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31. AUGUST 2022

DEMOCRACIES IN THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW

INTER-STATE SHAMING BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC AND NON-DEMOCRATIC STATES IN THE UPR



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1. Introduction

During session 31 of the Universal Periodic Review (hereinafter the UPR), China received a total of 387 recommendations, two of which – received from the Republic of Korea and Mali - recommended that China take steps towards the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights[1] (UPR Info database, 2022). Regardless of the similarity in content and form, when giving an answer to these recommendations, China only noted the one from the Republic of Korea and supported (accepted) the one from Mali. Similarly, during the review of Belarus[2], Brazil recommended that the country criminalize all forms of violence against women, particularly domestic and sexual violence. The recommendation given from Peru was almost identical[3]. Yet, the recommendation from Brazil was noted, meanwhile the one from Peru was supported.

It is no secret that within international organizations governments play out their political ties and carefully use all tools and mechanisms made available to them to advance possible domestic interests. Human rights mechanisms are not spared from the politics of their member states. These ties are even more accentuated when governments engage in naming and shaming during their mandates in human rights institutions. As the main compliance mechanism of these international institutions, it is of interest to understand what drives inter-state shaming. The relatively new human rights mechanism, UPR, witnesses a novel type of shaming- one that is more collaborative and less accusatory. One that plays out through short recommendations which can only be viewed as shaming when they are specific and detailed. Reasons behind shaming in the UPR have been explored by Terman and Veoten (2018). The authors have investigated possible determinants of shaming such as geopolitical affinity, formal military alliance, humanitarian aid and arms trade.

Drawing inspiration from their work, I propose a quantitative research using regime type, particularly democracies, as a predictor of inter-state shaming in the UPR. There are theoretical reasons that support the claim that democracies would behave differently than non-democracies. Democracies have a domestic institutional structure that makes them more susceptible to pressure from their own citizens. Sharing liberal values and holding each other to higher standards also makes them more prone to shaming states and one another. Using the database from UPR Info, and the Democracy Index from EUI, I will attempt to answer the questions: Do democracies shame norm-violators more than non-democratic regimes? Do they accept harsher recommendations compared to other regimes?

The research question presented and argued in this report was motivated by my six-month internship with UPR Info. My tasks as a communications intern revolved around maintaining the website and the organisation's social media accounts, while also creating content to bring attention to UPR Info's activities. With that being said, the focus of this paper goes beyond my daily responsibilities. Having followed several live sessions of the UPR by the end of its third cycle, there were interactive dialogues between states that were very striking, particularly when large democracies faced more "notorious"

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[1] Recommendation from the Republic of Korea: "Continue *its efforts to improve human rights institutions, and in particular to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." (Category 5: specific action). See the below sections of the report for further elaboration of action categories and their meaning.*
Recommendation from Mali: "Accelerate *the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. " (Category 4: general action)*

[2] Session number 36 of the third cycle of UPR, held on May of 2020.

[3] Recommendation from Brazil: "*Adopt a comprehensive law criminalizing all forms of violence against women, particularly domestic and sexual violence." (Category 5: specific action).*
Recommendation from Peru: "*Consider undertaking the necessary reforms to criminalize violence against women, in particular domestic and sexual violence." (Category 3: considering action)*

states. It is during those diplomatic voice raises that I thought of the toned-down form of shaming that exists within the UPR. This report is structured as follows: I will first introduce the UPR mechanism, which is then followed by a literature review. The concept of politicization will be elaborated and together with it, the naming and shaming inside the UPR. I will also look into the international relations theories that explain shaming from democratic regimes. Then, I present the UPR Info dataset, and all other relevant variables used in the multivariate regression analysis. Finally, I present the results and the conclusions.

2. The Universal Periodic Review – the mechanism in short

With the goal of improving the human rights around the globe, in March of 2006 the United Nations General Assembly created the Human Rights Council (HRC) (OHCHR, n.d.). Among the procedures and mechanisms that were introduced as part of the activity of the HRC, was also the Universal Periodic Review: an assessment of the human rights records of all 193 UN member states (OHCHR, n.d.).

A UPR cycle lasts four and a half years, during which all UN member states go through a review of their respective human rights records. The reviews are conducted by the UPR Working Groups which hold three sessions per year[4]. During these sessions, an interactive discussion happens between the State under Review (hereinafter SuR) and other UN member states. The session starts with the national report, where the SuR presents a self-evaluation of the human rights in the country. Civil society and other stakeholders have an opportunity to submit information as well[5]. During the interactive dialogue any UN member state can pose questions, comments and make recommendations to the SuR. The latter then will respond to each recommendation by either "supporting" it or "noting" it. States officially only commit to supported recommendations; they are considered as comments that were accepted by the SuR and their implementation is expected in the next four and a half years until the next UPR cycle. The review considers a state's performance based on its obligations under the UN Charter; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR); UN human rights treaties to which it is a party; any voluntary pledges it has made regarding human rights, including, after the first cycle, commitments made during previous reviews; and the principles of international humanitarian law.

