517 Frequently used risk factors to screen patients considered at high risk for
 1518 MDRO carriage were “known carriers”, “hospitalization abroad” and a
 1519 “direct transfer from abroad” (Table 2). Other risk factors are
 1520 heterogeneously recognized among institutions. Of note, few hospitals
 1521 (19%) systematically screen patients who have been transferred from
 1522 other Swiss hospitals for VRE carriage, despite increasing VRE rates and
 1523 ongoing outbreaks in Switzerland.

1524

1525 *Table 2. Patient-level risk factors considered for targeted MDRO*
 1526 *screening upon admission*

	ESBL (n=122)	CPE (n=119)	MDR- Acinetoba cter (n=62) ¹	MDR- Pseudomo nas (n=63) ¹	VRE (n=72)	MRSA (n=148)
(n = number of centers performing a targeted screening for each pathogen)						
Risk factors used for targeted admission screening (%)						
Known MDRO patient:	111 (91%)	111 (93%)	59 (95%)	60 (95%)	67 (93%)	143 (97%)
Direct transfer from abroad:	114 (93%)	107 (90%)	41 (66%)	37 (59%)	54 (75%)	144 (97%)
Direct transfer from Switzerland ² :	33 (27%)	29 (24%)	13 (21%)	14 (22%)	14 (19%)	71 (48%)
Transfer from a long term care facility:	11 (9%)	7 (6%)	3 (5%)	4 (6%)	5 (7%)	32 (22%)
Hospitalization abroad in the recent past ³ :	103 (84%)	98 (82%)	37 (59%)	32 (51%)	47 (65%)	109 (74%)
Travel in a country with endemic MDRO:	28 (23%)	34 (29%)	16 (25%)	18 (29%)	19 (26%)	35 (24%)
Other:	38 (31%)	41 (34%)	23 (37%)	21 (33%)	21 (29%)	84 (57%)

1527 *Abbreviations:*

1528 *ESBL: Extended-spectrum beta-lactamase*

1529 *CPE: Carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae*

1530 *MDR: Multi-Drug Resistant*

1531 *VRE: Vancomycin Resistant Enterococcus*

1532 *MRSA: Methicillin Resistant Staphylococcus aureus*

1533 *Footnote to Table 2:*

1534 ¹ *Missing values for: MDR Acinetobacter baumannii = 1, MDR Pseudomonas*
1535 *aeruginosa = 1.*

1536 ² *Mainly West Switzerland and Tessin were targeted when considering a direct*
1537 *transfer from Switzerland.*

1538 ³ *Varying timeframes considered as recent past, mainly from 6 to 12 months.*

1539


1540 Heterogeneity subsists on the choice of body site sampling. Nares (99%),
1541 throat (81%) and inguinal sampling (91%) are leading body sites to
1542 screen for MRSA, whereas anal or rectal swabs are most frequently used
1543 for ESBL (89%), CPE (94%) or VRE (88%) screening. However, in some
1544 centers, inguinal screening was also performed for enteric bacteria. For
1545 MDR-*A. baumannii* and *P. aeruginosa*, a large variety of body sites were
1546 screened (anal, rectal, inguinal, throat or nasal swabs). For high-risk
1547 patients, only 23% (33/142) of hospitals routinely performed repeat
1548 swabs in case of one negative screening result. A total of 90% (86/96) of
1549 ICUs implemented pre-emptive contact precautions, including placement
1550 in a single room in 63% of ICUs.

1551

1552 Despite local recommendations for admission screening provided by 96%
1553 (137/142) of hospitals, these practices were mostly impeded by a
1554 difficulty to identify high-risk patients (44%) and non-compliance of
1555 healthcare workers (35%). Reimbursement issues were less commonly
1556 cited as an obstacle (15%) and was predominant in public institutions
1557 (Figure 4).

1558

1559 *Figure 4. Reimbursement cited as a barrier to implement MDRO*
1560 *screening*



1561

1562 **Discussion**

1563

1564 This nation-wide survey to examine current practices of MDRO admission
1565 screening was answered by 180 institutions, representing an excellent
1566 response rate and the diversity of healthcare institutions in Switzerland,
1567 among public and private institutions of different sizes. This survey
1568 revealed good compliance with on-admission MDRO screening practices
1569 in larger acute-care hospitals, but also important gaps in small and
1570 private institutions.

1571

1572 This survey differs from previous national surveys evaluating MDRO
1573 screening practices at admission, mainly because of its higher response
1574 rate and the reporting of both risk factors and body sites sampled
1575 according to MDRO species.(2–5) Only one national survey performed in
1576 France in 2012 addressed public and private healthcare facilities. This
1577 survey observed that only 34% of 286 institutions reported management
1578 of patients at-risk at the time of admission.(3)

1579

1580 A mismatch between the current epidemiologic situation and screening
1581 practices was noticed with a disproportionate focus on MRSA (in particular

1582 in patients transferred from the French and Italian speaking parts of
1583 Switzerland) and a lack of awareness of possible spread of *A. baumannii*,
1584 *P. aeruginosa* and VRE by unknown carriers, including patients
1585 transferred within Switzerland. Indeed, nosocomial MRSA incidence has
1586 been declining, whereas VRE rates are rapidly increasing.(7,9,10) In
1587 addition, severe nosocomial outbreaks of *A. baumannii* infections linked to
1588 imported cases have occurred in Switzerland in the past.(11) Therefore,
1589 targeted high-risk screening should also include other MDROs beside
1590 MRSA.

1591
1592 A recent travel history to foreign countries without hospitalisation was
1593 rarely used as a risk factor to define high-risk patients eligible for
1594 screening at admission (23-29% of institutions according to the type of
1595 MDRO). This policy concerned in particular South-Asian countries with
1596 hyperendemic MDRO occurrence, such as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh,
1597 Nepal and Sri Lanka. A recent travel history to North America or U.S.
1598 citizenship were not considered as risk factors by any Swiss institution,
1599 despite increasing importation of community MRSA into Switzerland.(12)

1600
1601 Heterogeneity was also observed among risk factors considered for
1602 targeted screening, probably due to a lack of national consensus on
1603 multiple criteria supporting surveillance programs. Adding to this
1604 complexity, actual controversies addressing admission screening policies
1605 support the requirement for updated and uniform standards: species to
1606 be screened, risk factors considered for targeted screening, number of
1607 screening swabs to be performed at admission, among others.
1608 Interestingly, cost considerations did not play an important role in
1609 implementing MDRO screening policies.

1610
1611 This survey has limitations. First, we were unable to perform external
1612 validation of the respondents' answers. Second, this survey did cover

1613 neither screening practices beyond the admission procedure nor
1614 variability in MDRO control measures or laboratory detection methods.
1615 Third, the design of the study did not allow correlating MDRO screening
1616 practices to nosocomial MDRO transmission rates.

1617

1618 **Conclusions**

1619

1620 In summary, these results highlight the need for uniform national MDRO
1621 screening standards. It also demonstrates a lack of awareness about
1622 current MDRO trends, focusing on MRSA rather than VRE or gram-
1623 negative MDROs, and ongoing confusion about risk factors that might be
1624 addressed through uniform national standards. Harmonized, clear and
1625 accessible guidelines – which are already available in some countries –
1626 could support standardization of risk factors used for targeted admission
1627 screening and of sample sites for admission screening.(13,14)

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1632

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**Part 1) First reported nosocomial outbreak
of NDM-1 producing *Escherichia coli* in
Switzerland**

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1707 *A similar version of this chapter was published under the following*
1708 *reference:*

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*Martischang R, Chraiti M-N, Lazarevic V, Gaia N, Bandiera-Clerc C,
Soule H, Renzi G, Iten A, Ginet C, Pittet D, Schrenzel J, Harbarth S.
First reported nosocomial outbreak of NDM-1 producing Escherichia coli
in Switzerland. International Conference on Prevention and Infection
Control, Geneva, September 2019. Oral presentation # O45*

1719 **Introduction**

1720 Since 2008, NDM-producing Enterobacteriaceae has spread globally. In
1721 late 2017, a patient transferred from Dubai was identified as NDM-
1722 producing E.coli carrier, and placed under contact precautions during two
1723 hospital stays at HUG in Jan and Jul 2018. Between Nov 2018 and May
1724 2019, 3 secondary cases who had not travelled outside Switzerland for
1725 the past 12 months were found colonized with NDM-producing E. coli by
1726 routine screening swabs or urine cultures. Nosocomial cross-transmission
1727 was strongly suspected.

1728

1729 **Objectives**

1730 We report an outbreak investigation guided through molecular
1731 approaches.


1732

1733 **Methods**

1734 Roommates' screening (July and Nov 18, May 19), and environmental
1735 screening and disinfection (May 19) in the concerned patient room were
1736 performed. Following Illumina iSeq sequencing, the relatedness between
1737 4 NDM isolates was assessed by cgMLST and cgSNP analyses. Additional
1738 environmental Enterobacteriales strains originating from sewage in
1739 Geneva (Figure 1) were included to the scheme to evaluate potential
1740 community dissemination.

