Migration and demographic change in Albania

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Résumé

Afin d'appréhender au mieux les transformations dans la structure et la géographie de la population lors de la phase finale de la transition démographique, cette thèse traite des interactions entre les différentes composantes du changement démographique, et ce tout particulièrement dans les régions urbaines. La migration est susceptible de jouer un rôle important à ce stade, non seulement en raison de la faible croissance naturelle, mais également en raison d'une hausse probable du taux de migration, notamment lorsque la majorité de la population se situe aux jeunes âges actifs. En ce sens, le cas de l'Albanie revêt un intérêt prépondérant car elle a connu une transition de la fécondité tardive, ainsi qu'une rapide urbanisation et d'importants flux migratoires internationaux depuis la fin du régime communiste. En se basant sur des données de recensements et d'enquêtes, l'analyse porte sur les tendances et les interactions entre la migration rural-urbaine et internationale d'une part et la fécondité d'autre part, afin de démontrer de quelle manière celles-ci ont affecté la transition démographique et celle de la mobilité. Cette thèse est composée de cinq articles.

Le premier article traite de la sélection et de la diffusion de la migration interne et internationale à travers la hiérarchie urbaine depuis 1990 de manière à tester l'hypothèse de la transition de la mobilité. La géographie de la migration indique une émigration prépondérante ainsi qu'un exode rural dirigé vers la capitale Tirana. L'essor d'importants mouvements des campagnes vers les villes a été immédiat, en dépit de la crise politique et économique dans les années 1990. Si la migration internationale a été initiée dans les principales agglomérations urbaines ainsi que dans les zones rurales frontalières, elle s'est ensuite diffusée selon la hiérarchie urbaine. Durant ces dernières années, marquées par un développement économique, la migration interne a étonnement baissé, alors que celle internationale n'a pas faiblit – en particulier parmi les femmes. Cette contradiction apparente avec l'hypothèse de la transition de la mobilité s'explique par les interrelations entre les migrations internes et internationales, soit des mouvements migratoires par étapes, les migrations de retours dans les villes principales, ainsi que la substitution dans le temps de l'émigration internationale à celle urbaine.

Dans le second article, nous examinons si la transition de la fécondité albanaise depuis 1989 est conforme au modèle de réponse bi-phasique observé dans les pays anciennement socialistes – marqué par une limitation des naissances induite par la crise, suivie par un report des naissances durant la période de redressement économique et politique. Le calendrier et les modalités des changements de comportement en matière de mariage et de la fécondité par parité confirment généralement le modèle. Les différences de comportements entre groupes socioéconomiques ainsi que leurs tendances, soulignent le rôle majeur de la crise et des changements structurels, Aucun signe précurseur de la seconde transition démographique n'a été observé. Le cas de l'Albanie montre également la persistance de modèles traditionnels familiaux durant la crise ainsi que plus récemment au sein de certaines sous-populations.

En analysant l'effet de l'exode rural des femmes sur leurs comportements familiaux, le troisième article traite de l'apparente association au niveau macro-démographique entre l'urbanisation et la chute de la fécondité en Albanie depuis 1989. Le mariage et la fécondité des non-migrantes sont comparés à ceux des migrantes ainsi que de leurs enfants au cours de leur parcours migratoire. La migration féminine des

campagnes est étroitement liée à un mariage précoce et la socialisation rurale soutient la fécondité des migrantes au lieu de destination. Ainsi, ces résistances parmi les migrantes internes face aux transformations récentes de la famille albanaise ont retardé la transition de la fécondité.

Nous examinons dans le quatrième article si la fécondité albanaise est influencée par l'exposition indirecte des femmes au phénomène migratoire et ce dans un contexte où l'exposition directe au sein des ménages des émigrants diminue avec les réunifications familiales et les migrations en chaines. Les effets structurels, économiques et sociaux de la migration dans les ménages d'origine ont peu d'impact. Le mariage a été retardé et la fécondité réduite en raison des transformations du contexte social plus large, comme en témoigne l'importance des réseaux locaux d'émigrants et de l'augmentation des aspirations des femmes, induites par la perception des avantages et des perspectives de la migration dans la société en générale. Les effets de la migration sur la transition de la fécondité semblent ainsi être durables et indépendants des fluctuations des flux migratoires et de leurs retombées économiques.