Several characteristics make UPR innovative in the group of human rights monitoring mechanisms. As of January 2022, three cycles of the UPR have been completed, with a remarkable 100% participation rate from all UN Member States (UPR Info, 2022) As a state-run system, the UPR promises equal treatment of all countries and addresses the full range of human rights. In true UN nature, it relies on interactive dialogue and recommendations to promote human rights instead of sanctions or harsh measures against violators (Cowan & Billaud, 2015).

3. Literature review

In this section, I will dive into the phenomenon of politicisation in the realm of IGOs of human rights and where UPR stands in face of these claims. I will further develop the concept of "naming and shaming" as a compliance mechanism in the UPR and how it is used as a political tool in state reviews.

[4] The UPR Working Groups consist of 47 member states of the HRC that facilitate the reviews. Every UN Member State however, can participate in the interactive dialogue with the State under Review.

[5] Reviews are based on three different sources of information: 1) those provided by the SuR, which can take the form of a "national report"; 2) information contained in the reports of independent human rights experts and groups, known as the Special Procedures, human rights treaty bodies, and other UN entities; 3) information from other stakeholders including national human rights institutions and non-governmental organizations. (OHCHR,2022)

Shaming will also be discussed from different international relations theories to establish the reasoning behind strategic recommendations based on country regimes.

3.1. Politicization in the Universal Periodic Review: political by design

When the term "politicization" is used in the context of international organizations (IOs), particularly the area of human rights, it refers to political bias and subjectivity in inter-state relations (Carraro, 2017). Likewise, it implies the use of international institutions to advance the national and regional agendas of states. The United Nations Commission of Human Rights was one of the institutions that was plagued by politicization, or at least highly accused of it (Dominguez Redondo, 2008). According to author Dominguez Redondo, politicization in the UNCHR manifested itself in two main forms (2008). First, the Commission was increasingly composed of states whose interest laid not in the protection of human rights, but rather in the creation of a shield to avoid criticism or criticize others. Secondly, the country debates within the Commission were based on a highly confrontational and selective approach of targeting only certain states and only specific issues. These were arguably the" worst examples of politicization" in the former institution (Hannum, 2007, p.85). The build-up of criticism and consequent loss of credibility would overwhelm the Commission by the turn of the century, and ultimately lead to its replacement in 2006 (Davies, 2010).

In March of the same year, the Human Rights Council was created, together with the UPR as a new and improved mechanism. Understanding how politicization was materialized during the active years of the Commission, gives us an insight of what the UPR, as a novelty of the Council, was designed to mend or to avoid. The two issues identified above were addressed in the new Council by 1) implementing a limit of two terms for state memberships in order to ensure rotation and dissipate favouritism and 2) introducing the procedure of UPR itself, as a peer-review mechanism to tackle state targeting and guarantee universality. The UPR's peer-review "would help avoid, to the extent possible, the politicization and selectivity that are hallmarks of the Commission's existing system" (United Nations Secretary General, 2005, para.8)[6]. As can be seen from the case of the Commission, and widely in IOs of human rights, the absence of politicization is an important component of credibility and legitimacy, which was continuously sought after. (Carraro,2017).

Even though the UPR was conceived to bring credibility to the new Council and essentially operate free of political bias, scholars do not necessarily agree on the point. To elaborate, I first investigate the institutional design of the UPR. This mechanism is led by states: NGOs can participate, UN entities can contribute, but the floor belongs to the states. In a state-dominated process of this nature, it is difficult to strip the dialogue from political arguments and intentions. As stated above, the peer-review feature of the UPR was a main selling point for the new and improved Council. Davies brings our attention to the fact that many delegations are sent from foreign ministries rather than ministries of justice or human rights, which implies that the review is regarded as a foreign affair rather than a national examination of human rights (2010). All the characteristics above support the argument that politicization is institutionalized into the UPR's procedures. Valentina Carraro (2017) investigates in her article the extent to which the state reporting process of the Treaty Bodies and the UPR are perceived to be politicized, by the means of a survey distributed to member state delegates, Treaty Body committee members, and thirty-nine interviews conducted with officials from both mechanisms. Below we can see Figure 1 from the study of Carraro, on whether the recommendations of UPR and those of the Treaty Bodies are politically motivated. Visibly, a majority of respondents believe that recommendations are often or always politically motivated, a third of them are of the opinion that this seldom occurs, and no respondent indicated that this never happens.

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[6] In the explanatory note by the Secretary-General *"In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all"* a lot of emphasis was put on the peer-review feature of the UPR as the solution to the politicization problem of the Commission (2005).



Figure 1.Politically Motivated Recommendations (Carraro, 2017)

Terman and Voeten (2018) and Carraro (2017) agree that bilateral politics were often the determining factor of the severity of recommendations. With that being said, states appear to value their review and care highly about their evaluation in front of their peers. In a counterintuitive conclusion, Carraro explains how accepting a recommendation in the UPR setting, means that a political commitment has been created between the SuR and the recommending state. Even though some recommendations are exclusively issued for political reasons rather than out of human rights considerations, still more commitments are made than in an apolitical mechanism. (Carraro, 2017). Similarly, authors Terman and Voeten argue that "if the UPR matters, it is *because* of its political nature, not in spite of it" (2018, p.6). In their article, we see that regardless of the conventional view of political affinities as an obstacle for an impartial review of human rights, in the UPR, these ties are what fuels the social pressure that inspires behavioural outcomes.