1741

1742 *Figure 1. Environmental sampling in Geneva sewage*



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
1745 **Results**

1746 Spatiotemporal analyses identified the simultaneous passage of 2
1747 patients in a newly opened surgical step-down unit in July 18, and
1748 staggered passage of 3 patients in the same room on a private floor from
1749 Nov 18 through Apr 19. As of today (May 25), 20 environmental samples

1750 and all further contact screening swabs have been negative. Sequencing
1751 analysis confirmed cross-transmission with *E. coli* ST354 NDM-1
1752 (<10SNPs). No relatedness was observed with community strains.
1753 Standard precautions were reinforced in the concerned units. We
1754 implemented a computerized readmission alert system of all contact
1755 patients with potential exposition, requiring mandatory screening at re-
1756 admission. One of the patients died of surgical complications unrelated to
1757 *E. coli* NDM-1 carriage.

1758
1759

1760 *Figure 2. Phylogenetic tree of NDM-producing E.coli originating from*
1761 *Geneva University Hospitals (Ec 42,43,46,50,80) and from community*
1762 *environment (Other Ec).*



1763
1764

1765 **Conclusions**

1766 To our knowledge, this cluster represents the first nosocomial NDM-
1767 producing *E. coli* outbreak in Switzerland, despite implementation of strict
1768 contact precautions for the index case. The fortuitous detection of cases
1769 by the weekly universal screening implemented in intensive care units
1770 facilitate early control of this prolonged institutional outbreak. The
1771 retrieved *E. coli* ST354 clone has so far mostly been reported from
1772 animals, and was rarely associated with carbapenemases. This outbreak
1773 confirms the high nosocomial transmission potential of these highly
1774 resistant Enterobacteriaceae.

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Part 2) An interventional quasi-experimental study to evaluate the impact of a rapid screening strategy in improving control of nosocomial extended-spectrum beta-lactamase producing Enterobacterales and carbapenemase-producing organisms in critically ill patients

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MS in preparation (presented in International Conference on Prevention and Infection Control. 2021. Oral presentation # O02.).

1798 **Abstract**

1799

1800 *Introduction*

1801 Rapid molecular tests could accelerate the surveillance and control of
1802 extended-spectrum beta-lactamase producing Enterobacterales (ESBL-
1803 PE) and Carbapenemases-Producing Organisms (CPO) in intensive care
1804 units (ICUs).

1805

1806 *Objective and Methods*

1807 This interventional 12-month cohort study compared a loop-mediated
1808 isothermal amplification (LAMP) assay performed directly on rectal swabs
1809 with traditional culturing methods (control period, 6 months), for
1810 targeted screening at admission and universal weekly screening of all ICU
1811 patients. Contact precautions (CP) were implemented for all carriers of
1812 CPO or non-*E.coli* ESBL-producing Enterobacterales (nEcESBL-PE). Using
1813 survival analysis, we compared the median time intervals from admission
1814 to discontinuation of unnecessary preemptive CP among patients at risk
1815 and the median time intervals from screening to implementation of CP
1816 among newly identified carriers. We also compared diagnostic
1817 performances, and nEcESBL-PE/CPO acquisition rates. This study is
1818 registered, ISRCTN 23588440.

1819

1820 *Results*

1821 We included 1'043 patients (median length of ICU stay, 2.2 days). During
1822 the intervention and control phases, 92/147 and 47/86 of patients at-risk
1823 screened at admission were candidates for early discontinuation of
1824 preemptive CP. Similarly, 16/589 and 4/313 newly discovered carriers by
1825 weekly screening were candidates for implementation of CPs. The LAMP
1826 assay had a positive predictive value (PPV) of 44.0% and negative
1827 predictive value (NPV) of 99.9% for CPO, and 55.6% PPV and 98.2% NPV

1828 for nEcESBL-PE. The median time from admission to discontinuation of
1829 preemptive CP increased during the interventional period from 80.5
1830 (95%CI 71.5-132.1) to 88.3 (95%CI 57.7-103.7) hours (p=0.47). Due
1831 to the poor PPV, we had to stop using the LAMP assay to implement CP.
1832 Compared to the control period, the incidence rate ratios for nEcESBL-PE
1833 and CPO acquisition during the intervention phase were 0.80 [95%CI
1834 0.36-1.75] and 0.23 [95%CI 0.03-1.76] after adjustment for colonization
1835 pressure and hand hygiene compliance.

1836

1837 *Conclusion*

1838 A rapid screening strategy with LAMP assays performed directly on rectal
1839 swabs had no benefit for infection control in a low-endemicity setting.
1840 This study highlights the limitations and challenges of molecular
1841 screening tests and their routine use in the ICU setting.

1842

1843

1844

1845 **Introduction**

1846
1847 Digestive carriage of extended-spectrum beta-lactamase-producing
1848 Enterobacterales (ESBL-PE) and carbapenemase-producing organisms
1849 (CPO) places patients at risk of antibiotic-resistant infection, increasing
1850 length of hospital stay(137,138) and mortality.(1,138) Active
1851 surveillance as part of a multimodel approach already proved to be
1852 efficient to decrease ESBL and CPO infections.(54,139) In intensive care
1853 units (ICUs), admission and weekly universal screenings may help to
1854 detect new CPO and ESBL-PE carriers. In case of patients at risk,
1855 preemptive contact precautions (CP) after admission may be
1856 discontinued after negative results. However, current microbiologic
1857 screening methods are slow, delaying the discontinuation of preemptive
1858 CP, with possible harmful effects.(140):(141) This diagnostic delay also
1859 impacts detection of previously unknown carriers screened during routine
1860 surveillance, leading to an increased risk of cross-transmission.

1861
1862 Molecular screening methods such as loop-mediated isothermal
1863 amplification (LAMP) reaction tests have been developed to improve
1864 diagnostic performance(111) and accelerate the slow turn-around
1865 observed with traditional culture-based systems.(112,113,114)
1866 However, several reviews recently stressed the lack of clinical
1867 effectiveness studies.(142,143) In order to improve CPO and ESBL-PE
1868 control in the ICU setting, LAMP tests may yet represent a reasonably
1869 fast and specific, but also cost-effective screening method.(117) We
1870 hypothesized that a rapid LAMP assay performed directly on rectal swabs
1871 could yield individual and ecological benefits compared to traditional
1872 phenotypic methods, accelerating the discontinuation of unnecessary
1873 preemptive CP for negative patients screened at admission, and the
1874 implementation of CP for newly identified carriers, reducing ESBL-PE and
1875 CPO incidence among critically ill patients.

1876 **Material and methods**

1877

1878 *Setting and population*

1879 Geneva University Hospitals is a tertiary care center with 36 ICU beds.
1880 The mixed medical-surgical ICU admits 2'500 patients per year with an
1881 median length of stay of 1.9 days. The mean weekly prevalence of ESBL-
1882 PE carriage was 10.2% in 2016, with an average of 2.4 newly identified
1883 ESBL-PE positive patients per week.

1884 All ICU patients with a surveillance screening for ESBL-PE and CPO by
1885 rectal swabs or stool cultures were included in this study. The impact of
1886 rapid screening tests on de-implementation of preemptive CP was
1887 evaluated on a first sub-group of patients at risk of ESBL-PE and CPO
1888 carriage, screened at admission. It was further evaluated on a second
1889 sub-group of patients screened weekly during ICU stay. Patients with a
1890 competing and microbiologically proven indication for CP were excluded.

1891

1892 *Study design*

1893 This prospective, interventional, quasi-experimental cohort study
1894 compared a rapid molecular test (LAMP assay) performed directly on all
1895 rectal swabs during a first 12-month intervention period (April 2019-
1896 March 2020) with conventional culturing methods during a second 6-
1897 month control period (May-October 2020) after a one-month wash-out
1898 period.

1899

1900 *Outcomes and definitions*

1901 The primary outcome was the median time interval from admission to
1902 discontinuation of unnecessary preemptive CP among patients at risk
1903 screened upon ICU admission. Secondary outcomes included the median
1904 time from screening to implementation of CP among newly identified
1905 carriers, laboratory turn-around-times (TATs), diagnostic performances

1906 and ICU-acquired non-*E.coli* ESBL-producing Enterobacterales (nEcESBL-
1907 PE) or CPO acquisition events, defined as a newly detected nEcESBL-PE
1908 or CPO carriers by screening or clinical culture. Incidence rates of
1909 nEcESBL-PE and CPO acquisition were defined per 1'000 patient-days at
1910 risk.

1911

1912 *Surveillance screening and infection control measures*

1913 Admission screening targeted patients with specific risk profiles, including
1914 also a subpopulation of patients considered at high risk according to their
1915 prior exposure history (Suppl. Table 1). Weekly universal screening was
1916 performed for all ICU patients present on Monday morning. Additional
1917 screening of roommates was performed for active case finding in case of
1918 cluster investigations.

1919 nEcESBL-PE or CPO carriers were identified by door signage, flagged
1920 using automatized alert systems, and placed under CP, which included
1921 dedicated material (gowns, gloves), spatial separation, and
1922 environmental decontamination. Preemptive CP were discontinued at the
1923 first negative result for patients at-risk, or after sequential screenings for
1924 patients at high risk (e.g. previously known CPO carrier). Microbiological
1925 results were actively screened by dedicated infection control nurses, to
1926 ensure adequate discontinuation or implementation of infection control
1927 measures. Timing and adequacy of prescription for screening and CP were
1928 monitored by a dedicated nurse.

