The bitter taste of freedom: how saint-domingue's sugar-slavery economy was built and destroyed

Bastow, Maximilian Jonathan

The Bitter Taste of Freedom: How Saint-Domingue's Sugar-Slavery Economy Was Built and Destroyed

Master's Thesis

Master in the Political Economy of Capitalism

University of Geneva

Maximilian Bastow
Supervisor: Prof. Pilar Nogués-Marco

19 May 2025

Abstract

This master's thesis looks at French Saint-Domingue, once the richest colony in the world, to understand how it was made during three centuries of colonialism and what effects the Haitian Revolution had given its place in the world.

From Spanish colonisation to French rule, colonists sought to exploit Saint-Domingue economically. Under a mercantilist framework, they attempted to cultivate a variety of goods, ultimately centring around a sugar-slavery paradigm nearly a millennium old. Though various labour regimes were trialled, only a brutal slave plantation system was economically rational for sugar production, which also produced a rigid racial hierarchy to maintain social stability. Furthemore, the way Saint-Domingue, colonialism and slavery were considered in France prior to the Haitian Revolution limited the ability of the French Revolution to emancipate the colony's slaves, troubling the notion that France brought progressive ideals to Haitians. Though there were opponents of slavery and colonialism in France, they were unable or unwilling to achieve abolition for the enslaved populations of the colonies. French revolutionaries in 1789–1791 failed to abolish slavery in the colonies, instead finding ways of reconciling its persistence with their ideals.

Not waiting for emancipation to be granted, slaves and maroons rose up in the Haitian Revolution (1791-1804) and produced a change which made abolition inevitable even as it was "unthinkable" in the *métropole*. The thesis studies the impact this uprising had on sugar production, which dropped drastically due to the uprising, shown by using slave disembarkations as a proxy. This was felt in Paris, by sugar consumers who experienced a price shock of at least 100% in just a few days, at least partially because of the events in Saint-Domingue: they experienced "the bitter taste of freedom", to repurpose a Césaire poem. Yet, even as the slaves won liberty and destabilised sugar production, their actions did not seem to resonate in Parisian popular consciousness. Consumers nonetheless rioted, seizing and forcibly selling sugar as prices they considered fair, a striking example of a "moral economy".

Haiti's post-independence course is also considered, emphasizing the real and financial sources of its underdevelopment. Slavery continued to generate wealth in Cuba and Louisiana, while sugar developed in French colonies and on the mainland. Slavery and racism are explored in relation to each other and to capitalism, noting their persistence to the present day. This long history highlights Saint-Domingue's enduring legacies and lessons for the present.

Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

Acknowledgements

My deepest gratitude goes to Professor Pilar Nogués-Marco, who generously agreed to supervise my work, sharing feedback and sources. Her expertise and insight were invaluable. I extend my thanks to her and to Juliette Françoise for agreeing to assess my work, especially given the length my thesis has reached in trying to provide a thorough account of Saint-Domingue's history.

Several other professors at the University of Geneva have been influential on my work. My interest in the economics of slavery first began in a class run by Peter Bille Larsen, who assigned Kevin Bales' *Disposable People* and led fascinating discussions on the dynamics of slavery and capitalism. Michalis Nikiforos led the Spring 2024 Research Atelier in which students presented their early work towards a master's thesis; in these sessions, I was able to discuss my attempts to study slavery in one of its historic forms in Saint-Domingue and the impact of its abolition by the enslaved people themselves. I thank him and the fellow students of the Master in the Political Economy of Capitalism for their suggestions and encouragement. Many thanks to Mary O'Sullivan, who met with me and shared some excellent sources and advice on dealing with the impact of the Revolution on sugar. Other professors, including Cédric Durand, Bruno Amable and Marc Morgan, have influenced me more generally with the rigour and insight of their work, and I feel lucky to have had the opportunity to learn from them.

Working carefully with archives not only shines light on how history is produced, it also creates a sense of gratitude towards all the archivists who have worked to preserve crucial sources. Were my research to have lacked the works I accessed through archival platforms, the silences would have been too great to reach most of the conclusions I modestly advance. Many such platforms are currently under legal or political attack, especially Archive.org, so I wish to thank them for their work under increasingly difficult circumstances.

Last but not least, I wish to thank the family and friends who have supported me, especially during the unexpectedly difficult final two weeks: Emma, Jonathan, Felix, Toby, Mimi, Paul, Alessandro, Govind, and many others. Everyone with whom I have discussed the thesis has contributed to the work in some way, with special thanks to Jorik Mol, who made time for long calls to share constructive criticism.

Abbreviations

When an abbreviation refers to a primary source (e.g. AP or MR), it is followed by a volume number (or, failing that, a year) and page numbers unless otherwise mentioned.

AHN Archivo Histórico Nacional, the national historic archives of Spain. Hosted at https://pares.mcu.es.

AP Archives Parlementaires. The French Parliamentary archives, in 102 volumes. Hosted by CollEx-Persée at https://archives-parlementaires.persee.fr.

CP *Chronique de Paris*.

DDHC The *Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen* of 1789.

GN *Gazette Nationale*.

JP *Journal de Paris*.

MMA "Le marronnage dans le monde atlantique : sources et trajectoires de vie", a database of advertisements placed related to marroonage. For each advertisement cited, I have provided the slaveholder, the year, and the ID as attributed by the archivists, e.g. "MMA Curet 1783 (ID: 7119)".

MR *Oeuvres complètes de Maximilien Robespierre*, in ten volumes. Hosted by the University of Chicago's ARTFL Project at https://artfl-project.uchicago.edu/robespierre.

n.p. No pagination: indicated when page numbers are unavailable due to using an ebook or other non-physical source.

UNDP United Nations Development Programme.

U.S.A./U.S. United States of America.

Chronology

Year	Event
1444	The first time enslaved Africans are shipped to Europe, arriving in Lagos, Portugal from an expedition to West Africa. The first somatic classification of humans (using proto-racial categories) is developed there, and it becomes the first centre of the slave trade.
1452	The development of sugar plantations in Madeira marks the beginning of the long association between sugar and slavery.
1492	Christopher Columbus arrives on the island of Ayiti, renaming it Española. Spanish rule of the island begins.
1493	Columbus returns, with many settlers and sugarcane.
1501	The first enslaved Africans are brought to Española.
1505	Sugar cane is being grown in Santo Domingo, the first record of sugar cane being grown in the New World.[1]
1510	**22 January**: The Spanish King approves a shipment of 50 slaves to Española, the beginning of the transatlantic slave trade.
1518	**18 August**: The Spanish King approves the transport of thousands of enslaved West Africans to the West Indies, massively boosting the slave trade.
1521	**Christmas Eve**: The first documented slave revolt of Española, led by African maroons, is brutally repressed and leads to slave laws being put in place.
1537	**29 May**: Pope Paul III forbids the enslavement of Indigenous Americans, declared to be rational beings whom should be converted. It does not ban the enslavement of Africans.[2]
1571	The first enslaved Africans arrive in France, at Bordeaux. Crowds disrupt their sale and the slave trader is arrested.
1600	Spanish King Philip III outlaws the enslavement of Indigenous people in Spanish colonies.

[1] Givens 2022, p. 49.
[2] Pope Paul III 1537.

1635 France settles in Guadeloupe and Martinique.

1685 **March**: The Code Noir is signed by Louis XIV, formalising slavery in French colonies. While banning some forms of punishment in theory, its main effects are to stabilise French rule and the sugar plantation system.

1697 **20 September**: The Treaty of Ryswick is signed, formally recognising French rule of the West of the island after decades of informal settlement: Saint-Domingue is born.

1705 **10 June**: an ordinance distinguishes between "free Negroes" and "free people of colour", apparently the first time the distinction is made.[3]

1717 **April**: The Letters Patent served as the charter for the 18th-century French sugar business.[4]

1758 **20 January**: Arrest and execution of the Maroon leader François Makandal, putting an end to his eighteen-year long revolt.

1763 **10 February**: The Treaty of Paris concludes the Seven Years War, with Britain victorious. However, "the winner (Britain) lost while the loser (France) triumphed": France rebuilt the Caribbean and make Saint-Domingue highly successful.[5]

1777 **9 August**: France passes an "anti-Negro" law, banning any Black or person of colour from entering the kingdom of France.[6] It was the first French legislation based entirely on skin colour.[7]

1788 **19 February**: Foundation of the Society of the Friends of the Blacks (Société des Amis des Noirs) in Paris by Jacques-Pierre Brissot, advocating for the abolition of colonial race laws, the slave trade, and slavery.

1789 **5 May**: The *États généraux* meet in Versailles.
20 June: Tennis Court oath. The foundational speech act of French republican institutions, in which the Tiers Etat meet and all but one agree to continue doing so, even in the face of opposition, until a constitutional political system is established. Among them were five representatives of Saint-Domingue, who used it as a foot in the door.
14 July: Storming of the Bastille. Typically seen as the beginning of the French Revolution.
26 August: Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens. Men are born equal, it declares, yet the right to property and appeals to public utility will prevent this from implying the abolition of slavery.[8]

[3] Gauthier 2007, Annex: "Apparition et progrès du préjugé de couleur et de la législation ségrégationniste à Saint-Domingue 1705-1790" (n.p.).
[4] Stein 2023.
[5] Burnard and Garrigus 2018, pp. 18-19.
[6] Abanime 1979.
[7] Peabody 2002, p. 7.
[8] *DDHC* 1789.

22 October: A petition for the rights of the free people of colour of Saint-Domingue is received by the French Assembly.

1790 **8 March**: The National Assembly approves the creation of the Colonial Assembly, regrouping Saint-Domingue colonists in defence of their interests. Colonies — meaning the white governors of the colonies — would not be governed by the French constitution and would decide for themselves.
28 May: The basic principles of Saint-Domingue's colonial constitution are established.
25 September: Sonthonax predicts a time when "we will see an African with nappy hair [...] come participate in legislation within our National Assemblies".
October: Vincent Ogé leads an uprising of people of colour. It is repressed and he is executed in February 1791.
The French Constituent Assembly agrees not to intervene in the slave trade or with the status of persons in the colonies.

1791 **May**: The French Assembly debates racial equality in the colonies, and on 15 May grants full political rights to free people of colour who could prove they were born to two free parents.[9]
August: Boukman Dutty leads a religious ceremony at Bois Caïman, urging an uprising against the enslavers.
21-22 August: The Haitian Revolution begins with a slave revolt in the northern plains of Saint-Domingue.
30 November: In the French National Assembly, Millet gives a long and dramatic account of the slave uprisings, referring to them as "cannibals".[10] The text is published as a brochure and translated into English.[11]

1792 France sends 12,000 soldiers to Saint-Domingue to try to suppress the slave uprising.
February: Sugar prices in Paris increase by at least 100%. Sugar riots follow.
4 April: The French Legislative Assembly grants full civil rights to free people of colour in Saint-Domingue.
September: A new Constitution is proclaimed in France.

1793 **January**: Execution of King Louis XVI on grounds of treason.
February: France declares war on Britain and Spain, leading to foreign involvement in the revolution.
February: Commissioners Léger Félicité Sonthonax and Etienne Polverel are sent by the French National Convention to restore order in Saint-Domingue.

[9] Geggus 2017, p. 326.
[10] AP 35, pp. 460-467.
[11] Belissa 2023, p. 167.

29 August: Sonthonax proclaims emancipation in the North Province of Saint-Domingue. Toussaint Louverture issues his first public proclamation, saying " I have undertaken vengeance [for Ogé] I want liberty and equality to reign in St-Domingue".[12]
September: British troops invade Saint-Domingue.
October: Etienne Polverel abolishes slavery in the rest of Saint-Domingue.

1794 **4 February**: The French *Convention Nationale*, its hand forced by the uprising, abolishes slavery in its colonies, including Saint-Domingue. More than 600,000 people are freed.[13]
May: Toussaint Louverture deserts the Spanish and joins the French army.

1795 **22 July**: The Peace of Basel ends war between France and Spain, who cede Santo Domingo to France.

1797 **30 March**: France returns to gold and silver instead of *assignats* and *mandats*.

1800 Toussaint Louverture becomes the dominant figure in Saint-Domingue, effectively governing the colony.

1801 **January**: Toussaint Louverture invades Santo Domingo, abolishing slavery there and unifying Española.
July: Toussaint Louverture proclaims a new constitution for Saint-Domingue, declaring himself governor-general for life.

1802 **20 May**: Napoleon re-establishes slavery and the slave trade by decree.
7 June: French forces, sent by Napoleon, arrest Toussaint Louverture and deport him to France.

1803 **7 April**: Toussaint Louverture dies of illness in a prison cell in the Jura.
30 April: The Louisiana Purchase is agreed upon.
18 May: Dessalines rips the white third off the French flag. His god-daughter, stitching the red and white portions back together, creates the first version of the Haitian flag. The date is celebrated to this day as "Jounen Drapo Ayisyen": Haitian flag day.
18 November: The Battle of Vertières, the final major battle of the Haitian revolution, results in a decisive victory for Haitian forces.

1804 **1 January**: Haiti declares independence, becoming the first independent Black republic in the world.

[12] Geggus 2014, Part VI, Chapter 56, n.p. See also Foix 2007, Part II, Chapter "La liberté arrachée", n.p.
[13] Geggus 2017, p. 332.

1806	**27 December**: Haiti adopts its constitution, which organises the country as a Republic. It opens with the firm reaffirmation that "There can be no slaves in the territory of the Republic: slavery is abolished forever."
1825	**17 April**: France imposes "reparations" of 150 million francs on Haiti, for their losses of property including slaves and plantations.
1833	Britain passes the Slavery Abolition Act, which requires reparations for former slave owners and achieves abolition only after the transitional system of unfree apprenticeships.
1848	France's Second Republic abolishes slavery in all its colonies, buying slaves from their owners then freeing them.
1862	**12 July**: The US finally recognises Haitian independence.
1883	Haiti makes the last debt payment to France, though had taken out other debts to make it.
1915	The U.S.A. occupy Haiti militarily and financially. They have a sympathetic president installed who instates racial segregation and forced labour. Their occupation lasts until 1934.
1947	Haiti makes its final payment to debtors to cover the reparations to France. The total loss to the Haitian economy is valued at somewhere from $21 billion to $115 billion.
1948	**10 December**: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is adopted by the UN. Article 4 declares that "No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms."
2022	49,570,000 people live in modern slavery, according to the latest estimates.[14]

[14] International Labour Office, Walk Free Foundation and International Organization for Migration 2022, p. 17.

Epigraph

La négraille aux senteurs d'oignon frit retrouve dans son sang répandu
le goût amer de la liberté

Et elle est debout la négraille

la négraille assise
inattendument debout
debout dans la cale
debout dans les cabines
debout sur le pont
debout dans le vent
debout sous le soleil
debout dans le sang
    debout
      et
        libre

Aimé Césaire, *Cahier d'un retour au pays natal.*[15]

[Negridom with its smell of fried onion rediscovers the bitter taste of freedom in its spilt blood

and negridom is standing

the sat-down negridom
unexpectedly standing
upright in the hold
upright in the cabins
upright on the deck
upright in the wind
upright under the sun
upright in blood
    upright
      and
        free]

[15] Césaire 2014, p. 130.

Chapter 1

Introduction

This master's thesis started from a single, fascinating piece of information I encountered a year ago. In January 1792, Paris was shaken by riots. This much is not surprising to those familiar with the history of the tumultuous years of the French Revolution. What *was* surprising was the cause for the riots which most caught my attention: the price of sugar. Riots over food have a long history, but they usually focus on "staple cereals".[1] Why was sugar, initially dismissed by Robespierre as a "besoin factice" (artificial need), able to excite the crowds?[2] Even more surprising were the scale and speed of the price increase, which at least doubled in a couple of days. Today, even after the experience of recent inflationary shocks, such an increase in a food price is unimaginable to the French consumer.[3] What caused such a spike?

My research on this question started over a year ago, with some suspicions and a little naïveté about the difficulties it would involve. The sugar price hike occurred a few months after the start of the Haitian Revolution, in which the enslaved people of Saint-Domingue refused the brutality of the system in which they were held captive and sought to destroy it. The colonial slavery regime of Saint-Domingue, then the top sugar producer in the world, was eventually overthrown by their uprising, which started in August 1791. This appeared to be the obvious hypothesis for explaining the price shock. Testing the hypothesis, however, would unearth myriad difficulties and open many new doors, taking my research far beyond the familiar territory of political economy to other domains. Difficulties finding reliable sources would frustrate attempts to answer my initial questions and, more importantly, my research taught me that I would need to de-centre the riots to fully understand the web in which they took place. This thesis evolved, finally becoming what it is today. It attempts not to answer the narrow questions about the sugar riots, but the larger question: How was Saint-Domingue, a colonial plantation economy reliant on slavery

[1] Patel 2009, p. 1207.

[2] MR, 10, p. 9. See discussion in section 5.3.

[3] It is not unimaginable for many in the Global South, including in Haiti. In 2008, with food prices rising over 40% in less than a year, the creole term "grangou Klorox" (bleach hunger) spread, comparing the burning sensation in one's stomach to that of swallowing bleach. Food riots ensued, with UN peacekeepers firing rubber bullets to disperse the crowds ('Calm Returns to Haiti after Riots' 2008; De Solminihac 2008; Ryan 2008; The Associated Press 2008).

The latest figures, for March 2025, indicate a 25.2% year-on-year increase in the Consumer Price Index, which has risen nearly fivefold from its 2017-2018 average (Institut Haïtien de Statistique et d'Informatique (IHSI) 2025).

and sugar, made into the most profitable colony in the world — and how was it unmade by the Haitian Revolution? Furthermore, what legacies of Saint-Domingue persisted after its overthrow?

1.1 Presentation of the Chapters

This introductory chapter contains a number of notes on methodology and definitions to set the terms of the rest of my work. It also spends some time on two particularly important elements of background. The first of these is an understanding of race and racism as historically produced, essential for studying its importance to the construction of Saint-Domingue as a highly racially stratified society. The second is an engagement with the slavery/capitalism debate, explaining how different economists including Adam Smith and Karl Marx have thought about slavery, as well as how those working in the schools of the New Economic History of the 1970s and the contemporary New History of Capitalism have approached the issue. In both sections, this theoretical background leads towards the same conclusions: that with race as a "trace of history" on the one hand, and with the complex relationship between capitalism and slavery on the other, theory is insufficient to provide conclusions. We turn, in the rest of the thesis, to the concrete historical circumstances which describe how race, slavery and capitalism have interacted.

Chapter 2 delves into the political economy of Saint-Domingue on the eve of the Haitian Revolution, when it was the most profitable colony in the world. In order to properly explain how it was able to ascend to this position, I trace a number of histories. First, following Pierre Dockès, I consider the long-term use of a sugar-slavery paradigm to generate profits. This paradigm describes how, with remarkable consistency, sugar was produced on slave plantations from the ninth to the nineteenth centuries. The sugar plantation was taken up in the colonial era and applied to various "sugar frontiers", to use Jason W. Moore's illuminating concept, but rarely as profitably as in Saint-Domingue. Second, therefore, I consider the long history of the island of Ayiti from its colonisation by the Spanish (as "Española") to the French claiming the Western part as Saint-Domingue. By identifying a series of labour regimes which the Spanish and French attempted to impose, it becomes apparent that slavery was not the only way labour was managed on the island, but it would become the most successful and the most adapted to the gruelling work on sugar plantations.

These long histories of sugar, slavery and colonialism allow us to understand the converging factors which made Saint-Domingue a wealthy sugar colony. The chapter then details this wealth, its reliance on sugar and slavery, and the legal frameworks established in order to regulate it. Brought together, these different strands contextualise and explain Saint-Domingue's success story, at least as far as its planters were concerned. They imposed a certain productive 'recipe' under favourable conditions, supported by the French state. The economic and legal systems of the *Ancien Régime* allowed it to thrive, despite also squeezing it for profits. This would provide a source of instability, though not as much as the slave system itself. In order to stabilise Saint-Domingue's society, a series of legal structures generated

racial divides atop the slave-based ones.

These changes in economic and legal structures happened during the Enlightenment period, when the French *Lumières* were gaining influence through writings such as the famous *Encyclopédie*. Chapter 3 starts by looking at how the *Lumières* understood slavery and colonialism, finding examples of both support of and opposition to the institutions which structured Saint-Domingue. Though Voltaire is famous for exposing the brutality in *Candide*, his investments in the slave trade and justifications for it in other texts give us reason to consider him along other Enlightenment defenders of colonial slavery like Le Romain and Forbonnais, both authors in the *Encylopédie*. However, we also uncover attacks on the institution from Damilaville and Jaucourt in the same Encyclopedia, which provide arguments against enslavement on moral and economic terms.

Having looked at the political and intellectual background of the French Revolution, the chapter then turns to the years 1789-1791. This period is the start of the French Revolution, before the Haitian Revolution led by the enslaved has begun. By examining the archives from the French *Constituante* national assembly, I trace the political deliberations over colonies which occurred during these deeply turbulent times. I find it to be characterised by a debate about colonialism, slavery and (some forms of) racism in which the two sides are aggressively opposed to each other but nevertheless share a lot of common understanding. By defining the values of the French Revolution, and especially that of liberty, in ways which may appear counter-intuitive today, they were able to reconcile the idea of freedom with the continuation of slavery.

The shared world-view left them unable to conceive of the Haitian Revolution and its demands: when the slave uprising erupted in 1791, it was "unthinkable even as it happened".[4] Unforeseen and unimaginable, it would nevertheless have a massive impact on the world.

Chapter 4 is interested in one aspect of the Haitian Revolution's economic impact, and in how it was politicised. I look to the events of the sugar riots of January 1792 when, in response to prices increasing at least twofold, crowds led by women took to the streets. They seized sugar, forcing it to be sold it at its prior price. My initial instinct was that they must have related the shock to the Haitian Revolution: the revolt which was destroying sugar plantations across Saint-Domingue, the world's primary sugar producer, would impact quantities (and, therefore, prices) of sugar in Paris; and, likely, this would be understood by the consumer. Only one of these hypotheses was right and they are hard to assess in depth: these pivotal occurrences, the spark for this thesis, are unfortunately under-documented in the archive.

Working with these gaps, the chapter compiles contextual evidence of prices. I would have wanted to conduct a fine-grained economic analysis to the sugar supply shock and consider it through the framework of commodity inflation and 'rational bubbles', but I was held back by the lack of data. To complement this lack, the chapter conducts a political analysis of the situation. They are situated in the history of French sugar consumption and described by E.P. Thompson's concept of the

[4] Trouillot 2015, p. 73.

"moral economy". I also formulate a hypothesis of how rioters would have conceived of the enslaved: perhaps with solidarity, perhaps with antagonism, and perhaps with ignorance or indifference. Sadly, the voices of the rioters seem lost to history and, to an even greater degree than England, we struggle to know what people would have thought, though ignorance of the slaves' plight seems most likely. What the archive *does* show is the resonance of these events in Parisian newspapers. Using several papers from a period of several months, discussions of the 'hoarding' of sugar are inspected. These appear to show the metropolitan sugar merchants as the prime target of the riots, suggesting at least that antagonism towards the enslaved was not common. Finally, just as the Haitian Revolution was unthinkable for political figures in France, so too were some responses to the sugar shock. The moral economy tests the limits of the Revolution's ideals.

Chapter 5 returns to Saint-Domingue itself to assess the economic impact of the Haitian Revolution. It presents the context and a brief explanation of the Haitian Revolution, seeing its impact in the personal correspondence of planters.

By using the best available sources on the transatlantic slave trade, namely the *SlaveVoyages* database, the Revolution's impact on slave disembarkations is shown. We find, first, that the slave trade to Saint-Domingue reached its highest point after the high-minded start of the French Revolution, with 45% of all disembarkations in 1790 occurring in the colony. As a proxy for sugar production, disembarkation numbers allow us to study how the Haitian Revolution subsequently disrupted and destroyed the colonial slave-based economy, reduced in a few years to just a percent of its 1790 peak and ending after 1797. Complemented by other accounts of the uprising, we can infer that the activity of organised slaves, maroons and free people of colour did indeed profoundly disrupt the foremost source of sugar. While they did not realise it, those who lacked access to sugar in Paris were experiencing "the bitter taste of freedom": that is, of the freedom of the formerly enslaved, which was gained at a cost of colonial commodity exports to France.

In Chapter 6, I consider the *longue durée* of Haiti since its independence was declared in 1804 and then granted by France, albeit at great cost, in 1825. I separate the causes of Haitian underdevelopment into those in the real economy and those in the financial sector. 1825 acts as a turning point, at which point the country's elite appear to accept financial submission to France (and, later, the U.S.A.) in exchange for a recognition of independence. While they hoped to be able to develop the real sector, the weight of debt "smothered all possibility of growth for the economy".[5] As a result, both real and financial economic problems saddled Haiti throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and contributed to the catastrophic situation in the country today.

The sixth chapter also considers other developments linked to the Haitian Revolution. It turns to how Cuba and Louisiana both benefited from the demise of Saint-Domingue's plantations, reaping rewards from a world-economy which still demanded slave-made products and the loss of the biggest rival supplier. It also considers the persistence of slavery and coerced labour in other French colonies, by

[5] Péan 2003, p. 165.

contrast with Saint-Domingue.

Returning to questions of capitalism and slavery, I consider the persistence of slavery despite being illegal everywhere. Indeed, today there are *more* slaves in the world than were trafficked from Africa during the entirety of the transatlantic slave trade. This suggests a disturbing, under-examined and persisting degree of compatibility between the current structures of the world-economy and its commodity chains with brutal conditions for the "disposable people" slavery continues to target. Finally, I look at ways in which racism operates in capitalism today, which has inherited a lot from its instrumental use in supporting slavery. Brought together, these different threads indicate the significance of Saint-Domingue: the colonial slavery which operated there has profound legacies to the present day. These, and the lessons of the Haitian Revolution, have much to teach us about how slavery, race, colonialism and capitalism interacted then and have evolved since.

The conclusion, Chapter 7, summarises and includes some considerations of topics for further research I did not engage with here. Suggesting angles to explore the financial, gendered, ecological and global dimensions in more depth, it leaves suggestions and questions for future work.

1.2 Notes on Methodology

1.2.1 Historical Accounts

To study the Haitian Revolution, a variety of books served as historical background. First among them was C.L.R. James' classic *Black Jacobins*, first published in 1938.[6] I used its updated 1963 Vintage edition which, it should be noted, underwent some "prominent and significant changes", which "directly reactivated and updated the history to renew it for those times".[7] Among James' many influences on my own approach is "the injunction to place metropole and colony within the same analytic frame", in Catherine Hall and Keith McClelland's praiseworthy phrase;[8] this may have been criticised by past historians writing in France, but like Hall and McClelland I believe it to be vindicated as a framework of analysis that points us towards a global history. James was also attune to the importance of racism, which as I will seek to argue is crucial to understanding this period of history. Racism was promoted and mobilised to secure the political and economic stability of colonial plantations, but once spurred on in this way it gained a material force which will be a through-line of the analysis.

Many other accounts have furnished my research. These include Haitian, French and American scholars. I have also sought to study Haitian perspectives on their own history, conscious of the possibility of bias in remaining centred on European and North-American voices. Michel-Rolph Trouillot and Jean Casimir have been most influential in this respect.[9] This has provided helpful in identifying certain

[6] C. L. R. James 1989.
[7] Douglas 2019, p. 102.
[8] Quoted in Forsdick and Høgsbjerg 2017, p. 37.
[9] Casimir 2020; Trouillot 2015. Even then, I am aware that Trouillot and Casimir are Haitian

undervalued aspects of French and Haitian history. For example, some famous figures of the French Revolution are *in*famous in Haiti, for reasons often entirely ignored by French history. Despite all that French historians have written about Cocherel's role advocating for colonial slavery in the National Assembly, it is only the work of Haitians (and the Americans who have read them) which has identified his violent crimes against Black people as a planter in Saint-Domingue. Paying attention to the Haitian historical record allows the link between his material interests, individual behaviours, and political ideology to be established.

Despite all these efforts, Walter D. Mignolo points out in his introduction to Jean Casimir's history of Haiti that "Coloniality of knowledge—or what is the same, accounts based on principles of social sciences and humanities of Western modernity—tells half of the story".[10] As a Westerner educated in both humanities and social sciences in the West, I have tried to be (self-)critical as much as possible in order to think about the half that has never been told, to borrow Edward Baptist's expression about the history of slavery.[11] Nonetheless, I do not doubt that errors and biases remain in my text in general and in particular due to my position.

1.2.2 Reading Primary Sources

I am inspired by the hermeneutic method outlined by Haim Burstin regarding his study of Parisian social movements, namely to conduct a sort of "phenomenological reduction" which attempts as much as possible to study the events documented without imposing a reading. He wishes to "observe the trajectory of phenomena unfolding fully before"—or instead of—"making them into Lego pieces for a political commentary".[12]

In studying the history of ideas throughout the eighteenth century, I follow the guidance of the "so-called Cambridge school of intellectual history". In short, this involves "placing each [source] in its particular political and social context. To study an idea in context means that we can understand the meaning of any given idea only if we study the unique sphere of meanings to which it once belonged by looking at its procedures, aims, and vocabularies", resisting anachronism.[13]

1.2.3 Reading the Archive Against the Grain

How do the enslaved people of Saint-Domingue show up in archival documents?

Sadiya Hartman points out, applying Spivak's contributions about the subaltern to studies of slavery, that "there is no access to the subaltern consciousness outside dominant representations or elite documents".[14] This does not mean abandoning what is often referred to as "the archive" altogether if we are to understand the lives of the enslaved. Instead, it implies attending to the biases of the documents we use.

---

academics who worked within U.S. academia, which may have contributed both to their awareness of American biases on race and to other potential sources of bias.

[10] Mignolo in Casimir 2020, p. xii.

[11] Baptist 2014.

[12] Burstin 2013, p. 4.

[13] Vartija 2021, p. 5.

[14] Hartman 1997, p. 10.

To do so, we acknowledge that the documents are not just neutral traces of history, they are historically produced,: that is to say, they are written for certain purposes, in certain contexts, with certain standpoints. Hartman looks "critically at the production of historical narratives",[15] asking Marisa Fuentes' question: "What would a narrative of slavery look like when taking into account 'power in the production of history?'".[16] By bearing this in mind, I hope to reconstruct a less biased account of what occurs.

My aim in the present work is not as ambitious as Sadiya Hartman's: I do not seek to reach "subaltern *consciousness*" from the corpus of the archive. She herself acknowledges "limits" to this task and "the impossibility of fully recovering the experience of the enslaved and the emancipated".[17] My goal is more modest, but also more focused on material factors of political economy: I seek to establish the extent to which the resistance and revolt of enslaved peoples constituted a material force with which the ruling classes of Saint-Domingue and metropolitan France had to contend. Or, reading in the opposite direction, I seek to uncover the extent to which decisions by those in power in Paris and Saint-Domingue had to contend with the action of enslaved agents.

This is necessary work given the archive we are dealing with: traces of enslaved people appear most often in documents written by those enslaving them, in sources I use including classified ads about marooned slaves, reports of slave voyages written by ship-holders, or the legal cases about slave punishment. When this isn't the case, it is still almost always white people who are the authors: the deputies of the French Assembly, whose archives form the basis of my analysis of political forces around slavery.

That said, the Haitian Revolution offers a powerful example because, in the course of the uprising, some of the Black and free people of colour begin producing documents themselves as they take positions of power. In other words, they cease to be subaltern and start to create their own representations. I will sometimes quote these writings. That said, I keep in mind those who continue not to show up, including the majority of the participants of the uprising, those who formed the "counter-plantation system" after the Revolution, and the rioters in Paris.

Concluding my methodological overview, it perhaps bears stating that I have made a deliberate choice *not* to use two methods which are common in political economy works: regressions and modelling. Their absence here, therefore, is purposeful, though I hope to explore their use on this topic in future work.[18]

[15] Hartman 1997, p. 10.

[16] Fuentes 2016, "Introduction", n.p.

[17] Hartman 1997, p. 10, my italics.

[18] I take seriously a range of critiques of econometric regressions which I believe to caution against using them too widely in a variety of economic topics, and *a forteori* to economic history (Freedman 1991, 1999; Klees 2016; Leamer 1983, 2010). Critiques by Lawson and Slade-Caffarel of economic modelling in general, including when used in heterodox economics, also problematise their use (Lawson in Mearman, Berger and Guizzo 2019, p. 144; Slade-Caffarel 2019). For these reasons, I would only feel comfortably defending conclusions reached through modelling or regressions if I were able to spend a longer period of time addressing the methodological literature and if this interrogation reassured me about the usefulness of such methods. Such work would take me beyond the the scope of a master's thesis on an historical topic, so these common methodologies

1.3 Approaches to Race

1.3.1 Race and Racism

This thesis, which I set out to write as a political and economic history of Saint-Domingue and France during the Age of Revolutions, had to also become a *racial* history of this subject in order to make sense of the events. As Chapter 3 will argue, the French world-view prevented them from seeing the reality of the colony, accepting certain racist and colonial ideologies. Many historians writing since "have treated the events of Saint-Domingue in ways quite similar to the reactions of its Western contemporaries", with significant blinkers.[19] To avoid making the same mistakes, I argue that race must be considered explicitly and critically. My main conclusions about the historic formation of racism and race will not emerge until Chapter 6, building upon an engagement with primary materials throughout the thesis. However, in order for the investigation of race to be fully intelligible from the outset, some points about race and racism must be made here to dispel a common misunderstanding.

This common view, put simply, believes that racism reacts to an already-existing race. Considering people to be born into racial categories which have biological differences, often marked by skin colour, it sees racism as the reaction to such biological differences. This view may be held by a racist who sees the difference as meriting hierarchies, or by an anti-racist who considers that it is wrong to treat a difference (seen as real) as grounds for discrimination or violence (seen as unjustified). However opposed their political beliefs may be, they share an understanding of race as a biological given.

The framework used to study race in the present work, however, reverses this view entirely. It is racism which precedes and produces race, rather than merely reacting to it as a biological given, as theorists including Jean-Paul Sartre, Frantz Fanon, and Colette Guillaumin have shown. Sartre demonstrated this chain of causality in the case of antisemitism.[20] By assessing the various attempts to define Jewishness through physical or intellectual features — none of which are found in all Jewish people, nor are unique to them — the idea of a "Jewish race" pre-existing the political construction of racial identities falls apart. Instead, Sartre concludes: "the Jew is a human who other humans take to be a Jew [...] it is the antisemite who *makes* the Jew".[21] In 1961, Frantz Fanon suggested an analogous analysis of anti-Black racism as producing Blackness when he identified the "racialisation of thought" by European colonial powers, commenting that the Black person has "never

are bracketed for the present work.

[19] Trouillot 2015, p. 96.

[20] My spelling of 'antisemitism' here is deliberate, following Hannah Arendt and many others. As Waxman and coauthors write: "We prefer "antisemitism" (without the hyphen) to "anti-Semitism" – a term coined by self-defined "anti-Semite" Wilhelm Marr – because there is no "Semitism" which antisemites oppose, and rendering it with a hyphen may wrongfully imply that the term is meant to encompass all those who speak Semitic languages." (Waxman, Schraub and Hosein 2022, note 1, p. 1820).

[21] Sartre 2017, chapter 3, n.p., his italics.

been so much a Negro as since his domination by the White man".[22] As Colette Guillaumin later established, Sartre's examination of antisemitism as *producing* the racial category of 'the Jew' is an "analysis which is valid for all forms of racism".[23] In short, *racism produces race*.[24] I seek, following Patrick Wolfe, to study races as "traces of history", produced by historical circumstances rather than reflecting any essence.[25] This, we will see later, was in fact anticipated by some Haitians at the time of the Revolution.

For this reason, my use of 'race' and its related terms in this thesis should be understood as always implying a constructed category. This is especially important to note for any Francophone readers, as the French word '*race*' has often itself been taken to connote the racist view that it has a biological reality with a corollary in constructing a hierarchy.[26]

For clarity, I will often refer to 'racialisation', following Fanon's usage quoted above and its adoption in English-language sociology by Michael Banton in 1977.[27] Racialisation is sometimes used very loosely, "to suggest race-inflected social situations" with a "lack of specificity".[28] My use of 'racialised' isn't so general, but instead follows the meaning of Guillaumin's word "racisé". People are racialised in the same way that people can be gendered or oppressed: identified as fitting into a racial category, with appeal to a natural difference, in a relation to "dominant (meaning, here, racialising) society".[29] In this work, 'racialisation' will primarily refer to this phenomenon: the process through which racialised groups are formed.[30] I wish to draw attention to the process through which racial categories are formed and mobilised. Any usage of 'race' by myself should always also be taken to imply racialisation, race not as pseudo-scientific fiction but as a social reality which changes over time.

1.3.2 Describing Slavery and White Ignorance

This master's thesis is written in a descriptive mode. As I conducted readings, I discovered again and again that works commonly construed as *defending* something were instead, upon closer reading, *describing* it. To take just two examples I have already quoted, Fanon is often taken to be defending violence in places where he is analysing its causes and Sartre, who ironically contributed to this misreading of Fanon, is sometimes misunderstood as antisemitic based on glosses of his critical

[22] Fanon 2010, p. 202.

[23] Guillaumin 1972, note 9, p. 64.

[24] Saini 2019 demonstrates this point at greater length than I do here.

[25] Wolfe 2016.

[26] See the analysis in Mazouz 2020, Chapter "Être ou ne pas être": she explains why "race doesn't exist and yet it is everywhere" (n.p.).

[27] Murji and Solomos 2005a, p. 5.

See Banton 2019. See also Barot and Bird 2001 and the essays collected in Murji and Solomos 2005b.

[28] Goldberg 2005, p. 88.

[29] Guillaumin 1972, p. 7.

[30] See also Hochman 2019 for a philosophical defence of this usage.

analysis of antisemitism.[31] I would not wish for this thesis to be read in such a way, as the institutions of colonialism, slavery and racism which I seek to describe are deeply condemnable.

As I hope will become apparent, my critical use of primary sources which defend these institutions — often written in hateful language, which I make no attempt to exclude or soften — seeks to describe them unvarnished by presentist urges. Readers should be aware that this thesis gives examples of physical, psychological and sexual violence in attempting to understand the brutality of the structures of colonialism and slavery; it sometimes does so by quoting primary sources, many of which demonstrate racist and sexist prejudice. This should not be mistaken for apologia.

On the contrary, I believe that attempts to rehabilitate these institutions rely on a "national amnesia" cultivated around colonial slavery in precisely those nations which are historically implicated.[32] Many times, when merely mentioning (without expressing judgement) that I was researching slavery to white Europeans, I was met with a knee-jerk defensiveness and hostility to the very idea it was worth learning more about. I was encountering first-hand the "epistemology of ignorance" Charles W. Mills identified in *The Racial Contract* and expanded upon in *Black Rights, White Wrongs*.[33] As a "double-edged sword: it contains not-knowing, but also not wanting to know",[34] it manifests as a "studied",[35] "white ignorance", an ignorance that is "militant, aggressive, not to be intimidated, an ignorance that is active, dynamic, that refuses to go quietly".[36] Such a move supports a "claim of innocence" that reinforces racial injustice, as Gloria Wekker analyses in *White Innocence*.[37]

By demonstrating the reality of the institutions of colonialism, slavery, and race, white ignorance as a move to innocence is frustrated. The historical record provides little double about their violence, despite attempts to rehabilitate them through euphemism and misinformation. To engage with it, we must encounter the crudest forms of violence and racism — something which can be challenging. Charles King writes that when anthropologist Franz Boas demonstrated the lack of any scientific basis to racist theories, he "required readers to make a difficult conceptual leap: he was asking Americans and western Europeans to suspend their belief in their own greatness".[38] Similarly, the history of racial slavery is capable of eliciting wounded or defensive responses among white people. I have sought to interrogate any beliefs I, as a white person, may have in greatness, whether it be an imagined racial superiority or a pride in one's empire's former colonial glory; I trust that all readers will do as

[31] I allow that there may be reasons to argue this about both authors, but I certainly encountered places where they were both clearly misinterpreted.

[32] Harding 2022, p. 5.

[33] Mills 2022, p. 18. See Mills 2017, especially chapter 4.

[34] Wekker 2016, p. 17.

[35] Mills 2022, p. 133.

[36] Both from Mills 2017, p. 49.

[37] Wekker 2016, p. 17. See also Janet Mawhinney's productive concept of "moves to innocence", defined as "strategies to remove involvement in and culpability for systems of domination" (Mawhinney 1998, p. 17) and its mobilisation by Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang (Tuck and Yang 2012).

[38] King 2019, p. 111.

much. This may be troubling but only by doing so can we get to the reality of what racial categories and colonial empires produced.

1.3.3 The Capitalism/Slavery Debate

A long series of arguments, constituting a centuries-long capitalism/slavery debate, have considered the problem of how exactly capitalism and slavery relate to each other.[39] These take two broad forms: those which consider them to be incompatible, and those which do not. Among the latter group, we can further distinguish between those which consider slavery distinct from capitalism but compatible with it, and those which conflate the two. By reviewing these positions, we will arrive at our own approach, a "bloody dialectics" following Sébastien Rioux.

The Economic Backwardness of Slavery

The Smith-Hume Argument David Hume and Adam Smith, "the infidel and the professor" as one biographer described them, "were best friends for most of their adult lives" and strongly influenced each other through their "philosophical friendship of the very highest level".[40] It is no surprise, therefore, that they shared a similar view on slavery — one that has had an enduring influence in economic thought. Both considered it to be an economically backwards institution and advanced their opposition to it on pragmatic terms of lacking economic rationality. Here, I will consider Adam Smith's argument, though it should be considered that the claims studied here were all the more influential for being spread by Hume, who shared great status.[41]

Smith was the first to argue that slavery was inefficient based on a micro-economic approach. He acknowledged that "the state of slavery must be very unhappy to the slave" as well as "to the masters", but focused on what he saw as its economic inefficiency.[42] He advances three main reasons for this claim in *The Wealth of Nations*. First, the "wear and tear" of the slaves, which like that of the worker is covered by the employer, is greater than it is for a worker, such that "the work done by freemen comes cheaper in the end than that performed by slaves".[43] Second, the slave's status removes incentives for him to be productive which are available to workers who can make wages or own property: "A person who can acquire no property, can have no other interest but to eat as much, and to labour as little as possible".[44] His third claim seems closely connected to the second: that slaves have no incentive to invent anything new, so innovation is low. Technical progress, he thought, was the work of free people.

All three of these claims are empirical and there are reasons to doubt their universal truth. For the enslaved to be a more expensive workforce than free labourers, the cost of maintaining the slave would have to be higher, but there are

[39] For a good overview see Zeuske and Conermann 2020.
[40] Rasmussen 2017, p. xi, p. 6.
[41] Voltaire also advanced similar arguments in France.
[42] A. Smith 1978, p. 185.
[43] A. Smith 1976, Volume I, p. 90.
[44] ibid., Volume I, p. 411.

reasons to think that this was not always true: slaves were typically overworked, mistreated and (often) malnourished, and though their prices were growing in the late eighteenth century, the bargaining power of waged workers could change the equation of which was cheaper to maintain. Smith is right that the enslaved had good reason to resist working, and that in many cases labour "is squeezed out of him [sic] by violence only".[45] This, however, does not guarantee higher productivity among wage-workers: Smith isn't able to demonstrate that labour extracted by violence would be less productive than labour performed in promise of a wage. In the case of the difficult work of sugar cultivation, the opposite may be true. Finally, precisely the desire of the slave to mitigate the harshness of their work conditions might cause them to innovate: the idea that slavery is un-inventive is perhaps the hardest to maintain of the three claims. On the contrary, "the New World was a place where many different cultures and technologies met", with the mingling of African, European and sometimes Indigenous techniques providing a great dynamism.[46] The patents for new technologies nearly always obscured the true inventors when they were slaves, but slaveowners "wanted the benefits of their [slaves'] brains as well" as of their physical labour, and historians have been able to trace many innovations to enslaved people.[47] We can therefore be sceptical than any of Smith's three assertions are generally applicable to the degree required for his argument. But, by maintaining these three claims as if they applied everywhere, Smith argued that slavery would increasingly find itself at odds with capitalism as the latter developed. Capitalism demands cheapness, productivity and innovation, and slavery provided none according to him.

Another argument made by Adam Smith bolsters the impression that slavery would be phased out as capitalism progressed. In his *Lectures on Jurisprudence*, Smith claimed that "slavery takes place in all societies at their begining [sic], and proceeds from that tyranic [sic] disposition which may almost be said to be natural to mankind".[48] This serves to naturalise slavery, evacuating the political economy which may favour or disfavour it: from the claim that *all* societies start with slavery, itself untrue, he derives the conclusion that the "pride of man makes him love to domineer [so] he will generally prefer the service of slaves", as he put it in *The Wealth of Nations*.[49] As Rioux and co-authors argue, this "fetishization of economic laws hides the fact that they are actually the products of social relations, which are subject to change".[50]

Marx and Neo-Smithian Marxists Marx also advanced arguments about the economic "backwardness" of slavery, but how these are interpreted is the subject of much controversy. Rather than quote Marx here, Alex Dupuy's work in a Marxist lineage is enlightening for our subject. He elaborated a number of ways in which slavery held back the capitalist development of Saint-Domingue, specifically:

> "Slavery retarded the economy of Saint-Domingue because it could only

[45] A. Smith 1976, Volume I, p. 412.
[46] P. James 2004, p. 49.
[47] ibid., p. 51.
[48] A. Smith 1978, p. 452.
[49] A. Smith 1976, Volume I, p. 412.
[50] Rioux, LeBaron and Verovšek 2020, p. 716.

> increase the productivity and profitability of the plantations by quantitative, not qualitative, means. Planters could raise productivity only by increasing the number and size of plantations, or by employing more sugar mills, more animals, and more slaves. Planters could not increase the productivity of labor by "revolutionizing" agriculture with better technology and improved methods of production.
>
> Slaveholders could not substitute machines for slaves, even if they had decided to do so; nor could they hire and fire their slaves as market conditions dictated."[51]

Marx and Dupuy are far from alone in considering slavery's forms of inefficiency. How these inefficiencies are *interpreted*, however, is the crucial question. Sébastien Rioux and his co-authors have identified a strand of "neo-Smithian understanding of Marx's work", encouraged by Engels and others writing since.[52] By tracing a *Rezeptionsgeschichte* (a history of the reception) of Marx's writings, they convincingly argue that this interpretation of Marx, like Smith, excludes the compatibility of slavery and capitalism *by definition*: it "follows Adam Smith in defining capitalism exclusively as a system of free labor that is incompatible with extra-economic coercion and politico-legal constraints".[53] Thinkers like Maurice Dobb, Robert Brenner and (especially) Eugene Genovese and Elizabeth Fox-Genovese were influential in advancing such definitions of capitalism as necessarily distinct from slavery.[54] To a large extent, the Genoveses' "view of slavery as "pre-capitalist" is now generally presented as Marxian orthodoxy", though they understood themselves to be attacked the orthodox view.[55] What is now thought of as 'Marx's position' was instead read back into his view based on conflating him with later scholars.

The Capitalist Character of Slavery

Against the Neo-Smithians, I argue that Marx should not be taken to be providing an argument in the same line as Smith, Hume or Voltaire. John Bellamy Foster and his co-authors, in an article which makes some mistakes, nonetheless correctly identify that Marx saw "plantation slavery" as "highly competitive with other forms of production under capitalism".[56] Furthermore, "most Marxist and Marxist-influenced

[51] Dupuy 2019, p. 37.

[52] Rioux, LeBaron and Verovšek 2020, p. 714.

[53] ibid., p. 716.

[54] Robert Brenner is critiqued by Rioux, LeBaron and Verovšek for "the neo-Smithian presupposition that capitalism is reducible to a system of free wage-labor" (ibid., p. 722); however, John Clegg considers that "with some small modifications" the model of Brenner and Ellen Meiksins Wood is able to explain "the capitalist character" of slavery (Clegg 2020, p. 79).

Parron argues that we might add Eric Williams to the list of such Marxists, as he uses both classical and non-classical categories which "shaped two modes of reception" (Parron 2023, p. 682). By contrast, Rioux credits Williams with rejecting Neo-Smithian Marxism (Rioux 2022).

[55] Clegg 2020, p. 75.

[56] Foster, Holleman and Clark 2020, p. 108. The most egregious mistakes involve misattributing passages where Marx quotes John E. Cairnes to Marx himself: see quotes in ibid. p. 102 and p. 103, both misattributed to Marx. See Marx 1990, p. 377, for these passages where Marx is clearly quoting Cairnes. See Cairnes 1863, pp. 122-123, for the text which Marx is quoting.

writers on American slavery followed Marx in viewing slave plantations as capitalist" until the Genoveses' work disrupted this interpretation.[57] Beyond the U.S. example alone, scholars including John Bellamy Foster, Sébastien Rioux, John Clegg and Tâmis Parron are all using a Marxist framework to analyse the degree of linkage between capitalism and slavery, grounded not in theoretical definitions which separate them *a priori* but in historical study.

Even allowing for Neo-Smithians to be right about what Marx thought about slavery, I argue that they are wrong about slavery itself. A review of three theses about slavery — compatibility, conflatability, and a dialectical, non-identical unity — leads us in more fruitful directions.

The Compatibility Thesis While capitalism's "ideological foundations are contrary to the idea of servitude", or at least are typically expressed in such rhetoric, historically it has not necessarily been hostile to slavery.[58] This has become nearly consensual among historians: Heuman and Burnard consider it "generally accepted that slavery, if not exactly the same as industrial capitalism, was compatible with most forms of capitalist endeavour".[59] The sugar-slavery paradigm, a persistent recipe for profits employed from the ninth century, was a "precociously capitalist" institution.[60] The phrase "factories in the field" commonly used to describe sugar plantations is telling in this respect.[61] Slaveholders' behaviour often looked just like (other) capitalists', profit maximising and generating large revenues. But, just as with the 'economically backward' aspects of slavery, how these compatibilities are interpreted is crucial.

One interpretation of the compatibility of slavery and capitalism was advanced in response to Eric Williams' *Capitalism and Slavery*, which provoked a large range of criticisms. Some criticisms were, I believe, made in bad faith and not worth taking seriously.[62] Others concerned the question of slavery's impact on British industrialisation and will be considered later (see section 2.3.4). A third set of criticisms, "in the then emerging field of New Economic History (NEH) in the 1970s, [...] saw no contradiction at all between slavery and industrialization".[63] These critiques advance what Tâmis Parron labels the "compatibility thesis". But, by "[i]solating the economy from historical context and neutralizing it as a causal factor", Parron maintains that the New Economic History collapses the variety of information we ought to take into account.

The Conflatability Thesis Another attempt to understand capitalism and slavery has been much more sympathetic to Eric Williams. The New History of Capitalism

[57] Clegg 2020, p. 76.
[58] Grenier 2021, p. 907.
[59] Heuman and Burnard 2012, p. 8.
[60] Dockès 2012, p. 190.
[61] Linebaugh 2019, Section F: Haiti, Chapter 17, n.p.
[62] The misrepresentation or dismissal of Williams' arguments by some of his critics is discussed by Nick Draper in LSE Economic History Channel 2023 and in Colin Palmer's introduction to Williams 2021, pp. ix-xxvii.
[63] Parron 2023, p. 678.

has mostly focused on U.S. slavery, and starts from it being "plainly obvious that the history of American capitalism is a history with slavery".[64] This is certainly true.

However, the NHC has reinterpreted slavery and capitalism without precise definitional distinctions, "conflating them into a flat and unmediated identity".[65] Furthermore, Mary O'Sullivan, reviewing several works in the NHC, says that "the empirical underpinnings of the designation of slavery as capitalism are surprisingly weak".[66] As Parron notes, theoretical mistakes are often made too, as "local relations of power, institutions, markets, and capitalism are conflated in a single continuum, as if the *historical unity* provided by capital comprised a *historical uniformity*".[67] The New History of Capitalism's approach, when it fails to meaningfully distinguish between capitalism and slavery, is often unhelpful for analysis.

A Dialectical Relationship

How, then, should we understand the relationship between capitalism and slavery? What the above review has demonstrated is four approaches which are lacking in some respect. Adam Smith generalised a number of microeconomic observations in order to conclude that slavery lacked capitalist levels of profitability, naturalising slavery and defining it as distinct from and necessarily incompatible with capitalism. Neo-Smithian writers, including many Marxists, maintained this *a priori* incompatibility between slavery and capitalism in the face of historic evidence. The New Economic History school defined slavery and capitalism as distinct but compatible, though it understood them in a narrow sense which evacuated much history. The New History of Capitalism, by contrast, frequently conflates capitalism and slavery, without defining either precisely and with empirical weaknesses.

Instead, slavery and capitalism are neither entirely distinct — "a non-dialectical duality" — nor entirely conflatable — "a non-dialectical identity".[68] Understanding capitalism as a mode of exchange and a mode of production, where the domains "stand in dialectical unity", we can explain it at several levels.[69] It exhibits "developmental patterns" of for-profit production, rapid technical change and productivity growth, themselves generated by "sociological rules of reproduction": the worker-capitalist relation and competitive pressures. These are further enforced by "social property relations": the generalisation of capitalist markets to allocate capital, labour and commodities.[70] By understanding capitalism at several levels rather than defining it in opposition to slavery *a priori*, "unfree labor under global capitalism is not an anomaly but the result of capital dynamics".[71] This can be best understood by considering the "dialectical unity between capitalism and unfree labor".[72] We can study the ways in which slavery and capitalism coexisted (and coexist) in ways which are both intensely reciprocal and sometimes antagonistic.

[64] Rockman and Beckert 2016, pp. 3-4.
[65] Parron 2023, p. 687.
[66] O'Sullivan 2018, p. 774.
[67] Parron 2023, p. 687.
[68] ibid., p. 688.
[69] Rioux, LeBaron and Verovšek 2020, p. 726.
[70] Clegg 2020, p. 80.
[71] Rioux, LeBaron and Verovšek 2020, p. 726.
[72] ibid., p. 721.

Their reciprocity runs in both directions: from capitalism to slavery and from slavery to capitalism. In reality, both relationships exist, and it is a question of emphasis. Some authors frame the "slave plantations of the New World [...] as a by-product of European capitalism and colonialism".[73] Others locate the origins of industrial capitalism on sugar plantations: "the relationship between humans, plants, and capital had forged the core ideas of modern manufacturing—in cane fields. The plantation was the original factory."[74] Understood this way, slavery is contextualised: "slavery becomes part of the globally structured material-social relations of value forged through overlapping layers of the world geography of accumulation".[75] This allows us to understand what the other approaches often cannot explain: that, to this day, "the deepening and extension of capitalism seem to have reinforced unfree labor rather than diminished it".[76] It also enlightens the contradictory aspects of the relationship between slavery and capitalism: plantations provided "a 'germ' of capitalist development", but "the colonial-mercantilist forms proved politically vulnerable, even at the height of their economic growth", and industrial capitalism could be hostile to slavery too.[77]

Mary O'Sullivan, on the basis of a careful literature review, warns that "some of the most basic questions about the character and operation of slavery as capitalism remain wide open".[78] Much remains to be researched, and much caution is needed to do so well. We will heed this warning while following Sébastien Rioux, who writes that he chooses "the bloody dialectics of factual history over the analytical security of formal theory".[79] Chapters 2 to 6 engage in the economic, political and intellectual history of a particular case of how slavery, capitalism and race were constructed in relation to each other in Saint-Domingue and Paris, in an attempt to illuminate these dynamics through factual examples. With the degree of violence occurring in slave ships, on plantations, in the uprising and to a lesser degree in the Parisian riots, it is hard to think of bloodier dialectics than these.

[73] Blackburn 2011, Chapter 14: The Spiral Path, n.p.
[74] Patel and Moore 2020, p. 16
[75] Parron 2023, p. 702.
[76] Rioux, LeBaron and Verovšek 2020, p. 709.
[77] Clegg 2025, p. 114.
[78] O'Sullivan 2018, p. 773.
[79] Rioux 2022, p. 173.

Chapter 2

The Political Economy of Saint-Domingue

Today, the country of Haiti is one of the poorest in the world. Yet it wasn't always this way. Under French colonialism, it was the 'pearl of the Antilles', a highly profitable economy for the colonial power — at the expense of the exploited and enslaved masses who worked on the island.

Under Spanish and then French colonisation, the territory today known as Haiti would be renamed and reshaped, with successive labour regimes creating the path to slavery: three forms of unfree labour under Spanish rule, and another three labour regimes under the French. I provide an analysis of the reproduction of each labour regime to understand why successive attempts to harness the labour of Indigenous, settler and indentured white workers failed to achieve sustainability. I outline these regimes and their reproduction in section 2.2, but first I consider the model which would take root on the territory, so disastrously for some and so profitably for others.

Simultaneously with these unsuccessful and often brutal attempts to make the colonies profitable, modern slavery had been developing under European colonial powers since the second expansion of what Pierre Dockès calls "the sugar paradigm" in the XVth Century. From the earliest examples of the slave trade supplying European colonies (namely in the Portuguese colony of Madeira), slavery, sugar and colonialism were entangled. What I call the "sugar-slavery paradigm", already known to Columbus prior to his arrival in Ayiti, would gradually be implemented in Saint-Domingue, exemplifying "planter colonialism" in Nancy Shoemaker's typology of colonialism.[1] I describe it in section 2.1 to then address its imposition in section 2.2.

Slavery provided the atrocious solution of a reproducible and profitable labour supply which would ultimately make Saint-Domingue into the "pearl of the Antilles", the richest colony in the world. Section 2.3 makes clear both how economically significant the sugar-slavery paradigm was for France, and how violent it could be. Slave plantations, supplied by the slave trade and focused on colonial goods like sugar, were the fount of France's colonial wealth. Slavery played pivotal roles in supporting the economies of the world's greatest economic powers and it has structured the world as we know it today.

[1] Shoemaker 2015, p. 29.

As such, the construction of a colonial plantation economy required the elaboration of formal and informal institutions of a specific kind. As section 2.4 investigates, these institutions mobilised slave status and race to impose social hierarchies capable of stabilising Saint-Domingue in spite of widespread violence by a ruling class against an enslaved population which outnumbered them 9 to 1. Saint-Domingue is, therefore, one of the key places where and for which racism was produced, leaving a heavy legacy to this day.

2.1 The Sugar-Slavery Paradigm

2.1.1 Pierre Dockès' Sugar Paradigm

"Il était esclave en naissant,
Puni de mort pour un seul geste,
On vendait jusqu'à son enfant,
Le sucre était teint de son sang,
Ah ! daignez m'épargner le
reste"

"La liberté des Nègres", a 1794 French song celebrating the abolition of slavery.
Piis 1794, p. 32.

Slavery was especially useful for producing one commodity in particular: sugar.

Some origins of industrial capitalism are to be found on sugar plantations: "the relationship between humans, plants, and capital had forged the core ideas of modern manufacturing—in cane fields. The plantation was the original factory."[2] The birth of what Pierre Dockès has called the "sugar paradigm" has deep roots, which he locates as early as the ninth century. Dockès' approach to economic history identified a "succession of interlocking and conflictual 'productive paradigms' which emerge, are generalised, persist or enter a crisis only to be replaced by a new one".[3]

One such productive paradigm is the "sugar paradigm", which he explores in a 2002 book chapter. Braudel, in his second volume of *Civilisation matérielle, économie et capitalisme*, had already identified "les éléments de la vaste histoire sucrière :

> "les esclaves noirs, les planteurs, les techniques de production, le raffinement du sucre brut, le ravitaillement en vivres à bon marché des plantations, qui ne peuvent se nourrir elles-mêmes ; enfin les liaisons maritimes, les magasins et reventes d'Europe."[4]
>
> [Black slaves, planters, production techniques, raw sugar refining, supplying the plantation with cheap provisions, as they cannot feed themselves; finally, the maritime links, the warehouses and the sellers of Europe.]

[2] Patel and Moore 2020, p. 16

[3] Dockès 1990, p. 30.

[4] Braudel 2022a, Chapter 2, "L'économie face aux marchés", Section "Les marchés ont leur géographie", Subsection "Les marchés de matières premières".

Braudel left it to others to trace these elements. Dockès goes further in doing so, and identifies the remarkable regularity of a "socio-technical-economic sugar system" which was "reproduced, admittedly with local variants, but globally unchanged, spreading from Mesopotamia to America".[5] It has several characteristics:[6]

1. Developing in isolated places (usually islands);
2. With a tendency towards monocultures of sugar;
3. Undertaken on larger domains;
4. Eliminating native populations when they exist;
5. Employing black slaves who live on the plantation;
6. With overseers, often mixed-race;
7. With an industrial organisation, including mills and boilers;
8. The master's house (or that of a manager, in the case of absentee planters) being located apart and typically above the rest of the plantation;
9. Integrated into a commercial circuit (buying slaves and foodstuffs, selling sugar).

Remarkably, this system is already found as early as the ninth and tenth centuries, if not earlier. Historians have traced three varieties of sugarcane to three domestication sites (see Figure 2.1). The etymology of "sugar" in English, itself derived from "sucre" in French, indicates the geographical spread of the variety which interests here, *Saccharum barberi* (see Table 2.1). This variety was found in India as early as the fifth century B.C., where the Sanskrit term *sharkara* referred to ground or candied sugar.[7] Strabo reports that one of Alexander the Great's officers, Nearchus, travelled to India in the fourth century B.C. and marvelled at sugarcane: "reeds yield honey, although there are no bees".[8] From India, sugarcane moved to Persia (gaining a Persian name) then to other parts of the Muslim world. In the *Thousand and One Nights*, parts of which were composed in the ninth century, a poet al-Nazzam poses riddles to a wise female slave: "al-Nazzam asked, "We often chew on it after sunset during Ramadan." She answered, "It is sugarcane" (qasab al-sukkar)".[9] Another chapter of the *Thousand and One Nights* includes a story of "a black slave" who "lay, in a filthy and wet condition, upon a few stalks of sugar-cane".[10] These Middle Eastern folk tales thus indicate both the common consumption of sugar during the month of Ramadan and its slave-based production in Arabic countries at the turn of the millennium.

[5] Dockès 2012, p. 180.
[6] These points are a summary of ibid., pp. 183-184.
[7] Harper 2025.
[8] Strabo 1903, Chapter 1, n.p.
[9] Satō 2015, p. 122.
[10] *The Thousand and One Nights* 2010, Chapter II, p. 96.



Figure 2.1: The spread of sugar, 4000 BCE to 800 CE

Interpretation: Sugarcane can be traced back to three domestication sites. *Saccharum officinarum* was bred in New Guinea and proximate islands from around 4000 BCE. *Saccharum sinense* was domesticated in present-day China/Taiwan from around 3500 BCE. In 500-100 BCE, *Saccharum barberi* was cultivated in India. It spread Westwards from there. As the start of our story, we focus most on this variety.
Source: Detail of a map by Obsidian Soul 2019 reproduced under the Creative Commons CC0 1.0.

Language	Word	Period appeared
Sanskrit	शर्करा, *śarkarā*	10c. BCE
Persian	شکر, *shakar*	
Arabic	سکر, *sukkar*	
Medieval Latin	*zuccarum*	
Old French	*çucre*	12c.
Modern French	*sucre*	13c.
Middle English	*sugre*, *sucre*	late 13c.
Old Spanish	*açúcar*	

Table 2.1: Words for sugar and period in which they appeared

The sugar-slavery paradigm was based not just on sugar production by slaves but by a certain configuration, and this paradigm goes back perhaps to the ninth century. A mid-eighth century papyrus from Egypt mentions its cultivation.[11] Braudel notes that by "the tenth century, sugarcane is in Egypt and sugar is already manufactured there in an industrious way".[12] It provided a "productive recipe" for earning profits which could be followed by "capitalists": Katherine Browne labels it as the "sugar and slavery formula for building fortunes".[13] Those who applied it "reproduced it as-is, from island to island, over the (very long) duration of its history".[14] It was brought to Sicily and Valencia by Arab conquest, and "sugar was in the luggage of Christians" returning from Crusades in Syria in the thirteenth century.[15] As it developed in the Mediterranean, the sugar-slavery paradigm provided a "precociously capitalist" organisation and source of profits to those who used it.[16]

2.1.2 The Colonial Sugar-Slavery Paradigm

In the XVth Century began the "second history of the sugar paradigm" when Portugal, initially with the support of Genoese capitalists, applied it while embarking on colonial expeditions.[17] While Dockès emphasises the continuity over the ninth to nineteenth centuries, I want to insist that *something new* happens roughly halfway through the millennium he traces. The sugar-slavery paradigm becomes adopted by European powers as colonialism expanded across the globe. As a productive recipe for the colonists to apply where they settled, it is applied off the coast of Africa and then in the New World. What was new wasn't any one of the nine features enumerated above but the *intensification* of several of them, from industrial techniques to the commercial circuit to the racialisation of the enslaved. Indeed, Jean-Yves Grenier notes that "sugar cane transformation remained relatively stable from the sixteenth to the end of the eighteenth centuries", indicating a turning point in the paradigm which he perhaps places slightly late.[18] Colonialism provided a rebirth for the sugar-slavery paradigm in a new, colonial and eventually racial, form. Therefore, it is more accurate to periodise the paradigm into its Mediterranean form (ninth to fourteenth centuries) and colonial form (fifteenth to nineteenth centuries), each lasting about half a millennium.

This rebirth is where Raj Patel and Jason W. Moore begin their history of capitalism. They start in the 1460s in the Portuguese-occupied island of Madeira. This colony is where "Europe's wealthy ate the sugar, and sugar ate the island".[19] It

[11] Satō 2015, p. 1.

[12] Braudel 2022b, Chapter 3, "Le superflu et l'ordinaire : nourritures et boissons", Section "La table : luxe et consommations de masse", Subsection "Le sucre conquiert le monde".

[13] Dockès 2012, p. 184; Browne 2021, p. 20.

[14] Dockès 2012, p. 184.

[15] Braudel 2022b, Chapter 3, "Le superflu et l'ordinaire : nourritures et boissons", Section "La table : luxe et consommations de masse", Subsection "Le sucre conquiert le monde".

[16] Dockès 2012, p. 190.

[17] ibid., p. 197.

[18] Grenier 2021, p. 911. I believe that the example of Madeira indicates that he should place the turning point one century earlier, and that Dockès is right to extend the paradigm into the nineteenth century instead of the end of the eighteenth.

[19] Patel and Moore 2020, p. 17.

was the location of a sugar 'frontier', an example of a commodity frontier, meaning "a *zone beyond which further expansion is possible* [...] so long as there remains uncommodified land, and to a lesser extent labor, 'beyond' the frontier".[20] In other words, the sugar frontier of the 1460s was located in Madeira because the island offered room for expansion and intensification. The sugar paradigm pre-existed Portuguese colonialism and was a "capitalist modality",[21] as we have seen, but Madeira is where many industrial techniques of manufacturing were innovated. This capitalist innovation occurred not with labour performed by the free wage-worker stereotypical of capitalism: it was the slave who was the labourer. Sugar plantations, combining both proto-industrial production techniques and slave labour in the search of profit, present "the strange and enduring relationship between sugar and slavery"[22] that preceded even Madeira's forms, a relationship stretching a millennium, from the ninth to the nineteenth centuries. Madeira, however, applied and advanced the sugar-slavery paradigm: that's what made it a sugar frontier.

Ironically, the "Ilha de Madeira" (literally "island of wood") was stripped of its once-distinctive forests, deforested to make room for cane fields and for firewood burned in the furnaces which transformed cane stalks to sugar, its soils exhausted by a sugar cane monoculture. Sugar production exhausted Madeira, where the sugar frontier collapsed by the 1530s. The sugar frontier would move successively to other places (see Figure 2.2): after Madeira, São Tomé "experienced a sugar boom in the sixteenth century and in many ways served as a prototype for sugar production in the islands of the Caribbean".[23] Next as frontiers came Pernambuco, followed by Bahia, both in Brazil; then Barbados.[24] Finally, Barbados "crashed and was overtaken by Jamaica and Haiti in the 1720s–1750s ".[25] "As sugar islands moved further South, the centres of decision-making moved up to North Europe."[26]

The sugar paradigm explains why sugar "is tied to centuries of brutality, indigenous dispossession, environmental destruction, and racial hierarchy", something

[20]Moore 2000, p. 412. Moore is himself building on Wallerstein's concept of the commodity chain, "a network of labor and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity" (Hopkins and Wallerstein 1986, p. 159). Commodity frontiers, as "processes and sites of the incorporation of resources" (Beckert et al. 2021, p. 435), are a useful starting point for studying the places where raw resources are extracted and processed, before working forward along the commodity chain. They serve to recentre the sites at which production expands, rather than centring the finished product. Maxine Berg has offered a compelling critique of the use of "commodity frontiers", saying we should begin from a "[c]larity of concepts" (Berg 2021, p. 3). This involves distinguishing between "land, labour and capital" and between absolute surplus value and relative surplus value, distinctions which Berg considers to have been collapsed in much commodity frontier research.

[21]Dockès 2012, p. 190.

[22]Mintz 1986, p. 29.

[23]W. D. Phillips and C. R. Phillips 1992, p. 61.

[24]See, repsectively, da Silva and Eltis 2008 for Penambuco; Ribeiro 2008 for Bahia; Beckles 2016 for Barbados, especially Part I.