3.2. Naming and shaming in the Universal Periodic Review

The international human rights system relies heavily on "naming and shaming" violators in order to promote compliance with human rights. It is used in all human rights bodies with monitoring competences but with no enforcement powers at the domestic level (Dominguez Redondo, 2012). Studies on shaming, particularly in international organizations suggest that it can be effective in shedding a light on violations and placing them in the global agenda (Hafner-Burton, 2008). Shaming is also used to put pressure on target states which, in turn, triggers compliance. Many authors consider shaming to be the main compliance mechanism used by the UPR (Etone, 2019; Terman & Voeten, 2018). An opposing view has been introduced by Dominguez Redondo (2012) and Cowan and Billaud (2015) in their respective research about compliance in the UPR. As argued by these authors, the UPR represents a step towards non-confrontational inter-state cooperation rather than shaming, which they argue is ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst. States participated wholeheartedly in the process, seemingly because of the "soft" approach of recommendations (Dominguez Redondo, 2012). Cowan and Billaud call the creation of UPR as a shift from "shaming" towards "learning", where country reviews resemble a school setting (2015). Admittedly, in the work of the Commission, states

might have felt like the institution itself was shaming and targeting them which resulted in a lot of animosity. With the peer-review element of the UPR, it is not the mechanism giving the recommendations but the states itself, hence why Dominguez Redondo argues that UPR's nature has shifted to collaborative. It is also claimed that the high participation rate in the UPR indicates governments feeling less attacked and more willing to engage in a collaborative mechanism.

Between these two opposing views, Carraro (2019) presents an opinion that sits somewhat in the middle: UPR does indeed "name and shame" violators of human rights, but the institutional design of the mechanism does not allow this process to become confrontational, hence states often avoid being excessively harsh. As described by Terman and Voeten, shaming is a relational exercise and as long as states get to give personalized recommendations to other states, the possibility of shaming is always present (2018). The mechanism simply makes it easier for states to "agree" or "disagree" [7] with recommendations, which in turn makes the process less intimidating or confrontational- easier to participate in (Carraro, 2019). It is simple for the SuR to "note" the recommendations that are perceived as harsh or that feel more political. Another factor to be taken into account is the perception of "lack of expertise" in the UPR: when a recommendation comes from a political actor (a state) instead of an expert (e.g. Treaty Bodies), it is easier for the state under review to justify rejecting it. All of the reasons above make it so that participation is high in the UPR and shaming is more subtle.

3.3. Democracies in International Organizations

Through the lens of traditional international relations theories, there can be several reasons behind shaming. According to realists, naming and shaming is a political tool used by powerful states against weaker ones. This perspective puts emphasis on how state decisions are motivated by external constraints and alliances with other countries. The realist perspective infers that all regimes, democracies and non-democracies, reward their friends and punish their enemies (Koliev, 2020).
A liberal viewpoint on the other hand, argues that the decision of a democracy to shame another country stems from its domestic ideas and norms regarding foreign policy (Moravcsik, 1997). If a country defends liberal ideas domestically (which is more common in democratic regimes), it is more likely to support liberal ideas internationally too. In addition, democracies by institutional structure are more responsive to domestic pressure than other regimes. A recent example of this phenomenon is the case of Australian civil society who formed a coalition before Australia's third UPR review to influence the recommendations made by other states to the SuR (Australia) regarding children's rights in the climate crisis. Not only did they exert domestic pressure, but international pressure too by involving other governments in the lobbying process[8]. As a result, Australia received eight recommendations addressing climate change, four of which were supported- unlike the previous review where there were no recommendations on this issue (Choo, 2022). Another reason for democracies to engage in shaming is the desire of politicians to remain in power. Leaders may lose credibility and domestic support if they do not oppose violations of human rights. As a result, contrary to non-democratic leaders, politicians in democratic states have more to lose if they do not shame norm violators.
The constructivist perspective puts forth the normative aspect of the protection of human rights. To elaborate, the constructivist point of view sees international organizations as social environments where states use shaming to present themselves as promoters of human rights, thus creating norms of what is appropriate behaviour (Koliev, 2020). As mentioned above, democratic regimes have certain liberal values to uphold, making the shaming of violators not only an obligation but also the expected behaviour from such a regime. Using this logic, democracies acknowledge shared values and interests among other democracies, and use the tool of shaming to promote and spread these values (Lebovic & Voeten, 2006).

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[7] "Agreeing "refers to responding to a recommendation with "Supported" instead of "Noted".
[8] Australia's third cycle review occurred on January 20th of 2021 and Save the Children saw this as a great opportunity to advocate for children's rights and the climate crisis by encouraging different states to make recommendations to Australia about the topic.