1929

1930 *Microbiological procedures*

1931 *Routine screening procedures with conventional culture methods*

1932 Rectal swabs (eSwab™, Copan) were routinely collected by trained ICU
1933 nurses. Swabs were then plated on three media: chromID ESBL

1934 (bioMérieux), , chromID® OXA-48 (bioMérieux), and CHROMagar™
1935 *Acinetobacter* (CHROMagar, France). All colonies with specific colors
1936 according to manufacturers' instructions were identified by matrix-
1937 assisted laser desorption ionization–time of flight (MALDI-TOF) mass
1938 spectrometry and the antibiotic susceptibility profile of each isolate was
1939 determined by disc diffusion method using EUCAST
1940 recommendations.(144) For ESBL confirmation, we used double-disk
1941 synergy tests. In doubtful cases, ESBL + AmpC Screen Kit 98008 (Rosco
1942 Diagnostica) were used as a second line confirmatory test. For CPO
1943 confirmation, we used the LAMP eazyplex® SuperBug CRE system
1944 (AxonLab, UK) on selected isolates, a qualitative molecular test covering
1945 CTX M-1 and CTX M-9 families, KPC variants (KPC2 to KPC15), NDM
1946 variants (NDM1 to NDM7), VIM variants (VIM1 to VIM37), OXA-48-like
1947 variants (OXA-48, OXA-162, OXA-204, and OXA-244), and OXA-181-like
1948 variants (OXA-181, and OXA-232).(145)

1949

1950 *Workflow*

1951 The bacteriology laboratory processed non-stop all diagnostic samples
1952 related to the study during weekdays until 17h00. Of note, plating of
1953 isolates, incubation, and culture triage were automatized from March
1954 2019 onwards.(146)

1955

1956 *Interventional screening strategy (LAMP assay)*

1957 Rectal swabs were split into three equal parts and processed
1958 simultaneously. A first part was run by LAMP eazyplex® SuperBug CRE
1959 system as described above to detect the main genes coding for ESBLs
1960 and carbapenemases. A second part was processed using standard
1961 bacteriology methods for pathogen identification and quality assurance
1962 purposes (i.e. confirmed presence of *E.coli*). A third part was stored at -
1963 20°C to resolve any potential discordant results between molecular and

1964 phenotypic approaches. The results were communicated in real-time from
1965 Monday to Friday.

1966 Unnecessary preemptive CP were stopped based on negative LAMP
1967 results, and CP were implemented for newly identified patients based on
1968 LAMP-positive results for CPO, or culture-positive results for nEcESBL-PE.
1969 Cultures were used as the reference test in case of discordant results.
1970 LAMP-positive and culture-negative samples were investigated post-hoc
1971 using specific PCRs (TEM, SHV). Isolates from samples negative by LAMP
1972 were retested using LAMP and disk diffusion methods.

1973 Unnecessary preemptive CP were stopped based on negative LAMP
1974 results, and CP were implemented for newly identified patients based on
1975 LAMP-positive results for CPO, or culture-positive results for nEcESBL-PE.
1976 Cultures were used to inform infection control measures in case of
1977 discordant results. LAMP-positive and culture-negative samples were
1978 investigated post-hoc using specific PCRs (TEM, SHV). Isolates from
1979 samples negative by LAMP were retested using LAMP and disk diffusion
1980 methods.

1981

1982 *Pilot study*

1983 This rapid testing strategy has been previously validated in our institution
1984 and showed high sensitivity and specificity.(147) In 2018, we included
1985 209 samples from 187 ICU patients and observed a TAT gain of 44.1
1986 hours with the LAMP technology compared to conventional methods, with
1987 a high specificity and negative predictive value (respectively 98.8% and
1988 97.6%).(148) In the present study, the diagnostic performance of LAMP
1989 was again evaluated among all samples processed by both LAMP and
1990 cultures, the last being used as a reference test.

1991

1992 *Data collection*

1993 TATs were categorized into pre-analytical TAT (time from admission to
1994 screening, time from screening to sample delivery to the laboratory),
1995 analytical TAT (time from arrival at the laboratory to reporting of results),
1996 and post-analytical TAT (time from result notification to implementation
1997 or discontinuation of CP). Pre-analytical and analytical TATs were
1998 collected from computerized laboratory databases. Post-analytical TAT
1999 was computed based on the date and time of implementation or
2000 discontinuation of CP, directly informed by the electronic patient file.

2001 Acquisition events were collected using screening and clinical cultures
2002 from routine surveillance data. Colonization pressure was defined as the
2003 monthly sum of positive screening and clinical cultures for ESBL-PE and
2004 CPO. Only the first ESBL-PE or CPO isolate was considered per patient.
2005 Monthly hand hygiene compliance of healthcare workers was collected
2006 according to WHO methods. Systemic antibiotic consumption (ATC J01)
2007 was measured in daily doses per 1'000 patient-days. Adherence to
2008 screening and contact precautions was measured as defined in the Suppl.
2009 Appendix 1.

2010

2011 *Statistical analysis*

2012 *Time benefits for infection control*

2013 Analytical TATs expressed as medians were first compared using
2014 Wilcoxon rank-sum test, χ^2 test and Fisher exact test when appropriate.
2015 Unnecessary times (in days) spent under preemptive CP among patients
2016 screened at admission were compared for the intervention and control
2017 periods using survival analysis. Right censoring of patients occurred at
2018 ICU discharge or death, which were consequently regarded as competing
2019 events. Proportional subdistribution hazard modelling was performed in
2020 addition to cause-specific hazard models to account for competing
2021 events. Subdistribution hazard ratio (sHR) and cause-specific hazard

2022 ratios (csHR) were calculated using Fine and Grey models, and Cox
2023 models, respectively. Hazards proportionality was tested by the visual
2024 examination of Schoenfeld residuals.

2025 TATs were evaluated in an intention-to-treat analysis, regardless of the
2026 patient status (at-risk or at a high risk) and study-related laboratory
2027 activity, which was interrupted during weekends and public holidays.
2028 Several exploratory analyses were also performed. First, to estimate the
2029 effect of the rapid screening strategy on actionable results (without the
2030 need of sequential screening), we performed the same analysis,
2031 excluding patients screened during holidays and at high risk. Second, we
2032 reported detailed pre-analytical, analytical, and post-analytical TATs of
2033 patients screened at admission with CP discontinuation before discharge,
2034 excluding patients screened during holidays and at high risk.

2035 *Impact on nECESBL-PE and CPO acquisition rates*

2036 Chi-square or Fisher's exact tests were used to compare categorical
2037 variables and Student's t-test, for continuous variables. The impact of the
2038 interventional screening strategy on adjusted incidence-density ratios of
2039 nEcESBL-PE or CPO acquisition was compared using Poisson regression,
2040 accounting for aggregate-level exposures, including colonization pressure
2041 and hand hygiene compliance. All analyses were performed using R
2042 (version 4.0).

2043

2044 *Ethical statement*

2045 This study was approved by the local Ethics Committee Review. It was
2046 considered as a quality improvement project, relying on routine
2047 surveillance data, and was therefore exempted from individual patient
2048 consent. This study is registered, ISRCTN 23588440.

2049

2050 **Results**

2051 This study included 1'043 patients sampled 1'778 times (median length
2052 of stay, 2.2 days), including 231 patients with a targeted screening at
2053 admission and 896 patients with either weekly or epidemiologically
2054 indicated screening (Figure 1). Of 231 patients screened at admission,
2055 we distinguished 58 (25.1%) patients at high risk requiring sequential
2056 screening, and 173 (75.0%) patients at risk (Table 1). Most patients at-
2057 risk were transferred from another hospital (53.2%), and most patients
2058 at a high risk were already known carriers (46.6%, Suppl. Appendix 2).
2059 Among all patients screened at admission, 185 (80.1%) had preemptive
2060 CP. Among them, only 12 (6.5%) were positive for ncEC-ESBLPE or CPO,
2061 and 34 (18.4%) had an alternative indication to maintain CP, including
2062 known carriage of other MDROs. Thus, 139 (75.1%) patients screened at
2063 admission were included in the final analysis (Fig. 1). As shown in Fig. 1,
2064 42 (4.7%) patients screened routinely during ICU stay were positive by
2065 either LAMP or culture for either CPO or ESBL-producing non-*E.coli*. After
2066 exclusion of 22 patients with known carriage or competing indication for
2067 CP, 20 patients were included in the final analysis.


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2072



2079 *Table 1. Individual and aggregated characteristics of study participants*
 2080 *and ICU patients.*
 2081

	Interventional period	Control period	
Among participants screened at admissions	n= 147 patients^a	N= 86 patients^a	P-value
Patients at a high risk (%)	30 (20.4%)	29 (33.7%)	0.04
Median length of stay (days, IQR)	2.8 (1.5-5.6)	2.8 (1.7-7.1)	0.67
nEcESBL-PE carriers	10 (6.8%)	8 (9.3%)	0.68
CPO carriers	1 (0.7 %)	3 (3.5%)	0.14
CPE carriers	1 (0.7 %)	3 (3.5%)	0.14
Preemptive contact precautions prescribed	115 (78.2%)	70 (81.4%)	0.45
Among all participants screened weekly	n= 589 patients^b	n= 313 patients^b	P-value
Median length of stay (days, IQR) ^c	6.9 (2.9-12.6)	6.9 (3.8-15.1)	0.06
nEcESBL-PE carriers	19 (3.2%)	16 (5.1%)	0.22
CPO carriers	4 (0.7%)	8 (2.6%)	0.03
CPE carriers	3 (0.5%)	3 (1.0%)	0.42
Newly detected carriers	13 (2.2%)	10 (3.2%)	0.52
Contact precautions implemented at the time of detection among newly detected carriers	1/13 (7.7%)	6/10 (60%)	0.02
Colonization pressure (incidence density)	n=8'884 patient-days	n=3'772 patients-days	P-value
ESBL-PE (cases per 1'000 patient days)	15.3 [95%CI 12.8-18.1]	19.1 [95%CI 14.9-24.0]	0.13
CPO (cases per 1'000 patient days)	0.7 [95%CI 0.2-1.5]	2.9 [95%CI 1.5-5.2]	0.05
CPE (cases per 1'000 patient days)	0.4 [95%CI 0.1-1.1]	1.6 [95%CI 0.6-3.5]	0.22
Antibiotic consumption (ATC JC01)	n=8'884 patient-days	n=3'772 patients-days	P-value
Mean monthly consumption (DDD per 1'000 patient days, 95%CI)	813 [95%CI 722-899]	728 [95%CI 471-986]	0.48

Hand hygiene compliance among healthcare workers	Hand hygiene opportunities = 474	Hand hygiene opportunities = 360	P-value
Pooled mean of hand hygiene compliance	59.7 [95%CI 55.3-64.1]	61.1 [95%CI 56.1-66.1]	0.73

2082 Footnote to table 1

2083 ^a: 2 patients screened at admission were readmitted during the control phase.