Dans le dernier article, nous tentons de résoudre l'opposition entre la théorie de la transition urbaine, qui prédit un rôle majeur pour les migrations dans les phases précoces et tardives de la croissance urbaine, et les preuves empiriques dans les pays en voie de développement mettant en évidence la prédominance de la croissance naturelle. Nous montrons que la contribution dominante de la composante naturelle dans la croissance urbaine de l'Albanie d'après-guerre a été induite par une immigration limitée des campagnes, due aux restrictions migratoires pour les campagnes sous le régime communiste ainsi qu'à la redirection des migrants ruraux vers l'étranger par la suite. Les migrants internes ont également soutenu le taux de natalité en zone urbaine à travers le gonflement des cohortes en âge de reproduction ainsi que le retardement de la transition de la fécondité. Nous concluons donc que la migration a effectivement dominé la croissance urbaine au début et dans la période récente et que la migration rurale-urbaine a retardé le processus de vieillissement démographique dans les villes d'Albanie.

Les résultats de cette thèse prouvent l'importance des dynamiques migratoires tant internes qu'internationales pour comprendre la géographie de la population. L'urbanisation n'a pas résulté uniquement de l'immigration dans les villes, mais aussi de la baisse de la population rurale en raison de l'important exode rural, dont une part significative a court-circuité les villes du pays, pour alimenter la croissance urbaine dans les pays plus développés. Ces résultats soulignent le rôle des crises politiques et économiques dans la redirection des migrants vers l'étranger à court terme, façonnant ainsi le cours de la transition de la mobilité à long terme en raison des effets de réseaux – particulièrement si les pays d'origine et de destination sont proche géographiquement. L'étude confirme également le rôle prédominant de la migration dans la transition de la fécondité à travers les transformations du contexte social plus large, plutôt qu'à travers son impact sur le statut de la femme dans les familles migrantes ou les ménages d'émigrés. Les stratégies migratoires se sont appuyées sur des systèmes familiaux patriarcaux, ce qui a eu pour effet de les renforcer, soulignant ainsi l'importance des facteurs culturels dans le changement démographique et les interactions entre comportements au sein des ménages.

Cette thèse démontre également l'importance des mouvements internationaux et des interactions entre migration et fécondité dans la compréhension de la croissance urbaine dans les pays en voie de développement. Si la population urbaine albanaise

a connu une émigration et une très faible fécondité, elle a jusqu'à présent aussi bénéficié du gonflement des cohortes en âges d'activité économique ainsi que d'un soutien à la croissance naturelle grâce à l'immigration des campagnes. Cependant, la persistance des flux internationaux pourrait annihiler la future fenêtre d'opportunité démographique pour le développement du pays.

Abstract

This study of interactions between components of population change aims to increase understanding of the transformations in population structures and geography in the completion phase of demographic transition, with particular emphasis on urban areas. At this stage, migration is likely to have important consequences for demographic and socioeconomic change, not only because of the low level of natural increase, but also because of a potential increase in the rate of movements when the majority of population is of a young working age. We study the case of Albania, a former socialist country which experienced a late fertility transition, as well as a rapid urbanisation and large-scale international migration since the end of communist rule. After decades of isolation from the outside world and migration control, migration has been a major source of livelihood since 1990. Using census and survey data, we analyse trends and interactions in rural-to-urban and international movements and fertility, and investigate how these have shaped the country's demographic and mobility transition. The thesis is composed of five papers.

In the first paper, we analyse the selection and diffusion of internal and international migrations across the urban hierarchy since 1990, to test the hypothesis of a mobility transition. The geography of population mobility evinces a dominant emigration alongside a rural exodus focussed on the capital, Tirana. The onset of rural-to-urban movements was immediate and large scale, despite the political and economic crisis in the 1990s. International migration started in the main urban agglomerations and well-located rural areas, and gradually diffused down the urban hierarchy over time. During the recent period of economic development, internal migration surprisingly declined, whereas international outflows did not level off – especially among women. This incongruence with the hypothesis of a mobility transition is explained by the interrelationships between internal and international migrations, which include step-wise residence trajectories, returns to the main cities, as well as a later substitution of international for internal movements.