Even if the motivation for shaming might differ slightly in the last two theories, from both a liberal and constructivist point of view, a state's democratic structures and values encourage it to shame norm violators. This brings me to the first hypothesis:

> ***Hypothesis 1:*** *Democracies are more likely to shame norm-violators than non-democracies*

Rooted in the liberal and constructivist theories, the "democratic peace" literature stipulates that democracies do not go to war with each other, instead they find diplomatic means to resolve their conflict. Shaming can be one of those non-violent, less coercive, and more diplomatic ways to express disagreement. As such, it is expected that democracies hold each other to a higher standard by shaming more harshly their fellow democracies in order to demonstrate their legitimacy in relation to democratic values. In the name of the same values, democracies on the receiving end of these recommendations are more likely to accept them (Koliev,2020). The theory above leads to the second hypothesis:

> ***Hypothesis 2:*** *Democracies are more likely to accept harsh recommendations than non-democracies*

4. Data

To evaluate our hypotheses, I will be conducting a quantitative analysis with the help of multivariate regressions. First, I introduce the data and how they were collected, then the relevant variables used in the analysis and the adjustments made to adapt the data to our needs. Lastly, I present the results of the analysis.

4.1. Dependent Variables

While working with UPR Info, I got familiarized with the database of UPR recommendations and voluntary pledges that they have developed. The data is pulled from outcome reports of the 193 countries that have undergone the first two cycles, and 154 countries[9] in the third cycle. For each recommendation, the database offers information on the state giving the recommendation (Recommending State), the state receiving the recommendation (State under Review, SuR), and the SuR's response to the recommendation (the Response). Recommendations are also labelled according to the kind of action demanded on the part of the SuR (Action Category), and the specific human rights issue involved. For this internship report, the complete database of recommendations was used: 75,913 observations in total.
The first dependent variable is the *Action Category* (Hypothesis 1) of recommendations. All recommendations in the database are sorted in five categories based on the action verbs they contain. The UPR Info categories and the verbs used to rank recommendations can be found in Appendix 1. For this report, following the example of Terman and Voeten (2018), I recoded the Action Category into a 3-point measure that represents the severity of shaming starting from 1 (minimal action and most likely

[9] At the time of writing, the third cycle reviews of the following countries are not up on the database yet. **Session 38**: Namibia, Niger, Mozambique, Estonia, Paraguay, Belgium, Denmark, Palau, Somalia, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Latvia, Sierra Leone, Singapore. **Session 39**: Suriname, Greece, Samoa, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sudan, Hungary, Papua New Guinea, Tajikistan, United Republic of Tanzania, Antigua and Barbuda, Eswatini, Trinidad and Tobago, Thailand, Ireland. **Session 40**: Togo, Syrian Arab Republic, Venezuela, Iceland, Zimbabwe, Lithuania, Uganda, Timor-Leste, Republic of Moldova, Haiti, South Sudan.

accepted), to 3 (most specific, and least likely to be accepted) [10]. Evidently, recommendations of category 1 are not considered shaming: they require minimal effort from the SuR to implement them. Category 3 on the other hand is the most severe in terms of shaming: actions required are at times very specific and demand more commitment from the SuR. Examples of all three categories of shaming recommendations:
Example of category 1:

> "*Draw on the support of the international community and the relevant United Nations mechanisms to reinforce and protect human rights"*- Qatar to Libya, session 36, 3rd cycle

Example of category 2:

> *"Take measures to protect freedom of expression and protect journalists from harassment and injustices"*- Norway to Rwanda, session 37, 3rd cycle

Example of category 3:

> *"Amend the 2013 Communications Law to stop the use of the vaguely defined concept of "social emergency" to suspend or suppress legitimate communications and exchanges of information, or otherwise to limit freedom of opinion and expression"*- Finland to Kazakhstan, session 20, 2nd cycle

The second dependent variable is the *Response* to the recommendations. It shows whether the SuR has *supported* or *noted* the recommendation. No manipulation was done to this variable.

4.2. Independent Variable

The explanatory variable for both hypotheses is the regime type. Since this information is not part of the UPR Info database, a regime index had to be chosen to complete the dataset. I have selected the Democracy Index compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit. The variable captures the extent to which citizens can choose their political leaders in free and fair elections, enjoy civil liberties, prefer democracy over other political systems, can and do participate in politics, and have a functioning government that acts on their behalf (Herre, & Roser ,2013). The index attempts to measure the state of democracy in 164 countries and territories. Through a score of 1 to 10, the Democracy Index classifies states into authoritarian (0-4), hybrid (4-6), flawed democracy (6-8) and full democracy (8-10). In the regime dataset created for the purpose of this report, flawed democracies and full democracies are all under the democratic regime type. In the final regression analysis, hybrid and authoritarian will fall under the non-democratic regime type for a more clear-cut interpretation.

Covering only 164 countries, the Democracy Index leaves the regime dataset short of 29 countries. The missind data of the remaining states have been completed using the Global Freedom scores of Freedom House. The Global Freedom scores do not explicitly assert the regime type of states, but they do evaluate political rights and civil liberties. The 29 states were classified as authoritarian if they have a "Not Free" status in the Global Freedom Score, hybrid in case of "Partly Free" status and democracy in case of "Free" status[11] (Freedom House, 2021). In Appendix 2 all countries and their respective regimes can be

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[10] UPR Info Action Categories 1 and 2 (Minimal and Continuing Action) were coded as level 1- the least severe recommendations. Category 4 (General Action) is coded as level 2. Lastly, Action Categories 3 and 5 (Considering and Specific Action) were coded as level 3 recommendations- the most severe. Cf. Appendix 1.