2084 ^b: 6 patients stayed both in the interventional and control phase.

2085 ^c: information available for 151 and 312 patients in the interventional and
2086 control period.

2087

2088 Colonization pressure was similar between interventional and control
2089 periods for both ESBL-PE and CPE, but not for CPO, which increased
2090 during the control period (Table 1). Median antibiotic consumption and
2091 hand hygiene compliance were also similar between both periods, though
2092 minor monthly variations occurred (Table 1, Suppl. Table 2). Adherence
2093 to weekly screening during both interventional and control phases, was
2094 69.6% [95%CI 61.5-77.5] and 84.0% [95%CI 71.1-87.8], respectively.
2095 Lowest screening rates were observed in March 2020 at the peak of the
2096 first COVID-19 pandemic wave (Suppl. Figure 1). We performed 23 audits
2097 to assess implementation of CP. An agreement of 94.0% (146/156
2098 observations) was observed between prescribed and implemented CP.

2099


2100 Among all screened patients, ESBL-PE prevalence was 16.1%
2101 (168/1'043), including 4.3% (45/1'043) of nEcESBL-PE and 1.3%
2102 (14/1'043) of CPO. Most of the nEcESBL-PE, and CPO were isolated in
2103 patients at high risk (respectively 16% and 5%; Suppl. Table 3). Among
2104 1'117 samples, including 25 samples CPO-positive by LAMP, the
2105 diagnostic performance indicators were: 91.7% [95%CI 76.0-100.0]
2106 sensitivity, 98.7% [95%CI 98.1-99.4] specificity, 44.0% [95%CI 24.5-
2107 63.5] positive predictive value (PPV), and 99.9% [95%CI 99.7-100.0]
2108 negative predictive value (NPV). Among 27 samples nEcESBL-PE positive

2109 by LAMP, performances were: 45.4% [95%CI 28.5-62.4] sensitivity,
2110 98.8% [95%CI 98.1-99.5] specificity, 55.6% [95%CI 36.8-74.3] PPV,
2111 and 98.2% [95%CI 97.3-99.0] NPV. To note, specificity and NPV
2112 observed among CPO (98.7%, 100.0%) and ESBL-producing non-*E.coli*
2113 (96.0%, 92.0%) decreased among patients at a high risk screened at
2114 admission. Further analysis of discordant results unveiled that most of
2115 isolates negative by LAMP were positive once retested (Suppl. Appendix
2116 3).

2117
2118 Of 92 and 47 patients screened at admission with unnecessary
2119 preemptive CP during the interventional and control period, we observed
2120 a median time from admission to CP discontinuation of 88.3 (95%CI
2121 57.7-103.7) versus 80.5 (95%CI 71.5-132.1) hours ($p=0.47$, Figure 2).
2122 Time from admission to result notification was respectively 21.1 (95%CI
2123 18.5-25.8) and 103.1 (95%CI 66.4-131.3) hours ($p <0.001$). Following
2124 univariate competing risk regression, the rapid screening strategy did not
2125 accelerate discontinuation of CP (sHR 1.4 [95%CI 0.8-2.6], $p=0.2$), with
2126 similar estimates using Cox regression. Results were unchanged after the
2127 exclusion of patients screened during weekends and laboratory holidays,
2128 as well as after the exclusion of patients at a high risk (Suppl. Appendix
2129 4, Suppl. Figures 2 & 3).

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2140 *Figure 2. Time (hours) spend under preemptive contact precautions by*
 2141 *negative patients screened at admission with culture-based methods*
 2142 *(control period) and LAMP assay (interventional period)*
 2143



2144
 2145
 2146 Among patients admitted during weekdays and screened at admission in
 2147 the interventional and control period, 34 (37.0%) and 14 (29.8%) had
 2148 CP discontinued in the ICU. Among them, CP discontinuation occurred
 2149 43.4 (IQR 27.0-92.0) and 67.4 (34.7-84.6) hours after admission
 2150 (p=0.29, Table 2) during the interventional and control period,
 2151 respectively, and results were notified 22.1 (IQR 12.3-55.2) and 61.9
 2152 (56.7-105.0) hours after admission (p<0.001). No apparent impact of
 2153 the first pandemic wave was observed on pre-analytical and post-
 2154 analytical TATs (data not shown).

2155
 2156
 2157
 2158

2159 *Table 2. Laboratory turn-around times among patients at-risk with*
 2160 *unnecessary contact precautions and actionable results (excluding*
 2161 *patients at a high risk of carriage and patients screened during*
 2162 *holidays)*
 2163

	Interventional period (n=34)	Control period (n=14)	P-value
Pre-analytical TAT			
From admission to screening (h)	11.6 (IQR 2.0-21.8)	6.2 (IQR 3.2-33.3)	0.759
Analytical TAT			
From screening to arrival in the laboratory (h)	2.5 (IQR 1.5-11.3)	6.4 (IQR 2.3-19.0)	0.189
From receipt to result notification (h) ^a	2.6 (IQR 2.1-28.8)	40.4 (IQR 29.3-73.7)	<0.001
Post-Analytical TAT			
From result notification to CP discontinuation (h) ^{a,b}	24.0 (IQR 5.7-32.8)	17.4 (IQR 9.1-30.5)	0.56
Total TAT			
From admission to CP discontinuation (h)	43.4 (IQR 27.0-92.0)	67.4 (IQR 34.7-84.6)	0.29
From admission to result notification (h) ^a	22.1 (IQR 12.3-55.2)	61.9 (IQR 56.7-105.0)	<0.001

2164 Footnote to table 2:

2165 ^a Excluding 2 patients in the interventional period with missing date of results.

2166 ^b Excluding 3 and 5 patients in the interventional and control period with CP
 2167 discontinued before results notification.

2168
 2169 CP were implemented for two patients newly CPO-positive by LAMP.
 2170 However, they were false positive by culture, leading to unnecessary
 2171 contact precautions. Considering the poor PPV of this test, the ICU
 2172 physicians decided to stop using the LAMP assay on rectal swabs in June
 2173 2019.

2174

2175 Incidence densities of acquisition per 1'000 patient-days during the
2176 interventional and control period were respectively 2.48 [95%CI 1.55-
2177 3.75] and 2.92 [95%CI 1.46-5.22] for nEcESBL-PE; 0.34 [95%CI 0.07-
2178 1.00] and 2.12 [95%CI 0.92-4.18] for CPO; and 0.11 [95%CI 0.03-0.81]
2179 and 1.06 [95%CI 0.29-2.72] for CPE only. Incidence rate ratios for
2180 nEcESBL-PE and CPO acquisition were 0.80 [95%CI 0.36-1.75; p=0.57)
2181 and 0.23 [95%CI 0.03-1.76; p =0.16) after adjustment for colonization
2182 pressure and hand hygiene compliance.

2183

2184 **Discussion**

2185 The findings of this interventional cohort study support three main
2186 conclusions: (1) the diagnostic accuracy of the LAMP assay performed
2187 directly on rectal swabs was suboptimal; (2) under real-life conditions,
2188 there was no benefit of this rapid diagnostic strategy in a low-endemicity
2189 setting, neither for discontinuing unnecessary CP among critically ill
2190 patients screened at admission, nor for implementing CP among newly
2191 positive patients; (3) many ICU patients screened at admission and
2192 placed under preemptive CP were negative, and most of them were
2193 discharged before discontinuation of CP.

2194

2195 The rapid screening strategy had methodological flaws. Although it
2196 demonstrated acceptable NPV for discarding intestinal carriage of
2197 nEcESBL-PE and CPO, it generated several false positive results as
2198 compared to cultures. The low endemicity and poor pre-test probability
2199 during universal weekly screening both impacted the observed PPV.
2200 Because of the human and economic cost of unnecessary CP, the ICU
2201 physicians decided to stop using the rapid screening strategy to
2202 implement CP early in the study. Moreover, the investigation of
2203 discordant results observed that when retesting isolates from previously
2204 LAMP-negative swabs, they are often identify as positive. This indicates

2205 that the quality of rectal screening might have impacted analytical
2206 sensitivity.