In the second paper, we examine whether Albania's post-1989 fertility transition was congruent with the dominant model observed in other post-communist countries characterised by a limitation of marital fertility and a strong postponement of the onset of motherhood. The trends and patterns of changes in marriage and parity-specific fertility generally adhere to the model. Socioeconomic differentials and trends are consistent with a major role for the crisis and structural change, whereas signs of the onset of the second demographic transition have yet to appear. The Albanian case also highlights the enduring importance of traditional models of family formation during the crisis, as well as among specific subpopulations more recently.

In the third paper, we examine the apparent association between Albania's post-communist urbanisation and fertility decline through an analysis of the impact of women's rural exodus on their family behaviours. We compare marriage and fertility patterns of non-migrants with that of migrants and their descendants over the residential trajectory. Women's migration was strongly interdependent with early marriage, and rural socialisation sustained marital fertility at destination. These resistances among internal migrants to the recent transformations of the Albanian family in fact delayed the fertility transition.

In the fourth paper, we question whether Albanian fertility is influenced by women's indirect exposure to emigration, because direct exposure within sending-households

is decreasing with family reunifications and chain migrations of kin. Structural, economic and social effects of migration in sending households played a limited role. Marriages were postponed and fertility was reduced because of the transformation of the larger social context, as indicated by the importance of community migrant networks. Women's increased aspirations, which were induced by the perception of the prospects and benefits of migration in the society at large, also played an important role. The effects of emigration on the fertility transition seem therefore to be sustainable and independent of periodic fluctuations in population flows and their associated economic benefits.

In the last paper, we aim to resolve the discrepancy between urban transition theory, which predicts a major role for migration in the early and late phases of urban growth, and empirical evidence in developing countries highlighting the predominance of natural increase. We show that the dominant contribution of natural increase in post-war Albania was induced by a limited urban in-migration; this was due to the communist era's restrictions on leaving the countryside and, thereafter, to the redirection abroad of rural out-migrants along with urban emigration. Rural-to-urban migrants also indirectly sustained the urban crude birth rate because they swelled cohorts of reproductive age and delayed the fertility transition. We conclude that population mobility did indeed dominate urban growth in the early and also the recent period, and that rural-to-urban migration has postponed the demographic ageing in cities.

The results of this thesis point to the importance of considering the dynamics of both internal and international migration, to increase understanding of the evolutions of population geography. Urbanisation was not only driven by urban in-migration. Populations in the countryside were depleted by the rural exodus, but a significant share bypassed domestic cities so that potential urban growth was forgone in favour of more developed countries. Albania highlights the role of political and economic crises in redirecting migrants abroad in the short-run, which has long-term implications on the course of mobility transition through cumulative causation – particularly when the sending and destination countries are geographically proximate to each other. The study also confirmed a role for migration in the fertility transition through the transformation of the larger social context rather than through the impact on women's status in migrant (sending) families. As migration rested on family systems, the results underscore the role of culture in demographic behaviours and interactions at the household level.

The thesis also demonstrates the importance of international movements and the interactions between migration and fertility for an increased understanding of urban demographic change. Albania's urban population engaged in emigration and lowest-low fertility, but has so far benefited from swelled working age cohorts and inflated levels of natural increase because of in-migration. However the unabated trend in the international outflow may relocate outside the country the window of demographic opportunity for development in the future.

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Introduction

Motivation and research questions

Demographic change has major implications for social and economic development, and vice-versa. The historical control of diseases and the transformation of economic and social relations during the process of modernisation led to a sequenced decline in the death and birth rates worldwide, which became known as the first demographic transition (Davis 1945; Notestein 1945; Landry 1982). Unprecedented population growth during this transitional period, when the numbers of births strongly exceeded that of deaths, exacerbated pressure on economic and social structures due to the dominance in the population of dependent children rather than adults of working ages (i.e. a children's bulge). This motivated individuals to limit marriages and reduce the number of births. In the late transitional and immediate post-transitional phases, when the number of children is shrinking while that of older people is (still) small, the children bulge moves to adult ages, becoming a youth bulge. As the majority of the population is of working age, resources can be channelled into productive activities and the development of new technologies, human capital and social security schemes, as well as to capitalise for the future (Coale and Hoover 1958; Bloom and Williamson 1998). This low demographic dependency constitutes a temporary window of opportunity for social and economic development.