[11] Regimes that were added using the Global Freedom Scores of Freedom House: Brunei, South Sudan, Somalia, Andorra, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Kiribati, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Sao Tome & Principe, San Marino, Samoa, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, St Vincent & the Grenadines, St Lucia, St Kitts & Nevis, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Maldives, Monaco, Tonga.

found as they were used in the regressions. Below we can see the number of democratic, authoritarian and hybrid countries.



Figure 2. Distribution of regime types for 193 UN Member States

4.3. Method

The main tool of the analysis will be logistic regressions. To answer the first hypothesis, the Recommending states will be examined by looking into the type of recommendations regimes give out the most, and to whom they are directed. The objective is to discern the possible patterns of shaming among the regimes and see if democracies stand out among non-democracies. This will be possible by following category 3 recommendations as the indicator of shaming.

For the second hypothesis, the actions of the SuR will be in focus. The dependent variable will be a dichotomous *Response* variable indicating whether the SuR accepted the recommendation. To answer both hypotheses, the Regime variable will be duplicated into Regime of Sur (Regime_SuR) and Regime of Recommending State (Regime_RS) In addition, *Action Category* will also take the role of an explanatory variable in certain parts of the analysis to see if it influences the acceptance rate of recommendations.

5. Results

To get more familiarized with the data, descriptive statistics will be introduced first. Out of the total number of observations (n=75,913), from the three main variables that are used in the analysis, there are 1040 missing values, and they can be found in the Action Category variable. There are still a substantial 74,873 observations left for me to work with. In Figure 3 below, the number of supported and noted recommendations can be seen. Supported recommendations distinctly exceed the number of those that are only noted, marking a sign of high cooperation from states in the UPR. The distribution of the recoded Action Categories can be found in Figure 4. We can see that a good majority of the recommendations belong to category 3, or the most specific type of action category. Category 3 recommendations are the ones that give the SuR the most indicators and details on how to implement an action, hence they are the most encouraged by the UPR.



Figure 3. Number of Supported and Noted recommendations



Figure 4. Number of recommendations per Action Category

Figure 5 presents a table compilation of absolute values collected from the database to help us get a better understanding of our two independent variables (regime of SuR, regime of Recommending State), and two dependent ones (Action Category and Response). It is at this stage that the decision to put authoritarian and hybrid regimes together was made. Confronted with the bare data, there are not as many hybrid countries as democracies or authoritarian regimes.[12] The theoretical gap on predictions of behaviour about hybrid countries could possibly become an interpretation issue down the line. Hybrids were put together with authoritarian regimes instead of democracies because, on the EIU Democracy Index used for their classification, there are already two very extended democracy levels: full and flawed. Hybrid scores are closer to authoritarian regimes than full democracies, making the decision more intuitive. Furthermore, after this change was affected, the tendencies of recommendations' acceptance rate and action categories remained the same, indicating that the hybrid addition did not disturb significantly the dynamics between the regimes (cf. Appendix 3).

[12] The complete table with absolute values before putting together authoritarian and hybrid regimes can be found in Appendix 3.

UPR	State under Review	Democracy				Non-democracy			
Recommending state	Action Category	Supported	Noted	Total	Acceptance %	Supported	Noted	Total	Acceptance %
Democracy	1	2085	125	2210	94.34%	2595	203	2798	92.74%
	2	6584	1018	7602	86.60%	8809	2143	10952	80.43%
	3	5256	3639	8895	59.09%	7701	7616	15317	50.28%
Non-democracy	1	2264	88	2352	96.25%	6628	104	6732	98.46%
	2	3758	567	4325	86.89%	5665	493	6158	91.99%
	3	2122	1600	3722	57.01%	2879	1631	4510	63.84%

Figure 5. All recommendations classified by acceptance, category, regime of Recommending State and regime of SuR

This table represents 97 democratic states and 96 non-democratic states. There are a few trends that can be discerned from the numbers alone.
The first visible element is the trends in the acceptance rate of recommendations of different categories. In this paragraph we concentrate mostly on SuR. The response to recommendations follows similar trends across the board. The average acceptance rate[13] between regimes is as follows: democracies have accepted 80% of recommendations coming from other democracies, and 80% of recommendations from non-democracies. Non-democracies, on the other hand, have accepted 74% of recommendations originating from democracies, and 85% of those coming from fellow non-democracies. Through this information, we can see that democracies do generally accept recommendations by comparison. Regardless of the regime, states support a striking majority of category 1 recommendations, with acceptance rates going from the lowest 92% in the democracy (RS)-non-democracy (SuR) combination, to the highest, 98% in the non-democracy (RS)-non-democracy (SuR) dyad. Unsurprisingly, category 3 recommendations, the ones that are the harshest in shaming have the lowest acceptance rate. Non-democratic regimes have supported only 50% of category 3 recommendations given by democratic recommending states. Meanwhile, the opposite of that interaction scores a 57% acceptance rate: higher but not by much. Category 3 recommendations are accepted the most between same-regime states: democracy- democracy (59%), non-democracy-non-democracy, (64%). Looking into all category 3 recommendations without a difference of regime in the Recommending state, democracies have accepted 58% of them, and non-democracies have accepted 57%. There is a difference, but it is rather small. There is evidence for hypothesis 2 but is not that strong[14].
Another observation that brings forth the tendencies in action categories can be seen in the column Total. It is visible that democracies give more category 3 recommendations and fewer of category 1, regardless of the regime of the receiving state. Meanwhile non-democracies prioritize category 1 and 2 recommendations instead of category 3. Based on numbers alone, it is noticeable that democracies give more recommendations in general than non-democracies. Having looked at the absolute values, there seems to be stronger evidence for hypothesis 1[15].