[25]Patel and Moore 2020, note 56, p. 215. This list of 'sugar frontiers' are *not* an exhaustive list of all the places the sugar-slavery paradigm was applied. See the orange dots in Figure 2.2 for other locations where it was developed. Moore and Patel don't offer an explanation for choosing these locations, but based on my own research they appear to be the places where plantations were most economically successful and where significant innovations took place.

[26]Dockès 2012, p. 201.



Figure 2.2: Sugar frontiers, fifteenth to eighteenth centuries

Interpretation: Red circles indicate sugar frontiers, with names and the approximate dates at which they gained prominence (not the dates they were first developed but the time they achieved 'frontier' status). The red lines show how the frontier moved: Madeira was the sugar frontier until it was overtaken by São Tomé, and so on. Jamaica and Saint-Domingue became the sugar frontiers from the 1720s. Orange circles mark other places where sugar plantations were developed to a lesser extent than in the frontiers.
Source: Own work, using a public domain map (*Robinson Map* 2021), building on the works of Patel and Moore 2020.

which has perplex some writers.[27] All these aspects occurred together, and indeed were coherent. For example, the use of islands or other geographically cut-off spaces provided many advantages for isolating and controlling slaves in a configuration which inspired concentration camps,[28] as well as serving as a neat unit for monocrop organisation. The paradigm "depended on colonists' ability to maintain rigidly stratified societies", explaining why they resorted to forms of exclusion which became race-based.[29] The differentiation of white masters from mixed-race overseers and Black slaves stabilised an economic stratification. The placement of the planter's house on a hill overlooking the plantation favoured their domination and surveillance over their captives. It also provided climactic advantages: the slaveholder on a hill benefited from the cooling effects of the wind in a tropical climate, while the enslaved laboured without this benefit.[30]

This coherence and reproduction over time ended up naturalising the slave-sugar paradigm, to the point where it seemed impossible to have sugar without slaves. What was a constant conjunction of elements (a plantation, sugar, Black slaves...) was erroneously interpreted as a necessary relationship.[31]

As Fernand Braudel put it, "the extension of sugarcane and sugar trade to Brazil and in the Antilles" constituted the "first colonial greatnesses of America".[32] The sugar-slavery paradigm, taken up and developed by colonial powers, fuelled their expansion and domination.

This paradigm was imported into Española by Christopher Columbus, who brought sugar cane to the island just a year after first landing there, in a history to which we now turn.[33]

---

[27] Anker 2022, p. 37.

[28] Dockès 2012, pp. 189-190.

[29] Browne 2021, p. 20.

[30] Argument from La Série Doc, ep 1, maybe Frédéric Régent.

[31] David Hume, in his philosophical approach to causation, used "constant conjunction" to describe the invariable appearance of two events together. As he pointed out, one need not necessarily cause the other to explain their association. I use the term ironically here.

Incidentally, Hume also opposed slavery "not because he believed in the equality of blacks, but because, like Adam Smith, he considered the whole business too expensive" (Trouillot 2015, p. 79/80).

[32] Braudel 2022a, Chapter 2, "L'économie face aux marchés", Section "Marchands et circuits marchands", Subsection "Les Arméniens et les Juifs": he writes of the "premières grandeurs coloniales de l'Amérique, notamment en ce qui concerne l'extension de la canne et le commerce du sucre au Brésil et dans les Antilles".

[33] For considerations about the Mediterranean origins of New World sugar cultivation see Sauer 1992, p. 211; and the response in Daniels 2010, pp. 194-195.

Figure 2.3: The Spanish Monarchy directing Columbus

Interpretation: King Ferdinand II points across the Atlantic to where Columbus is landing on a Caribbean island.
Source: Frontispiece from Vespucci 1504.

2.2 The History of Saint-Domingue

2.2.1 Spanish Rule

"¡Es una maravilla!"
["It's a marvel!"]

Christopher Columbus, seeing Ayiti for the first time.
Quoted in Bellegarde 2004, p. 16.

"Viene el diablo blanco."
[The white devil is coming.]

"Duerme Negrito", a traditional Afro-Caribbean lullaby.
Quoted in Saunier 2023, §10.

Figure 2.4: Ayiti's five chiefdoms, 1492

Source: Reproduced from *Cacicazgo de Quisqueya* 2007 under the Creative Commons CC0 1.0.

First colonisation

In 1492, veteran slave trader Christopher Columbus, travelling with about ninety sailors in three ships, 'discovered' three islands. The first two were the Bahamas on 12 October and Cuba on 28 October, where the sailors "noted with some excitement that gold body ornaments were worn by the indians [sic]".[34] The third island where he landed was inhabited by a Taíno population whose way of life was 7,500 years old.[35] They called it "Ayiti", meaning "mountainous land" or "high land".[36] Today, it is the island divided between Haiti and Saint-Domingue, but at the time it was divided into five *cacicazgos*, or 'chiefdoms', in 1492, of which two overlapped with present-day Haiti (see Figure 2.4).

This name didn't matter to Columbus, who decided to designate it as "La Isla Española", honouring the Spanish monarchy which had funded his colonial voyage.[37] Neither did any of the existing Indigenous society matter to Columbus. It was to be "the ground zero of European colonialism in the Americas".[38] Upon arriving in 1492 he planted a cross, had a fort built called "Navidad" in honour of the Christmas season, and left 39 Spaniards there to hold the fort.

Columbus returned a year later, with 17 ships carrying about 1,500 settlers (all male) brought by "the lure of gold".[39] They landed at Navidad on 28 November 1493, to find that none of the 39 Spanish settlers were left: all had died, perhaps of syphilis or infighting, perhaps as a result of Taínos "getting rid of the pests".[40] Over the course of the next few years, using his military might and attack dogs, Columbus would conquer the island and subjugate the population. He conducted "slave-raiding

[34] Watts 1990, p. 87.
[35] Casimir 2020, p. 4.
[36] Bellegarde 2004, p. 16.
[37] I refer to it as 'Española' here, as is typically done since Las Casas. Many English sources prefer 'Hispaniola', following Peter Martyr Vermigli's spelling.
[38] Dubois 2004, p. 12.
[39] Watts 1990, p. 90.
[40] The syphilis and infighting hypotheses come from ibid., p. 91; the notion that Taínos killed the Spaniards in retaliation is from Guitar 2002, p. 2.

parties to capture the 'peaceable natives' ", reducing many Indigenous people to slavery and servitude either on the island or elsewhere, with many being shipped out.[41] Columbus himself "returned to Spain with four hundred Arawak slaves" in his ship.[42] Many would die of the conquerors' violence, the disease they brought, or of suicide.

Columbus had visited Madeira in 1478 to buy sugar there.[43] Now, returning to newly baptised Española in 1493, he introduced sugarcane brought from the Canary Islands. In Spanish and then French hands, the sugar plantation was to eventually become the source of the island's wealth and make it the Pearl of the Antilles.

Labour regimes of Española

Systems of domination of the Indigenous population evolved over time. For half a century, until "Native slavery was declared illegal in 1542", the Indigenous population was enslaved and put to work — at least, when they survived contact with the colonists.[44] Despite Native Americans being declared subjects to the Crown in 1501, an often murderous degree of violence was inflicted upon the population. Various attempts to regulate work followed, with the state attempting to save colonists from themselves: enslavement and violence were unsustainable with a rapidly declining Indigenous population.

In addition to outright slavery, three systems of coerced labour occurred in Española past the 1542 decree. First was the *encomíenda* system with its feudal logic. Spanish settlers, known as *encomenderos*, were given oversight and control of up to 300 dominated and taxable Indigenous persons on a parcel of communaly-owned land. It was abolished and replaced by the *repartimiento* system in 1550. This second system made Indigenous people "into forced laborers who had to work for their masters without pay for specific periods of time".[45] Though *repartimiento* labourers were meant to have "decent working conditions" and a "predetermined wage", abuse was rife and it was scaled back to work in mines alone.[46] Third came the *hacienda* system, from the 1550s, which "foreshadowed the plantation system", with workers being "forcibly moved onto land enclaves and incarcerated".[47]

This offers an obvious precedent to the slavery of later years, with Bellegarde saying that "slavery was thus created in Española by the domination of the indigenous population".[48] Dubois rightly nuances the claim as it "was not technically slavery—

[41] Watts 1990, p. 92.

[42] Dunbar-Ortiz 2014, Chapter Two: "Culture of Conquest".

[43] Davidson 1997, p. 34.

[44] W. D. Phillips 2011, p. 332.

[45] ibid., p. 332; Manjapra 2020, Chapter 1, "Expanding Commodity Networks", n.p. Several of the books I cite, including Manjapra's, I accessed in ebook formats which do not include page numbers. As much as possible, I have attempted to find physical copies to provide page numbers, but when this has not been available I indicate 'n.p.' (no pagination) and provide at least the chapter number or title.

[46] W. D. Phillips 2011, p. 332, pp. 332-333.

[47] Manjapra 2020, Chapter 1, "Expanding Commodity Networks", n.p.

[48] "Les Aborigènes furent réduits en servitude et distribués par lots aux insurgés. [...] L'esclavage fut ainsi créé à Hispaniola par l'asservissement de la population indigène.", Bellegarde 2004, p. 23.

workers were not owned by the settlers—but in practice it was little different."[49] This difference is important to historians, at least because "Slaves were personal property, not subject to *repartimiento*" and so not included in the allotment records.[50] It is thus "only in a rhetorical sense that the term "slavery" can to be applied to the social and legal relationships of the *encomienda*", as to the other two systems.[51]

The elimination of the natives

Spanish domination was deadly for the Indigenous population, who were dying rapidly. In 1492, there were 500,000 to 750,000 Taino inhabitants of Ayiti; by 1514, only 29,000 were left.[52] In other words, it took just a generation for 94-96% of the Indigenous population to disappear. This is in line with other places where Columbus landed: demographers report "post-Columbian depopulation rates of between 90 and 98 percent" with great regularity.[53] When Sauer claims that "It was not wanton brutality, however, that decimated the natives but a wrong and stupid system", he is half right: it was *also* wanton brutality which killed many Indigenous people.[54] On top of Columbus' initial wars and slave-raids, widespread acts of settler violence took place. In addition, they brought disease, further decimating many Taíno people. That said, Sauer is also right that the system in place was such that direct violence wasn't the only factor producing the elimination of the native: through the widespread overwork, famine and assault on Indigenous life-forms, it produced deaths of exhaustion, malnutrition and despair. They were "annihilated by the voracity of genocide".[55]

Alonso de Zuazo, governor of Santo Domingo, "foresaw correctly the end of the natives by the end of the second decade of the [sixteenth] century".[56] As Laurent Dubois confirms, the Indigenous population had "all but vanished" by the mid-sixteenth century.[57] The planter Viennot, count of Vaublanc, looked to find any descendents of the Indigenous population in the late eighteenth century and concludes that "my research convinced me that not a single one exists".[58] The only eighteenth-century Indigenous people who did claim descent from the original Taíno population of Ayiti were to be found in neighbouring Spanish Santo Domingo, not Saint-Domingue.[59] Incredibly, this did not prevent a degree of cultural transmission, including the Indigenous name which would be resurrected by Haitian Revolutionaries renaming Saint-Domingue as Haiti when they gained independence.[60]

Dominican friars arriving in Española were horrified by what they saw. On the

[49] Dubois 2004, p. 14.
[50] Sauer 1992, p. 200.
[51] Whitehead 2011, p. 268.
[52] Dubois 2004, p. 14.
[53] Stannard 1993, p. x.
[54] Sauer 1992, p. 203.
[55] Henriques and Sala-Molins 2002a, p. 15.
[56] Sauer 1992, p. 204.
[57] Dubois 2004, p. 14.
[58] "Pendant que j'étais dans la colonie, j'ai cherché s'il y avait encore quelques descendants des indgènes ; mes recherches m'ont convaincu qu'il n'en existait pas un seul": Vaublanc 1838, p. 196.
[59] Geggus 2002a, p. 212.
[60] See the research on the naming of Haiti in Geggus 1997.

last Sunday of Advent in 1511, Fray Antonio de Montesino delivered a sermon in which he castigated the Spanish settlers for "living in mortal sin because of their treatment of the Indians, who should become their Christian brothers".[61] Young settler Bartholomé de las Casas arrived in 1515 and was horrified, too. He is still widely remembered for his description of the atrocities, listing to the cruelties of the "Christians", the Spanish colonisers:

> "Débese de notar otra regla en esto: que en todas las partes de las Indias donde han ido y pasado cristianos siempre hicieron en los indios todas las crueldades susodichas y matanzas y tiranías y opresiones abominables en aquellas inocentes gentes, y añidían muchas más y mayores y más nuevas maneras de tormentos, y más crueles siempre fueron"[62]
>
> ["I should hereupon note another rule: that in all parts of the Indies where Christians have gone and passed through, they always subjected the Indians to all the aforementioned cruelties, and slaughtered, tyrannised, and inflicting abominable oppressions on those innocent people, and they added many more and greater and newer ways of torments, and they were always more cruel"]

> "nuestros españoles, por sus crueldades y nefandas obras, han despoblado y asolado, y que están hoy desiertas, [...] más de diez reinos mayores que toda España [...] Daremos por cuenta muy cierta y verdadera que son muertas en los dichos cuarenta años por las dichas tiranías y infernales obras de los cristianos injusta y tiránicamente más de doce cuentos de ánimas, hombres y mujeres y niños, y en verdad que creo, sin pensar engañarme, que son más de quince cuentos."[63]
>
> ["our fellow Spaniards, through their cruelty and nefarious deeds, have depopulated and desolated, leaving deserted, an area equivalent to ten kingdoms, bigger than all of Spain [...] We will give a very true and accurate count that, in the aforementioned forty years, by the said tyrannies and infernal acts of the Christians, more than twelve million souls, men and women and children, have been killed unjustly and tyrannically, and in truth I believe, without thinking to deceive myself, that they are more than fifteen million."][64]

There are many overwhelming atrocities exhibited in las Casas' *Brevísima relación de la destrucción de las Indias* [Brief Account of the Destruction of the Indies], but he would add:

> "antas son las perdiciones, daños, destruiciones, despoblaciones, estragos, muertes y muy grandes crueldades horribles y especies feísimas dellas, violencias, injusticias y robos y matanzas que en aquellas gentes y tierras se han hecho (y aún se hacen hoy en todas aquellas partes de las Indias) que

[61] Sauer 1992, p. 197.
[62] Casas 2011, pp. 34-35.
[63] ibid., p. 16.
[64] My translation. I verified that "cuentos", literally translated as "counts", indeed meant million using the Penguin Classics edition Casas 2004, p. 12.

> en todas cuantas cosas he dicho y cuanto lo he encarecido, no he dicho ni encarecido en calidad ni en cantidad de diez mil partes (de lo que se ha hecho y se hace hoy) una."[65]
>
> [So great are the perditions, damages, destructions, depopulations, ravages, deaths and massive, ugly forms of awful cruelties, violence, injustices and robberies and slaughters that have been done (and are still done today in all those parts of the Indies) to those peoples and lands, that in all that I have told, I have not even reported one-ten-thousandth of what has been done and is done today, either qualitatively or quantitatively.]

The origins of Black slavery in Española

However, it was also Bartholémé de Las Casas, simplistically remembered as a great humanitarian, who proposed a racist "solution" allowing both colonisation and slavery to continue: to substitute African slaves for Taíno ones.

> "Cette cruelle situation émut l'âme sensible du Père Bartolomé de Las Casas. Pour essayer de sauver ces malheureux indigènes d'une extermination complète, il ne trouva rien de mieux que de demander à la Cour d'Espagne d'autoriser l'envoi à Hispaniola, en 1517, de quatre mille nègres d'Afrique. Le bon moine pensait que ces nègres, plus vigoureux et plus endurcis, supporteraient mieux le climat ardent des Indes Occidentales."[66]
>
> [This cruel situation moved Father Bartolomé de Las Casas's sensitive soul. To try and save these unfortunate natives from complete extermination, he found nothing better than to ask the Spanish Court to authorise the dispatch of four thousand African negroes to Española in 1517. The good monk thought that these negroes, more vigorous and hardened, would be better able to withstand the scorching climate of the West Indies.]

Las Casas may have become a more universal anti-slavery and anti-colonial thinker later and he came to regret his position, realising that the enslavement "of Blacks was just as unjust as that of Indians".[67] However, by a curious difference in his views of these two different racialised groups, his condemnation of Indigenous slavery played into the enslavement of Africans.[68]

In reality, Las Casas was encouraging an already-existing trade of Africans to Española. In 1444, a Portuguese expedition to Africa had given rise to the first case of Europeans shipping African captives back to Europe to be sold as slaves. The Iberian powers pioneered the African slave trade, and "[b]y 1500, about a tenth of the population of Lisbon and Seville was African slaves".[69] Early African arrivals were

[65] Casas 2011, p. 145.
[66] Bellegarde 2004, p. 25.
[67] Quoted in Lepape 2003, n.p.
[68] Las Casas was also widely smeared by defenders of slavery and others with interests in rejecting him, for example in France in the late eighteenth century (see Gauthier 2007, Introduction and Part II, Chapter 4). However, the existence of slander against him, designed to disqualify his attacks on the brutality of colonialism, does not negate his own admissions to making these mistakes.
[69] Blackburn 1997, p. 81.

known as *ladinos*, and were assimilated Spanish-speaking Catholics who had been living along the Iberian Coast.[70] For a number of reasons, they were considered less practical slaves than *bozales*, the Spanish term for African-born captives trafficked directly from the continent. By 1509, the number of Africans in Española "had overtaken the Spanish and Taíno population".[71] They were brought initially to work on gold mines. "The fateful choice – that Africans were to be preferred to Indians as laborers – assured the development of the transatlantic slave trade."[72] Therefore, as Las Casas made his plea, "[t]he mass importation of Negroes was already underway in 1518, when the island economy was shifted from gold to agriculture".[73]

As Trouillot puts it, Las Casas struggled with the contradiction between the humanity of Indigenous people and the violence of their subjugation under colonialism, and "himself offered a poor and ambiguous compromise that he was to regret later: freedom for the savages (the Indians), slavery for the barbarians (the Africans). Colonization won the day."[74] So as the Baron de Vastey, the chancellor of Haiti, would write,

> "here lies the fateful origin of *the slave trade*! It was to substitute them for the poor Indians [sic], to condemn slaves as they had condemned them to labour, to torment, to contempt and to death, that the Europeans undertook this vile trafficking; one crime always leads to another"[75]

"Enslaved Africans rebelled against their new circumstances from the moment of their arrival", as we will shortly see.[76] Furthermore, and despite Las Casas' efforts, the Indigenous population continued to decrease, and the Taíno Arawaks were annihilated.[77] The Spanish had thus transformed Ayiti, an independent Indigenous territory, into Española, a slave-based island which substituted African for Indigenous enslaved labour. The ground was prepared.

Spanish abandonment

It was gold that had attracted settlers from Spain to Española, but their success had been limited. Sauer's history labels the period 1509-1519 as the "island crisis"

[70] W. D. Phillips 2011, p. 333.
[71] C. Eddins 2022, p. 69.
[72] W. D. Phillips 2011, p. 332.
[73] Sauer 1992, p. 207.
[74] Trouillot 2015, p. 75.
[75] Vastey 1814, p. 13, his italics.
[76] C. Eddins 2022, p. 719.
[77] Dupuy 2019, p. 11.
While most literature agrees upon the vanishing of the Indigenous people due to the violence of the Spanish regime, certain scholars have disputed this. Lynne Guitar presents an argument against what she terms "the myth of Taíno extinction" on the island: see Guitar 2002. The evidence is mixed, with some (based on historical study) being more convincing than others (photos of people alive in the Dominican Republic today who she considers to 'look' like Taínos). Even allowing for her evidence to be correct, the existence of people with Taíno ancestry in Haiti or the Dominican Republic today is not problematic for a claim that the natives were eliminated. Whether or not every Indigenous person died out, what is historically verified is that Taínos were eliminated *as a community* in the West of Española. Their social and political existence was destroyed, even if some individuals survived and had children.

because "it became more and more difficult to produce the gold".[78] This was due to some combination of supplies being exhausted and the labour force dying off.

The Spanish colonisers "attempt[ed] to create a sugar-based economy" but, as Crystal Eddins writes, they were thwarted by the resistance of Black and Indigenous maroons.[79] Christmas Day of 1521 was marked by "the first black-led uprising against enslavement in the Americas", when twenty enslaved Africans from Diego Columbus' sugar plantation recruited 400 Black and Indigenous people to attack planters and their mills.[80] Maroons, who ran away from plantations to live autonomous lives and sometimes encourage others to do the same, numbered seven thousand by the 1540s and were the bane of the governor's rule. They targeted the sugar-slavery farms, and "by 1548 maroons had destroyed two-thirds of the island's sugar plantations".[81] Because of the scale of resistance, Eddins encourages us to think of it as "the first of several '*Ayitian* Revolutions' ".[82]

The discovery of gold in other parts of South America being colonised by the Spanish created a rush for colonists and labourers alike, who were already struggling against French "interlopers" and "the constant threat of African rebellion".[83] Española emptied and by 1574 only 500 households remained, a fraction of the 12-14,000 Spaniards which there had been in 1508.[84]

In 1605, Spain formally decided to abandon the Western coast of Española. It evacuated its colonists, "burning its own towns", to retreat from Dutch interference.[85] For a few decades, the territory which would become Saint-Domingue and then Haiti was inhabited only by a few "Brethren of the Coast", to whom we now turn.[86]

2.2.2 French colonial domination

France takes the colony

While Spain was focused on gold, causing it to abandon the West of Española, a "second wave of Europeans thus found their own source of "gold" in the cultivation of sugarcane".[87] In the mid-seventeenth century, "Holland, England, and France began their struggles to challenge Spanish hegemony and gain control over the Caribbean islands".[88] The first Caribbean outpost of the French Empire was Saint Christopher, a small island today know as Saint Kitts, taken from the English in 1625.[89] That same year, French buccaneers began arriving on the Île de la Tortue, or 'Turtle Island', just off the coast of mainland Española.[90] These settlements of "interlopers"

[78] Sauer 1992, p. 197.
[79] C. Eddins 2022, p. 228.
[80] ibid., p. 72.
[81] ibid., p. 74.
[82] ibid., p. 71.
[83] Dubois 2004, p. 17; C. Eddins 2022, p. 229.
[84] Dupuy 2019, p. 19.
[85] Garrigus 2006, p. 23.
[86] Kemp and Lloyd 1961.
[87] Browne 2021, p. 20.
[88] Dupuy 2019, p. 11.
[89] Dubois and Garrigus 2017, p. 3.
[90] I explain who these buccaneers were below, in my discussion of the labour regimes.

survived several attempts by Spain to dislodge them.[91] They were recognised by Louis XIV in France's name just a few decades later, in 1659.[92]

In 1664, French emperor "Louis XIV chartered a new enterprise, the *Compagnie des Indes*, to take sole authority over the French trade in enslaved African people to Ayiti and to develop sugar and tobacco plantations on the western portion of the island" of Haiti.[93] Several French encroachments on 'Spanish' territory in Española occurred, causing military conflicts in 1681, 1690 and 1695.[94] The French succeeded in effecting a "second sugar revolution in the 1680s" on the island where earlier Spanish attempts had failed in the face of slave uprisings—a "counter-revolution", therefore, against Black resistance.[95] While not yet recognised by Spain, France was already strongly establishing itself and by 1680, there were four thousand Europeans settled in the French areas.[96]

"In late 1694, [...] France purchased ownership of the western portion of indigenous Ayiti", notes Kris Manjapra — adding that this was "as if the land were Spain's to sell".[97] Finally, the 1697 Treaty of Ryswick made official the transfer of the colony to the French. Spain would retain the East side of the island, today known as the Dominican Republic, while ceding what became Haiti to the French.[98] In the language at the time, the French typically referred to the island as a whole as Saint-Domingue, often distinguishing between the French and Spanish parts. They "began transforming it in short order into one of the most intensive plantation economies on earth."[99] It was in the French colonisation that would reach "the heights of the plantation world, or a new world of African slavery, which had already been, albeit only feebly, inaugurated by Spanish dis-settlers two centuries before".[100] In order to explain how the French reached such terrible heights, we must first consider the overall economic system of the French empire and the attempts to establish other labour regimes in Saint-Domingue's plantation economy before France resorted fully to slavery. This history will make the immoral economic rationality of the sugar-slavery paradigm entirely apparent.

Colonial Mercantilism and the Financing of Saint-Domingue

The French development of the sugar-slavery paradigm in Saint-Domingue occurred within a particular economic framework, defined by colonialism and mercantilism. As Kris Manjapra has put it, mercantilism is "the marriage between advancing commodification, on the one hand, and expanding state centralization, on the other."[101] As during the period of Spanish mercantilism, which sought to commodify through the actions of a centralised state, the *Ancien Régime* government was an

[91] Dubois 2004, p. 17.
[92] Obregón 2018, p. 601.
[93] Manjapra 2022, p. 46.
[94] Dupuy 2019, p. 11.
[95] C. Eddins 2022, p. 229.
[96] Dubois 2004, p. 17.
[97] Manjapra 2022, p. 46.
[98] D. E. Dubuisson 2024, p. 26.
[99] Manjapra 2022, p. 46.
[100] Daut 2023, Chapter 2: "Slavery", n.p.
[101] Manjapra 2020, Chapter 1, section "Expanding Commodity Networks", n.p.

active participant in shaping the economic structures which shaped the activity of the planters and merchants of Saint-Domingue and its commercial connections.

The French *Compagnie des Indes Occidentales*, or West India Company, was created in 1664 by a charter which gave it "various military, political, and commercial rights".[102] This "voluntaristic policy" was hardened from 1670 when foreign ships were forbidden from Saint-Domingue's docks.[103] It was the work of Colbert, who also "decided to generalise the sugar paradigm to the French Antilles".[104] The policy served to capture the benefits of the colonies for France, and to prevent the profiting of the Dutch merchants who "had been the main commercial conduit between the French Caribbean and European markets" in the seventeenth century, and of English smugglers.[105]

Wealthy investors, known as "subscribers", generously financed the *Compagnie*. They invested to the 1,604,360 *livres* in 1665, and by 1672 investments of nearly 8 million *livres* in subscriptions had been poured into the organisation.[106] Though this may sound like a private venture, the nature of the investors reveals otherwise: the King was always the company's largest investor, and "[a]lmost all of the remainder was furnished by revenue-farmers, tax-collectors and officials, acting in the great majority of cases under the orders of Colbert. Only very insignificant sums were furnished by merchants or others".[107] Therefore, this was not a private enterprise in any sense which would imply its autonomy from the royal government: it was and remained "a commercial enterprise created by the government, supported by it and directed by the king's greatest minister", "maintained and controlled by the state to perform a national service and to make possible the success of a national policy".[108]

Bernard Gainot writes that "mercantilism is inseperable from a policy of national preference which, in the colonial domain, is called the *exclusif*".[109] CLR James quipped that the *exclusif* was a "more honest name" than that of the mercantile system in England, built as it was on the premise that "the colonies existed to increase the wealth of the mother country".[110] An Encyclopédie article by Forbonnais bluntly said as much: "These colonies [are] established only for the utility of the *métropole*".[111] This "colonial system" placed several demands Saint-Domingue (and all other French colonies) which we can summarise in four points:[112]

1. All manufactured and agricultural goods were to be bought from the metropole — usually at an expensive price;

2. All products were to be sold to French merchants only, and these merchants could buy from French colonies only — usually at a cheap price;

[102]Dupuy 2019, p. 12.
[103]Stein 2023, p. 7.
[104]Dockès 2012, p. 204.
[105]Garrigus 2006, p. 31.
[106]Dupuy 2019, p. 12.
[107]Mims 1912, pp. 81-82.
[108]ibid., p. 82.
[109]Gainot 2015, Chap 1, Section "Les initiatives", Subsection "Les impulsions gouvernementales".
[110]C. L. R. James 1989, p. 46; Stein 2023, p. 6.
[111]Enc, 3, pp. 651: "Ces colonies n'étant établies que pour l'utilité de la métropole".
[112]Dupuy 2019, pp. 12-13.

3. All trade and transport had to happen on French ships;
4. The balance of trade had to favour the metropole.

In 1674 the company was dissolved, but "French monopoly over the Antilles trade was retained".[113] From 1698 to 1728, a new Saint-Domingue Company was given monopoly control over the southern peninsula by the French. Required to clear the area, populate it, and begin agricultural production, it was unpopular with colonists for its abuse of its trade monopoly. By charging inflated prices for metropolitan goods and not always buying the entire output of plantations (which could not legally be sold to anyone else), they provoked a series of uprisings from 1720 to 1722. Their properties were burned and their governor was arrested, requiring French military intervention to halt the worst of the revolts. In 1728, still unpopular and facing popular unrest, their charter was rescinded.[114]

The economic result of the *exclusif* was a distribution of profits which favoured the metropolitan traders: "as much as a half of the value of colonial produce accrued as mercantile profits to metropolitan interests".[115] No wonder that it was hated by the colonists! They would frequently organise against it, . Colonial criticism of the *exclusif* only stopped when some sought to make common cause with merchants in order to protect slavery from metropolitan interference, as the Club Massiac would.[116]

Meanwhile, following a 1684 ban on new refineries in the Antilles supposed to resolve overproduction, Saint-Domingue had been experiencing an "off and on" crisis; this was resolved in 1717, with a new "administrative reorganisation".[117] As Robert Louis Stein writes:

> "The Letters Patent of April, 1717, returned the colonial system to an orderly state that lasted until the Revolution. They also served as the charter for the eighteenth-century French sugar business, and together with the Letters Patent of October, 1727, they provided the clearest statement of the government's conception of a national sugar business."[118]

This Letters Patent, reiterating the principles of the exclusif, extended and stabilised them for the seven decades to come. Foreigners were prohibited from trading in the French colonies, linking the islands to the metropole even more strongly.

1717 was also the year in which the Compagnie d'Occident was founded to sell shares in the colonisation of Louisiana and Mississippi. John Law was its founder, notorious for the "système de Law" by which he would engineer what is usually referred to as the "Mississippi bubble": the rapid rise and fall of Compagnie d'Occident share prices.[119] The fallout from this episode, which caused "a more severe deflation than the United States experienced during the Great Depression", meant

[113] Stein 2023, p. 7.
[114] Dupuy 2019, p. 14.
[115] Blackburn 1996, p. 163.
[116] ibid., p. 175.
[117] Stein 2023, p. 9.
[118] ibid., p. 98.
[119] Velde 2009, p. 109, p. 99. See also Neal 1993, chapter 4.

that "French financial institutions and markets", reverting to "remained stagnant and inefficient for over a century".[120] It would also inspire "the South Sea Company, a slave-trade firm that had helped the government refinance its debt in the past, [to] presen[t] a potential solution to Parliament", resulting in a second bubble in the same year of 1720.[121] This was the "invention of the bubble", with finance tied to slave and colonial expeditions.

This system of state-supported slavery would last: "the duty rates set in 1717 remained in effect until the French Revolution".[122] Likewise, it was only on 27 July 1793 that the "subsidies awarded until the present day for the slave trade are abolished", as one of that day's decrees declared.[123] Thanks to this state support of both the trade and plantations, "French West Indian sugar dominated the European market during times of peace in the eighteenth century".[124]

With the end of the monopoly companies, the French government decided to intervene politically in Saint-Domingue, installing a colonial governor and intendant. [here: Casimir on the colonial govt]

Labour regimes of Saint-Domingue and their reproduction

How would France acquire the labourers necessary to make Saint-Domingue into a plantation economy? As noted above, the Indigenous population had been annihilated during the years of Spanish colonisation of the island. The new owners of the colony would thus rely on bringing workers, first free and later enslaved, from increasingly remote locations. Three labour regimes followed: buccaneer labour, indentured labour, and finally the slavery which would characterise Saint-Domingue's plantation economy at the time of the French Revolution.

Settlers The first settlers as Spain abandoned the West of Española were "a motley crew of pirates and settlers".[125] These can be broken down into three groups, beginning with *boucaniers* (buccaneers): adventurers, castaways, and fleeing mariners or indentured servants, so named because they hunted wild cattle and sold their smoked meat, or *boucan*.[126] Often living on the nearby Île de la Tortue before they came to Saint-Domingue, they increasingly settled there.

In addition to buccanneers, two other groups settled there: *flibustiers* ("free-booters", local pirates) and *habitants* ("planters", small-scale farmers). Together they made up the "Brothers of the Coast", and by 1650 there were at least 500 of them along the north-west coast of Santo Domingo.[127] Voltaire, describing them

[120] Quinn and Turner 2020, p. 35, p. 38.
[121] ibid., p. 23.
[122] Stein 2023, p. 69.
[123] 'Décret N.° 1287 de La Convention Nationale, Qui Supprime Les Primes Pour La Traite Des Esclaves.' 1793, p. 47.
[124] Stein 2023, p. 99.
[125] Dubois 2004, p. 17.
[126] Dubois and Garrigus 2017, p. 4.
[127] Garrigus 2006, pp. 23-24. The degree to which the three groups can be distinguished is arguable — though it is common to do so in histories of Saint-Domingue, works focused on the "Brethren of the Coast" like that of Kemp & Lloyd report on descriptors of these groups as they would on interchangeable terms for the same group (see Kemp and Lloyd 1961, pp. 2-3).

as a "troop of thieves: but what else have any conqueror ever been?", would say that "France owes to them its half of the island [...]: it is by their weapons that we established ourselves there".[128]

Recognising their usefulness, the French navy encouraged them to become settlers in Saint-Domingue, serve as a militia, and develop plantations. Mostly male, they were given an attractive and sinister proposal which the colonial authorities hoped would lead to a permanent and reproducing settler class: advances in cash, guaranteed profit shares, duty exemptions, and women shipped in to be their brides.

The communities of settlers included few women, which was problematic for the reproduction of a settler force. The French 'solution' to this, which we do not have time to sufficiently address here, was a provision in women which, read against the grain, suggests massive gendered violence. De Wimpffen, discussing who the women sent there were, provides a remarkably vulgar assessment of them:

> "Le choix des femmes était moins difficile a faire. La France ne manquait point alors de filles pauvres, laborieuses, modestes, dont la douceur et l'ingénuité même eussent poli, eussent épuré des mœurs plus dépravées que corrompues. Que fît-on? On leur envoya des catins de la Salpétrière [a hospital where sex workers were interned], des salopes ramassées dans la boue, des gaupes effrontées dont il est étonnant que les mœurs, aussi dissolues que le langage, ne se soient pas plus perpétuées qu'elles n'ont fait chez leur postérité, ce qui a fait dire à un voyageur, aussi sévère que véridique, qu'excepté quelques familles de marchands qui se sont établis dans les colonies et y ont mené leurs femmes et un domestique sage et réglé, on ne fait pas tort à tout le reste des îles, en les comparant à Rome, dont les premiers fondateurs n'étaient qu'un ramas confus de brigands et de putains conduits par deux bâtards."[129]
>
> [The choice of women was less difficult to make. France had no shortage of poor, hard-working, modest girls, whose gentleness and ingenuity would have polished and purified morals that were more depraved than corrupt. What was done? They sent them harlots from the Salpétrière, sluts picked up in the mud, shameless gaupes whose morals [were] as dissolute as their language [...] with the exception of a few merchant families who settled in the colonies and brought their wives and a wise and orderly servant with them, we are not doing any injustice to the rest of the islands by comparing them to Rome, whose first founders were nothing more than a confused collection of brigands and whores led by two bastards.]

Moreau de Saint-Méry meanwhile gave a more gentle account of "timid orphans" — perhaps a euphemism[130] — brought to Saint-Domingue to make the bucaneers into "sensitive spouses, and into virtuous family fathers".[131] Pierre de Vaissière, in his 1909 study of Saint-Domingue, concludes that Wimpffen's account is closer to the truth.[132]

[128] Voltaire 1878, volume 12, chapter CLII, p. 416: "Ce n'était, à la vérité, qu'une troupe de voleurs : mais qu'ont été tous les conquérants ?", "C'est à eux que la France doit la moitié de l'île de Saint-Domingue ; c'est par leurs armes qu'on s'y établit dans tout le temps de leurs courses".
[129] Wimpffen 1911, p. 52.
[130] Bellegarde 2004, p. 43.
[131] Moreau de Saint-Méry 1798, p. 7.
[132] Vaissière 1909, p. 22, note 1.

Whichever is true, however, we can see that Saint-Domingue's early phase of settler colonialism is marked by the violent instrumentalising of women who, as orphans or sex workers, were marked as undesirable in metropolitan France and used in the reproduction of settler structures in Saint-Domingue. They were expected to contribute to the social reproduction of the colony, both through literal reproduction (having children with the settlers) and through feminised work. As Moreau de Saint-Méry said, it was with "the help of the seductive sex" that "Saint-Domingue had a population that could become its own, who could start considering it like a true homeland".[133] We are not given any indication of how they felt about this, how coerced they were into moving to Saint-Domingue, or whether they resisted it. However, we know from other accounts how violent the patriarchal regimes of Western Europe in this period were. Silvia Federici states that "the witch-hunts of the 16th and 17th centuries", perhaps the predominant form of violence against women in the period, "was as important as colonization [...] for the development of capitalism": this suggests that patriarchal violence in Europe and colonisation in the Caribbean were directly linked, too.[134]

This settler regime, however, would prove unsuccessful: "the number of buccaneers [and other local settlers] willing to relocate on the island soon reached its limits, and their recruitment was abandoned".[135] France would have to turn to Europe to continue populating Saint-Domingue.

Indentured workers Next in the attempted restructuring of the colony came landless French peasants used as indentured labour or 'engagés'. This regime was supported by the French government, and "in 1687, [indentured] whites outnumbered slaves, 4,411 to 3,358."[136] Once they had officially gained control of the island, the French "required in the seventeenth century that all ships going to the West Indies carry up to six engagés".[137] In the 1720s, fines started being imposed on ships who did not carry their quota of indentured workers: while Blackburn takes this as a "tighten[ing] up" of the legislation, Stein considers it to be a relaxing of the same laws, as it effectively allowed a fee to be paid instead of meeting the requirement.[138] Further research on how well-enforced the legislation was before and after the change would be informative. In any case, it indicates state involvement in enforcing the indentured labour regime.

However, for all the attempts to promote the use of indentured labour, "[a]t no time since the introduction of sugar cane had the number of engagés alone been sufficient to work the plantations."[139] Saint-Domingue's focus on sugar production, specifically, made the reliance on white servants problematic: "it was sugar which excluded the white labourer from Caribbean agriculture", having eliminated Indigen-

[133] Moreau de Saint-Méry 1798, p. 7.
[134] Federici 2014, "Introduction", n.p.
[135] Dupuy 2019, p. 12.
[136] Dubois 2004, p. 19.
[137] Stein 2023, p. 18.
[138] Blackburn 2010, p. 297; Stein 2023, p. 18.
[139] ibid., p. 18.

ous labourers.[140] As Olivier Pétré-Grenouilleau confirms in his study of the slave trade, "neither the Indigenous nor the European populations were able to provide efficient responses to the new need for labour sparked by the sugar revolution and the boom in the plantation economy".[141]

2.2.3 Enslaved Workers

> "Le sucre serait trop cher, si l'on ne faisait travailler la plante qui le produit par des esclaves."
> [Sugar would be too expensive if we did not work the sugarcane with slaves.]
>
> Montesquieu, *L'esprit des lois* (Montesquieu 2010, Book 15, Chapter 5, p. 586.)

Defining Slavery

It was thus the sugar plantations which secured the transition from indentured to enslaved labourers in the Caribbean generally and Saint-Domingue specifically. This warrants a conceptual definition of slavery in sociological, legal and especially economic terms, to mark its difference with wage labour and indentured labour. As Paulin Ismard writes, there are two definitions which "are not necessarily contradictory".[142] Though he considers them to be "substantially different", I believe them instead to refer to two different angles from which to view slavery: one, economic, and the other, social.[143]

The sociological analysis of slavery found in the works of Orlando Patterson convincingly establishes the latter type of definition. Based on a wide-ranging study of sixty-six slaveholding societies, he builds on the works of anthropologist Claude Meillaussoux in establishing that "the condition of slavery is always represented as a form of social death".[144] Slavery, says Patterson, is "the permanent, violent, and personal domination of natally alienated and generally dishonored persons".[145] There are three "constituent elements" of social death:

1. Exposure to gratuitous violence, "a state of structural or open vulnerability";[146]

[140] Williams 1971, p. 109.
[141] Pétré-Grenouilleau 2006, "L'engrenage négirer", Subsection "Les Africains, enfin".
[142] Ismard 2021, p. 12.
[143] ibid., p. 11.
[144] Patterson 1979, p. 39. See Patterson 1982, Annex B in that work for the list of the slaveholding societies.
[145] ibid., p. 13.
[146] Wilderson 2017, p. 18. I use Wilderson here because he restates Patterson's definition of social death eloquently.

2. "[P]rofound natal alientation", the "alienation of the slave from all formal, legally enforceable ties of "blood," and from any attachment to groups or localities other than those chosen for him by the master";[147]

3. Experiencing general dishonour: "you are dishonored in your very being".[148] As Patterson insists, this is different from experiencing occasional acts of dishonour as a free person: the slave "could have no honor because he had no power and no independent social existence, hence no public worth".[149]

One witness of French colonial slavery gave an account which supports all three aspects of violence, natal alienation and general dishonour:

> "Dans la condition d'esclave, l'homme a perdu de sa liberté tout ce qu'il a été possible de lui enlever. Ses talens, son industrie, son travail ne lui appartiennent pas; ses actions son toutes soumises à la volonté d'un autre, et il faut qu'il s'oublie pour être sans réserve à cet autre, pour en recevoir le mal comme le bien, pour en supporter les caprices, les outrages, les punitions, la mort même; et l'espérance, cette dernière compayne du malheureux, qui, quand tout est perdu, assoupit encore nos maux par ses fugitives illusions, l'espérance est interdite à l'esclave. Que devient donc dans cet état l'homme, cet être doué par-dessus tout du don de se modifier ?"[150]
>
> [In the condition of slave, a human loses from their free state all that it has been possible to take away. Their talents, his industry, their work do not belong to them; their actions are all subject to the will of another, and they must forget themself in order to be unreservedly subservient to that other, to accept the bad as well as the good, to bear its whims, its insults, its punishments, even death; and hope — that last companion of the unfortunate, which, when all is lost, still dulls our ills with its fleeting illusions — hope is forbidden to the slave. What becomes of man in this state, this being gifted above all else with the gift of self-realisation?]

Patterson, however, did not consider social death to equal slavery. Instead, he noted, "slavery is [...] represented legally as a condition of propertylessness and symbolically as a state of social death".[151]

Orlando Patterson's contributions of a more sociological nature about the symbolic representation of slavery can be combined with its legal and economic aspects (what Ismard sees as the second definition). Legally, slavery is often defined through property: "the master exercises property rights over the slave".[152] However, "precise legal and ideological aspects vary considerably from society to society".[153] Slavery

[147] Patterson 1982, p. 38, p. 7.
[148] Wilderson 2017, p. 18.
[149] Patterson 1982, p. 10.
[150] Robin 1807, p. 165.
[151] Patterson 1979, p. 40. Wilderson reduces slavery to social death (or, at least, prioritises social death over other forms of analysis) when he says that "what slavery really is, is social death" (Wilderson 2017, p. 18). I believe this to be a theoretical impasse.
[152] Ismard 2021, p. 11.
[153] Padgug 1976, p. 5.

may be legally codified (or not) in a variety of ways. Today, despite being widespread, slavery is not legally recognised anywhere, yet it takes place. What is more fundamental is the *economic* aspect of slavery upon which the legal aspect of slavery is built in slaveholding societies. What does it mean, economically?

The slaveholder, whether legally entitled to or not, exercises extreme power over the slave. They control the slave and their body as they would any other possession, able to do what they please.[154] This is different from the situation for a serf or a wage worker, who have a greater degree of freedom during production (in the serf's case) or outside of the workplace (in the wage-worker's case). This also means that the slaves *themselves* are treated like commodities, being sold and bought. By contrast, feudal labour was not typically commodified, while wage workers do not sell themselves but, in Marxist terminology, sell their labour-power for a limited period of time.

The most salient features appear when we consider it with the Marxist concepts of labour-power, and necessary and surplus labour. Robert Padgug, whose historical research led him to feel the need to give slavery a "theoretical existence", elaborated the following definition using such concepts:

> "a slave [is] one who owns or controls neither his own labor-power nor the means of production with which he produces, and whose entire product is forcibly appropriated by another; the latter retains that portion which is called the product of "surplus labor," while returning to the slave as the direct means of his or her livelihood that portion which is the product of "necessary labor." In addition—and this point is closely connected to the preceding one—the slave is normally outside of the dominant community in which he performs his labor [...] Because of his external relationship to the dominant community, the slave can be bought or sold or otherwise alienated and exchanged, and is, as a laborer, subject to an amount of direct force normally greater than that found in other labor relationships. Thus the slave is both a producer of objects (often in the form of commodities) as well as an object himself (often, again, in fact a "commodity"); that is, he is defined as the property of others"[155]

This definition helpfully foregrounds the economic aspects of slavery. The three constituent elements of social death and the othering of slaves through racism can all be understood by reference to this basis. Importantly, though, it draws out the extent to which the product of the slave's labour is entirely expropriated, with only their basic needs guaranteed, and their very person is commodified. These features emphasise how slave labour is different from indentured or waged labour.

Slavery in Saint-Domingue

Sugar plantations required a labour supply which, as Eric Williams pointed out, needed to have three characteristics: (1) abundant supply; (2) cheapness; (3) docility. But the "white servant satisfied none of these desiderata. The Negro slave seemed to

[154]The Code Noir notoriously defines slaves as a kind of furniture.
[155]Padgug 1976, p. 4.

Labour	Enslaved	Indentured	Waged
Legal status	Unfree, considered property	Semi-free, bound for a period	Free, by contractual agreement
Means of production owned by	Slave-holders	Land usually by masters, instruments usually by workers	Capitalists
Compensation	None monetarily, survival needs sometimes covered	Minimal to none, survival needs typically covered, sometimes benefits provided after contract	Wages supposed to cover subsistence, above survival level if wage workers have bargaining power
Surplus extraction	During production	After production	During production
Production process	Subordinated and cooperative	Independent and individual	Subordinated and cooperative
Coercion	Violence is common, often extreme, sometimes deadly	Contract enforced by law, harsh conditions	Economic coercion to work in general, but freedom to refuse any particular job
Resistance	Maroonage (*grand* and *petit*); violence towards slaveholders, selves or livestock; rebellion	Contract breaks, protests	Bargaining, sometimes in unions; strikes; protests

Table 2.2: Difference between slavery and other forms of work

Source: Own work. Some inspiration taken from Table 4 in Durand 2020, p. 205; however, Durand's table compares slavery, feudalism and capitalism, and doesn't look at all the same features.

satisfy all."[156] "Slavery, therefore, emerged as the only viable solution", concludes Alex Dupuy.[157] Enslaved Africans were certainly in abundant supply during the days of a thriving slave trade and were usually less expensive than indentured servants. Using the *SlaveVoyages* database, we can identify the number of slaves shipped every year. Their supply from Africa was seldom threatened, though its ability to reach the Caribbean was sometimes risked by wars between the colonial powers engaged in the area, during which we can notice decreases in *all* slave disembarkations, with Haiti reflecting the general pattern.[158] These wars *also* impacting other shipments, including of *engagés*, means that the slave trade always at least as reliable as indentured labour as a source of workers. More importantly, when the ships themselves did not encounter obstacles, the supply of African enslaved people was much higher than French indentured workers: "France could supply perhaps 1,000 engagés in a year", whereas the slave trade brought in many more labourers.[159] As our use of the *SlaveVoyages* database will demonstrate, during the years 1764-1777 and 1784-1807, at least sixty thousand slaves were disembarked annually in the Atlantic world, and sometimes many more. During the final years before the Haitian Revolution, in 1785-1791, Saint-Domingue captured between 30 and 45% of all slaves being disembarked.[160]

Concerning the third feature of docility, of course there is no innate racial difference making Africans more docile than white indentured servants. To be absolutely clear, "Africans suited labor in American plantation environments no better than Europeans did".[161] However, because of their structural disadvantage, secured through racism, they "could be whipped into docility and degraded through enslavement without the social and political repercussions which the enslavement of European laborers would have triggered".[162] Making a complementary point, Robert Louis Stein agrees on the first two features as Williams, and for the third includes the lack of "moral qualms" about enslaving Black people, which would arise if enslaving white populations.[163]

Racism thus produced two effects useful for slavery: it spread myths about the characteristics of Black people which would make them "better suited" to enslavement on the one hand, while removing objections to their brutal mistreatment on the other. The latter effect, this mistreatment, itself served to generate some of the reputed characteristics: for example, an enslaved worker subjected to routine violence would be likely to present as more docile than an indentured worker with a higher degree of legal recourse. The effects were mutually reinforcing. We will return to racism's role later in this chapter (section 2.4), as well as analysing it in more depth in section 6.3.

[156] Williams 1971, p. 109.
[157] Dupuy 1983, p. 243.
[158] The evidence from the *SlaveVoyages* database is presented in Chapter 5.
[159] Stein 2023, p. 18.
[160] See Chapter 5
[161] Johnston 2023, p. 5.
[162] Dupuy 2019, pp. 19-20. Dupuy is paraphrasing Williams 1971, p. 102.
[163] Stein 2023, pp. 18-19.

The Brutality of Slavery

"Where sugar was king, the white man survived only as owner or overseer. [...] The economic triumph of sugar meant the demographic domination of the Negro."[164] Williams' provocative phrasing of demographic "domination" in no way suggests an empowerment of the enslaved population. On the contrary, the maintenance of a slave system in a situation where the white overseers are increasingly outnumbered only increased the myriad forms of violence enacted to reproduce domination.

Slaves would be worked from the ages of 5 to 70.[165] 22% of the slaves of sugar plantations during 1760-1792 surveyed by David Geggus were children.[166] Approximately 5-10% of all slaves died every year, from a combination of "overwork, malnutrition, disease, and harsh treatment".[167] Such harsh treatment took the form of physical punishments, "both a constant threat and a frequent reality in the lives of the slaves".[168] Whipping, permitted by the Code Noir, was the most common. Slave owners "frequently had their slaves whipped in public", combining physical punishment with social degradation.[169] Jean-Baptiste Labat, a Dominican priest who travelled to the West Indies, would comment:

> "beaucoup portoient sur leur dos les marques des coups de fouet qu'ils avoient reçus: cela excitoit la compassion de ceux qui n'y étoient pas accoûtumez ; mais on sy'y fait bien-tôt."[170]
>
> [Many of their [slaves'] backs were scarred by whippings they had been given: this excited the compassion of those who were not accustomed to it, but one soon gets used to it.]

Beyond whipping, all sorts of violence were methodically and cruelly inflicted despite often being illegal: "Although the colony's slave laws prohibited torture, the judges claimed there was no need for the courts to oversee masters".[171] Alex Dupuy summarises some of the documented forms of torture:

> "More sadistic planters placed pieces of burning wood on their [slaves'] buttocks, or poured hot cinders, salt, pepper, and citron [lemon] on their open wounds. Others poured burning wax or boiling cane syrup on their slaves and then buried them up to their necks near wasp nests. Still others made the slaves eat their excrement, burned them alive, or blew them up with gunpowder."[172]

Many of the physical acts of cruelty permanently disfigured enslaved victims. These acts were often not commented upon, but maroon advertisements, placed by

[164] Williams 1971, p. 110.
[165] Emmer and Engerman 2017, p. 79.
[166] Geggus 1993, p. 79.
[167] Dubois and Garrigus 2017, p. 7.
[168] Dubois 2004, p. 50.
[169] Dupuy 2019, p. 34.
[170] Labat 1722, p. 65.
[171] Burnard and Garrigus 2018, p. 258.
[172] Dupuy 2019, p. 34.

slave-owners seeking to get 'their' slaves back, provide physical details that leave no doubt as to the treatments inflicted: a boy named Jean-Charles who fled at the age of 13 or 14, with one hand chopped off and the other "maimed"; a pair of fugitives, Moinsa and Keingue, were identifiable by the wound on Moinsa's head and the scabs on Keingue's thigh and shoulder; Jean-Baptiste was missing for a month by the time the advert looking for him was placed, noting that his feet were "scarred by burns".[173] Indeed, planters even organised for their "right to torture and execute suspected workers", allowing justified or unjustified fears of poisoning by their slaves to validate all sorts of atrocities.[174] As one planter commented, "we are reproached for having *assassinated* [...] *Negroes who did not belong to us*", "these acts are [...] very easy to justify, and follow the law".[175] Dubuisson continued: "when the existence of a Negro entails the ruin of my fortune, [...] death — especially a very prompt death — is without a doubt what equity and my interest dictate me to do".[176] As Gordon K. Lewis noted in his study of colonial Caribbean thought, this text is a "representative presentation of the planter outlook".[177]

Of course, such violence could sometimes be counterproductive. Not only did it meet resistance from the enslaved, it could also cause such physical harm as to prevent the enslaved person from working, or from doing so as productively. However, planters often valued the discipline generated by more brutal acts of violence, for reasons bragged about by a character in the film *First Cow*:

> "You see, here is the rub. When one factors the loss of labor from the punished hand versus the gain of labor from the hands who witness the punishment, a stricter punishment can sometimes become the more advisable path.
>
> Sometimes a properly rendered death is even useful in the ultimate accounting. It can be a vastly motivating spectacle for the indolent, let alone the mutinous."[178]

The enslaved would sometimes mutilate themselves as a form of resistance, too. Moreau de Saint-Méry writes, coldly, of a slave called Jean-Baptiste who:

> "détestant le travail de la culture, imagine pour s'en débarrasser, de tailler sur les dimensions de son bras droit, un bras de bois assez dur, et pendant plusieurs moi, il exerce sa main gauche à couper le poignet du bras de bois avec sa serpe. Lorsqu'enfin il se croit assez sûr de son coup, il place la vraie main droite qu'il ne peut cependant amputer qu'au quatrième coup"[179]

[173] See the respective classifieds: Barbe 1767; Mesnier 1774; Radous 1773.
[174] Burnard and Garrigus 2018, p. 257.
[175] P. U. Dubuisson 1780, p. 81, his italics.
[176] ibid., p. 82.
[177] Lewis 2004, p. 135. To be precise, he considers it more representative than Moreau de Saint-Méry 1798 and Hilliard d'Auberteuil 1776, who despite their shocking racism are attacked by Dubuisson for "each concession that his rival makes to the Enlightenment outlook" (Lewis 2004, p. 135). They are "partial racists, Dubuisson is the complete racist" (ibid., p. 136).
[178] Raymond and Reichardt 2021, p. 48. I use a quote from a piece of fiction, not because of a lack of historic evidence but because it succinctly represents the logic of slaveholders. For further evidence of punishment and murder used as tools of discipline, see Fick 2004, pp. 34-38.
[179] Moreau de Saint-Méry 1798, p. 61.

> [hating the work of cultivation, imagines, to be rid of it, to carve a rather hard wooden arm based on the dimensions of his right arm, and during several months, practices using his left hand to cut the wrist of the wooden arm with his sickle. When he finally feels confident enough, he replaces it with the real right hand, though he is only able to amputate it on the fourth stroke.]

Ultimately, slavery relied to a great degree on widely imposing brutal and sometimes fatal violence on the enslaved. James Stephens, an abolitionist writing in Britain, wrote: "that which supports the master's authority, and ensures his safety, is a strong and indefinite terror, which the slave from his earliest years, or from the period of his importation from Africa, has attached to the idea of active resistance ; and which has been strengthened daily more and more, by habit, and the universal example of his fellow slaves".[180] As Laurent Dubois concludes, "Slavery in Saint-Domingue was sustained by a regime of terror and torture".[181] For all these reasons, however terrible indentured work could be — and it was — "Plantation slaves would willingly have switched status with indentured servants, had the opportunity presented itself".[182]

The Rise of Slavery

Enslaved labourers did indeed rapidly replace white settlers. "Planters in Martinique and Guadeloupe turned so rapidly to enslaved African men and women that by the 1650s, about a decade after sugar was introduced, black slaves outnumbered free colonists there".[183] "Slavery became the dominant form of class relations after the demise of the system of indentured labor, the expropriation of the small freeholders, and the concentration of their lands by the large sugar planters."[184] The *SlaveVoyages* database, presented in a later chapter, collects all known data on shipments of enslaved people. In the century following the Treaty of Ryswick of 1697, nearly 14% of all enslaved people disembarked from slave ships arrived in Saint-Domingue. 768,673 enslaved people were trafficked there.[185]

1763 marked a turning point, a paradoxical victory for France who had lost the Seven Years' War. The Treaty signed that year imposed "the abandonment of New France, in favour of a colonial withdrawal to the tropics alone - the French part of Santo Domingo, Martinique, Guadeloupe, French Guiana and the Mascarene Islands".[186] As Burnard and Garrigus write, "the winner (Britain) lost while the loser (France) triumphed": "Saint-Domingue experienced an even greater transformation [than Jamaica], catapulting it above Jamaica in wealth and imperial importance" in the 25 years which followed.[187]

---

[180] Stephen 1802, p. 73.
[181] Dubois 2009, p. 112.
[182] Clarence-Smith and Eltis 2011, p. 137.
[183] Dubois and Garrigus 2017, p. 6.
[184] Dupuy 2019, p. 202.
[185] In the years 1697-1797, 768,673 of the 5,538,382 disembarkations occurred in Saint-Domingue, or 13.88%.
[186] *Atlas des esclavages* 2013, chapter "Les traites légales", section "Les traites anglaise et française" (n.p.).
[187] Burnard and Garrigus 2018, pp. 18-19, p. 18.

2.2.4 The Demography of Slavery in Saint-Domingue

Before me
caesura the sea

Julian Randall,
"Mississippi Genesis"
Randall 2022

By 1790, "the French colonies had the largest number of slaves of any European power in the West Indies", and a third of all the enslaved people in the West Indies were to be found on Saint-Domingue specifically.[188]

In the case of Saint-Domingue at the time of the revolution, French administrators separated people through the racialisation of some groups. These categories were flexible owing to the underdeveloped nature of scientific racism. Nonetheless, they were adopted at the time as well as in the literature on Haiti. As Dubois notes, "by [the] eighteenth century, labor in the Caribbean had been deliberately and obsessively racialized. With the exception of a few managers and overseers, plantation workforces were entirely of African descent."[189] Table 2.3 below identifies the heterogeneity of each racial grouping, interrogating assumptions of automatic racial affinity given the variety of socio-political interests found among each group.

Outnumbered slave-owners

The population statistics for each racial group lead to the first aspect of the answer to why the Revolution took place when it did. Note the disparity between slave and white populations, with the latter outnumbering the former ten-to-sixteen-fold in 1789 depending on the source. Further data and the calculation of the slave-to-white ratio in each year show the evolution over time (see Figure 2.5). The slave plantation system has been noted by Trevor Burnard and John Garrigus as particularly innovative in the form of *discipline* it developed, allowing a minority of overseers to keep control over a majority of captives through brutal methods.[190] However, this could not prevent the outnumbered planters from being vulnerable were this discipline to slip, as it would in the summer of 1791.

Cohesion among slaves

Second, slaves in Saint Domingue were a highly diverse group, as noted in Table 2.3. The lower caste in particular were torn from many different African cultures, meaning they did not even share a language. However, "France's capacity to convert Ashanti, Mandingo, Ibo, Nago, and Kongo captives into *blacks*, into homogenous colonial workers" would turn and end up working against the French.[191] A common "oppressed culture and [...] counter-plantation system" was able to develop out of slaves developing a common language and forms of community, whether as captives

[188] Emmer and Engerman 2017, p. 74.
[189] Dubois 2004, p. 19.
[190] See Burnard and Garrigus 2018.
[191] Casimir 2020, p. 350.

Racial group	White	Free people of colour	Black
Groups	"Grands blancs": Europe-based planters, resident planters, merchants, lawyers, political figures.	"Colonists of colour": the upper caste. Rich, French-educated planters; slave catchers. Barred from public office and many professions.	Elite caste of slaves: foremen, coachmen, cooks, butlers, maids, nurses, female companions, and other house-servants
	"Petits blancs": managers, artisans, shop-keepers, seamen.	Lower middle class, competing with petits blancs.	Upper caste (usually Creole)
	The "engagés", freed after some years	Recently freed "black" slaves.	Lower caste of slaves: majority African, of many different nationalities and mother tongues. Maroons
Number of people (1789)	30-40'000	25-30'000	452-500'000

Table 2.3: Social groups of Saint-Domingue, 1789.
The sources for population numbers are Casimir 2020; Desan 2013; Geggus 1989b; C. L. R. James 2001; Moreau de Saint-Méry 1798.



Figure 2.5: The evolution of the Haitian population (left axis) and the slave-white ratio (right axis)

Interpretation: In 1685, Saint-Domingue had about 6,000 Black slaves and 5,000 white settlers alongside 1,000 free people of colour (left axis), making for an enslaved-to-settler ratio of 1.2 (right axis). By 1790, the respective populations have risen to 465,000 slaves, 30,000 settlers and 28,000 free people of colour, with a much higher ratio of 15.5.
Source: Representation of data from Henochsberg 2016, Annex F, p. 58 (reproduced in the Annex B).

or as permanent maroons (slaves who fled plantations and did not return, settling in other parts of the island).[192] Thus, it was possible for them to form a sociopolitical bloc which they hadn't been able to previously, shifting the relative power of this group.

Conflict Among the Ruling Classes

The various classes which held most power in Saint-Domingue were constantly wrestling for dominance. Among white planters, there were many conflicts. In particular, the permanent residents, known as "creoles", were at odds with the "absentee owners", seeing themselves as more worthy of decision-making.[193] This was recognised as the French National Assembly sought to understand the success of the slave uprising and identified "very dangerous divisions among white citizens in Port-au-Prince".[194] White planters also sought to exclude planters of colour from privileges, so that the whites could be an "aristocracy of the skin".

For the three reasons just outlined the situation in 1791 was explosive: the ruling classes, a demographic minority, were increasingly at odds with each other at the very moment the rapidly growing slave population was increasingly coordinated. The booming slave and sugar trades made slave populations rise rapidly, and they grew increasingly coordinated as a group while their oppressors lost in cohesion.

2.3 Saint-Domingue's Economic Role for France

> "How profitable was this detestable trade! What a sad irony in human history!"
>
> Jean Jaurès

2.3.1 Economic Importance and Slavery

Saint-Domingue was exceptionally important to France's economy: by the eve of the French and Haitian revolutions it had become, without exaggeration, "the most valuable colony in the world".[195] It accounted for 40% of France's total foreign trade.[196] At the same time, "Saint-Domingue in 1789 was the most extreme example of the slave-based society that Europeans had created throughout the Americas."[197]

These two aspects of Saint-Domingue — its economic importance and its vicious slavery — were entirely coherent. To put it bluntly, "Haiti was a worth a fortune *in*

[192] Casimir 2020, p. xx.
[193] Dupuy 2019, p. 26.
[194] AP 37, p. 222.
[195] Dubois 2004, p. 13.
[196] Knight and Palmer 1989, p. 21. Desan 2013 puts the number at 50%, p. 27.
[197] Popkin 2010, p. 26.

enslaved human beings".[198] As an anonymous article from Diderot and d'Alembert's famous Enlightenment *Encyclopédie* states, "Negroes are the main source of wealth of the island's planters".[199] Sugar barons "commonly described their wealth not in terms of cane acreage or tons of sugar exports, but instead in terms of the hundreds of enslaved workers they controlled".[200]

To be more precise, it was not just enslaved human beings, subjected to the most awful violence and treated as property, which constituted the colony's fortune: it was their exploitation under brutal conditions on slave plantations, rigorously organised along industrial principles, which forcibly realised the value of the enslaved population's labour upon the environment, in the form of colonial commodities. Profit-seekers were sensible to choose to establish plantations in Saint-Domingue. "To interest the greed of the rich," wrote the Baron de Wimpffen, each concession of land "can easily produce a net revenue of 50,000 francs".[201] As another contemporary wrote after analysing the planters' return on investment, "there is no country in the universe that offers riches in such a proportion".[202]

As these representative witnesses indicate, it was widely recognised at the time that Saint-Domingue was, in Geneviève Rousselière's words, the "center of the French empire".[203] Planter Moreau de Saint-Méry, in his positive description of its model of a colonial exploitation, bragged that Saint Domingue was "so rightly envied by all Powers" as "the pride of France".[204] From across the channel, Adam Smith agreed: about French colonies, he argued that "the genius of their government naturally introduces a better management of their negro slaves", guaranteeing higher prosperity than England's colonies.[205] In France's revolutionary governments this fact was acknowledged repeatedly, for example by Antoine Barnave who, extolling its profitable production, warned: "Abandon the colonies, and these sources of prosperity will disappear or decrease".[206] This was a question of the "sacred interests of the Revolution and the destiny of many million of French people attached to the prosperity of our trade, and to the possession of our colonies".[207] Only a fool would deny such an "incontestable truth".[208]

Again and again the historical record demonstrates the contemporaries of the slave trade and their use as workers on plantations to be convinced that they were

[198] Tuck and Yang 2012, p. 26, my italics.
[199] Anonymous 1765, p. 80: "Les *negres* sont la principale richesse des habitans des îles". I translate "habitans" by "planters" to reflect common usage at the time, see Casimir 2020, note 3, p. 396.
[200] Dubois and Garrigus 2017, p. 6.
[201] Wimpffen 1911, p. 22: "Pour intéresser l'avidité des riches, on a donné une telle étendue aux concessions, que chacune, en prenant le café pour terme moyen, peut aisément produire un revenu net de cinquante mille francs."
[202] Hilliard d'Auberteuil 1776, p. 148: "Il n'y a point de pays dans l'univers qui offre des richesses en une telle proportion".
[203] Rousselière 2024, p. 163.
[204] Moreau de Saint-Méry 1798, p. iv: "cette Colonie, qui a été si justement enviée par toutes les Puissances, qui fut l'orgueil de la France".
[205] A. Smith 1976, Volume II, p. 99.
[206] Barnave and Montesquiou Fezensac 1881, p. 70.
[207] ibid., p. 69.
[208] ibid., p. 68.

producing extraordinary wealth. This has not always been acknowledged by those writing after abolition. When slavery was legal, a sugar planter from Saint-Domingue could declare that "an industrious citizen should not be ashamed of having run the fine manufactures that made his country so prosperous".[209] Now that consensus has shifted and it is generally accepted that slaveholders *should* have been ashamed, historians sometimes seem embarrassed to admit that slavery was a sinister source of France's riches. But while it took some time, historians — especially writing outside of France — have come to appreciate that "Saint-Domingue was France's El Dorado".[210] It was "the most important French colony in the New World", indeed the most important of any country's colonies anywhere: not just "the motor of France's economy and the most valuable of the country's provinces" but "the most valuable colony in the world".[211]

2.3.2 Sugar Slavery

The foremost source of Saint-Domingue's wealth was its production of sugar, which had a long and ultimately fruitful history for the colonisers.[212] The French succeeded in effecting a "second sugar revolution in the 1680s", nearly two centuries after it was first colonised.[213] As we have examined above, it was ultimately the slave system which ensured the reproduction and expansion of sugar plantations in Saint-Domingue. Over the course of a century, the sugar plantation system would thrive, to the point where "during the 1780s, the island alone represented nearly 40% of global sugar production".[214] If anything, the metropole tended to *over*estimate its value: a merchant's report read in the National Assembly declared in January 1792 that Saint-Domingue produced twice as much as all other colonies in the world put together.[215] In 1790, its 793 sugar plantations[216] — with an average of 201 slaves per plantation by the 1790s[217] — produced 87,000 tons of sugar, its output having doubled between 1765 and 1788 alone.[218]

Saint-Domingue thrived, outdoing all rival plantation colonies. It was the "top

[209] AP 37, p. 611-612 (letter by Joseph-François Delbé, read by M. Lacuée on 24 January 1792): "un citoyen industrieux ne saurait rougir d'avoir exploité de belles manufactures qui faisaient la prospérité de sa patrie" (p. 612).

[210] Popkin 2010, p. 26.

[211] Dupuy 2019, p. 28; Popkin 2010, p. 26; Dubois 2004, p. 13.

[212] We discussed the thwarted Spanish "attempt to create a sugar-based economy" (C. Eddins 2022, p. 228) above, see section 2.2.1.

[213] ibid., p. 229. Eddins emphasises it as a "counter-revolution", therefore, against the resistance of the enslaved.

[214] Cabot 2021, p. 121.

[215] AP 37, p. 612: "Toutes les colonies réunies, dépendantes des diverses puissances de l'Europe, ne produisaient pas en sucre la moitié de la récolte de la seule colonie de Saint-Domingue."

[216] Blackburn 2010, p. 433. A count of 813 sugar mills is given for the year 1789 by a diplomatic correspondent, AHN, Mº EXTERIORES H,2523, Exp. 9, p. 27.

[217] Geggus 1993, p. 74; the average for 100 plantations surveyed from 1745-1792 is 177, growing every decade within the sample. To be contrasted with the average coffee plantation size of 48 (for 1767-1792), see ibid., p. 76.