Besides adaptation in fertility behaviours, people also move from rural to urban areas in search of new work opportunities, which sustains the urban-based development of industry and services (Davis 1963; Chesnais 1986). Declining fertility also increases women's time off from childrearing, leading to more equal gender roles in society. Population aging and urbanisation enlarges a society's adult power base, which is related to the rise in democratic institutions (Dyson 2001). Thus, the first demographic transition constitutes both a driver and an integral part of modern development.

However, when the youth bulge reaches retirement ages and fertility remains low in the post-transitional phase, population aging accelerates. The associated costs of social support increase again in the context of a working-age population which is shrinking. At this stage, demographic stabilisation usually rests on immigration from other countries.

Despite the fact that migration particularly concerns people at working-ages, the framework linking the first demographic transition to development explicitly does not account for this third component of demographic change. Although migration has shaped human societies throughout history – from early transhumance, wars, and colonial movements to modern patterns of mobility linked to labor, family, and leisure activities – its role in the demographic transition remains underappreciated (Chesnais 1986; Dyson 2001; Oris 2003; Coleman 2006). This is paradoxical in the current era of globalisation. International networks of information, transport infrastructure and economic activities facilitate geographic mobility. Countries which are classified as economically less developed by the United Nations are currently completing the first demographic transition (or already face post-transitional youth bulges), whereas more developed countries have reached the advanced post-transitional phases that imply a labour shortage. The role of migration in international demography and development therefore deserves increasing attention.

A demographic focus on migration is justified by its increasing importance around the world. The number of international migrants rose from 154 to 232 million between 1990 and 2013 (United Nations 2013). Although its share in the world population remained stable (3.5%) because of sustained demographic growth in the post-war period, its impact is important in origin and destination countries. Migration within national borders must have been important as well, especially from rural to urban areas, as evinced by the sharp increase in the proportion of urban residents in less developed countries, from 34% in 1990 to 48% in 2010 (United Nations 2012). UNDP (2009) indeed reported a three-times-higher worldwide estimate of internal, as opposed to international, migrants (hereafter also referred to as out-/in-migration and emigration/immigration, respectively).

Since an important motive for changing place of residence is to stabilise or increase living standards, migrants usually move from economically less to more developed places. The increase in migration flows has therefore motivated a policy emphasis on their socioeconomic consequences. In sending regions, selective emigration relieves demographic pressure on saturated labour markets. Yet it also drains human capital, which benefits destination regions, where labour is often scarce.

This spatial redistribution of populations within a given country is usually considered as a companion (if not the source) of modern economic development. This is especially the case when the pattern involves rural-to-urban movements that support the sectoral shift from an agricultural to an urban-based industry and services economy (Todaro 1980). The spatial concentration of the labour force and of capital in cities indeed enables the development of large-scale production, urban infrastructure, and social services, as well as technological innovations (Boserup 1981). The development process is further sustained through economies of scale and agglomeration, as well as by knowledge spillovers arising from the vertical integration, spatial proximity, and interaction of individual enterprises in a dense production sector (Henderson et al. 2001; Catin and Van Huffel 2003; Bank 2009). Although extensive rural-to-urban movements also put pressure on urban labour markets, and are often accompanied by the growth of slums in developing countries, these negative effects of urbanisation could be leveraged by adequate urban governance and planning (Bilsborrow 1998; Satterthwaite 2007).

The international redistribution of population, by contrast, is often seen as hampering sending countries' development, even if recent debates recognise the potential of emigration in the contemporary context of globalisation. Migration extends economic and social relations throughout space, as the sending society maintains contacts with family and community members who have gone elsewhere. Migrants often engage in transnational living through their continued participation in economic and political activities back home, which influences processes of socioeconomic and cultural change (Levitt 1998; Nyberg-Sorensen et al. 2002; Guarnizo 2003; UNDP 2009). Transformations in the family, work, and political sphere may be initiated or hastened by way of the return of migrants, their remittances (i.e. money transfers), and the new ideas and attitudes that they have adopted abroad.