2207

2208 Unfortunately, few samples were available to re-examine swabs positive
2209 by LAMP but negative by cultures. We hypothesized these discordant
2210 results might partly be explained by under-detection from cultures, in
2211 case of low bacterial load, non viable species on specimen, growth
2212 difficulty in selective media for non-Enterobacterales species (e.g. non-
2213 fermentative bacteria), enzyme mutants not expressing carbapenemases
2214 activity,(149) and for certain resistance mechanisms with low hydrolytic
2215 activity (OXA-48-like enzymes), which has also been observed in prior
2216 studies,(150,151) with unclear infection control relevance.(151)

2217

2218 Despite reduced analytical TAT, the overall duration of unnecessary CP
2219 among patients screened at admission was not significantly different
2220 between the intervention and control periods, even after exclusion of
2221 patients screened during holidays or at a high risk of carriage. Of note,
2222 only a fraction of eligible patients screened at admission had CP
2223 discontinuation before ICU discharge. This can be explained by the short
2224 length of ICU stay, and slightly higher pre- or post-analytical TATs during
2225 the interventional period, suggesting a role for external factors. (152)

2226

2227 We observed a non-statistically significant increase of CPO acquisition
2228 rates during the control period, but not regarding nEcESBL-PE. This
2229 increase was confounded by an outbreak of VIM-producing *P. aeruginosa*
2230 (n=21) from April 2018 to September 2020 related to an environmental
2231 reservoir, with a peak observed in August 2020.(153) However, similar
2232 conclusions were observed regarding acquisition rates after exclusion of
2233 non-fermentative bacteria. We are therefore confident to conclude that
2234 the rapid screening strategy did not change nEcESBL-PE and CPO
2235 acquisition rates.

2236

2237 Several experimental studies observed reliable concordance of the
2238 eazyplex® SuperBug CRE system when performed on CPO and nEcESBL-
2239 PE isolates when compared to cultures or PCR.(154–157) However, when
2240 directly performed on rectal swabs, Yamamoto et al. observed a PPV of
2241 62% to detect carbapenem-resistant *Acinetobacter baumannii*,(130)
2242 which is close to our PPV. The sole study evaluating clinical relevance of
2243 LAMP when performed on rectal swabs and/or bronchial aspirates,
2244 observed a decreasing incidence of carbapenem-resistant *A. baumannii*
2245 infection from 35.2 to 20.9 per 1'000 patient days in a hyper-endemic
2246 ICU using weekly, admission, and discharge screening.(130) Another
2247 benefit of such rapid test has been suggested by a study using PCR to
2248 accelerate screening during outbreaks.(158) However, one should also
2249 consider current limitations to implement LAMP tests in routine screening,
2250 which include their cost, and the additional workload to simultaneously
2251 process cultures and LAMP tests.

2252

2253 This study is the first to evaluate clinical effectiveness of a rapid screening
2254 strategy based on LAMP tests to accelerate discontinuation or
2255 implementation of infection control measures. However, our study has
2256 several limitations. First, the study design did not allow a concurrent
2257 control group, which left room open for confounding events such as the
2258 SARS-CoV-2 pandemic and VIM-producing *P. aeruginosa* outbreak, with
2259 a possible influence on surveillance and implementation of infection
2260 control measures. Second, the microbiological laboratory of our
2261 institution automated its plating and incubation processes in March 2019,
2262 decreasing TAT of cultures.(146) Comparison of LAMP with a competing,
2263 improved control could potentially under-estimate its true benefits.
2264 However, the major problem remained unchanged, which was the short
2265 length of ICU stay as compared to the time for CP discontinuation. Third,
2266 results might not be generalizable to hyper-endemic settings.

2267

2268 **Conclusions**

2269 In its current form, a rapid rectal screening strategy based on LAMP
2270 assays has neither a clear benefit to discontinue unnecessary CP among
2271 patients screened at admission, nor an added value to accelerate the
2272 implementation of CP among newly positive patients in a low-endemic
2273 setting. This study suggests the requirement for further adjustments,
2274 including IT-based automatic reporting of molecular resistance
2275 information combined with IPC stewardship to ensure fast and reliable
2276 use of results, and further control to improve the quality of rectal swabs.
2277 Further research could investigate benefits from LAMP to fasten unit-wide
2278 screening for outbreak control, or IPC measures in hyper-endemic
2279 settings.

2280

2281

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2283

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2837 **Supplementary Appendix**

2838

2839 **Supplementary Appendix 1.** Adherence to screening and contact
2840 precautions

2841

2842 Weekly surveillance screenings are often not performed for patients
2843 already screened recently (admission screening), and could also be
2844 delayed by several days. Therefore, estimating true adherence to
2845 weekly surveillance screening should account for prior and delayed
2846 screenings. Instead of measuring adherence of screening only on
2847 Monday, which would underestimate the true proportion of patients
2848 screened, we opted to measure the screening coverage of all ICU
2849 patients hospitalized on Monday from 05 am to 08 am (candidates for
2850 weekly screening). Among this population, the screening coverage
2851 considered those with a screening performed from the prior Tuesday to
2852 the next Wednesday. This indicator helps to answer whether carriage
2853 status was investigated among patients present at the time of weekly
2854 universal screening. During the interventional phase, we investigated
2855 missing screenings, and distinguished screening performed elsewhere,
2856 performed in ICU but not included in the study, or not performed.
2857 Adherence to prescribed CP was assessed by 4 audits spanning the
2858 interventional and control period.

2859

2860

2861 **Supplementary Appendix 2.** Risk factors for patients screened at
2862 admission

2863

2864 Of 231 patients with a targeted screening at admission, we
2865 distinguished 58 (25%) patients at a high risk requiring sequential
2866 screening, and 173 (75%) patients at risk (Table 1). Most frequent high
2867 risk exposures included 27 (46%) previously known carriers, 16 (28%)

2868 direct transfer from or recent hospitalization in ICUs abroad, and 15
2869 (26%) prior hospitalization in endemic countries. Most frequent
2870 exposures defining patients at-risk included 92 (53%) hospital transfer,
2871 18 (10%) prior hospitalization in Swiss or French hospital, 32 (18%)
2872 other reasons, and 22 (13%) unknown reason. Among all patients
2873 screened upon admission, 185 (80%) had CP implemented at
2874 admission. Among them, 46 (25%) had an indication to keep CP,
2875 including other MDRO carriage.

2876

2877 **Supplementary Appendix 3.** Investigation of results with discordant
2878 LAMP and culture results

2879

2880 **LAMP positive and culture negative.**

2881 Because of quality concerns, only four from 23 samples with positive
2882 LAMP results and negative culture results were further investigated. 14
2883 of 23 results were discordant for CPO results (6 KPC, 3 OXA-181, 3
2884 NDM, 1 OXA-48, 1 KPC & NDM), and 12 of 23 were discordant for ESBL
2885 results (9 CTX-M-1, 3 CTX-M-9). Two samples with discordant ESBL
2886 results, and two samples with both discordant ESBL and CPO results
2887 were retested using PCR, which did not confirm initial results, and
2888 detected TEM genes.

2889

2890 **LAMP negative and culture positive.**

2891 27 of 31 isolates negative for ESBL by LAMP, including 21 *E.coli*, 9
2892 *Klebsiella*, 1 *Citrobacter*, 1 *Enterobacter*, and 1 *Pseudomonas* species,
2893 were further investigated. Sixteen isolates were LAMP positive (11 CTX-
2894 M-1, 4 CTX-M-9, 1 for both CTX-M-1 & CTX-M-9), 4 additional isolates
2895 were confirmed as non ESBL-PE by disk diffusion methods, and among
2896 the 6 isolates tested by PCR, 2 were positive for TEM and SHV, 2 were
2897 positive for SHV, and 2 were negative.


2898

2899 **Supplementary Appendix 4.** Time to discontinue contact precautions
2900 among patients at-risk screened upon admission, after exclusion of
2901 patients at a high risk, and patients screened during weekends and
2902 laboratory holidays.

2903
2904 Results were unchanged after the exclusion of patients screened during
2905 weekends and laboratory holidays, (n=95, 77.4 [95%CI 48.1-117.2]
2906 and 80.5 [95%CI 63.5-132.1] hours for interventional and control
2907 period, p=0.43), as well as after the exclusion of patients at a high risk
2908 (n=96, 51.3 [95%CI 44.8-88.3] and 75.9 [95%CI 71.2-82.1] hours for
2909 interventional and control period, p=0.06, Suppl. Figures 2 & 3).


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2911 **Suppl. Figure 1.** Weekly screening coverage for patients hospitalized
 2912 on Monday mornings from 5am to 8am.