[218] Blackburn 2010, p. 433. C. N. Eddins 2022, p. 87: 100 million pounds in 1765, 200 million pounds in 1788.

sugar producer" of the *world*.[219] It produced "nearly as much sugar as the whole of the British West Indies" combined.[220] and provided "close to one-half of all the sugar [...] consumed in Europe and the Americas".[221] It drew their envy, as can be seen in a report presented to the British House of Commons, which complains of the "advantages" of Saint Domingue. These advantages, according to its authors, arose partly from its soil quality, partly because of innovation, and partly because slave-owners were willing to work their slaves harder.[222] Adam Smith, who as we saw recognised the prosperity of French sugar colonies, emphasised the "arbitrary" government of the Ancien Régime which achieved better results than republican government did; he also considered that French colonies "refining their own sugar" set them ahead of the British.[223]

Saint-Domingue, even more so than other French islands in the Caribbean known for their "extraordinary fertility", was "more fertile and produced commodities at a lower cost" than did rival islands, which were smaller and had depleted their soil through long-term cultivation.[224] Knowing how productive and profitable they were, most French people could only agree to supporting the further development of colonial sugar plantations. To increase its national wealth, "it is essential for France to extend its sugar colonies", said Hilliard d'Auberteuil.[225]

2.3.3 Coffee

"The colony's economy, however, did not rest entirely upon sugar."[226] The already thriving and always-expanding sugar economy was the island's "colonial vocation", as Michel-Rolph Trouillot put it; but the French had also "pioneered New World coffee cultivation" in the second half of the eighteenth century, only adding to the wealth produced by using the then-untapped mountainous areas that proved useless for sugar plantations.[227] Hilliard d'Auberteuil wrote of the "révolution du Café" which ensued.[228] The rise in production was astronomical: "between 1767 and

[219] Gauthier 2014, p. 39.

[220] Cheney 2017, p. 1.

[221] Knight and Palmer 1989, p. 21.

[222] House of Commons 1789. This report asks about the differences between Jamaica and Saint-Domingue are instructive. It brings attention to a combination of natural and institutional variations which result in what is described as an advantageous situation for France's sugar supply. Natural advantages include favourable soil and weather conditions, and the quantity of available land. Various costs are incurred for both environmental and institutional reasons: insurance, freight, duty fees... The help or hindrance of the state plays a big role, too, as French planters are given land but British planters had to buy theirs. Finally, the relations of production are crucial. As the report's shameless language repeatedly reveals, there are opportunities for slave-owners to extract more absolute surplus value by intensifying the work to which captives were subjected: "the English exact less Labour from their Negroes"—if they would exact more, it suggested, perhaps they could compete with the plantation system of the French.

[223] A. Smith 1976, Volume II, p. 99.

[224] Stein 2023, p. x; Daudin 2005, p. 164: "les Antilles françaises – et notamment Saint-Domingue – étaient plus grandes et plus récemment mises en culture que celles de ses concurrents. Par conséquent, elles étaient plus fertiles et produisaient des denrées à moindre coût.".

[225] Hilliard d'Auberteuil 1776, p. 9: "il est essentiel à la France d'étendre ses Colonies à sucre".

[226] Fick 1997, p. 55.

[227] Trouillot 1982, p. 336; Blackburn 1996, p. 163. See Dubois 2004, pp. 20-21.

[228] Hilliard d'Auberteuil 1776, p. 51.

1789, slightly more than two decades, the volume of coffee exports from the French Caribbean colony of Saint-Domingue quadrupled".[229] Fascinatingly, it was mostly led by free people of colour, who would experience less racism by turning to mountainous areas "untouched or unwanted by sugar planters and many *petits-blancs*".[230] This leads Trouillot to conclude that "the very social marginality of the freedmen of color prepared them in many ways for the coffee explosion".[231] This is one of many examples of how the racial structure of Saint-Domingue influenced the form of economic development taken there.

The island was thus increasingly drained in order to produce wealth, with no regard for the well-being of the enslaved nor the ecological sustainability of the plantations. Saint-Domingue thus became "the world's leading producer of both sugar and coffee"; it exported "as much sugar as Jamaica, Cuba, and Brazil combined" and half of the world's coffee.[232] It had other exports, too, but they play a far less significant role, with indigo diminishing in the middle of the eighteenth century and cacao fields experiencing "destruction [...] around 1736".[233] That is not to say it became developed; its wealth flowed to France. France's development was Haiti's underdevelopment.

2.3.4 The Many Economic Effects of Slavery

The British Example

In order to better understand the French slave colonies, scholarship on British slavery provides an illuminating example. As Maxine Berg and Pat Hudson have expertly demonstrated in the case of slavery's impact on the British industrial revolution, economic historians in the UK have typically restricted their studies to direct profits from the slave trade and plantations, meaning that "the role of slavery [...] has been generally underestimated by historians".[234] Eric Williams had already advanced several hypotheses, including that the slave trade and slave plantations fuelled the British industrial revolution, in his 1938 dissertation and his 1944 book *Capitalism and Slavery*.[235] Yet what his elegant account produced was not a new field of honest empirical interrogations, but a powerful backlash among "those who claimed a European heritage".[236] From the 1960s especially, a narrow slave historiography relied on both "misleading measures" and reductive methodologies to dismiss Williams and anyone else advancing similar theses.[237] As a result, "there have been few attempts

[229] Trouillot 1982, p. 331.
[230] ibid., p. 352.
[231] ibid., p. 353.
[232] Dubois 2004, p. 21.
[233] Debien 1943, quoted in Trouillot 1982, p. 336.
[234] Berg and Hudson 2023, p. 7.
[235] Williams 2021.
[236] Colin A. Palmer in the Introduction to ibid., p. xxv. Not all white reviewers had a negative reaction, as Palmer notes, but many did respond to Williams "with venomous assaults rather than with reasoned arguments, careful research, and analysis" (p. xxvi).
[237] Berg and Hudson 2023, p. 35.

to convey the fuller picture".[238] Berg and Hudson have provided the most up-to-date account of slavery's role for British economic development, partially vindicating Williams and assembling a kaleidoscopic picture of its economic entanglements, in *Slavery, Capitalism and the Industrial Revolution*. What of France's economic development based on slavery?

Why France Hasn't Received the Same Attention

Unfortunately, no *Slavery, Capitalism and the Industrial Revolution* has been written for France — and neither do we have an equivalent of *Slavery and Capitalism* in terms of a text which prompted widespread scholarship on French slavery.[239] There are several different plausible explanations for this. On the one hand, a few factors explain why it might capture less attention. France did not experience an industrial revolution simultaneously with its reliance on colonial slavery, so the story of a slave-fueled capitalist development is less obvious. However, the high point of France's slave plantation system correlated with precisely the period in which it was the most successful in world trade.[240] And, as Burnard and Garrigus write, "wealth from Saint-Domingue helped move French eighteenth-century merchant capitalism toward industrialism, though the American and French Revolutions delayed and shaped this process".[241]

There are other, more problematic explanations. Questions of colonialism and slavery during the French Revolution have been hard to develop within French academia. As Badiou has pointed out, it is CLR James' *Black Jacobins* — not a French text, and one written only in 1938 — that provided the best account of the Haitian Revolution;[242] and only in the past three decades has Florence Gauthier's work indicated the degree of importance questions of colonialism, slavery and race had in the French Revolution. Yves Bénot devotes a chapter to the "falsified mirror of historians" who left many silences about these questions, amounting to them being "systematically devalorised".[243] He attributes it to two factors: "the unconscious influence of an imperialist climate" when the histories are being written; and an "inertia of ideas—or of the absence of ideas", in which the lack of treatment of colonial questions by earlier historians set the path for its persistent absence.[244] Similarly, Alain Badiou considers "racist and colonial repression" of attempts to write history to explain the difficulty of telling this story.[245]

[238] Berg and Hudson 2023, p. 44.

[239] Some important Francophone works were produced in the late 1990s and 2000s, owing in part to increased interest surrounding the UNESCO and the French government remembrances of slavery.

[240] Daudin 2005, p. 8.

[241] Burnard and Garrigus 2018, p. 21.

[242] To Badiou's argument we might add that *Black Jacobins* was mostly popularised in the 1960s.

[243] Bénot 1989, p. 205, p. 215.

[244] ibid., p. 216, p. 217.

[245] "Son omission dans la plupart des récits historiques ne fait qu'avérer le refoulement racialiste et colonialiste sur quoi s'est fondé, jusqu'à la guerre d'Algérie incluse, cet esprit de la IIIe République, dont tant de bonnes âmes se déclarent aujourd'hui nostalgiques." Badiou 2006, "Renseignements, commentaires et digressions".

Towards a Full View of Economic Effects

Based on these factors, we do not have a strong integrated framework upon which to establish slavery's importance in the French case. We can, however, indicate a number of different economic effects. Colonial trade had both "push and pull effects on French growth".[246] Put together, these effects are estimated by Guillaume Daudin to account for about 8-15% of France's economic growth in the "short eighteenth century" of 1713-1792.[247]

First, we can consider the people to whom direct profits of the slave trade and slave production flowed. The *exclusif* meant that "as much as a half of the value of colonial produce accrued as mercantile profits to metropolitan interests [...] The brilliant prosperity of Bordeaux and Nantes derived from colonial commerce."[248] Wealthy individuals in France, including members of the nobility and bourgeoisie, invested heavily in Saint-Domingue. "In 1789, 15 percent of the 1,000 members of the National Assembly owned colonial property, and many others were probably tied to colonial commerce."[249] "Jean-Joseph de Laborde, the wealthiest man in France, invested heavily in Saint-Domingue [...] He populated his estates with thousands of captives, many of whom traveled from Africa on his slave ships. By 1789 his estates had fourteen hundred enslaved workers."[250] Slave traders stood to benefit, too, of course. Sébastien Rioux writes that the "period of 1779-1788 was particularly favourable to slave traders"; ventures identified in 1779-1784 reached profits of 51.6%.[251] Typically, through the various investments made, money flowed from the colonies to France and especially into Paris, "which in the eighteenth century was transformed from an administrative and manufacturing city into a financial powerhouse".[252]

Importantly, the slave-made commodities of Saint-Domingue were not entirely — nor, usually, mostly — consumed in France. Trevor Burnard and John Garrigus estimate that "up to three-quarters of the plantation products imported by France from its colonies were reexported to other European countries",[253] whereas Guillaume Daudin finds a re-exportation rate of "more than 80%" using detailed French trade data.[254] Colonial products were not just consumer goods for the French, they were commodities which could be bought cheap thanks to the favourable *exclusif* system, and sold cheap elsewhere. Merchants had much to gain and the New World colonies reoriented trade on a global scale: "Atlantic trade for the first time in French history challenged trade to the Mediterranean as the dominant sector in French commerce."[255] This boosted growth: "imperial products amount[ed] to as much as 15 percent of overall economic growth in France during the expansionary years between 1716 and

[246] Daudin 2005, p. 165.
[247] ibid., p. 9; see chapter iv of his work.
[248] Blackburn 1996, p. 163.
[249] Dubois 2004, p. 21.
[250] Burnard and Garrigus 2018, p. 22.
[251] Rioux 2022, p. 173. This is based on just eight cases, unfortunately the only ones identified so far in primary sources.
[252] Burnard and Garrigus 2018, p. 22.
[253] ibid., p. 5. Dubois supports this for sugar and coffee, see Dubois 2004, p. 21.
[254] Daudin 2005, p. 164.
[255] Burnard and Garrigus 2018, p. 24.

1787."[256]

The colonies also generated employment — and none as much as Saint-Domingue. In September 1790, its planters would estimate that their "colonial industry" employed 6 million people.[257] Laurent Dubois more accurately estimates that the "livelihood of as many as a million of the 25 million inhabitants of France depended directly on the colonial trade", a lower but still significant number.[258] This corroborates Hilliard d'Auberteuil's contemporary estimation that "one-thirtieth of the residents of the French Kingdom" were "occupied" by this colony. He did not consider this to be a small quantity, especially as they were "the industrious part of the nation", he hastened to add.[259] This makes Saint-Domingue "deserve general admiration" and "dignified of the government's attention", he affirmed.[260]

Saint-Domingue's produce developed in complementarity with others. The "sugar and slave trades stimulated vital economic growth in the metropolitan centers, particularly in industries such as shipbuilding and copper production".[261]

As Berg and Hudson have explored for Britain, the slave trade and slave-made products led to development which varied across the country. Different port cities and industrial hubs developed in different ways, building on slavery as a source of profits and of commodities. Similarly, France's differential geographic economic development must be noted to identify *where* the country most benefited from Saint-Domingue.

One could take each port city in turn, identifying its involvement, but just two cities will be considered here for the sake of argument. Bordeaux, for instance, provided weapons and ammunition; sent slave ships on the triangular trade; sent foodstuffs, building materials and clothing to Saint-Domingue. Meanwhile, it received many colonial products. It devoted thirty ships fully to "trade with the Caribbean", of which half were devoted to "Martinique, the only French island with the capacity to refine its own sugar at the time".[262] However, "most of Bordeaux's direct investments in the Caribbean centered on Saint-Domingue", making the colony "something of an extension of the city's economy".[263]

In Nantes, involvement with slavery looked different. 43% of French slave ship expeditions were led by Nantes shipowners, who alone were "responsible for 5-6% of the European Atlantic slave trade".[264] Nantes' development was far more tied to the slave trade than, by contrast, Bordeaux, which "was a minor player for much of the eighteenth century".[265] This demonstrates the complex web of linkages between Saint-Domingue's economic success and the various benefactors in the colony and across France.

[256] Note 58 from Burnard and Garrigus 2018, p. 22.
[257] Assemblée générale de la partie françoise de S.-Domingue 1790, p. 5.
[258] Dubois 2004, p. 21.
[259] Hilliard d'Auberteuil 1776, p. 33.
[260] ibid., p. 35, p. 33.
[261] Browne 2021, p. 23.
[262] Gates and Curran 2022, p. 9.
[263] ibid., p. 10.
[264] Ayrault 2021, n.p.
[265] Gates and Curran 2022, p. 12.

2.3.5 A Sustainable Economic Role?

Despite its roaring success, this system was not without its costs. These were so high as to help bring down the *Ancien Régime* in two different ways. First, the price of maintaining this system likely contributed to financial crisis which was instrumental in the *régime*'s downfall. Furthermore, while the colony generated immense wealth for France, the restrictive French trade policies kept the prices planters could demand for their products down, meaning metropolitan merchants often profited disproportionately. The riches made through this merchants contributed to the French Revolution, as noted by Jean Jaurès.[266]

Given this, we might also wonder if the two successive revolutions in France and Haiti disrupted a winning model — or was Saint-Domingue's sugar paradigm already reaching limitations? The question of whether it was "a thriving economic system or one that was undermined by its own internal contradictions" is interesting but difficult to decide upon.[267] Burnard and Garrigus note that "Whether the growth of Saint-Domingue would have continued if the French Revolution had not occurred is the subject of debate", though they conclude that the plantation system "did extraordinarily well in the 1780s" and "there was nothing inevitable about the [...] decline of [...] Saint-Domingue" past the endpoint of their study in 1788.[268] Arguing the opposite point of view, Paul Cheney's study of one Saint-Domingue plantation highlights that planters had to "cope with the effects of slave mortality, wars, economic disruptions, uprisings, and resource scarcity that the plantation complex regularly produced", as well as "unpredictable market gyrations" and "unstable environmental conditions" which could disrupt plantation production and profits.[269] For Cheney, the various contradictions of the plantation system would produce its downfall.

My own view, based on these and other materials, is that there are two countervailing forces which are important to note. On the one hand, the sugar paradigm was often profitable, sometimes massively so. Denying this, as some of those who argued for slavery's 'economic backwardness' have, isn't empirically verified in the case of Saint-Domingue.[270] Burnard and Garrigus are among many scholars who have compellingly documented that, in Jamaica and Saint-Domingue, "Profits from plantation production remained high and promised to become very high indeed".[271] The overwhelming evidence confirms that Saint-Domingue was absolutely central to the French economy in the late eighteenth century. Its loss during the Haitian Revolution had significant consequences for France.

On the other hand, it would be inaccurate to overestimate the stability of the

[266] Jaurès 1901, p. 61: "Les fortunes créées à Bordeaux, à Nantes par le commerce des esclaves ont donné à la bourgeoisie cet orgueil qui a besoin de la liberté et contribué à l'émancipation générale."
[267] Popkin 2021, p. 5.
[268] Burnard and Garrigus 2018, p. 19, p. 242, p. 266.
[269] Cheney 2017, p. 7, p. 7, p. 44.
[270] Furthermore, having abandoned a moral argument in order to make a purely economic one, when slavery is discovered to be profitable there is no reason left to oppose it: "Prosperity is not a moral question and the justification of San Domingo was its prosperity" (C. L. R. James 1989, p. 45).
[271] Burnard and Garrigus 2018, p. 242.

system. The economic system was so complex and interlinked, and the sources of instability so conjunctural, that bold counterfactual claims about its lack of long-term economic viability are hard to defend. However, in addition to sources of economic instability it also generated social instability, which we know ended up determining the fate of the colony. Saint-Domingue's slavery produced its own gravediggers, albeit structurally disadvantaged ones, in the enslaved labour force it so brutally mistreated. It was their resistance, constituting a military and political force, which would ultimately overturn the system of colonial slavery.

2.4 Slavery and Racism as Structural Forces

The political economy of Saint-Domingue cannot be complete if it remains colour-blind. On the contrary, only by identifying how race became an organising principle in the colony can its economic structures and reproduction be fully understood. This section tells the story of how, beginning with legislation on slavery that did not mention race, French colonial labour became "deliberately and obsessively racialized", in Laurent Dubois' words.[272]

At the start of the eighteenth century, Sue Peabody reminds us, "France's legal system was a complex patchwork of overlapping jurisdictions and systems of appeal".[273] The institutional apparatus which developed to maintain and stabilise slavery first formed to guarantee the domination of enslaved people, without much formal recognition of the reality that it applied in racial terms. As Reinhardt puts it, "race was not necessarily a motive for the initial enslavement of Africans", but "it clearly occupied an important place in eighteenth-century perceptions of West Indian slavery".[274] The eighteenth century shows a development of racism as distinct from the mere legislation of slavery, which would increasingly play a role in social structures, allowing the stabilisation of a highly antagonistic society which included masters, slaves, and freed people. State racism originates in the eighteenth-century elaboration of such systems.[275] While colonial slavery was, in theory, kept at a distance from the white population of metropolitan France, it was necessary for the planters to double up the physical separation of the enslaved with a racial separation, for Black people to be "shut out from their [white] world by a vast veil", to quote W. E. B. Du Bois.[276] It was, therefore, not just slavery but *racial* slavery which had economic rationality for the colonial production of sugar.

2.4.1 The Code Noir of 1685

The infamous Code Noir is a much debated document about which we have to be careful and nuanced. On the one hand, we have to be careful not to rehabilitate it. It was not the humanitarian document some have pretended it to be: as "the first

[272] Dubois 2004, p. 19.
[273] Peabody 2002, p. 15.
[274] Reinhardt 2006, p. 39.
[275] This point has been made by made, including Michel Foucault and Hannah Arendt (Arendt 1944; Foucault 1997).
[276] Du Bois 2015, p. 4.

document legalizing slavery in the Americas",[277] it regulated slavery to allow it to continue, not to emancipate captives. Slaves were defined as furniture, enshrining their exclusion from humanity and justifying their (mis)treatment as property. So, for any nuance we show, we will not pretend to apologise for it (the nuance is not *moral*).

On the other hand, the *Code Noir* should not be read as presenting the state racism we will identify in later documents. Its object is the enslaved person, and not the Black person or person of colour. As such, it was "colour-blind" in theory: "There was, in principle, no discrimination solely on the basis of African descent or skin color."[278] Of course, slavery was undeniably discriminatory in practice towards Black people, who by the end of the eighteenth century would be the only slaves in French colonies. Saint-Domingue had "a class structure that also reflected the hierarchy of race and color that slavery engendered".[279] The language of the *Code*, though it doesn't refer to "noirs" (Blacks), does refer to "nègres" on seven occasions. This word, most commonly translated by "Negro", suggested the extent to which slavery was racialised *de facto*. Racism, however, was not yet consolidated as a force distinct from anti-slavery measures. In some respects, the Code Noir — while in no way an anti-racist document — did not contain forms of racism which would later be developed. For instance, one article declares emancipation from slavery to be legally equivalent to being born in the colonies, suggesting a vision of slavery as unlinked to essential racial characteristics:

> Article 57
>
> "Déclarons leurs affranchissements faits dans nos îles, leur tenir lieu de naissance dans nosdites îles et les esclaves affranchis n'avoir besoin de nos lettres de naturalité pour jouir des avantages de nos sujets naturels de notre royauté, terres et pays de notre obéissance, encore qu'ils soient nés dans les pays étrangers."[280]
>
> [Let us declare that an emancipation happening in our islands acts as a birth in these islands and that the freed slaves do not need our naturalisation documents to enjoy the advantages of our natural subjects of our royalty, lands and countries of our obedience, even though they were born in foreign lands.]

Article 59 confirmed that *affranchis* would have "the same rights, privileges and immunities which are enjoyed by people born free".[281] Yet, as Laurent Dubois writes, "certain stipulations differentiated the *affranchis* from other free individuals", contradicting the spirit of the latter article.[282] The fifty-eighth article, lodged awkwardly between these two, suggests a special legal status of freed slaves with respect to their former masters:

> Article 58

[277] Reinhardt 2006, p. 33.
[278] Dubois 2004, p. 61.
[279] Dupuy 2019, p. 202.
[280] *Code Noir* 1743, p. 26
[281] ibid., p. 27.
[282] Dubois 2004, p. 61.

> Commandons aux affranchis de porter un respect singulier à leurs anciens maîtres, à leurs veuves et à leurs enfants, en sorte que l'injure qu'ils leur auront faite soit punie plus grièvement que si elle était faite à une autre personne: les déclarons toutefois francs et quittes envers eux de toutes autres charges, services et droits utiles que leurs anciens maîtres voudraient prétendre tant sur leurs personnes que sur leurs biens et successions en qualité de patrons.
>
> [Let us command the freedmen to show a singular respect to their former masters, their widows and their children, so that any insult they may cause them will be punished more severely than if it were done to any other person. However, we declare them free and clear of all other charges, services and useful rights that their former masters may wish to claim both over their persons and over their property and inheritance in their capacity as bosses.]

Despite these ambiguities, earlier domination relied especially on the distinction between master and slave. Racial divisions were already important *de facto*, with skin colour serving as an immediate cause for suspicion. In law, however, racism had not been developed in 1685. This would change.

2.4.2 The Theorisation of Racism

Already, in sixteenth century Spain, "as the sub-Saharan slave trade continued to develop, the word *negro* [Black] began to appear in legal documents instead of *esclavo* [slave]".[283] Colonial slavery was highly racial *de facto*, given that the preferred source of slaves was sub-Saharan Africa. However, over time, these racial structures would take on a *de jure* reality and, indeed, an independence from the categories of slavery which has resonances to this day.[284] The laws passed demonstrate this gradual transformation of slavery into something overtly racial, from which racism would gain an autonomy as a material factor in society.

As we have noted, the Code Noir did not deploy racial categories as distinct from the category of slave upon which it rested, though it did use "nègre" to refer to slaves, synonymously with "esclaves". "After 1685," however, "colonial administrators and [...] judges gradually corrected much of what they perceived as the Code's leniency on questions of race and freedom".[285] Meanwhile, in metropolitan France, the very existence of racial slavery brought attention to race: "Slavery, slave-trading expeditions, and the constant flow of "ethnographic" information coming back from the Caribbean transformed the subject of Black Africans into a major preoccupation during these years".[286]

Racial prejudice would rise over time, serving to stabilise colonial society. Racism was essential to maintaining the hierarchies necessary for slavery to continue bearing its fruits. Racial categories increasingly took on importance independently of position

[283] Weissbourd 2013, p. 532.

[284] There are some other reasons that legislation tended towards race-based language. Sue Peabody argues that the aversion of Parliament to adopt laws referring to slaves "forced the monarchy to adopt racial terminology to police its boundaries against colonial slavery" (Peabody 2002, p. 8).

[285] Garrigus 2006, p. 42.

[286] Gates and Curran 2022, p. 12.

as slave or free person. Outside of the Code Noir, "the king's official language started to racially define slaves by the early eighteenth century."[287]

One example of a radical race-based change was in marriages. Relationships between white Frenchmen and women of colour were considered acceptable at first. A missionary in the seventeenth century wrote rather strangely that this was a "necessity" due to a lack of white women, meaning that men in inter-racial relationships were "esteemed to be members of honest society".[288] Such a claim points both to a degree of discomfort with such relationships at least among the missionary and his imagined readers, but also to their prevalence and to their justification through "necessity". The Code Noir also allowed for marriage: it was the only way for a slave-owner who had a child with an enslaved woman not to suffer fines and slave confiscation, according to its ninth article.[289] Wedding records indicate that 6.9% of marriages were interracial between 1700 and 1729, up from 3.5% before 1700.[290]

The interracial marriage rate would start lowering however, to 4.6% between 1730-1759.[291] This was due to increasing discouragement of racial mixing. The colonial authority obstructed many weddings between free women of colour and whites by refusing to give licences.[292] Mixed relationships started being described as "criminal conjunctions" between "different species", with mixed-race children maligned as "nature's monsters".[293] On 5 April 1778, whites were explicitly prohibited from marrying Black people or people of colour by the French government, which was reiterated in 1781 by a royal decree banning "marriages between whites and those of African descent".[294] Though the colonial authority hadn't issued its own proclamations, it had participated in discouraging such relationships.[295]

The 1770s were a decade of many repressive racist legislation extending far beyond marriage alone. A law of 1773 forbade taking a "white name" as a person of colour. The text is very clear that it prevents naming behaviours which would, it believes, "destroy that insurmountable barrier between whites and people of color that public opinion has established and which the government wisely maintains".[296] 1777 saw even further racist legislation. The "Police des Noirs" law prohibited the entry of all "blacks, mulattoes, and other people of color" into the metropole.[297] "As opposed to the previous two laws that applied to black slaves only, the Police des Noirs focused on *all* non-whites", suggesting an expansion of racial repression.[298] Simultaneously, and in spite of laws banning the entry of Black people in mainland France, "the law was modified to lift some of the restrictions, allowing colonial slaves to accompany

[287] Reinhardt 2006, p. 34.
[288] Quoted in Garrigus 2006, p. 40.
[289] *Code Noir* 1743, pp. 6-7.
[290] Houdaille 1981, p. 277.
[291] ibid., p. 277.
[292] Bellegarde 2004, p. 53.
[293] "conjonction criminelle d'hommes et de femmes d'une différente espèce donnant naissance à un fruit qui est un monstre de la nature". Quoted in Gautier 2010, chapter VI, section 17.
[294] Reinhardt 2006, p. 35; Peabody 2011, p. 612.
[295] Burnard and Garrigus 2018, p. 68.
[296] Quoted in ibid., p. 186.
[297] Ghachem 2012, note 130, p. 117.
[298] Reinhardt 2006, p. 34, Abanime 1979.

their masters" from 1777.[299] In 1779, "whites" and free people of colour were forced to wear different clothing to prevent what was seen as a "reprehensible assimilation".[300] In a few short years, the partial acceptance gained by free people of colour was severely rolled back.

Modest progress in the following decade faced backlash which led to conditions harshening. "In the mid-1780s reform-minded administrators in the Colonial Ministry in Paris, driven in part by reports of small uprisings on plantations, passed two royal decrees meant to improve the condition of the slaves in the Caribbean", which would prove profoundly unpopular with the colonists.[301] In the face of opposition to "provisions [...] aimed at curbing the autonomy of plantation managers—and therefore their power to abuse their slaves—by requiring them to keep careful registers of the work and production on the plantations", the law was amended in December 1785.[302] The amendment was deeply troubling, emphasising the "respect and obedience" which slaves were considered to owe their superiors, encouraging punishment in a variety of situations, and for the progressive provisions it did allow, providing legal immunity for all past crimes for which proceedings had already started.[303]

Racial Triangulation

Claire Jean Kim introduced the notion of racial triangulation to analyse the ways in which Asian Americans, in contemporary American society, undergo simultaneous "relative valorization" relative to one racialised group (people racialised as Black) *and* "civic ostracism" related to a dominant group (people racialised as White).[304] While the concept merits expansion and qualification for current contexts,[305] it is particularly fruitful as a description of colonial Saint-Domingue, which Deborah Jenson describes as a "pigmentocracy".[306] This was a society in which three main racial groups of white, person of colour and Black were constantly being affirmed as different and distinct. The three categories were understood relationally, always in reference to the other two. The freedom provided to people of colour was, on the one hand, a relative valorisation against the condition of the enslaved Black people and, on the other, not as complete as the freedom of property-owning white men. A free person of colour may become a property-owner, even a slave-owner, indeed possibly a wealthy one, but they were always barred from certain privileges: in Geggus' words, all free people of colour "were subject to humiliating, apartheid-like restrictions".[307] Saint-Domingue presented, therefore, not a binary of white/Black, but a triad of white/person of colour/Black, all three aspects being important — along with, as we will shortly see, an Indigenous group racialised in such a way as to promote its

[299] Buck-Morss 2000, p. 831.
[300] Gauthier 2007, Annex: "Apparition et progrès du préjugé de couleur et de la législation ségrégationniste à Saint-Domingue 1705-1790" (n.p.). (Gauthier's book does not feature page numbers, but is broken into parts, chapters and sections, which are provided in my citations.)
[301] Dubois 2004, p. 31.
[302] ibid., p. 31.
[303] Ghachem 2012, p. 161.
[304] C. J. Kim 1999, p. 107.
[305] See N. Y. Kim 2022 for some thoughts on this.
[306] Jenson 2011, p. 27.
[307] Geggus 2002a, p. 162.

sociological disappearance.

2.4.3 Purposes of Racism

Why did racism, which appears so irrational from a modern perspective, receive such a stimulus from colonial society? A 1771 letter by French naval minister Pierre Étienne Bourgeois de Boynes insists on "maintaining the principle THAT MUST FOREVER KEEP PEOPLE OF COLOUR, AND THEIR DESCENDENTS, APART FROM ANY ADVANTAGES AFFORDED TO WHITES".[308] This "principle" was not from Antoine Gisler identifies the role of "colour politics" in "stabilising the colonial order".[309] As proof of this, he cites a memorandum from the king in 1776:[310]

> "Les gens de couleur sont libres ou esclaves ; les libres sont des affranchis ou des descendants d'affranchis : à quelque distance qu'ils soient de leur origine, *ils conservent toujours la tache de l'esclavage*, et sont déclarés incapables de toutes fonctions publiques ; les gentilhommes mêmes qui descendent à quelque degré que ce soit d'une femme de couleur *ne peuvent jouir des prérogatives de la noblesse*. Cette loi est dure, mais *sage et nécessaire* : dans un pays où il y a quinze esclaves contre un blanc, on ne saurait mettre trop de distance entre les deux espèces, on ne saurait imprimer aux nègres trop de respect pour ceux auxquels ils sont asservis. Cette distinction, rigoureusement observée même après la liberté, est *le principal lien de la subordination de l'esclave*, par l'opinion qui en résulte que sa couleur est vouée à la servitude, et que rien ne peut le rendre égal à son maître."[311]
>
> [People of colour are free or slaves; the free are *affranchis* [freed people] or descendants of *affranchis*: however far they may be from their origin, *they always retain the stain of slavery*, and are declared incapable of all public functions; even gentlemen who are descended in any degree from a woman of colour *cannot enjoy the prerogatives of nobility*. This law is harsh, but *wise and necessary*: in a country where there are fifteen slaves for every white man, one could never put too much distance between the two species, one could never imbue Negroes with too much respect for those to whom they are enslaved. This distinction, rigorously observed even after freedom, is *the main pillar for subordinating the slave*, through the resulting opinion that his colour is doomed to servitude, and that nothing can make him equal to his master.]

This document is remarkable for its naked declarations of the rationality of racism. It clearly identifies the racialisation of people of colour as decisive, rather than their status as free or enslaved: their skin colour, a "stain of slavery", is inherently suspect

[308] Quoted in Gauthier 2010, p. 23, his capitalisation: "maintenir le principe QUI DOIT ÉCARTER À JAMAIS LES GENS DE COULEUR, ET LEUR POSTERITÉ DE TOUS LES AVANTAGES ATTACHÉS AUX BLANCS."

[309] Gisler 1981, p. 99.

[310] See also the discussion in Dupuy 2019, p. 29.

[311] Quoted in Gisler 1981, pp. 99-100, my italics.

according to this document. It thus seeks an expansive definition of Blackness, operating similarly to "the 'one-drop rule'. According to this principle of racialisation, any amount of African ancestry, no matter how remote, and regardless of phenotypical appearance, makes a person Black", i.e. assigns them to the category of Blackness.[312] Admittedly, Saint-Domingue was note-worthily different from, for example, the United States in its "convention of verbal classifications of racial admixture": the colonial system created a dizzying array of racial categories between those of white and Black.[313] Here, however, we see an attempt to erect a clear colour line collapsing the racial triangle into a binary: the white on one side, and the non-white (whether Black or of colour) considered stained by slavery, on the other.

As Patrick Wolfe has noted, building upon Indigenous scholars, the 'one-drop rule' is not the only form of racialisation which occurs. By contrast, Indigenous people tend to be racialised in "subtractive" or "exclusive" ways, leading to their disappearance over time as those with only partial Indigenous heritage are excluded from the category of Indigenousness.[314] In Saint-Domingue, this occurred too: in 1746 the colony's governor allowed anyone living there who claimed "Indian" (meaning Indigenous) heritage to declare themselves as white.[315] The Indigenous race vanished as it was inconvenient to administrators. In 1771, for example, the French naval minister refused to recognise the Indigenous heritage claimed by two correspondents.[316] The "elimination of the native" wasn't just physical destruction, it was also social and cultural erasure.

Blackness, by contrast, is an "expansive" or "inclusive" racialisation, which seeks to increase the number of people identified as Black over time through the one-drop rule. This "maximised the reproduction of slaves".[317] This is coherent according to the structures of settler colonies with slave plantations, as white planter-colonisers desire both the reproduction of the enslaved labour force and the disappearance of the Indigenous population.[318]

Notably, these two contrasting forms of racialisation are immanent in the sugar-slavery paradigm identified above. As we have seen, the paradigm tends towards the elimination of the native concurrently with the exploitation of Black enslaved labour.

[312] Wolfe 2006, pp. 387-388.

[313] Jenson 2011, p. 28.

[314] The example of Australian colonialism is instructive for understanding this point. Australian racialisation reacted to a demographic situation in which "the full descent Indigenous population was declining, [while] the mixed descent population was increasing" (Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission 1997, p. 24). As an Australian Human Rights Commission report would later acknowledge, the settler-colonial government imposed a stark racial distinction between the declining 'full blood' Indigenous people on the one hand, and those considered 'half caste', 'quadroon' or 'octoroon', in the racist language of the time. Both groups tended to identify strongly as Indigenous and were situated in their communities, so the assimilation of the mixed-descent population into whiteness occurred violently, without their consent: children were forcibly removed from their families and "whitened" by re-education and assimilation.

[315] Gauthier 2007, Annex: "Apparition et progrès du préjugé de couleur et de la législation ségrégationniste à Saint-Domingue 1705-1790" (n.p.).

[316] Gauthier 2010, p. 22.

[317] Wolfe 2016, Introduction, "Traces of History" (n.p.).

[318] Wolfe 2006 identifies the "inclusive taxonomy" of Black people's enslavement, p. 387. Tuck and Yang 2012 build on Wolfe, developing the additional vocabulary of "expansive" for Blackness and "subtractive" or "exclusive" for Indigenousness, see p. 11-13.

It also tends towards its own naturalisation, producing a durable link between race, sugar, and slavery which is interpreted as necessity. This links Dockès' economic paradigm to Wolfe's ideological taxonomy: by producing the differential treatment of two non-white racialised groups *while* passing such treatment as natural, the sugar-slavery paradigm produces two different forms of racialisation. In the *mémoire du roi*, we see that the law is, in spite of harshness, deemed "wise and necessary": it is justified by reference to its social function.

We have already quoted Médéric Moreau de Saint-Méry's description of the condition and demographics of slavery. He was also responsible for an attempted typography of racial categories. Anticipating pseudo-scientific racism with its logical rigour, his argument developed a racial gradient in 128 "parts" according to the racialisation of one's parents.[319] He simplified things, however, placing each of these 128 types within eleven racial categories, from "nègre" (Black) who have 0 to 8 parts of white ancestry, to "Sacatra" (8 to 23), and so on. Only having *all* 128 ancestors being white allowed someone to deserve "the term of White".[320]

2.5 Conclusion: A Colonial Slave Economy

From the early days of the sugar-slavery paradigm over a millennium ago, it appeared to many as a foregone conclusion that sugarcane was to be planted, harvested and processed by slaves. As the paradigm took on a new, global dimension in the colonial era, it only intensified. Surely it was natural that sugar needed slaves, the thinking went, to which other naturalised hierarchies were added, racist ones most of all: the enslavement of people pseudo-scientifically considered to 'naturally' be suited to such work. Certainly, by the eve of the Haitian Revolution it was no longer possible to describe the colonial economy without including racial slavery. As the baron of Wimpffen would conclude, the "colonies [...] can no longer exist without slavery. It's an awful truth to admit, but the danger of disregarding it may lead to the most terrible consequences. Therefore, slavery must be maintained or the colonies must be renounced."[321] However, as Russell Menard's study of British colonies unambiguously states, neither "Africanisation" of the enslaved labour force nor slavery's implantation in the Americas were inevitable.[322]

We have seen as much in our history of Saint-Domingue: from the early days of Spanish colonisation to the French intrusion into the island, many attempts to develop the colonial economy were made, relying sometimes on gold, other times on plantations, sometimes on settlers and other times on indentured work, or in

[319] Going back seven generations, one has 128 ancestors, but his argument does not (explicitly) rest upon this fact. Perhaps for the sake of exposition, he instead details only some variations between 0 and 128, based entirely on the racial category within which he places the parents. This oversimplification makes the mathematics unintelligible but Moreau uses the mathematical form to give himself a semblance of authority: in this respect it anticipates pseudoscientic racism, too.

[320] Moreau de Saint-Méry 1798, p. 86.

[321] Wimpffen 1911, p. 28: "Vos colonies, telles qu'elles sont, ne peuvent plus exister sans l'esclavage. C'est une vérité affreuse à dire, mais le danger de la méconnaître peut entraîner les plus terribles conséquences. Il faut donc maintenir l'esclavage ou renoncer aux colonies".

[322] Menard 2001, p. 33.

combination. What proved incredibly successful in Saint-Domingue, as the French would come to discover, was a form of planter colonialism which prioritised lucrative sugar, supported by a mercantilist economic system, with plantations worked by brutally mistreated slaves whose condition came to be justified by appeals to race. Within a complex world-economy, economic rationality led to the development of slavery, in a racial and brutal form, as the power-house of colonial prosperity.

The nation which all this brutality benefited was France, with Saint-Domingue accounting for 40% of its foreign trade and, with the other colonies, accounting for perhaps 15% of French economic growth in the short eighteenth century. This prompts the question of what the French thought about it. The same century was France's famous Enlightenment period, in which the *Lumières* thinkers were seen as beacons of societal progress and godfathers of the French Revolution. In the next chapter, we turn to some of these public intellectuals' writings on slavery and colonialism to consider how they defined French worldviews on Saint-Domingue. From there, we will dive into Parliamentary Archives of the French Revolution, identifying how the *Constituante* referred (or not) to colonies and their slavery. What we will find is just how unthinkable certain forms of justice were in France — up to the moment when they took place.

Chapter 3

Saint-Domingue in French Consciousness

> "To study Saint-Domingue is to study one of the origins, one of sources, of today's Western civilisation."
>
> Aimé Césaire.
> Césaire 1962, p. 21.

In this chapter, I carefully examine primary sources in order to establish how Saint-Domingue was conceived of in France up to the moment of the Haitian Revolution. This is achieved through two main sources: the Enlightenment *Encylopédie* and the Parliamentary Archive.[1]

There are many reasons to return to historical documents in order to understand what happened. Arzalier has noted the degree to which "official versions of history" ignore France's colonialism and, *a forteori*, colonial slavery: for example, "nearly every school manual, to this day, practices a real 'colonial mutism', and ignore the humiliating defeat inflicted by the Haitian rebels against a French army which came to re-establish slavery".[2] Outside of textbooks, the situation is not much better. As Jeremy Popkin has argued, "historians of the French Revolution continue to minimize or even ignore the revolution's colonial dimension", and they often have done from the start.[3] These eighteenth century texts reveal two slightly paradoxical facts: first, that the colonial question and questions of slavery were very much a subject of

[1] The *Encyclopédie, ou dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers...*, edited by Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d'Alembert, is a widely-read text from the eighteenth century. I used the version hosted by the University of Chicago's ARTFL Encyclopédie Project (Autumn 2022 Edition), edited by Robert Morrissey and Glenn Roe, at https://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu. Each article is cited as a separate bibliographical entry, with reference to the volume number.

The Parliamentary Archive was created in 102 volumes and has recently been hosted by CollEx-Persée at https://archives-parlementaires.persee.fr. I refer to it as to a primary source, with the letters AP, followed by a volume number, followed by page numbers.

[2] Arzalier 2007, pp. 18-19.

[3] Popkin 2009, p. 199. This has also been noted by Yves Bénot, Alain Badiou and others, and was discussed in section 2.3.4 above.

interest to both philosophers and politicians prior to the Haitian Revolution; but, second, that their world-view cast some forms of decolonisation and abolition as 'unthinkable'. This chapter will show how, despite talking about colonial slavery a lot, opposing discourses in France nonetheless obscured many of its realities — and especially the possibility of its immediate abolition. Yet, as the Haitian Revolution would demonstrate, a structurally disempowered group of slaves and maroons could overthrow it, however unimaginable this was for the French.

How did the debates around colonial slavery reach the point where, by 1791, the Haitian Revolution was "unthinkable even as it happened"?[4] This is precisely the question this chapter traces using eighteenth century interventions. There were real, profound and frequently bitter oppositions between different sections of the French intelligentsia and revolutionary government, as both the contradictory *Enyclopédie* and conflictual *Archives Parlementaires* show. What's more, were the anti-slavery side to have had all the ideological and political power, their arguments and actions may have been bolder and achieved at least partial liberation for the enslaved. However, what these archives demonstrate is that pro- and anti-colonial, and pro- and anti-slavery, forces in France interacted in ways which allowed colonial slavery to continue, all the while obscuring the possibility for change.

For the Parliamentary Archive, my focus is on a period of a few years only, 1789-1791. This attempts to isolate the French political activity and discourse which reacted to Saint-Domingue's evolving situation. During the same period in Britain, "Parliament opened public debates, from 1789 to 1791, on the British slave trade".[5] This period seriously troubles "the image of a France mother of the Rights of Man".[6] What it reveals instead is a vindication of Trouillot: the Haitian Revolution was in some ways "unthinkable" for the French. From the virulent apologies of racism and colonialism from some colonists, to the strategies of secrecy of others, and extending to the abolition movement itself, no French political actors were willing to defend enslaved Black people in Saint-Domingue. The record is troubling for narratives which have wished to credit the Haitian Revolution and its abolition of slavery to Enlightenment values.

3.1 Enlightenment Contradictions

There were important anti-colonial, anti-slavery and anti-racist thinkers before the eighteenth century. Francisco de Vitoria, a Dominican friar and founder of the School of Salamanca in the early sixteenth century, believed that all humans ought to have the same rights by virtue of sharing the same nature, which he understood in theological terms. This made the domination of other humans execrable, and he rejected the conquest of the Americas for this reason.

Jean Bodin was another opponent of slavery, on very different grounds. He is remembered for his defence of a strong central authority, often used as a support of monarchism. This, perhaps surprisingly, was articulated with his anti-slavery thought: "his defense of absolute sovereignty and his critique of slavery went hand

[4] Trouillot 2015, p. 73.
[5] Fick 1997, p. 62.
[6] Arzalier 2007, p. 19.

in hand".[7] Bodin identified slavery as a source of instability, and thus a risk to the survival of a central authority. On the one hand, the enslaved were a constant threat: autant d'esclaves, autant d'ennemis, he would say, citing it as an old saying. On the other hand — and, according to Ghachem, the "primary emphasis" for Bodin — "slavery tempted masters to push at the boundaries of their authority".[8] Slavery is a system which produces violence from enslaved and masters alike, with the former being dangerous when they rebel and the latter having the power to alter the state. He, therefore, offers the polar opposite of those later liberals who would defend slavery on the basis of the slaveholder's right to private property or self-government: "The best expedient for preserving the state is never to grant a prerogative of sovereignty to any subject", Bodin said.[9]

Both pro- and anti-slavery *and* pro- and anti-colonial discourses had developed before the French Revolution began. French reflections on both questions started as both systems developed and, given that "from 1763, the only French colonies are slave-owning ones",[10] the defences of colonialism and of slavery tend to converge.

As Sue Peabody has noted, "several prominent writers" of the 1760s and 1770s, "including Rousseau, Voltaire, Raynal, and Diderot, used the symbol of the African slave to criticize the perceived tyranny of the French crown".[11] But how much did this *symbol* reflect a critique of the actual institution of slavery?

3.1.1 Encyclopédie entries

The Encylopédie of Diderot and d'Alembert indicates opposing tendencies on these questions. Whereas some entries, like "Antilles", "Aboriginal" or "Coloniser",[12] are merely factual, "Enlightenment encyclopedias sat on a thin line between confident syntheses of knowledge and interventions in polemical debates",[13] and several entries on colonialism and slavery fit into the second category. This was already hinted at by Diderot's prospectus which considered it undeniable that dictionaries contributed to "the general enlightenment spreading across society".[14] In order to assess the enlightenment discourse about colonialism and slavery, I looked at a number of relevant entries, in addition to searching the text of all seventeen volumes (and the 'eighteenth volume' of banned entries) for discussions of "colonies" or "slavery" and their related terms. After considering 696 search results, the following indicates how the topics were discussed.[15] To discuss the range of views, I have selected five articles representing the variety of *Encyclopédie* positions, both favouring and

[7] Ghachem 2012, p. 47.

[8] ibid., p. 48. I have not read the full Bodin text, but those passages I have surveyed certainly appeal to both slaves and masters as dangerous.

[9] Quoted in ibid., p. 50.

[10] Bénot 1989, p. 12: "depuis 1763, la France n'a plus que des colonies esclavagistes".

[11] Peabody 2002, p. 9.

[12] Anonymous 1753; Mallet 1751.

[13] Vartija 2021, p. 5.

[14] "On ne peut disconvenir que depuis le renouvellement des Lettres, parmi nous, on ne doive en partie aux Dictionnaires les lumieres générales qui se sont répandues dans la société, et ce germe de Science qui dispose insensiblement les esprits à des connoissances plus profondes.": Diderot 1798, p. 4.

[15] See annex D for the search terms and results.

opposing colonialism and slavery.

The article simply titled "colonie", given a prized place, is pro-colonial, though this bias takes a little while to become apparent. The entry's author Forbonnais first defines a colony simply as the transportation of (part of) a people from one country to another.[16] He establishes six "types" of colony and takes time to get to the kind which were most relevant at the time of his writing: the sixth type, namely European colonies established "for trade and agriculture".[17] From this, Forbonnais derives as if it were a matter of fact that:

> "il étoit nécessaire de conquérir les terres, et d'en chasser les anciens habitans, pour y en transporter de nouveaux."[18]
>
> [it was necessary to conquer the land and drive out the old inhabitants in order to bring in new ones.]

The phenomena of extermination and slavery are thus euphemised as "driving out" and "bringing in", and furthermore presented as necessities. In another article, the same author considers colonisation to simply be what "intelligent peoples" do to satisfy consumer demand, confirming his positive view.[19] As Yves Bénot would summarise, Forbonnais was "loyal to the status quo, to slavery, to the domination of the metropole over its colonies".[20]

As mentioned, however, the *Encyclopédie* was a contradictory document. It also had a number of anti-colonial articles. One of the more suprising places such sentiment is found is in Damilaville's entry on "Population".[21] He says that colonies result from a "spirit of conquest and expansion" which "destroys the conquerors as it does those who are conquered".[22] He makes a clever distinction: the world is made up of places which are inhabited — and the lack of population indicates it to be "unfavourable to the human species", which should prevent us from trying to settle there — and places where people already live — which "belong to those who live there. Why dispossess them?"[23] Over the course of his entry, Damilaville tries to expose the immorality of settler colonialism beyond any doubt, speaking of "odious treatments", "despotism", "degradation", "cruelty", and so on.[24] He also makes a claim to the nation's own interest that the colonies, by specialising France in the production of "trading luxuries and superfluities", have not caused "advantages" but "harms" to the economy.[25] This is unconvincing and thankfully not the crux of his argument, which is mostly moral. Nowhere it is clearly than when Damilaville makes

[16] Forbonnais 1753a, p. 648.
[17] ibid., p. 650.
[18] ibid., p. 650.
[19] Forbonnais 1753b, p. 691.
[20] Bénot 1989, p. 21.
[21] Damilaville was a friend of Voltaire who help spread his and others' pamphlets: see F. A. Kafker and S. L. Kafker 1988, pp. 84-88.
[22] Damilaville 1765, p. 99.
[23] ibid., p. 99.
[24] ibid., p. 99, p. 93, p. 95, p. 97.
[25] ibid., p. 100.

sure to emphasise his opposition to slavery, so entangled with the settler-colonial project, by saying:

> "on ne manqueroit pas de se dire que nul n'a le droit d'acquérir la possession individuelle d'un autre ; que la liberté est une propriété de l'existance inaliénable, qui ne peut se vendre ni s'acheter ; que les conditions d'un tel marché seroient absurdes ; qu'enfin les hommes n'appartiennent qu'à la nature, et qu'ils l'outragent par une coutume qui les avilit et qui la dégrade."[26]
>
> [we will not miss the opportunity to say that no one has the right to the individual possession of another; that freedom is an inalienable property of existence, which cannot be bought or sold; that the conditions of such a bargain would be absurd; that finally men belong only to nature, and that they offend it by a custom that degrades them and degrades it.]

By contrast, Jean-Baptiste-Pierre Le Romain, an obscure author who "published nothing except for his contribution to the Encyclopédie", wrote a pro-slavery article.[27] Titled "Negres, considérés comme esclaves dans les colonies de l'Amérique" (Negroes, considered as slaves in the American colonies), it falsely whitewashes New World slavery as improving the quality of life of the enslaved, claiming that they:

> "trouvent en Amérique des douceurs qui leur rendent la vie animale beaucoup meilleure que dans leur pays. Ce changement en bien les met en état de résister au travail, et de multiplier abondamment."[28]
>
> [they find sweetnesses in America that make their animal life much better than in their country. This change for the better enables them to withstand hard work and to multiply abundantly.]

There were many articles containing "nègre" in the title, however. A few of this attempted to be factual, such as the natural history entry for "Negre" which gives the best medical theories for purported racial difference — all wrong, with some involving bile, or humours, and others involving strange comparisons to eggs or worms.[29] Some articles about "nègres" can also be considered anti-slavery. The anonymous entry "Negres" placed in the category of "Commerce" has some critiques of slavery's defenders.[30] Its author writes that "they try to justify the odious nature of this trade, which is contrary to natural law, by saying that [...]" in order to introduce pro-slavery arguments.[31] nother example is by Jaucourt. The prolific author of "seventeen thousand [articles] — about one-quarter of all the articles in the seventeen volumes" of the *Encyclopédie*, wrote one on the slave trade.[32] "Traite des nègres" is explicit in its opposition to its subject:

[26] Damilaville 1765, p. 102.
[27] F. A. Kafker and S. L. Kafker 1988, p. 211.
[28] Le Romain 1765, p. 80.
[29] Formey 1765, p. 77.
[30] Not to be confused with the Formey article "Negre" in the natural history category discussed above.
[31] Anonymous 1765, p. 79.
[32] F. A. Kafker and S. L. Kafker 1988, p. 177.

> "Cet achat de negres, pour les réduire en esclavage, est un négoce qui viole la religion, la morale, les lois naturelles, et tous les droits de la nature humaine."[33]
>
> [This purchase of negroes, to reduce them into slavery, is a trade that violates religion, morality, natural laws and all the rights of human nature.]

His article advocated for "granting them freedom", predicting that doing so would only promote the economy: "in a few generations, this vast and fertile land will be inhabited by countless people".[34] This argument for the economic benefits of emancipation was more realistic than the one advanced by Damilaville. The latter had claimed that colonial slavery promoted economically unhelpful forms of trade, yet the colonial commodity trade was making some French people very rich. Jaucourt, by contrast, acknowledged that "trade will suffer for some time: I admit to it, it is the effect of all new arrangements"; but he did foresee long-term benefits, after the reorientation of the economy.[35]

3.1.2 Voltaire

Voltaire is most remembered today for his philosophical tale *Candide*, which follows a naïve man on travels around the world. When in Surinam, Candide is shocked to see a Black man lying on the ground missing an arm and a leg. Candide is taken aback, especially when learning that the slave's condition is caused by his master. The slave nonchalantly responds that it is custom ("c'est l'usage"), explaining how he was mutilated:

> "Quand nous travaillons aux sucreries, et que la meule nous attrape le doigt, on nous coupe la main ; quand nous voulons nous enfuir, on nous coupe la jambe ; je me suis trouvé dans les deux cas. C'est à ce prix que vous mangez du sucre en Europe."[36]
>
> [When we work in the sugar mills and the millstone catches our finger, they cut off our hand; when we want to run away, they cut off our leg. That's the price we pay for the sugar you eat in Europe.]

However, we must avoid seeing this as a condemnation of slavery outright, and certainly not of its racial nature. Other writings from Voltaire caution us against seeing his view as overly progressive. In his *Essai sur les moeurs*, Voltaire makes a rather shocking inference from a misrepresentation of African slavery to their inferiority:

> "Nous n'achetons des esclaves domestiques que chez les nègres. On nous reproche ce commerce : un peuple qui trafique de ses enfants est encore plus

[33] Jaucourt 1765, p. 532.
[34] ibid., p. 533.
[35] ibid., p. 533.
[36] Voltaire 2010, pp. 73-74.

Figure 3.1: An illustration of Voltaire's *Candide* by Moreau le Jeune

Interpretation: Moreau illustrates Voltaire's famous nineteenth chapter of *Candide* and captions it with the slave's words: "this is the price for the sugar you eat in Europe". *Source:* Reproduced from the public domain work published by the Bibliothèque Nationale Française, see Moreau and Bacquoy 1787.

> condamnable que l'acheteur ; ce négoce démontre notre supériorité ; celui qui se donne un maître était né pour en avoir."[37]
>
> [We only buy domestic slaves from the Negroes. We are reproached for this trade: a people who traffic their own children is even more condemnable than the buyer; this trade demonstrates our superiority; he who gives himself a master was born to have one.]

His editors were embarrassed enough by this to sharply contradict Voltaire in a footnote, pointing out that African traders "were only the accomplices and instruments of the Europeans; the latter are the true culprits".[38] Voltaire's perspective is to be understood in reference to his economic interests: as "a self-described 'merchant philosopher' [he] held shares in the *Compagnie des Indes* throughout his adult life", deriving large profits from colonialism and investing 10,000 *livres* on a slave ship.[39] Gianamar Giovannetti-Singh has analysed how Voltaire's apparently anti-slavery passage of *Candide* is, in fact, "compatible with the *philosophe*'s material interests as a colonial investor", criticising Dutch practices in a way which "bolstered support for a less barbarous, more efficient form of French racialized labour".[40]

3.1.3 Explaining the Contradictions

Perhaps the most famous text explicitly opposing slavery before the French revolution is by Condorcet.[41] Geneviève Rousselière has argued that even he proposed "a gradualist plan for abolition".[42] Rousselière places this within a broader "paradox of republican emancipation", arguing that those French Republicans most committed to extending freedom universally nonetheless considered many people who were "dependent" to be incapable or unworthy of being free:

> "Paradox of Republican Emancipation: only those who are not dependent, that is, those who are already free, are eligible to be emancipated."[43]

This paradox applied to many categories of people, from landless peasants to women to slaves. What Rousselière helpfully brings out of a subset of revolutionaries who were progressive in theory was that they also mistrusted the ability of oppressed groups including women, the poor and slaves to know what to do with their freedom. This creates a predicament in which slaves will never be worthy of freedom because they lack features they could only have developed if they were free. At best, this is cautiously resolved by slow and timid steps towards emancipation, and it certainly ruled out immediate abolition. It shows why even the French defenders of slaves and opponents of slavery were rarely able to support their full liberation.

---

[37] Voltaire 1878, volume 13, pp. 177-178.
[38] ibid., volume 13, note 8, p. 178.
[39] Giovannetti-Singh 2022, p. 24, p. 27.
[40] ibid., p. 32.
[41] Condorcet 1781.
[42] Rousselière 2024, p. 168.
[43] ibid., p. 25.

However, slavery was rarely thought of so precisely and explicitly. Bertrand Binoche, in his analysis of the philosophy of the *Lumières*, identifies slavery as a "*maître-mot*" for them, meaning a keyword or watchword. It was used incredibly frequently,"a testament to its decisive character".[44] They loved it as a "symbol" of tyranny, which they saw themselves as fighting.[45] However, they evaded the concrete analysis of colonial slavery as an institution. As Binoche argues, "the *Lumières* needed 'slavery' *in* all its confusion": the term had a "constitutive indetermination".[46] As a symbol, it represented an unfree, undignified condition, and the *Lumières* saw themselves as fighting against it, for freedom. However, we must wonder where this left the *philosophes*' ability to oppose actual slavery. Far too often, slavery as symbol covered slavery as concrete practice. Their discourse masked real-life injustices happening in their lifetimes.

Moreau de Saint-Méry and Hilliard d'Auberteuil both mocked the *philosophes* for being ineffectual.[47] They were right not to be particularly scared, though it is confusing why, with their often violent rhetoric, they didn't do more to attack slavery. Bertrand Binoche again helps us to better understand this apparent lack of effectiveness. The *Lumières*, he argues, were attempting a philosophical insurrection. They wished to change people's minds, to transform society based on an ideological shift. This, precisely, ruled out political revolution: they "explicitly advised a *non*-insurrectionary political emancipation".[48] They were "revolutionary by the very aggressive image they gave themselves of their [philosophical] task, but were not generally [revolutionary] when they advocated for political measures".[49]

Catherine Reinhardt's analysis of eighteenth century texts "reveals the persisting ambiguity surrounding the relationship between race and slavery"; "*philosophes* and *encyclopédistes* expressed their ideological struggle with this issue, at times even subscribing to prevailing racist theories".[50] For all their progressivism, Reinhardt is right to highly that Enlightenment "narrative[s] often overlapped with arguments voiced by proponents of the slave regime": there was a "surprising concurrency of pro- and antislavery ideology".[51]

We can explain this surprising overlap with Charles Mills' identification of the racial politics at play. The *Lumières*, along with other thinkers of the eighteenth century, were humanists. Yet, as Charles Mills has argued, "*European humanism usually meant that only Europeans were human*".[52] The much-celebrated liberalism which in many ways began in this era "was and is racialized, based on exclusion, and the substantive inclusion of people of color will be resisted".[53] Where both pro- and anti-slavery voices typically met was in what we might call their whiteness, if not more outrightly in their racism.

[44]Binoche 2018, p. 153, his italics.
[45]Peabody 2002, p. 9.
[46]Binoche 2018, p. 153, his italics.
[47]Reinhardt 2006, pp. 42-43.
[48]Binoche 2018, p. 158, his italics.
[49]ibid., p. 159.
[50]Reinhardt 2006, p. 39.
[51]ibid., p. 39, p. 41.
[52]Mills 2022, p. 27, his italics.
[53]ibid., p. xxxix.

When the French Revolution began in 1789, in great part building on discourses of progress, it thus inherited this ambiguous legacy. Despite a few dissident voices who dared go further, the "framework of Western thought"—certainly, that of French thought—was defined by debates on slavery whose opponents shared racist assumptions.[54] As we now turn to the French Revolution, in which the Society of the Friends of the Blacks would fight the planter class of the Massiac Club, we will see that their antagonism did not produce a deep questioning of the racial order of Saint-Domingue. That would only be engendered fully by the enslaved themselves, during the Haitian Revolution.

3.2 The Start of the Revolution

1789 is arguably the most significant year in French history, remembered as the start of the Revolution that has defined national identity ever since. It is remembered as progressive both by its opponents and its advocates. It also produced enthusiasm, paradoxically, among all parts of Saint-Domingue's population:

> "A Saint-Domingue, comme dans les autres Antilles, la Révolution avait été accueillie par tous avec enthousiasme. Les planteurs en attendaient la fin du despotisme ministériel; les petits blancs, l'égalité de fortune par une sorte de partage des plantations; les mulâtres et les affranchis, la reconnaissance de leurs droits civils et civiques. Les esclaves eux-mêmes n'avaient pas été sans concevoir de vagues espoirs de délivrance."[55]
>
> [In Saint-Domingue, as in the other Antilles, the Revolution was welcomed by all with enthusiasm. The planters expected an end to ministerial despotism; the small whites hoped for equality of wealth through a sort of redistribution of the plantations; the mulattoes and freedmen, recognition of their civil and civic rights. The slaves themselves also had vague hopes of deliverance.]

From 1789 to September 1791, the first National Assembly was formed. This was called the *Constituante*, so named because it was concerned with providing France with a constitution. It is primarily with this first period of revolutionary government that we are concerned here, for several reasons. Its debates often touched upon who was included in the "sovereign people": would slaves, or free people of colour, be given full citizenship?[56] This period is one in which the French revolution had the opportunity to transform the colonial order, abolish slavery and fight racism. Despite progress on certain topics, it did little on these three. When the Constitution of September 1791 was produced and the assembly was replaced with the *Assemblée nationale législative*, its measures did not apply to the colonies, thus maintaining slavery and racism there; the slave trade was also allowed to continue. The constitution did guarantee citizenship to those free people of colour who met the same conditions as a white person would, but only within the French mainland;

[54] Trouillot 2015, p. 82.
[55] Deschamps 2012, p. 82.
[56] Wahnich 2019, p. 85. As Wahnich notes, also at issue was whether domestics, women, the poor, Protestants and Jewish people could be considered sovereign.

in so doing, it neglected to attack the anti-Black racism fundamental to slavery. While the French assembly advanced little on these issues, Haitians organised, and the constitution arrived after the Haitian Revolution had already begun. When slavery was eventually abolished 'by' the National Convention in February 1794, it was largely determined by the success of the Haitian uprising.

What, then, caused the *Constituante* to make so little progress on Saint-Domingue? This is the directing question for the rest of this chapter. The Assembly was not, of course, a homogenous group, and the conflict and balance of power between its various factions is what determined its results. No one group having absolute power, its rulings were determined by the complex interplay between them. Some groups were ferociously opposed to each other, such as the *Société des Amis des Noirs* (Society of the Friends of the Blacks) who fought against the colonial Club Massiac.

The "colonial question" isn't always present in the documents of the National Assembly, but it reappears periodically. It is a background to all discussions in the years of the *Constituante*, whether acknowledged or not: given as the assembly was concerned with established a constitution for 'France', the question of whether the constitution was to apply to the colonies lurked. The archive of the parliamentary debates is only the most visible part of the interventions around this question, as colonial influence took secretive forms too, lobbying various political actors. Indeed, even the open discussions of the colonies often sought to shield the institutions of the slave trade and plantations from scrutiny. However, even those trying to obscure the economic realities of Saint-Domingue knew its material importance, as we explained in section 2.3.

3.2.1 Saint-Domingue on the Tennis Court: A Foot in the Door

The tennis court oath of 20 June 1789 is one of the most significant moments of the French Revolution, remembered for the sermon taken by all bar one deputy. The deputies had seen their entrance barred by the King's men and found a nearby sports room to use as a meeting place. The oath to always meet, despite any repression by the monarch, to elaborate a constitution for the country's better interests is rightly remembered as pivotal in the beginning of the end of the French monarchy. However, when we return to the documentation itself, looking past the event's symbolic role in a teleological account of the revolution, we find two things of note. First, the ambiguity of the oath towards the monarchy. Second, the presence of the colonial question on the tennis court. Here, we focus on the second.

Present on that day are twenty representatives of Saint-Domingue, elected by some of the island's white adult population (though controversy will emerge on this). Not mere silent background actors, they actively participate, with Louis Gouy d'Arsy, foremost colonialist of Saint-Domingue, making the declaration that the colony "puts itself under the protection of the National Assembly".[57]

In this moment, twelve deputies are admitted for Saint-Domingue, which is irregular in two ways. First, they are not approved of by the King (unlike the others). Second, there is no reasoning given for the number of deputies admitted. No appeal

[57]AP 8, p. 138.

is made to their number being proportional to the population of the island, nor to its economic significance. No comparison is made with the number of deputies of the provinces of France. We cannot know if there was an implicit reasoning for the admission of twelve deputies, or if such a reasoning followed the standards for other deputies in a separate set: it certainly did not directly follow population proportionality. What we do know, however, is that this question will come back in a very explicit form in later months. At that point, it is the colonies' uniqueness that will be used as a pivotal argument, rather than any comparison. The significance of Saint-Domingue's alliance with the Assemblée *against* the King is crucial, however. It is was allowed the colonial deputies to make appeals to their allegiance when courting favours from the *Constituante* in subsequent months.

The tennis court oath is thus the critical beginning of Saint-Domingue's elites' attempts to seek protection from the revolutionary government. As noted by Florence Gauthier among others, these were not their only efforts: they were simultaneously lobbying the King and conducting numerous more secretive activities. But, as we will see from the parliamentary archive, their engagement with the national assembly demonstrates a series of manoeuvres to protect Saint-Domingue's slave-based institutions. This explains the apparent contradiction in how, "autonomists by conviction, their first procedure was to seek integration".[58] Integration was achieved by their best attempts to present themselves in alignment with revolutionary aims, a fraught and contradictory project. It makes strange bedfellows as they attempt in places to present themselves as victim to the arbitrary laws of the King. At times they appeal against their inability to trade with countries other than France, speaking to an economically liberal aspiration of free trade; at other times, they spoke to the uniqueness of the island and the inability of France-based politicians to make decisions for them, speaking to a progressive democratic aspiration of self-governance. At all times, they dehumanised the enslaved from Saint-Domingue, but their rhetoric could vary: sometimes, slaves were to be presented as barbarians; other times, they were to be seen as victims of plights the island was going through, additional reasons to, for instance, provide the island with bread. The often contradictory appeals to and against mercantilism, liberalism, democracy, and the rights of man, are made coherent when understood as tactical rhetorical moves to legitimise or protect from scrutiny the slave plantations of Saint-Domingue.

3.2.2 Debates Over Deputation

The tennis court oath was a foot in the door for the deputies of Saint-Domingue, who secured power within the revolutionary parliament. By the time their deputation is being scrutinised a week later, on 27 June 1789, "it was less a question of whether they were to be admitted than of deciding whether, having admitted them, they should be excluded."[59]

Pierre-Louis Prieur opened the discussion, orienting it around three questions: (1) whether Saint-Domingue should have deputies at all, (2) whether the designation of the deputies in Saint-Domingue was legitimate, and (3) how many deputies Saint-

[58] Césaire 1962, p. 37.
[59] ibid., p. 39.

Domingue should have.[60] This was an astute move on Prieur's part, as he was able to reorient the discussion around the third question, announcing himself that he thought twenty to be the best number of deputies to admit. The question of the number stimulated a discussion: should it be two, or twelve, or twenty? Bouche considered what a proportional deputation would be by comparison with French provinces: if they are to be proportional to the whole population, Black included, then 25 deputies is fair; if they are to be calculated by white population alone, then they should only get two.[61] Lanjuinais raises the importance of abolishing slavery and dismisses the idea of admitting deputies in the meantime, though Bouche thinks it is important to wait for a "calmer time" to discuss abolition.[62] The archbishop of Bordeaux asks for Saint-Domingue to have twelve deputies, without explanation; Legrand suggests that, were this rule to be applied to all colonies, it would mean giving them 200 deputies as a whole.[63] Louis Marthe de Gouy d'Arsy builds on Bouche's figures on the economic importance of Saint-Domingue to respond that it is more economically important that other colonies, and therefore requires more deputies: an attempt to curtail democracy by making representatives proportional not to population alone but also to wealth.[64] This comes as little surprise from Gouy d'Arsy, a noble representative of Saint-Domingue who had been front and centre of colonial affairs before the French Revolution began.[65]

Others attempted to get away from this strange debate about deputy numbers by bringing the "fate of the blacks" to the fore, including Stanislas de Clermont-Tonnerre, Guy-Jean-Baptiste Target and Jean-François Gaultier de Biauzat; the cardinal Dominique de La Rochefoucauld also asked "that the Assembly consider the freedom of blacks before it separates".[66] It didn't work, however: the assembly prepared to vote on the second question — whether the Saint-Domingue deputies were properly elected by a subset of the white population — thus bypassing debates about the legitimacy of deputation *tout court*. Even this, however was interrupted by the arrival of deputies who, upon the King's orders, had come to join the assembly.

The Missed Opportunity

As Jeremy Popkin imagines, slavery could have been abolished during the pushback to colonial demands on 27 June:

> "At this critical moment, when the colonial deputies had not yet been seated, a snap vote might have committed the assembly to an epochal decision by insisting that a free nation could not have slave colonies, But the discussion was suddenly interrupted by the arrival in the hall of the remaining noble and clergy deputies, obeying Louis XVI's injunction to accept the union of the

[60] AP 8, p. 164.
[61] AP 8, pp. 164-165.
[62] AP 8, p. 165.
[63] AP 8, p. 165.
[64] AP 8, p. 165.
[65] See e.g. Gouy d'Arsy 1788.
[66] AP 8, p. 165.