Yet there has been little integration of this literature linking population mobility and socioeconomic change with the paradigm connecting the first demographic transition to development. Although international immigration has been considered a partial solution to counter the shrinkage of working-age populations in more developed countries (United Nations 2001), the demographic impacts of migration in the less developed world have not attracted the same attention. The limited availability and

low quality of migration data may be one reason for this, alongside the historical focus on the completion of the fertility transition in the global South, where demographic growth was above 2% annually between 1950 and 1990 (implying a doubling of populations every 35 years).

A renewed focus on the demographic effects of migration is timely, as less developed countries are currently in the completion phase of their first demographic transition. The impact of population mobility should increase alongside a low (if not negative) balance between births and deaths. Given that migration mainly selects young adults, one may also expect an increasing rate (if not number) of movements during the post-transitional youth bulge. As large cohorts at working ages experience an exceptionally low demographic dependency of children and older people, their mobility potential is high (Fargues 2011). Dynamics in migration may therefore determine the extent to which demographic potential for development can be exploited in origin countries rather than being redirected to more developed countries. Alternatively, when a country's youth bulge is not met by a commensurate creation of jobs, emigration may relieve saturated labour markets. But in either case, the departure of young adults also drains potential parents (i.e. reproductive potential) from the sending society, thereby shaping the future geography of demographic conditions for development. This neglect of the impact of migration particularly hampers our understanding of the demographic dynamics in the urban areas of less developed countries, where the majority of the world population is currently concentrated and where the bulk of future increases are expected (United Nations 2012).

From this description there emerges an increased need for monitoring migration and its demographic impacts in less developed countries and their urban areas, which constitute the focus of this thesis. We adopt a sending country perspective and analyse how rural-to-urban and international migrations interact to redistribute populations within and across national borders, and how these movements affect spatial differences in reproductive dynamics. This research should result in improved understanding of demographics that are relevant for economic and social development and planning in less developed countries.

Our first focus on the direct demographic impact of both rural-to-urban *and* international movements aims to resolve a longstanding paradox in migration research: the independent analysis of each flow. This has concealed the interrelationships of the social processes underlying internal and international moves, as well as the commonalities in their root causes, such as poverty, aspirations for higher living standards, family motives, etc. Migration research is also characterised by a national bias. On the one hand, the international perspective disregards differences in emigration or immigration at the subnational level, despite the fact that these are influenced by and shape economic geographies through the spatial redistribution of the labour force and of human and financial capital. Assessing the selection of international migrants across the urban hierarchy would be particularly useful for our understanding of urbanisation and contemporary urban growth. On the other hand, scholars of internal migration strongly emphasise the nationally differentiated geography of opportunities, but assume a closed country. As state borders are blurred and more easily surmountable in a globalised world, this national bias in internal and international migration research is increasingly questionable. What is more, the separate development of both these research traditions has

prevented an integrated assessment of the demographic, geographic, and socioeconomic impact of population mobility.

To account for the migration component in the population-development paradigm, we build on the earlier work of Davis (1963), Zelinsky (1971), and Skeldon (1990), among others, who were the most prominent pioneers of the integration of our understanding of different flows. Migration is seen as an integral part of an individual *and/or* family living project at origin or destination. We consider domestic and foreign destinations within a continuous hierarchy of opportunities, assuming that decisions to move within a given country cannot be dissociated from decisions to leave it, and vice versa. This perspective should be particularly fruitful in increasing our understanding of the process of urbanisation and urban growth in less developed countries, where the role of international migration has been overlooked so far.

The second focus of this thesis centres on the indirect effects of migration on natural population growth — more specifically on birth rates. The aim is to develop an integrated understanding of migration as an endogenous component of population change which interacts with fertility. In an intermediate to low fertility setting, the spatial redistribution of reproductive potential strongly determines demographic trends. Like the direct effect of migration, this indirect role has been underappreciated so far in demographic theory, despite the implicit recognition of the socioeconomic consequences of population mobility in the theoretical foundations of the field.

The Malthusian perspective emphasises a role for out-migration as a security valve for population pressure on scarce resources (Malthus 1826). Migration is viewed as a consequence of the high natural growth that prevents people from taking advantage of new opportunities to maintain or increase living standards (Davis 1963). Yet cross-country assessments of such demographic pressures for international migration have been inconclusive — although they tend to confirm a positive association among emigration countries (Chesnais 1986; Zlotnik 2004; Kritz 2001). Rural-to-urban migration, by contrast, is clearly considered to be driven by the demographic transition (Dyson 2011; Chesnais 1986). Friedlander (1969) therefore argued that the relief of demographic pressure by migration postponed the adaptation in fertility that was deemed necessary to ensure long-term sustainability. This perspective on the role of migration in demographic change eliminates the prospect of a demographic window of opportunity.