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2917 **Suppl. Figure 2.** Time (hours) spend under preemptive contact
 2918 precautions by negative patients screened at admission with culture-
 2919 based methods (control period) and LAMP assay (interventional period)
 2920 excluding patients screened from Friday to Sunday and during
 2921 laboratory holidays



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2927 **Suppl. Figure 3.** Time (hours) spend under preemptive contact
 2928 precautions by negative patients screened at admission with culture-
 2929 based methods (control period) and LAMP assay (interventional period)
 2930 excluding patients at a high risk and patients screened during
 2931 laboratory holidays



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2935 **Suppl. Table 1.** Exposures considered for admission screening

2936

Indication for ESBL-PE and CPO screening at admission of patients at-risk
Hospitalized & overnight stay in Switzerland
Prior travel in endemic countries
Dialysis treatment
Indication for ESBL-PE and CPO screening at admission of high risk patients
Known ESBL-PE and CPE carrier
Hospitalized & overnight stay abroad

2937

2938

Date	Actions	Opportunities	Compliance	95% CI
2019-05-01	31	55	56,4	[95%CI 43.3-69.5]
2019-06-01	31	60	51,67	[95%CI 39-64.3]
2019-08-01	17	26	65,4	[95%CI 47.1-83.7]
2019-09-01	47	76	61,8	[95%CI 50.9-72.8]
2019-10-01	53	79	67,1	[95%CI 56.7-77.5]
2019-11-01	30	47	63,8	[95%CI 50.1-77.6]
2019-12-01	25	46	54,3	[95%CI 40-68.7]
2020-01-01	18	28	64,3	[95%CI 46.5-82]
2020-02-01	27	47	57,4	[95%CI 43.3-71.6]
2020-03-01	4	10	40,0	[95%CI 9.6-70.4]
2020-04-01	15	28	53,6	[95%CI 35.1-72]
2020-05-01	17	42	40,5	[95%CI 25.6-55.3]
2020-06-01	23	31	74,2	[95%CI 58.8-89.6]
2020-07-01	63	110	57,3	[95%CI 48-66.5]
2020-08-01	78	117	66,7	[95%CI 58.1-75.2]
2020-09-01	39	60	65	[95%CI 52.9-77.1]

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2943 **Suppl. Table 3.** Prevalence of patients carrying EC-ESBL, nEC-ESBLPE,
 2944 CPE, and CPO among 3 sub-cohorts of ICU patients.

	Intervention period			Control period		
	Patients at-risk at admission (n=117) ^a	Patients at a high risk at admission (n=30) ^b	Patients screened weekly (n=589) ^c	Patients at-risk at admission (n=57) ^a	Patients at a high risk at admission (n=29) ^b	Patients screened weekly (n=313) ^c
Patient carrying ESBL-producing <i>E.coli</i>	15 (12.8%)	8 (26.7%) ^e	81 (13.8%)	7 (12.3%)	9 (31.0%)	36 (11.5%)
Patient carrying nECESBL-PE	5 (4.3%)	5 (16.7%) ^e	19 (3.2%)	0 (0.0%)	8 (27.6%)	16 (5.1%)
Patient carrying CPE	0 (0.0%)	1 (3.3%)	3 (0.5%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (10.3%)	3 (1.0%)
Patient carrying CPO	0 (0.0%)	1 (3.3%)	4 (0.7%)	0 (0.0%)	3 (10.3%)	8 (2.6%)

2945

2946 Footnote

2947 ^a: 1 patients was included both in the interventional and control phase.2948 ^b: 1 patients were included both in the interventional and control phase.

2949 ^c: 6 patients were included both in the interventional and control phase,
 2950 patients at-risk were included if screened weekly

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2954

CHAPTER FOUR

2955

General discussion

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2961 **Introduction**

2962 This thesis aimed to elucidate the transmission dynamics and temporal
2963 trends of antibiotic-resistant Gram-negative bacteria, more specifically of
2964 ESBL-producing *E. coli* and *K. pneumoniae* in understudied settings, such
2965 as LTCFs and households. First, we aimed to assess the proportion of co-
2966 carriage and transmission of ESBL-producing *E.coli* and *K.pneumoniae*
2967 among household members, the temporal trends in the prevalence of
2968 ESBL-EC clones in a LTCF, and the epidemic potential of emerging ESBL-
2969 EC subclones in a LTCF. Second, this thesis attempted to improve active
2970 surveillance strategies by measuring existing gaps and barriers in
2971 Switzerland, and by evaluating innovative screening methods in
2972 accelerating infection control measures targeting MDR-GNB. Specifically,
2973 we aimed to evaluate current MDRO admission screening practices in
2974 Swiss hospitals and barriers impeding their implementation, and to
2975 compare traditional phenotypic methods against rapid screening
2976 strategies to accelerate the discontinuation of unnecessary preemptive
2977 CP for negative patients screened at admission, and the implementation
2978 of infection control measures for newly identified carriers.

2979

2980 **Summary of results**

2981 The **first chapter** aimed to improve our comprehension of ESBL-PE
2982 dynamics and to monitor epidemiologically important multidrug resistant
2983 clones with high transmissibility in understudied settings such as
2984 households and LTCFs. In the **first part** of this chapter, based on an
2985 investigation in a university-affiliated LTCF, we observed a high
2986 prevalence of ESBL-EC and its clone ST131 (10.5%, and among them
2987 58.0%). ESBL-EC prevalence increased from 2010 to 2020, while its
2988 ST131H30 subclone decreased. However, we fortuitously detected the
2989 clonal expansion of an atypical subclone ST131H89 from 2018 driven by
2990 multiple silent outbreaks. Despite a short follow-up period, the absence

2991 of rebound effect following the discontinuation of contact precautions for
2992 ESBL-EC in 2019 supported the most recent guidelines for ESBL-PE
2993 control. The prevalence of ST131 clones among all ESBL-EC in our LTCF
2994 was comparable to LTCF in other countries such as The Netherlands or
2995 Spain (56-70%) (1,2). Though clonal fluctuation with displacement of
2996 existing subclones is a known phenomenon in ESBL-EC epidemiology, (3)
2997 the spread of the specific ST131H89 subclone is unusual and has not been
2998 reported yet. The effectiveness of standard precautions alone to control
2999 ESBL-EC has already been observed in several other studies, performed
3000 either in acute-care hospitals or in LTCF. (4–6) The **second part** of this
3001 chapter focused on ESBL-PE transmission dynamics in household
3002 settings. In a systematic review, we aimed to quantify the prevalence of
3003 ESBL-PE co-carriage among families. In 13 studies, 8% to 37% of 863
3004 household members of ESBL-PE positive index cases were also colonized
3005 by an ESBL-PE. More precisely, 12% (95%CI: 8-16%) among these
3006 household members were colonized by a clonally-related ESBL-PE strain,
3007 with higher proportions for index cases carrying *K. pneumoniae* as
3008 compared to *E.coli* (20-25% versus 10-20%). In a subset of relevant
3009 studies, acquisition rates of clonally-related ESBL-PE among 180 initially
3010 ESBL-PE free household members of a previously identified carrier ranged
3011 between 1.56 - 2.03 events per 1000 person-weeks of follow-up. In
3012 summary, this review highlighted the role of families and households as
3013 ESBL-PE amplification platform, supported by pre-existing evidence. To
3014 note, multiple sources of ESBL-PE introduction with shared exposure
3015 among household members could contribute to the high prevalence
3016 observed in families and the polyclonal ESBL-PE picture. This systematic
3017 review also highlighted an important heterogeneity among studies and
3018 methodological gaps. Index patients presenting asymptomatic carriage
3019 and infection from endemic or epidemic settings were mixed, and
3020 external confounding by antibiotic, healthcare, travel, or food exposure
3021 was frequent. Different designs such as cross-sectional and cohort

3022 studies, as well as selection of index cases and household contacts further
3023 impeded comparison between studies. Robust detection methods with
3024 sequencing of multiple isolates per morphotype were recommended for
3025 future research. **The third part** of the first chapter was a direct
3026 continuation from the prior systematic review, with a multicentric
3027 prospective cohort of ESBL-EC and ESBL-KP colonized index cases and
3028 their household members, using whole genome sequencing to determine
3029 acquisition and transmission events, and adjusting with relevant
3030 exposures such as comorbidities, antibiotic, proton pump inhibitor
3031 therapy, hospital, travel, and food exposure. Among 71 index cases and
3032 102 household contacts, the incidence of ESBL-PE transmission among
3033 households was 1.18 per 100 participant-weeks at risk, with higher rates
3034 for ESBL-KP against ESBL-EC (1.16 versus 0.93 per 100 participant-
3035 weeks at risk). Interestingly, most ESBL-PE acquisitions occurred during
3036 the first 2 months (1st week: 41%; 2nd-8th week: 29%). Providing
3037 assistance for urinary and faecal excretion to the index case increased
3038 the risk of ESBL-PE transmission among household members (adjusted
3039 prevalence ratio, 4.3; 95%CI 1.3-14.1). This study observed higher co-
3040 carriage proportions compared to those described in the former
3041 systematic review (34% with 1.9 events per 100 weeks at risk versus
3042 12%, with 0.16 to 0.20 events/100 participant-weeks). This significant
3043 difference could be explained by a reduced risk of detection bias in the
3044 later cohort study, using enrichment broths, and selecting multiple
3045 colonies per samples. Furthermore, the shorter follow-up duration in the
3046 cohort study (4 versus 12 months) probably contributed to capture more
3047 transmission events.

3048
3049 The **second chapter** evaluated the implementation status of screening
3050 strategies and infection control measures among multiple hospitals at the
3051 national level. It also aimed to assess the effectiveness of certain
3052 screening strategies, including universal regular screening and a rapid

3053 screening strategy included as part of the universal regular and targeted
3054 admission screening. In **the first part**, a nation-wide survey among 139
3055 Swiss healthcare institutions was conducted, achieving a good response
3056 rate and an adequate coverage of the Swiss health system (covering
3057 49.5% of all 281 recorded healthcare facilities in Switzerland). (7) The
3058 difference mostly resulted from excluded specialized clinics (psychiatric
3059 institutions, palliative care, pain therapy centers), rehabilitation centers
3060 and LTCFs. This survey observed that MDRO admission screening was
3061 implemented in 83% of institutions, with striking differences between
3062 private and public institutions (28% versus 9% did not implement
3063 admission screening), and mostly including CPE, ESBL-PE and MRSA.
3064 However, surveillance gaps at admission were identified for VRE (44 %
3065 of institutions), multi-resistant *A. baumannii* (41 %) and *P. aeruginosa* (37
3066 %). Interestingly, admission screening practices for VRE were mostly
3067 deficient in Eastern Switzerland, and coincided with large multi-hospital
3068 VRE outbreaks, which required revision of national guidelines for VRE
3069 control. (8,9) This survey also identified heterogeneity among risk factors
3070 and body sites used in surveillance. To note, the difficulty to identify high-
3071 risk patients was mentioned as a barrier in 44% of participants. These
3072 findings highlighted the need for harmonized and feasible screening
3073 strategies targeting resistant Gram-negative bacteria among Swiss
3074 healthcare institutions. The difference with the lower screening rates
3075 previously reported in Germany or in The Netherlands is probably due to
3076 an increased awareness of institutions over time. (10,11)

3077 In the **second part**, we detailed the early control of a NDM-producing
3078 *E.coli* institutional outbreak following fortuitous detection of secondary
3079 cases by regular universal screening in the ICU. This small outbreak
3080 investigation highlights the added value of universal regular screening to
3081 facilitate early implementation of infection control measures.