To answer the first hypothesis, I used the logistic regression presented below. The explanatory variable, regime of Recommending States, is statistically significant with a p-value of under 0.05. Confidence Intervals (CIs) do not contain 1.0, which indicates that there is an association between the regime of states and the action categories. This possible association would be negative (0.42), meaning that the odds of a non-democratic regime to give category 3 recommendations are 2.37 lower than the odds of a democratic regime to do the same. This goes on to show that democracies do give more category 3 recommendations than other regimes.

[13] Not shown on the table but calculated manually.
[14] **Hypothesis 2:** Democracies are more likely to accept harsh recommendations than non-democracies.
[15] **Hypothesis 1:** Democracies are more likely to shame norm-violators than non-democracies.

	Action_Category_rec		
Predictors	*Odds Ratios*	*CI*	*p*
(Intercept)	1.00	0.98 – 1.02	0.818
regime RS [Non-Demo]	0.42	0.41 – 0.44	**<0.001**
Observations	74873		
R^2 Tjur	0.040		

Figure 6. Logistic regression no. 1.

In addition to the results above, the effect plot below shows which Recommending state regime is most associated with recommendations of action category 3. It is shown that democracies are harsher when when giving recommendations compared to non-democratic regimes, for that reason hypothesis 1 is proven.



Figure 7. Effect plot showing the regime of Recommending States and Action Category

To see whether democracies, compared to non-democracies, are more likely to accept harsh recommendations, the regression below gives us an answer. *Response* is the dependent variable which is explained by two independent ones: the regime of the SuR and the Action Category. The first predictor below the intercept, the non-democratic SuR, has an odds ratio below 1.0 which represents a negative logistic association (0.87). The variable is statistically significant (p-value under 0.001) and has CIs that do not include 1.0 (0.77-0.83) which indicates that the null hypothesis of association can be rejected. This shows that there is an association between the response to recommendations and the two explanatory variables.
Reading the model below and their exponential coefficients, it can be said that all else equal, among non-democratic regimes, the ratio of countries who accept recommendations versus those who do not is 1.25[16] lower than the ratio among democratic regimes. It can be deduced from this that democracies do tend to accept more recommendations than other regimes. The action category variable gives us a different type of information. The category of reference is category 1, also referred to above as minimal shaming. The odds of category 3 recommendations to be accepted are 22.36 lower than a recommendation of category 1.

[16] Exponential of the negative coefficient derived by the logistic model calculated on R Studio. Correlates to the Odds Ratio Column in the model

Predictors	Response_rec Odds Ratios	CI	p	Response_rec Odds Ratios	CI	p
(Intercept)	3.18	3.09 – 3.26	**<0.001**	30.41	27.78 – 33.36	**<0.001**
regime SUR [Non-Demo]	0.87	0.84 – 0.90	**<0.001**	0.80	0.77 – 0.83	**<0.001**
Action Category rec [3]				0.04	0.04 – 0.05	**<0.001**
Action Category rec [2]				0.22	0.20 – 0.24	**<0.001**
Observations	75913			74873		
R^2 Tjur	0.001			0.164		

Figure 8. Logistic regression no.2

On Figure 9, two effect plots portray how, even though the regimes follow a similar pattern of responses, there are differences to how they react to the two main action categories. Non-democratic regimes have a higher positive response rate for category 1 recommendations and a higher negative response rate for category 3 recommendations. The opposite can be seen on the democratic side of the plot. They have a higher rate of acceptance of category 3 recommendations and a lower one for category 1. It is worth noting that the differences are not blatant between regimes, however they remain statistically significant enough to not reject hypothesis number 2. To answer the question of the second part of the analysis, democracies are more likely to accept harsher recommendations in the UPR than their fellow non-democratic states.



Figure 9. Effect plots presenting the regime of SuR, Action Category and the Response variable

Based on these findings, I can conclude that regime type does play a role in inter-state shaming. The 1st logistic regressions shows that non-democratic regimes (of recommending states) have a negative relation with the variable action category (category 3 in particular). Between the two regimes, democracies give the most category 3 recommendations. The 2nd logistic regression also shows a negative relation between the non-democratic regime (of SuR) and the variable Response (particularly the response Supported). All things considered; non-democratic regimes are less likely to respond with

Support to recommendations. Based on figure 9, democratic regimes are the ones that accept the most category 3 recommendations.

For hypothesis 1 and 2, the respective null hypotheses were rejected.