> three orders and providing a dramatic example of how colonial and domestic issues were to interfere with each other throughout the revolution."[67]

Likewise, Yves Bénot argued "that the antislavery cause perhaps missed a promising opportunity in mid-1789", as Geggus reports.[68] Bénot considers the lobbying by colonists to demonstrate "a climate favourable to anti-slavery figure" which they were organising against.[69] The colonial faction "felt a current of opinion which the *Amis des Noirs* were unable to make the most of", and they acted quickly and effectively.[70] Popkin writes that "after this initial battle, the defenders of colonial slavery in the National Assembly managed to prevent any further legislative debate on the issue".[71] With better organisation, the antislavery movement might have made significant gains, but it failed. When August came, however, the most famous declaration of the French Revolution would appear to some to provide a progressive way forward — but did it?

3.2.3 The *Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen*

The narrative of the French Revolution as a progressive movement, excised of its complicated relationship with colonial slavery, refers to "its catalytic ideology of equality and liberty".[72] No document is more often cited in representation of this than the *Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen* (DDHC, Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen) of 26 August 1789, which opens on the principles of freedom and equality for all men.[73] Despite its supposed universality, consider how the first and last articles are presented:

> Article 1:
>
> Les hommes naissent et demeurent libres et égaux en droits. Les distinctions sociales ne peuvent être fondées que sur l'utilité commune.
>
> [Men are born and remain free and equal in rights. Social distinctions can only be based on the common good.]

> Article 17:
>
> La propriété étant un droit inviolable et sacré, nul ne peut en être privé, si ce n'est lorsque la nécessité publique, légalement constatée, l'exige évidemment, et sous la condition d'une juste et préalable indemnité.
>
> [The right to property being inviolable and sacred, nobody may be deprived of it except when public necessity, established by law, clearly requires it, and on condition of a just and prior compensation.]

[67] Popkin 2009, p. 202.
[68] Geggus 2002a, p. 159.
[69] Bénot 1989, p. 107.
[70] ibid., p. 108.
[71] Popkin 2009, p. 202.
[72] Fick 1997, p. 67.
[73] The masculine language indicated the exclusion of women from the rights presented, which was soon criticised by feminists. Olympe de Gouges responded with her 1791 *Déclaration des droits de la femme et de la citoyenne*.

Florence Gauthier notes that "the principles of the *Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen* inspire terror among defenders of slavery and colour prejudice".[74] This is true, and we will soon see colonists like Moreau de Saint-Méry organise against it. But Pierre Philippy, in his preface to Gauthier's book, is wrong to consider it to be "beyond ambiguity" that the DDHC established the "ontological liberty and equal dignity of every person", making "the slave trade and slavery [...] absolutely condemnable".[75]

Contra Philippy, the DDHC clearly provides obstacles for the principles of equality and liberty. Article 1, when read in full, clearly provides one clear basis for "social distinctions": 'public utility'. On the basis of the slippery concept of public utility, the hierarchies one might have thought ruled out by equality are able to be reintroduced. Meanwhile, Article 17 made clear the utmost importance of private property. Slaves being property, this article protected the slaveholders.[76] Robin Blackburn persuasively argues that "slaves were indubitably a sort of property as well as arguably a prop of public utility", so "the qualification of natural liberty seemed robust enough to reassure the many colonial proprietors in the French assembly".[77] Sylvia Wynter puts the point even more strongly in her famous manuscript *Black Metamorphosis*:

> "The 'freedom' which the bourgeoisie claimed from the feudal aristocracy of Europe was based *primarily* on their right [to] property. The blacks were not simply excluded from these rights. They themselves *were* 'property'."[78]

Blackburn is right, therefore, to argue that the "French Revolution at first presented barriers to slave emancipation as strong as those present in North America".[79] The claim that the DDHC unambiguously established ontological liberty and equality, simply taking some time to act, is based on a partial reading of its text.

3.3 Revolutionary Approaches to Slavery?

We have established how the first months of the French Revolution played out in colonists' favour, allowing their deputation and with their opponents missing an opportunity to block their progress. Now, rather than give a detailed account of each turn in the *Constituante*, we summarise the approaches taken as they pertain to racial slavery. We find a variety of different rhetorical stances: from arguments shielding the colonies from scrutiny, to others attempting to reform their racial

[74] Gauthier 2007, Part III, Chapter 3, §36 , n.p. See also Belissa 2023, Chapter 2, titled "La Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen, « terreur des colons », 1789-1794.

[75] Philippy in Gauthier 2007, Preface, §3, n.p.

[76] The possibility of transgressing private property in the name of "public necessity" is a little less slippery than "public utility" was for Article 1: the law must be changed in order to achieve it. Furthermore, the stipulation that just and prior compensation must occur is not given any caveats, casting abolition without compensation as contrary to the DDHC. When slavery was abolished the final time in France, this principle was the basis for the state buying slaves from slaveholders first, then emancipating them.

[77] Blackburn 2006, pp. 650-651.

[78] Wynter n.d., p. 46, her emphasis.

[79] Blackburn 2006, pp. 650.

institutions to better protect slavery, to opposition to colour prejudice. We also find anonymous or forged documents being circulated to try to influence the debate. What they demonstrate is how, as a whole, these diverse and opposing positions nonetheless produced the range of views according to which the Haitian Revolution was unthinkable.

3.3.1 Empowerment of the Colonial Faction

In the months after the DDHC, despite fear among colonists, little was achieved. For a while, it seemed, from 22 October, that a campaign by the *Société des Colons Américains* might gain deputies representing free people of colour. A letter from 23 November signed by Julien Raimond, Vincent Ogé and other prominent advocates of people of colour made a powerful case.[80] However, their demands were never heard in the Assembly due to "extraordinary obstruction" by their opponents.[81] By contrast, colonists were able to advance their cause more successfully.

A Colonial Committee?

On 26 November 1789, two months after Louis de Curt was admitted as a white deputy for Guadeloupe, he made a proposal on behalf of all French colonies. As the Assembly sought to establish laws for the whole country, Curt raised "the necessity of giving your sugar islands a special status", because they "differ in every respect from the metropole".[82] His arguments were carefully pitched to appeal to the revolutionary government: he sought to show that their material interests relied on the colonies and that their political values could be reframed in alignment with protecting colonial institutions from interference, too. In so doing, he crafted a liberal shield for a most illiberal institution, slavery. Just a few months later his project was successful.

Curt began by reminding the Assembly of a royal memorandum on the colonies from earlier that year which had noted the "stunning disparities between them [the colonies] and the European provinces of France".[83] With much of the *Constituante* still loyal to the King, and all of the government wary of him, this framed the favourable context for the colonists: a degree of consent and coercion secured by the monarchy upon which the motion could be advanced.

The colonists had respected the "great works" of the Revolution, says Curt, by keeping the "most absolute silence" while awaiting that laws be passed on the colonies. But now, it was urgent to address them — and it was "as dangerous as it is bad politics" to continue delaying discussion.[84] Indeed, he continues, "the great resources of the nation are so dependent upon the fate of the colonies" that the slightest mistake in legislation would have terrible effects.[85] This serves a first rhetorical function, namely to prepare for a later argument (or, really, a veiled threat): that if they were to act selfishly, the colonists would ask for independence, ruining France

[80] AP 10, pp. 329-333.
[81] Geggus 2002a, p. 164.
[82] AP 10, p. 263.
[83] Ministres du roi 1877, p. 592.
[84] AP 10, p. 263.
[85] AP 10, pp. 263-264.

in the process. The colonists' (in reality, ambiguous) adhesion to the metropole, as Curt put it grandiosely and wordily, "put their glory to sacrificing themselves to the heroism of the love of the French name".[86]

The second rhetorical function of his claim that any mistake is dangerous is to build the notion that the Assembly itself is poorly prepared to make decisions about the colonies. These lands are distant — "two thousand leagues" away — and very different from the metropolitan provinces, and most deputies have never set foot there.[87] Plus, as earlier mentioned, the Assembly seems too busy to attend to them.

To these pragmatic arguments about the unsuitability of the National Assembly to issue proclamations on colonies, Curt adds an appeal to two politically liberal ideals. The first is that of democratic control: as Yves Bénot has noted of this period, often "colonial demands are presented as democratic demands, demands of *self-government*".[88] Of course, the colonists' desired independence is far from the independence sought by anti-colonial movements on the basis of more thorough democracy. They wish for white planters to be independent from France *so that they can better continue their oppression* of the enslaved and racialised populations.

This is what makes the second way Curt appeals to the French Revolution's vision of progress all the more dishonest. He presents a totally inaccurate vision of what the colonies were like:

> "comme dans les colonies il n'existe ni dîmes à supprimer, ni féodalité à détruire, ni priviléges [sic] à combattre, ni traitants à dépouiller, ni impôts odieux à proscrire; comme il n'y a aucun systéme de finance à purifier, [...] il ne s'agit plus que de surveiller, [...] ce qui est très-facile [sic] dans un pays où la grande communication ne laisse de secret sur rien, et pour personne ; comme les tribunaux n'ont besoin que d'un petit nombre de lois pour assurer la propriété de chacun"[89]
>
> [as in the colonies there are no duties to abolish, no feudal system to destroy, no privileges to fight, no traitors to dispossess, no odious taxes to proscribe; as there is no financial system to purify, [...] we only have to monitor, [...] which is very easy in a country whose great communication leaves no secret about anything, or for anyone; as the courts need only a small number of laws to ensure everyone's property]

This long list of features of the colonies was nearly entirely wrong, of course. All French colonies (including his own colony of Guadeloupe) had a highly hierarchical structure, with Saint-Domingue being no exception as we have seen. However, Curt presented them as being free of feudalism and privilege, which at best misses the point. Even if we define feudalism in a narrow sense, the system of slavery and the privileges afforded to the 'aristocracy of the skin' did not make it free of hierarchy and exclusion. Furthermore, even on a purely racist view which did not consider

[86] AP 10, p. 264: "s'ils ne mettaient pas leur gloire à se sacrifier à l'héroisme de l'amour du nom francais".

[87] AP 10, pp. 265.

[88] Bénot 1989, p. 49, his italics and his use of English word 'self-government' in a French-language text.

[89] AP 10, p. 264.

the humanity of the free people of colour and Black people, an honest report would have had to recognise the high degree of hierarchy within the white population, with many *petits blancs* being closer to serfs than to the model free citizen. By presenting this fiction to the *Constituante*, he was relying on their lack of knowledge which he had earlier used as an argument against their ruling over the colonies. He hoped that their ignorance would allow them to believe that these distant lands were free of the problems that preoccupied the revolutionaries, and therefore didn't need to be attended to as urgently as the feudal privilege or odious tax which concerned the National Assembly in France.

All these arguments are brought together by Curt in calling for a committee: "if you wish to organise your colonies in such a ways that forever assures you the advantages of these precious lands, you must form a committee to perfect their organisation without delay".[90] He argues the colonies provide wealth to the metropole at great sacrifice for the colonists, but:

> "Cependant, pour que cet état de choses subsiste, il nous faut une legislation particuliére qui ne contrarie en rien nos mœurs, nos usages, nos propriétés ; il faut, surtout, qu'elle nous assure la tranquillité sur nos foyers, pendant que nous travaillerons à vous procurer cette espèce de bonheur qui dépend de toutes les commodités de la vie. Laissez donc aux colons réunis, aux négociants, le soin de vous éclairer sur leurs besoins; ordonnez qu'ils travaillent eux-mémes au code qu'ils penseront convenir le mieux à leur situation."[91]
>
> [However, for this state of things to persist, we need a particular legislation which does not contravene our morals, our customs, our properties. Above all, it must guarantee us peace in our homes, while we work to provide you with that species of happiness which depends on all of life's amenities. Let, then, the colonists and merchants meet to enlighten you about their needs; order them to work on the code that they will think to best suit their situation.]

Such a committee, Curt thinks, should involve 20 people: 10 colonists and 10 merchants. All, therefore, would have a material interest in plantation slavery and the slave trade continuing — not that he mentions this. Its conclusions would then be presented to the Assembly, with Curt providing a final guarantee to make it all the more palatable: "you will examine it in all your wisdom, and you will only decree it once you are left with no doubts about its utility and its perfection".[92] Curt's hyperbole was risible, but the promise it communicated was reassuring: the Assembly would have the ability to sign off. In the meantime, however, colonists and merchants would be able to advance their cause away from the prying eyes of the *Constituante*, which appeared to pose a threat since the *Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen* was passed.

It took a few months, but the idea was ultimately successful. On 3 March 1790, the Assembly's colonial committee was created. A few days later, "on March 8, 1790, [the *Constituante*] passed a decree which granted the colonies internal legislative

[90] AP 10, p. 264.
[91] AP 10, p. 265.
[92] AP 10, p. 265.

autonomy."[93] As Marc Belissa writes, it was "a first victory for the colonists".[94] A vote on 28 March further reinforced the decree.

I have spent a good deal of time on Curt's motion in part because it represents a most significant turning point in the parliamentary strategy of the colonists. The colonists had many enemies, and two chief ones among them: the *exclusif* on the one hand, and abolitionism on the other. The first squeezed them for profits, placed them at risk of food shortages, and created a dependency on the metropole. It was humiliating and destabilising and they wanted it gone. The second risk, however, was greater, and Curt's motion represents the turning point at which the colonists decisively built a front against it, even at the expense of accepting the *exclusif*. During the Revolution and in the *DDHC*, they saw the risk of democracy and humanitarianism abolishing slavery and the deep racial hierarchies which sustained it. This is why Curt is so self-effacing as to allow for the continuation of the *exclusif* and to call for a committee in which merchants would sit. Though they were in conflict over profits, colonists and merchants could make common cause to save the colonial system which enriched them both.

Cocherel's Campaign in Favour of Slavery

The same day as Curt's initial motion, Nicholas Robert de Cocherel distributed a tract which would find its way into the Assembly's archive a few days later.[95] Cocherel was a colonial deputy who is well-recognised by French historians for his prominent role in the French Revolution. However, they and many other historians have failed to identify what he did in Saint-Domingue. The Baron de Vastey, however, unveiled his reputation for "cruelties" as long ago as 1814. Cocherel was a planter who "had his subjects whipped to death" and forced bizarre, cruel punishments on them. He would also become "known in the early days of the revolution for the massacre of blacks that he carried out", though the colonial historians would not register these crimes.[96] Perhaps having uncovered these acts would have prevented some historians from falling for his attempts to present defences of colonial slavery under the guise of humanism.[97] As Vastey wrote of the perpetrators he exposed:

> "A la honte de la France, pas un seul de ces monstres [...] a subi la peine due à ses forfaits ; pas un seul n'a éprouvé le plus petit châtiment pour ses crimes."[98]
>
> [To France's shame, not a single one of these monsters [...] has suffered the penalty that they deserve for their acts; not one has experienced even the slightest punishment for their crimes.]

[93] Geggus 2002a, p. 160.
[94] Belissa 2023, p. 59.
[95] Gauthier 2007, Part I, Chapter 4, section 2.
[96] Vastey 1814, p. 47.
[97] David Geggus, for instance, seems to credit him, writing that "Even the colonial deputy Cocherel had suggested in November 1789 that all blacks should be free so long as they stayed in France", Geggus 2002a, p. 282, note 85.
[98] Vastey 1814, p. 62.

It was this kind of "monster" who was addressing the assembly in a document meant to defend slavery from the revolution. Cocherel knew that what he had done was unsavoury; his strategy was to present the planter class he was a part of as benevolent — humanitarian, even. He presented slaves as people whose lives were only improved by being trafficked to Saint-Domingue :

> "arrachés au climat brûlant de l'Afrique par des négociants des ports de mer et soustraits par eux au plus dur des esclavages qui fait la base et la constitution indestructible de ce peuple barbare, ont été transportés sur les rives fortunées de Saint-Domingue habitées par une nation libre, hospitalière, qui s'empresse toujours d'obtenir à prix d'argent des négociants français la possession de leurs captifs détenus dans leurs navires."[99]
>
> [taken from the scorching climate of Africa by sea port traders and removed by them from the harshest of slaveries, which is the basis and indestructible constitution of this barbaric people, they were transported to the wealthy shores of Saint-Domingue inhabited by a free and hospitable nation, which is always eager to obtain possession of their captives held in their ships at a high price from French traders.]

Cocherel was constructing a number of myths concurrently. He presented Africa as a place of utmost brutality for the enslaved, recalling Voltaire's blaming of Africans.[100] Cocherel points out that there are laws (meant) to regulate the treatment of the enslaved and claims that "their servitude [...] hardly extends further than that of the strict discipline observed in military bodies".[101]

As Florence Gauthier notes, Cocherel "had just opened the campaign in favour of maintaining the slave trade and slavery" for the first time in the Revolution.[102] He was careful, appearing to make humanistic appeals to "improve the lot of blacks", to grant freedom to the enslaved in the metropole, and said they would consent to the abolition of the slave trade, a trade "done by French merchants" were it to be decreed.[103] But this only better hid the maintenance of colonial slavery, with his appalling claim that "the heaviest of their [slaves'] chains are broken as they enter the habitations of their new conquerors who mix their sweat, share their woes, and give them care as dictated by humanity, by interest and by law".[104]

[99] AP 10, p. 266.

[100] Voltaire wrote, as we discussed above, that "a people who traffic their own children is even more condemnable than the buyer; this trade demonstrates our superiority; he who gives himself a master was born to have one" (Voltaire 1878, volume 13, pp. 177-178).

[101] AP 10, p. 266.

[102] Gauthier 2007, Part I, Chapter 4, section 8.

[103] AP 10, p. 267.

[104] AP 10, p. 266: "les chaînons les plus pesants de leurs fers se brisent en entrant sur les habitations de leurs nouveaux conquérants qui mêlent sans cesse leurs sueurs avec les leurs, partagent leurs peines, leur prodiguent des soins dictés par l'humanité, l'intérêt et la loi".

3.3.2 A Forgery and an Anonymous Document

A Forgery Attributed to Free Blacks

David Geggus cites a "open rift" among the racialised free people: a document which appeared in November 1789, the *Réclamation des nègres libres, colons américains*, which circulated throughout Paris. In spite of Geggus' claims,[105] this appears to be a forgery. Indeed, as Debien, Binoche and Gauthier have all concluded, the Club Massiac forged this document to create fear. We have several reasons to believe this, not least the absence of any evidence that the "Société des Nègres libres" who supposedly authored it existed. This document is the only place their name appears.[106] Furthermore, the enthusiasm with which the Club Massiac made it known and distributed it suggests that they wanted people to react fearfully. Even if we doubt it having been forged, its reception in France was not due to free Black people spreading it but due to their enemies making it known.

What did this forgery say and *why* did it say it? We can distinguish two levels of the text: the explicit argument it makes (as "free Black people", purportedly), and the effect it hopes to have on French readers misled into thinking it real. The first level, the literal one, shows an argument against free people of colour, called "mulattoes", as a "bastardised species":

> "Le Nègre est issu d'un sang pur ; le Mulâtre, au contraire, est issu d'un sang mélangé ; [...] c'est une espèce abâtardie.
>
> D'après cette vérité, il est aussi évident que le Nègre est au-dessus du Mulâtre, qu'il l'est que l'or pur est au-dessus de l'or mélangé."[107]
>
> [The Negro is descended from pure blood; the mulatto, on the contrary, is descended from mixed blood [...] he is a bastardised species.
>
> From this truth, it is as obvious that the Negro is above the mulatto as pure gold is above mixed gold.]

Taken at face value, the text argues that "pure" blood, whether white or black, places one above mixed-race people. On the level of its effect, the (dissemination of the) text was designed to achieve a number of things. First, it denigrated free people of colour, reinforcing the colour prejudice against them. Second, it created fear among white French people, and doubt about those who favoured reform in the favour of people of colour. By arguing that the true place of people of colour was *below* that of Black people, it suggested that any moves in favour of the former must also benefit the latter. As the document says:

> "les Nègres libres doivent au moins espérer, comme les Gens de couleur, une représentation à l'Assemblée Nationale, si ces derniers obtiennent cette faveur qu'ils viennent de soliciter"[108]

[105] Geggus 2002a, p. 163.
[106] Gauthier 2007, Part II, chapter 3, note 21 (n.p.).
[107] Société des Nègres libres 1791, p. 1. Also included in the Parliamentary Archive: AP 10, p. 329.
[108] ibid., p. 2.

> [free Negroes must at least hope, like coloured people, for representation in the National Assembly, if the latter obtain this favour which they have just solicited.]

This was a scary thought to those accustomed to society structured by racial triangulation, which promoted free people of colour at the expense of Black people. The fear it would have inspired suggests the crux of the forgery's motive. To the white reader, it did not seek sympathy for the rights of free Blacks but wanted to present the rights of free people of colour as a slippery slope. Empower them and, the document suggested, one would have to empower free Blacks too. At a time when the *Amis des Noirs* had started emphasising the rights of free people of colour over that of enslaved Blacks, on the basis precisely of the similarity of white people and people of colour, this forgery menaced their strategy — and was able to be effective precisely because there were so few people still defending the humanity of Black people.

Moreau de Saint-Méry's Pro-Slavery Writings Under Cover of Anonymity

As we have seen, Médéric Moreau de Saint-Méry was a notable figure in Haiti, providing both detailed descriptions of Saint-Domingue and a pseudo-scientific racial characterisation of its inhabitants. He left Saint-Domingue in 1783, selling his books and two of his slaves, and moving to France.[109] When the French Revolution broke out, he was living in Paris and became a deputy for the colonists of Martinique. He would also respond to Grégoire's text, but anonymously: we today know that he was the author thanks to Florence Gauthier's careful scholarship.[110]

Moreau de Saint-Méry's project was to guarantee the stability of the colonist class' rule. This, he thought under cover of anonymity, would best be achieved by admitting new people to the category of "White", thus increasing the numbers within the ruling class. Florence Gauthier has referred to this as the "theory of neo-whites".[111] His project is a reformist one aimed to better defend the existing dominance of a certain class of people by widening its boundaries. He, therefore, appears positively liberal compared to other defenders of the colonial system's colour prejudice who could admit no 'new' whites.

The forgery discussed above, the dissemination of which sought to block rights for people of colour as a slippery slope for given rights to Black people, indicates a radically different approach. Colonists were divided: some sought to preserve the stability of racial categories and the hierarchy into which they were placed at all cost; others, like Moreau de Saint-Méry, thought that the only way to protect the colonial system was through adjustments to the racial hierarchy. We can present his approach as one of colonial conservativism and racial reformism. He dissented from the

[109] Johnson 2023, p. 1. Sara E. Johnson's study of Moreau de Saint-Méry is an excellent work, highly creative and sometimes experimental. It explores his life at greater length and provides a "communal biography" of the (often racialised) people among whom he lived.

[110] Gauthier 2007, Part II, Chapter 4, Section "Moreau de Saint-Méry théoricien du néo-blanc".

[111] ibid., Part II, Chapter 4, Section "Moreau de Saint-Méry théoricien du néo-blanc".

3.3.3 Failures of Opposition To Colonists

The pushback to the colonists came in several forms, but ultimately it was relatively ineffective. In several ways, the *Amis des Noirs* played into the hands of the colonists. Some, like Cournand, attacked colonists Moreau de Saint-Méry based on rumours that they were not white themselves. By using a racist attack to try to disqualify their opponents, they only played into the structures they were supposed to oppose.

For the most part, however, the *Amis des Noirs*, instead of insisting on the full emancipation of enslaved subjects and the abolition of all racist structures, instead increasingly fell back upon a defence of free people of colour. They would certainly support a number of initiatives which attacked the "prejugé de couleur", the racial discrimination which separated (free) whites from free people of colour. In March and April 1791, they would support attempts by people of colour to secure new rights.[112] But they did not extend the same support to the enslaved. David Geggus, in attempting to explain this, finds a strategic response to racism on the one hand — "the mixed heritage of the *gens de couleur* would have the best chance of overcoming opposition"[113] — and a strategic mobilisation of the defence of property: "Resting squarely on the Declaration of the Rights of Man, the civil rights of tax-paying, property-owning nonwhites seemed a much safer issue to the *Amis des Noirs* than did the slave trade" (or slave plantations).[114] This argument of Geggus' appears to make excuses for them, however, as it is unclear to what extent they privately believed in a more radical agenda.

Instead, the discourse of the *Amis des Noirs* indicates them to have become no real friends of Blacks by the time of the Revolution: their efforts are towards expanding rights to include free people of colour but maintaining the exclusion of the enslaved, of Black people, and of those who did not own property. Indeed, they frequently justified the end of the *préjugé de couleur* against free people of colour by arguing that "elevating the status of free nonwhites would strengthen the slave regime (and act as a check on white secessionism)".[115] Furthermore, as a speech by Brissot we will discuss shortly shows, they were willing to oppose the efforts of the slaves to rebel against their condition. This was the group which was "at the forefront of the abolitionist cause", meaning that there was little hope for the enslaved that freedom would come from the metropole.[116]

Put together, the lacklustre approach of the *Amis des Noirs* and the creative lobbying of the colonists meant progress for the latter. In May 1791, the assembly passed a constitutional decree that explicitly guaranteed the slave regime against metropolitan interference.[117]

[112] Some successes were achieved for free people of colour, though the complicated degree of their being granted, not necessarily applied, revoked and so on is not considered here. Some successes are considered below.

[113] Geggus 2002a, p. 163.

[114] ibid., p. 164.

[115] ibid., p. 164.

[116] Rousselière 2024, p. 167.

[117] On 1 June, the King sanctioned the decrees of 13 and 15 May, and 21 June saw the return of the colonial deputies (who had left the Assembly on 16 May).

3.3.4 Two Years and Little Progress

The *Constituante* produced its constitution after over two years of deliberation, giving way to the *Législative*. But, despite all the debates and discussion about colonies, the slave trade and slave production, "the Constituent Assembly came to an end with the status quo intact".[118] For all the efforts of the Amis des Noirs and other French abolitionists, "France never developed a popular abolitionist movement",[119] and nothing had improved politically in two years of debate and discourse in which they were sidetracked and increasingly unpopular. By shrinking from any real defence of the enslaved in favour of attempting to extend rights to free people of colour, they abandoned the task of abolition:

> "When the slaves of Saint Domingue launched their historic uprising in August 1791, the Société des Amis des Noirs had yet to propose the ending of slavery. Its energies had been concentrated on attacking racial exclusion within the free population."[120]

They had made no progress on attacking slavery, but they had also failed to challenge the basis of racial discrimination in Saint-Domingue following the reversal of even timid anti-discriminatory measures: "In October 1791, slavery, the slave trade, and racial discrimination in the colonies all remained juridically unchanged."[121]

That said, some achievements are worth noting. Two important ones came in the interim between the Haitian Revolution beginning and its news reaching France. On 24 September, the Assembly revoked the decree of 15 May, turning back restrictions on citizenship for people of colour.[122] On 28 September, the Assembly abolished slavery on French metropolitan soil.[123] However, "the victory in September 1791 came too late": by this point, the Haitian Revolution had already begun.[124] The enslaved had taken matters into their own hands, the *Amis des Noirs* having been incapable of securing a victory for them. Despite being to the credit of those who organised them, these advancements were ultimately less important than the uprising unfolding in Saint-Domingue in abolishing the racial structures of the colony.

3.3.5 News of the Haitian Revolution

Because of Saint-Domingue's uneasy relationship with the *métropole*, the colony initially sought help from other sources. News of the uprising of August 1791 took some time to get to France. The Massiac club found out on 22 October, and by 27 October the *Assemblée legislative* learned of it too, more than two months after the start of the uprisings.[125]

[118] Geggus 2002a, p. 164.
[119] ibid., p. 159.
[120] Blackburn 2006, p. 651.
[121] Geggus 2002a, p. 167.
[122] AP 31, pp. 270-288.
[123] AP 31, pp. 438-439.
[124] Popkin 2009, p. 204.
[125] Bénot 1989, p. 135.

When the news did make its way to France, "the most common reaction among interested parties was disbelief: the facts were too unlikely; the news had to be false".[126] Indeed, as Trouillot highlights, the Friends of the Blacks were the most heavily in denial; they justified their disbelief with a number of patronising, frequently racist, arguments.

Amis des Noirs founder Jacques Pierre Brissot's 30 October 1791 speech is exemplary of this. Brissot had declared himself the "sworn enemy of the trade and enslavement of blacks" a few months earlier.[127] Now, he began by describing the rumoured uprising as an "awful catastrophe" and expressing sorrow for "our brothers", by which he meant not the slaves but the free population of the colony:

> "Tout bon François doit en être déchiré ; la douleur de nos frères de Saint-Domingue doit retentir dans toutes les âmes ; voler à leur secours, doit être le cri universel : c'est le mien"[128]
>
> [Every good French person must be heartbroken; the pain of our brothers in Saint-Domingue must resonate in every soul; to fly to their rescue, this must be the universal cry: it is mine]

These rumours are enough for him to abandon even the timid rhetoric of the Amis des Noirs in favour of abolition: "I would feel guilty for resuscitating these discussions, when we must stop the blood of our brothers from flowing".[129] A "revolt of Blacks" is taken as such "disastrous news", as he reiterates, that it causes the French revolutionaries to unite in defence of their white, colonial interests.[130] Indeed, he considers it impossible that any whites would have participated, because "fratricide cannot enter the soul of a white person", making clear that he considers white people to be 'brothers' and Black people not to be, and furthermore that inter-racial violence is plausible in a way that intra-racial violence is not.[131]

Some of Brissot's suspicion resulted from the news initially coming from British sources and not (yet) being reported by others, explained by Saint-Domingue's initial reticence to ask for French support. "Truth is hard to guess" from a distance and there are various reasons people might have to lie about such an event.[132] Indeed, all early French reactions to the Haitian Revolution must be contextualised in the "reigning climate of suspicion".[133] The crux of Brissot's argument, however, is a racist one, arguing that Blacks are incapable of such a thing:

> "Mais quiconque connoît un peu le caractère, les moyens, les forces, l'état des Noirs, concevra-t-il jamais comment en quelques jours on a pu rassembler 50,000 Noirs ?"[134]

[126] Trouillot 2015, p. 90.
[127] Brissot de Warville 1791b, p. 3.
[128] Brissot de Warville 1791a, p. 1.
[129] ibid., p. 2: "je me croirois coupable de ressusciter ces discussions , lorsqu'il faut arrêter l'effusion du sang de nos frères".
[130] ibid., p. 2: "Depuis quelques jours on voyoit circuler des nouvelles désastreuses sur l'état actuel de Saint-Domingue. On parloit d'une révolte de noirs".
[131] ibid., p. 8.
[132] ibid., p. 11.
[133] Bénot 1989, p. 136.
[134] Brissot de Warville 1791a, p. 8.

> [But could anyone who knows anything about the character, the resources, the strength and the state of the Blacks ever understand how, in a few days, 50,000 Blacks could be assembled?]

They have "no leaders, no discipline", "are ignorant of tactics and the art of fortifications", and for Brissot it is preposterous that they may have "suddenly guessed the secret" of military tactics.[135] Admittedly, some of the reasons he gives for thinking them incapable of revolt point to the *circumstances* of enslaved people, who are "not used to war, exhausted by slavery".[136] But, on the whole, Brissot demonstrates an essentialist race-based logic: it's the deficiencies of the Blacks, which 'anyone' who knows their character is aware of, that makes the uprising unbelievable.[137] Even disbelieving the news of the uprising, he approves the military support of the white planters.

As Yves Bénot would conclude, "slaves are, to summarise, abandoned by the Assembly" at the moment of the Haitian Revolution: all parts of the French Revolutionary government "pronounced themselves in favour of repression".[138] News of the uprising united the Assembly *against* the enslaved. From that point on, "it completely changed the debate there about the colonial situation. For the rest of the revolutionary period, the abstract issue of whether the rights of man extended to the colonies would be inextricably linked to the explosive question of responsibility for the "disasters" afflicting Saint-Domingue".[139] Their preoccupation with the question of responsibility mostly found one agent to blame. Moreau de Saint-Méry's *Considérations* of 1791 started with stark answer:

> "Il ne s'est rien passé de désastreux aux colonies depuis 1789, qui ne soit l'effet des ouvrages & des démarches des amis-des-noirs."[140]
>
> [There has not been a disastrous occurrence in the colonies since 1789 which was not caused by the works and the procedures of the friends of the blacks.]

The *Amis des Noirs* would struggle to defend themselves from this charge which, incidentally, is not reflected by the facts of the Haitian Revolution itself. But they often sought to do so by 'blaming' other white agents, such as the King, rather than by recognising slave agency. What these mirror-image arguments have in common is a refusal to recognise the intelligence, agency and capacity for organisation of

[135] Brissot de Warville 1791a, p. 8.
[136] ibid., p. 9.
[137] Speaking of 'Blacks' was often a euphemism for the enslaved, the word 'slave' being politically unpopular at this point due to the "grotesque debate on the most appropriate way to name the slaves, while avoiding pronouncing this word that to be uttered alone was, on Robespierre's word, a source of dishonor to the constituents who were regulating the thing" (Sala-Molins 2006, p. 71). For this reason, "the oligarchs used polite substitute terms like *black*, *African*, and *cultivator*" (Casimir 2020, p. 310.). Not all those who discussed the features of "Black" people were talking racially, therefore: many were commenting instead on slaves. However, Brissot appeals to the features of 'Blacks' in essentialist terms, as distinct from the circumstantial qualities which may arise from their enslavement.
[138] Bénot 1989, p. 137.
[139] Popkin 2009, p. 205.
[140] Moreau de Saint-Méry 1791, p. 16.

the enslaved. The difficulty for the racist imaginary of contemporary whites was in understanding the very possibility of a coordinated slave revolt arising autonomously, without white leadership.

"The Haitian Revolution thus entered history with the peculiar characteristic of being unthinkable even as it happened", Michel-Rolph Trouillot writes.[141] Even the "most radical writers" from the colonial centre could not come to grips with it: "The events that shook up Saint Domingue from 1791 to 1804 constituted a sequence for which not even the extreme political left in France or in England had a conceptual frame of reference. They were 'unthinkable' facts in the framework of Western thought."[142] As Trouillot has identified, French discourse remained trapped in a paradigm which could not understand the realities unfolding in Saint-Domingue: "Worldview wins over the facts".[143] This paradigm, we can see with hindsight, was both colonial and racist.

3.4 Conclusion: French Colonial Visions and the Impossible Event

The Amis des Noirs on the one side and the Club Massiac on the other were ardent opponents. They were nonetheless united on many points which become apparent outside of the *métropole*. Not everyone who participated in the *Constituante* was committed to the liberal values of the French Revolution and its attachment to freedom, but even those who were did so in ways which maintained slavery. Freedom and slavery were reconciled in two ways. On the one hand, some sought what Elizabeth Anker has termed "ugly freedoms", liberty achieved at the expense of others.[144] On the other hand, some who held a greater commitment to sharing freedom nonetheless were caught in the paradox of republican emancipation identified by Rousselière, unable to conceive of emancipating people who they did not think capable of using their freedom well.[145] In both cases, the "liberty" of the French Revolution was made compatible with the maintenance of the most characteristically unfree institution of slavery, and this in spite of slavery being a preferred metaphor for the unfreedom the Republicans saw themselves as fighting.

Colonial and planter lobbyists were very skilful at presenting their defences of plantation slavery under the guise of democratic demands, as we have seen. Slavery in Saint-Domingue is presented as unfortunate, but a better condition than that of slavery in Africa from which all slaves are assumed to have come: so, were the planters not humanitarian? It thrived on developing forms of private property and trade: were the planters not economically liberal entrepreneurs? And Saint-Domingue had suffered from unwanted, tyrannical intrusions from the metropole: did the planters not deserve democracy and self-government? Thanks to the ignorance or distraction of other deputies, the planters made outrageous claims such as these to gain favour

[141] Trouillot 2015, p. 73.
[142] ibid., p. 82.
[143] ibid., p. 93.
[144] Anker 2022.
[145] See above and Rousselière 2024, chapter 4.

with the *Constituante*.

Meanwhile, the abolition movement, as we have seen, was very timid, failing to advocate for immediate abolition and not even achieving that. But some key abolitionists had some merit. As Yves Bénot has argued, they served to prepare French consciousness for abolition. The revolutionary government accepted the abolition of slavery, presented to it as a *fait accompli*, in great part through military self-interest. But, if the history of slavery shows us anything, it is that attachment to the institution is stubborn. Bénot has praised those thinkers who acted "against the tide: certainly against the aristocrats, but also against themselves".[146] The "handful of intellectual heroes" who were willing to speak out against slavery and colonialism advanced the unpopular notion that morality demanded sacrifices from metropolitan France.[147]

As Napoleon's partially successful attempt to re-establish slavery would show, the National Assembly need not have accepted abolition, even if the initial decision was taken out of their hands. Yet they did: "when news of the emancipation arrived in Paris in January 1794 the Convention greeted it with enthusiasm, if only because, like Sonthonax, the deputies saw it as a way to defeat the Republic's British and Spanish enemies in the Caribbean. On 4 February, accordingly, the Convention framed its own decree".[148] This, of course, spoke mostly to their military interest. But for them to have accepted abolition (and congratulated themselves for it), even if it took waiting for a moment in which it could serve them, shows some degree of intellectual victory for abolitionists. Without their efforts, the National Assembly may well have insisted on re-establishing slavery in spite of their better judgement, as Napoleon would.

That said, abolitionists were not willing to immediately abolish slavery. As David Brion Davis has written, "the dominant frame of mind of the eighteenth century was overwhelmingly disposed to gradualism".[149] It was only in the late 1820s in England and the United States that abolitionists would turn to *immediatism*, their word for the "immediate and unconditional abolition of slavery"; this was not just strategic but "a fundamental transformation in reformers' worldviews" and "a major turning point in intellectual history".[150] More than a shift in strategy, it was "a shift in total outlook from a detached, rationalistic perspective on human history and progress to a personal commitment to make no compromise with sin".[151] Of course, it had already been anticipated by slaves themselves, and nowhere so successfully as Haiti.

In France however, even "the re-emergence of a species of abolitionism" in the 1820s was timid, as exemplified by the *Société de la Morale Chrétienne*, a liberal anti-slavery organisation founded in 1821.[152] Their arguments focusing on slavery's economic inefficiency and not its moral unacceptability, at most they could only advocate for a gradualist position, with private property and public utility continuing

[146]Bénot 1989, p. 217: "une action à contre-courant, contre les aristocrates certes, mais aussi contre soi-même".
[147]ibid., p. 217.
[148]Doyle 2018, chapter 17, n.p.
[149]Davis 1988, p. 242.
[150]Stauffer 1997, p. 364.
[151]Davis 1988, p. 255.
[152]Blackburn 1996, p. 482.

to provide obstacles to emancipation:

> "In 1829 the abolitionists of the *Société* had published a pamphlet advocating the gradual emancipation of the slaves. But in general the French abolitionists still approached this question very gingerly, displaying lively concern for the property rights of slaveholders and the need to ensure continuing good order and subordination."[153]

In spite of the worldviews of the French revolutionaries, the racial and colonial slavery of Saint-Domingue created its own grave-diggers through the conditions of its economic and political possibility. First, its economic system was secured through brutality and terror inflicted upon the enslaved and supported by discrimination against the free racialised people of Saint-Domingue; this rightfully generated opposition from those who suffered from it. Second, its political possibility was secured by promoting a racist and colonial ideology; this prevented many of those enthralled with this ideology from identifying the reality of the colony and its plantations — and the real threats to the slave plantation system which could be mounted by the enslaved. When the Haitian Revolution erupted in 1791, it was "unthinkable even as it happened"[154] — and yet it changed the world.

[153] Blackburn 1996, p. 485.
[154] Trouillot 2015, p. 73.

Chapter 4

Sugar Shock-Waves in Paris

In a January 1792 caricature, "a municipal officer in a scarf, dancing rather awkwardly on a tight rope" holds a balancing pole. On one end of the pole hangs the constitution, while on the other end, far outweighing it, is a Phrygian cap full of heavy sugar loaves, "leaning in a way that is alarming for the dancer whom it seems to be dragging along". As Jacques-Marie Boyer de Nîmes, a contemporary journalist, would say at the time, perhaps "the artist wanted to express that the weight of the sugar outweighs that of the Constitution".[1]

Sugar was certainly a pivotal commodity in our story of Haitian and Parisian uprisings. As our history of Saint-Domingue has shown, the sweet substance was central to colonial slavery and its profits, as the sugar-slavery paradigm provided a productive recipe for planters. Because of this history, sugar "is tied to centuries of brutality, indigenous dispossession, environmental destruction, and racial hierarchy".[2] The 1792 caricature also suggests that it is not just barbarous towards Indigenous, enslaved and racialised people and the environment, but also endangers the political principles of the colonial core.

This chapter addresses the supply shock experienced in 1792 by sugar consumers — which included every layer of the population. Having focused so far on the *production* of sugar, we turn in section 4.1 to the history of its *consumption*. Using Sidney Mintz's work and French primary sources, we trace how this commodity, at first considered an "artificial need" by Robespierre, nevertheless came to be seen as a necessity — including by Robespierre. As such, despite its association with luxury, I argue that its place in the late-eighteenth century French diet is more akin to staple foods like cereals or bread.

This provides the background for the sugar shock of 1792. As several sources report, prices doubled or even tripled in just a couple of days in January 1792 in Paris. This material fact is the starting point for several investigations, not all of which were fruitful. I sought to contextualise this price shock by tracing the course of prices. While data are too sparse to provide a full picture, they do offer some insights. Difficulties in finding sources also leave the economic explanation of the rise in prices incomplete. We can identify the contribution of a variety of factors,

[1] Jacques-Marie Boyer, quoted in Duprat 2004, p. 3.
[2] Anker 2022, p. 37.

including the Haitian Revolution but also extending to merchants applying heavy markups. However, there is not enough information to deduce how much weight each factor might have had in explaining the price increase in a rigorous economic way. For this reason, the remainder of the chapter turns to the political interpretations of the supply shock, for which we have better sources. Using various primary materials including a number of newspapers, I identify how the economic fact of the sugar shock was understood in political terms. I seek to answer several questions. Was the role of slavery in sugar production understood in France? Did the material connection sugar provided between Haitian uprisings and Parisian prices bring any awareness to this? Did this international link provide the basis for an antagonism towards the slave uprising?

4.1 Sugar Consumption and Social Conflict

4.1.1 Sugar Consumption in 1790s France

Human nutrition has involved sweetness for millennia (most of all through honey in Europe), but the use of sugar is more recent.[3] Sidney Mintz, in his important work *Sweetness and Power*, disentangles the "five principal uses or 'functions' " of sucrose for consumers in Europe.[4] These different functions emerged at different periods. As Benjamin Mosely observed in his 1800 *Treatise on Sugar*, "Sugar, when first introduced into every [European] country, was used only medicinally".[5] After its use as a medicine, it "turned into a spice and condiment, then a decorative material, a preservative, a sweetener and finally attained the status of a food", as summarised in table 4.1.[6]

In France, England and Spain, three new drinks gained significance in the late seventeenth century: coffee, tea and chocolate. They are all "stimulant drinks which keep one awake and do no cause drunkenness", which was unprecedented in Western Europe.[7] Holding an exotic appeal, the wealthier classes consumed all three. Their spread throughout the population varied greatly by country, though. In the eighteenth century, tea became widespread in England; chocolate was more popular in Spain. In France, "chocolate and tea [remained] marginal and aristocratic drinks, contrary to coffee" — also a Saint-Domingue staple.[8] Sugar was a fine complement to all three drinks, making their bitter tastes more palatable. It was, therefore, mostly by being paired with coffee that "sugar became a common commodity, particularly in urban milieux" in eighteenth-century France.[9] By the 1780s working-class Parisians made "daily use of sugar and coffee".[10] To be sure, British sugar consumption was far greater than French — and French colonial sugar would often be re-exported to

[3] Walvin 2018, Chapter 1: "A Traditional Taste".
[4] Mintz 1986, p. 78. As noted by Christian Daniels, sugarcane had many more uses outside of Europe, see Daniels 2010, p. 54.
[5] Moseley 2012, p. 75.
[6] Daniels 2010, p. 52.
[7] Quellier 2013, p. 66.
[8] ibid., p. 66.
[9] Stein 2023, p. 319.
[10] Mathiez 1973a, p. 30.

Period used	Function	Description
11th C — 19th C	Medicine	In medical preparations at the time, "sugar stands out conspicuously" (p. 97). Entered Europe via Spain, thanks to Arabic pharmacology.
12th C — 17th C	Spice, condiment	Used in "very small" quantities, altering flavour "without clearly sweetening it" (p. 79, p. 82).
14th C — present	Preservative	Curing meat, making jam, candied fruits. This "function was always important, but became qualitatively and quantitatively different in modern times" (p. 79).
16th C — present	Decoration	Mixed to make a "claylike or pastelike solid", then moulded into "sugar sculpture[s]", a cheaper alternative to marzipan (p. 79, p. 93).
Late 17th — present	Sweetener	Especially to sweeten "three other exotic imports—tea, coffee, and chocolate" (p. 108).
18th C — present	Food	Added to porridge, spread as treacle on bread, used in desserts and other recipes. Desserts appear from the fifteenth century for the rich, but "a dessert course was the third, rather than the first, important sugar use for the poor", after its uses as a sweetener for tea then as treacle for bread (p. 133).

Table 4.1: Consumer uses of sugar in Europe, 11th century to present day

Source: Inspired by Table 6 in Daniels 2010, p. 53, corrected and added to with Sidney Mintz's work. All quotes from Mintz 1986.

England to serve its high demand. Even in France though, sugar played an important role as a stimulant, with *café au lait* being a typical breakfast. This energising effect is important: it was complementary with work, allowing labourers to feel invigorated. Furthermore, sugar has addictive properties: it is a "drug food", in Mintz's words.[11] This property cannot be downplayed in considering its popularity. All these factors combined so that, by the end of the eighteenth century, as Stein puts it, "sugar was now considered a necessity by large numbers of the capital's residents".[12]

Louis-Sébastien Mercier, a writer and witness to Parisian life in the 18th Century, commented upon this in his famous *Tableau de Paris* of 1781: "The *café au lait* (who could believe it?) has taken favour among these robust men", he says referring to workers.[13] Indeed, in the eighteenth century coffee "became a popular drink sold by street vendors, consumed with milk and large quantities of sugar".[14] The vendors were typically women carrying tin barrels full of the drink on their backs, selling it for 2 *sols* per cup.[15] This coffee was therefore available before and during the workday for labourers, who needed not step into cafés in order to get a quick cup.

Mercier documents the extent to which this sweet beverage became a staple of the Parisian worker's diet, describing it as their "déjeuner éternel" or "eternal breakfast/lunch".[16] As Sidney Mintz has noted, "sugars both complemented the complex carbohydrates and partly supplanted them" in people's diets.[17] Because of "the astounding caloric yield of sucrose", it contributed to increasing the calories consumed per person across Europe.[18] This was especially the case for the working class, who were typically short on calories:

> "All over the world sugar has helped to fill the calorie gap for the laboring poor, and has become one of the first foods of the industrial work break."[19]

In eighteenth century Paris, the café au lait was able to become their foodstuff of choice, consumed in "prodigious quantities", in part because it was affordable: in many cases it even came to *replace* both breakfast and lunch because it provided "greater economy, energy and flavour" than other foods and drinks.[20] Mathiez quotes the papal diplomat Salamon, who wrote of sugar in a letter that:

> "Cette denrée est devenue de première nécessité, car il n'y a pas un cordonnier, une lavandière, une poissarde qui ne prenne chaque matin une grande écuelle de café au lait."[21]
>
> [This foodstuff has become an utmost necessity, as there is not a cobbler, laundress or fishmonger who does not take a large bowl of *café au lait* every morning.]

[11] Mintz 1986, p. 99.
[12] Stein 2023, p. ix.
[13] Mercier 1782, p. 385.
[14] Garrioch 2002, p. 122.
[15] Mercier 1782, p. 385.
[16] ibid., p. 386.
[17] Mintz 1986, p. 133.
[18] ibid., p. 192.
[19] ibid., p. 149.
[20] Mercier 1782, p. 386.
[21] Quoted in Mathiez 1973b, p. 31.

Having been substituted for more expensive foods and acting as a stimulant, the *café au lait* was no treat: it had become truly essential. Alongside this meteoric rise in sweetened coffee consumption was a "more gradual acceptance of sugar as a necessity in the kitchen".[22] Anything impacting its price would, therefore, be threatening a key aspect of working class peoples' sustenance. This is precisely what would happen with a massive shock on sugar prices in 1792.

4.1.2 The French Revolution

In the 1780s, as ordinary people struggled with the cost of living and the country experienced a financial crisis, the noble ruling class were blamed. Marie-Antoinette was called "Madame Déficit", showing the extent to which elite profligacy and the woes of the national economy were linked in the popular imagination.[23] The unsustainable financial situation and the response it generated were both instrumental in the downfall of the monarchy, a fact so uncontroversial that, as Eugene Nelson White has written, "[e]very history of the French Revolution discusses the important role that the financial crisis of 1788/89 played in the demise of the *ancien regime*".[24] The events of 1789 need no introduction, but needless to say that the beginning of the French Revolution did not resolve the social tensions, financial difficulties or political instability that France was experiencing. Instead, these interlinked forms of crisis deepened.

By 1792, the French Revolution had reached a period of extreme upheaval, marked by political instability and social chaos. The monarchy had been abolished, but revolutionaries were deeply divided between factions, intensifying internal conflicts. They remained in disagreement over "the colonial question" and their attitudes towards slavery despite deeper convergences which Chapter 3 attempted to chart.[25]

4.1.3 Sugar as Mediator of Social Conflict: The Riots

In an already volatile domestic and international situation for France, the Haitian Revolution contributed to price shocks on commodities including sugar. As Aimé Césaire put it in the poem which I borrowed for the title of this thesis, the Haitian Revolution saw slaves rise up and "discover in their spilt blood the bitter taste of freedom".[26] This was a bitter taste, too, for Parisians, whose access to sugar was suddenly threatened. Sugar prices doubled in January 1792 and this led to protests and riots by various segments of Parisian society.[27] Sugar, as a colonial commodity, thus provides a link to the uprisings in Saint-Domingue, causing the Haitian Revolution to have knock-on effects in Paris: it is a mediator of social conflict, materially linking France to its disavowed colonies. So far, we have shown in Chapter 2 that Saint-Domingue was of pivotal economic importance for France thanks to its slave-based economy and, in Chapter 3, noted that slavery's role was downplayed

[22] Stein 2023, p. 13.
[23] Chavagneux 2020, chapter 1, n.p.
[24] E. N. White 1989, p. 545.
[25] Césaire 1962, p. 37.
[26] Césaire 2014, p. 130.
[27] See Desan 2013; Doyle 2018; Zancarini-Fournel 2016.

and ignored, with the *Constituante* failing to abolish it. Now, we find sugar to be a commodity through which the material dependence of metropolitan France on Saint-Domingue was manifested in January 1792. However, this does not guarantee that this connection would be understood or politicised.

As sugar consumers with little spare income, working-class Parisians were especially angry about rising prices and the question of what quantities would remain available and accessible.[28] Such protests, usually led by women, included radical actions: some attacked stores or the homes of those thought to be hoarding sugar, causing damage and sometimes trying to break in. As they rioted, they were heard to say "we will take justice into our own hands", angry at the lack of governmental action.[29] Others captured sugar from hoarders but, rather than merely stealing it, forcibly sold it at prices considered acceptable by the rioters, in line with former costs.

A month later, on 26 February 1792, the Gobelins section submitted a petition to the National Assembly. This time, it requests them to "order the release of several citizens imprisoned after the troubles caused [...] by the high price of sugar", to some applause.[30] There does not seem to be a trace of their release being granted, however. As the agitated days of the French Revolution continued, it seems that their fate was lost among the chaos.

It is significant but not sufficiently commented upon in the research about Paris that sugar is now known to have addictive effects, a "drug food" as Mintz said. Robespierre initially hesitated about considering sugar to be a "need" in people's diets, with the riots contributing to him revising his view. People reacted so strongly to sugar prices doubling, in a way more typical of people deprived of staple foods like bread or water than of people deprived of treats. As Raj Patel notes, "the foods over which protests are made are usually staple cereals or products such as bread that are made from such cereals", so the sugar riots appear as an outlier in the foodstuff they focused on.[31]

I suggest that we cannot neglect the physiological and psychological effects of sugar withdrawal as a factor in pushing people to riot. With an entire class of people suddenly unable to consume sugar, we have a population all simultaneously experiencing withdrawal effects, which can include irritability and intense cravings. While we should not exaggerate the impact this would have had, especially not if it means underestimating the agency of the rioters, the withdrawal of an addictive stimulant can be taken as a physiological stimulus for protest, much as hunger triggers protests — and in this case both withdrawal and hunger would have been layered.

Studying the politicisation of the sugar riots is not an obvious task: the archives,

[28]We must bear in mind that Parisians were not merely linked to Saint-Domingue as consumers, they were also entangled with it as workers. Perhaps 4% of the French population made a living from colonial trade: the "livelihood of as many as a million of the 25 million inhabitants of France depended directly on the colonial trade", as we noted in a previous chapter, section 2.3.4 (Dubois 2004, p. 21).

[29]Spang 2015, p. 179.

[30]AP 39, p. 119.

[31]Patel 2009, p. 1207.

as far as have been explored for this master's thesis, do not include a single rioter's voice except for that recorded during the attacks on the house above (understandably, this would be admitting to a crime). However, a variety of sources show various perspectives on the riots and on the sugar price shock more generally.

4.2 The Sugar Shock

Sugar Prices

Several secondary sources report on a significant price shock occurring in January 1792: sugar prices at least *doubled* in just a few days. Two of these sources do not provide the prices before and after, whether claiming they double or triple.[32] The other two agree on the post-shock price of 3 *livres*, equivalent to 60 *sous*; they differ on what price sugar rose from. Michèle Zancarini-Fournel claims a prior price of 25-30 *sous*, whereas Albert Mathiez suggests it was 22-25 *sous*.[33] These two sources suggest a sugar price shock that was, therefore, somewhere between 100% and 173% in just a few days.

These two works use different primary sources, so it is plausible that different shops in Paris had different prices, ranging from 22 to 30 *sous*, and that depending on where one shopped the price shock was bigger or smaller because of the range in prior prices. These prices are also consistent with price variations in the years preceding the shock: from 1778 to 1791, they stayed within a range of 20-30 sous (see Figure 4.1). The 1791 price is 25 *sous tournois* found by Hauser in his study of prices, and is the value on which both estimates overlap.[34] Taking 25 *sous* as the plausible price prior to the shock suggests, therefore, an increase of 140%. Without being able to verify the primary sources, we can retain the most cautious estimate of the price shock, which is nevertheless a stunning increase of 100% in a few days: a doubling of the price.[35]

In just a few days, this is an *enormous* variation. To take a point of comparison, Quinn and Turner's influential account uses two criteria to define "major" bubbles. The first criterion is one of size: "We require a rise in asset prices of at least 100 per cent over less than 3 years, followed by at least a 50 per cent collapse in prices over a 3-year period or less".[36] In the case of Paris in January 1792, a boom of at least 100% occurs—not over a few years but over a few days! The scale of price variation thus competes with the most dramatic of price booms seen in major bubbles.[37]

[32]Respectively, Desan 2013, p. 27; Doyle 2018, Chapter 6, n.p.

[33]Zancarini-Fournel 2016; Mathiez 1973a, p. 31. The source for Zancarini-Fournel appears to be Burstin 2013, to which I do not have access.

[34]Hauser 1936, p. 142.

[35]The primary sources cited by these authors are in archives which were inaccessible within the scope of the Master's Thesis.

[36]Quinn and Turner 2020, p. 12.

[37]To be clear, this is *not* to say that this is a bubble: to justify such a claim, we would need further information not available in the sources consulted. It is simply a comparison.



Figure 4.1: Sugar prices in Paris, in *sous tournois* per *livre*, 1600-1791

Interpretation: In the long run from 1600 to 1791, prices remained between 12.5 and, at most, 30 *sous tournois* per pound. They were at 25.00 *sous tournois* in 1791.
Source: prices from Hauser 1936, pp. 141-142.



Figure 4.2: Sugar prices in France (1820 = 100), 1798-1820

Interpretation: Following the source, prices are expressed in an index, where 1820 = 100. Two lines mark two turning points: 1807, when France is blockaded and a threefold increase in prices occurs over five years; 1812, when the beetroot sugar industry is established in France and prices collapse by 70% during 1812-1816.
Source: Price index in Chabert 1945, table in Annex XLIII on p. 150.



Figure 4.3: Sugar Prices in Paris in *sous tournois* per *livre*, 1781-1791.

Interpretation: In the 1780s, average Parisian sugar prices varied between 20 and 29 *sous tournois* per pound, dropping by about 30% during 1782-1786 and then regaining in price following the French Revolution.
Source: Hauser 1936, pp. 141-143.

Contextual Data on Sugar Prices

Sugar prices in the years 1791-1797 are undocumented in all primary sources accessed in the course of researching this thesis, meaning that we must rely on a more far-removed context to consider the variation of January 1792. Average prices are known for many decades before the Haitian Revolution (1600-1789, see Figure 4.1) and for the second half and aftermath of the Revolution (1798-1820, see Figure 4.2). Detailed data from Nantes, the second most important port of France, demonstrates a level of price volatility pre-existing the Haitian Revolution (see Figure C.1 in the Annex). Different levels of refinement of sugar would fetch different prices but their relative expense would change. This led to dynamic shifts in the parts of the production process occurring in France, where increasingly more refinement of sugar occurred. Data from Britain demonstrates that similar price volatility occurred in English prices (Figure C.3), further corroborating what we have found.

Furthermore, prices *in Paris* were also volatile, as Figure C.2 shows (looking at just white sugar). A subset of this history is presented in Figure 4.3, showing the price evolution in the decade before the Haitian Revolution. As can be seen, it wasn't a particularly stable commodity, varying between 20 and 29 *sous tournois* per *livre*. However, this variation would be overshot by the leap in prices we will see in February 1792.

4.2.1 Price Difficulties and *Assignat* Inflation

Prolonged efforts to fill in the middle period of the course of prices, for precisely the year of the sugar riots especially (1792), has been a time-consuming yet fruitless task. One source which documents the 1798-1820 period suggests why and demonstrates a final contextual factor for the sugar riots: the financial volatility already being experienced and expected throughout France.[38] Born of an attempt to fill in data for the entirety of 1790-1820, the researcher Chabert considered the task of establishing prices for 1790-1797 prices *too complicated* for a PhD thesis—whose sole purpose was to establish price levels for this three decade period. As a result, he limited himself to 1798-1820 in his study. His reason for his thesis is valid for this master's thesis, too, as to the best of my knowledge better data has not made such a study possible. Instead, the complexities introduced by assignat inflation seem to make establishing prices an unmanageable and unhelpful task. This is disheartening for establishing overall variations in sugar prices. However, I do not believe it to be in contradiction with taking the price doubling as a given. Furthermore, the inflation only added to the factors which pushed Parisians onto the streets to seize sugar themselves.

The Case of *Assignats*

The French revolutionaries were tasked with "honoring debts, paying overdue bills, and minimizing conflict", but in trying to do so "opted for policies that turned out to be far more disruptive than they expected or intended".[39] One of the most economically disruptive of these responses was a novel currency called the *assignat*. Etienne Clavière, a financier in exile from Geneva who co-founded the *Société des Amis des Noirs*, devised the *assignat*.[40] This unique currency was guaranteed by land—something that the revolutionaries had seized from the Church and emigrants in large quantities. Such land was "the finest real estate in France", taken to play a similar role to gold in guaranteeing the currency's value; but the quantities of *assignat* issued surpassed this land stock.[41]

Though France had experienced the "invention of the bubble" when John Law injected currency into the French economy in 1715-1720, this time was thought to be different by those who brought in the *assignats*.[42] They believed themselves to be protected from financial crisis by having pegged it to land. However, the experience of the first bubble "having caused terrible evils, [had] left only frightful memories" among most French people.[43] As John Kenneth Galbraith writes, "Frenchmen remained deeply suspicious of banks and bank notes, of any money that was not made of metal".[44] But Mr. Matrineau, a parliamentarian, argued that this time was different: "Paper money under a despotism is dangerous; [...] but in a nation constitutionally governed, which itself takes care in the emission of its notes, which

[38] Chabert 1945.
[39] Spang 2015, p. 59.
[40] Hunt 2013, pp. 40-42; Thibaud 2021, p. 960.
[41] A. D. White 1933, p. ix.
[42] Quinn and Turner 2020, p. 16. See Chapter 2 of their book.
[43] A. D. White 1933, p. 9.
[44] Galbraith 2017, chapter 4, n.p.

determines their number and use, that danger no longer exists".[45] His line won in Parliament, and the French revolutionary government therefore pressed ahead and printed money. The *assignat* enjoyed forced circulation, becoming the only currency "that people *had* to accept".[46]

On 1 October 1791, massive further quantities of *assignats* were issued (see Table 4.2)—more than 2,200 times the number already in circulation. While they did not substantially adjust the rate of the currency (lowering it just a little from 91 to 84 metal *livres*), this was a ticking time-bomb of inflation. By 1796, the *assignat* would have fallen to 1/500th of its initial rate. One woman would exclaim to her husband: "All I know is that with all this paper we are nonetheless always down to our last écu!"[47]

Economists are divided on their appraisals of the *assignat* depending on their school of thought — and this paper currency has certainly interested an extraordinary variety of economists, from American monetarists to Soviet communists. Andrew Dickson White wrote a proto-monetarist account of the paper currency arguing that, from the start, it "could only be disastrous" to print so much money and endeavouring to prove that it indeed turned out to be terrible.[48] By contrast, heterodox economist John Kenneth Galbraith described *assignats* as a useful "instrument of revolution", arguing that they (and the American Revolution's Continental notes) were, despite being short-lived and experiencing inflation, a crucial tool for financing the new system. "In February 1797 [...] the Directory returned to gold and silver. But by then the Revolution was an accomplished fact. It had been financed, and this the assignats had accomplished".[49] This episode was also studied by Soviet economists as an analogy for the issuing of paper currency in early, War-Communist USSR.[50] Galbraith argues it played a similar role in the USSR as in France.

However, we could argue that already in early 1792 the value of the currency was under some doubt due to the massive injection of October 1791. The atmosphere of uncertainty in reflected in one story from the archives. A French businessman was accused of claiming that the *assignat* had *deflated* by 60% in order to mark up his products.[51] Whether he really did so is unprovable from the archive, but for it to even be considered a plausible line of attack, the financial situation would have had to be highly uncertain.

It's significant that doubts about financial volatility should be the background of the sugar supply shock. This made people nervous and uncertain about prices and supplies. It was also a situation out of which "grew a speculating class; and, in the complete uncertainty as to the future, all business became a game of chance, and all business men, gamblers".[52] In turn, this generated suspicion of speculators among

[45] Quoted in A. D. White 1933, pp. 3-4.
[46] Spang 2015, p. 9, her italics.
[47] Quoted in ibid., p. 127.
[48] A. D. White 1933, p. 4.
[49] Galbraith 2017, chapter 6, n.p.
[50] Preobrazhensky 2014, pp. 732-798. Preobrazhensky uses the *assignat*, which fell to 1/600th of its value, to understand the Rouble's drop to 1/5000th of its pre-war value.
[51] *Patriote Français*, no. 908, 4 February 1792.
[52] A. D. White 1933, p. 65.



Figure 4.4: Assignat: quantities in circulation and rate

Date	Assignats issued (thousands)	Rate of assignats to metal *livres*
1 August 1789	120,000	98
1 October 1790	400,000	91
1 October 1791	1,154,000,000	84
1 August 1792	1,800,000,000	61
1 August 1793	3,775,816	22
1 August 1794	8,577,705	34
1 August 1795	17,466,553	3 livres 5 sous
1 June 1796	45,578,809	3 sous 9 deniers

Table 4.2: Assignats: quantities issued and rate

Source: Preobrazhensky 2014, p. 750.

the population, which would prove key in the sugar riots as we will see.

Taken on top of the already-documented difficulties in finding sources, the *assignat* inflation puts a nail in the coffin of my attempts here to track sugar prices. As I have discussed, it is the reason that Chabert, whose PhD thesis initially wished to find prices for 1790-1820, abandoned such work for the years before 1798. While this makes work on the tendency of prices highly complex to establish and use, it does not mean that the doubling of prices in a few days can be disqualified as merely a monetary mirage. Note that it is not all prices, but specifically *sugar* prices, which brought people out onto the streets of Paris: rather than a protest of generalised inflation, these riots were commodity-specific, albeit in an overall inflationary context.



Figure 4.5: Sugar production (tons), Saint Domingue/Haiti, 1710-1819

Interpretation: Sugar production rose from 1710 to 1791. Despite sparse data during the revolutionary years, we know it to have collapsed by the 1820s.
Source: Deerr 1949, p. 240.

Therefore, the sugar shock must have been more significant than the inflationary pressures on other goods.[53]

Sugar Quantities: A Collapse in Production

Another secondary source is informative as to the evolution of sugar production before, during, and after the Haitian Revolution. As shown on Figure 4.5, the production of sugar collapsed between 1791 and 1801, being divided by ten. Furthermore, even post-independence (i.e. after 1804) the Haitian republic would not be able to regain the dynamism of the brutal slave plantation regime, collapsing further still, approaching zero.

Sugar was not alone in collapsing. Comparing export data from 1789 with exports from 1800-1801, the collapse in all colonial commodities leaving Saint-Domingue is obvious (see Figure 4.6). The least effected of the five commodities, coffee, nevertheless experienced a 44% decrease in just a decade. Cotton exports are down a third, while raw sugar drops to just a fifth of its 1789 level. As for white sugar and indigo, they practically vanish, their exports dropping to negligible amounts. However, the combination of Saint-Domingue being especially dominant as a sugar

[53]That said, even prices do not necessarily provide as much information about consumer good availability as they do in France today. Today, the French consumer can go to any supermarket and pay for sugar with euros, a stable currency; its price meaningfully conveys its accessibility. But in the revolutionary period, with competing methods of payment, uneven acceptance of the *assignats* as a currency, and uncertain availability of goods, the price of sugar we may be able to ascertain from historic sources does not provide such a sound insight into its availability.



Figure 4.6: Exports from Saint-Domingue (thousand kgs), 1789 vs. 1800-1801

Interpretation: Exports of all five commodities decrease significantly between 1789 and 1800-1801. White sugar and indigo nearly fully collapse, to 8,000 kgs and under a thousand kgs respectively. Raw sugar is down 80%, while cotton and coffee decrease by 65 and 44% respectively.
Source: Table in Blackburn 1996, p. 241, converted to kgs; itself sources from Pluchon's *Toussaint Louverture*, p. 275. Reproduced in Table C.1.

producer and experiencing a total crash in its production, unlike that of coffee, meant that sugar would have been uniquely impacted.

Explaining the Shock: Open Questions

Robespierre notes that the petition about the shortage "lacks the elaboration of the causes, whether general or particular to the city of Paris, of the artificial or natural shortage they denounce to us", and this frustrating lack of information about the causes persists to the present day.[54] In spite of this, we can consider what would have effected prices. Figure 4.7 illustrates the mechanisms operating to cause (and counteract) the supply shock on sugar. This section has illustrated them: the direct impact on sugar production is important, but so too are the actions of those anticipating the supply to be impacted in the medium-to-long term. This leads to some amassing stocks of sugar in expectation of being able to sell it more expensively, and those who *do* sell being able to increase prices. The doubling of prices occurred for these reasons. What is less clear is the extent to which this price change reflect an immediate change in supply or speculation based on predicted changes in supplies.

What weight each factor had, a question I had hoped to answer here, remains to be determined by a researcher with more time and a larger archive. However, we know that the overall effect was significant and prompted two types of response also featured in the diagram designed to relieve the inflationary pressures: (1) removing incentives to export sugar, effectively increasing the domestically-sold supply by displacing part of the shock onto the foreign market, and (2) discouraging sugar

[54]MR, 5, p. 283: "il manque au travail des pétitionnaires le développement des causes générales ou particulières à la ville de Paris, de la disette factice ou naturelle qu'ils nous dénoncent". MR refers to the complete works of Maximilien Robespierre in 10 volumes (see Abbreviations).



Figure 4.7: Mechanisms of slave uprisings causing the sugar price shock

Interpretation: + represents a contribution to quantities decreasing and/or prices increasing. - represents a counterbalancing factor. *Source:* Own work.

consumption. The latter proved less successful than the former, as sugar was too deeply anchored into daily food consumption.

4.2.2 The Moral Economy of Parisian rioters

The sugar riots reflect what E. P. Thompson has called a "moral economy of the poor", introducing this term to historical research to label "a consistent traditional view of social norms and obligations, of the proper economic functions of several parties within the community".[55] Thompson, by supplanting the term 'riot' with that of 'moral economy', sought to bring attention to the politicised dimensions of food riots, which usually express or imply a belief in a certain accessibility of foods.[56] The illustration included here (Figure 4.8) sarcastically depicts "a sure way to reduce the price of grain", as its caption says. An angry and jubilant crowd surrounds a "forestaller", dragged through the street and threatened with acts of violence. From their newfound position of superiority over him, the crowd ask "how much now?" and the vendor proposes ever-lower prices under their threats. What makes these occurrences fascinating is that they do not involve mobs stealing goods outright. Instead, the crowds forcefully impose a price onto vendors — and pay the imposed price. This is why these food riots have a clear political underpinning, in that they impose a price considered 'fair' by the crowds.