Demographic transition theory also stresses the importance of the contextual effects of urbanisation in the transformations of social structures, cost-benefit calculus, and social norms, which all trigger fertility decline (Notestein 1945; Tabutin 2000). The sanitary and technological innovations that led to the onset of mortality decline and, thus, of the first demographic transition emerged in cities as well (Reher 2001). However, the role played in these processes by the population dynamics that bring about urbanisation – internal and international migrations – have remained underappreciated. Davis (1963) recognized the multiplicity of demographic responses to population pressure and modernisation — including changes in marriage, fertility and migratory behaviours, whereas Zelinsky (1971) assumed a parallel evolution in out-migration and natural population growth during the first demographic transition. But the interactions between these components of population change have not been specifically addressed, despite the fact that they constitute an (implicit) argument in the first demographic transition theory. The present thesis aims to increase knowledge in this field.

The strong age-selectivity of migration transforms the population's age-sex structure, which indirectly affects marriage and birth rates. Male emigration reduces the number of potential spouses available to single women, whereas the departure of women depresses the total number of children born. As developing countries have initiated their fertility transition since the 1960s, demographers have also been increasingly interested in the rural-to-urban migrants' adaptation of childbearing to the urban living context, where fertility standards are lower. Rural-to-urban migration has been seen as a process which speeds up national fertility transitions (Martine 1972; Goldstein and Goldstein 1981; Brockerhoff 1998). We will question the relevance of this perspective in the completion phase of the first demographic transition.

International migration, by contrast, was attributed a significant role in the historical diffusion of the first demographic transition from Europe across the world. Colonisation and international trade were effective in introducing public health and new labor technologies in pre-transitional settings, thereby triggering a mortality decline and, to a lesser extent, a fertility decline (Davis 1945; Chesnais 1986; Reher 2004). This diffusion of the first demographic transition also led to the onset of population urbanisation across the world (Fox 2011).

However, contemporary international migration streams are inversed — from countries that are less to those that are more advanced in terms of the first demographic transition. This has raised new questions related to the interactions of international migration and fertility. Fargues (2006) showed convincing evidence that the social and economic consequences of contemporary emigration from less developed countries has accelerated the pace of their fertility transition by altering the reproductive context and thus alleviating global population pressure. Yet we still know little about the channels of these influences, which could involve the migrants' spouses, their families, and communities as much as the sending society at large.

From a receiving countries' perspective, Coleman (2006) has argued that immigrants will not only prevent population decline, but that their higher fertility may lead them to become the majority group in the future. We will show that this perspective may be increasingly relevant today for urban areas in less developed countries as well.

To account for the multifaceted impacts of population mobility in sending countries, we rely not only on demographic concepts (e.g., sex, age or duration of exposure to migration or fertility), but also on theoretical insights into the wider consequences of migration, as developed in geography, sociology, and economics. Migration is a human behaviour determined by existential, social and psychological needs, and strongly dependent on period circumstances. The integration of different theories from different fields has therefore emerged as the most fruitful approach with which to understand its onset and perpetuation (Massey et al. 1993). The demographic consequences of migration should be addressed accordingly.

Albania as a case study

In this thesis, we aim to increase understanding of the demographic impact of different types of migration in the completion phase of demographic transition through an investigation of the case of Albania. Albania is a small country of 28,748 square kilometres located on the Adriatic Sea within Europe, bordering Italy and Greece (in the West and South) and Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia (in the North and East). As will be highlighted throughout the papers constituting this thesis, this former communist country is a particularly interesting setting for our purpose for

several reasons. Albania experienced a recent and fast completion of the first demographic transition between the 1950s and the 2000s — similar to that of developing countries (Chesnais 1986; Reher 2004). With demographic growth above 2% annually in the post-war period, population pressure on the socioeconomic system was significant.