6. Conclusions

In this internship report, I have attempted to analyse the impact of regime types in inter-state shaming in the UPR. Firstly, I looked into the politicization of UPR. Inter-state shaming cannot exist without political interactions between actors. It was established that the UPR is indeed political, but its political nature is what inspires actual compliance with commitments. From politicization, I moved to inter-state shaming. The institutional design of UPR makes it possible for states to engage in inter-state shaming that is not confrontational or selective, but rather a less hostile form of shaming. In order to know if regime types, particularly democracies as the focus of this report, can explain naming and shaming in international organizations, I adopted a liberal and a constructivist perspective. The three main reasons behind democratic inter-state shaming are democratic states' institutional structures, domestic political environments, and the liberal values through which they hold each other to a high standard. The two questions I raised were: Are democracies more likely to shame norm-violators than non-democracies and are democracies more likely to accept harsh recommendations than non-democracies? To address these questions, I conducted a few logistic regressions using the variables Regime type (of recommending state and SuR), Action Category (representing the severity of shaming) and Response (acceptance of recommendations). The findings showed that there is an association between regime (of recommending state) and action category: democracies are more likely to shame norm-violators by giving them category 3 recommendations. The results also showed an association between response and regime (of SuR): democracies were more likely to accept category 3 recommendations than non-democracies. It is worth mentioning that the differences between non-democracies and democracies are smaller on the second test (regime of SuR and response).

The findings of this article contribute to our understanding of how naming and shaming functions, especially in the international organizations of human rights. It is important to understand in what circumstances shaming works. As can be seen in the work by Terman and Vpeten (2018), and in this report, responsiveness to shaming depends at times on who is the receiver and the giver of the recommendation. It also brings forth another side of politicization that is not as negative as we're used to seeing in academic literature concerning international organizations. As Carraro (2017) puts it, even if some recommendations are exclusively issued for political reasons, still more commitments are made than in an apolitical mechanism.

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Appendix 1. Action Categories as used by UPR Info

UPR Info analyses the first verb and the overall action contained in the recommendation and ranks it on a scale from 1 (minimal action) to 5 (specific action).

- Rank 1: Recommendation directed at non-SuR states, or calling upon the SuR to request technical assistance, or share information (Example of verbs: call on, seek, share).
- Rank 2: Recommendation emphasizing continuity (Example of verbs: continue, maintain, perpetuate, persevere, persist, pursue, remain, sustain).
- Rank 3: Recommendation to consider change (Example of verbs: analyse, assess, consider, envisage envision, examine, explore, reflect upon, revise, review, study).
- Rank 4: Recommendation of action that contains a general element (Example of verbs: accelerate, address, encourage, engage with, ensure, guarantee, intensify, promote, speed up, strengthen, take action, take measures or steps towards).
- Rank 5: Recommendation of specific action (Example of verbs: conduct, develop, eliminate, establish, investigate, undertake as well as legal verbs: abolish, accede, adopt, amend. implement, enforce, ratify).

When there is an even rationale for two different actions in a recommendation, emphasis is generally placed on the first action. When a recommendation starts with two verbs, the second one is privileged. Ex: "*Continue and strengthen...*" -> category 4. When a recommendation starts with a general action but then provide examples of specific actions, it is considered as category 5. Ex: "*Improve women's rights by amending the family code*" (UPR Info, 2016).

For my analysis, I created three levels of shaming contained in recommendations: rank 1 and 2 were coded as level 1 (least severe). Rank 4 is coded as level 2. Rank 3 and 4 are coded as level 3 (the most severe shaming).

Appendix 2. Countries classified based on the EIU Democracy Index of 2021.

Country	Regime type	Country	Regime type	Country	Regime type	Country	Regime type
Afghanistan	Authoritarian	DPR Korea	Authoritarian	Luxembourg	Democracy	Senegal	Democracy
Albania	Democracy	Ecuador	Democracy	Macedonia FYR	Democracy	Serbia	Democracy
Algeria	Authoritarian	Egypt	Authoritarian	Madagascar	Hybrid	Seychelles	Democracy
Andorra	Democracy	El Salvador	Hybrid	Malawi	Hybrid	Sierra Leone	Hybrid
Angola	Authoritarian	Equatorial Guinea	Authoritarian	Malaysia	Democracy	Singapore	Democracy
Antigua & Barbuda	Democracy	Eritrea	Authoritarian	Maldives	Hybrid	Slovakia	Democracy
Argentina	Democracy	Estonia	Democracy	Mali	Authoritarian	Slovenia	Democracy
Armenia	Hybrid	Ethiopia	Authoritarian	Malta	Democracy	Solomon Islands	Democracy
Australia	Democracy	Fiji	Hybrid	Marshall Islands	Democracy	Somalia	Authoritarian
Austria	Democracy	Finland	Democracy	Mauritania	Hybrid	South Africa	Democracy
Azerbaijan	Authoritarian	France	Democracy	Mauritius	Democracy	South Sudan	Authoritarian
Bahamas	Democracy	Gabon	Authoritarian	Mexico	Hybrid	Spain	Democracy
Bahrain	Authoritarian	Gambia	Hybrid	Micronesia	Democracy	Sri Lanka	Democracy
Bangladesh	Hybrid	Georgia	Hybrid	Moldova	Democracy	St Kitts & Nevis	Democracy
Barbados	Democracy	Germany	Democracy	Monaco	Hybrid	St Lucia	Democracy
Belarus	Authoritarian	Ghana	Democracy	Mongolia	Democracy	St Vincent & the Grenadines	Democracy
Belgium	Democracy	Greece	Democracy	Montenegro	Democracy	Sudan	Authoritarian
Belize	Democracy	Grenada	Democracy	Morocco	Hybrid	Suriname	Democracy
Benin	Hybrid	Guatemala	Hybrid	Mozambique	Authoritarian	Swaziland	Authoritarian
Bhutan	Hybrid	Guinea	Authoritarian	Myanmar	Authoritarian	Sweden	Democracy
Bolivia	Hybrid	Guinea-Bissau	Authoritarian	Namibia	Democracy	Switzerland	Democracy
Bosnia & Herzegovina	Hybrid	Guyana	Democracy	Nauru	Democracy	Syria	Authoritarian
Botswana	Democracy	Haiti	Authoritarian	Nepal	Hybrid	Tajikistan	Authoritarian
Brazil	Democracy	Honduras	Hybrid	Netherlands	Democracy	Tanzania	Hybrid
Brunei Darussalam	Authoritarian	Hungary	Democracy	New Zealand	Democracy	Thailand	Authoritarian