As David Garrioch wrote in *The Making of Revolutionary Paris*, Thompson's concept readily applies to Paris, even before the revolutionary period which we study here:

[55] Thompson 1971, p. 79. Thompson is building upon the Chartist leader James O'Brien's use of the term in the 1830s (Thompson 1991, p. 337). However, it has a longer, much wider usage. It arose when "morality was detached from the notion of economy in the middle of the eighteenth century, since its signification was no longer self-evident" (Götz 2015, p. 149), including in Rousseau's influential *Encyclopédie* article, Rousseau 1755.

[56] More precisely, he considers it not political "in the advanced sense" but not "unpolitical either", Thompson 1971, p. 79.

Figure 4.8: A caricature from 1800 illustrates a food riot

Source: Criukshank 1800, reproduced under Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0).

> "This moral economy is very clear in eighteenth-century Paris. Parisians believed they had a right to abundant white bread at low prices. Price rises during a shortage not only caused hardship but were considered morally wrong and provoked attacks on bakers and sometimes on the authorities held responsible."[57]

The sugar riots of 1792 thus fit into a broader context, not only of the "grocery riots" of that year but of a longer Parisian history of moral economy.[58]

An Unthinkable Moral Economy

The demands of the crowds, and their reflection of principles of moral economy, were at odds with the economically liberal worldview of the majority of revolutionary deputies. We have already seen how, as Michel-Rolph Trouillot elegantly explains, the Haitian Revolution was an 'unthinkable' event for the French political spectrum. The sugar riots have this similarity, in that their demands were totally at odds with the liberalism professed in the National Assembly. Mr. Massey, in response to the riots, summarily dismisses the possibility of fixing prices:

> "Je ne vous proposérai point de fixer le prix des denrées ce serait porter atteinte aux principes de la Constitution ce serait violer le droit de propriété."[59]
>
> [I will not propose that you fix the price of foodstuffs, as this would be an infringement of the principles of the Constitution and would violate the right of ownership.]

Therefore, one possible response to the crisis was summarily dismissed, on the steadfast appeal to the same property rights which had defended slavery.

4.2.3 A Racial-Colonial Contract?

We know that the sugar riots of Paris were radical in their nature, but what is missing is an analysis which connects them to the colonial situation: how did the protestors relate to the institution of slavery, specifically in their outrage over sugar prices? I do not consider the outcome to be determined by the price shock alone, but by the political interpretations of this price shock. We could imagine three hypothetical ways the crowd may have conceived of the enslaved. More recent history indicates different ways that the working class can politicise similar, imperial relations. As Arghiri Emmanuel discusses in his book *L'échange inégal*:

> "In the past, dockers went on strike just to prevent imperialist interventions. Now they are stopping strikes that have been called for other reasons so as not to create the slightest diversion from these interventions"[60]

[57] Garrioch 2002, p. 42.
[58] ibid., p. 301.
[59] AP 37, p. 614.
[60] Emmanuel 1978, n.p.

This suggests two opposite stances taken by the working class in colonial and imperial countries towards the victims of imperialism conducted by their countries. The first possible stance is for the workers of France to demonstrate solidarity with the slaves of Saint-Domingue, identifying themselves with their domination. This would also be encouraged by designating agents other than the slaves as blameworthy for sugar prices rising. As in Emmanuel's illustration of dockers striking against their government's interventions, there are numerous cases of such solidarity throughout history.

However, a different politicisation of the rise in sugar prices could generate antagonism from workers towards those rebelling in Saint-Domingue. This we see in the dockers calling off strikes so as not to disrupt imperialist goals, or going further still in another example giving by Emmanuel: dockers refused to service any boats trading with Cuba despite JFK's desire for a rapprochement with the island and a softening of U.S. imperialism. As theorised by many political economists, historians and philosophers, there are many such cases in which workers in countries of the core understand their material interests to rest upon colonialism and/or imperialism and come to ally with elites in their country, through a "racial contract" or "colonial pact".[61]

Of course, the imperialism contemporary to Arghiri Emmanuel's work is not the same as the colonialism of the late 18th Century. Not least for this reason, projecting such theories backwards by two centuries will be resisted. That said, this provides us with two opposing responses of solidarity or antagonism which the Parisian crowds may have felt towards the enslaved in Saint-Domingue as they rioted. To this, we can of course add a third hypothesis: that of indifference. The following subsections consider the (frustratingly limited) evidence for each hypothesis.

Scant Evidence of Popular Response

Some degree of popular sympathy and solidarity towards the enslaved is as old as colonial slavery itself, and is evidenced by repeated disruptions of slave sales in Europe. As we saw, the beginning of colonial slavery can be dated back to the Portuguese slave auction of 1444, and this very "first slave auction at Lagos was interrupted by the common folk who were enraged at seeing the separation of families of slaves".[62] In 1571, a slave merchant attempting to sell slaves in Bordeaux "was arrested and the slaves were freed".[63] In 1715, a young enslaved woman was left with nuns in Nantes, who "refused to release the girl" when her mistress returned.[64] The difficulty is finding good evidence of the sentiments of regular people, whose opinions appear far less often in the historical record than do those of the Enlightenment *philosophes* or of the parliamentarians whose discourses and policies we analysed in chapter 3.

In the UK, abolitionist Thomas Clarkson spent time assessing the views about slavery among the British population. With all the necessary precautions we must

[61] Mills 2022; Yarrington 2018, p. 22.
[62] Saunders 1982, p. 35.
[63] Peabody 2002, p. 12.
[64] ibid., p. 15.

take given his clear political position against the slave trade, his assessment provides a fascinating insight into popular sentiment. Of his time spent in Bristol, he wrote:

> "In my first movements about this city, I found that people talked very openly on the subject of the Slave-trade. They seemed to be well acquainted with the various circumstances belonging to it. There were facts, in short, in every body's mouth, concerning it; and every body seemed to execrate it, though no one thought of its abolition."[65]

The UK also knew some movements to boycott sugar, primarily on grounds of it relying on slave labour. "[U]p to 400,000 people refused to purchase or eat sugar produced by enslaved people in the West Indies", including the Queen herself.[66] Figure 4.9 shows a detail from a 1792 caricature of the royal family as "anti-saccharites" which the artist James Gillray clearly mocks. As their horrified daughters look on at the sight of tea consumed without sugar, the Queen urges an argument based on the forced labour involved in sugar production: "consider how much Work you'll save the poor Blackeemoors [sic] by leaving off the use of it!" For the financially insecure monarchy, this consideration appears secondary to the concern of "how much expence [sic] it will save your poor Papa". However, the caricature indicates the degree of public awareness of slave labour existing at the time.

Sadly, and in spite of Clarkson inspiring abolitionism in France, similar work to his does not appear to have been conducted in Paris. There are, however, several indications of popular sentiment supporting the enslaved.[67] However, during the sugar riots themselves slavery is notably absent as a surviving topic of popular discussion. The issue of slavery does not seem to have been widely considered. While absence of evidence is not evidence of absence, it seems fair to conclude that an organised attempt to bring awareness to the issue would have left a trace in the archives or secondary sources I have examined. Moreover, even by the 1830s, "French public opinion [was] hardly aware of the question" of slavery.[68]

This is reflected even among the most politicised groups in society. As Seymour Drescher notes, "not a single speaker linked the soaring price of sugar to the slave revolution or even noted that their sugar had been the product of slave labor" at the Jacobin Club.[69] This provides a sad contrast with Bristol, where Clarkson said that "every body seemed to execrate" the slave trade, "though no one thought of its abolition."[70] In Paris, it seems that many people thought neither of its possible abolition nor of its contemporary existence. As a result, neither the antagonism nor the solidarity hypotheses appear to be confirmed. Instead, what we find (or rather, deduce from the silences in the archives) is an overall indifference, itself perhaps produced by ignorance, and certainly reflected in the lack of politicisation of the issue of slavery by rioters.

[65] Clarkson 1808, p. 296.
[66] Goodall 2022, p. 2.
[67] For example, some of the *cahiers de doléance* collecting French peoples' complaints demanded the abolition of slavery. See Lambert 2015 for an account of the most famous campaign.
[68] Oudin-Bastide and Steiner 2015, Chapter 4, n.p.
[69] Drescher 2017, p. 376.
[70] Clarkson 1808, p. 296.

Figure 4.9: Detail from a caricature of "Anti-saccharrites"
James Gillray, *Anti-saccharrites, or, John Bull and his family leaving off the use of sugar* (1792)

Interpretation: John Bull is a personification of England, and here the male monarch is made to resemble George III. His wife, Queen Charlotte, is drawn to look unhealthy. Their enjoyment of sugar-less tea horrifies their daughters.
Source: Reproduced from Gillray 1792, a public domain image courtesy of Yale University Library.

Explanations of Ignorance

What explains this silence? Two factors, from either side of the political spectrum, seem key; we saw these in our analysis in Chapter 3. On the one hand, the colonists who supported slavery often preferred a strategy of silence. Especially after the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen*, they sensed that any light thrown on the system of colonial plantation slavery could pose a threat. The status quo suited them, so they did not want it to be caught up in the discussions of a government that was increasingly willing to instate massive institutional changes and could rule against them. Instead, most pro-slavery political actors did the exact opposite and focused on securing white colonial control over Saint-Domingue. By achieving this, often through rhetorical appeals to liberal values, slavery would remain a non-subject in French politics. On the other hand, the second factor was the timidity of the French "abolitionists", most of whom shrunk from any concrete abolition of slavery. The "Friends of the Blacks" found themselves more willing or more capable of defending those people of colour who looked most like them: property owners with some white ancestry. By abandoning the defence of enslaved Black people, perhaps thinking it the best strategy, their focus on the "préjugé de couleur" which targeted free people of colour allowed slavery to be forgotten in political proceedings.

As a result, two opposing political projects nonetheless produced a common effect, that of effacing slavery's importance. The Club Massiac and Amis des Noirs may have been opposed when it came to every subject they raised, but it is precisely the subjects that neither side was willing to address which produced this complicit silence.

4.3 The Sugar Shock in Parliament and Newspapers

4.3.1 Parliamentary Debates

At the height of the sugar riots, on 24 January 1792, the Assemblée Nationale Législative discussed them in some of the most agitated proceedings of this period. The archives frequently register grumbling, clapping, booing and mocking laughter as the debate unfolds. Deputies interrupt each other, and several statements or letter readings are split by attempts to change course in the discussion. The deputies were not alone, with some of the disruptions coming from the public seating area. We can only guess if any rioters were present, but we do know that there were at least sympathisers in the *tribunes*.[71] One letter from Jean-Marie Boscary, a deputy, financier and merchant, spoke of his shop's windows being broken and the crowd attempting to enter during the riots. As the letter was read, the public gallery grew noisy, drowning out the reading of the letter. The parliamentary secretary, from the centrist constitutional group of the assembly, was disturbed:

[71] In the Archives Parlementaires (AP), mentions of the *tribunes* refer to those present in the public galleries.

> "Je ne comprends pas ces murmures; le sentiment des malheurs publics ne devrait qu'affliger l'Assemblée (*Rires à l'extrême gauche et dans la tribune.*)"[72]
>
> [I do not understand these grumbles; the feeling of public misfortunes should only distress the Assembly (Laughter from the extreme left and in the gallery)]

As the laughter shows, the *tribunes* contained people who mocked the idea of sympathising with an alleged hoarder, even after he was the subject of a mob damaging his shop. They were joined in laughter by those of the far-left of the room. Claude-Henri Bijon, also a member of the centrist group, used Gothic imagery to evoke an assembly "surrounded by the jeering of a troop of vampires".[73] Enough calm was regained in order for the letter to be read to the end, but the laughter from the *tribunes* continued. Another member of the centrist grouping, Jean-Baptiste Louis Ducastel, was drowned out repeatedly as, ironically, he tried to appeal to a law from 21 June 1791 prohibiting any noise to be made by those in the gallery. Eventually, however, calm returned.

4.3.2 Using Newspapers

It is fairly common for newspapers to be used to study the French Revolution, and one can understand why: the Revolution saw a massive number of newspapers appear. Typically, "ten people saw each copy of every newspaper that circulated in Paris", and many papers were produced by the thousands, with a few printed in the tens of thousands.[74] This is especially relevant for the period of 1789-1792, as the French Revolution was at first characterised by high levels of freedom of speech and of press. Each significant political grouping had its own paper to represent its views, explaining why even "vehemently counterrevolutionary" papers with titles like *L'Ami du Roi* were able to circulate from 1789 until the "Second Revolution" of 10 August 1792.[75] This latter date marks both the end of the freedom of the press and the overturning of the "monarchist, colonial and slave-owning constitution of 1791".[76] As such, it is both the end-point for a certain period in France's relationship to its plantation colonies and the end of the variety characterising the archival materials used to assess this period.

Two periods were selected in which to conduct primary source research on these newspapers: one of breadth and one of depth. The broader but less deep period is August 1791 to August 1792, bookended by the Haitian Revolution beginning and the end of the freedom of press. For this period, newspaper issues were considered if they were found to contain keywords related to sugar. The narrower but more extensively studied period is 23 January to 1 March 1792. During this period, I systematically reviewed all copies of newspapers selected for study. In what follows, I synthesise arguments from these sources, sometimes quoting specific documents when they prove representative or noteworthy. I conclude that the sugar price shock

[72] AP 37, p. 615.
[73] AP 37, p. 615: "entourée des huées d'une troupe de vampires".
[74] Popkin 1990, p. 84.
[75] ibid., p. 85.
[76] Dorigny 1995, p. 200.

was politicised in different ways, in part through pre-established ideas, and was predominantly not linked to the events in Saint-Domingue.

4.3.3 The Role of the Slave Uprising

The debate over slavery was reflected in attitudes towards the sugar shock, with the defence of slavery as an unfortunate necessity corresponding to arguments that the uprising caused the shock. By contrast, some abolitionists were keen to downplay the effect to which the Haitian Revolution had even disrupted sugar production, with Brissot note-worthily denying that many sugar cane fields had been burned: perhaps 200 sugar plantations, he conceded, may have been burned, which he thought would only reduce the production by one sixth at most. Besides, he claimed, usually it was the cabins and not the sugar cane which were burned down. On both counts, he was far from the mark. As we saw, the *Amis des Noirs* were being attacked for supposedly influencing the Haitian Revolution, so his denial was perhaps most keen to avoid himself suffering consequences.

4.3.4 The Role of "Hoarders"

For abolitionists, among others, the responsibility of those stockpiling sugar was instead emphasised. This is a dimension I have yet to mention but which appears significant to the price shock, whose timing isn't obviously explained by the Haitian Revolution alone.

The Gobelin section of the Assembly presented a petition on 23 January 1792, the day of the largest riots.[77] It makes bold claims about the quantity of goods being kept by speculators ("vile hoarders") in warehouses around France. Referring to of Paris, they complain that the National Guard sided with stockpiling over merchants rather than the starving and suffering population. They declared themselves "certain" that "our warehouses hold at least enough for four years' worth of provisions". The possessive "our" indicated what they thought should happen: the seizing of sugar stocks. This would happen that same day by popular, not governmental, action.

The *Patriote Français* also carried this charge. Being edited by Brissot, it was perhaps a desire to disarm antagonism towards the slaves that motivated such articles. As mentioned, he denied the effect of the Haitian Revolution. Instead, he thought it was a purely speculative phenomenon, and that warehouses were indeed full of sugar, echoing the Gobelins' claims.

The response from merchants

Merchants were keen to defend themselves from the dangers posed by an unhappy mob. However, nowhere in the primary sources does anybody, including all merchants, contradict claims that the total stocks of sugar were massive. This is true even for the Gobelin's petition from 23 January: its claims of *four years'* worth of sugar being stockpiled around the country were "not contested. We can consider them to be exact".[78] Given the breadth of archives examined by Albert Mathiez in his

[77] AP 38, p. 554ff.
[78] Mathiez 1973a, p. 33.

works, which exceeds those used for this study, we can confirm that absence of retorts in the primary sources I have used is representative of the wider body of materials. Furthermore, this figure appears plausible given the quantity of sugar that was re-exported from France every year (7/8ths according to a speech by Ducos on 24 January 1792).[79] Given this ratio, simple arithmetic means that stockpiles would have constituted 6 month's worth of merchants' sugar sales. This is a plausible quantity to be kept in the context of uncertainty about sugar supplies. What the primary sources reveal is two approaches taken to counter anger at stockpilers: (1) individual merchants denying that they, specifically, have large stocks, and (2) arguments against the seizing of sugar.

Individual denials We find a key example of the denial of stockpiling in the *Journal de Paris*' supplement number 9 for the year 1792. Included is a joint letter by three merchants — d'André, Cinot and Charlemagne — to the authors of the paper, written on 26 January 1792. "People are saying everywhere" that their company had "acquired an enormous quantity of colonial goods" and "possess several warehouses filled with sugar".[80] They vehemently deny the charge. Mr. d'André has been "designated [...] as the chief of all hoarders", which they say to be defamatory. They advance a number of reasons to believe them: they provide the address of their "one and only store", they claim that every merchant and greengrocer will confirm what they say, and they offer a prize of "100 *louis*" — equivalent to 2,400 *livres* or 48,000 *sous*, so a very substantial amount — to anyone who can prove them to be lying.

A week and a half later, on 6 February 1792, another letter to the *Journal* follows. Though signed by "Hugounenc", its purpose is to defend M. d'André — the same merchant who signed the joint letter. He is accused in the *Patriote Français* of buying 400,000 *livres* of sugar (it is unclear if this is *livres* as a weight or as a price) and claiming assignats to have experienced a deflation of 60%, as we discussed in subsection 4.2.1. This, too, is vehemently denied.

This shows two examples of merchants or small groups of allied salesmen putting out claims in the press and write letters to the government to state that they were not hoarders and deflect attention and anger.

Defences based on merit Another form of argument used by merchants is to depict themselves as worthy of their goods and victims of uprisings and theft. Unlike denials, this does not involve downplaying their stocks but rather attempting to legitimise them. An example of this line of defence is a letter to the President of the National Assembly from 24 January 1792.[81] Its author, Joseph-François d'Elbé, unapologetically and repeatedly asserts his ownership of "two million" *sous* of sugar and his refusal to sell it: "a citizen should not blush for having exploited beautiful manufactures which contributed to the country's prosperity"; he thus "declares to the National Assembly [...] and to the whole of Europe" that he "will not sell at any

[79] Ducos 1792.

[80] JP 1792, p. 2.

[81] This letter was "distributed to the members of the Assembly in very large numbers" on behalf of its author (AP 37, p. 612). It was read in parliament by Mr. Lacuée on 24 January (AP 37, pp. 611-612) and reproduced in the *Journal de Paris* the following day (JP 1792, pp. 100-101).

price", which he "repeats out loud so that there be no doubt".[82] He thus stands by the stockpiling of these goods, and furthermore calls upon the French government to protect his stocks "with a sufficient guard, of which it is fair that I pay the fees".[83] As he says forcefully, referring to the Haitian Revolution: "it does not suit me, having suffered arson in America, to suffer plunder in France".[84]

Without wholly defending the hoarding of sugar — perhaps too hard to justify — d'Elbé nonetheless considers maintaining his large stocks legitimate. He chides the Gobelins for failing to identify the "delicate point where property ends and hoarding begins".[85] He is reminding the revolutionaries of their strong defence of "the sacred right to property" and suggesting that his sugar stockpile ought to be defended as such.[86] He is, therefore, recasting the debate about hoarding in the tight boundaries of the respect for private property: this tactic had limited the risk of slavery being overthrown (for slaves were property), and now it limited the risk of hoarding being outlawed (for what they hoarded was their property, too). Even failing this, he hoped that the situation would de-escalate: the riots which threatened his property could be suppressed while debate turned to theoretical questions about defining the boundaries of hoarding. Were this to be successful, it would buy him at least some precious time. Furthermore, his appearance of extreme transparency did not appear to place him at risk: it would appear that d'Elbé did not exist! The secretary, Claude Dorizy, makes a point saying "I deny his existence"; when he asks for anyone who knows d'Elbé to raise a hand, nobody volunteers.[87]

Notwithstanding whether or not d'Elbé existed, he appeared sympathetic to the majority of the parliament. The arguments and tone of the letter was clearly well-judged and d'Elbé's heavy-handed lobbying was effective: the Trade Committee responded to it favourably and the government agreed to protect stockpiles. It is d'Elbé's open defence of his stocks in the name of the right to private property which, I believe, resonated most strongly: the Committee emphasises that "freedom must be respected" and that "the law cannot strike the hoarders".[88] Unlike the merchants who denied that they held stocks, speaking to the rioters of Paris, d'Elbé openly acknolwedged them, speaking to the values of those liberals most strongly attached to the inviolability of private property. This proved successful at rallying the necessary manpower for a semi-privatised police force which could prevent the mob from seizing his goods.

4.3.5 Victims of their consumption?

A final line of reasoning is presented in a text from 26 January 1792 published in the *Chronique de Paris*, which takes a very different approach, exhorting the people of Paris to renounce their consumption of sugar. It mocks the rioters for being on the streets not because "freedom is in peril" or "the enemy is at the door" but because

[82] JP 1972, p. 100.
[83] JP 1972, p. 101.
[84] JP 1972, p. 100.
[85] JP 1972, p. 101.
[86] JP 1972, p. 101.
[87] AP 37, p. 615.
[88] JP 1972, p. 101.

"the charms of our mealtimes are eclipsed and sugar sells for a fortune". For the author, it appears ridiculous that "Paris is in chaos over *café au lait*".[89]

> "Etres pusillanimes ! quoi, c'est là ce qui vous trouble et vous émeut ! Du sucre ! c'est pour du sucre que vous pleurez, comme animaux flatteurs et rampants, qui attendent chaque jour, de la main de leur maître, la portion de sucre qu'il leur accorde ? La perte d'une friandise devient une calamité publique, et Paris est en désordre pour du café au lait ? Ah ! qu'ils doivent s'applaudir de leur système, ceux qui disent que vous n'êtes pas capables de supporter la liberté ?"[90]
>
> [You spineless creatures! What, this is what troubles and moves you? Sugar? Is it for sugar that you weep, like flattering, grovelling animals that wait every day for their master's hand to give them a portion of sugar? The loss of a treat becomes a public calamity, and Paris is in chaos over *café au lait*? Ah! How they must applaud their system, those who say that you are not capable of enduring freedom!]

The similarities in tone to the apocryphal "let them eat cake" claimed to have been uttered by Marie-Antoinette are hard to ignore, and make it hard to believe that this would have been a warmly received letter in the parts which emasculate rioters.[91] "Show that you are men, and renounce sugar", the letter exhorts.[92] Nowhere is it responded to favourably.

This strategy, however, aligned with that of the Jacobin Club which declared sugar to be a luxury in response to the crisis. The Abbé Grégoire, too, had chastised sugar consumers:

> "Parce qu'il vous faut du sucre, du café, du tafia, indignes mortels ! mangez plutôt de l'herbe et soyez justes."[93]
>
> [Because you need sugar, coffee and tafia, you wretched mortals! Eat grass instead and be just.]

However, as these other political actors, the author claims to be siding with the rioters whom he insults *against* the "hoarders" and aristocrats". Unlike the texts we have examined by merchants, it seeks to undermine the value of sugar by compelling people to lessen their demand for it. The author projects that "soon, the hoarders [will be] forced to lower the price of this debased, rotting good", thus suggesting that it is boycotting sugar, not rioting to seize it, which is the best approach.[94] This is an appeal to the free market as capable of re-establishing reasonable prices in response to lower demand.

[89] CP 1792, p. 103.
[90] CP 1792, p. 103.
[91] Patel 2009, p. 1208.
[92] CP 1792, p. 103.
[93] AP 10, p. 333.
[94] CP 1792, p. 103.

4.4 Conclusion: Parisian Shockwaves

At the start of the Revolution, Jacobins thought it silly to value sugar, but this was hard to maintain in the face of its mass consumption and following the sugar riots which demonstrated how important it was to some. Robespierre's opinion of sugar being a "besoin factice" (artificial need) evolved: he understood it to have become ingrained in French diets.[95] However, his interpretation of the shock on sugar and coffee reduced them to a "disette factice", or artificial scarcity.[96] Ironically, as "the Terror reached its height", "the death penalty was imposed for counterrevolutionary crimes like hoarding coffee and sugar".[97] France has periodically experienced crises related to sugar, from the upset over an 1837 law taxing sugar differentially depending on its source, to the "scandale des sucres" of 1919 and the December 1974 "crash" of sugar prices on the Paris market.[98]

This particular sugar crisis, grounded in the disruptions of the Haitian Revolution and amplified by speculators response to it to unknown proportions, was incredibly hard to solve. Given France's position as exporter of colonial sugar to the rest of Europe, it could not import sugar from elsewhere to make up for the issue. Besides, prices would have risen abroad too, on top of which the unfavourable exchange rate would not provide a solution. For all the radical measures taken, including that of issuing *assignats* which largely generated the inflationary context of the riots, it was a step too far to consider the seizure of sugar, and would not be a long-term solution either. Paris was confronted with the bitter taste of the slaves' freedom, yet it did not seem to know it. Instead, responsibility was largely attributed to the merchants and "hoarders" thought to be speculating on it, without a thought for the destruction of Saint-Domingue's plantations as a factor both reducing quantities and producing the speculative response. Ultimately, ignoring the full situation and averse to some responses to it, the *Constituante* chose a different response: war. "The war of 1792 was, up to a point, an economic war", as Mathiez wrote.[99] This is another story, however linked it is, and we have another war to attend to: the war of independence successfully waged over thirteen long years by the slaves of Saint-Domingue. This uprising would have major, material effects, to which we now turn.

[95] Compare with Robespierre's 29 July 1793 proposal on national education, which ordered for children to be taught "le mépris des besoins factices" (comtempt for artificial needs): see MR, 10, p. 39. See also MR, 10, p. 9, which paraphrases Robespierre saying "le sucre et le café ne servent qu'à alimenter des besoins factices".

[96] MR 5, p. 283.

[97] Mann 2017, pp. 102-103. See MR 10, p. 9.

[98] Giraudo 1975; Yarrington 2018.

[99] Mathiez 1973b, p. 46.

Chapter 5

"The Contagion of Freedom": The Haitian Revolution's Impact

In July 1791, Madame de Rouvray was panicking. As the wife of a prominent Saint-Domingue planter, she was worried about a suspected, imminent abolition of slavery by the National Assembly. Everyone who relied on slavery — and "all the powers with slave colonies" — should worry, she thought, and "had an interest in opposing such a mad decree because the contagion of freedom would soon defeat them, too".[1] Rouvray may have been right to worry about the 'contagion of freedom' and the threat it would pose, but she was wrong about its source: it was the enslaved themselves who, less than a month after her letter was written, would rise up, kill planters, and destroy massive parts of the plantations. The Haitian Revolution, as it became known, would be the end of the colonial slave plantation of Saint-Domingue which had been so profitable for the Rouvrays — as for so many others. It was able to force France to abolish slavery on the northern part of the island in 1793, which was to be extended throughout all French colonies in 1794 (though Napoleon would repeal the law in 1802). Historian Robin Blackburn notes that "it is scarcely possible to exaggerate the impact of the Haitian revolution on the fate of colonial slavery".[2]

This chapter endeavours to study the impact this uprising had using the best available sources on the transatlantic slave trade, namely the *SlaveVoyages* database. After presenting the context and a brief explanation of the Haitian Revolution, I consider its impact seen through the letters of planters. The chapter then turns explaining the database and using it to study the Revolution's impact on slave disembarkations. As a helpful proxy for sugar production in a variety of ways I explain below, it allows us to study how the Revolution disrupted, then extinguished, the colonial slave-based economy.

[1] Madame de Rouvray to her daughter, 30 July 1791, in McIntosh and Weber 1958, p. 137.
[2] Blackburn 1996, p. 30.

5.1 The Haitian Revolution

5.1.1 Legacies of Resistance

From the start of the colonisation of the island, there had been forms of resistance. We have already noted the importance of "Ayitian revolutions" which disrupted Spanish attempts to create sugar plantations and contribution to the withdrawal of Spain from the West of the island.[3] As France sought to establish itself in Spain's place, these forms of resistance continued and evolved. France officially gained governance of Saint-Domingue in 1697, with the Treaty of Ryswick. From this point, Jean Casimir writes that "the state [...] implanted itself on the territory", creating a counter-movement in "the society that organized itself in response": Haiti's specificity is "its response to France, in its oppressed culture and its counter-plantation system".[4] Thus, while many historians (typically writing outside of Haiti) have emphasised the French Revolution as the 'starting point' of the Haitian Revolution, providing

In 1989, David Geggus described a "paradox underlying the greatest of all slave revolts" which "has received little scholarly attention": why the Haitian revolution occurred in a colony which had known very few revolts, especially compared with other colonies.[5] Yet this early claim of his seems inaccurate when acknowledging the long history of resistance which has been identified by others (and, since, by himself) in the years since. The eighteenth century was not quiet for Saint-Domingue planters, and the enslaved were constantly resisting in various ways.

One way was through *marronage*, or running away. The French distinguished two types: *grand marronage* for those who fled slavery permanently, and *petit marronage* for temporary absences, sometimes to visit family or engage in ceremonies, and sometimes as a way of reclaiming a degree of power against slaveowners.[6] Slaveowners would publish advertisements attempting to gather information or help to get 'their' slaves back, producing a fascinating historical record of this resistance told from the master's perspective. One fascinating advert from 1783 complains of a woman called Rosette with a distinctive forehead bump marooning "for the hundredth time".[7] She must have returned to the plantation willingly or by force, because the following year the same planter again publishes a classified about a Rosette, with the same bump in her forehead, having "been marooned for a month".[8] Rosette is just one of 22,639 slaves whose resistance is documented by the archivists of "Le marronnage dans le monde atlantique : sources et trajectoires de vie", and many more would have marooned without a trace surviving.[9]

[3] See section 2.2.1.

[4] Casimir 2020, p. 5, p. 6, p. xx.

[5] Geggus 1989b, p. 24.

[6] Trouillot et al. 2021, p. 206. Trouillot considers the latter reason "a symbolic gesture of protest", but it was not merely symbolic: through *petit marronage*, a slave could (1) disrupt production, (2) demonstrate their ability to disrupt production, (3) demonstrate their ability to flee permanently. All of these altered the balance of power somewhat in their favour, albeit in a still highly hierarchical situation.

[7] MMA Curet 1783 (ID: 11123).

[8] MMA Curet 1784 (ID: 7119).

[9] The project, which translates to "Maroonage in the Atlantic World: Sources and Life Trajectories", is hosted at www.marronnage.info. Most of the database covers Saint-Domingue specifically,

The Haitian Revolution, sometimes erroneously interpreted as an aftershock of the French Revolution, was rather the moment that this long history of Haitian resistance found the opportunity for the largest successful slave revolt in history.

5.1.2 Brief History of the Uprising

In August 1791 in Saint Domingue, slaves from the Northern plain began congregating in a "series of nighttime meetings".[10] Unbeknown to the white slave-owners who had long subjected them to brutal treatment, these captives were about to launch a rebellion. C.L.R. James depicts a religious ceremony led at the Bois Caïman by Boukman Dutty, who gave a stirring speech:

> "The god of the white man inspires him with crime, but our god calls upon us to do good works. Our god who is good to us orders us to revenge our wrongs."[11]

The Bois Caïman ceremony is likely misrepresented in most histories and many of its details are lost.[12] Nevertheless, historical narratives conferred it with a mythical status, as "the Haitian Revolution's equivalent of the Battle of Lexington and the storming of the Bastille".[13] The ceremony which *did* take place, on an unknown date in August 1791, "surely infused its participants with courage and a heightened sense of solidarity".[14] Starting on 21 August 1791, within two days the uprising already involved a "troop of nearly 2,000 slaves".[15] What had begun was "the largest slave revolt in the history of the Americas": the Haitian Revolution.[16]

"By the end of September, over 1,000 plantations had been burned", and widespread violence by slaves against whites was met with even more brutal reprisals against the former captives.[17] As a witness wrote, the flames spread "to the sugarcane, to all the buildings" and "covered the sky with whirlwinds of smoke during the day, and at night set the horizon alight with an aurora borealis that [...] gave all objects a livid tint of blood".[18] Saint-Domingue's governors were way of this information getting to France: they were worried food imports would stop. They embargoed all ships to France and appealed not to them but to their English, Spanish and American neighbours for military help.[19]

---

through 10,772 maroonage adverts (published by slave-owners to try to locate slaves) and 6,535 prison listings (published by prisons to try to return captured slaves to slave-owners).

[10] Dubois 2004, p. 94.

[11] C. L. R. James 1989, p. 87.

[12] While most histories include it, scholars including Léon-François Hoffman have claimed it to never take place. David Geggus provides a careful examination of the historical record in Geggus 2002b. He concludes that it "did indeed take place", "but that much of what has been written about it is unreliable" (p. 82).

[13] Popkin 2021, p. 7.

[14] Geggus 2002b, p. 92.

[15] Dubois 2004, p. 94.

[16] Geggus 1989a, p. 1303.

[17] Geggus 2002a, p. 12.

[18] Lacroix and Hedouville 1819, p. 94.

[19] AP 37, pp. 224-225.

Figure 5.1: The burning of Cap Français in June 1793

Source: Frontispiece from Anonymous 1819.

When the news did reach the French *métropole*, most reacted with disbelief: "the facts were too unlikely; the news had to be false".[20] Yet they would not be able to remain ignorant for long, not least because the French economy was deeply entwined with the colonial production of Saint Domingue. As we have seen, sugar was perhaps the key commodity representative of this economic dependence. As Haitian sugarcane fields burned, so too did the source of nearly half all sugar consumed in Europe and the Americas.[21] Having become a staple in even the diets of the working class, who used it as a stimulant for work, withdrawal effects were not the only consequence of this major disruption.

The uprising of August 1791 has very concrete material effects in profoundly sabotaging slave-based production. The marquis of Rouvray, a wealthy planter on the cusp of even greater fortunes, was one of the lesser impacted slave-owners: his wife, in private correspondence to her daughter on 4 September 1791, announced that – despite a week and a half of the uprising spreading across the island – they are "all safe", and in their region of the island "nothing has happened" in the way of arson or other property destruction.[22] A week later still, "[n]othing yet has happened to our properties".[23] Yet, even though such families were *physically* safe, "[w]e cannot say that our fortune is [safe] because we are still at war with slaves", with her husband in fact becoming a leading military officer defending the plantations, who bragged of the slaves he killed.[24] At the end of the month, she reiterates: "We have not been burned down [...] Even supposing that we escape the fire, we have not escaped the effect of the disorder and trouble which has, as for everyone, prevented us from

[20] Trouillot 2015, p. 90.
[21] Knight and Palmer 1989, p. 21.
[22] Madame de Rouvray to her daughter, 4 September 1791, in McIntosh and Weber 1958, p. 141.
[23] Madame de Rouvray to her daughter, 10 September 1791, in ibid., p. 144.
[24] Madame de Rouvray to her daughter, 4 September 1791, in ibid., p. 141; Dubois 2004, p. 115.

making our income."[25] Several months later, while still safe, the pair have lost some of their sugar-related buildings. The marquis estimates their value at 100 000 écus, and further complains of losing 50 slaves, "stolen by the bandits".[26] As so often in planter writings, slaves are discussed as property more than as people. He also estimates lost income caused by the uprising in terms of sugar and coffee that will not be produced: 500 000 pounds of sugar and 150 000 of coffee.[27]

The slaves' military might, not least in virtue of their numbers, is decisive in constraining white elites' decision-making. Politician and confederate major-general Howell Cobb proclaimed (in the USA, a different context of course) that "If slaves will make good soldiers our whole theory of slavery is wrong."[28] Evidently, their theory was wrong: for other reasons, too, but also by virtue of the ability of slaves to "make good soldiers" and constitute a powerful military force.

For instance, the marquise de Rouvray relates in a private letter that no matter how well the rebellion is put down, they cannot stay "in a country where sooner or later we will end up slaughtered by the Negroes because it is impossible to kill them all".[29] This statement reveals the power of the rebellion. First, Mme de Rouvray is no longer aiming for the rebels to be returned to slave plantations, instead she considers that safety can only come from the genocide of the entire Black population of Saint-Domingue. The rebellion has therefore made the slave plantation form of production impossible. Second, she notes the impossibility of conducting such a genocide to completion, instead preferring to abandon the island. From the perspective of the wife of someone who was responsible for many military victories against the slaves, this speaks to the strength of his opponents, the formerly enslaved. They have made genocide, to which the system had to tend in moments of crisis, impossible.

5.2 The Impact Seen Through Slave Voyages

> "Cette grande et riche Colonie françoise est dans un état de ruine absolue".
> [This great and rich French Colony is in a state of absolute ruin.]
>
> Brissot commenting on the Haitian Revolution
> (Brissot de Warville 1791a, p. 7.)

[25] Madame de Rouvray to her daughter, 29 September 1791, in McIntosh and Weber 1958, p. 150.
[26] Monsieur de Rouvray to the Countess of Lostanges, 6-7 December 1791, in ibid., p. 155.
[27] Ibid., p. 156.
[28] Cobb 1900, p. 1009.
[29] Madame de Rouvray to her daughter, 10 September 1791, in McIntosh and Weber 1958, p. 145.

5.2.1 Using the Slave Voyages Database

The database

SlaveVoyages is a database resulting from "several decades of independent and collaborative research by scholars".[30] It is an ideal primary source as it compiles all known ship journeys which transported captives across the Atlantic – in total, 36,108 voyages. Furthermore, the database has been subjected to much scrutiny since it was first created in 1999, resulting in the correction of errors and omissions. The version of the database used here is the most recent one available (2020) and reflects the rigorous, careful work of many scholars who are experts in the history of slavery critically assessing the data over several decades. For each voyage, the primary source(s) which confirm its existence and sometimes provide rich further information are indicated.

Methodology

Using Excel, information was extracted from the database. For each voyage, the year of arrival and the number of captives disembarked was selected. This allowed me to generate tables showing the number of slaves disembarked per year. I conducted this process for all Inter-Atlantic voyages *and* for just those which involved disembarkations in Haiti.[31] Various other aspects of the transatlantic slave trade were researched and are used at other points in this thesis, but here the focus is on explaining the disembarkations.

The result of this simple data processing is found in a table in Annex A. It is clearest when visualised. A graph illustrating the period of 1697, when the Treaty of Ryswick was signed, to 1820, can be found at the end of chapter in Figure 5.5 (page 135). This graph compares all disembarkations (on the left axis) to disembarkations in Saint-Domingue/Haiti (on the right axis). Figure 5.2 looks at a shorter period, from 1763 to 1800, focused around the French and Haitian Revolutions.

5.2.2 Results

Before the Haitian Revolution

From the 1740s to the 1780s, Haitian disembarkations broadly followed the general pattern of all disembarkations. Disruptions can be noted in both the set of disembarkations as a whole and the subset of those occurring in Saint Domingue, during the same periods, illustrating that the colony was not immune to the challenges experienced by the slave trade as a whole.

The three disruptions in question can be explained through three corresponding periods of conflict, listed in Table 5.1. Note that the periods of war correspond to significant slowdowns in slave disembarkations. Even more dramatically, each of the treaties concluding these wars (in 1748, 1763 and 1783) are immediately followed

[30] Eltis 2024.

[31] The first time this process was conducted, only ships with French flags were considered. This was revised to include all ships, exposing slave shipments occurring outside of the *exclusif* system.



Figure 5.2: Disembarkations, 1763-1800

Period of War	**Concluding Treaties**
Nine Year's War, 1688-1697	Peace of Ryswick, 1697
Wars of Jenkins' Ear and of the Austrian Succession, 1739-1748	Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1748
Seven Years' War, 1756-1763	Treaty of Paris, 1763
War of American Independence, and linked Caribbean action, 1776-1783	Peace of Paris, 1783
War of the Pyrénées, 1793-1795	Peace of Basel, 1795

Table 5.1: Major wars and treaties impacting Saint-Domingue
Inspired by Watts 1990, p. 241.

by a dramatic rise in slave disembarkations from 0 or near-0 to high numbers of trafficked captives.

The French Revolution Starts, with No Effect The 1790s are different in quite how much Saint-Domingue not only tracks but exceeds the overall disembarkations. 1790 is the all-time peak of captives being disembarked in Haiti, with 44,572 enslaved people being trafficked to Saint-Domingue, a major increase on the previous year by 49%. This makes for a staggering 45% of *all* disembarkations *everywhere* that year occurring in Saint-Domingue alone.[32] It should be remembered that this is the year after the DDHC had declared in article 1 that "men [sic] are born and remain free and equal in rights".[33] Clearly, the slave trade did not respond to the high ideals of supposedly universalist French revolutionaries: "there is no French Revolution in the French colonies", as Césaire put it.[34] Our assessment in Chapter 3 of Enlightenment

[32]Saint-Domingue accounts for 44572 of 98141 disembarkations in 1790, or 45.42%.
[33]*DDHC* 1789.
[34]Césaire 1962, p. 24.

and Revolutionary ideologies suggests why.

During the Haitian Revolution The database indicates a perhaps surprising fact: captives did not stop being disembarked when the rebellion started (1791), nor when France abolished slavery in the North of the island (1793), nor even when it abolished slavery throughout all of its colonies (1794). Instead, it took until 1797 for the last disembarkations of captives to take place.[35]

Despite that, as the Haitian Revolution starts, disembarkations fall sharply: from the 1790 peak, they fall to 63% of this amount in 1791, to 22% in 1792, and down to just 3% of the high-point by 1793. sees disembarkations fall by 47.3%. The slave rebellion began in August of 1791, so the data indicate that it has a substantial effect on the normal state of affairs, providing a clear break with the tendency up until that point and soon reducing the trade to negligeable amounts. After hovering around 1% for a few years, it reaches zero by 1798.

The continuation of disembarkations after the beginning of the uprising suggest important conclusions: the slave trade was not totally prevented despite the beginning of the dramatic rebellion. For example, in 1792 nearly 10,000 disembarkations occur: on the one hand, a massive drop of 78% compared to 1790; on the other, far from a total stop. The continuing disembarkations indicate a slave trade which was heavily disrupted but not entirely prevented by the Haitian Revolution, and even by the subsequent abolition of slavery. Slavery persisted, *in fact* if *not by law*, past the official outlawing of this practice in 1793 (on parts of the island) and 1794 (everywhere in the French empire).

Importantly, the above analysis allows us to fill in the blank left between 1791 and 1801 in the data on sugar production presented above (see Figure 4.5 and the related discussion). As the figures from before the revolution indicate, production depended on "importing" more and more slaves, who died at high rates due to their mistreatment so had to be replaced through the slave trade. Thus, a functioning plantation would require regular disembarkations to continue functioning. We can conclude that one of two things occurred to explain the drop in disembarkation numbers: (1) plantations' production being disrupted, leading to demand for disembarked captives dropping, or (2) disembarkations being disrupted, leading to plantations being starved of labour. As histories indicate, the slave uprising impacted both plantations themselves and the disembarkations which sustained them. However, mostly the disruption was of the first kind: of the plantations themselves. Examining the Slave Voyages entries for 1791-1797 more finely also suggests that the physical disembarkations were not substantially affected by the Haitian Revolution's activity. Records suggests other events taking place *during* the voyages which would have been disruptive (e.g. a ship from one country being captured by another country, and then continuing to sell its slaves); they do not indicate problems encountered at the docks where captives were disembarked.[36] Furthermore, the disembarkations which

[35]The disembarkations occurring after that are few, and all involve slaves rescued from slave ships and brought to Haiti to be free there.

[36]Of course, there are reasons why such events might occur without being indicated in the record, yet elsewhere they occur and are indicated.

Figure 5.3: A 1794 painting of the fires in Cap Français on 21 June 1793

Source: Reproduced from Chapuy and Boquet 1794 as a public domain image. Cropped and edited.

did occur appear to have gone without incident. We can, therefore, conclude that the dominant way in which the Haitian Revolution disrupted the plantation complex was *not* disembarkations (2), but rather through directly preventing production on plantations (1), and thereby the demand for more slaves dropping and leading to fewer disembarkations.

One especially salient episode from the Haitian Revolution explains the effect the uprising had. The events in Cap Français during June 1793 have been widely represented in visual materials, with fires spreading across the city as a result of chaotic fighting (see Figures 5.3 and 5.1). Constituting a major crisis, this period of intense conflict stretched across several days centred around 20 June. What occurred permanently disrupted the production of sugar in several ways. First, much of the town was burned down, with the impressive results captured by a map accounting for fire damage (see Figure 5.4). Second, it "threw nearly the entirety of its white population into exile", marking a definitive end of slave-owners' attempts to gain profits there.[37] Third, it would force the hand of the *Assemblée Nationale* in France, its February 1794 abolition of slavery being a "direct result of the events in Cap Français a half year earlier".[38] As our study of *SlaveVoyages* has shown, though, even events less drastic than this contributed to remarkable falls in disembarkations before and after then.

[37]Cabot 2021, p. 91.
[38]Popkin 2010, p. 2.

Figure 5.4: Fire Damage in Cap Français

Interpretation: This map indicates buildings lost to the 21 June 1793 fires in black. It was commissioned by the French government.
Source: Reproduced from Warin 1793 as a public domain image. Cropped and edited for clarity.

5.3 Conclusion: The Slave Uprising

> "La couleur tombe, et l'homme reste"
> [The colour falls, and the human remains]
>
> Pierre-Antoine-Augustin de Piis, "La liberté des Nègres" (Piis 1794, p. 36.)

The *SlaveVoyages* database allows us to conclude that the slave uprisings of August 1791 onwards *did* substantially and quickly disrupt production on plantations in Saint Domingue. Saint-Domingue's brutal slavery regime made it dependent on "importing" captives to the island in increasingly astounding numbers.[39] For this reason, slave disembarkations are instructive indicators of production on the plantations. We can conservatively assume that all forms of production were equally impacted by the revolts, though accounts seem to emphasise sugar cane plantations in particular being burnt down more than other types of plantation.[40] Given this, we can conclude that the effect on the sugar supply was immediate and drastic, perhaps roughly proportionate to the drop in disembarkations. When "the imperial state", its hand forced by the uprising, "liberat[ed] the slaves and transform[ed] them into

[39] Some other plantation systems were based around the reproduction of the slave labour force rather than a high death rate (and high "turnover") through purchasing new slaves. The contradiction between the treatment of slaves and their reproduction would cause a good deal of such plantations to collapse.

[40] See, for example, Lacroix and Hedouville 1819, p. 94.

citizens, the modern state deprived the plantations of one of the tools indispensable for their exploitation".[41] This compels us onwards to our next chapter and our next question: how this successful slave uprising transformed the country in which it took place, and what resonances it had in the wider world-economy, including to the present day.

[41] Casimir 2020, p. 312.



Figure 5.5: Slave disembarkations, 1720-1820

Chapter 6

After Saint-Domingue: Slavery, Sugar and Racism Post-Revolution

6.1 Slavery, Continued

Robin Blackburn observes how the triumphs of the 1790s and the instabilities of the slave system could have been seen as the end of slavery by an 'optimist':

> "Around the year 1790 the optimist could suppose that slavery and the Atlantic slave trade were doomed. Anti-slavery was soon able to win major battles."[1]

A belief in the linear nature of progress would certainly have comforted progressives who opposed slavery given recent events. What better beacon of hope than the Haitian Revolution, as anyone who has encountered "the anticolonial Romanticism of *The Black Jacobins*" (at least in its 1938 edition) will know?[2] However, Blackburn comments in his latest work that "plantation slavery was a moving target and gained the time and space it needed for a 'second wind'."[3]

In this section, we will explore slavery's persistence after the Haitian Revolution and find the linkages between them and Saint-Domingue. As colonial slavery was overthrown in Haiti, many of its perpetrators fled to nearby Cuba and Louisiana. They participated in stimulating the slave plantation economies in both places, which also captured the benefits of an ever-growing demand for the commodities which were suddenly no longer being produced in Saint-Domingue.

6.1.1 Slavery After Saint-Domingue

The Haitian Revolution ended colonial slavery in its territory. However, abolition in one country does not imply abolition everywhere. The world-economy, led by the colonial cores of European states and with the U.S.A. emerging as a new power,

[1] Blackburn 2024, "Introduction: Why the Second Slavery?", n.p.

[2] D. Scott 2004, p. 63. David Scott's analysis highlights how "the anticolonial romanticism of the 1938 edition is translated into a form of postcolonial tragedy" in the 1963 version by the additions of 6 new paragraphs, as summarised by Forsdick and Høgsbjerg 2017, p. 28.

[3] Blackburn 2024, "Introduction: Why the Second Slavery?", n.p.

Figure 6.1: Planter Migration from Saint-Domingue

Interpretation: A map of the Caribbean, showing the proximity of Cuba and Louisiana to Saint-Domingue.
Source: Own work, using a public domain map (*Robinson Map* 2021, showing today's borders).

remained reliant on slavery as a way of producing important staples in the periphery. This produced what Dale Tomich refers to as the "second slavery": "the extraordinary expansion of new frontiers of slave commodity production—cotton in the US South, sugar in Cuba, and coffee in Brazil during the nineteenth century—and their role in the economic, social, and political transformations of the nineteenth-century world-economy".[4] During the second slavery, "more slaves worked on New World plantations than ever before".[5] While the "first" slavery had been linked to a mercantilist economic framework, the second slavery was entirely complementary with emerging industrial capitalism. One might consider mercantilism to be "pre-capitalist", though this is arguable.[6] Even granting the point, however, what the second slavery makes unambiguous is the potential complementarity of capitalism and slavery. While capitalism is not intrinsically linked to slavery in theory, in fact being generally opposed to it in principle, "historically, the expansion of capitalism was accompanied by slave forms of production".[7]

Cuba

Before the French empire was able to reorient itself after the Haitian Revolution, a rival power benefited — and more so: "planters and administrators in Cuba stepped

[4]D. W. Tomich and Lovejoy 2021, p. 1. See Lavina and Zeuske 2014; D. Tomich 2017; D. W. Tomich 2004.

[5]Schmidt-Nowara 2017, p. 219.

[6]Robin Blackburn labels colonial mercantilism as pre-capitalist. Nancy Fraser disagrees, building on Jairus Banaji's scholarship on "commercial capitalism": see Banaji 2007, 2020; Fraser 2025; likewise, Jean-Yves Grenier refers to mercantilism as "the first capitalism" (Grenier 2021, p. 910).

[7]ibid., p. 907.

into the vacuum created by the destruction of what had been the most important supplier of the world's sugar".[8] Cuba's most prominent sugar planter was jubilant to see the destruction of Saint-Domingue's plantations: "There is no need for doubt. The hour of our happiness has arrived".[9]

The colony of Cuba had been conquered by the Spanish from nearby Santo Domingo in 1511.[10] "The Havana oligarchy jumped all obstacles to start their sugarmills", and were ultimately constrained by one factor alone: the supply of enslaved labour; as Moreno Fraginals puts it, "sugar development depended on the slave trade".[11] "Sugar production and slavery were fixtures in colonial Cuba", experiencing "cyclical periods of expansion followed by contraction"; from the 1740s, it started experiencing sustained expansion as "Spain eliminated import duties for Cuban sugar" and the demand for it across Europe grew.[12]

Havana was captured by Britain in 1762 for a period of eleven months, returning to Spain afterwards.[13] British occupation, while brief, was impactful. British traders brought "unprecedented numbers of [enslaved] Africans to Havana".[14] They introduced 5000 slaves to the island in 1762, providing "an initial stimulus to the Cuban sugar industry".[15] Trade restrictions and import/export taxes were abolished, favouring the slave and sugar trades.[16] Once back under Spanish occupation, there were "subsequent restrictions" in commercial policy, but Paul Cheney suggests that the British measures "stayed more or less in place".[17] Francisco López Segrera notes the importance of both the stimulus to the sugar-slavery paradigm and the integration in global markets to Cuba's success: "Cuban development accelerated with the establishment of a plantation economy, with tight connections to international capital".[18] This allowed it to increase its sugar exports more than sixfold, from 300 to 2000 tons a year, in the half decade following British occupation when it returned to Spanish control.[19] The white sugar planters of Cuba "had spent the last two decades attempting to emulate the magnificent wealth and power of the Saint-Domingue planter class".[20] In February 1789, the free trade in slavery was declared by the Spanish Crown, which by this act "acknowledged the importance of the slave trade".[21] One member of the elite who lobbied in favour of maintaining the policy did so because it "allowed the island to prosper".[22] In 1785, Cuba produced 12 thousand tons of sugar, trailing behind Saint-Domingue (which made 100 thousand

[8] Dubois 2004, p. 304.
[9] Quoted in Ferrer 2014, pp. 4-5.
[10] Dubois 2004, p. 15; Ferrer 2014, p. 18.
[11] Moreno Fraginals 1976, p. 15.
[12] Bergad 2017, p. 102.
[13] ibid., p. 102.
[14] Ferrer 2014, p. 20.
[15] D. W. Tomich 2004, p. 81.
[16] Ferrer 2014, p. 20.
[17] D. W. Tomich 2004, p. 81; Cheney 2017, p. 195.
[18] López Segrera 1985, p. 78.
[19] Ferrer 2014, p. 20.
[20] ibid., p. 4.
[21] Childs 2019, p. 23.
[22] Francisco Arango y Parreño quoted in ibid., p. 23.

tons in 1788) but still significant.[23]

With the slave uprising of Saint-Domingue, "Cuban sugar production catapulted forward".[24] It benefited Cuba in two ways. First, Saint-Domingue ceased to be a competitor, as we have seen, and "the price of sugar was sky high".[25]

Second, many of Saint-Domingue's white planters were able to escape to Cuba, often carrying slaves, and contribute to its own slave plantation economy. Initially, planters saw "the town of Santiago, eighty kilometers from Saint-Domingue on the eastern tip of Cuba, as a convenient observation post and jumping-off point for a projected return to their properties"; going there was "the latest in a series of tactical withdrawals".[26] However, for many it became a new home from which to re-establish their plantations. The *marquise de Rouvray* we quoted as an eyewitness to the uprising told her daughter of her husband's plans to move to "Havana, the capital of the island of Cuba, where the Earth is perfect".[27] This would allow him "to throw down the foundations of a new fortune", to be built on a plot of land he asked the Spanish King to give him.[28] They were not alone as, from 1792, "French slave-owners began migrating as refugees to other parts of the Caribbean, to the United States, and to the Isle de France in the Indian Ocean".[29] For both passing through and settler, Cuba was an especially attractive location after the 1795 Treaty of Basel established peace between France and Spain.[30] All in all, at least 18,000 French immigrants, across all racial groups, arrived in Cuba during the revolutionary period.[31] Robin Blackburn estimates a higher number of 20,000-30,000 refugees.[32] To give a point of comparison, the town of Santiago de Cuba where most arrived had a population of just 26,400 people by 1803.[33]

This immigration wave was "the real turning point in that island's economic development".[34] The slave-owners arriving from Saint-Domingue's formerly favourable environment bristled against political and economic institutions which were "contrary to industry", in the words Paul Cheney quotes planter Corbier as saying.[35] They fought for their "independence", "individual freedom to acquire private property", the "right of personal authority over one's property—including enslaved people", among other liberties.[36] Here, as in Saint-Domingue, they pursued these examples given by Anker of "ugly freedoms", meaning "freedoms [which] enact or produce harm, brutality and oppression", building upon those ugly freedoms already acquired

[23]Herrera 2001, p. 8 for Cuba; C. N. Eddins 2022, p. 87 for Saint-Domingue (expressed as 200 million pounds).

[24]D. W. Tomich 2004, p. 81. The decline of the British sugar plantations of the West Indies also played a role.

[25]Portuondo 2003, p. 231. See also Ortíz-Minaya 2019, p. 65.

[26]Cheney 2017, p. 193.

[27]Madame de Rouvray to her daughter, 10 September 1791, in McIntosh and Weber 1958, p. 145.

[28]Madame de Rouvray to her daughter, 15 September 1791 [mislabelled as 15 August 1791], in ibid., p. 147; see Madame de Rouvray to her daughter, 28 February 1794, in ibid., p. 229.

[29]Manjapra 2022, p. 56.

[30]Cheney 2017, p. 193.

[31]ibid., p. 195.

[32]Blackburn 1996, p. 387.

[33]Cheney 2017, p. 195.

[34]ibid., p. 195.

[35]ibid., p. 196.

[36]Anker 2022, pp. 39-40.

through the *hacienda* system and the opening to free trade.[37] In their time in Cuba, they thus impacted the island's functioning, promoting harsher, more profitable forms of slavery, increasing slave imports, and further opening it to foreign trade.

The French immigrants, however, would not be settled there forever (with the possible exception of those who were naturalised under the Spanish crown). Hostility grew, especially after Napoleon invaded Spain in 1808, and in April 1809 non-naturalised French immigrants fled Cuba, facing anti-French riots.[38] Cuba was swept with "urban and rural campaigns to burn the properties of French migrants from Haiti", as well as by slave rebellions.[39]

The "émigrés' Cuban interlude" may have been short,[40] but it contributed to intensifying Cuba's slavery and its economic integration into the world market so that it could better benefit from the ever-increasing demand for sugar at the expense of its captives. With slave shipments massively increasing, "the slave population in Cuba nearly tripled" between 1792 and 1810.[41] Disembarkations would continue through to the 1860s (see Figure 6.2). Cuban elites were "hop[ing] that their island would succeed Saint-Domingue as the new center of world sugar production", and they were right to be hopeful.[42] In Havana province, not only did the number of sugar mills double in the two decades following the Haitian Revolution: their productivity doubled, too. By the 1820s Cuba was "the world's largest producer of sugar, the new pearl of the Antilles".[43] What had been a society with slaves became a slave society.[44] Estimates of slaves imported into Cuba from 1789 to 1867 vary from 700,000 to 1 million.[45] In any case, the slave population of Cuba tripled in just the years of 1792 to 1810.[46] Ada Ferrer considers the sad mirror-image of Saint-Domingue in Cuba:

> "At a basic level, liberation in Saint-Domingue helped entrench its denial in Cuba. As slavery and colonialism collapsed in the French colony, the Spanish island underwent transformations that were almost the mirror image of Haiti's. The sugar no longer produced in Saint-Domingue was now produced in Cuba."[47]

Cuba's rise as a sugar producer was stunning: from 12 thousand tons in 1785, it nearly quadrupled to 44 thousand in 1815.[48] While it was still overshadowed by Brazil for part of the early 19th Century, "by 1830 [Cuba] would eclipse Brazil in

[37] Anker, in Oklahoma Center for the Humanities 2023.
[38] Cheney 2017, p. 197.
[39] Santiago-Valles 2019, p. 295.
[40] Cheney 2017, p. 197.
[41] Childs 2019, p. 24.
[42] Cheney 2017, p. 196.
[43] Ferrer 2014, p. 5.
[44] ibid., p. 5; Ferrer is referencing Knight 1970.
The distinction between societies with slaves and slave societies is made by M. I. Finley, see Finley 1980, especially chapter 2. As Piketty summarises, slave societies meeting Finley's criteria were "considerably more widespread than Finley imagined", see Piketty 2019, p. 249.
[45] Childs 2019, p. 23.
[46] ibid., p. 24.
[47] Ferrer 2014, p. 10.
[48] Herrera 2001, p. 8.



Figure 6.2: Slave disembarkations compared across four areas, 1780-1866

Interpretation: Slave disembarkations for Saint-Domingue/Haiti, the rest of the French Caribbean (including Martinique, Guadeloupe and French Guiana), Cuba and the USA are show for the years 1780-1866. They come to an end in Saint-Domingue due to the Haitian Revolution, but continue in the other three areas. There is a spike for the USA in 1807, but afterwards numbers dwindle. Yearly disembarkations in the French Caribbean (excluding Saint-Domingue) vary between 0 and about eight thousand, and in 1831 the last disembarkations in the French Caribbean occur. In Cuba, regular disembarkations occur throughout, in smaller amounts during 1780-1815, then with several peaks over the remaining period and steadily decreasing in the last years before the civil war.
Source: Slave Voyages database.

production".[49] By 1850, Cuba produced over a quarter of all sugar in the world.[50] In 1868, the year the Cuban civil war broke out, its share of global production neared 30%. It had not just kept up with but outpaced the rise in total sugar production, which had multiplied by ten since 1760.[51] This was "a seismic shift to Cuba as a dominant sugar producer".[52]

The rise in Cuban production all the way up to 1867 looks like an exponential function, as Herrera notes, reaching 761,000 tons in 1867, a sixty-three-fold increase compared to 1785, achieved in just eight decades.[53] By this point, Cuba was already supplementing its enslaved labour force, following the 1807 British abolition of the slave trade which significantly blocked Cuba's access to new trafficked African slaves. To supplement them, it used indentured labourers from Spain, from Yucatan and from China. The Chinese labourers — 150 000 of them, in total — were brought to Havana by the same slave traders who had once brought slaves.[54]

[49] Ortíz-Minaya 2019, p. 67.
[50] Rood 2017, p. 40.
[51] D. W. Tomich 2004, p. 75.
[52] Ortíz-Minaya 2019, p. 66.
[53] Herrera 2001, p. 8.
[54] ibid., p. 11, p. 13.

Louisiana

Many of the French immigrants fleeing Cuba went to yet another country which benefited from Haitian slave abolition in a world which still demanded slave-made commodities: the United States. In 1809, ten thousand of the émigrés from Cuba went to New Orleans, doubling the city's population immediately,[55] but the country's development of slavery and profiting from Saint-Domingue's fall began earlier. Mark M. Smith writes that "the slave-based plantation system was beginning to define the southern cultural, social, political, and economic landscape" of the U.S.A. by the end of the eighteenth century.[56] In the 1790s and 1800s, like Cuba, the US benefited from the loss of a competitor and from an influx of slave-owners looking to expand slave plantation production. In June 1793, for instance, as the Cap Français burned, more than ten thousand migrants fled from Saint-Domingue to various U.S. states,[57] the influx of whom "produc[ed] the country's first refugee crisis".[58]

The United States' plantation economy also acquired extra territory on which to develop slavery in part thanks to the outcome of the Haitian Revolution. Louisiana, which "from the moment of [its] founding" involved "[r]acial ideas and practices",[59] was a French territory regained by Napoleon from Spain in 1800. His attempts to suppress the Haitian Revolution were both unsuccessful and costly, putting an end to "the dream of a French empire on the American mainland" to which Louisiana was meant to be central.[60] By "quickly negotiating the sale of the vast Louisiana Territory to the United States, thereby keeping it out of British or Spanish hands",[61] Napoleon also "rescued" "good relations between France and the United States",[62] selling it in 1803 for a sum which was large—albeit "utterly incommensurate with [its] true value".[63] The United States acquired a territory already structured by slavery, with 20% of the population being enslaved, though it was not particularly economically developed.[64] While American politicians debated outlawing the slave trade, this only drove slave-owners in Louisiana to redouble their efforts to import as many enslaved people as they could while it was still legal. During 1804 to 1808, 6,000 more slaves were brought to Louisiana, many from the Caribbean, until the trade was abolished in January 1808.[65] When the 9-10,000 French émigrés from Cuba arrived in New Orleans in 1809, these "white Saint-Dominguan refugees [...] found a place they could easily call home", "held together by a shared commitment to racial slavery".[66] The territory continued to prosper on the backs on enslaved people, as "the slave population of Louisiana [reached] 35,000 by 1810 and [...] 69,000

[55] Lachance 1988, p. 109, p. 112. It may have been nine thousand: see Vidal 2019, p. 498.
[56] M. M. Smith 1998, p. 3.
[57] Cabot 2021, p. 92.
[58] Popkin 2010, p. 3.
[59] Vidal 2019, p. 514.
[60] Trouillot 2015, p. 100.
[61] Popkin 2010, p. 379.
[62] Blackburn 1996, p. 250.
[63] ibid., p. 284.
[64] ibid., p. 284.
[65] Cabot 2021, pp. 391-392.
[66] Vidal 2019, p. 498.

by 1820".[67]

Sucres indigènes et coloniaux in France

While the Haitian Revolution succeeded in having slavery abolished throughout all French colonies in 1794, Napoleon would attempt to reinstate it in 1802. He would not succeed in Haiti, where despite the kidnapping of Toussaint Louverture the revolutionaries ultimately won the final major battle against the French in November 1803. But in other French colonies slave-owners reintroduced slave plantation production, vigorously reapplying the sugar-slavery paradigm. Their focus was on sugar and foodstuffs, letting cotton and coffee decline.

Meanwhile, a beet sugar industry was developing in France, leading to the "question des sucres" (sugar question) erupting. Political blocs formed around the "sucre indigène" (indigenous sugar) made from beetroot in mainland France, placed in competition with "sucre colonial" (colonial sugar) which continued to be made from sugarcane in the colonies.[68] The scientific techniques for producing beet sugar had been slowly developing in the eighteenth century, especially under Franz Karl Achard's tireless work to develop it from 1786.[69] In the first decade of the nineteenth century, the project of France becoming self-sufficient for sugar production became urgent. Metropolitan France experienced "severe sugar shortages between 1803 and 1810", not least due to a retaliatory blockade instituted by the British.[70] Achard knew the solution, which he emphasised in his writings on "le sucre *européen* de betteraves" (*European* beetroot sugar).[71] He published treatises explaining how best to crystallise sugar from beetroots, and how to ideally cultivate them for such purposes.[72] "The raw sugar obtained" from his methods "entirely resembles the sugar which comes from colonies", he wrote.[73] Achard had presented a loaf of beet sugar to Frederick William III of Prussia in 1799 and shortly after opened the first beet sugar factory.[74] "Saccharomania" spread across Europe. Claude Louis Berthollet, a chemist, began researching sugar on Napoleon's orders in 1803.[75] When banker Benjamin Delessert started making beetroot sugar in his sugarcane refinery with newly efficient industrial techniques in 1811, Napoleon went to bestow awards upon him. Supposedly, Napoleon detached the *Légion d'honneur* medal hanging on his own chest to offer it directly to Delessert.[76] In 1812, "Napoleon declared the official establishment of the beet sugar industry, instructing each department to set aside land for beets" and promising annual returns of 100%.[77] The beet sugar industry, and the 'beet bloc' which formed around it, developed slowly but surely in a history

[67] Blackburn 1996, p. 284.
[68] Yarrington 2018, p. 20.
[69] Saint-Louis 2007, pp. 8-9; Williams 1971, pp. 242-243.
[70] Yarrington 2018, p. 23.
[71] Achard 1812, p. 1, my italics.
[72] See especially ibid.
[73] ibid., p. 72: "Le sucre brut obtenu est entièrement semblable au sucre des colonies". He was right: they are chemically identical.
[74] Yarrington 2018, p. 23; Perrier-Robert and Bernadin 1999, p. 22.
[75] Yarrington 2018, p. 23.
[76] Saint-Louis 2007, p. 9.
[77] Yarrington 2018, p. 23.

which is highly documented by the French sugar industry to this day.[78]

Despite the development of the beet sugar industry in France, slave-made sugar from the French colonies started being imported again from 1810. It remained both cheaper and better quality than beet sugar, so from the start of *sucre indigène* it encountered fierce competition.[79] The colonies would experience "a small boom in sugar production between 1820 and 1830" thanks to protective tariffs.[80] By the mid-nineteenth century "the French islands were supplying 40 percent of the sugar consumed around the world" according to some estimates.[81] The islands still under French control, put together, had come to provide as much as Saint-Domingue once had single-handedly. As in Saint-Domingue, this depended on slavery.

World-Economic Transformations

Cuba and Louisiana most immediately prospered in their sugar slavery systems after Saint-Domingue's own slavery complex had been abolished by the enslaved. But they would also be destroyed:

> "At the midpoint of the Nineteenth Century, the plantation production of sugar in both Louisiana and Cuba rested on the enslaved labour of tens of thousands of men and women of African descent. [...]
>
> Yet in the second half of the nineteenth century each of these slave systems was destroyed by war and by the upheaval and legislation that followed war. At this moment, when the two economies faced enormous challenges, former slaves stepped forcefully onto the public scene."[82]

I leave the rest of the story to be told by Rebecca J. Scott, among others. I also leave to one side a variety of other transformations. These include the success of Brazil as a slave-based society and host of early sugar frontiers Pernambuco and Bahia; in the seventeenth century it would be the largest producer of sugar in the world, though it would decline as Saint-Domingue grew and experienced a financial crisis when it finally abolished slavery in 1888.[83] Brazil is today the leader in sugar

[78]The history of beet sugar is appealing because it offers a whitewashed starting point for discussing sugar (most historical materials from the sugar industry do so; France Culture's four-part radio documentary series on sugar also starts with beetroot, not colonial cane). By beginning the story with the scientific research on beetroot in the eighteenth century, one evacuates the long history of slave-made slavery we have traced with the sugar-slavery paradigm.

Yet such a history has no power to explain why the 1747 synthesis of sugar crystals from beetroot would led to its mass production. This scientific discovery was given an impulse only because France was already a nation of sugar consumers; and it consumed sugar in large quantities only thanks to the highly productive colonial sugar industry. Furthermore, many of those who developed the beet sugar industry were entangled with sugar slavery, too: Delessert also refined slave-made sugar, as did other *sucre indigène* producers like Louis Say (brother of Jean-Baptiste the economist). Most flagrantly, Napoleon, who oversaw the beet sugar explosion, also reimposed slavery.