Population movements were strictly controlled by the totalitarian communist regime from the 1960s to the 1980s, but the onset of the transition to democracy and a market economy led to large-scale migrations. Large numbers of departures abroad were accompanied by a sharp increase in urbanisation, which was again comparable to experiences in less developed countries (Hamilton et al. 2005). The absence of population mobility under communist rule and its rapid catch-up thereafter provide a quasi-laboratory setting in which to appreciate not only socioeconomic but also demographic impacts (King 2005).

Albania's cultural legacy is clearly European, marked by influences ranging from the ancient Roman and Greek Empires, the Catholic Church, as well as the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empire and Italian colonisation. During the communist era, when diplomatic relations were limited to the USSR and China before being completely interrupted, the country also experienced major advances in social development, such as universal education and health care. Yet because of its international isolation from the 1960s to the 1980s, Albania inherited an economic position similar to that of less developed countries. GDP per capita was 2,850 dollars in 1990 (at current parity purchasing power), which represented less than a fifth when compared to its neighbouring countries, Italy and Greece. Albania was by far the least developed country in Central and Eastern Europe and ranked among the lower tertile worldwide – although we have to acknowledge that official statistics hide the substantial contributions of the informal economy.

The geographical position of Albania within Europe not only increased the accessibility of attractive migrant destinations after the fall of communist rule, but also exposed the society starkly to resumed international influences such as capitalism, European lifestyles, and new family models. The emergence of low fertility patterns and the role of migration in this process are, therefore, particularly interesting to analyse in Albania.

Moreover, Albania has experienced two contrasting socioeconomic contexts since 1989. Social upheavals and economic crises characterised the 1990s, whereas the 2000s were marked by political consolidation and high levels of economic growth. As less developed countries experienced similar discontinuous patterns of socioeconomic change, Albania is an interesting setting in which to analyse demographic responses to contextual changes — despite its particular political history.

The main questions raised in this analysis of Albanian demography are how rural-to-urban and international migration streams evolved and interacted with each other, and how they affected fertility and demographic change in the completion phase of first demographic transition. The study of demographic interactions is conducted with reference to the changing socioeconomic and cultural context. Demographic behaviours are investigated in a life course perspective, which is defined by parallel sequences of age-graded events and transitions – such as the birth of a child or the change in place of residence. These sequences of an individual life course involving different domains are interlinked with each other, with others' life courses, and are

embedded in social institutions, ranging from the family to the nation state and the international arena (Elder 1994, 2001). In particular, we will study how domestic and international residence trajectories are interrelated at the individual, family and community level. We are also interested in the interactions between these migratory careers and individuals' reproductive histories, composed of marriage and family enlargements. The role of social institutions and the macro-context will not be neglected, as they define the morality and the period-specific sets of opportunities and constraints affecting individual behaviours.

The remainder of this introduction briefly documents Albania's demographic context since World War II and the post-communist trends in migration at the national level, in order to situate the country in an international perspective. To increase our understanding of the evolution in population mobility since 1990, we then assess whether internal migration was a rural exodus, whether international migration differed across the urban hierarchy, and how these processes were interrelated over time (chapter 1). Gender differences in destination-specific migration are also addressed, as they determine the spatial redistribution of reproductive potential. To complete the exposition of the context in which interactions between migration and fertility are analysed, we document Albania's last phase of fertility transition (chapter 2). We assess the underlying changes in marriage and fertility behaviour with reference to the experiences of other post-communist countries. We then investigate how the rural exodus and international emigration influenced these transformations of reproductive behaviours at the individual, family, and community level (chapter 3 and 4). Enriched by this understanding of demographic interactions, we then move back to the macro level, disaggregated according to urban and rural place of residence, to assess the demographic process leading to Albania's transformation from a mainly rural to a predominantly urban society (chapter 5). This most notably arises from the interplay of different components of population change in a geographic system of migrations, with major consequences for socioeconomic development.

Given the transformations in the Albanian statistical infrastructure since 1990, current demographic data are either not available (as in the case of migration), or are affected by under-registration and incompleteness (as in the case of births and deaths), or limited in terms of availability of information. We therefore mobilise census and survey data. Assessments of their internal consistency, as well as comparisons with external sources of information, are reported in the Appendix data assessment. We conclude that the completeness and representativeness of these data are good. Although retrospective estimates of migration and fertility are affected by selection biases that are related to the large-scale emigration before the date of interview, the surveys' response rates are very high, and the quality of the declarations of age and date of occurrence of demographic events is not problematic.