Bulgaria	Democracy	Iceland	Democracy	Nicaragua	Authoritarian	Timor-Leste	Democracy
Burkina Faso	Authoritarian	India	Democracy	Niger	Authoritarian	Togo	Authoritarian
Burundi	Authoritarian	Indonesia	Democracy	Nigeria	Hybrid	Tonga	Hybrid
Cambodia	Authoritarian	Iran	Authoritarian	Norway	Democracy	Trinidad and Tobago	Democracy
Cameroon	Authoritarian	Iraq	Authoritarian	Oman	Authoritarian	Tunisia	Hybrid
Canada	Democracy	Ireland	Democracy	Pakistan	Hybrid	Turkey	Hybrid
Cape Verde	Democracy	Israel	Democracy	Palau	Democracy	Turkmenistan	Authoritarian
Central African Republic	Authoritarian	Italy	Democracy	Panama	Democracy	Tuvalu	Democracy
Chad	Authoritarian	Jamaica	Democracy	Papua New Guinea	Democracy	Uganda	Hybrid
Chile	Democracy	Japan	Democracy	Paraguay	Hybrid	Ukraine	Hybrid
China	Authoritarian	Jordan	Authoritarian	Peru	Democracy	United Arab Emirates	Authoritarian
Colombia	Democracy	Kazakhstan	Authoritarian	Philippines	Democracy	United Kingdom	Democracy
Comoros	Authoritarian	Kenya	Hybrid	Poland	Democracy	United States	Democracy
Costa Rica	Democracy	Kiribati	Democracy	Portugal	Democracy	Uruguay	Democracy
Cote d'Ivoire	Hybrid	Kuwait	Authoritarian	Qatar	Authoritarian	Uzbekistan	Authoritarian
Croatia	Democracy	Kyrgyzstan	Authoritarian	Republic of Congo	Authoritarian	Vanuatu	Democracy
Cuba	Authoritarian	Laos	Authoritarian	Republic of Korea	Democracy	Venezuela	Authoritarian
Cyprus	Democracy	Latvia	Democracy	Romania	Democracy	Viet Nam	Authoritarian
Czechia	Democracy	Lebanon	Authoritarian	Russian Federation	Authoritarian	Yemen	Authoritarian
D.R. of Congo	Authoritarian	Lesotho	Democracy	Rwanda	Authoritarian	Zambia	Hybrid
Denmark	Democracy	Liberia	Hybrid	Samoa	Democracy	Zimbabwe	Authoritarian
Djibouti	Authoritarian	Libya	Authoritarian	San Marino	Democracy		
Dominica	Democracy	Liechtenstein	Democracy	Sao Tome & Principe	Democracy		
Dominican Republic	Democracy	Lithuania	Democracy	Saudi Arabia	Authoritarian		

Appendix 3. Table of absolute values, including the hybrid regime

UPR	State under Review	Democracy				Authoritarian				Hybrid			
Recommending state	Action Category	Supported	Noted	Total	Acceptance %	Supported	Noted	Total	Acceptance %	Supported	Noted	Total	Acceptance %
Democracy	1	2085	125	2210	94.34%	1669	144	1813	92.06%	926	59	985	94.01%
	2	6584	1018	7602	86.60%	5348	1648	6996	76.44%	3461	495	3956	87.49%
	3	5256	3639	8895	59.09%	4318	5801	10119	42.67%	2683	1815	4498	59.65%
Authoritarian	1	1494	41	1535	97.33%	3599	55	3654	98.49%	1301	7	1308	99.46%
	2	2321	340	2661	87.22%	2487	218	2705	91.94%	1254	57	1311	95.65%
	3	1053	795	1848	56.98%	1062	409	1471	72.20%	495	163	658	75.23%
Hybrid	1	770	47	817	94.28%	1168	21	1189	98.23%	560	21	581	96.39%
	2	1437	227	1664	86.36%	1267	160	1427	88.79%	657	58	715	91.89%
	3	1069	805	1874	57.04%	840	725	1565	53.67%	482	334	816	59.07%
Total		22069	7037	29106	75.81%	21758	9181	30939	70.33%	11819	3009	14828	79.71%