[79]Brançon and Viel 1999, p. 241.

[80]Emmer and Engerman 2017, p. 82.

[81]Browne 2021, p. 24.

[82]R. J. Scott 2009, p. 1.

[83]Blackburn 2024; Schulz 2008; Schwartz 2004.

production, at 23% of the global total.[84] Also significant is the shift towards cotton at the end of the eighteenth century, a key factor in European industrial development.[85] These and other histories have been done justice elsewhere, including in the works included in the footnotes on this page.

At the risk of belabouring a point which runs through this section, the emergence and rise of a second slavery after the Haitian Revolution was the result not of the revolution itself but of the world economy. Global demand for sugar remained high, with no stipulations about whether it was slave-made or not. Slavery continued to provide a productive bedrock for planters wishing to pursue cash crops like sugar for which the production conditions are so difficult. Haiti could, on the contrary, have had a positive effect in providing a rival supply of sugar *not* dependent on slavery — though, as we will see in section 6.4, Haiti was prevented from integrated the world market in such a way for a long time due to the colonial powers' refusal to trade with it. Yet none of the global economic system favoured the production of sugar by free workers above that by slaves: there were enough planters willing to subjugate enslaved people to this end; most states supported or ignored their activity; there were not sufficient (or sufficiently organised) consumers conscious of slavery and willing to boycott those who used it.

The Haitian Revolution also provided "the single most important inspiration for slave resistance and abolitionism in the modern era", despite the best efforts of slave societies to prevent knowledge of the uprising and its success.[86] It served as "a talisman for future uprisings of enslaved people", including in Louisiana where it inspired a 1811 revolt.[87] In Cuba, too, a free black man conspiring to revolt in 1812 had portraits of the leaders of the Haitian Revolution he would use to teach "lessons in the history of the Haitian Revolution".[88] As it inspired the enslaved, the "fearful specter of a new Haiti" also terrified the slaveholder class: "slaves were suspected of plotting to repeat the success of Saint Domingue".[89] Many publications also appeared in France detailing what was presented as "African atrocities" against whites; there was a large "audience, both horrified and fascinated by these scenes of horror" for such works, which in reality "said more of the terror of the publishers than the factual realities".[90]

6.1.2 Slavery After Slavery: Legal Forms of Coerced Labour

When slavery was finally abolished (at different times in different places), it left deep inequalities. One might imagine that production which had used slaves would turn to wage-labourers, that the formerly enslaved would be given compensation and become free and waged, but this would be wrong. Instead, the slave-*holders* were compensated while the abolition of slavery ran as a protracted process. Unfree

[84] FAOSTAT Database, data for 2023.
[85] Grenier 2021, p. 915.
[86] Ghachem 2012, p. 2.
[87] Manjapra 2022, p. 64.
[88] Quoted in Dubois 2004, p. 305.
[89] Ciccariello-Maher 2017, p. 61; Fischer 2004, p. 110.
[90] Belissa 2023, p. 167.

labour was replaced with semi-free labour.

The French empire typically replaced slaves with *engagés* (known as coolies in English). In the Caribbean, "between 1854 and 1862, the French imported more than 19,000 African indentured laborers into their Caribbean colonies" and, "[b]etween 1853 and 1888, around 79,000 [indentured] Indian laborers arrived in the French West Indies".[91] Meanwhile, 117,813 engagés were imported to the island of La Réunion between 1818 and 1882.[92] The productivity of the system was favoured by police controls in which former slaves were required to prove their freedom, anti-vagrancy laws, and a crackdown on squatting — at a human cost for the indentured labourers who were structurally disempowered. As a result, it took just 11 and 22 years, respectively, for Martinique and Guadeloupe to reach the level of sugar production they had experienced using slave labour prior to abolition.[93]

French colonisation in the late nineteenth century took new forms but maintained some continuity with the colonial slavery of the eighteenth. "There are no more "slaves", there are only "indigènes" [natives]".[94] However, as Isabel de Castro Henriques and Louis Sala-Molins point out, the colonial category of "indigène", by making racialised populations in French colonies vulnerable, allowed "situations of capture to be disguised as contracts for colonies long after the end of the slave trade proper".[95] Beginning in Algeria, the system of *Indigénat* allowed France to requisition labour from 1871, developing an "indenture regime" from the 1880s and expanding unfree labour categories in the interwar period. For example, in Kanaky/New Caledonia, a 1920 measure aimed to requisition "*all* able-bodied Kanak men between 18 and 22 for a limited 12-month period" for paid work, while from 1929 the "prestation" system imposed mandatory unpaid labour onto men for 4 to 15 days, depending on how many children they had.[96] Immigrant indentured labourers also suffered . As a result, "the memory of this era [is] one in which Kanak and the immigrant indentured laborers were worked like slaves".[97] Many such systems reached their height during WWII, the period of "the apogee of the regime of constraints weighing on Kanak and immigrant indentured laborers" in New Caledonia, but also the period of the Vichy government extending *indigénat* to the Jewish population of Algeria, and of Gaullists hardening colonisation in West Africa; only in Equatorial Africa did the regime improve.[98]

Sala-Molins identifies an ideological continuity between slavery and *indigénat* in "blanco-biblisme", a term conjoining "white" and "Bible" suggesting the alliance of European racism and theology in producing colonial slavery and other forms of colonial dispossession. He writes that after abolition "codes of *indigénat* replace the Codes noirs": "Blanco-Biblism waters down its ideological soup a little and enslaves

[91] Emmer and Engerman 2017, p. 94.
[92] Holstein, Monnier and Corral-Broto 2024, p. 267.
[93] Emmer and Engerman 2017, p. 94.
[94] Sala-Molins 2002, p. 39.
[95] Henriques and Sala-Molins 2002b, p. 18: "maquiller en contrat des situations de rapt pour les colonies bien longtemps après la fin de la traite proprement dite".
[96] Merle and Muckle 2022, p. 266. I use the term "Kanaky" to honour the Indigenous term commonly used for New Caledonia, with "Kanak" referring to the most common Indigenous group.
[97] ibid., p. 265.
[98] ibid., p. 287.

Black people in their own lands".[99]

Ultimately, the *Indigénat* system was abolished in law between 1944 and 1947, though this would not mark the end of colonialism.[100] It was also certainly not the end of the racialised division of labour. Forced labour would be abolished in April 1946,[101] but the differential positions within the performing of labour according to race very much continued, as we will note shortly.

6.1.3 Slavery After Slavery: Illegal Forms of Forced Labour

Though abolitions were slow, often protracted, and frequently substituted by indentured and racialised forms of labour, abolition has at least been achieved everywhere by law. Officially, slavery is abolished in every country in the world since 1981.[102] The cruel paradox, however, is that there are "more slaves alive today than all the people stolen from Africa in the time of the transatlantic slave trade", as slavery expert Kevin Bales remarks in what has been appreciated as a "groundbreaking book on modern slavery".[103] No longer can we find a proud slaveholder; no longer does anyone own a slave by law. Yet 49,570,000 people live in modern slavery, according to the latest estimates by the International Labour Office. This includes 27.6 million people in forced labour, with the rest being in forced marriages.[104]

In a sad turn of events, Haiti is particularly impacted by forms of illegal slavery to this day.[105]. One of its forms is child slavery, under the euphemistic Creole term "restavèk", from French "reste avec" meaning "stay with". Jean-Robert Cadet, himself a former restavek, has documented how these "children of the very poor" are taken from families who struggle to feed them and promised a better life. From that point on they "belong to well-to-do families" and are used "as house servants", "los[ing] all contact with their families".[106] Most families "do not even see restavèk as children" and though the practice of restavèk is illegal former president Jean-Bertrand Aristide

[99] Sala-Molins 2002, p. 39.

[100] Merle and Muckle 2022, pp. 293-294.

[101] ibid., pp. 293.

[102] Mauritania was the final country to do so, though it took until 2007 to instate laws allowing the prosecution of slaveholders.

[103] Bales 2012, Chapter 1, "The New Slavery", n.p.; Caruana et al. 2021, p. 253.

[104] International Labour Office, Walk Free Foundation and International Organization for Migration 2022, p. 17.

[105] The much-cited Global Slavery Index estimates Haiti to have the second-highest prevalence of slavery in the Americas, and the highest degree of vulnerability (Walk Free 2023, p. 90, p. 92). However, this index is flawed in several ways. Its 2014 dataset made a number of disastrous extrapolations, including calculating South Africa's number of slaves based on considering it to be "70% like western Europe (because "historically, South Africa has been culturally similar to western, democratic nations") and 30% like Africa" (Gallagher 2014). Since, it has improved somewhat and is based on valuable surveys of 77,914 people across countries. However, its use to reach conclusions about Haiti is undermined by the fact that the survey was never conducted in Haiti, nor was Haiti named by any person surveyed elsewhere (Walk Free 2025). The surveys from 68 countries are best used to research those countries alone rather than extrapolating, the situation in Haiti is much better understood by researching the country itself, and the comparative study of slavery cannot rely on such a flawed index.

[106] Cadet 1998, p. 4.

observed that it is "so ingrained in Haiit that too many people do not even know they are breaking the law".[107] Cadet estimates their numbers at over 250,000. "More than one-third of households in Port-au-Prince reported housing *restavèk* children" in a 2007-2008 survey, so this seems likely: 300,000 victims of child slavery was a plausible amount for this period.[108] In February 2023, the U.S. embassy in Haiti estimated "150,000 and 300,000 child domestic workers in Haiti".[109] Children have also increasingly been falling victim to forced recruitment into armed gangs, with UNICEF estimating that "30–50% of children in Haiti are involved with armed groups".[110]

Haitians often fall victim to slavery in the neighbouring Dominican Republic, too. Until the 1980s, men and children from Haiti were outright sold to work on the *bateyes* (sugar mill settlements). *Batey* settlements usually replicate the features of the colonial sugar plantation, with vulnerable workers living next to the sugar mill and often far from towns. Even once this stopped, "recruitment and employment contracts" often operated like "a form of trafficking".[111] A 2015 UNDP report counted 425 *bateyes* with an estimated 200,000 people in the Dominican Republic.[112] About half of these people are Haitian. Their "work conditions comparable to debt slavery" are to be connected with "the private management of the sugar industry", according to Raúl Zecca Castel.[113] The Dominican Republic's sugar industry has been struggling, leading to many settlements trying to transition to other forms of production and social life. However, Haiti's recent events have only exacerbated the vulnerability of Haitians to slavery.

More widely, slavery continues in every country in the world. Bobby Banerjee notes that slavery "remains a viable and profitable management practice for business".[114] He considers modern slavery to be "an enabling condition of global neoliberal capitalism".[115] Indeed, a 2016 report found that 71% of firms estimate that it is "likely" or "very likely" that modern slavery occurs in their supply chains, with an anonymous Head of Corporate Responsibility doubting the claims of the remaining 29%: "any brand that is saying it does not have any issues, you don't know your supply chain".[116] Unfortunately, the study of modern slavery is not widely developed. In business and management studies, "modern slavery is hardly in fact a field at all [...] To all intents and purposes, it is a nonfield".[117] This is also true in other academic disciplines.

[107] Restavèk Freedom 2011, §21, §17.
[108] Kenendy 2015, p. 49.
[109] Bureau of International Labor Affairs 2023, p. 2. A 2011 submission to the United Nations also estimated anywhere from 150,000 to 500,000 *restavèk* children; while submissions are not necessarily vetted, theirs was considered valuable by the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery who has cited it in his reports (Restavèk Freedom 2011).
[110] ACAPS 2024, p. 4.
[111] Ould 2004, p. 59.
[112] Hasbún Martínez 2014, p. 11.
[113] Zecca Castel 2021, p. 890.
[114] Banerjee 2021, p. 1.
[115] ibid., p. 2.
[116] Lake et al. 2015, p. 8.
[117] Caruana et al. 2021, p. 253.

The economics of slavery demonstrate how incredibly profitable it remains. When Kevin Bales conducted his study, he estimated that someone buying an underage girl and forcing her to work in a brothel will have made her price back 66 times over in just a month.[118] Modern slaves are affordable and available, "disposable people" in Kevin Bales' terminology. For this reason, Bobby Banerjee's conclusion is pessimistic about the possibility of ending slavery:

> "If modern slavery has to be eradicated, that business model has to be changed. But I for one will not be holding my breath."[119]

6.2 Slavery and Race

As we established in the introduction, race is not a natural category; it is not given by biology.[120] Instead, it is entirely socially determined. Arguably, Marx "took for granted the existence of racial categories"[121], and some subsequent theorists made the same mistake. Our investigation of the history of Ayti/Hispaniola/Saint-Domingue/Haiti allows us to examine how race was produced in this particular context of colonial slavery.

The elaboration of laws and discourse around slavery and race covered in section 2.4 demonstrates how, from the sixteenth century, the categories of "slave" and "Black" were often coterminous, with Spanish-language documentation about slavery "seemingly automatically substituting *negro* [Black] for *esclavo* [slave]".[122] However, the possibility of emancipation posed a threat to the order and cohesion of societies built upon slavery. Race had to expand and become entrenched in societies in order to maintain this order. Increasingly, laws started to deal with racial categories rather than the categories of slavery, as we traced in section 2.4. This is the birth of state racism, as a form of biopolitics: politics "not of the human-as-body, but of the human-as-species".[123]

6.2.1 The Puzzle of Race

> "Considered slaves regardless of their origin, Black people stand out at first glance; their skin is an immediate arrest warrant."
>
> Norman Ajari
> (Ajari 2023, p. 98)

So ingrained is the association between the categories of *slave* and *Black* that there is little questioning to be found in the historical record of the reasons for this

[118] Bales 2012, Chapter 1, "The New Slavery", n.p.: he estimates a price of $150 and a monthly income of $10,000.
[119] Banerjee 2021, p. 4.
[120] See section 1.3.
[121] Knox and Kumar 2023, p. 31.
[122] Weissbourd 2013, p. 532.
[123] Foucault 1997, p. 216.

association. It makes little sense: the slaves working in Saint-Domingue and other plantations never needed to be Black. This, I argue following several thinkers, should puzzle us. Ultimately, it will not remain a puzzle: we will find that there is a great deal of economic rationality lying behind the enslavement of Black people, just as there was for slavery in general. However, by engaging deeply with this puzzle as our starting point, a number of features of colonial slavery are helpfully brought to the surface in ways they might not be were we not to have noticed it.

Frank B. Wilderson III argues that pure economic rationality would have encouraged Saint-Domingue planters to use white slaves from the French *métropole*, for example by "pick[ing] up 50,000 vagrants per year and turn[ing] them into slaves on an industrial scale".[124] We may wonder whether these vagrants were nonetheless not sufficiently "othered" to make this possible, but another example provides even more of a puzzle. Royal decrees issued in Spain in 1501, the year the transatlantic trade began, "prohibited Jews, Muslims, *conversos*, or *moriscos* from going to the New World".[125] These populations, mistreated as racialised others, were already structurally disadvantaged; yet they were barred from enslavement or indentured work. Spain eventually expelled many of these groups, such as the *moriscos* between 1608 and 1612, still choosing not to enslave them. At the very same time, they were buying tens of thousands of Africans. As Robin Blackburn asks, "Why, then, were the *moriscos* not enslaved and sent to the New World?"[126]

The difficulties and expense of establishing a triangular trade with Africa might have been avoided had the condition of slavery been imposed upon white or other non-Black people shipped from Europe to the Caribbean. For this not to pose a puzzle to more historians of slavery speaks of the degree to which anti-Black racism remains under-examined even among those studying its most brutal historic forms. So, why did "slave" and "Black" become synonymous?

Wilderson, like other thinkers in the field of Afro-pessimism, considers that the explanation cannot be economic because exploiting non-Black slaves would have been more economically rational.[127] Indeed, Afro-pessimism fundamentally argued that anti-Blackness is *not* "a contingent ideological apparatus in the service of capitalist exploitation or other forms of social violence", and is thus characterised by its refusal of a (merely) economic explanation of racism. Instead, Wilderson argues that "*psychological* obstacles" among those practising enslavement prevented them from trafficking whites or people of colour.[128] There is some support for this in the Spanish royal authorities considering the potential selling of *morisco* slaves to be "dishonourable", for instance.[129]

Limits to acceptable behaviour, both external and internal to the ruling class, are

[124]Wilderson, Spatzek and von Gleich 2016, p. 16.
[125]W. D. Phillips 2011, p. 333.
[126]Blackburn 1997, p. 82.
[127]For a sympathetic overview of Afro-pessimism see Ajari 2023; for a semi-autobiographical introduction see Wilderson 2020; for an anthology of texts key to the field see Anonymous 2017; for critical overviews of Afro-pessimism see Okoth 2020; Olaloku-Teriba 2018; Thomas 2018; Wekker 2021.
[128]Wilderson, Spatzek and von Gleich 2016, p. 16, his italics.
[129]Blackburn 1997, p. 83.

fought over and set even under social formations which allowed for legal plantation slavery. David Eltis would finally notice the puzzle that it was Black people who were enslaved, at greater economic cost than were it whites, and forces us to confront it. Thus, the limit to enslaving white people and their offspring, apparently also applying to *moriscos*, is not a limit which applies to Black people.

Frank B. Wilderson III, building upon Eltis' work, identifies anti-Black structures as subjecting Black people to "violence beyond the limits". By this, he means that the psychological obstacles to certain degrees of violence against white people do not apply to violence against Black people: "in the *libidinal* economy there are no forms of violence so excessive that they would be considered too cruel to inflict upon Blacks". He also means that there are "no explanations that would make *political or economic* sense of the violence that positions and punishes Blackness".[130]

Wilderson III goes a step further than I would like to by claiming that *no* political-economic explanation makes sense of anti-Black violence. On the contrary, on the plantation, the very relation of exploitation of slavery *requires* continuous violence, as Orlando Patterson points out in a text Wilderson himself also uses:

> "The slave who was freed was no longer a slave. Thus, it was necessary continually to repeat the original, violent act of transforming free man [sic] into slave."[131]

Once this violence is required by the economic structures, we can readily understand the degree to which anti-Black racism is generated and propagated, as both the outcome of structures of violence which dehumanise Black people *and* as one of the pillars allowing these structures to survive. I will return to this shortly.

However, Wilderson does serve to nuance the account that "Race as a coherent ideology did not spring into being simultaneously with slavery, but took even more time than slavery did to become systematic."[132] This suggests, as raised by Norman Ajari, that "racism [...] sought legitimization only after this fact. However, this view fails to explain why Africans were chosen as raw material in the first place."[133]

What Eltis, Wilderson and Ajari have all suggested is that anti-Black racism must have existed in some substantial form *prior* to race and racism becoming coherent ideologies to stabilise slave plantations as a form of production, in order for such a starkly racialised form of slavery to be possible in the first place. Thus, political economic explanations of the anti-Black racialisation of slavery begin to fray and lose their groundings in economic rationality as they confront the origins of such slavery. However, more than Wilderson admits, they have a role in explaining the degree to which slavery required ongoing racism and thereby built a coherent and continuing ideology of race.

Wilderson thus exposes the force of anti-Blackness prior to slavery becoming established as an institution, something which is underappreciated by many historians of slavery and race, but I depart from his analysis in significant ways. Writing in

[130] All quotes from Wilderson 2020, p. 216, Wilderson's italics.
[131] Patterson 1982, p. 3.
[132] B. J. Fields 1990, p. 106.
[133] Ajari 2023, p. 97.

a somewhat ambiguous philosophical register of the "paradigmatic necessity" of anti-Black violence,[134] or about the degree to which it serves a "libidinal" purpose, he portrays it as having an (un)logic[135] grounded in constructing slave/Black as relational categories opposed to that of "Human", his label for non-Black identities:

> "What civil society wants/needs from Black people is far more essential, far more fundamental than land and profits. What civil society needs from Black people is confirmation of Human existence."[136]

This psychological account, explicitly denying an economic explanation of racism's origins, is complicated by the evidence to which we now turn.

6.2.2 Slavery as producing racism

As Audrey Smedley writes in her history of racial identity, it strikes the modern researcher as odd how little importance 'racial' variation appeared to have in the ancient world:

> "What seems strange to us today is that the biological variations among human groups were *not* given significant social meaning."[137]

However strange it appears, it is true. This has led some scholars, in contrast with the Afro-pessimists presented above, seeing race as an ideology which arises because "All human societies [...] assume that nature has ordained their social arrangements."[138] Race is constructed to explain oppressive structures, and in so doing sustains them — functioning analogously to witchcraft, which explained and enabled the oppression of women.[139]

Race, as we explored in the introduction, has little to do with skin colour. Historically, many different people who are today considered white have been racialised.[140] Crucially, racism is not a response to race: race is a construction of racism, motivated by the reasons outlined above among others. It is not an enteral feature, as it did not exist in many forms on society.

Such a critique is suggested even in sources from the 1790s. It is anticipated in some ways by a remarkable letter written by three leaders of the Haitian Revolution. Jean François, Biassou and Toussaint Louverture (under a pseudonym Belair) indicate an interesting understanding of race:

> "l'espèce humaine souffrait de voir avec qu'elle barbaries vous traitiés ces hommes comme vous oui des hommes et sur qui vous n'avez d'autre droit que celui du plus fort et du plus barbare [...]

[134] Wilderson 2020, p. 245.
[135] To use Annie Olaloku-Teriba's term from Olaloku-Teriba 2018.
[136] Wilderson 2020, p. 219.
[137] Smedley 1998, p, 693, my italics.
[138] B. J. Fields 1990, p. 106. See K. E. Fields and B. J. Fields 2022.
[139] The analogy explains the title of the Fields' book: *Racecraft*.
[140] The first two chapters of Robinson 2000 contain only one mention of "Black slaves", instead considering European racialised populations.

> Nous sommes noirs, il est vrait mais *detes* nous Messieurs vous qui êtes si judicieux qu'el est cette loy qui dit que l'hommes noirs doit appartenir et être une propriété à l'homme blancs certainement que vous ne pourrez pas nous la faire voir ou si elle existe ce n'est que dans votte imagination toujours prête a en former de nouvelles [*] des lors que c'est à votte avantage, oui Messieurs nous sommes nés libre comme vous [...] et nous ne pouvons voir ni trouver le droit que vous prétendez avoir sur nous, ni rien qui puisse nous le prouver placé sur la terre comme vous étant tous enfans d'un même perre créé sur une même image nous sommes donc vos égaux en droit naturel et si la nature se plait a diversifier les couleurs dans lespèce humain il n'est pas un crime detre noir ni une avantage detre blanc"[141]

> [the human race suffered to see the barbarity with which you have treated men like yourself — yes, men — over whom you have no other right except that of being mightier and more barbaric than we are [...]
>
> We are black, it is true, but *tell* us, gentlemen, you who are so judicious, what is the law that says that the black man must belong to the white man and be his property? Certainly you will not be able to make us see where that exists, if it is not in your imaginations — always ready to form new ones [*] so long as they are to your advantage. Yes, gentlemen, we are free like you, [...] and we can neither see nor find the right that you claim to have over us, nor anything that could prove it to us, we who were placed on Earth like you, all of us children of the same father created in the same image. We are, therefore, your equals by natural right. If nature pleases itself to diversify colours within the human race, it is not a crime to be born black nor an advantage to be white.]

The "new ones" next to which I have placed an asterisk in brackets are somewhat ambiguous: do they refer to new laws regarding race being invented, or to imaginary ideas of race more broadly? Some scholars have preferred the second interpretation, with Nick Nesbitt considering the missing word to be "phantasms". He writes in *Caribbean Critique* that the three authors "understood identity (here, blackness) as a phantasmatic illusion, the ideological expression of power as domination, social division and hierarchy".[142] Whether or not we go as far as Nesbitt in considering their letter to imply such an argument, they certainly emphasise the unity of the human race within which all racialised people are to be included. Though "nature pleases itself to diversify [skin] colours" — as we find diversities in eye colour, or height, or any other somatic characteristic — it does not provide race, already formed. Instead, racial ideologies select certain types of difference (such as skin colour) and invest them with meaning as racial categories. This only seems to be confirmed when a racist Saint-Domingue law passed in 1773 justified itself as maintaining the "insurmountable barrier between whites and people of color *that public opinion has established and which the government wisely maintains*".[143] The barrier is not

[141] As reproduced in Piquionne 1998, p. 133. Their italics.
[142] Nesbitt 2013, p. 2.
[143] Quoted in Burnard and Garrigus 2018, p. 186, my italics. The law forbade taking a "white name" as a person of colour. See section 2.4.

biological but social.

Bringing Economic Explanations Back In

Theodore W. Allen has emphasised that the "non-slavery of white labor was the indispensable condition for the slavery of black labor".[144] He returns to the puzzle of European powers not enslaving its white vagrants, further adding that doing so "would not have imperiled the fundamental ruling power": despite the need of rulers to avoid their power being challenged, Allen does not estimate the enslavement of vagrants to have constituted a threat to them — at least, not in Europe. It was "the establishment of a system of social control in the unique conditions of the plantation colonies" which demanded a racial difference to be made.[145]

Allen returns to Bacon's Rebellion to explain the economic rationale for racism. During this revolt in 1676-77, "African-American and Anglo bond-laborers together had demanded an end to bond-servitude".[146] This uprising, which saw no racial boundaries between the labourers participating, sought "not the overthrow of capitalism as such, but an end to the version of that system imposed by the plantation elite, based on chattel bond-servitude and engrossment of the land".[147] According to Allen, this would so frighten the ruling class that they turned to racism for its effectiveness in dividing the working and enslaved classes. Were workers to be divided by race, they would be incapable of organising against those who exploited them. This rationale would go on to trump other pragmatic needs, he claims.

There are reasons to challenge other aspects of the puzzle. Robin Blackburn's comment on the *moriscos* has explanations which he does not consider. We have noted the possibility that the powerful in Spain had a psychological obstacle towards enslaving and transporting the Moors who they instead expelled in 1608-1612.[148] We must ask, though, if they would have been able and willing to do so had they not considered it "dishonourable". If not, the 'dishonour' might serve more as a *post hoc* justification than a true influence on the situation. To put it in the terms of economic rationality, setting aside the moral opposition we would have, we are asking if the *moriscos* were an adequate substitute for African labourers. If, considered purely under this unethical economic viewpoint, there are reasons not to favour enslaving the *moriscos* as an additional slave force, the burden of proof is shifted back to those claiming we need to understand it through the anti-Black libidinal economy.

Indeed, there are such reasons. The xenophobic treatment of *moriscos* spread stereotypes akin to antisemitic treatment of Jewish people, of intellectual superiority and physical inferiority.[149] They were, therefore, not "othered" in a way which was

[144] Allen 1976, p. 5.
[145] ibid., p. 5.
[146] Allen 2021, Volume One, Introduction , n.p.
[147] ibid., Volume Two, Part Four, Chapter 13, n.p.
[148] In addition to the arguments considered below, the shared language and culture between white inhabitants and either vagrants or *moriscos* suggests a 'psychological' obstacle which responded to contact with the people alongside whom they lived which they did not have with those living in Africa, whose humanity they could more easily dismiss.
[149] My thanks to Pilar Nogués-Marco for raising this important point.

conducive to their enslavement, with pernicious anti-Black stereotypes contrarily suggesting intellectual inferiority and physical superiority. This much is compatible with the Afro-pessimist claim that anti-Blackness preceded slavery, but with an important nuance: Negrophobic xenophobia did not need to be the most fundamental form of racism in order to produce the atrocious enslavement of Africans. Rather, anti-Blackness was one form of xenophobia among others, and better supported the enslavement of Black people than other xenophobic traditions supported enslaving other racialised groups.

Most importantly, the trade in African captives was already underway by 1608. Slave traffickers were not presented a pure hypothetical out of nothing, where they had the choice between (1) enslaving only Africans, or (2) enslaving Africans and Moors, from which they made a binary choice and began the slave trade. Instead, they had already developed the slave trade in their particular historical conjuncture, using captives from Africa.[150] By the time the *moriscos* were to be expelled from Spain, the triangular trade worked with a certain regularity. To put it in political-economic terms, anti-Black xenophobia and the development of the triangular trade produced path dependency for the traders and planters. As agents situated in these conjunctures, they were not considering all possible racial categories of potential slave as substitutable inputs. Economic rationality may well have compelled them to enslave Africans, rather than any other group, around which racist structures and ideologies would develop to create legitimacy. We will now consider the anti-Black xenophobia upon which racial practices built.

6.2.3 Predecessors of anti-Black racism

Xenophobia, Race, and Reservoirs

This thesis makes a possibly shocking (yet well-supported) claim that anti-Black racism was only developed in the eighteenth century. However, when it developed it was importantly built on pre-existing forms of anti-Black prejudice which we can call *Negrophobia*, following Patrick Wolfe:

> "European xenophobic traditions such as anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, or Negrophobia are considerably older than race, which, as many have shown, became discursively consolidated fairly late in the eighteenth century."[151]

Debra Blumenthal, in her careful study of slavery in fifteenth century Valencia, likewise concludes that racism did not yet exist there. In her conclusion, she writes that there is

> "some suggestive evidence for the development of racialized ideas in connection with slavery, [yet] it still seems misleading to label what we see here in fifteenth-century Valencia as "racism" or even "protoracism.""[152]

[150] The history and explanations of how this trade developed are an important complementary subject for further research.

[151] Wolfe 2006, p. 387. In support of this argument, he cites Guillaumin 1972 among others, and his discussion in Wolfe 2002.

[152] Blumenthal 2009, p. 277.

That said, when anti-Black racism did develop in the eighteenth century, it did so by taking up the ideological reservoir of pre-existing Negrophobia. As Gidley, McGeever and Feldman wrote, this image of a reservoir helpfully depicts how racist tropes work. Antisemitism, they explained, was best understood as

> "a deep reservoir of stereotypes and narratives, one which is replenished over time and from which people can draw with ease. Indeed, the image of a reservoir may help us to understand not only antisemitism but also other racisms"[153]

Building on both this and Wolfe's distinction, it is helpful to consider certain ideological forms of practice as building and filling the reservoirs of xenophobic tropes. These are mobilised in the form of racism, a deeper, structural practice. As state racism used the antisemitic reservoir to enact Judeocide, it used the Negrophobic reservoir to enact anti-Black state racism. This raises the question: what tropes filled the anti-Black reservoir?

Christian Imagery

Through Christianity, anti-Black imagery circulated abundantly. David Brion Davis finds that from the twelfth century, "the iconography of western European churches became stocked with the images of unmistakable black Africans as torturers, tempters, and executioners, often in scenes of the Passion of Christ".[154] Though this wasn't the only representation of Africans in religious imagery — Davis also finds wise men and heroes with 'African' appearances — it was a predominant and potent one.

On the whole, however, religion "provided divine sanction and justification to an *emerging or existing* social order" of racial slavery — not the other way around.[155] Negrophobia did not produce the enslavement of Black Africans, but it did provide a convenient justification for racial slavery. As slavery increasingly required social stratification to guarantee its stability, tropes were drawn from the Negrophobic reservoir to build a powerful anti-Black state racism.

Older, non-racial imagery from the Bible was also racialised in order to support the system. The Bible's Curse of Ham was reinterpreted to produce "a racial consciousness that presented Africans and their descendants as inherently unfree".[156] This tale involved Ham transgressing against his father, Noah, while the latter was drunk.[157] Noah discovers this upon waking and punishes Ham's son, Canaan:

> "When Noah awoke from his wine and found out what his youngest son had done to him, he said,

[153] Gidley, McGeever and Feldman 2020, p. 416.
[154] Davis 2006, p. 59.
[155] ibid., p. 66, my italics.
[156] Obregón 2018, p. 603.
[157] The transgression is likely presented in euphemism, so its nature has been subject of much debate.

> 'Cursed be Canaan!
> The lowest of slaves
> will he be to his brothers.'
>
> He also said,
>
> 'Praise be to the Lord, the God of Shem!
> May Canaan be the slave of Shem.
> May God extend Japheth's territory;
> may Japheth live in the tents of Shem,
> and may Canaan be the slave of Japheth.' "[158]

The Bible thus recalls Noah's three sons Shem, Ham, and Japheth, stipulating that Ham's son Canaan will "be the slave" of the descendents of the other two sons, and became the "single greatest justification for Black slavery for more than a thousand years" according to David M. Goldenberg's study of the curse.[159] In the late eighteenth century, historians at the University of Göttingen reinterpreted the three sons and their descendents as racial groups: Semitic, Hamitic and Japhetic respectively.[160] This pseudo-scientific idea was layered with the notion, using the above passage of the Bible, that the "Hamitic" race, interpreted to be Africans, was cursed by Noah to slavery. It would gain particular force in the nineteenth-century U.S.A., appearing to provide "a way of remaining faithful to the biblical account of a common human origin while also giving divine authority for the enslavement and subordination of African blacks and their descendants".[161] Given the level of adherence to Christianity in societies which practiced colonial slavery, the ability to racialise what was seen as the word of God was a powerful way of legitimising their practices.[162]

What David Brion Davis calls "Christian Negrophobic racism", more properly seen as a form of proto-racism, had several other sources, including antisemitic treatments of *conversos*.[163] Suffice it to say here that these various images filled the reservoir of Negrophobia, propelled by the authority of Christianity. Similar tropes existed in Judaism and Islam and were able to be mobilised, too, to produce a powerful anti-Black racism with much popular adherence.

For modern plantation slavery to emerge in such a starkly racialised form required not just economic rationality but the mobilisation of pre-existing Negrophobia in service of this rationality. Once established, however, the institution of slavery itself encouraged anti-Blackness and generated state racism. This has legacies to which we now turn.

[158] Genesis 9:24-27 (New International Version).
[159] Goldenberg 2009, p. 1.
[160] This was the first use of "Semitic" to (spuriously) refer to a race.
[161] Davis 2006, p. 66.
[162] On the curse of Ham, see also Blackburn 1997, pp. 90-97.
[163] Davis 2006, p. 70.

6.3 Capitalism and Race Today

As we have already seen, capitalism was not antithetical to slavery to the degree we often assume, though they are related in a complex, sometimes contradictory way. Under various forms, capitalism was key to slavery and benefited from it, just as it could also compete with it and seek to snuff it out; today, the capitalist world-system still harbours 49 million enslaved people, with a similar paradoxical mixture of symbiosis and antagonism. But what of the racism which, if not entirely produced by slavery, was certainly uniquely propelled by it? Where is it today?

We could engage in "abstract debates" about whether racism is *necessary* to capitalism, but "[o]ne cannot know such things in advance, on the basis of principles abstracted from concrete historical life".[164] Instead, as many theorists have acknowledged, we can observe concrete ways in which capitalism and racism reinforced each other from slavery, to its abolition, to this day. Racism provides useful functions for capital and, for that reason, is (re)produced under capitalism. How, then, has this use of racialisation under capitalism evolved since the days of the French and Haitian Revolutions?

6.3.1 Racism as a Tool of Division

One view of the function of racism in a capitalist society goes back at least to the writings of Karl Marx and remains common in political arguments today. In writings on both the US civil war and Ireland,[165] Marx emphasised that "race could serve as a device to divide the revolutionary working-class movement".[166] As we saw in Allen's works above, this served to fragment both enslaved and waged workers along racial lines in the seventeenth century. It is argued that, after slavery's abolition, the "reproduction of an internally divided labour force"—of which "[r]ace is one of the main mechanisms"—prevents the working class from uniting and organising to constitute a threat to capitalism.[167]

However, the reduction of racism to the function of division alone at best leads to challenging racism as an obstacle to anti-capitalism—and, at worst, to opposing *anti*-racism as itself unnecessarily divisive. Either way, this reduction "treats 'race' as significant only insofar as it is an obstacle to class unity", failing to fully grapple with the depth and origins of racial divisions.[168]

6.3.2 Nancy Fraser: Racism and the "Two Exes"

Racism, therefore, cannot just be seen as a distraction from working-class unity. It plays other functions. Nancy Fraser has emphasised its role in enabling *expropriation*, which she casts as a background condition to the exploitation of wage labour, thus linking these "two exes". "Behind Manchester stands Mississippi", Fraser writes,

[164]McNally 2017, p. 107.
[165]For example, Marx 1990, p. 414; Marx 1867, esp. part III.
[166]Knox and Kumar 2023, p. 30.
[167]Hall et al. 1992, p. 346.
[168]Olaloku-Teriba 2018, p. 9.

linking U.S. slave production of cotton to the fabric factories of industrial England.[169] Indeed, this was also a point made by Marx, who argued about U.S. slavery that "the absolute *expropriation* of human beings through slavery remained the pedestal of the system, the basis on which arose the veiled *exploitation* of wage labor".[170] One national myth of the U.S.A. involves a foundational distinction between enlightened capitalist North and enslaved regressive South. But Charles Sumner, an abolitionist senator, pointed out the "an unhallowed union—conspiracy let it be called" between "the lords of the lash and the lords of the loom".[171] Rather than being neatly distinguishable, the wage labourers of the North and enslaved workers of the South were often linked through commodity chains. The example of "Negro cloth" demonstrates this most clearly: cotton which Southern slaves were coerced into picking was processed by wage labourers in the North; the resulting, coarse fabric, was sent straight back to plantations as a cheap and rough piece of clothing for enslaved labourers.

Fraser indicates the exploitation-expropriation relation to be structured by racism, which marks some populations as expropriable (see Figure 6.3). Fraser is building on Marxist notions that capitalism began and continues with "so-called 'primitive' accumulation"[172] and its "persistence"[173] in ongoing "accumulation by dispossession".[174] She calls this "*confiscation-cum-conscription-into-accumulation*."[175] This suggests, therefore

6.3.3 Racism Throughout Economic Structures

Fraser provides us with a helpful picture of capitalism as an "institutionalized societal order".[176] Yet, she too neatly relegates racism into the "expropriation" sphere of this order, when it is fundamental to how exploitation itself occurs in the economic sphere[177]—and, indeed, to *all* of the background conditions which she includes in her elegant model of capitalism. Racism is enmeshed not just in the two exes and the political domain, but also in the appropriation of nature[178] and in the processes of social reproduction.[179] All four background conditions, when fully considered, are racially structured — and reducing racism to the relation between the "two exes" distracts from its full reality.

For this reason, the two functions we have established so far do not exhaust how racism operates in interaction with capitalism.[180] Racism is ingrained in every aspect of the processes of capitalism, and as such facilitates what Fraser calls the

[169]Fraser 2022, n.p., inspired by Jason W. Moore's formulation: Moore 2018, p. 30.
[170]This formulation of Marx's view is from Foster, Holleman and Clark 2020, p. 104.
[171]Sumner 1900, p. 233.
[172]Marx 1990, pp. 873-941.
[173]Koshy et al. 2022, p. 14.
[174]See the influential theorisation of Harvey 2003, pp. 137-182.
[175]Fraser 2022, n.p., her italics.
[176]ibid.
[177]Raine 2019.
[178]Moore 2018; Pellow 2007; Pulido 2017; Washington 2019.
[179]Glenn 1992; McNally 2017; Roberts 2014.
[180]To recall, these functions are (1) racism as preventing working-class unity and (2) racism as enabling expropriation.



Figure 6.3: Nancy Fraser's expanded conception of capitalism

Interpretation: This graphic summarises the relations between economic production by free wage-workers undergoing exploitation, and four background enabling conditions of the capitalist economy. Expropriation, which Fraser argues is racialised, is one of four supporting conditions of production using wage-labour.
Source: Own work, summarising Fraser 2022; Fraser and Jaeggi 2018.

"cannibalisation" of extra-economic spheres.[181] As a result, while recognising the many incentives for capitalism to (re)produce racism, we cannot reduce the story to a single causal mechanism. Virdee notes "the convoluted, incremental and contingent manner in which different modalities of racism were assembled and sedimented over the course of historical time to produce the global structures of racialised capitalism that we live with today."[182]

Once we understand racism as constructing race—not interpreting already-existing racial categories—it can no longer be reduced to bigoted acts and beliefs at the individual level. It must instead be treated as structural. Jacques Rancière explains how racism is often portrayed as the "expression of "white trash" from the most backward layers of society"; this, he argues, allows anti-racism to be "appropriated to construct the legitimacy of a new form of racism"—that of the state and elites.[183] That said, we cannot consider racism merely a "passion from above" as Rancière does.[184] To do so neglects what Houria Bouteldja calls "racial collaboration between small and big Whites", employing the language we saw deployed in Saint-Domingue's divisions between white planters and workers, here with ironic distance.[185]

For this, Bouteldja uses Gramsci's concept of the "integral state", which designates "an interconnection and dialectical unity of the state and civil society, where the

[181] Fraser 2022, n.p.
[182] Virdee 2023, p. 116.
[183] Rancière 2011, p. 123
[184] ibid., p. 119. Not least because the term "passion" understates the structural nature of racism.
[185] Bouteldja 2023, p. 150.

latter is integrated under the leadership of the former".[186] Similarly, structural racism operates through the interconnection of the state and civil society. Drawing upon this notion and the "racial state" theorised by David Theo Goldberg,[187] Bouteldja coins the "integral racial state"[188]. Racism is produced throughout the political and civil institutions of capitalist societies, firstly *by* state forces, but in such a way that permeates the entire institutionalised societal order.

While not logically necessary, several mechanisms strongly incentivise capitalism to (re)produce racism at every level of the social order. The persistence of racialisation, after the abolition of slavery, shows race to be a "trace of history", following Patrick Wolfe, but one which has an active and powerful material impact to this day.

6.4 The *Longue Durée* of the Haitian Revolution

The astonishing success of the Haitian Revolution is nevertheless incomplete. Even this historical episode, as John Bracey observes, demonstrates "the difficulty if not the impossibility of carrying through a revolution limited to one country".[189] In this section, we will look at how Haiti declared its independence, both departing from the racial legacy of Saint-Domingue and inheriting many of its structures. As the real and financial causes of its underdevelopment will show, Haiti's place in the world-economy prevented it from encountering success as a newly independent Black republic.

6.4.1 Rupture and Continuity in Haiti

The 1804 Declaration of Independence

When Haiti won its independence, it proclaimed so in a declaration written by Boisrond-Tonnerre, approved by Dessalines, and printed by the Haitian government in the third week of January 1804.[190] It is a bold document announcing their freedom. However, this declaration also contains a notable paradox. Boisrond-Tonnerre's text has a "rare violence" toward the French, "yet it is in the sounds of French that he writes his proclamation".[191] Frenand Léger likewise declares that he is "perplexed by an act of independence *written in French* in which the signatories nevertheless cry "anathema to the dismal French name" and "eternal hatred to France."".[192] This symbolic paradox, a document declaring autonomy from France while using its language,[193] represents a broader ambivalence. The Haitian Revolution did not mark

[186]Humphrys 2018, p. 29.
[187]Goldberg 2002.
[188]Bouteldja 2023, p. 21.
[189]Bracey 2017, p. 326.
[190]Jenson 2011, p. 132.
[191]Laroche 1981, p. 45.
[192]F. Léger 2024, p. 217, my italics.
[193]There are of course reasons to consider this *not* to be paradoxical. While it was addressed to the Haitian people, whom it calls to as "citoyens!" (citizens!) but who mostly spoke Creole, being francophone allowed its easier interpretation by the French and other non-Creole speakers who

a total rupture with the structures of French colonial slavery in Saint-Domingue; Haiti was, in part, born in continuity with this past.

These forms of continuity cannot be explained through the Revolution's leaders alone. For instance, Madison Smartt Bell has claimed that "Toussaint had a large material investment in the colonial status quo".[194] Not only are such interpretations insufficient, "These revisionist readings negate the stand Louverture took for himself and for other enslaved and free Saint-Dominguans of color against slavery and colonialism".[195] As Jean Casimir puts it in his *longue durée* history, we ought instead to see the continuity of a long-term political and social structure:

> "From the Treaty of Ryswick to Haitian independence, Saint-Domingue was organized by an imperial, despotic, secular, modern, and racist state. From 1804 to 1915, the public administration in Haiti inherited all these traits, though they deployed them in new ways."[196]

France left behind "an administrative carcass" and "a set of norms, principles, and ideologies inherited by the Haitian public authorities".[197] This transferred to the highest level of government: Alejo Carpentier's historical novel *The Kingdom of This World* recognises that Henri Christophe had "endeavour[ed] to give his court a thoroughly European air".[198] This was not merely symbolic, as we will see shortly after discussing the treatment of race in newly-born Haiti.

Establishing a Black Republic

In the Haitian Constitution of 20 May 1805, three articles are particularly interesting for concluding our study of racism in the long history of the territory.

> Article 12.
>
> Aucun blanc, quelle que soit sa nation, ne mettra le pied sur ce territoire, à titre de maître ou de propriétaire et ne pourra à l'avenir y acquérir aucune propriété.
>
> [No white person, whatever his nation, will set foot on this territory as master or owner and will not be able to acquire any property there in the future.]

> Article 13.
>
> L'article précédent ne pourra produire aucun effet tant à l'égard des femmes blanches qui sont naturalisées haïtiennes par le gouvernement, qu'à l'égard des enfants nés ou à naître d'elles. Sont compris dans les dispositions du présent article, les Allemands et Polonais naturalisés par le gouvernement.

would come to read it. For other objections (and reasons to dismiss them), see F. Léger 2024, pp. 217-218.

[194] Bell 2007, p. 83.

[195] N. M. Léger 2024, pp. 452-453.

[196] Casimir 2020, p. 222.

[197] ibid., p. 227.

[198] Carpentier 1989, Part III, Chapter 6, n.p.

> [The preceding article shall have no effect either on white women who are naturalized Haitians by the government, or on children born or to be born of them. Germans and Poles naturalized by the government are included in the provisions of this article.]

> Article 14.
>
> Toute acception de couleur parmi les enfants d'une seule et même famille, dont le chef de l'État est le père, devant nécessairement cesser, les Haïtiens ne seront désormais connus que sous la dénomination génériques de Noirs.[199]
>
> [Any distinction of colour must necessarily cease among the children of a single family, of which the Head of State is the father, and Haitians will henceforth be known only by the generic name of Blacks.]

These three articles achieved a number of things which troubled racial categories. First, they barred whites of any nation from settling as masters or property-owners in Article 12, not only barring slavery but also forms of neocolonialism. Second, Article 13 of the Haitian Constitution allowed for white women, Germans, and Polish people to attain citizenship, extracting them from the category of white.[200] Dessalines also extended personal protection to other whites. Third, Article 14 radically abolished all distinctions of colour among Haitians, defining everyone generically as Black. As Laurent Dubois puts it, "those who embraced its [Haiti's] creed of rejecting France and the slavery it had propagated were welcome to change their official identity and become a part of it, and therefore of the black race".[201] Race was erased through a universalism which, as Sibylle Fischer puts it, was derived by generalising a particular.[202] This made it a pioneering country in fighting racial discrimination, with Marlene L. Daut explaining:

> "By declaring that "all distinctions of color" had to "necessarily cease," Haiti became the first state not only to permanently outlaw slavery and to ban imperial rule, but to try to criminalize color prejudice."[203]

Fischer identifies that these articles were "[d]isrupting any biologistic or racialist expectations": all Haitians are declared 'Black' — including some who had white skin and were previously considered white — because to be Black was "a mere implication of being Haitian and thus a political rather than a biological category".[204] It must be said that this did not prevent forms of discrimination from persisting, most notably a form of "mulatto colorism".[205] It also hasn't prevented other kinds of social stratification based on class, gender and other factors, often indicated through language: "fluency in the French language signals" privilege and is a vector

[199] Dessalines 1805, p. 2.
[200] The Poles had deserted Napoleon's army or not evacuated with them — as had some French members of the army (Belissa 2023, p. 153). The Germans were settled prior to the Revolution.
[201] Dubois 2004, p. 300.
[202] Fischer 2004, p. 233.
[203] Daut 2023, Chapter 9, "Anti-racism", n.p.
[204] Fischer 2004, p. 233.
[205] Marius 2022, p. 22.

of exclusion.[206] But this remarkable approach to race, far earlier than such progress in European countries, disrupted fixed understandings of race in pseudo-scientific terms by insisting on its social and political construction.

The Counter-Plantation System

Despite the progress on racial issues, Haiti post-emancipation presented a number of continuities with Saint-Domingue. Jean Casimir explains how this happened and emphasises that these continuities were opposed by the majority of Haitians. This is helpfully discussed by using Michel-Rolph Trouillot's distinction between the state and the nation. As he has written, Haitian peasants "often refer to powerful individuals, especially urbanites, as *leta* ("the state" [in Creole]), regardless of their actual ties to the state apparatus".[207] This is contrasted to the "sense of a national community born during the struggle against slavery", in an opposition reflected in his book's title, *State Against Nation*.[208] The "state", therefore, designates the elites and the Valerie Kaussen has summarised the contrast using these terms:

> "While "the state" amassed its wealth largely by taxing the poor and through its links to international trade, the "nation," configured as descendants of the former Saint-Domingue enslaved population who revolted against the French colonizer, chose to remain "outside" Haiti's urban commercial centers, also the headquarters of state apparatuses and institutions."[209]

Jean Casimir coined the term 'counter-plantation' in his 1980 book *La cultura oprimada*.[210] Then and since, he and others have built upon it. Casimir writes in a recent history of Haiti that "As soon as the first indications of the collapse of the plantation system were visible, the majority of the population set about building a society of villages by chiseling the fragments of clans and lineage systems into an approach to life I call the *counter-plantation system*".[211] The counter-plantation system, in short, is the "refusal of the economics, labor regimes, and hierarchies of the plantation" by captives and their descendents.[212] This refusal also came with a positive project, forms of sovereignty and economic activity pursued by the peasant majority in rural areas, an "oppressed culture".[213] It grew throughout the Haitian Revolution:

> "The counter-plantation system evolved in a crescendo over the fourteen years of the war of national liberation. It generalized itself throughout the Haitian countryside."[214]

[206] Marius 2022, p. 100. This suggests that the adoption of the French language in the declaration of independence contributed to what Marius calls the "color of language" (p. 24).
[207] Trouillot 1990, p. 81.
[208] ibid., p. 74.
[209] Kaussen 2024, p. 326.
[210] Laurent Dubois credits the coinage (though gives a wrong publication date of 1981) in his translator's note to Casimir 2020, p. xxvi.
[211] ibid., p. 304, his italics.
[212] Kaussen 2024, p. 326.
[213] See Casimir 2018.
[214] Casimir 2020, p. 142.

This is where Casimir locates "actual sovereignty", in Dubois' summary of his contribution: "the counter-plantation institutions that in fact controlled most of Haitian space and made its ongoing autonomy—and the flourishing of new ways of life—possible"[215]

This counter-plantation system and its oppressed culture are difficult to study because the "administrative machinery of this state, under the direction of its legislative, judicial, and executive powers, seeks to render invisible and irrational the institutions of resistance created by the oppressed".[216] "Legal texts only rarely allude to these institutions and structural arrangements, and only to criticize them, to seek to turn them to ash, or at best to transform them into something that the sovereign people didn't want."[217] Casimir has done a remarkable job, then, of illustrating its precarious existence as a nation alongside and against the Haitian state, to put it in Trouillot's terms. Carolyn E. Fick's study of the Haitian Revolution has also confirmed the idea that it did not originate in the ideas of revolutionary France:

> "In the end, their agricultural egalitarianism had more to do with their own African origins and the desire to define their lives through their relationship to the land than to French bourgeois-revolutionary notions of liberty and equality."[218]

As the plantation system lived on as a model — not an explicitly slave-based one, but certainly a brutal one — so did resistance to it. "Moins pas esclave, moin pas travaye", goes one Creole phrase popular among Haitian peasants: "I'm not a slave, I will not work".[219] The counter-plantation system had driven the Haitian Revolution's successes, and, once this Revolution had led to a new regime, resisted its forms of continuity with the slave-plantation past.

Influence on Abolitionism

The Haitian Revolution was highly influential on other areas of the world. As we have noted in section 6.1, it provided Cuba and Louisiana (among other slavery strongholds) with opportunities to capture more of the ever-growing market. But it also inspired the enslaved and their allies. As the *Quartlerly Review* (opponents of the revolution) noted in a 1819 editorial:

> "the first germ of Negro emancipation was unintentionally planted in the island of Santo Domingo [...] whence it can hardly fail to spread its roots, in the course of no very distant period, through the whole of the [...] Antilles."[220]

[215] Dubois in Casimir 2020, p. xxvi.
[216] ibid., p. 6.
[217] ibid., p. 304.
[218] Fick 2004, p. 250.
[219] Blackburn 1996, p. 241.
[220] *Quarterly Review* 42, quoted in Gaspar and Geggus 1997, p. vii.

6.4.2 Real and Financial Economic Underdevelopment

"Konstitisyon se papye, bayonèt se fè"
[The constitution is made of paper, bayonets are made of iron]

Popular Haitian saying.
Quoted in Comité Consultatif Indépendant 2021, p. 9.

Real Underdevelopment

As the Creole saying above suggests, a constitution or declaration made of paper does not have power against iron bayonets. The history of Haiti post-Revolution indicates that its aspirations, printed as declarations, were foiled by economic forces it could not overcome. These were of two types: real economic forces and financial ones, with the first being significant in the twenty years following the proclamation of Haiti and latter taking over with France's formal recognition of the country's independence in exchange for what some, including a French president, have called a "ransom".

The Collapse of Haitian Production Comparing a sugar production of 71,700 tons five years before the abolition of slavery to just 1,200 tons five years afterwards, Emmer and Engerman identify a collapse of 98.3%. This is to be compared with other declines in sugar production following abolition, which are significant but nowhere as large as those of Haiti: −29.6% for Matinique and −44.5% for Guadeloupe, to take the French comparisons; the highest other example is Louisiana, where the decline is of 75.2%.[221]

What caused this collapse? First, the "war for independence evidently left little time to focus on the economic issues, especially in the sugar industry" as Henochsberg notes.[222] Once concluded, the thirteen years of war had "left 180,000 Haitians dead, almost half of the population".[223] The environmental effects of Saint-Domingue's intensive plantation agriculture certainly didn't help, either. By the eve of Haiti's 1804 independence, "500,000 hectares, or half the currently cultivated surfaces, were already deforested".[224] Furthermore, fleeing slave-owners and planters brought many slaves with them — and equipment, too. "Machinery, suddenly without a purpose in revolutionary Saint-Domingue, found its way to Cuba", serving both to propel the latter's development and to create obstacles to Haitian production after its Revolution.[225]

This collapse did not merely impact sugar: most of the other commodities decreased significantly and durably, as detailed in a fascinating document prepared

[221] Emmer and Engerman 2017, p. 92.
[222] Henochsberg 2016, p. 18.
[223] Alcenat 2021, p. 195.
[224] Bellande 2016, p. 131.
[225] Ferrer 2014, p. 10.



Años	Cafe libras	Algodon id	Cacao id	Campeche id	Caoba pies	Tabaco libras
1836.	37.622.674	1012.555	550.484	6.767.902.	4.954.944.	1.222.716
1837.	30.845.400	1023.172	266.024.	6.036.233.	4.798.262.	39.569.
1838	42.820.244	1.170.179.	453.488	7.333.936.	4.330.873.	1.995.042
1839	37. 889.092	1.639.420	477.414.	25.946.063.	5.903.477.	2.002.795.
1840	46. 126.272	922575.	442.369	39.230.205.	4.072 645.	1.725.382.
1841	34. 144.117	1.992.482	640.616.	49.072.393.	6.002.632.	3.212.690.
1842	40.752.061	380.517.	600.000.	12.560.147.	4.026.716.	2.518.612.
1843	44.900.552	448.422.	703.827	25.562.904.	5.129.324.	1.715.816.
1844	49.344.908	914.838.	513.448	47.405.120.	2.554.482.	171.838.
1845	41.002.570.	557.480	336.004	63.132.533.	"	5.602.
1846.	33.503.172.	570.061.	630.102.	59.955.363.	3.103.604	" 576.
1847	48.383.692.	529.033.	1.171.520	32.795.670.	2.286.380.	"
1848	37.630.435.	411.462.	905.399	36.340.072.	2.324.552.	"
1849	30.603.343.	544.126.	664.516.	86.232.530.	2.148.001.	"
Totales	559.090.543.	12.997.337	8.360.678	507.009.639	52.259.555.	14.667.625.
Sale por año en 1790	39.935.038. 76.837.219.	871.238. 7.400274.	632.909 600.000.	36.214.977. "	3.735.420. 2.000.000	1.047.688. "
Diminucion Aumento.	36.902.181. "	6.529.036. "	" 32.909.	" 36.214.977.	5.268.530.	" 1.047.688.

Figure 6.4: Haitian exports in 1836-1849, compared with 1790

Interpretation: The second column shows that in 1836, Haiti exported 37,622,674 pounds of coffee. The total exports for 1836-1849 are 559,090,543 pounds, or an average of 39,935,038 per year. Compared with 1790's export numbers of 76,837,219 pounds, this makes for a decrease of 36,902,181 (or −48%).
We can repeat this for the other columns, which deal respectively with cotton (a 1836-1849 average of −88% compared to 1790); cacao (+5%), "campeche" (bloodwood, a new export used as a dye); "caoba" (mahogany, −59%); tobacco (new).
Source: AHN, Mº EXTERIORES H,2523, Exp. 9, p. 29.

by a Spanish diplomat (see Figure 6.4).[226] After detailing the export figures for six key commodities in the years 1836-1849, the author compares the post-independence yearly average with export quantities from 1790. Nearly every key commodity registers significant decreases: cotton plummets to 12% of its 1890 export quantities, while coffee and mahogany are both halved (−48% and −59%). Cacao is roughly in line with the 1790 figure, while two new exports emerge. Exports of tobacco, reaching millions of pounds in the late 1830s and early 1840s, dwindle and stop by the second half of the 1840s. The one significant and durable increase is of "campeche", the Spanish word for *Haematoxylum campechianum* or bloodwood tree, used as "a versatile dye source in the hands of Europe's dyers".[227]

The mahogany and bloodwood just mentioned were two of the three most important woods exported from Haiti in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with the third being *Lignum vitae* (also called guaiacum). The continued exploitation of Haiti for wood, which had already begun under French occupation, led to the country being "widely deforested by the first quarter of the twentieth century", which to this day suffers from "desertification".[228] As for sugar, only in the 1960s would Haiti finally regain the level of sugar production that the slave plantations had experienced.[229]

[226] I am grateful to Pilar Nogués-Marco for sharing this archive with me.
[227] Dodge 2024, p. 16. It most reliably produced a black hue, "an important colour for consumers, especially in Protestant Europe" (p. 19).
[228] Bellande 2016, p. 130.
[229] Emmer and Engerman 2017, p. 92.

Geopolitical Isolation While Haiti proclaimed its independence in the ambiguous declaration of 1804, it suffered for two decades of the non-recognition by other countries: between 1804 and 1825, "the declared independence of Haiti had been looked upon by the rest of the world as an aberrant, *unrecognizable* fiction".[230] It was aberrant and unrecognisable because of the threat it present to the colonial order. Haiti offered an inspiring example to other colonised territories — so, a danger to colonial powers everywhere. Countries avoided trade with the young Republic and, in 1806, the United States declared that "trade with Haiti was illegal", placing it under embargo.[231] The "diplomatic impasse" would mostly come to an end in 1825.[232] However, the U.S.'s isolation of Haiti outlived even this: it took until 1864 for the United States to formally recognise Haiti.

Part of this treatment was racial in motivation. Patrick Bellegarde-Smith wrote that "race prejudice has played a dominant role in Haitian diplomatic relations with Western Europe and North America".[233] Motivated by "the fear of French negroes", meaning "the alarm invoked by the very idea of black revolt", powerful states sought to punish the country as a way of disincentivising future rebellions by enslaved Black people.[234] As Manjapra synthesises, the "nations of North America and Europe would not officially engage with Haiti as a sovereign nation until France had 'emancipated' it; that is, until Haiti was reassigned a place in the international Euro-American regime of colonial rule and antiblackness."[235]

However, racism is not the only explanatory factor for Haiti's diplomatic isolation, as Bellegarde-Smith and Julia Gaffield have both emphasised. Furthermore, despite the reaction to the "significance of Haitian independence" through attempted isolation, the Atlantic World "was connected by warfare, economics, and political change" and strategic contacts occurred in spite of Haiti's relative ostracism.[236] However, the refusal of most powers to trade with Haiti did not allow it to build its productive capacities for export towards other countries, and therefore mostly deprived it of incoming money or goods.

Financial Underdevelopment

In 1825, after ten years of attempted negotiations, France would finally recognise Haitian independence.[237] This, however, would not be done benevolently. Instead, it was granted in exchange for "reparations", a perverse term reflecting the arrogance of French planters, who were influential in French politics.[238] They believed themselves to deserve compensation for their lost fortune in slave plantation income. 150 million francs were demanded, based on estimated 1789 settler revenues, with a total of 25,838 French people considered to be owed reparations.[239] Nor was this agreement

[230] Bongie 2014, n.p.
[231] Gaffield 2015, p. 148.
[232] Bongie 2008, p. 46.
[233] Quoted in Gaffield 2015, p. 3.
[234] Johnson 2012, p. xxvi.
[235] Manjapra 2022, p. 45.
[236] Gaffield 2015, p. 3, p. 4.
[237] Girard 2016, p. 150.
[238] Fondation pour la Mémoire de l'Esclavage 2025, p. 4.
[239] Henochsberg 2016, p. 41. See the breakdown of the estimates on p. 26.

Figure 6.5: Charles X Recognising Haitian Independence

Interpretation: This deceitful illustration uses the familiar image of a slave in chains begging for freedom, common in the European abolition movement, suggesting that Charles X is emancipating them: "Be happy like our beautiful France", he says.
Source: Berthet 1825, Reproduced under Creative Commons Share Alike 4.0.

itself free: the French Baron de Mackau who came to demand the indemnity, in a "unilateral ultimatum", was "accompanied by a flotilla of 14 war ships".[240] This has been taken as a threat to invade were the counter-reparations not issued: an example of gunboat diplomacy. As Obregon puts it, the 'agreement' was actually "an imposition that president Boyer could not refuse".[241]

Alex Dupuy has somewhat nuanced the account of the debt as entirely imposed upon Haiti by the French as external forces. More accurately, it was imposed from outside and, within the country, from above: Haiti's new rulers agreed to the indemnity not only due to military pressure, but also because of "the *class interests* Boyer and Alexandre Pétion were defending".[242] The countries' leaders "willingly entered into financial relations with foreign capital and facilitated its reconquest of the economy".[243] This should not distract, however, from the degree to which the indemnity was rejected by a majority of Haitians, was constantly renegotiated by

[240]Obregón 2018, p. 610; Dupuy 2023, p. 113.
[241]Obregón 2018, p. 610.
[242]Dupuy 2023, p. 115.
[243]Dupuy 2019, p. 126.

Boyer, and would harm the country.

The agreement involved three articles, with the second establishing the "indemnity" and the third serving to "grant" independence. Also included, in article 1, was the order that duties on French ships be "reduced to half the amount" of that imposed on all other ships.[244] The risible way this was framed in France was of Charles X generously giving independence to Haitian slaves (see Figure 6.5). Such a whitewash ignores that slavery was abolished three decades before he became King, such that it was independence and not abolition which was granted; that this independence had already been proclaimed by Haiti, but was frustrated due to France's efforts to isolate the country, in which the U.S. had provided much assistance; and that it was only acknowledged by France in exchange for a large payment of "reparations". In reality, the agreement sought to make Haiti "into a dependent commercial colony for France", not to emancipate it.[245]

The debt which serviced these "reparations" would have enormous impacts on Haiti's development. The country was expected to pay the 150 million francs over the course of just 5 years, sending 30 million francs every year. The total amount, however, was almost six times annual Haitian revenue, making it near-impossible to pay.[246] As Marlene Daut has documented, "the French king knew the Haitian government was hardly capable of making these payments".[247] Unable to meet the first payment, Haiti borrowed the 30 million francs from a French bank, at a nominal interest rate of 6%. When the handling fees are considered, the real interest rate was of 7.5%.[248] For this reason, it is often referred to as a "double debt".[249] In 1838, Boyer was able to renegotiate the debt, leaving the country with 90 million francs to pay.[250] Despite such efforts, the total amount paid was 156 million francs when borrowing costs are also considered. This placed an enormous pressure upon the Haitian economy: in the 1880s, "a staggering 80 percent of national expenditures went to financing debts".[251] Estimates of the damage this caused vary, with a thorough New York Times study calculated a loss of $21 to $115 billion to the Haitian economy in today's money which can be attributed to the double debt.[252]

This case of odious debt redoubled the economic woes Haiti faced in the real sector with a financial sector burden that, when combined with other borrowing, is responsible for Haitian underdevelopment to this day. Not only did the economy reorient to pay the debt, but the Banque Nationale de la République d'Haiti created to manage this loans was owned by France and supervised by the French *Société*

[244]For the full text of the *ordonnance* see Annex A in Henochsberg 2016, p. 53.
[245]Obregón 2018, p. 610.
[246]Gamio et al. 2022.
[247]Daut 2025, n.p.
[248]Of the 30 million borrowed, 6 million went to handling fees, meaning that the Haitian state only received 24 million. The 6% interest demanded on the basis of a 30 million loan amounted to 1,8 million francs, or 7.5% of the amount received. See Henochsberg 2016, p. 30, for the nominal and real interest rates of the other loans contracted.
[249]Fondation pour la Mémoire de l'Esclavage 2025, p. 7.
[250]Henochsberg 2016, p. 13.
[251]Alcenat 2021, p. 196.
[252]Porter, Méheut, Apuzzo et al. 2022; see Porter, Méheut, Gebrekidan et al. 2022 for sources and methodology.



Figure 6.6: The American Marines "Ready for Action near Port-au-Prince", 1915

Interpretation: A United States battalion prepares to attack a Haitian militia, or "caco". Ammunition lies near each gun. We can see the shadow of a ladder used to identify targets.
Source: United States Marine Corps Photo 517564. Higher-quality version as reproduced in Alcenat 2021, p. 197. See also the military history Buckner 1981, pp. 8-9.

Générale. It refused to provide loans which would have helped Haitian economic development.[253] Executives in the Bank also aided theft of large sums of money. Putting all these factors together, the financial situation of Haiti placed it in a structurally disadvantaged position and determined its underdevelopment. As Haitian historian Alain Turnier put it:

> "External finance succeeded in transferring to the economy the colonialism that was politically defeated on the battlefields of Saint-Domingue, and thus perpetuated the past."[254]

The U.S., long financially entangled with Haiti, also intervened in the early twentieth century. In 1914, U.S. Marines were deployed to "retrieve $500,000 from Haiti's national reserves", which were brought to New York.[255] Through a series of military operations in 1915, the U.S. began occupying the country and would do so for a period of 19 years (see Figure 6.6). They ruled through martial rule and imposed forced labour, described as the "twentieth-century version" of the slavery the French had once inflicted on Saint-Domingue.[256] The American occupiers

[253]Henochsberg 2016, p. 31. Henochsberg does not distinguish the Banque Nationale d'Haiti from the Banque Nationale de la République d'Haiti which succeeded it.
[254]Quoted in Dupuy 2023, p. 121.
[255]Alcenat 2021, p. 198.
[256]Schmidt 1995, p. xii.

also exerted financial control: the Banque Nationale de la République d'Haiti "was taken over by the National City Bank of New York" (today's Citigroup) following the occupation.[257] A number of other institutions were also created or taken over, and the Haitian government was required to have American approval for most of its undertakings, especially financial ones.[258] While the U.S. occupation largely displaced France's relationship with Haiti, it did nothing to improve Haiti's situation. As Westenley Alcenat puts it, "U.S. economic imperialism underdeveloped Haiti", including after the end of the occupation.[259]

6.4.3 Debts, Financial and Moral

As I worked on this thesis, Haiti was frequently in the news. For over a century, the country predominantly appears as a scare story: "it has taken cycles of violence and instability for [...] media to notice that Haitians exist".[260] Its current state, of despairing violence and instability, was not generated outside of history. Instead, the *longue durée* of Haitian history, from 1492 to French rule, from financial underdevelopment to the Duvalier regime, and through to today, demonstrates the historical factors contributing to the present situation.

Reparations have been considered as a response to this long-lasting imbalance. Haitian president Jean-Bertrand Aristide attempted to ask for $21 billion in reparations in 2003. The following year, he was forced into exile in a series of events he described as a kidnapping. French involvement has been suggested by reporters since the events, with recent reporting finding confirmation from the ambassador and alleging it to be related to Aristide's demand for reparations:

> "France's ambassador to Haiti at the time, Thierry Burkard, said in an interview that France and the United States had effectively orchestrated "a coup" against Mr. Aristide, and that his abrupt removal was "probably a bit about" his call for reparations from France, too."[261]

Under the presidency of François Hollande, it seemed like reparations might be possible. He condemned the "ransom of independence" and in the same sentence announced: "when I come to Haiti, I will in turn repay the debt we owe".[262] This sounded like a promise of material reparations, but later in the same speech he suggested this was not on the table:

> "la seule dette qui doit être réglée, c'est de pouvoir faire avancer l'humanité."[263]
>
> [the only debt which must be settled is to be able to make humanity advance.]

The following day, it would be confirmed that Hollande only meant to recognise the "moral debt" of France, and not any concrete financial debts.