3082 In the **third part**, we performed an interventional quasi-experimental
3083 study comparing a rapid genotypic test with standard phenotypic

3084 cultures, in order to accelerate surveillance and subsequent infection
3085 control measures. We observed a suboptimal diagnostic accuracy of the
3086 rapid LAMP assay for ESBL-PE and CPE when directly performed on rectal
3087 swabs. The poor positive predictive values reproduced the estimates
3088 already published from multiplex PCR and LAMP directly performed on
3089 rectal swabs. (12–14) Importantly, most of ICU patients screened at
3090 admission and under unnecessary contact precautions were discharged
3091 before discontinuation of contact precautions. Our study observed that
3092 under real-life conditions, and without proper diagnostic stewardship and
3093 further adjustments (quality control of rectal swabs sampled in
3094 surveillance screening), there was no benefit of LAMP in a low-endemicity
3095 setting, neither for discontinuing unnecessary CP among critically ill
3096 patients screened at admission, nor for implementing CP among newly
3097 positive patients. However, these parameters heavily depend on
3098 epidemiological settings and local prevalence of pathogens of interests.
3099

3100 **Strengths and limitations**

3101 **First, this thesis** evaluated the dynamics of ESBL-PE in understudied
3102 settings, such as households and LTCFs. These settings constitute an
3103 important reservoir considering the specific vulnerability of LTCF and the
3104 community dissemination of ESBL-PE. Traditional challenges impacting
3105 findings from household-based prospective cohorts were highlighted in
3106 our review and accounted for in our later prospective cohort. **Secondly,**
3107 we monitored several atypical clones at risk, including NDM-producing
3108 *E.coli* ST354 in acute care facilities and ESBL-producing *E.coli* ST131H89
3109 in LTCFs, advocating to further monitor the molecular epidemiology of
3110 certain clones among LTCF using repeated cross-sectional surveys and
3111 among institutions using regular universal screening in high-risk units
3112 (i.e. ICUs). **Third,** our repeated prevalence surveys in LTCFs benefited
3113 from a large sample size and long-term surveillance data. **Fourth,** the

3114 originality of our review was a strength, opening a path for future
3115 prospective cohort studies among household settings. **Fifth**, the
3116 subsequent, original cohort study used a robust methodology and
3117 detection methods by using whole-genome sequencing in a multicentric
3118 population to ascertain ESBL-PE transmission rates in households. **Sixth**,
3119 our nation-wide survey achieved an excellent response rate covering a
3120 large proportion of public and private Swiss healthcare institutions and
3121 combining results with geo-spatial information. Such information could
3122 have major impact when interpreted simultaneously with epidemiological
3123 data, such as the number and size of MDRO clusters, or prevalence of
3124 healthcare-associated MDROs. **Seventh**, our quasi-experimental study
3125 was original in demonstrating lack of effectiveness of a rapid screening
3126 test to inform infection control measures, and benefited from robust
3127 exhaustive admission and weekly screening strategies.

3128
3129 However, the scientific work leading to this thesis has also several
3130 limitations. **First**, the COVID-19 pandemic (2020-2022) impacted not
3131 only the productivity and consistency of the research produced in this
3132 thesis, but also interfered with the design, conduct and analysis of several
3133 studies. Laboratories, researchers, and clinicians were either forced to
3134 delay or to reallocate their time and funds for COVID-19 related projects.
3135 Many COVID-19 studies were conducted by our group in order to guide
3136 infection control policies both in hospitals and the community, but
3137 remained outside the scope of this thesis. Studies occurring during the
3138 pandemic period were often influenced by residual confounding effect and
3139 bias, including sampling bias (reallocation of testing resources), modified
3140 application and adherence to screening strategy, but also to standard and
3141 contact precautions. For example, the interventional quasi-experimental
3142 study, already prone to confounding events by using a historical control,
3143 was probably influenced by decreased screening rates, by suboptimal
3144 infection control measures (temporary universal gloving), and by

3145 modified opportunities at risk for cross-transmission (increased self-
3146 awareness). Decreased screening rates possibly under-detected potential
3147 acquisitions or transmissions occurring in ICUs. A **second limitation** was
3148 the late detection of a nosocomial VIM-producing *P. aeruginosa* outbreak
3149 occurring in the Geneva ICU between 2018 and 2020. As previously
3150 described, the control of this outbreak included temporary ICU closure of
3151 certain areas, with enhanced patient screening (biweekly screening) and
3152 environmental control. (15) The co-occurrence of the COVID-19
3153 pandemic and this *P.aeruginosa* outbreak and their unmeasured effect on
3154 our findings illustrates the vulnerability of interventional IPC studies to
3155 external confounding and time effects. The **third** limitation is related to
3156 the challenges of conducting prospective studies in household settings,
3157 and include potential selection bias when including household members
3158 and strains to be sequenced. As a **fourth** limitation, the heterogeneity of
3159 surveillance and infection control measures implemented globally, and
3160 the influence of epidemiological context and resources on their
3161 implementation and effectiveness impair the generalizability of our
3162 findings. A **fifth** limitation related to the quasi-experimental study in the
3163 ICU is related to the absence of gold standard when evaluating the LAMP
3164 assay, with the uncertain clinical relevance of discordant LAMP positive
3165 results. Such discordances might partly be explained by under-detection
3166 from cultures, in case of low bacterial load, non-viable species on
3167 specimen, growth difficulty in selective media for non-Enterobacterales
3168 species (e.g. non-fermentative bacteria), enzyme mutants not expressing
3169 carbapenemase activity, (16) and for certain resistance mechanisms with
3170 low hydrolytic activity (OXA-48-like enzymes), which has also been
3171 observed in prior studies, (17,18) with unclear infection control
3172 relevance. (17) Interpretation of molecular resistance information to
3173 guide IPC measures might be hindered by these discrepancies. An
3174 additional limitation of using molecular tests, not addressed in this
3175 manuscript, is the changing landscape of resistance genes. In summary,

3176 emergent resistance genes (false negative) or mutant resistance genes
3177 (false positive) might or might not be detected by molecular tests. **Sixth**,
3178 this thesis highlighted the presence of potential delays when identifying
3179 target populations for screening upon admission. Effectively, certain
3180 exposures are only detected after thorough discussion. Difficulties in
3181 identifying patients at risk can also result in a potential information bias
3182 with patients not screened. However, the most relevant exposures are
3183 systematically informed at admission, such as direct transfer from a
3184 healthcare institution or previously known carriage. Additional delays
3185 result from the interpretation of complex results, often requiring an IPC
3186 consultation. Thus, when evaluating the effectiveness of a rapid test to
3187 accelerate infection control measures, strategies to accelerate
3188 identification of patients at risk, and interpretation of molecular
3189 resistance information should be included as part of a holistic screening
3190 strategy, with a defined diagnostic stewardship program. **Seventh**,
3191 ethical constraints obstructed the implementation of a robust design
3192 evaluating ecological benefits from routine interventions. A cluster-
3193 controlled trial was initially planned to assess the effectiveness of LAMP
3194 assays. As our approach was based on an already pre-existing MDRO
3195 surveillance and control strategy targeting critically ill patients, a waiver
3196 of informed consent according to the Art. 34 LRH was deemed necessary.
3197 Unfortunately, despite multiple appeals and well-thought justifications,
3198 the waiver of informed consent was not granted by our local IRB. Thus,
3199 in agreement with the president of the ethical committee, the study
3200 design was modified for a quasi-experimental study without cross-over
3201 that did not require informed consent. The discussion with our ethical
3202 committee and further modifications in our protocol further delayed the
3203 ICU study start until April 2019.
3204

3205 **Connection with existing policies, practices, and**
3206 **instruments**

3207 In the **first part** of the **first chapter**, our repeated surveys of ESBL-EC
3208 prevalence in LTCF observed no rebound effect after discontinuation of
3209 contact precautions, and clonal fluctuation with multiple silent
3210 monoclonal outbreaks of ESBL-EC. These findings are supporting current
3211 guidance recommending discontinuation of contract precautions for
3212 ESBL-EC in healthcare settings. The emergence of closely related clones,
3213 sometimes associated with oxacillinases in neighbouring countries (19)
3214 warrants a close monitoring of ESBL-EC subclones, especially regarding
3215 the current under-detection of the OXA-48 carbapenemase and the
3216 absence of genotypic confirmation of CPE in certain countries. The silent
3217 outbreaks in LTCF highlights their vulnerability regarding MDRO spread
3218 and advocates for surveillance in this setting, such as repeated
3219 prevalence surveys.