[257] Dupuy 2019, p. 127.
[258] ibid., p. 132.
[259] Alcenat 2021, p. 193.
[260] ibid., p. 194.
[261] Méheut et al. 2022, n.p.
[262] Hollande 2015, n.p.
[263] ibid.

On 17 April 2025, Hollande's successor Emmanuel Macron more cautiously evoked a "very heavy indemnity" and, rather than announce any action, announced the creation of a Franco-Haitian commission to study the history, a "joint memorial work" seeking, according to him, the "recognition of the truth of history".[264] By carefully avoiding the question of reparations from France to Haiti, he indicates that we are unlikely to see them occur any time soon. Yet, the "case for restitution" continues to be made by many scholars and activists on the basis of the historical record.[265]

6.5 Conclusion: Afterlives of Saint-Domingue

This chapter has sought to connect the events of the Haitian Revolution to what happened elsewhere and what has happened since. It finds that Cuba and Louisiana's development, both becoming hubs of slave production, were closely related to the overthrow of Saint-Domingue's plantation economy. Though Cuba would take a major role in world sugar production, France would also continue to produce colonial sugar using slaves on other islands. So, too, would it develop beet sugar, known as *sucre indigène*, in a major transformation of the geographies of sugar commodity chains.

Slavery persisted outside of newly-born Haiti, but was eventually abolished everywhere. That said, when colonial powers decided upon abolition, they did so in gradual ways in contrast to Haiti's sharp abolition. Through apprenticeships and coolies, slaves were transitioned to or replaced by indentured labourers. Even once free wage-labour emerged, racial structures continued to influence how it operates. One sad afterlife of slavery is the degree to which the racism which was promoted to ensure the stability of the slave system continues to structure societies to this day, something we have analysed by engaging with critical theorists including Nancy Fraser. Another sad reality is that of modern slavery, with there being more slaves alive today than were trafficked from Africa. This under-examined phenomenon is compatible with the current world-economy — indeed, it is arguably promoted by it.

Finally, we have looked at the fate of Haiti after its successful Revolution. We found both ruptures and continuities between Saint-Domingue and Haiti, which lead to its abolition of plantation structures and racial ideologies being incomplete in spite of the counter-plantation system organising against them. The republic's place in the world-economy and the interventionist actions taken by the French and U.S. governments in particular severely undermined its capacity to develop, creating both real and financial sources of underdevelopment.

[264] Macron 2025.
[265] Boltax, Boulger and Miller 2021.

Chapter 7

Conclusions: The Significance of Saint-Domingue

> "Il faut que le monde que vous [les Européens] avez envahi s'affranchisse de celui que vous habitez. [...] Alors, les mers ne sépareront plus que deux amis, deux frères."
>
> [The world that you Europeans have invaded must free itself of the one you inhabit. Then, the seas will merely separate two friends, two siblings.]
>
> Diderot, *Histoire des Deux Indes*

7.1 Summary

This master's thesis has sought to understand the fraught, unequal historical relationship between France and Haiti through a variety of lenses covering a thousand years of history and engaging with a variety of databases, primary sources and theoretical debates. With some consideration of the conceptual stakes of the slavery/capitalism debate, we sought to approach sources with care and attentiveness to the silences produced.

We began in 1492, with the colonisation of what was then called Ayiti, an island where Indigenous groups lived. When Christopher Columbus landed there and decided to pursue its colonisation, a series of transformations of the island began. It was ultimately the sugar-slavery paradigm, which predated even the colonial era, which provided a highly successful "productive recipe" for French colonists in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The production of sugar for export by brutally mistreated slaves made Saint-Domingue the centre of the French empire and the most profitable colony in the world.

The third chapter turned to how the French perceived Saint-Domingue in their engagement with questions of slavery and colonisation. We found an apparently antagonistic debate between those who opposed slavery and those who supported it, or those who opposed and supported the colonies. However, underlying the real hostility between opposing factions in philosophical or parliamentary debates was a set of shared principles which meant that even the most progressive voices could not fathom immediate abolition — if, indeed, they could fathom abolition at all. French revolutionary events often remembered as entirely progressive were reassessed. We identified the degree to which colonial slavery was protected by appeals to property rights and public order, even as the *Constituante* saw itself as fighting against unjust hierarchies — which, ironically, they often represented with the analogy of slavery. France's material dependence on Saint-Domingue's slave plantations informed French parliamentarians' inability to imagine the radical emancipation of slaves there. This served to justify our agreement with Michel-Rolph Trouillot that the Haitian Revolution was "unthinkable" in France. What French revolutionaries could not even imagine, however, was undertaken by Haitian slaves, from August 1791.

The fourth chapter turned to a remarkable event which took place in Paris in January 1792: rioting over sugar prices, which had at least doubled in price in just a couple of days. A study of the history of French sugar consumption confirmed its role in diets across all segments of Parisian society. The riots were then approached with the hypothesis that this price shock was linked to the Haitian Revolution and would, therefore, have made France's colonial dependency on slave plantations apparent to consumers in France. The reality was more complicated and hard to find. Many of the qualitative archives indicated the role of hoarders in driving up prices and restricting sales. While quantitative archives did not allow for precise variations in sugar prices and quantities to be studied, they did confirm the plausibility of the prior prices, the scale of the price shock being at least 100%, and the collapse of production in Saint-Domingue.

Chapter 5 returned to Saint-Domingue itself, or rather to Haiti as it was being born. Using the *SlaveVoyages* database and other sources, we demonstrated the extent to which the uprising of slaves and maroons in Saint-Domingue disrupted the colonial economy of the island. The continued disembarkation of slaves after the beginning of the French Revolution confirmed that its progressive ideals did not prevent the slave trade from peaking in 1790, a year in which a shocking 45% of the victims of the transatlantic trade landed in Saint-Domingue. However, we see the slave uprising taking effect and quickly decreasing disembarkations to a couple of percent of this peak after two years, before stopping after 1797. The database confirms the effectiveness of the Haitian Revolution in disrupting the system of colonial slavery.

Chapter 6 traced a *longue-durée* history beginning after the Haitian Revolution. International in focus, it first examined how the rise of other slave powers occurred in complementarity with the demise of slave plantations in Saint-Domingue. Cuba and Louisiana harboured slave-owners, their captives and their machinery, receiving a significant stimulus from the transfer of wealth, technologies and labour from Haiti. This, conversely, prevented Haiti's development by stripping it of people

and productive means. When combined with the effects of a highly deadly war, ecological exhaustion and diplomatic isolation, Haiti's real economy experienced low levels of development. This was further exacerbated by financial economic underdevelopment, most of all propagated by the "double debt" of 150 million francs imposed by France in exchange for the recognition of independence, which caused the modern-day equivalent of at least $21 billion in losses to the Haitian economy. To this day, there has been no reparation to Haiti for the damages caused by colonialism, slavery or the double debt. The sixth chapter also sought to return to debates about the relationship between slavery, race and capitalism. Our conclusion is a nuanced one: that racialised slavery, and specifically the enslavement of Black Africans, was an economically rational choice made in a path-dependent context. Based on Negrophobia and the historical development of the triangular trade, it then produced anti-Black state racism to ensure its survival. We find its legacies in the continued perpetration of racism not (just) as individual bigotry but as a structuring aspect of modern capitalist societies. Saint-Domingue, therefore, has many afterlives: it created wealth, promoted racism, and when its enslaved victims overthrew it, they faced retaliation and structurally-caused underdevelopment.

7.2 Angles for Further Research

There are several angles which haven't been explored in the present work but which would make for interesting further explorations. In addition to some areas which have already been explicitly addressed as lacking study, I conclude with some topics which deserve expansion in the literature.

7.2.1 Finance and Crisis

The abolition of slavery caused a massive transformation of colonial slave-owning societies. Brazil provides the clearest case, with its transformation being highly disruptive: an "acute financial crisis ushered in by abolition" occurred from 1891 to 1901.[1] For every country dependent on slavery, abolition required a substantial change in production and economic interdependencies. Whether this took the form of a crisis depended on whether abolition was anticipated and managed adequately. As we have seen, the economic situation in France was highly complicated and volatile at the time of the Haitian Revolution. Nevertheless, future work attempting to disentangle the effect of abolition would be important, so that we no longer have to argue by proxy or by analogy. Archival work on the correspondence and finances of those who most benefited from colonial slavery would enlighten our view of how the impact was felt. This would be fascinating to contrast with the more gradual French abolitions of 1848.

7.2.2 Gender

Key among the subjects I have put aside in the present work is gender. Just as the division of labour (whether free or enslaved) was and continues to be racialised, it

[1] Schulz 2008, p. xii.

was and continues to be gendered, and these dynamics intersect.[2] Examining these dynamics would — and should — take another thesis' worth of research. Furthermore, as the history of the buccaneers who were "given" wives shows,[3] Saint-Domingue's development under French rule was clearly characterised from the start by a form of patriarchy. It would be fascinating to trace the history and evolution of patriarchal regimes in the colony's evolution from buccaneer settlers to indentured labourers to slavery. When it came to enslaved people, primary sources offer many indications of gendered differentiation, with the Baron of Wimpffen considering that "girls are a more highly valued merchandise than boys".[4] My breakdown of the population of 1789 along class and racial lines (see Table 2.3) could be further differentiated along a third axis of gender, with the relations of gendered and racialised domination being interrogated. The work of Arlette Gautier is promising in this respect.[5]

What's more, in France a gendered analysis would likely be fruitful. The sugar riots were often led by women and some appeals seemed to address them directly, rather than men. Future research could examine women's often underestimated position as agents of social change in spite of their structural disadvantage. We could also benefit from adding how the *philosophes* and French revolutionaries we looked at in Chapter 3 considered women's rights. How they articulated such views with their views on slavery and the colonies would be informative.

7.2.3 Ecological Analysis

As Braudel said in a 1984 interview, "History is man and everything else. Everything is history: soil, climate, geological movements".[6] These latter, environmental aspects, deserve more attention that they have been given above. The "plantationocene", a term coined by Donna Haraway, identifies the importance of the plantation form to understand environmental transformations. "The plantation system depends on the relocation of the generative units: plants, animals, microbes, people."[7] Future research could fruitfully combine such frameworks, which operate at an epochal, worldwide level, with the study of local particularities. Katherine Johnston's recent book *The Nature of Slavery* offers one impressive account of how slave plantations related to the climate, based on archival research. Her work "connects the history of health and the environment with political events and economic concerns" to examine how concepts of biological race emerged in slave colonies.[8] Further work could attempt to reach conclusions about the ecological conditions on plantations based on a critical reading of the archives she has found which describe the environment. Likewise, this could be done for Saint-Domingue, which was not part of her study.

Ecological analysis could also build upon the sugar-slavery paradigm we elaborated from Dockès' work in section 2.1. It would be fascinating to establish whether the

[2] See Glenn 1992 for a particularly good treatment.

[3] This was explored in subsection 2.2.2.

[4] Wimpffen 1911: "Les filles sont une marchandise plus estimée que les garçons", p. 151.

[5] Gautier 2010. Her category of "domestic slavery" (chapter 1, section 18), however, is insufficient for analysis of all gender dynamics, including how chattel slavery was gendered.

[6] Quoted in Rojas 1992, footnote 24, p. 188. See also Moore 2003, p. 431.

[7] Haraway et al. 2016, p. 557.

[8] Johnston 2023, p. 7.

paradigm generated similar environment effects everywhere it was deployed, or if some places were better able than others to harbour sugar slavery without being damaged by it. This should be conducted with some necessary warnings about how we understand "the potential of 'the environment' as a category": a category which, as Lucien Febvre said but according to Paul Warde perhaps did not fully understand, is far too often used in a deterministic fashion.[9]

7.2.4 Towards a Truly Global History

The slave trade and its interaction with structures around the world could also be addressed in more depth. Future research could identify the long commodity chain of Saint-Domingue's sugar, taking inspiration from the approach developed by Hopkins and Wallerstein.[10] As we discussed in a footnote above, the commodity chains and commodity frontiers approaches are both helpful frameworks, especially when used subject to the scrutiny recommended by Maxine Berg.[11] A commodity chain for Saint-Domingue sugar would be truly global, with enslaved people being trafficked from all parts of Africa, with the slave ships producing profit for their owners, and with the plantation system generating massive wealth which differentially developed different areas of France. Berg and Hudson's approach, which applied to Britain, ought to be studied by anyone wishing to undertake such work for France as it is excellent.[12] That said, one could go further, integrating histories of Africa to better understand how the world-system worked as a totality.[13] As James Walvin has written, by considering a wider geographical scope we can "think about slavery in a truly global setting".[14]

I am finishing this master's thesis five centuries after Ayiti was colonised, 234 years after the Haitian Revolution began, 200 years after the independence ransom was imposed, and amidst the dire ongoing situation in Haiti. If there is one take-away I wish to emphasise, it is that these different markers in Haitian history are connected. As I write these lines on the day Haitians celebrate the *Jounen Drapo Ayisyen*, the day of the birth of the Haitian flag, my hope is that the country can regain stability and prosperity on the basis of the Haitian Revolution's values. This must be based on understanding that "Haiti's underdevelopment was caused in part by its incorporation into the capitalist world-economy as a peripheral economy", in part by the legacy of colonial slavery, and in part through ongoing class inequalities.[15] Hope for its development, therefore, hangs on the reversal of the forms of exploitation and domination, both external and internal, which impact the country. This would be no small feat, but only then will France and Haiti be able to aspire to being two friends, two siblings, separated only by an ocean.

[9] Warde 2017, p. 192.
[10] Hopkins and Wallerstein 1986.
[11] See footnote 20 on page 22.
[12] Berg and Hudson 2023.
[13] Gareth Austin's account of the African slave trade is informative: see Austin 2019.
[14] Walvin 2024, p. 89.
[15] Dupuy 2019, p. 210.

Appendix A

Slave Voyages

The outcome of the data processing using Slave Voyages is presented in the table below.

Disembarkations	Haiti	Everywhere
1697	0	31853
1698	363	40387
1699	503	35012
1700	0	44141
1701	515	47276
1702	268	38770
1703	0	29497
1704	0	31559
1705	0	30781
1706	0	27564
1707	0	34710
1708	268	33876
1709	502	27408
1710	602	33308
1711	1058	31168
1712	0	29540
1713	1600	35563
1714	1851	41595
1715	4552	41059
1716	4175	39165
1717	2906	40235
1718	2644	43990
1719	3415	41022
1720	4005	39701
1721	3337	35305
1722	5016	36653
1723	1245	34822
1724	2497	51922
1725	2918	48080

1726	3043	52902
1727	2962	49758
1728	2139	49209
1729	3567	55035
1730	2000	52532
1731	3894	52309
1732	4479	49598
1733	4099	44602
1734	1683	46836
1735	3679	44380
1736	4266	48874
1737	4024	56787
1738	8782	47896
1739	10851	57668
1740	15308	53952
1741	17459	53030
1742	11566	53157
1743	11563	49550
1744	6306	59964
1745	0	31249
1746	356	30485
1747	864	45747
1748	2346	46181
1749	6530	56498
1750	8790	56125
1751	7362	52858
1752	11186	61683
1753	12516	61005
1754	13493	62797
1755	15232	70396
1756	3525	56582
1757	830	43615
1758	0	48313
1759	0	44094
1760	0	50150
1761	440	56553
1762	0	50905
1763	2106	51626
1764	13584	74266
1765	11984	79473
1766	15322	82346
1767	15920	75879
1768	15442	73062
1769	13382	72704
1770	16531	80013
1771	11349	75227

1772	16960	81886
1773	14690	75184
1774	16209	84732
1775	16128	79006
1776	20708	77745
1777	22056	60249
1778	18521	54931
1779	419	34165
1780	218	36717
1781	1191	44125
1782	4175	47301
1783	9131	55933
1784	25741	94382
1785	26809	84179
1786	29918	83200
1787	33917	88239
1788	31392	91267
1789	30001	81054
1790	44572	98141
1791	28040	94875
1792	9863	101945
1793	1255	89623
1794	635	61545
1795	600	64343
1796	366	61836
1797	158	67946
1798	0	65553
1799	0	79802
1800	0	77528
1801	0	71371
1802	0	88813
1803	0	86953
1804	0	77894
1805	0	79071
1806	0	89344
1807	0	97035
1808	0	37554
1809	0	35330
1810	0	64105
1811	455	52202
1812	0	54055
1813	0	45862
1814	0	49136
1815	0	53392
1816	0	69653
1817	0	80059

1818	0	78508
1819	353	68047
1820	0	63788
Totals	769481	7103437

Appendix B

Demographic Data

Table B.1: Racial Demographics in Saint-Domingue: Population Numbers in Thousands, and Ratio of Enslaved to White Inhabitants

Year	Black	Free people of colour	White	Total	B:W Ratio
1685	6	1	5	12	1.20
1690	10	1	6	17	1.67
1695	15	2	10	27	1.50
1700	19	2	13	34	1.46
1705	22	2	16	40	1.38
1710	27	2	20	49	1.35
1715	32	2	23	57	1.39
1720	36	3	26	65	1.38
1725	51	3	29	83	1.76
1730	65	3	30	98	2.17
1735	78	3	30	111	2.60
1740	92	3	30	125	3.07
1745	105	3	30	138	3.50
1750	119	5	30	154	3.97
1755	136	5	30	171	4.53
1760	156	6	30	192	5.20
1765	174	6	30	210	5.80
1770	230	9	30	269	7.67
1775	271	9	30	310	9.03
1780	302	9	30	341	10.07
1785	333	14	30	377	11.10
1790	465	28	30	523	15.50

Interpretation: In 1685, there were approximately 1000 free people of colour, 5000 whites, and 6000 Black people in Saint-Domingue, making for a ratio of Black-to-white inhabitants of 1.2. The white population reached 30,000 in 1730 and remained stable until the eve of the Haitian Revolution in 1790. Meanwhile the Black population continuously grew, reaching 465,000 in 1790, at which point Black people outnumbered whites over fifteen-to-one.
Source: Data from Henochsberg 2016, Annex F.

Appendix C

Sugar Prices and Exports

As noted above, precise price data is unavailable for the years of interest (1791-1793). The following graphs establish the evolution of sugar prices in France in the decades before 1791 (Figures C.2 and C.1). Also indicated, for comparison, are sugar prices in London during 1760-1787 (Figure C.3). These are my own work based on the sources listed under each graph.

Table C.1 presents the data for Figure 4.6 above.

Table C.1: Export Quantities (in thousands of kgs), 1789 vs. 1800-1801

Thousand kgs	1789	1800-1801	Decrease
White sugar	21549	8	99.96%
Raw sugar	42437	8399	80.21%
Coffee	34846	19601	43.75%
Cotton	3176	1125	64.59%
Indigo	344	0	99.87%

Interpretation: Quantities are rounded to the nearest thousand kgs, while percentages are calculated on precise amount.



Figure C.1: Prices in *sous tournois* for a *livre* of 5 different types of sugar, from least refined (sirop) to most (blanc), 1680-1787
Source: Hauser 1936, pp. 494-503.



Figure C.2: Price of a *livre* of sugar in Paris, in *sous tournois*, 1600-1791
Source: Hauser 1936, pp. 141-143.



Figure C.3: Sugar prices in London (shillings), 1760-1787
Source: House of Commons 1789, Part V.

Appendix D

Encyclopédie Articles

Table D.1 indicates the survey of the *Encyclopédie* conducted for my purposes. The search terms used and number of results found are indicated in the first two columns. The next two columns sort the most relevant entries into, respectively, those with predominantly factual content and those with predominantly political content. The division is not always so neat, of course, but this attempts to demarcate the "thin line between confident syntheses of knowledge and interventions in polemical debates" upon which these entries sat, as noted by Vartija.[1]

[1] Vartija 2021, p. 5.

Table D.1: Encyclopédie Articles

Search term	Results	Factual entries	Political entries
"colonies"	497	Surinam Transmigration	Colonie Commerce Population Vanité
"Domingue"	130	Amérique, ou le Nouveau-Monde Antilles Boucanier Cacao Cap-François Coton Domingue (Saint) Jamaique Martinique Tabac Tortue, île de la Machine à épuiser les eaux d'une mine	Humaine espèce
"nègre"	69	Acara, ou Acarai Assiente, ou Assiento Caraibes, ou Cannibales Esclave Hermaphrodite Homme Luxe Négre (hist nat) Nègres blanc Noirs Piece d'Inde Sucrerie Tete de Negre	Mulatre Nègres (commerce) Nègres, considérés comme esclaves Traite des negres

Bibliography

Robinson Map (14th Aug. 2021). *A Detailed Robinson Projection SVG Map*. URL: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:BlankMap-World.svg (visited on 19/04/2025).

Abanime, Emeka P. (1st Jan. 1979). 'The Anti-Negro French Law of 1777'. In: *The Journal of Negro History*. DOI: 10.2307/2717123.

ACAPS (30th Sept. 2024). *Haiti: Impact of Conflict on Children and Youth*. Thematic profile, p. 8. URL: https://www.acaps.org/en/countries/archives/detail/haiti-impact-of-conflict-on-children-and-youth (visited on 04/05/2025).

Achard, Franz Carl (1812). *Traité Complet Sur Le Sucre Européen de Betteraves : Culture de Cette Plante Considérée Sous Le Rapport Agronomique et Manufacturier*. 268 pp. URL: https://hdl.handle.net/2027/nyp.33433006676716?urlappend=%3Bseq=9 (visited on 22/03/2024).

Ajari, Norman (2023). *Darkening Blackness: Race, Gender, Class, and Pessimism in 21st-Century Black Thought*. 224 pp.

Alcenat, Westenley (3rd Apr. 2021). 'How U.S. Economic Imperialism Underdeveloped Haiti: The United States Is among the Colonizers, Occupiers, and Interventionists Who Bear Historical Responsibility for Generations of Haitian Suffering. Calls for Reparations Demand a Hearing.' In: *NACLA Report on the Americas* 53.2, pp. 193–201. ISSN: 1071-4839. DOI: 10.1080/10714839.2021.1923226. URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/10714839.2021.1923226 (visited on 04/05/2025).

Allen, Theodore W. (1976). *Class Struggle and the Origin of Racial Slavery: The Invention of the White Race*. Hoboken Education Project. 26 pp. URL: http://credo.library.umass.edu/view/full/mums1021-s02-i001 (visited on 03/04/2025).

— (2021). *The Invention of the White Race: The Origin of Racial Oppression*. One-volume edition. London New York: Verso. [ebook]. ISBN: 978-1-83976-393-9.

Anker, Elisabeth R. (2022). *Ugly Freedoms*. Durham: Duke University Press. ISBN: 978-1-4780-2240-4.

Anonymous (1753). *Colon*. In: *Encyclopédie Ou Dictionnaire Raisonné Des Sciences, Des Arts et Des Métiers, Par Une Société de Gens de Lettres*. Ed. by Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d'Alembert. University of Chicago: ARTFL Encyclopédie Project (Autumn 2022 Edition), Robert Morrissey and Glenn Roe (eds). Vol. 3. 17 vols., pp. 646–647. URL: https://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/ (visited on 28/03/2025).

— (1765). *Negres (Commerce)*. In: *Encyclopédie Ou Dictionnaire Raisonné Des Sciences, Des Arts et Des Métiers, Par Une Société de Gens de Lettres*. Ed. by

Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d'Alembert. University of Chicago: ARTFL Encyclopédie Project (Autumn 2022 Edition), Robert Morrissey and Glenn Roe (eds). Vol. 11. 17 vols., pp. 79–80. URL: https://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/ (visited on 28/03/2025).

Anonymous (1819). *Saint-Domingue, ou Histoire de ses révolutions; : contenant le récit effroyable des divisions, des troubles, des ravages, des meurtres, des incendies, des dévastations et des massacres qui eurent lieu dans cette île, depuis 1789 jusqu'à la perte de la colonie*. Paris: Tiger, imprimeur-libraire, rue du Petit-Pont, no. 10. Au Pilier littéraire. 124 pp. URL: http://archive.org/details/saintdomingueouh01pari (visited on 19/04/2024).

— ed. (2017). *Afro-Pessimism: An Introduction*. Racked & Dispatched. 180 pp. URL: https://rackedanddispatched.noblogs.org/files/2017/01/Afro-Pessimism2.pdf.

Arendt, Hannah (Jan. 1944). 'Race-Thinking Before Racism'. In: *The Review of Politics* 6.1, pp. 36–73. ISSN: 1748-6858, 0034-6705. DOI: 10.1017/S0034670500002783. URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/review-of-politics/article/abs/racethinking-before-racism/02AAE753AAD57BAFB03A2F003EF12538 (visited on 31/03/2025).

Arzalier, Francis (2007). 'Colonialisme et Impérialisme : L'exception Française Ou Le Mythe Humaniste'. In: *Une Mauvaise Décolonisation: La France, de l'empire Aux Émeutes Des Quartiers Populaires*. Ed. by Georges Labica. Napoli ; Pantin: Città del sole ; Temps des cerises, pp. 15–44. ISBN: 978-88-8292-352-5.

Assemblée générale de la partie françoise de S.-Domingue (13th Sept. 1790). *Lettre de l'assemblée générale de la partie française de Saint-Domingue aux chambres du commerce et manufactures du royaume. (A bord du "Léopard", en rade de Brest)*. Letter. URL: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k5786466w (visited on 03/04/2025).

Atlas des esclavages (2013). *Atlas des esclavages: de l'Antiquité à nos jours*. Paris: Éd. Autrement.

Austin, Gareth (2019). 'Africa: Economic Change South of the Sahara Since c. 1500'. In: Roy, Tirthankar and Giorgio Riello. *Global Economic History*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, pp. 251–270. ISBN: 978-1-4725-8843-2.

Ayrault, Jean-Marc (2021). 'Nantes, Bordeaux, La Rochelle : l'héritage des grands ports négriers français'. In: *L'histoire de l'esclavage et de la traite négrière: 10 nouvelles approches*. Ed. by Marc Cheb Sun. Librio. Paris: Librio. ISBN: 978-2-290-25734-0.

Badiou, Alain (2006). *L'être et l'événement 2, Logiques des mondes*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil. ebook. ISBN: 978-2-02-106828-3.

Bales, Kevin (2012). *Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy*. Revised version updated with a new preface. Berkeley Los Angeles London: University of California Press. ISBN: 978-0-520-27291-0.

Banaji, Jairus (2007). 'Islam, the Mediterranean and the Rise of Capitalism'. In: *Historical Materialism* 15.1, pp. 47–74. ISSN: 1465-4466, 1569-206X. DOI: 10.1163/156920607X171591. URL: https://brill.com/view/journals/hima/15/1/article-p47_4.xml (visited on 14/05/2025).

Banaji, Jairus (2020). *A Brief History of Commercial Capitalism*. Chicago, Illinois: Haymarket Books. 197 pp. ISBN: 978-1-64259-132-3.

Banerjee, Bobby (Feb. 2021). 'Modern Slavery Is an Enabling Condition of Global Neoliberal Capitalism: Commentary on Modern Slavery in Business'. In: *Business & Society* 60.2, pp. 415–419. ISSN: 0007-6503, 1552-4205. DOI: 10.1177/0007650319898478. URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0007650319898478 (visited on 18/04/2025).

Banton, Michael (2019). *The Idea of Race*. Reproduction en fac-similé. London New York: Routledge. 199 pp. ISBN: 978-0-367-29295-9.

Baptist, Edward E. (2014). *The Half Has Never Been Told: Slavery and the Making of American Capitalism*. New York: Basic Books, a member of the Perseus Books Group. 498 pp. ISBN: 978-0-465-04470-2.

Barbe (7th Oct. 1767). 'Un Mulâtre, Nommé Jean-Charles...' In: *Affiches américaines*. URL: http://www.marronnage.info/fr/document.php?id=2046 (visited on 23/04/2025).

Barnave, Antoine and François Xavier Montesquiou Fezensac (1881). 'Rapport par M. Barnave sur la pétition des villes de commerce et sur l'affaire des colonies, lors de la séance du 8 mars 1790'. In: *Archives Parlementaires de la Révolution Française* 12.1, pp. 68–72. URL: https://archives-parlementaires.persee.fr/prt/db7cac1a-58bc-419d-a0b8-4369e8357854 (visited on 12/04/2025).

Barot, Rohit and John Bird (1st Jan. 2001). 'Racialization: The Genealogy and Critique of a Concept'. In: *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 24.4, pp. 601–618. ISSN: 0141-9870. DOI: 10.1080/01419870120049806. PMID: 19177690. URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870120049806 (visited on 31/03/2025).

Beckert, Sven et al. (Nov. 2021). 'Commodity Frontiers and the Transformation of the Global Countryside: A Research Agenda'. In: *Journal of Global History* 16.3, pp. 435–450. ISSN: 1740-0228, 1740-0236. DOI: 10.1017/S1740022820000455. URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S1740022820000455/type/journal_article (visited on 08/05/2024).

Beckles, Hilary M. (2016). *The First Black Slave Society: Britain's "Barbarity Time" in Barbados, 1636-1876*. Jamaica Barbados Trinidad Tobago: The University of the West Indies Press. 296 pp. ISBN: 978-976-640-585-4.

Belissa, Marc (2023). *La Révolution française et les colonies*. Paris: la Fabrique éditions. 320 pp. ISBN: 978-2-35872-265-0.

Bell, Madison Smartt (16th Jan. 2007). *Toussaint Louverture*. Pantheon. 360 pp. ISBN: 978-0-375-42337-6. URL: http://archive.org/details/toussaintlouvert00bell (visited on 16/04/2025).

Bellande, Alex (2016). 'Haïti Dans Le Marché Mondial Du Bois Aux 19ème et 20ème Siècles: Commerce et Environnement'. In: *Journal of Haitian Studies* 22.1, pp. 130–146. ISSN: 1090-3488. JSTOR: 24894150. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24894150 (visited on 03/05/2025).

Bellegarde, Dantès (2004). *Histoire du peuple haïtien (1492-1952)*. Ed. by Rency Inson Michel. Digital edition. Les classiques des sciences sociales. 460 pp. URL: http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/bellegarde_dantes/histoire_du_peuple_haitien/histoire_du_peuple_haitien.html (visited on 16/04/2024).

Bénot, Yves (1989). *La révolution française et la fin des colonies : essai*. Paris: La Découverte. 282 pp. ISBN: 978-2-7071-1731-1. URL: http://archive.org/details/larevolutionfran0000beno (visited on 27/03/2025).

Berg, Maxine (Nov. 2021). 'Commodity Frontiers: Concepts and History'. In: *Journal of Global History* 16.3, pp. 451–455. ISSN: 1740-0228, 1740-0236. DOI: 10.1017/S1740022821000036. URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-global-history/article/abs/commodity-frontiers-concepts-and-history/06CCE76B4BE3D8F54415C4CD13FA38F1 (visited on 23/04/2024).

Berg, Maxine and Pat Hudson (2023). *Slavery, Capitalism and the Industrial Revolution*. Polity Press. 288 pp. ISBN: 978-1-5095-5270-2.

Bergad, Laird W. (2017). 'Slavery in Cuba and Puerto Rico, 1804 to Abolition'. In: *The Cambridge World History of Slavery: Volume 4: AD 1804–AD 2016*. Ed. by David Eltis et al. Vol. 4. The Cambridge World History of Slavery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 98–128. ISBN: 978-0-521-84069-9. DOI: 10.1017/9781139046176.006. URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-world-history-of-slavery/slavery-in-cuba-and-puerto-rico-1804-to-abolition/A4054475E21A6E96A3ED7F44AB2BC93C (visited on 20/04/2025).

Berthet (1825). *S. M. Charles X Le Bien-Aimé Reconnaissant l'indépendance de Saint-Domingue*. URL: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Grabado_de_Carlos_X_de_Francia_danddole_la_independencia_a_Hait%C3%AD.jpg (visited on 19/05/2025).

Binoche, Bertrand (2018). *Écrasez l'infâme ! philosopher à l'âge des Lumières*. Paris: la Fabrique éditions. 260 pp. ISBN: 978-2-35872-170-7.

Blackburn, Robin (1996). *The Overthrow of Colonial Slavery, 1776-1848*. London ; New York: Verso. 572 pp. ISBN: 978-0-86091-901-8.

— (1997). 'The Old World Background to European Colonial Slavery'. In: *The William and Mary Quarterly* 54.1, pp. 65–102. ISSN: 0043-5597. DOI: 10.2307/2953313. JSTOR: 2953313. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2953313 (visited on 25/03/2025).

— (2006). 'Haiti, Slavery, and the Age of the Democratic Revolution'. In: *The William and Mary Quarterly* 63.4, pp. 643–674. ISSN: 0043-5597. JSTOR: 4491574. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4491574 (visited on 25/03/2025).

— (2010). *The Making of New World Slavery: From the Baroque to the Modern, 1492-1800*. London: Verso. 602 pp. ISBN: 978-1-84467-631-6.

— (2011). *The American Crucible: Slavery, Emancipation and Human Rights*. London: Verso. ISBN: 978-1-78168-228-9. URL: https://archive.org/details/americancrucible0000blac.

— (2024). *The Reckoning: From the Second Slavery to Abolition, 1776-1888*. London New York: Verso. ebook. ISBN: 978-1-80429-343-0.

Blumenthal, Debra (2009). *Enemies and Familiars: Slavery and Mastery in Fifteenth-Century Valencia*. Conjunctions of Religion and Power in the Medieval Past. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 306 pp. ISBN: 978-0-8014-4502-6.

Boltax, Mandy, Thomas Boulger and Tyler Miller (5th Mar. 2021). *The Haitian Independence Debt: A Case for Restitution*. DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3798802. So-

cial Science Research Network: 3798802. URL: https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3798802 (visited on 19/03/2025). Pre-published.

Bongie, Chris (2008). *Friends and Enemies: The Scribal Politics of Post/Colonial Literature*. 1st ed. Vol. 3. Liverpool University Press. ISBN: 978-1-84631-143-7. JSTOR: j.ctt5vjkm2. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt5vjkm2 (visited on 22/04/2025).

— (2014). 'Preface: Baron de Vastey and Post/Revolutionary Haiti'. In: Vastey, Pompée-Valentin de. *The Colonial System Unveiled*. Liverpool: Liverpool university press, pp. 10–20. ISBN: 978-1-78138-031-4.

Bouteldja, Houria (2023). *Beaufs et Barbares: Le Pari Du Nous*. Paris: La Fabrique éditions. 263 pp. ISBN: 978-2-35872-250-6.

Bracey, John H. (2017). 'Introduction to the Cuban Edition of The Black Jacobins'. In: Forsdick, Charles and Christian Høgsbjerg. *The Black Jacobins Reader*. The C.L.R. James Archives. Durham (N.C.): Duke university press. ISBN: 978-0-8223-7394-0.

Brançon, Denis and Claude Viel (1999). 'Le sucre de betterave et l'essor de son industrie : Des premiers travaux jusqu'à la fin de la guerre de 1914-1918'. In: *Revue d'Histoire de la Pharmacie* 87.322, pp. 235–246. DOI: 10.3406/pharm.1999.4743. URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/pharm_0035-2349_1999_num_87_322_4743 (visited on 02/05/2025).

Braudel, Fernand (2022a). *Les Jeux de l'échange*. Civilisation Matérielle, Économie et Capitalisme 2. Armand Colin. ebook. ISBN: 978-2-200-63416-2.

— (2022b). *Les Structures Du Quotidien*. Civilisation Matérielle, Économie et Capitalisme 1. Armand Colin. ebook. ISBN: 978-2-200-63415-5.

Brissot de Warville, Jacques Pierre (1791a). *Discours sur un projet de décret relatif a la révolte des noirs: prononcé a l'Assemblée Nationale, le 30 Octobre 1791*. Imprimerie Nationale. 24 pp.

— (1791b). *Réplique de J.P. Brissot à La Première et Dernière Lettre de Louis-Marthe Gouy, Défenseur de La Traite Des Noirs et de l'esclavage*. Paris: Chez Belin. 54 pp. URL: http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/MOME?af=RN&ae=U104045414&srchtp=a&ste=14&locID=columbiau (visited on 05/05/2025).

Browne, Katherine E. (2021). *Creole Economics: Caribbean Cunning under the French Flag*. Austin: University of Texas Press. 272 pp. ISBN: 978-0-292-79734-5. DOI: 10.7560/702929.

Buck-Morss, Susan (2000). 'Hegel and Haiti'. In: *Critical Inquiry* 26.4, pp. 821–865. ISSN: 0093-1896. JSTOR: 1344332. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1344332 (visited on 27/02/2025).

Buckner, David N. (1981). *A Brief History Of The 10th Marines*. Washington, D. C.: History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps. 144 pp. URL: http://archive.org/details/ABriefHistoryOfThe10thMarines (visited on 04/05/2025).

Bureau of International Labor Affairs (2023). *Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor - Haiti*. URL: https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ILAB/child_labor_reports/tda2022/Haiti.pdf (visited on 04/05/2025).

Burnard, Trevor G. and John D. Garrigus (2018). *The Plantation Machine: Atlantic Capitalism in French Saint-Domingue and British Jamaica*. The Early Modern

Americas. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 350 pp. ISBN: 978-0-8122-2423-8.

Burstin, Haim (26th Sept. 2013). *Une révolution à l'oeuvre: Le Faubourg Saint-Marcel (1789-1794)*. Editions Champ Vallon. 1138 pp. ISBN: 978-2-87673-719-8. Google Books: 8SOQAQAAQBAJ.

Cabot, Andy (12th Jan. 2021). 'Esclavage, empires et diplomatie (France, Grande-Bretagne, Etats-Unis) : abattre ou consolider l'esclavage dans le monde atlantique après Saint-Domingue (c. 1795 - c. 1825) ?' PhD thesis. Université Paris Cité. URL: https://theses.hal.science/tel-03525093 (visited on 14/03/2024).

Cacicazgo de Quisqueya (21st Aug. 2007). URL: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Copia_de_Cacicazgos_de_la_Hispaniola.png (visited on 19/04/2025).

Cadet, Jean-Robert (1998). *Restavec: From Haitian Slave Child to Middle-Class American*. 1st ed. Austin: University of Texas Press. 182 pp. ISBN: 0-292-71203-0.

Cairnes, John Elliott (1863). *The Slave Power : Its Character, Career, and Probable Designs ; Being an Attempt to Explain the Real Issues Involved in the American Contest*. London ; Cambridge : Macmillan and Co. 468 pp. URL: http://archive.org/details/slavepoweritscha6013cair (visited on 21/04/2025).

'Calm Returns to Haiti after Riots' (10th Apr. 2008). In: *BBC News*. URL: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7341683.stm (visited on 30/04/2025).

Carpentier, Alejo (1989). *The Kingdom of This World*. Trans. by Harriet de Onís. Ebook. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Caruana, Robert et al. (Feb. 2021). 'Modern Slavery in Business: The Sad and Sorry State of a Non-Field'. In: *Business & Society* 60.2, pp. 251–287. ISSN: 0007-6503, 1552-4205. DOI: 10.1177/0007650320930417. URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0007650320930417 (visited on 18/04/2025).

Casas, Bartolomé de las (2004). *A Short Account of the Destruction of the Indies*. Trans. by Nigel Griffin. reprinted with a chronology and further reading. Penguin Classics. London: Penguin Books. 143 pp. ISBN: 978-0-14-044562-6.

— (2011). *Brevísima relación de la destrucción de las Indias*. Ed. by José Miguel Martínez-Torrejón. Medellín, Colombia: Editorial Universidad de Antioquia. ISBN: 978-958-714-466-6.

Casimir, Jean (2018). 'Teoría Y Definición De La Cultura Oprimida'. In: Valdés Léon, Camila and Frantz Voltaire. *Antología Del Pensamiento Crítico Haitiano Contemporáneo*. CLACSO, pp. 153–200. DOI: 10.2307/j.ctvnp0jsn.8. JSTOR: j.ctvnp0jsn.8. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvnp0jsn.8 (visited on 16/04/2025).

— (2020). *The Haitians: A Decolonial History*. Trans. by Laurent Dubois. Latin America in Translation/En Traducción/Em Tradução. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. 419 pp. ISBN: 978-1-4696-5154-5.

Césaire, Aimé (1962). *Toussaint Louverture: La Révolution Française et Le Problème Colonial*. Paris: Présence Africaine. 312 pp. URL: https://archive.org/details/toussaintlouvert0000aime.

— (2014). *Notebook of a return to my native land = Cahier d'un retour au pays natal*. French-English Bilingual Edition. Bloodaxe contemporary French poets 4. Newcastle upon Tyne: Bloodaxe Books. 160 pp. ISBN: 978-1-85224-184-1.

Chabert, A (1945). *Essai Sur Les Mouvements Des Prix En France de 1798 à 1820*. Paris: Librairie de Médicis. 261 pp.

Chapuy, Jean-Baptiste and Pierre Jean L. Boquet (1794). *Vue de l'incendie de La Ville Du Cap Français, Arrivée Le 21 Juin 1793*. URL: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b6946889b (visited on 28/04/2025).

Chavagneux, Christian (2020). *Les plus Belles Histoires de l'escroquerie - Du Collier de La Reine à l'affaire Madoff*. Seuil.

Cheney, Paul (2017). *Cul de Sac: Patrimony, Capitalism, and Slavery in French Saint-Domingue*. Chicago London: The University of Chicago Press. ISBN: 978-0-226-07935-6.

Childs, Matt (2019). 'Introduction to Part I'. In: *Breaking the Chains, Forging the Nation: The Afro-Cuban Fight for Freedom and Equality, 1812-1912*. Louisiana State University Press, pp. 23–32. ISBN: 978-0-8071-7098-4. URL: https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/236/edited_volume/chapter/2286712 (visited on 02/04/2025).

Ciccariello-Maher, George (2017). *Decolonizing Dialectics*. Radical Américas. Durham: Duke University Press. 256 pp. ISBN: 978-0-8223-7370-4.

Clarence-Smith, William G. and David Eltis (2011). 'White Servitude'. In: *The Cambridge World History of Slavery: Volume 3: AD 1420–AD 1804*. Ed. by David Eltis and Stanley L. Engerman. Vol. 3. The Cambridge World History of Slavery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 132–160. ISBN: 978-0-521-84068-2. URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-world-history-of-slavery/white-servitude/26D147E460AE526BB03BAD78F3AB62FE (visited on 01/04/2025).

Clarkson, Thomas (1808). *The History of the Rise, Progress, and Accomplishment of the Abolition of the African Slave-Trade by the British Parliament*. Vol. 1. 2 vols. London: L. Taylor. URL: https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/clarkson-the-history-of-the-abolition-of-the-african-slave-trade-vol-1 (visited on 30/03/2025).

Clegg, John (Mar. 2020). 'A Theory of Capitalist Slavery'. In: *Journal of Historical Sociology* 33.1, pp. 74–98. ISSN: 0952-1909, 1467-6443. DOI: 10.1111/johs.12259. URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/johs.12259 (visited on 18/04/2025).

— (24th Feb. 2025). 'Roads To Freedom'. In: *New Left Review* 151, pp. 113–128.

Cobb, Howell (1900). 'Letter from Howell Cobb to James A. Seddon, January 8, 1865'. In: *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*. Vol. 3. 4. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, pp. 1009–1010. URL: https://encyclopediavirginia.org/entries/letter-from-howell-cobb-to-james-a-seddon-january-8-1865/ (visited on 23/02/2025).

Code Noir (1743). *Code Noir Ou Recueil d'édits, Déclarations et Arrêts Concernant Les Esclaves Nègres de l'Amérique...* URL: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k324202j (visited on 25/03/2025).

Comité Consultatif Indépendant (Jan. 2021). *Avant-Projet Constitution*. URL: https://www.haitilibre.com/docs/CCI-CONSTITUTION_Projet-de-Constitution-2-fevrier-2021-20h00.pdf.

Condorcet, Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat (1781). *Réflexions sur l'esclavage des négres*. Neufchatel: La Société Typographique. 122 pp. URL: http://archive.org/details/rflexionssurlesc00cond (visited on 03/06/2024).

Criukshank, Isaac (1800). *Hints to Forestallers, or a Sure Way to Reduce the Price of Grain!* URL: https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/object/P_1868-0808-6904?selectedImageId=187537001 (visited on 20/04/2025).

Da Silva, Daniel Barros Domingues and David Eltis (7th Oct. 2008). 'The Slave Trade to Pernambuco, 1561–1851'. In: *Extending the Frontiers: Essays on the New Transatlantic Slave Trade Database*. Ed. by David Eltis and David Richardson. Yale University Press, pp. 95–129. ISBN: 978-0-300-13436-0. DOI: 10.12987/yale/9780300134360.003.0003. URL: https://doi.org/10.12987/yale/9780300134360.003.0003 (visited on 14/05/2025).

Damilaville, Etienne-Noël (1765). *Population*. In: *Encyclopédie Ou Dictionnaire Raisonné Des Sciences, Des Arts et Des Métiers, Par Une Société de Gens de Lettres*. Ed. by Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d'Alembert. University of Chicago: ARTFL Encyclopédie Project (Autumn 2022 Edition), Robert Morrissey and Glenn Roe (eds). Vol. 13. 17 vols., pp. 88–103. URL: https://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/ (visited on 28/03/2025).

Daniels, Christian (2010). 'Agro-Industries: Sugarcane Technology'. In: Needham, Joseph. *Agro-Industries and Forestry*. 3. print. Vol. Vol. 6, Biology and biological technology, Part 3. Science and Civilisation in China. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. ISBN: 978-0-521-41999-4.

Daudin, Guillaume (1st Apr. 2005). *Commerce et prospérité : la France au XVIIIe siècle*. 19. Presses de l'université Paris-Sorbonne, p. 611. URL: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03587819 (visited on 22/03/2025).

Daut, Marlene L. (2023). *Awakening the Ashes: An Intellectual History of the Haitian Revolution*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. ebook. ISBN: 978-1-4696-7475-9.

— (16th Apr. 2025). *200 years ago, France extorted Haiti in one of history's greatest heists – and Haitians want reparations*. The Conversation. URL: http://theconversation.com/200-years-ago-france-extorted-haiti-in-one-of-historys-greatest-heists-and-haitians-want-reparations-254550 (visited on 17/05/2025).

Davidson, Miles H. (1997). *Columbus Then and Now*. University of Oklahoma Press. 650 pp. ISBN: 978-0-8061-2934-1. URL: http://archive.org/details/columbusthennowl00davi (visited on 19/04/2025).

Davis, David Brion, ed. (1988). *From Homicide to Slavery: Studies in American Culture*. New York: Oxford University Press. 305 pp.

— (2006). *Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN: 978-0-19-514073-6.

De Solminihac, Benoît (20th Apr. 2008). 'Revue de Presse Des Hebdomadaires Du 20/04/2008'. In: *RFI*. URL: http://www1.rfi.fr/actufr/articles/100/article_65253.asp (visited on 30/04/2025).

Debien, Gabriel (1943). *Le plan et les débuts d'une caféière à Saint-Domingue: La plantation "La Merveillère" aux Anses-à-Pitre (1789-1792)*. Valcin. 20 pp. Google Books: D7rjngEACAAJ.

DDHC (1789). *Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen de 1789*. URL: https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/le-bloc-de-constitutionnalite/declaration-des-droits-de-l-homme-et-du-citoyen-de-1789 (visited on 31/05/2024).

'Décret N.° 1287 de La Convention Nationale, Qui Supprime Les Primes Pour La Traite Des Esclaves.' (1793). In: *La Révolution Française et l'abolition de l'esclavage*. Vol. 12, La législation nouvelle : table générale & index. Paris: ED-HIS. URL: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k93367 (visited on 17/04/2025).

Deerr, Noël (1949). *The History of Sugar, Vol. 1*. Vol. 1. Chapman and Hall. 308 pp. ISBN: 978-0-598-92410-0. Google Books: o1xFAQAAIAAJ.

Desan, Suzanne M. (2013). *Living the French Revolution and the Age of Napoleon: Course Guidebook*. 384 pp.

Deschamps, Léon (2012). *Les Colonies Pendant La Révolution: La Constituante et La Réforme Coloniale*. University of Illinois Digital Edition. Perrin et Cie. 340 pp.

Dessalines, Jean-Jacques (20th May 1805). *Constitution d'Haïti*. URL: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k316887c (visited on 01/04/2025).

Diderot, Denis (1798). 'Prospectus de l'encyclopédie'. In: *Oeuvres de Denis Diderot*. Ed. by Jacques-André Naigeon. Vol. 3. Paris: Deterville, pp. 3–51.

Dockès, Pierre (1990). 'Formation et transferts des paradigmes socio-techniques'. In: *Revue française d'économie* 5.4, pp. 29–82. DOI: 10.3406/rfeco.1990.1264. URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/rfeco_0769-0479_1990_num_5_4_1264 (visited on 03/04/2025).

— (2012). 'Le paradigme sucrier (XVIe-XIXe siècle)'. In: Célimène, Fred and André Legris. *L'économie de l'esclavage colonial: enquête et bilan du XVIIe au XIXe siècle*. Biblis 15. Paris: CNRS éditions, pp. 179–207. ISBN: 978-2-271-07308-2.

Dodge, Cameron J. G. (24th Oct. 2024). 'From Piracy to Mechanization: The Atlantic Logwood Trade, 1550–1775'. In: *Itinerario*, pp. 1–21. ISSN: 0165-1153, 2041-2827. DOI: 10.1017/S0165115324000238. URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0165115324000238/type/journal_article (visited on 03/05/2025).

Dorigny, Marcel, ed. (1995). *Les abolitions de l'esclavage : de L.F. Sonthonax à V. Schœlcher, 1793, 1794, 1848 : actes du colloque international tenu à l'Université de Paris VIII les 3, 4 et 5 février 1994*. Saint-Denis [France] : Presses universitaires de Vincennes ; Paris : UNESCO. 418 pp. ISBN: 978-2-910381-15-8. URL: http://archive.org/details/lesabolitionsdel0000unse (visited on 02/06/2024).

Douglas, Rachel (2019). *Making "The Black Jacobins": C. L. R. James and the Drama of History*. The C.L.R. James Archives. Durham: Duke university press. ISBN: 978-1-4780-0530-8.

Doyle, William (2018). *The Oxford History of the French Revolution*. Third Edition. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. 466 pp. ISBN: 978-0-19-285221-2.

Drescher, Seymour (2017). 'European Antislavery: From Empires of Slavery to Global Prohibition'. In: *The Cambridge World History of Slavery: Volume 4: AD 1804–AD 2016*. Ed. by David Eltis et al. Vol. 4. The Cambridge World History of Slavery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 373–398. ISBN: 978-0-521-84069-9. DOI: 10.1017/9781139046176.017. URL:

https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-world-history-of-slavery/european-antislavery-from-empires-of-slavery-to-global-prohibition/27E8ABE8D221C767BB0A03EF18DC97C3 (visited on 30/03/2025).

Du Bois, W. E. B. (2015). *The Souls of Black Folk*. First Yale University Press edition. New Haven London: Yale University Press. 240 pp. ISBN: 978-0-300-19582-8.

Dubois, Laurent (2004). *Avengers of the New World: The Story of the Haitian Revolution*. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 357 pp. ISBN: 978-0-674-01304-9.

— (2009). 'Avenging America: The Politics of Violence in the Haitian Revolution'. In: *The World of the Haitian Revolution*. Ed. by David Patrick Geggus and Norman Fiering. Blacks in the Diaspora. Bloomington, Ind: Indiana University Press, pp. 111–124. ISBN: 978-0-253-22017-2.

Dubois, Laurent and John D. Garrigus (2017). *Slave Revolution in the Caribbean, 1789-1804 : A Brief History with Documents*. Second Edition. Boston : Bedford/St. Martin's, Macmillan Learning. 230 pp. ISBN: 978-1-319-04878-5. URL: http://archive.org/details/slaverevolutioni0000dubo_2ed (visited on 01/04/2025).

Dubuisson, Darlène Elizabeth (2024). *Reclaiming Haiti's Futures: Returned Intellectuals, Placemaking, and Radical Imagination*. 1st ed. Critical Caribbean Studies. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 1 p. ISBN: 978-1-9788-3739-3.

Dubuisson, Pierre Ulric (1780). *Nouvelles considérations sur Saint-Domingue, : en réponse a celles de M. H. Dl. - Par M. D. B****. A Paris, : rue Dauphine, chez Cellot & Jombert fils jeune, libraires, imprim. la seconde porte cochère à droite, en entrant par le Pont-Neuf, au fond de la cour. 372 pp. URL: http://archive.org/details/nouvellesconsid01dubu (visited on 27/04/2025).

Ducos, Roger (24th Jan. 1792). 'Speech to National Legislative Assembly' (Assemblée nationale législative).

Dunbar-Ortiz, Roxanne (2014). *An Indigenous Peoples' History of the United States*. ReVisioning American History. Boston: Beacon Press. 1 p. ISBN: 978-0-8070-0041-0.

Duprat, Annie (1st Sept. 2004). 'Le regard d'un royaliste sur la Révolution : Jacques-Marie Boyer de Nîmes'. In: *Annales historiques de la Révolution française* 337 (337), pp. 21–39. ISSN: 0003-4436. DOI: 10.4000/ahrf.1505. URL: https://journals.openedition.org/ahrf/1505?lang=en#bodyftn13 (visited on 31/03/2025).

Dupuy, Alex (1983). 'Slavery and Underdevelopment in the Caribbean: A Critique of the 'Plantation Economy' Perspective'. In: *Dialectical Anthropology* 7.3, pp. 237–251. ISSN: 03044092, 15730786. JSTOR: 29790074. URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/29790074 (visited on 27/04/2025).

— (2019). *Haiti in the World Economy: Class, Race, and Underdevelopment Since 1700*. Milton: Routledge. 1 p. ISBN: 978-0-367-01392-9.

— (13th Dec. 2023). 'Haiti and the Indemnity Question'. In: *University of Miami Inter-American Law Review* 55.1, p. 112. URL: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr/vol55/iss1/7.

Durand, Cédric (2020). *Techno-féodalisme: critique de l'économie numérique*. Paris: Zones. ISBN: 978-2-35522-115-6.

Eddins, Crystal (25th Aug. 2022). 'Maroon Movements Against Empire: The Long Haitian Revolution, Sixteenth-Nineteenth Centuries'. In: *Journal of World-Systems Research* 28.2 (2), pp. 219–241. ISSN: 1076-156X. DOI: 10.5195/jwsr.2022.1108. URL: http://jwsr.pitt.edu/ojs/jwsr/article/view/1108 (visited on 16/04/2024).

Eddins, Crystal Nicole (2022). *Rituals, Runaways, and the Haitian Revolution: Collective Action in the African Diaspora*. 2nd ed. Cambridge Studies on the African Diaspora. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 978-1-009-25615-5. DOI: 10.1017/9781009256148. URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/rituals-runaways-and-the-haitian-revolution/2FCBF92A767FD8DE3615602F589C326E (visited on 16/04/2024).

Eltis, David (2024). *Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade - Understanding the Database*. SlaveVoyages. URL: https://www.slavevoyages.org/voyage/about#methodology/introduction/0/en/ (visited on 23/05/2024).

Emmanuel, Arghiri (1978). *L'Échange Inégal: Essai Sur Les Antagonismes Dans Les Rapports Économiques Internationaux*. Éd. revue et complétée. Économie et Socialisme 12. Paris: Maspero. 422 pp. ISBN: 978-2-7071-0269-0.

Emmer, Pieter C. and Stanley L. Engerman (2017). 'The Non-Hispanic West Indies'. In: *The Cambridge World History of Slavery: Volume 4: AD 1804–AD 2016*. Ed. by David Eltis et al. Vol. 4. The Cambridge World History of Slavery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 73–97. ISBN: 978-0-521-84069-9. DOI: 10.1017/9781139046176.005. URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-world-history-of-slavery/nonhispanic-west-indies/AF591528CEE949AF81DAEAEF3AE7B239 (visited on 30/03/2025).

Fanon, Frantz (2010). *Les damnés de la terre*. La découverte poche 134. Paris: La Découverte. 311 pp. ISBN: 978-2-7071-4281-8.

Federici, Silvia (2014). *Caliban and the Witch: Women, the Body and Primitive Accumulation*. Second, revised edition, ebook. New York: Autonomedia. ISBN: 1-57027-059-7.

Ferrer, Ada (2014). *Freedom's Mirror: Cuba and Haiti in the Age of Revolution*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 978-1-107-69778-2.

Fick, Carolyn E. (1997). 'The French Revolution in Saint Domingue: A Triumph or a Failure?' In: *A Turbulent Time : The French Revolution and the Greater Caribbean*. Ed. by David Barry Gaspar and David Patrick Geggus. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 51–77. ISBN: 978-0-253-33247-9. URL: http://archive.org/details/turbulenttimefre0000unse (visited on 17/04/2025).

— (2004). *The Making of Haiti: The Saint Domingue Revolution from Below*. 6. print. Knoxville: Univ. of Tennessee Pr. 355 pp. ISBN: 978-0-87049-667-7.

Fields, Barbara Jeanne (1st June 1990). 'Slavery, Race and Ideology in the United States of America'. In: *New Left Review* (I/181), pp. 95–118.

Fields, Karen E. and Barbara Jeanne Fields (2022). *Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life*. Paperback edition. London ; New York: Verso. 304 pp. ISBN: 978-1-83976-564-3.

Finley, Moses I. (1980). *Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology*. New York: Viking Press. 218 pp. ISBN: 978-0-670-12277-6. URL: http://archive.org/details/ancientslaverymo00finl (visited on 21/04/2025).

Fischer, Sibylle (2004). *Modernity Disavowed: Haiti and the Cultures of Slavery in the Age of Revolution*. Durham: Duke University Press. 382 pp. ISBN: 978-0-8223-8550-9. DOI: 10.1515/9780822385509.

Foix, Alain (2007). *Toussaint Louverture*. ebook. Folio 29. Paris: Gallimard. ISBN: 978-2-07-247960-1.

Fondation pour la Mémoire de l'Esclavage (Mar. 2025). *La Double Dette d'Haïti : Une Question Actuelle*. 4. Fondation pour la Mémoire de l'Esclavage, p. 32. URL: https://memoire-esclavage.org/sites/default/files/2025-04/Note%20FME%204%20Ha%C3%AFti%202025%20web.pdf.

Forbonnais, François Véron de (1753a). *Colonie*. In: *Encyclopédie Ou Dictionnaire Raisonné Des Sciences, Des Arts et Des Métiers, Par Une Société de Gens de Lettres*. Ed. by Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d'Alembert. University of Chicago: ARTFL Encyclopédie Project (Autumn 2022 Edition), Robert Morrissey and Glenn Roe (eds). Vol. 3. 17 vols., pp. 648–651. URL: https://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/ (visited on 28/03/2025).

— (1753b). *Commerce*. In: *Encyclopédie Ou Dictionnaire Raisonné Des Sciences, Des Arts et Des Métiers, Par Une Société de Gens de Lettres*. Ed. by Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d'Alembert. University of Chicago: ARTFL Encyclopédie Project (Autumn 2022 Edition), Robert Morrissey and Glenn Roe (eds). Vol. 3. 17 vols., pp. 690–699. URL: https://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/ (visited on 28/03/2025).

Formey, Jean-Henri-Samuel (1765). *Negre (Histoire Naturelle)*. In: *Encyclopédie Ou Dictionnaire Raisonné Des Sciences, Des Arts et Des Métiers, Par Une Société de Gens de Lettres*. Ed. by Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d'Alembert. University of Chicago: ARTFL Encyclopédie Project (Autumn 2022 Edition), Robert Morrissey and Glenn Roe (eds). Vol. 11. 17 vols., pp. 76–79. URL: https://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/ (visited on 28/03/2025).

Forsdick, Charles and Christian Høgsbjerg (2017). *The Black Jacobins Reader*. The C.L.R. James Archives. Durham (N.C.): Duke university press. ISBN: 978-0-8223-7394-0.

Foster, John Bellamy, Hannah Holleman and Brett Clark (1st July 2020). 'Marx and Slavery'. In: *Monthly Review*, pp. 96–117. ISSN: 0027-0520, 0027-0520. DOI: 10.14452/MR-072-03-2020-07_9. URL: https://monthlyreviewarchives.org/index.php/mr/article/view/MR-072-03-2020-07_9 (visited on 21/04/2025).

Foucault, Michel (1997). *"Il faut défendre la société": cours au Collège de France, 1975-1976*. Ed. by François Ewald, Mauro Bertiani and Alessandro Fontana. Hautes études. Paris: Seuil. ISBN: 978-2-02-023169-5.

Fraser, Nancy (2022). *Cannibal Capitalism: How Our System Is Devouring Democracy, Care, and the Planet - and What We Can Do about It*. London: Verso. 190 pp. ISBN: 978-1-5095-2526-3.

— (24th Feb. 2025). 'Slavery and Social Theory'. In: *New Left Review* 151, pp. 143–148.

Fraser, Nancy and Rahel Jaeggi (2018). *Capitalism: A Conversation in Critical Theory*. Medford, MA: Polity. 1 p. ISBN: 978-1-5095-2526-3.

Freedman, David A. (1991). 'Statistical Models and Shoe Leather'. In: *Sociological Methodology* 21, pp. 291–313. ISSN: 0081-1750. DOI: 10.2307/270939. JSTOR: 270939. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/270939 (visited on 22/01/2024).

— (1st Aug. 1999). 'From Association to Causation: Some Remarks on the History of Statistics'. In: *Statistical Science* 14.3, pp. 243–258. DOI: 10.1214/ss/1009212409.

Fuentes, Marisa Joanna (2016). *Dispossessed Lives: Enslaved Women, Violence, and the Archive*. 1st ed. Early American Studies. Philadelphia (Pa.): PENN University of Pennsylvania Press. ISBN: 978-0-8122-4822-7.

Gaffield, Julia (2015). *Haitian Connections in the Atlantic World: Recognition after Revolution*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. 254 pp. ISBN: 978-1-4696-2563-8.

Gainot, Bernard (2015). *L'empire Colonial Français de Richelieu à Napoléon: 1630-1810*. Ebook. Collection U. Histoire. Paris: Armand Colin. ISBN: 978-2-200-60384-7.

Galbraith, John Kenneth (2017). *Money: Whence It Came, Where It Went*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 374 pp. ISBN: 978-0-691-17166-1.

Gallagher, Anne (28th Nov. 2014). 'The Global Slavery Index Is Based on Flawed Data – Why Does No One Say So?' In: *The Guardian. Global development*. ISSN: 0261-3077. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2014/nov/28/global-slavery-index-walk-free-human-trafficking-anne-gallagher (visited on 04/05/2025).

Gamio, Lazaro et al. (20th May 2022). 'Haiti's Lost Billions'. In: *The New York Times. World*. ISSN: 0362-4331. URL: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/05/20/world/americas/enslaved-haiti-debt-timeline.html (visited on 19/05/2025).

Garrigus, John D. (2006). *Before Haiti: Race and Citizenship in French Saint-Domingue*. 1st ed. Americas in the Early Modern Atlantic World. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 396 pp. ISBN: 978-1-4039-8443-2.

Garrioch, David (2002). *The Making of Revolutionary Paris*. Berkeley: University of California press. 382 pp. ISBN: 978-0-520-23253-2.

Gaspar, David Barry and David Patrick Geggus, eds. (1997). *A Turbulent Time : The French Revolution and the Greater Caribbean*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 290 pp. ISBN: 978-0-253-33247-9. URL: http://archive.org/details/turbulenttimefre0000unse (visited on 17/04/2025).

Gates, Henry Louis and Andrew S. Curran (2022). *Who's Black and Why? A Hidden Chapter from the Eighteenth-Century Invention of Race*. Cambridge (Mass.): The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. ISBN: 978-0-674-24426-9.

Gauthier, Florence (2007). *L'aristocratie de l'épiderme: Le Combat de La Société Des Citoyens de Couleur, 1789-1791*. Histoires Pour Aujourd'hui. Paris: CNRS éditions. 446 pp. ISBN: 978-2-271-06576-6.

— (2010). '« Gens de couleur » de 1685 à 1789'. In: *Vacarme* 52.3, pp. 22–23. ISSN: 1253-2479. DOI: 10.3917/vaca.052.0022. URL: https://shs.cairn.info/revue-vacarme-2010-3-page-22 (visited on 03/04/2025).

— (2014). 'Mondialisation et Esclavage. Comment En Sortir ? L'exemple de l'île à Sucre et à Esclaves de Saint-Domingue, de 1492 à l'indépendance d'Haïti, 1789-1804'. In: *Être Citoyen Du Monde. Actes Du Séminaire Doctoral Du Laboratoire*

ICT - EA 337. Ed. by Marie-Louise Pélus Kaplan et al. Vol. 1. Cosmopolitisme et Internationalisme : Théories - Pratiques - Combats XVe-XXIe Siècles. Université Paris Diderot, pp. 35–48. URL: https://hal.science/hal-01336997 (visited on 14/03/2024).

Gautier, Arlette (2010). *Les sœurs de Solitude : Femmes et esclavage aux Antilles du XVIIe au XIXe siècle*. Histoire. Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes. 276 pp. ISBN: 978-2-7535-6732-0. URL: https://books.openedition.org/pur/128424 (visited on 22/03/2025).

Geggus, David Patrick (1989a). 'Racial Equality, Slavery, and Colonial Secession during the Constituent Assembly'. In: *The American Historical Review* 94.5, pp. 1290–1308. ISSN: 0002-8762. DOI: 10.2307/1906352. JSTOR: 1906352. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1906352 (visited on 26/05/2024).

— (1989b). 'The Haitian Revolution'. In: *The Modern Caribbean*. Ed. by Franklin W. Knight and Colin A. Palmer. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. ISBN: 978-0-8078-1825-1.

— (1993). 'Sugar and Coffee Cultivation in Saint Domingue and the Shaping of the Slave Labor Force'. In: Berlin, Ira and Philip Morgan. *Cultivation and Culture: Labor and the Shaping of Slave Life in the Americas*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, pp. 73–98, 318–324.

— (1997). 'The Naming of Haiti'. In: *NWIG: New West Indian Guide / Nieuwe West-Indische Gids* 71.1/2, pp. 43–68. ISSN: 1382-2373. JSTOR: 41849817. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41849817 (visited on 08/04/2025).

— (2002a). *Haitian Revolutionary Studies*. Blacks in the Diaspora. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. ISBN: 978-0-253-34104-4.

— (2002b). 'The Bois Caïman Ceremony'. In: *Haitian Revolutionary Studies*. Blacks in the Diaspora. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 81–92. ISBN: 978-0-253-34104-4.

— (2014). *The Haitian Revolution: A Documentary History*. Ebook. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. ISBN: 978-0-87220-865-0.

— (2017). 'Slavery and the Haitian Revolution'. In: *The Cambridge World History of Slavery: Volume 4: AD 1804–AD 2016*. Ed. by David Eltis et al. Vol. 4. The Cambridge World History of Slavery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 321–343. ISBN: 978-0-521-84069-9. DOI: 10.1017/9781139046176.015. URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-world-history-of-slavery/slavery-and-the-haitian-revolution/DA0C5685A016FE1F5F375DB64065ADF3 (visited on 27/03/2025).

Ghachem, Malick W. (2012). *The Old Regime and the Haitian Revolution*. Cambridge New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 978-0-521-54531-0.

Gidley, Ben, Brendan McGeever and David Feldman (2020). 'Labour and Antisemitism: A Crisis Misunderstood'. In: *The Political Quarterly* 91.2, pp. 413–421. ISSN: 1467-923X. DOI: 10.1111/1467-923X.12854. URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1467-923X.12854 (visited on 19/04/2025).

Gillray, James (27th Mar. 1792). *Anti-Saccharrites, or, John Bull and His Family Leaving off the Use of Sugar*. URL: https://collections.library.yale.edu/catalog/11859384 (visited on 02/05/2025).

Giovannetti-Singh, Gianamar (1st Nov. 2022). 'Racial Capitalism in Voltaire's Enlightenment'. In: *History Workshop Journal* 94, pp. 22–41. ISSN: 1363-3554. DOI: 10.1093/hwj/dbac025. URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/hwj/dbac025 (visited on 16/05/2025).

Girard, Philippe (2016). 'Did Dessalines Plan to Export the Haitian Revolution?' In: *The Haitian Declaration of Independence*. Ed. by Julia Gaffield. Creation, Context, and Legacy. University of Virginia Press, pp. 136–158. ISBN: 978-0-8139-3788-5.

Giraudo, Alain (26th Nov. 1975). 'L'affaire des sucres blancs de Paris'. In: *Le Monde*. URL: https://www.lemonde.fr/archives/article/1975/11/26/l-affaire-des-sucres-blancs-de-paris-le-compromis-est-accepte-par-cinquante-huit-partenaires-sur-soixante_3101494_1819218.html (visited on 19/05/2025).

Gisler, Antoine (1981). *L'esclavage aux Antilles françaises, XVIIe-XIXe siècle : contribution au problème de l'esclavage*. Paris: Karthala. 242 pp. ISBN: 978-2-86537-013-9. URL: http://archive.org/details/lesclavageauxant0000gisl (visited on 22/03/2025).

Givens, Terri E. (2022). *The Roots of Racism: The Politics of White Supremacy in the US and Europe*. Bristol: Bristol University Press. 1 p. ISBN: 978-1-5292-0922-8.

Glenn, Evelyn Nakano (1992). 'From Servitude to Service Work: Historical Continuities in the Racial Division of Paid Reproductive Labor'. In: *Signs* 18.1, pp. 1–43. ISSN: 0097-9740. JSTOR: 3174725. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3174725 (visited on 26/11/2023).