3220

3221 **In summary, this thesis suggests for existing surveillance**
3222 **networks to:**

- 3223 • Monitor carefully the emergence of certain ESBL-EC subclones,
3224 particularly in high-risk settings such as LTCFs using simple and
3225 low-cost designs such as repeated cross-sectional surveys.

3226

3227 In **the second and third parts**, our systematic review and its following
3228 prospective cohort study observed a significant rate of acquisition and
3229 transmission among household members of an index patient colonized by
3230 ESBL-PE. Particularly, index patients requiring assistance for urinary and
3231 faecal excretion were at increased risk to transmit ESBL-EC or ESBL-KP
3232 to caregivers. This specific exposure is currently not included in defined
3233 risk profiles targeting candidates for admission screening. However, the
3234 feasibility to identify this subpopulation at admission and the positive

3235 predictive value of this exposure among screened patients still need to
3236 be determined. Furthermore, information sheets could be provided to
3237 household members to raise awareness of the increased risk of cross-
3238 transmission and to limit community spread.

3239

3240 **In summary, this thesis suggests for institutions to:**

- 3241 • Consider household contacts of ESBL-PE index cases as risk profiles
3242 defining candidates for targeted admission screening
- 3243 • Inform household members carrying for ESBL-PE or CPE positive
3244 patients with impaired autonomy about their increased risk of
3245 cross-transmission, with recommendations for good hygienic
3246 practices in order to limit household spread.

3247

3248 In the **first part** of the **second chapter**, our national survey on
3249 screening practices at admission participated in identifying current gaps
3250 in the institutional and national MDRO surveillance system, especially
3251 concerning certain neglected pathogens and risk factors. This survey also
3252 observed a significant heterogeneity in current practices, with
3253 identification of major facilitators and barriers to implement correct
3254 practices. These findings advocated for harmonized national guidance to
3255 better control importation events and inter-facility transfers. These
3256 findings have been communicated to SwissNoso and particularly the StaR
3257 committee and might serve as an evidence base to strengthen national
3258 guidelines. They also have been mentioned and could support the current
3259 update of ESCMID guidelines to control nosocomial ESBL and CPE spread.
3260 Homogenized screening policies are particularly warranted to avoid
3261 importation events, regarding the recent Swiss VRE outbreaks in multiple
3262 facilities, the emergence of OXA carbapenemases, and the presence of
3263 community clones (E.coli ST131 H41) harbouring carbapenemases.

3264

3265 **In summary, this thesis suggests for policy makers to:**

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- 3276
- Harmonize risk profiles used to target candidates for admission screening by easily accessible standards of evidence-based risk factors for MDRO colonization and infection. Such risk profiles might facilitate identification of patients at-risk in clinical routine.
 - Potentially include in these standards an evidence-based list of body sites to be screened for each pathogen considered for admission screening.
 - Potentially consider repeated surveys of screening practices among healthcare institutions and integration with epidemiological surveillance to prevent large inter-institutions outbreaks.

3277 In the **second part**, the failure of a rapid genotypic screening strategy
3278 in accelerating infection control and the challenges observed in this
3279 interventional study might advocate for abandoning the use of rapid
3280 genotypic assays without a proper diagnostic stewardship programme
3281 facilitating identification of target populations, result notifications and
3282 interpretations. Rapid phenotypic tests might yield an advantage to
3283 identify species and facilitate interpretation of results with key relevant
3284 information (viability, clinical and IPC relevance). We observed no
3285 individual nor ecological harm by using this rapid test in the surveillance
3286 screening strategy. This risk-benefit balance might be used as an
3287 example to advocate more flexible use of waivers of informed consent in
3288 Swiss laws concerning future prevention trials in Switzerland, and also to
3289 highlight the importance of experts to ascertain on a case-by-case basis
3290 the adequate balance of risks against benefits.

3291

3292 **In summary, this thesis suggests for healthcare institutions to:**

3293 - When implementing a screening strategy, include a diagnostic
3294 stewardship programme to accelerate the identification of target
3295 subpopulations, result notifications and interpretations.

3296

3297 **In summary, this thesis suggests for ethical committees to:**

3298 - Use this example to advocate for more flexible use of waivers of
3299 informed consent in future trials assessing ecological benefits of
3300 surveillance or infection control practices in Switzerland.

3301

3302

3303

3304 **Perspectives for future research**

3305 The findings from this thesis also raised additional scientific questions
3306 which could serve as a basis for future research activities.

3307
3308 The emergence of ESBL-EC ST131H89 in our LTCF, scarcely described in
3309 the literature by studies using globally-sourced genomes, (20) has never
3310 demonstrated monoclonal clustering in community or in healthcare
3311 settings, except from a recently published survey performed in 2019
3312 among 16 Swiss LTCF, (21) from Swiss household members of our
3313 prospective cohort study, and from environmental samples isolated from
3314 a Swiss river. (22,23) An international research collaboration has recently
3315 been created to compare these strains in a multicentric study evaluating
3316 the regional spread of an atypical ESBL-EC subclone among different
3317 human and environmental reservoirs from Western Switzerland. Of note,
3318 a close *E.coli* subclone (ST131H41) has recently been observed to harbor
3319 an oxacillinase in neighbouring Germany. (19) This highlights the need
3320 for monitoring this atypical subclone on a larger scale.

3321
3322 The observational cohort of household members offered a robust
3323 overview of transmission dynamics of major ESBL-PE in the first months
3324 after discharge of an index patient, using sequencing information. Future
3325 research could complement missing epidemiological information to ESBL-
3326 PE transmission dynamics in the community. In particular, we miss robust
3327 estimates of the duration of colonization. This could be achieved by
3328 prospective cohort studies using a predefined long-term follow-up, robust
3329 screening strategy, and whole-genome sequencing to avoid potential
3330 attrition bias, selection bias, and detection bias. Previously negative index
3331 patients could be recruited following an outbreak or from units with high
3332 sampling rates to avoid potential lead time bias. Such study could serve
3333 to identify of ESBL-PE or CPE carriers with intermittent or long term
3334 carriage, and could ultimately inform surveillance practices in hospitals

3335 and future mathematical modelling incl. agent-based models. In
3336 particular, this information could be used to strengthen the current
3337 indications and protocols for sequential screening practices among known
3338 carriers.

3339
3340 Highly heterogeneous IPC policies were observed at a national level
3341 between healthcare institutions, with several important gaps in
3342 surveillance and infection control practices. A follow-up survey could be
3343 informative, especially few years after the diffusion of nation-wide
3344 standards. If follow-up surveys are scheduled, the findings could be
3345 associated with the analysis of secular trends in nosocomial MDRO
3346 prevalence and incidence.

3347
3348 Using rapid genotypic tests without a proper diagnostic stewardship
3349 programme was not sufficient to accelerate infection control measures
3350 and had poor diagnostic value to detect ESBL-PE and CPE in a low
3351 endemic setting. However, the negative predictive value was adequate,
3352 and future studies could assess the effectiveness of this test to accelerate
3353 screening of close contacts for outbreak control, or to accelerate the
3354 cohorting of MDRO carriers in high-endemicity settings. However, the
3355 positive predictive value would remain a problem to identify carriers, and
3356 would probably require a two-tiers screening strategy with a more specific
3357 test. Also, methods to facilitate the identification of target populations
3358 presenting risk profiles at admission, result notification, and
3359 interpretation of molecular information could be developed to further
3360 accelerate surveillance and subsequent infection control measures.
3361 Finally, further research assessing effectiveness of rapid phenotypic
3362 methods to accelerate surveillance and improve infection control
3363 measures would probably yield interesting results.

3364

3365

3366 **Conclusions**

3367 This thesis contributed to the knowledge base about adequate monitoring
3368 of multidrug resistant clones and evaluation of transmission dynamics in
3369 understudied settings, such as LTCFs and household settings. We
3370 generated several original key findings. First, clonal fluctuation and silent
3371 outbreaks of ESBL-EC among LTCFs advocate for careful monitoring of
3372 emerging multi-resistant clones in similar settings. Second, we
3373 determined the role of households as ESBL-PE amplification platforms,
3374 especially for household members with impaired autonomy, with
3375 increased co-carriage proportions, either by significant acquisition and
3376 transmission rates, or potentially by sharing relevant exposures. This
3377 could inform future screening policies, IPC interventions to control
3378 community spread, or mathematical modelling. Third, heterogeneity and
3379 gaps were observed in admission screening policies among Swiss
3380 healthcare institutions. These findings could serve to inform future policy
3381 guidance, improving reallocation of existing financial and human
3382 resources by focusing on the right pathogens and exposure risks, while
3383 improving control of importation events and inter-facility transfers.
3384 Fourth, despite current controversies around universal MDRO surveillance
3385 to control MDR-GNB, this thesis highlighted an important side-benefit of
3386 such screening of critically ill patients to accelerate detection and early
3387 management of institutional outbreaks outside the ICU. Fifth,
3388 implementing a LAMP-based rapid genotypic test without proper
3389 diagnostic stewardship programme is doomed to fail in accelerating
3390 infection control measures. This lesson served as an additional evidence
3391 against routine use of molecular tests directly performed on rectal
3392 screening specimens in low-endemicity settings. Otherwise, diagnostic
3393 stewardship programme facilitating identification of target populations for
3394 admission screening, result notification and interpretation of molecular
3395 resistance information should be developed and included in institutional
3396 screening strategies.

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3484

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