Goldberg, David Theo (2002). *The Racial State*. Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishers. 319 pp. ISBN: 978-0-631-19919-9.

— (2005). 'Racial Americanization'. In: *Racialization: Studies in Theory and Practice*. Ed. by Karim Murji and John Solomos. Oxford New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 87–102. ISBN: 0-19-925703-5.

Goldenberg, David M. (2009). *The Curse of Ham: Race and Slavery in Early Judaism, Christianity, and Islam*. Jews, Christians, and Muslims from the Ancient to the Modern World. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 468 pp. ISBN: 978-0-691-12370-7.

Goodall, Mimi (Dec. 2022). *Sugar: Sustainability, Consumer Sentiment, and Regulation*. Case Study 27. Oxford Centre for Global History, p. 11. URL: https://globalcapitalism.history.ox.ac.uk/files/case27-sugarsustainabilitypdf.

Götz, Norbert (4th May 2015). ''Moral Economy': Its Conceptual History and Analytical Prospects'. In: *Journal of Global Ethics* 11.2, pp. 147–162. ISSN: 1744-9626. DOI: 10.1080/17449626.2015.1054556. URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/17449626.2015.1054556 (visited on 03/05/2024).

Gouy d'Arsy, Louis-Marthe de (1753-1794) Auteur du texte (1788). *Lettre Du Comité Colonial de France, Au Comité Colonial de Saint-Domingue...* 135 pp. URL: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k57868186 (visited on 15/05/2025).

Grenier, Jean-Yves (2021). 'Capitalisme'. In: *Les mondes de l'esclavage: une histoire comparée*. Ed. by Paulin Ismard, Benedetta Rossi and Cécile Vidal. L'univers historique. Paris: Seuil, pp. 907–921. ISBN: 978-2-02-138885-5.

Guillaumin, Colette (1972). *L'idéologie raciste. Genèse et langage actuel*. Publications de l'Institut d'études et de recherches interethniques et interculturelles 2. Paris: Mouton & Co. 247 pp. URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/ierii_1764-8319_1972_mon_2_1 (visited on 31/03/2025).

Guitar, Lynne (2002). 'Documenting the Myth of Taíno Extinction'. In: *KACIKE: Journal of Caribbean Amerindian History and Anthropology*. ISSN: 1562-5028. URL: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/26448179_Documenting_the_Myth_of_Taino_Extinction (visited on 19/04/2025).

Hall, Stuart et al. (1992). *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order*. Critical Social Studies. London: Macmillan. 425 pp. ISBN: 978-0-333-22061-0.

Haraway, Donna et al. (26th May 2016). 'Anthropologists Are Talking – About the Anthropocene'. In: *Ethnos* 81.3, pp. 535–564. ISSN: 0014-1844. DOI: 10.1080/00141844.2015.1105838.

Harding, Thomas (2022). *White Debt: The Demerara Uprising and Britain's Legacy of Slavery*. Orion Publishing Group, Limited. 338 pp. ISBN: 978-1-4746-2104-5. URL: http://archive.org/details/success0000thom (visited on 17/03/2025).

Harper, Douglas (2025). *Etymology of "Sugar"*. In: *Online Etymology Dictionary*. URL: https://www.etymonline.com/word/sugar (visited on 02/05/2025).

Hartman, Saidiya V. (1997). *Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America*. Race and American Culture. New York: Oxford University Press. 281 pp. ISBN: 978-0-19-508983-7.

Harvey, David (2003). *The New Imperialism*. New York: Oxford University press. ISBN: 978-0-19-926431-5.

Hasbún Martínez, Julia (June 2014). *Reporte de estudio de línea base: Bateyes*. Proyecto Inter-agencial sobre Seguridad Humana en los Bateyes de la República Dominicana (ACNUR, PNUD, UNICEF). Dominican Republic: United Nations Development Programme. URL: https://www.undp.org/es/dominican-republic/publicaciones/reporte-de-estudio-de-linea-base-bateyes (visited on 04/05/2025).

Hauser, Henri (1936). *Recherches et Documents Sur l'histoire Des Prix En France de 1500 à 1800*. URL: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k25931b (visited on 18/04/2024).

Henochsberg, Simon (Dec. 2016). 'Public Debt and Slavery: The Case of Haïti (1760-1915)'. Paris: Paris School of Economics. 60 pp. URL: http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/files/Henochsberg2016.pdf.

Henriques, Isabel de Castro and Louis Sala-Molins, eds. (2002a). *Déraison, esclavage et droit: les fondements idéologiques et juridiques de la traite négrière et de l'esclavage*. Mémoire des peuples. La route de l'esclave. Paris: Ed. UNESCO. 375 pp. ISBN: 978-92-3-203864-7.

— (2002b). 'Introduction'. In: *Déraison, esclavage et droit: les fondements idéologiques et juridiques de la traite négrière et de l'esclavage*. Ed. by Isabel de Castro Henriques and Louis Sala-Molins. Mémoire des peuples. La route de l'esclave. Paris: Ed. UNESCO, pp. 11–22. ISBN: 978-92-3-203864-7.

Herrera, Rémy (2001). *Capitalisme, Esclavage et Sucre à Cuba*. Université de Paris I, Maison des sciences économiques. URL: ftp://atom.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/cahiers2001/R01002.pdf (visited on 14/03/2024).

Heuman, Gad J. and Trevor G. Burnard, eds. (2012). *The Routledge History of Slavery*. First published in paperback. The Routledge Histories. London New York: Routledge. 358 pp. ISBN: 978-0-415-52083-6.

Hilliard d'Auberteuil, Michel-René (1776). *Considérations sur l'état présent de la colonie française de Saint-Domingue : Ouvrage politique et législatif; présenté au ministre de la marine*. Paris: Grangé; Cabinet-Littéraire. 362 pp. URL: http://archive.org/details/considrationss00hill (visited on 22/03/2025).

Hochman, Adam (11th June 2019). 'Racialization: A Defense of the Concept'. In: *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. ISSN: 0141-9870. URL: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01419870.2018.1527937 (visited on 31/03/2025).

Hollande, François (10th May 2015). 'Déclaration de M. François Hollande, Président de la République, sur le Mémorial ACTe, le premier centre caribéen d'expression et de mémoire de la traite et de l'esclavage, à Pointe-à-Pitre le 10 mai 2015.' URL: https://www.elysee.fr/francois-hollande/2015/05/10/declaration-de-m-francois-hollande-president-de-la-republique-sur-le-memorial-acte-le-premier-centre-caribeen-dexpression-et-de-memoire-de-la-traite-et-de-lesclavage-a-pointe-a-pitre-le-10-mai-2015 (visited on 19/05/2025).

Holstein, Philippe, Jehanne-Emmanuelle Monnier and Pablo Corral-Broto (31st Mar. 2024). 'An Environmental History of the Plantation System on the Island of La Réunion (1638–1960)'. In: *Entire of Itself? Towards an Environmental History of Islands*. Ed. by Milica Prokic and Pavla Simkova. White Horse Press, pp. 259–281. URL: https://hal.univ-reunion.fr/hal-04516882 (visited on 27/03/2025).

Hopkins, Terence K. and Immanuel Wallerstein (1986). 'Commodity Chains in the World-Economy Prior to 1800'. In: *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 10.1, pp. 157–170. ISSN: 0147-9032. JSTOR: 40241052. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40241052 (visited on 04/05/2024).

Houdaille, Jacques (1981). 'Le métissage dans les anciennes colonies françaises'. In: *Population* 36.2, pp. 267–286. DOI: 10.2307/1532549. URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/pop_0032-4663_1981_num_36_2_17173 (visited on 27/02/2025).

House of Commons (1789). 'Part V. The Advantages Which the French West India Islands Are Supposed, at Present, to Enjoy over the British Islands, and the Reasons on Which These Superior Advantages Are Founded'. In: *Report of the Lords of the Committee of Council Appointed for the Consideration of All Matters Relating to Trade and Foreign Plantations*. Parliament of Great Britain.

Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1997). *Bringing Them Home: Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families*, p. 524. URL: https://bth.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/bringing_them_home_report.pdf.

Humphrys, Elizabeth (1st Aug. 2018). 'Anti-Politics, the Early Marx and Gramsci's 'Integral State''. In: *Thesis Eleven* 147.1, pp. 29–44. ISSN: 0725-5136. DOI: 10.1177/0725513618787638. URL: https://doi.org/10.1177/0725513618787638 (visited on 26/11/2023).

Hunt, Lynn (2013). 'The Global Financial Origins of 1789'. In: Desan, Suzanne, William Max Nelson and Lynn Hunt. *The French Revolution in Global Perspective*. Cornell University Press, pp. 32–43. ISBN: 978-0-8014-6746-2.

Institut Haïtien de Statistique et d'Informatique (IHSI) (2025). *L'Indice des Prix à la Consommation de Mars 2025*. URL: https://ihsi.gouv.ht/public/storage/ipc-bulletins/April2025/5P40M0rFzTmTKFuFyZB8.pdf (visited on 30/04/2025).

International Labour Office, Walk Free Foundation and International Organization for Migration, eds. (2022). *Global Estimates of Modern Slavery: Forced Labour and Forced Marriage*. Geneva: International Labour Office. 131 pp. ISBN: 978-92-2-037483-2.

Ismard, Paulin (2021). 'Introduction : Les mondes de l'esclavage'. In: *Les mondes de l'esclavage: une histoire comparée*. Ed. by Benedetta Rossi and Cécile Vidal. L'univers historique. Paris: Seuil, pp. 7–21. ISBN: 978-2-02-138885-5.

James, C. L. R. (1989). *The Black Jacobins : Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution*. New York : Vintage Books. 454 pp. ISBN: 978-0-679-72467-4. URL: http://archive.org/details/blackjacobinstou0000jame (visited on 01/04/2025).

— (2001). *The Black Jacobins: Toussaint L'Ouverture and the San Domingo Revolution*. Penguin Books. ISBN: 978-0-14-193708-3.

James, Portia (2004). '"To Collect Proof of Colored Talent and Ingenuity": African-American Invention and Innovation, 1619–1930'. In: *Technology and the African-American Experience: Needs and Opportunities for Study*. Ed. by Bruce Sinclair. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, pp. 49–70. ISBN: 978-0-262-19504-1.

Jaucourt chevalier de, Louis (1765). *Traite Des Nègres*. In: *Encyclopédie Ou Dictionnaire Raisonné Des Sciences, Des Arts et Des Métiers, Par Une Société de Gens de Lettres*. Ed. by Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d'Alembert. University of Chicago: ARTFL Encyclopédie Project (Autumn 2022 Edition), Robert Morrissey and Glenn Roe (eds). Vol. 16. 17 vols., pp. 532–533. URL: https://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/ (visited on 28/03/2025).

Jaurès, Jean (1901). 'La Constituante (1789-1791)'. In: Paris: Jules Rouff, pp. 13–146.

Jenson, Deborah, ed. (8th Feb. 2011). *Beyond the Slave Narrative: Politics, Sex, and Manuscripts in the Haitian Revolution*. Liverpool University Press. ISBN: 978-1-84631-497-1. DOI: 10.5949/UPO9781846316517.002. URL: https://doi.org/10.5949/UPO9781846316517.002 (visited on 19/05/2024).

Johnson, Sara E. (2012). *The Fear of French Negroes: Transcolonial Collaboration in the Revolutionary Americas*. Flashpoints 12. Berkeley: University of California Press. 289 pp. ISBN: 978-0-520-27112-8.

— (2023). *Encyclopédie noire: the making of Moreau de Saint-Méry's intellectual world*. Published by the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture and the University of North Carolina Press Series. Williamsburg, Virginia: Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture. 376 pp. ISBN: 978-1-4696-7691-3.

Johnston, Katherine (20th Jan. 2023). *The Nature of Slavery: Environment and Plantation Labor in the Anglo-Atlantic World*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. 280 pp. ISBN: 978-0-19-751460-3.

Kafker, Frank A. and Serena L. Kafker (1988). *The Encyclopedists as Individuals: A Biographical Dictionary of the Authors of the Encyclopédie*. Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century 257. Oxford: Voltaire Foundation at the Taylor Institution. 430 pp. ISBN: 978-0-7294-0368-9.

Kaussen, Valerie (2024). 'Marxism and the Moun Andeyo'. In: *A History of Haitian Literature*. Ed. by Kaiama L. Glover and Marlene L. Daut. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 325–342. ISBN: 978-1-009-48514-2. DOI: 10.1017/9781009485142.018. URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/history-of-haitian-literature/marxism-and-the-moun-andeyo/8017410342824FB9E3C0133774765792 (visited on 16/04/2025).

Kemp, Peter Kemp and Christopher Lloyd (1961). *Brethren of the Coast; Buccaneers of the South Seas*. New York: St. Martin's Press. 282 pp. URL: http://archive.org/details/brethrenofcoastb00kemp (visited on 03/05/2025).

Kenendy, Cara L. (Jan. 2015). 'Toward Assessment of Child Survivors of Restavèk in Haiti: Development and Evaluation of a Locally Adapted Psychosocial Assessment Instrument'. In: *Slavery Today Journal: A Multidisciplinary Journal of Human Trafficking Solutions* 2.1, pp. 48–66.

Kim, Claire Jean (1st Mar. 1999). 'The Racial Triangulation of Asian Americans'. In: *Politics & Society* 27.1, pp. 105–138. ISSN: 0032-3292. DOI: 10.1177/0032329299027001005.

Kim, Nadia Y. (27th May 2022). 'Globalizing Racial Triangulation: Including the People and Nations of Color on Which White Supremacy Depends'. In: *Politics, Groups, and Identities* 10.3, pp. 468–474. ISSN: 2156-5503. DOI: 10.1080/21565503.2021.1997767. URL: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21565503.2021.1997767 (visited on 31/03/2025).

King, Charles (2019). *Gods of the Upper Air : How a Circle of Renegade Anthropologists Reinvented Race, Sex, and Gender in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Doubleday. 474 pp. ISBN: 978-0-385-54219-7. URL: http://archive.org/details/godsofupperairho0000king (visited on 08/04/2025).

Klees, Steven J. (2016). 'Inferences from Regression Analysis: Are They Valid?' In: *Real-World Economics Review* 74.

Knight, Franklin W. (1970). *Slave Society in Cuba during the Nineteenth Century*. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press. 266 pp. ISBN: 978-0-299-05790-9. URL: http://archive.org/details/slavesocietyincu0000knig (visited on 02/04/2025).

Knight, Franklin W. and Colin A. Palmer, eds. (1989). *The Modern Caribbean*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 382 pp. ISBN: 978-0-8078-1825-1.

Knox, Robert and Ashok Kumar (3rd Aug. 2023). 'Reexamining Race and Capitalism in the Marxist Tradition – Editorial Introduction'. In: *Historical Materialism* 31.2, pp. 25–48. ISSN: 1465-4466, 1569-206X. DOI: 10.1163/1569206x-bja10012. URL: https://brill.com/view/journals/hima/31/2/article-p25_2.xml (visited on 30/11/2023).

Koshy, Susan et al., eds. (2nd Sept. 2022). *Colonial Racial Capitalism*. Duke University Press. ISBN: 978-1-4780-2337-1. DOI: 10.2307/j.ctv2vr9ckn. JSTOR: 10.2307/j.ctv2vr9ckn. URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/j.ctv2vr9ckn (visited on 30/11/2023).

Labat, Jean-Baptiste (1722). *Nouveau Voyage Aux Isles de l'Amérique, Contenant l'histoire Naturelle de Ces Pays, l'origine, Les Moeurs, La Religion et Le Gouvernement Des Habitans Anciens et Modernes, Les Guerres et Les Événemens Singuliers Qui y Sont Arrivez, Le Commerce et Les Manufactures Qui y Sont Établies*. Vol. 1. 525 pp. URL: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k741010 (visited on 28/04/2025).

Lachance, Paul F. (1988). 'The 1809 Immigration of Saint-Domingue Refugees to New Orleans: Reception, Integration and Impact'. In: *Louisiana History: The Journal of the Louisiana Historical Association* 29.2, pp. 109–141. ISSN: 0024-6816. JSTOR: 4232650. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4232650 (visited on 02/04/2025).

Lacroix, Pamphile de and Jehan de fmo RPJCB Hedouville (1819). *Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire de la révolution de Saint-Domingue. Par le lieutenant-général baron Pamphile de Lacroix. ; Avec une carte nouvelle de l'île et un plan topographique de la Crête-à-Pierrot*. A Paris : Chez Pillet ainé, imprimeur-libraire, éditeur de La collection des moeurs françaises, rue Christine, no 5. 444 pp. URL: http://archive.org/details/mmoirespourser01lacr (visited on 31/05/2024).

Lake, Quintin et al. (2015). *Corporate Approaches to Addressing Modern Slavery in Supply Chains: A Snapshot of Current Practice*. Berkhamstead, Hertfordshire: Ashridge Centre for Business Sustainability. 42 pp. ISBN: 978-1-910025-16-1.

Lambert, Elodie (2015). 'L'intervention des habitants de Champagney pour l'abolition de l'esclavage des Noirs dans leur cahier de doléances (1789)'. In: *Bulletin de la Société d'Histoire de la Guadeloupe* 172, pp. 117–124. ISSN: 0583-8266, 2276-1993. DOI: 10.7202/1035306ar. URL: https://www.erudit.org/fr/revues/bshg/2015-n172-bshg02383/1035306ar/ (visited on 24/03/2025).

Laroche, Maximilien (1981). *La littérature haïtienne : identité, langue, réalité*. Montréal: Leméac. 134 pp. ISBN: 978-2-7609-4150-2. URL: http://archive.org/details/lalittratureha00laro (visited on 16/04/2025).

Lavina, Javier and Michael Zeuske (2014). *The Second Slavery: Mass Slaveries and Modernity in the Americas and in the Atlantic Basin*. LIT Verlag Münster. 209 pp. ISBN: 978-3-643-90367-9. Google Books: LLHtAgAAQBAJ.

Le Romain, Jean-Baptiste-Pierre (1765). *Negres, Considérés Comme Esclaves Dans Les Colonies de l'Amérique*. In: *Encyclopédie Ou Dictionnaire Raisonné Des Sciences, Des Arts et Des Métiers, Par Une Société de Gens de Lettres*. Ed. by Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d'Alembert. University of Chicago: ARTFL Encyclopédie Project (Autumn 2022 Edition), Robert Morrissey and Glenn Roe (eds). Vol. 11. 17 vols., pp. 80–88. URL: https://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/ (visited on 28/03/2025).

Leamer, Edward E. (1983). 'Let's Take the Con Out of Econometrics'. In: *The American Economic Review* 73.1, pp. 31–43. ISSN: 0002-8282. JSTOR: 1803924. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1803924 (visited on 22/01/2024).

— (1st May 2010). 'Tantalus on the Road to Asymptopia'. In: *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 24.2, pp. 31–46. DOI: 10.1257/jep.24.2.31.

Léger, Frenand (2024). 'Some Causes of the Underdevelopment of Haiti's Creole-Language Literature'. In: *A History of Haitian Literature*. Ed. by Kaiama L.

Glover and Marlene L. Daut. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 214–229. ISBN: 978-1-009-48514-2. DOI: 10.1017/9781009485142.012. URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/history-of-haitian-literature/some-causes-of-the-underdevelopment-of-haitis-creolelanguage-literature/7E46526B6EFA03BEDD22584F2CCB4F5E (visited on 16/04/2025).

Léger, Natalie M. (2024). 'Partisan Politics and Twentieth-Century Fictions of the Haitian Revolution'. In: *A History of Haitian Literature*. Ed. by Kaiama L. Glover and Marlene L. Daut. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 444–457. ISBN: 978-1-009-48514-2. DOI: 10.1017/9781009485142.025. URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/history-of-haitian-literature/partisan-politics-and-twentiethcentury-fictions-of-the-haitian-revolution/4DAE1152B419C30BBBC6D8EE045B22EA (visited on 16/04/2025).

Lepape, Pierre (1st Mar. 2003). 'Cruelle colonisation'. In: *Le Monde diplomatique*. URL: https://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2003/03/LEPAPE/10006 (visited on 18/05/2025).

Lewis, Gordon K. (2004). *Main Currents in Caribbean Thought : The Historical Evolution of Caribbean Society in Its Ideological Aspects, 1492-1900*. Lincoln : University of Nebraska Press. 398 pp. ISBN: 978-0-8032-8029-8. URL: http://archive.org/details/maincurrentsinca0000lewi_q4z2 (visited on 27/04/2025).

Linebaugh, Peter (2019). *Red Round Globe Hot Burning: A Tale at the Crossroads of Commons and Closure, of Love and Terror, of Race and Class, and of Kate and Ned Despard*. Ebook. Oakland, California: University of California Press. ISBN: 978-0-520-97118-9.

López Segrera, Francisco (1985). 'Cuba: Dependence, Plantation Economy, and Social Classes, 1762-1902'. In: Engerman, Stanley L., Frank Moya Pons and Manuel Moreno Fraginals. *Between Slavery and Free Labor: The Spanish-Speaking Caribbean in the Nineteenth Century*. Johns Hopkins Studies in Atlantic History and Culture. Baltimore ; London: Johns Hopkins university press. ISBN: 978-0-8018-3224-6.

LSE Economic History Channel, director (12th Oct. 2023). *Slavery, Capitalism and the Industrial Revolution*. URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N8-Enu1OfZw (visited on 30/10/2024).

Macron, Emmanuel (17th Apr. 2025). 'Déclaration du Président de la République sur la relation entre la France et Haïti.' URL: https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2025/04/17/declaration-du-president-de-la-republique-sur-la-relation-entre-la-france-et-haiti (visited on 19/05/2025).

Mallet, abbé Edme-François (1751). *Aborigènes*. In: *Encyclopédie Ou Dictionnaire Raisonné Des Sciences, Des Arts et Des Métiers, Par Une Société de Gens de Lettres*. Ed. by Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d'Alembert. University of Chicago: ARTFL Encyclopédie Project (Autumn 2022 Edition), Robert Morrissey and Glenn Roe (eds). Vol. 1. 17 vols., p. 32. URL: https://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/ (visited on 28/03/2025).

Manjapra, Kris (30th Apr. 2020). *Colonialism in Global Perspective*. 1st ed. Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 978-1-108-56058-0. DOI: 10.1017/9781108560580.

Manjapra, Kris (2022). *Black Ghost of Empire: The Long Death of Slavery and the Failure of Emancipation*. London: Allen Lane, an imprint of Penguin Books. 240 pp. ISBN: 978-0-241-39248-5.

Mann, Geoff (2017). *In the Long Run We Are All Dead: Keynesianism, Political Economy, and Revolution*. London ; New York: Verso. 416 pp. ISBN: 978-1-78478-599-4.

Marius, Philippe-Richard (2022). *The Unexceptional Case of Haiti: Race and Class Privilege in Postcolonial Bourgeois Society*. Caribbean Studies Series. Jackson (Miss.): University Press of Mississippi. ISBN: 978-1-4968-3908-4.

Marx, Karl (16th Dec. 1867). *Outline of a Report on the Irish Question to the Communist Educational Association of German Workers in London*. Marxists Internet Archive. URL: www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1867/12/16.htm (visited on 23/10/2023).

— (1990). *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume I*. Trans. by Ben Fowkes. Penguin Classics. London: Penguin Books. 1119 pp. ISBN: 978-0-14-044568-8.

Mathiez, Albert (1973a). *La Vie Chère et Le Mouvement Social Sous La Terreur : Tome Deuxième*. Vol. 2. URL: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k9803p (visited on 03/05/2024).

— (1973b). *La Vie Chère et Le Mouvement Social Sous La Terreur : Tome Premier*. Vol. 1. URL: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k9827g (visited on 03/05/2024).

Mawhinney, Janet Lee (1998). 'Giving up the Ghost, Disrupting the (Re)Production of White Privilege in Anti-Racist Pedagogy and Organizational Change'. In: URL: http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/tape15/PQDD_0008/MQ33991.pdf (visited on 17/03/2025).

Mazouz, Sarah (2020). *Race*. Paris: Anamosa. ISBN: 979-10-95772-93-4.

McIntosh, M. and B. Weber (1958). 'Une correspondance familiale au temps des troubles de Saint- Domingue (1791-1796). Lettres du marquis et de la marquise de Rouvray à leur fille'. In: *Outre-Mers. Revue d'histoire* 45.159, pp. 119–279. DOI: 10.3406/outre.1958.1295. URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/outre_0399-1385_1958_num_45_159_1295 (visited on 25/02/2025).

McNally, David (2017). 'Intersections and Dialectics: Critical Reconstructions in Social Reproduction Theory'. In: *Social Reproduction Theory: Remapping Class, Recentering Oppression*. Ed. by Tithi Bhattacharya and Liselotte Vogel. London: Pluto Press, pp. 94–111. ISBN: 978-1-78680-158-6.

Mearman, Andrew, Sebastian Berger and Danielle Guizzo (2019). *What Is Heterodox Economics? Conversations with Leading Economists*. Routledge Advances in Heterodox Economics 40. London New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. 313 pp. ISBN: 978-1-315-18873-7.

Méheut, Constant et al. (20th May 2022). 'Demanding Reparations, and Ending Up in Exile'. In: *The New York Times. World*. ISSN: 0362-4331. URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/20/world/americas/haiti-aristide-reparations-france.html (visited on 19/05/2025).

Menard, Russell R. (2001). *Migrants, Servants and Slaves: Unfree Labor in Colonial British America*. Variorum Collected Studies Series 699. Aldershot: Ashgate. ISBN: 978-0-86078-838-6.

Mercier, Louis-Sébastien (1782). *Tableau de Paris, Tome Second*. 460 pp. URL: http://archive.org/details/tableaudeparisb00mercgoog (visited on 03/06/2024).

Merle, Isabelle and Adrian Muckle (2022). *The Indigénat and France's Empire in New Caledonia: Origins, Practices and Legacies*. 1st ed. Cambridge Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies. Cham: Springer International Publishing AG. 1 p. ISBN: 978-3-030-99033-6.

Mesnier (31st Dec. 1774). 'Un Negre Nouveau, Taille de 5 Pieds 2 à 3 Pouces...' In: *Affiches américaines*. URL: http://www.marronnage.info/fr/document.php?id=4239 (visited on 23/04/2025).

Mills, Charles W. (2017). *Black Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism*. Transgressing Boundaries. New York (N.Y.): Oxford university press. ISBN: 978-0-19-024542-9.

— (2022). *The Racial Contract*. Twenty-fifth anniversary edition. Ithaca [New York]: Cornell University Press. 171 pp. ISBN: 978-1-5017-6428-8.

Mims, Stewart L. (1912). *Colbert's West India Policy*. 398 pp. URL: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k370175w (visited on 04/04/2025).

Ministres du roi (1877). 'Mémoire des ministres concernant les colonies, lors de la séance du 27 octobre 1789'. In: *Archives Parlementaires de la Révolution Française* 9.1, pp. 592–593. URL: https://archives-parlementaires.persee.fr/prt/4d6fe755-3c70-47b1-8e22-79ab56446aeb (visited on 14/04/2025).

Mintz, Sidney W. (1986). *Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar in Modern History*. New York: Penguin Books. 274 pp. ISBN: 978-0-14-009233-2.

Montesquieu baron de La Brède et de, Charles Louis de Secondat (2010). *L'Esprit des lois*. Digital Edition. Oeuvres complètes IV. E. Laboulaye Garnier. 2118 pp. URL: https://www.ebooksgratuits.com/pdf/montesquieu_04_esprit_des_lois.grand.pdf (visited on 02/05/2025).

Moore, Jason W. (2000). 'Sugar and the Expansion of the Early Modern World-Economy: Commodity Frontiers, Ecological Transformation, and Industrialization'. In: *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 23.3, pp. 409–433. ISSN: 0147-9032. JSTOR: 40241510. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40241510 (visited on 23/04/2024).

— (Dec. 2003). 'Capitalism as World-Ecology: Braudel and Marx on Environmental History'. In: *Organization & Environment* 16.4, pp. 514–517. ISSN: 1086-0266, 1552-7417. DOI: 10.1177/1086026603259091. URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1086026603259091 (visited on 19/05/2025).

— (23rd Feb. 2018). 'The Capitalocene, Part II: Accumulation by Appropriation and the Centrality of Unpaid Work/Energy'. In: *The Journal of Peasant Studies* 45.2, pp. 237–279. ISSN: 0306-6150, 1743-9361. DOI: 10.1080/03066150.2016.1272587. URL: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03066150.2016.1272587 (visited on 30/11/2023).

Moreau, Jean-Michel and Pierre Charles Bacquoy (1787). *L'esclave (Surinam)*. URL: https://classes.bnf.fr/candide/grand/can_007.htm (visited on 03/05/2025).

Moreau de Saint-Méry, Louis-Élie (1791). *Considérations présentées aux vrais amis du rapos et du bonheur de la France, : à l'occasion des nouveaux mouvemens*

de quelques soi-disant Amis-des-noirs. Paris: L'Imprimerie Nationale. 64 pp. URL: http://archive.org/details/considrationsp7882more (visited on 12/04/2025).

Moreau de Saint-Méry, Louis-Élie (1798). *Description Topographique, Physique, Civile, Politique et Historique de La Partie Française de l'isle Saint-Domingue. Tome 1 / . Avec Des Observations Générales Sur Sa Population, Sur Le Caractère & Les Moeurs de Ses Divers Habitans ; Sur Son Climat, Sa Culture... Accompagnées Des Détails Les plus Propres à Faire Connaître l'état de Cette Colonie à l'époque Du 18 Octobre 1789 ; et d'une Nouvelle Carte de La Totalité de l'isle*. URL: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k111179t (visited on 25/03/2025).

Moreno Fraginals, Manuel (1976). *The Sugarmill: The Socioeconomic Complex of Sugar in Cuba 1760-1860*. Trans. by Cedric Belfrage. New York: Monthly Review Press. 187 pp. URL: http://archive.org/details/thesugarmill (visited on 13/04/2025).

Moseley, Benjamin (2012). *A Treatise on Sugar: With Miscellaneous Medical Observations*. Cambridge Library Collection. Latin American Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1 p. ISBN: 978-1-139-24573-9. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139245739.

Murji, Karim and John Solomos (2005a). 'Introduction: Racialization in Theory and Practice'. In: *Racialization: Studies in Theory and Practice*. Ed. by Karim Murji and John Solomos. Oxford New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–27. ISBN: 0-19-925703-5.

— eds. (2005b). *Racialization: Studies in Theory and Practice*. Oxford New York: Oxford University Press. 307 pp. ISBN: 0-19-925703-5.

Neal, Larry (1993). *The Rise of Financial Capitalism: International Capital Markets in the Age of Reason*. 1. paperback ed. Studies in Monetary and Financial History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 278 pp. ISBN: 0-521-45738-6.

Nesbitt, Nick (2013). *Caribbean Critique: Antillean Critical Theory from Toussaint to Glissant*. Contemporary French and Francophone Cultures 26. Liverpool: Liverpool university press. ISBN: 978-1-84631-866-5.

O'Sullivan, Mary (Dec. 2018). 'The Intelligent Woman's Guide to Capitalism'. In: *Enterprise & Society* 19.4, pp. 751–802. ISSN: 1467-2227, 1467-2235. DOI: 10.1017/eso.2018.96. URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/enterprise-and-society/article/abs/intelligent-womans-guide-to-capitalism/973BE59FC9A88BECE3D4A0C8EAFC2E06 (visited on 09/11/2024).

Obregón, Liliana (Sept. 2018). 'Empire, Racial Capitalism and International Law: The Case of Manumitted Haiti and the Recognition Debt'. In: *Leiden Journal of International Law* 31.3, pp. 597–615. ISSN: 0922-1565, 1478-9698. DOI: 10.1017/S0922156518000225. URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/leiden-journal-of-international-law/article/abs/empire-racial-capitalism-and-international-law-the-case-of-manumitted-haiti-and-the-recognition-debt/4CE72865EFD32479C4F31327D6C5DDFA (visited on 31/03/2025).

Obsidian Soul (16th Jan. 2019). *Map Showing Centers of Origin of Saccharum Officinarum in New Guinea, S. Sinensis in China, and S. Barberi in India*. URL: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Map_showing_centers_of_

origin_of_Saccharum_officinarum_in_New_Guinea,_S._sinensis_in_China,_and_S._barberi_in_India.png (visited on 17/04/2025).

Oklahoma Center for the Humanities, director (28th Jan. 2023). *Ugly Freedoms with Elisabeth Anker*. URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tPA3Mj1OyyI (visited on 03/04/2025).

Okoth, Kevin Ochieng (2020). 'The Flatness of Blackness: Afro-Pessimism and the Erasure of Anti-Colonial Thought'. In: *Salvage* 7, pp. 79–114. URL: https://salvage.zone/the-flatness-of-blackness-afro-pessimism-and-the-erasure-of-anti-colonial-thought/ (visited on 18/05/2025).

Olaloku-Teriba, Annie (30th July 2018). 'Afro-Pessimism and the (Un)Logic of Anti-Blackness'. In: *Historical Materialism* 26.2, pp. 96–122. ISSN: 1465-4466, 1569-206X. DOI: 10.1163/1569206X-00001650. URL: https://brill.com/view/journals/hima/26/2/article-p96_5.xml (visited on 04/11/2023).

Ortíz-Minaya, Reynaldo (2019). 'Unlocking the Spatial Code of the Plantation Landscape: Material Processes and Social Space in Cuban Slavery, 1760-1860'. In: *Breaking the Chains, Forging the Nation: The Afro-Cuban Fight for Freedom and Equality, 1812-1912*. Ed. by Aisha K. Finch and Fannie Rushing. 1st ed. Baton Rouge: LSU Press, pp. 65–91. ISBN: 978-0-8071-7098-4.

Oudin-Bastide, Caroline and Philippe Steiner (2015). *Calcul et Morale. Coûts de l'esclavage et Valeur de l'émancipation (XVIIIe-XIXe Siècle)*. L'Évolution de l'humanité. Albin Michel. ebook. ISBN: 978-2-226-33795-5.

Ould, David (2004). 'Trafficking and International Law'. In: *The Political Economy of New Slavery*. Ed. by Christien van den Anker. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, pp. 55–74. ISBN: 978-1-4039-3786-5. DOI: 10.1057/9781403937865_4. URL: https://doi.org/10.1057/9781403937865_4 (visited on 04/05/2025).

Padgug, Robert A. (1976). 'Problems in the Theory of Slavery and Slave Society'. In: *Science & Society* 40.1, pp. 3–27. ISSN: 00368237, 19432801. JSTOR: 40401917. URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40401917 (visited on 27/04/2025).

Parron, Tâmis (1st July 2023). 'Transcending the Capitalism and Slavery Debate: Slavery and World Geographies of Accumulation'. In: *Theory and Society* 52.4, pp. 677–709. ISSN: 1573-7853. DOI: 10.1007/s11186-022-09501-4. URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-022-09501-4 (visited on 28/03/2024).

Patel, Raj (2009). *Food Riots*. In: *The International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest: 1500 to the Present*. Ed. by Immanuel Ness. Blackwell Publishing, pp. 1207–1210. ISBN: 978-1-4051-8464-9.

Patel, Raj and Jason W. Moore (2020). *A History of the World in Seven Cheap Things: A Guide to Capitalism, Nature, and the Future of the Planet*. Paperback edition. London New York: Verso. 318 pp. ISBN: 978-1-78873-774-6.

Patterson, Orlando (1st Oct. 1979). 'On Slavery and Slave Formations'. In: *New Left Review* (I/117), pp. 31–67.

— (1982). *Slavery and Social Death*. Harvard University Press. 528 pp. ISBN: 0-674-81082-1.

Peabody, Sue (2002). *There Are No Slaves in France: The Political Culture of Race and Slavery in the Ancien Régime*. 1. issued as an Oxford Univ. Press paperback. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. 210 pp. ISBN: 978-0-19-515866-3.

Peabody, Sue (2011). 'Slavery, Freedom, and the Law in the Atlantic World, 1420–1807'. In: *The Cambridge World History of Slavery: Volume 3: AD 1420–AD 1804*. Ed. by David Eltis and Stanley L. Engerman. Vol. 3. The Cambridge World History of Slavery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 594–630. ISBN: 978-0-521-84068-2. DOI: 10.1017/CHOL9780521840682.025. URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-world-history-of-slavery/slavery-freedom-and-the-law-in-the-atlantic-world-14201807/DE192D188521DE1F1F4BB4670C602099 (visited on 17/05/2025).

Péan, Leslie J.-R. (2003). *Haïti, Économie Politique de La Corruption. De Saint-Domingue à Haïti 1791-1870*. Littératures d'Afrique et de La Caraïbe. Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose. 348 pp.

Pellow, David N. (2007). *Resisting Global Toxics: Transnational Movements for Environmental Justice*. Urban and Industrial Environments. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 346 pp. ISBN: 978-0-262-66201-7.

Perrier-Robert, Annie and Marie-Paule Bernadin (1999). *Le grand livre du sucre*. Paris: Solar. 186 pp. ISBN: 978-2-263-02821-2. URL: http://archive.org/details/legrandlivredusu0000perr (visited on 02/05/2025).

Pétré-Grenouilleau, Olivier (2006). *Les traites négrières: essai d'histoire globale*. Ebook. Bibliothèque des histoires. Paris: Gallimard. 468 pp. ISBN: 978-2-07-073499-3.

Phillips, William D. (2011). 'Slavery in the Atlantic Islands and the Early Modern Spanish Atlantic World'. In: *The Cambridge World History of Slavery: Volume 3: AD 1420–AD 1804*. Ed. by David Eltis and Stanley L. Engerman. Vol. 3. The Cambridge World History of Slavery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 325–349. ISBN: 978-0-521-84068-2. DOI: 10.1017/CHOL9780521840682.015.

Phillips, William D. and Carla Rahn Phillips (1992). *The Worlds of Christopher Columbus*. Cambridge [England] ; New York : Cambridge University Press. 342 pp. ISBN: 978-0-521-35097-6. URL: http://archive.org/details/worldsofchristop0000phil_j6r2 (visited on 20/04/2025).

Piis, Augustin de (1794). *Chansons Patriotiques : Chantées, Tant à La Section Des Tuileries, Que Sur Le Théâtre Du Vaudeville*. 117 pp. URL: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k484015 (visited on 03/04/2025).

Piketty, Thomas (2019). *Capital et idéologie*. Les livres du nouveau monde. Paris: Éditions du Seuil. 1199 pp. ISBN: 978-2-02-133804-1.

Piquionne, Nathalie (1998). 'Lettre de Jean-François, Biassou et Belair'. In: *Annales historiques de la Révolution française* 311.1, pp. 132–139. DOI: 10.3406/ahrf.1998.2095. URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/ahrf_0003-4436_1998_num_311_1_2095 (visited on 02/04/2025).

Pope Paul III (29th May 1537). *Sublimis Deus: On the Enslavement and Evangelization of Indians*. URL: https://www.papalencyclicals.net/paul03/p3subli.htm (visited on 22/04/2025).

Popkin, Jeremy D. (1990). *Revolutionary News: The Press in France, 1789-1799*. Durham ; London: Duke University Press. 240 pp.

— (2009). 'The French Revolution's Other Island: The Impact of Saint-Domingue on Revolutionary Politics in France'. In: *The World of the Haitian Revolution*. Ed. by

David Patrick Geggus and Norman Fiering. Blacks in the Diaspora. Bloomington, Ind: Indiana University Press. ISBN: 978-0-253-22017-2.

Popkin, Jeremy D. (2010). *You Are All Free: The Haitian Revolution and the Abolition of Slavery*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 978-0-521-51722-5.

— (3rd Apr. 2021). 'The Haitian Revolution Comes of Age: Ten Years of New Research'. In: *Slavery & Abolition* 42.2, pp. 382–401. ISSN: 0144-039X. DOI: 10.1080/0144039X.2020.1834279. URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/0144039X.2020.1834279 (visited on 29/03/2024).

Porter, Catherine, Constant Méheut, Matt Apuzzo et al. (20th May 2022). 'The Root of Haiti's Misery: Reparations to Enslavers'. In: *The New York Times. World*. ISSN: 0362-4331. URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/20/world/americas/haiti-history-colonized-france.html (visited on 12/05/2025).

Porter, Catherine, Constant Méheut, Selam Gebrekidan et al. (12th May 2022). 'The Ransom: A Look Under the Hood'. In: *The New York Times. World*. ISSN: 0362-4331. URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/20/world/americas/haiti-bibliography.html (visited on 12/05/2025).

Portuondo, María M. (2003). 'Plantation Factories: Science and Technology in Late-Eighteenth-Century Cuba'. In: *Technology and Culture* 44.2, pp. 231–257. ISSN: 0040-165X. JSTOR: 25148106. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/25148106 (visited on 13/04/2025).

Preobrazhensky, Evgeny Alekseevich (2014). *The Preobrazhensky Papers: Archival Documents and Materials*. Ed. by Richard B. Day and Mikhail M. Gorinov. Historical Materialism Book Series volume 47. Leiden: Brill. ISBN: 978-90-04-24521-1.

Pulido, Laura (Aug. 2017). 'Geographies of Race and Ethnicity II: Environmental Racism, Racial Capitalism and State-Sanctioned Violence'. In: *Progress in Human Geography* 41.4, pp. 524–533. ISSN: 0309-1325, 1477-0288. DOI: 10.1177/0309132516646495. URL: http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0309132516646495 (visited on 26/11/2023).

Quellier, Florent (2013). *La Table Des Français : Une Histoire Culturelle (Xve-Début Xixe Siècle)*. Tours: Presses universitaires François-Rabelais, Presses universitaires de Rennes. 282 pp. ISBN: 978-2-7535-2184-1. URL: http://archive.org/details/isbn_9782753521841 (visited on 22/04/2025).

Quinn, William and John D. Turner (2020). *Boom and Bust: A Global History of Financial Bubbles*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 978-1-108-42125-6. DOI: 10.1017/9781108367677. URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/boom-and-bust/D09C2E3BEA798F6EDC9D3880FC0300ED (visited on 27/02/2024).

Radous (23rd June 1773). 'Un Negre, Nommé Jean-Baptiste...' In: *Affiches américaines*. URL: http://www.marronnage.info/fr/document.php?id=3675 (visited on 23/04/2025).

Raine, Barnaby (20th May 2019). 'Capitalism, Racism and Totality: A Response to Nancy Fraser'. In: *Politics/Letters Quarterly*. URL: http://quarterly.politicsslashletters.org/capitalism-racism-and-totality-a-response-to-nancy-fraser/ (visited on 04/11/2023).

Rancière, Jacques (2011). 'Une passion d'en-haut'. In: *Lignes* 34.1, pp. 119–123. ISSN: 0988-5226. DOI: 10.3917/lignes.034.0119. URL: https://www.cairn.info/revue-lignes-2011-1-page-119.htm (visited on 26/11/2023).

Randall, Julian (24th June 2022). *Mississippi Genesis*. Frontier Poetry- Exploring the Edges of Contemporary Poetry. URL: https://www.frontierpoetry.com/2022/06/24/julian-randall/ (visited on 13/04/2025).

Rasmussen, Dennis Carl (2017). *The Infidel and the Professor: David Hume, Adam Smith, and the Friendship That Shaped Modern Thought*. Princeton (N.J.): Princeton university press. ISBN: 978-0-691-17701-4.

Raymond, Jon and Kelly Reichardt (2021). *First Cow*. URL: https://deadline.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/FIRST-COW-screenplay.pdf.

Reinhardt, Catherine A. (2006). *Claims to Memory: Beyond Slavery and Emancipation in the French Caribbean*. Polygons Volume 10. New York: Berghahn. ISBN: 978-1-84545-079-3.

Restavèk Freedom (2011). *Restavèk: The Persistence of Child Labor and Slavery*. 19295–3. United Nations Human Rights Council, p. 11.

Ribeiro, Alexandre Vieira (7th Oct. 2008). 'The Transatlantic Slave Trade to Bahia, 1582–1851'. In: *Extending the Frontiers: Essays on the New Transatlantic Slave Trade Database*. Ed. by David Eltis and David Richardson. Yale University Press, pp. 130–154. ISBN: 978-0-300-13436-0. DOI: 10.12987/yale/9780300134360.003.0004. URL: https://doi.org/10.12987/yale/9780300134360.003.0004 (visited on 14/05/2025).

Rioux, Sébastien (23rd Mar. 2022). 'Slavery, Capitalism, and Imperialism'. In: *The Oxford Handbook of Economic Imperialism*. Ed. by Zak Cope and Immanuel Ness. Oxford University Press. ISBN: 978-0-19-752708-5. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197527085.013.15. URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197527085.013.15 (visited on 31/05/2024).

Rioux, Sébastien, Genevieve LeBaron and Peter J. Verovšek (3rd May 2020). 'Capitalism and Unfree Labor: A Review of Marxist Perspectives on Modern Slavery'. In: *Review of International Political Economy* 27.3, pp. 709–731. ISSN: 0969-2290. DOI: 10.1080/09692290.2019.1650094. URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2019.1650094 (visited on 25/04/2025).

Roberts, Dorothy (19th Feb. 2014). *Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty*. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. 402 pp. ISBN: 978-0-8041-5259-4. Google Books: nhfSAgAAQBAJ.

Robin, Charles-César (17-18 ?) Auteur du texte (1807). *Voyages Dans l'intérieur de La Louisiane, de La Floride Occidentale, et Dans Les Îles de La Martinique et de Saint-Domingue, Pendant Les Années 1802, 1803, 1804, 1805 et 1806. Tome 3 / , Contenant de Nouvelles Observations Sur l'histoire Naturelle, La Géographie, Les Moeurs,... Suivis de La Flore Louisianaise, Avec Une Carte Nouvelle... Par C.-C. Robin,...* Vol. 3. URL: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k103080r (visited on 02/05/2025).

Robinson, Cedric James (2000). *Black Marxism: The Making of the Black Radical Tradition*. Chapel Hill (N.C.): University of North Carolina press. ISBN: 978-0-8078-4829-6.

Rockman, Seth Edward and Sven Beckert (2016). *Slavery's Capitalism: A New History of American Economic Development*. Early American Studies. Philadelphia (Pa.): University of Pennsylvania Press. ISBN: 978-0-8122-4841-8.

Rojas, Carlos Antonio Aguirre (1992). 'Between Marx and Braudel: Making History, Knowing History'. In: *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 15.2, pp. 175–219. ISSN: 01479032, 2327445X. JSTOR: 40241218. URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40241218 (visited on 19/05/2025).

Rood, Daniel (2017). *The Reinvention of Atlantic Slavery: Technology, Labor, Race, and Capitalism in the Greater Caribbean*. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN: 978-0-19-065526-6.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques (1755). *Économie Ou Œconomie*. In: *Encyclopédie Ou Dictionnaire Raisonné Des Sciences, Des Arts et Des Métiers, Par Une Société de Gens de Lettres*. Ed. by Denis Diderot and Jean le Rond d'Alembert. University of Chicago: ARTFL Encyclopédie Project (Autumn 2022 Edition), Robert Morrissey and Glenn Roe (eds). Vol. 5. 17 vols., pp. 337–349. URL: https://encyclopedie.uchicago.edu/ (visited on 28/03/2025).

Rousselière, Geneviève (2024). *Sharing Freedom: Republicanism and Exclusion in Revolutionary France*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 978-1-009-47731-4.

Ryan, Orla (9th Apr. 2008). 'Food Riots Grip Haiti'. In: *The Guardian. World news*. ISSN: 0261-3077. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/09/11 (visited on 30/04/2025).

Saini, Angela (2019). *Superior: The Return of Race Science*. Boston: Beacon Press. 1 p. ISBN: 978-0-8070-7694-1.

Saint-Louis, Vertus (2007). 'Sucre, Science et Révolution à Haïti'. URL: http://www.montraykreyol.org/sites/default/files/sucre_science_et_revolution_a_haiti.pdf (visited on 14/03/2024).

Sala-Molins, Louis (2002). 'Théologie et philosophie choisissent leur camp : l'esclavage des Nègres est légitime'. In: *Déraison, esclavage et droit: les fondements idéologiques et juridiques de la traite négrière et de l'esclavage*. Ed. by Isabel de Castro Henriques and Louis Sala-Molins. Mémoire des peuples. La route de l'esclave. Paris: Ed. UNESCO, pp. 23–40. ISBN: 978-92-3-203864-7.

— (2006). *Dark Side of the Light: Slavery and the French Enlightenment*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. ISBN: 0-8166-4389-X.

Santiago-Valles, W. F. (2019). 'Afterword'. In: *Breaking the Chains, Forging the Nation: The Afro-Cuban Fight for Freedom and Equality, 1812-1912*. Ed. by Aisha K. Finch and Fannie Rushing. 1st ed. Baton Rouge: LSU Press, pp. 293–313. ISBN: 978-0-8071-7098-4.

Sartre, Jean-Paul (2017). *Réflexions sur la question juive*. Paris: Gallimard. ISBN: 978-2-07-275606-1.

Satō, Tsugitaka (2015). *Sugar in the Social Life of Medieval Islam*. Islamic Area Studies 1. Leiden ; Boston: Brill. 232 pp. ISBN: 978-90-04-28156-1.

Sauer, Carl Ortwin (1992). *The Early Spanish Main*. Berkeley: University of California Press. 336 pp. ISBN: 978-0-520-01125-0. URL: http://archive.org/details/earlyspanishmain0000saue (visited on 17/04/2025).

Saunders, A. C. de C. M. (1982). *A Social History of Black Slaves and Freedmen in Portugal, 1441-1555*. Cambridge Iberian and Latin American Studies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 283 pp. ISBN: 978-0-521-23150-3.

Saunier, Zoé (25th June 2023). 'La potentialité subversive de la berceuse : « Duerme negrito », « Canción de cuna para dormir a un negrito », et « Canción de cuna para despertar a un negrito »'. In: *Textes et contextes* 18–1. ISSN: 1961-991X. URL: https://preo.ube.fr/textesetcontextes/index.php?id=4168 (visited on 26/03/2025).

Schmidt, Hans (1995). *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1934*. Rutgers University Press. 340 pp. ISBN: 978-0-8135-2203-6.

Schmidt-Nowara, Christopher (2017). 'Continuity and Crisis: Cuban Slavery, Spanish Colonialism, and the Atlantic World in the Nineteenth Century'. In: *The Atlantic in Global History*. 2nd ed. Routledge. ISBN: 978-1-315-10899-5.

Schulz, John (8th July 2008). *The Financial Crisis of Abolition*. Yale University Press. ISBN: 978-0-300-15049-0. DOI: 10.12987/yale/9780300134193.001.0001. URL: https://academic.oup.com/yale-scholarship-online/book/21291 (visited on 27/02/2024).

Schwartz, Stuart B. (6th Sept. 2004). 'A Commonwealth within Itself: The Early Brazilian Sugar Industry, 1550–1670'. In: *Tropical Babylons: Sugar and the Making of the Atlantic World, 1450-1680*. Ed. by Stuart B. Schwartz. University of North Carolina Press. ISBN: 978-0-8078-2875-5. DOI: 10.5149/9780807895627_schwartz.10. URL: https://doi.org/10.5149/9780807895627_schwartz.10 (visited on 14/05/2025).

Scott, David (2004). *Conscripts of Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment*. Durham: Duke University Press. 279 pp. ISBN: 0-8223-3444-5.

Scott, Rebecca J. (2009). *Degrees of Freedom: Louisiana and Cuba after Slavery*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 384 pp. ISBN: 978-0-674-02759-6.

Shoemaker, Nancy (2015). 'A Typology of Colonialism'. In: *Perspectives on history* 53.7, pp. 29–30. URL: https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cluster=13413062607006132965&hl=en&oi=scholarr (visited on 09/04/2025).

Slade-Caffarel, Yannick (May 2019). 'The Nature of Heterodox Economics Revisited'. In: *Cambridge Journal of Economics* 43.3, pp. 527–539. ISSN: 0309-166X. DOI: 10.1093/cje/bey043.

Smedley, Audrey (1998). ''Race' and the Construction of Human Identity'. In: *American Anthropologist* 100.3, pp. 690–702. ISSN: 1548-1433. DOI: 10.1525/aa.1998.100.3.690. URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1525/aa.1998.100.3.690 (visited on 18/04/2025).

Smith, Adam (1976). *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. Ed. by Edwin Cannan. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. 524 pp. ISBN: 978-0-226-76374-3.

— (1978). *Lectures on Jurisprudence*. Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith 5. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 674 pp. ISBN: 978-0-19-828188-7. URL: http://archive.org/details/lecturesonjurisp0000smit_b7b6 (visited on 15/05/2025).

Smith, Mark M. (1998). *Debating Slavery: Economy and Society in the Antebellum American South*. New Studies in Economic and Social History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN: 0 521 57158 8. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139171120.

Société des Nègres libres (1791). *Réclamations Des Nègres Libres, Colons Américains*. 3 pp. URL: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k57901950 (visited on 03/04/2025).

Spang, Rebecca L. (2015). *Stuff and Money in the Time of the French Revolution*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 350 pp. ISBN: 978-0-674-04703-7.

Stannard, David E. (1993). *American Holocaust : The Conquest of the New World*. New York : Oxford University Press. 424 pp. ISBN: 978-0-19-508557-0. URL: http://archive.org/details/americanholocaus00stan (visited on 19/04/2025).

Stauffer, John (1997). *Immediatism*. In: *The Historical Encyclopedia of World Slavery*. Ed. by Junius P. Rodriguez. Vol. 1 A - K. 2 vols. Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, p. 364. ISBN: 978-0-87436-885-7. URL: http://archive.org/details/historicalencycl01rodr.

Stein, Robert (2023). 'The French Sugar Business in the Eighteenth Century: A Quantitative Study'. In: *The Atlantic Slave Trade, Vol. III: Eighteenth Century*. Routledge. ISBN: 978-1-003-36249-4.

Stephen, James (1802). *The Crisis of the Sugar Colonies, or, An Enquiry into the Objects and Probable Effects of the French Expedition to the West Indies [Microform] : And Their Connection with the Colonial Interests of the British Empire, to Which Are Subjoined Sketches of a Plan for Settling the Vacant Lands of Trinidada [Sic]: In Four Letters to the Right Hon. Henry Addington, Chancellor of the Exchequer, &c.* London : Printed for J. Hatchard ... 243 pp. ISBN: 978-0-665-20872-0. URL: http://archive.org/details/cihm_20872 (visited on 27/04/2025).

Strabo (1903). 'Book XV: India and Persia'. In: *Geography*. Trans. by H.C. Hamilton and W. Falconer. URL: http://data.perseus.org/citations/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0099.tlg001.perseus-eng2:15 (visited on 02/05/2025).

Sumner, Charles (1900). 'Union among Men of All Parties against the Slave Power and the Extension of Slavery. Speech before a Mass Convention at Worcester, June 28, 1848'. In: *Charles Sumner: His Complete Works*. Vol. 2. 20 vols., pp. 226–241. URL: https://www.gutenberg.org/files/45473/45473-h/45473-h.htm#UNION_AMONG_MEN_OF_ALL_PARTIES_AGAINST_THE_SLAVE_POWER_AND_THE (visited on 22/04/2025).

The Associated Press (8th Apr. 2008). 'Haiti: Thousands Protest Food Prices'. In: *The New York Times. World*. ISSN: 0362-4331. URL: https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/08/world/americas/08briefs-THOUSANDSPRO_BRF.html (visited on 30/04/2025).

The Thousand and One Nights (2010). Trans. by Edward William Lane. Project Gutenberg EBook. Vol. I. London: Chatto & Windus. 555 pp. URL: https://www.gutenberg.org/files/34206/34206-h/34206-h.htm (visited on 03/05/2025).

Thibaud, Clément (2021). 'Révolutions atlantiques'. In: *Les mondes de l'esclavage: une histoire comparée*. Ed. by Paulin Ismard, Benedetta Rossi and Cécile Vidal. L'univers historique. Paris: Seuil, pp. 953–966. ISBN: 978-2-02-138885-5.

Thomas, Greg (2018). 'Afro-Blue Notes: The Death of Afro-pessimism (2.0)?' In: *Theory & Event* 21.1, pp. 282–317. ISSN: 1092-311X. URL: https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/1/article/685979 (visited on 04/05/2025).

Thompson, E. P. (1971). 'The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century'. In: *Past & Present* 50, pp. 76–136. ISSN: 0031-2746. JSTOR: 650244. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/650244 (visited on 03/05/2024).

— (1991). *Customs in Common*. New Press. 602 pp. ISBN: 978-1-56584-003-4. URL: http://archive.org/details/customsincommon00thom (visited on 03/05/2024).

Tomich, Dale (16th Oct. 2017). *Slavery and Historical Capitalism during the Nineteenth Century*. Lexington Books. 217 pp. ISBN: 978-1-4985-6584-4. Google Books: jj1DDwAAQBAJ.

Tomich, Dale W. (2004). *Through the Prism of Slavery : Labor, Capital, and World Economy*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 232 pp. ISBN: 0-7425-2938-X. URL: http://archive.org/details/throughprismofsl0000tomi (visited on 29/03/2024).

Tomich, Dale W. and Paul E. Lovejoy (2021). *The Atlantic and Africa: The Second Slavery and Beyond*. Fernand Braudel Center Studies in Historical Social Science. Albany: State University of New York press. 336 pp. ISBN: 978-1-4384-8443-3.

Trouillot, Michel-Rolph (1982). 'Motion in the System: Coffee, Color, and Slavery in Eighteenth-Century Saint-Domingue'. In: *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)* 5.3, pp. 331–388. ISSN: 0147-9032. JSTOR: 40240909. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/40240909 (visited on 27/04/2025).

— (1990). *Haiti, State against Nation: The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism*. New York, N.Y: Monthly Review Pr. 282 pp. ISBN: 978-0-85345-756-5.

— (2015). *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History*. Boston: Beacon Press. 190 pp. ISBN: 978-0-8070-8053-5.

Trouillot, Michel-Rolph et al. (2021). *Trouillot Remixed: The Michel-Rolph Trouillot Reader*. Durham London: Duke University Press. ISBN: 978-1-4780-2153-7.

Tuck, Eve and K. Wayne Yang (8th Sept. 2012). 'Decolonization Is Not a Metaphor'. In: *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society* 1.1 (1). ISSN: 1929-8692. URL: https://jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/des/article/view/18630 (visited on 17/03/2025).

Vaissière, Pierre de (1909). *Saint-Domingue : la société et la vie créoles sous l'ancien régime (1629-1789)*. Paris: Perrin. 452 pp. URL: http://archive.org/details/saintdominguelas00vais (visited on 24/03/2025).

Vartija, Devin Jack (2021). *The Color of Equality: Race and Common Humanity in Enlightenment Thought*. Intellectual History of the Modern Age. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. ISBN: 978-0-8122-5319-1.

Vastey, Pompée-Valentin (1814). *Le systeme colonial devoilé*. Cap-Henry [Haïti]: P. Roux, imprimeur du Roi. 118 pp. URL: http://archive.org/details/lesystemecolonia00vast (visited on 18/04/2025).

Vaublanc, Vincent Marie Viénot comte de (1838). *Souvenirs*. F. Ponce Lebas. 564 pp. Google Books: BHpSAAAAcAAJ.

Velde, François R. (2009). 'Was John Law's System a Bubble? The Mississippi Bubble Revisited'. In: *The Origins and Development of Financial Markets and Institutions: From the Seventeenth Century to the Present*. Ed. by Jeremy Atack and Larry Neal. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 99–120. ISBN: 978-0-521-89517-0. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511757419.005. URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/origins-and-development-of-financial-markets-and-institutions/was-john-laws-system-a-bubble-the-mississippi-bubble-revisited/ABF3777E7BECD716068A1BD5D7069282 (visited on 09/04/2025).

Vespucci, Amerigo (1504). *Lettera di Amerigo Vespucci delle isole nuovamente trovate in quattro suoi viaggi (1504). Reproduced in facsimile from the MeCormick-Hoe copy in the Princeton University Library*. Reproduced in facsimile from the MeCormick-Hoe copy in the Princeton University Library, 1916. 54 pp. URL: http://archive.org/details/bib_fict_927990 (visited on 21/04/2025).

Vidal, Cécile (2019). *Caribbean New Orleans: Empire, Race, and the Making of a Slave Society*. Williamsburg (Va.) Chapel Hill: Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture University of North Carolina Press. ISBN: 978-1-4696-4519-3.

Virdee, Satnam (10th July 2023). 'Racism and State Formation in the Age of Absolutism'. In: *Historical Materialism* 31.2, pp. 104–135. ISSN: 1465-4466, 1569-206X. DOI: 10.1163/1569206x-bja10010. URL: https://brill.com/view/journals/hima/31/2/article-p104_5.xml (visited on 30/11/2023).

Voltaire, François-Marie Arouet dit (1878). *Essai Sur Les Mœurs et l'esprit Des Nations*. Paris: Garnier. URL: https://fr.wikisource.org/wiki/Essai_sur_les_m%C5%93urs.

— (2010). *Candide, ou, L'optimisme : conte philosophique*. Paris: Larousse. 182 pp. ISBN: 978-2-03-583906-0. URL: http://archive.org/details/candideouloptimi0000volt_q3g7 (visited on 03/05/2025).

Wahnich, Sophie (2019). *L'intelligence politique de la Révolution française: un laboratoire pour le temps présent documents commentés*. Nouvelle éd. augmentée. Petite encyclopédie critique. Paris: Textuel. 226 pp. ISBN: 978-2-84597-775-4.

Walk Free (2023). *The Global Slavery Index 2023*. Minderoo Foundation, p. 173. URL: https://walkfree.org/global-slavery-index.

— (2025). *Methodology*. Walk Free. URL: https://www.walkfree.org/global-slavery-index/methodology/methodology-content/ (visited on 04/05/2025).

Walvin, James (2018). *Sugar: The World Corrupted: From Slavery to Obesity*. e-book. New York: W. W. Norton. ISBN: 978-1-68177-720-7.

— (2nd Jan. 2024). 'Book Reviews: Slavery, Capitalism, and the Industrial Revolution'. In: *Family & Community History* 27.1, pp. 87–104. ISSN: 1463-1180. DOI: 10.1080/14631180.2024.2319483. URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/14631180.2024.2319483 (visited on 30/10/2024).

Warde, Paul (2nd Nov. 2017). 'Social and Environmental History in the Anthropocene'. In: *History after Hobsbawm: Writing the Past for the Twenty-First Century*. Ed. by John H. Arnold, Matthew Hilton and Jan Rüger. Oxford University Press, pp. 184–199. ISBN: 978-0-19-876878-4. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198768784.003.

0010. URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198768784.003.0010 (visited on 19/05/2025).

Warin, Ch. Jos. S. (1793). *Plan de La Ville Du Cap Français Sur Lequel Sont Marqués En Teinte Noire Les Ravages Du Premier Incendie, et En Rouge Les Islets, Parties d'islets, Édifices, Etc. Qui Existent Encore Le 21 Juin 1793*. URL: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b55005281x (visited on 28/04/2025).

Washington, Harriet A. (2019). *A Terrible Thing to Waste: Environmental Racism and Its Assault on the American Mind*. First edition. New York: Little, Brown Spark. 360 pp. ISBN: 978-0-316-50943-5.

Watts, David (1990). *The West Indies: Patterns of Development, Culture and Environmental Change Since 1492*. URL: http://archive.org/details/west-indies-patterns (visited on 31/05/2024).

Waxman, Dov, David Schraub and Adam Hosein (4th July 2022). 'Arguing about Antisemitism: Why We Disagree about Antisemitism, and What We Can Do about It'. In: *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 45.9, pp. 1803–1824. ISSN: 0141-9870. DOI: 10.1080/01419870.2021.1960407. URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2021.1960407 (visited on 19/04/2025).

Weissbourd, Emily (2013). '"I Have Done the State Some Service": Reading Slavery in "Othello" through "Juan Latino"'. In: *Comparative Drama* 47.4, pp. 529–551. ISSN: 00104078. JSTOR: 24615301. URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/24615301 (visited on 26/03/2025).

Wekker, Gloria (2016). *White Innocence: Paradoxes of Colonialism and Race*. Durham: Duke University Press. 241 pp. ISBN: 978-0-8223-7456-5. DOI: 10.1515/9780822374565.

— (1st Feb. 2021). 'Afropessimism'. In: *European Journal of Women's Studies* 28.1, pp. 86–97. ISSN: 1350-5068. DOI: 10.1177/1350506820971224. URL: https://doi.org/10.1177/1350506820971224 (visited on 04/05/2025).

White, Andrew Dickson (1933). *Fiat Money Inflation in France: How It Came, What It Brought, and How It Ended*. New York ; London: D. Appleton and Co. 79 pp. URL: https://mises.org/library/book/fiat-money-inflation-france (visited on 03/05/2024).

White, Eugene Nelson (1989). 'Was There a Solution to the Ancien Régime's Financial Dilemma?' In: *The Journal of Economic History* 49.3, pp. 545–568. ISSN: 0022-0507. JSTOR: 2122504. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2122504 (visited on 04/05/2025).

Whitehead, Neil L. (2011). 'Indigenous Slavery in South America, 1492–1820'. In: *The Cambridge World History of Slavery: Volume 3: AD 1420–AD 1804*. Ed. by David Eltis and Stanley L. Engerman. Vol. 3. The Cambridge World History of Slavery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 248–272. ISBN: 978-0-521-84068-2. DOI: 10.1017/CHOL9780521840682.012. URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-world-history-of-slavery/indigenous-slavery-in-south-america-14921820/307C700F0F053965A65D53F9B643B8A9 (visited on 19/04/2025).

Wilderson, Frank B. III (2017). 'Blacks and the Master/Slave Relation'. In: *Afro-Pessimism: An Introduction*. Racked & Dispatched, pp. 15–30. URL: https://rackedanddispatched.noblogs.org/files/2017/01/Afro-Pessimism2.pdf.

Wilderson, Frank B. III (2020). *Afropessimism*. First edition. New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation. 352 pp. ISBN: 978-1-63149-614-1.

Wilderson, Frank B. III, Samira Spatzek and Paula von Gleich (2016). ''The Inside-Outside of Civil Society' : An Interview with Frank B. Wilderson, III.' In: *Black Studies Papers* 2.1, pp. 4–22. ISSN: 2198-7920. URL: https://media.suub.uni-bremen.de/handle/elib/3230 (visited on 24/02/2025).

Williams, Eric Eustace (1971). *From Columbus to Castro : The History of the Caribbean, 1492-1969*. New York : Harper & Row. 612 pp. ISBN: 978-0-06-014668-9. URL: http://archive.org/details/fromcolumbustoca0000will (visited on 24/03/2025).

— (2021). *Capitalism & Slavery*. Third edition. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press. 240 pp. ISBN: 978-1-4696-6368-5.

Wimpffen, Alexandre-Stanislas de (1911). *Saint-Domingue à La Veille de La Révolution (Souvenirs Du Baron de Wimpffen)*. Ed. by Albert Savine. 190 pp. URL: https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k6541337w (visited on 28/03/2024).

Wolfe, Patrick (Apr. 2002). 'Race and Racialisation: Some Thoughts'. In: *Postcolonial Studies* 5.1, pp. 51–62. ISSN: 1368-8790, 1466-1888. DOI: 10.1080/13688790220126889. URL: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13688790220126889 (visited on 23/03/2025).

— (Dec. 2006). 'Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native'. In: *Journal of Genocide Research* 8.4, pp. 387–409. ISSN: 1462-3528, 1469-9494. DOI: 10.1080/14623520601056240. URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14623520601056240 (visited on 22/03/2025).

— (2016). *Traces of History: Elementary Structures of Race*. London New York: Verso. 296 pp. ISBN: 978-1-78168-918-9.

Wynter, Sylvia (n.d.). 'Black Metamorphosis: New Natives in a New World'. New York: Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture. URL: https://monoskop.org/images/6/69/Wynter_Sylvia_Black_Metamorphosis_New_Natives_in_a_New_World_1970s.pdf.

Yarrington, Jonna M. (2018). 'Sucre Indigène and Sucre Colonial: Reconsidering the Splitting of the French National Sugar Market, 1800–1860'. In: *Economic Anthropology* 5.1, pp. 20–31. ISSN: 2330-4847. DOI: 10.1002/sea2.12099. URL: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/sea2.12099 (visited on 22/03/2024).

Zancarini-Fournel, Michelle (2016). *Les Luttes et Les Rêves : Une Histoire Populaire de La France de 1685 à Nos Jours*. Zones. La Découverte. ISBN: 978-2-35522-114-9.

Zecca Castel, Raúl (7th Dec. 2021). 'Trabajo, Deuda y Chantaje: Los Braceros Haitianos En Los Cañaverales de La República Dominicana'. In: *Latin American Research Review* 56.4, pp. 877–890. ISSN: 0023-8791, 1542-4278. DOI: 10.25222/larr.1111. URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0023879100007172/type/journal_article (visited on 04/05/2025).

Zeuske, Michael and Stephan Conermann (2020). 'The Slavery / Capitalism Debate Global: From "Capitalism and Slavery" to Slavery as Capitalism. Introduction'. In: *Comparativ* 30.5/6 (5/6), pp. 448–463. ISSN: 0940-3566. DOI: 10.26014/j.comp.

2019.05-06.01. URL: https://www.comparativ.net/v2/article/view/3080 (visited on 29/03/2024).