Consequently, the description of population change relies mainly on indirect techniques of demographic estimation. To explain reproductive and migratory behaviours, the analytical part mobilises longitudinal and multivariate statistical models. We adopt a longitudinal approach of the life course to ascertain a causal inference between socioeconomic and demographic determinants, on the one side, and the demographic events that we aim to explain, on the other side. This approach should also clarify the sequence of interactions between events of interest. Rather than analysing people's migratory and fertility trajectory in a holistic approach, we decompose demographic behaviour into successive transitions, such as the first migration and parity-specific steps in the process of family formation (e.g., marriage,

transitions to the first and subsequent births). This is not only important in order to understand the heterogeneity in response to the post-communist crisis (Agadjanian 1999), but also to situate the effects of socioeconomic change and demographic interactions with reference to the stage attained in the individual's life course in order to account for specific situational constraints, needs, and aspirations.

The use of different variables indexing different determinants of a demographic event aims to control for their confounding effects. For example, fertility may be low in urban areas not because of the higher costs of living, but because of the higher educational endowment of the population, which also tends to decrease the level of fertility. Accounting for the same determinants at different levels of social organisation, by contrast, aims to highlight competing channels of influences which arise from different modalities of exposure to these determinants. Distinguishing the couple or family levels from the individual and community level is crucial because the former constitute the main locus of fertility and migratory decision-making, while the latter two determine, respectively, the incentives of behaviour and the socioeconomic resources available to act.

The next subsections of this introduction briefly outline the overall demographic and migration context in Albania based on censuses, and introduce the different papers in more detail.

Albania's post-war demographic history and population mobility since 1989

Although located on the border of the European Union, Albania experienced a late onset but rapid pace of demographic transition. Mortality started to decline in the 1930s, whereas fertility remained above six children per women until the 1960s. The country, therefore, evinced among the highest growth rates in post-war Europe (above 2% annually), leading to an increase from 1.2 million residents in 1950 to a peak of 3.2 in 1989 (Figure 1). Despite a young age structure, the population declined thereafter to 3.1 million in 2001 and 2.8 in 2011, which means an annual decrease of -0.3% and -0.8%, respectively. The main reasons for this depopulation are declining fertility and rising emigration, which are the topics of this thesis.

FIGURE 1. TOTAL POPULATION NUMBERS AND GROWTH RATE (IN %) IN ALBANIA, 1923–2011



Sources: Albanian population censuses.

Behavioural changes in fertility and migration have strongly affected the age and sex structure of the Albanian population. The irregular shape of the age-sex pyramid is a sign of how past demographic behaviour affected the size of the successive birth cohorts surviving within Albania (which are plotted in Figure 2 according to sex and age attained in 1989, 2001, and 2011). The marked hollow (or indentation) in the middle of the population pyramid in 2001 and, particularly, in 2011 testifies to the high emigration of young adults between the ages of 20 and 39. Approximately half of these generations, as observed at child age in 1989, moved abroad. This was accompanied in both census years by smaller numbers of children, thereby narrowing the base of the population pyramid. Cohorts of childbearing age (20–44 years) were not only depleted, but also had lower fertility. The role of migration in this decline in natural increase will be investigated in the papers.

In 2001, women clearly outnumbered men in Albania because emigration was initiated by the latter in the 1990s. The number of men and women was more balanced in 2011, indicating an increasing participation of women in the migratory phenomenon. There was actually an overrepresentation of men among the population aged 20–29 (111 men for 100 women), which means that young women in particular engaged in emigration.

One also discerns an increasing overrepresentation of boys relative to girls among young children. This can be related to the increase in the sex-ratio at birth since Albanian fertility declined to low levels. There were 110 male for 100 female births in 2010 (against a natural ratio of 104 to 106), which ranks among the highest levels in Europe and the world. It has been related to son-preferred childbearing in a context where traces of patriarchy persisted in the society and affected women's reproductive behaviour (UNFPA 2012; Lerch 2013).

FIGURE 2. AGE AND SEX STRUCTURE OF THE ALBANIAN POPULATION, 1989, 2001, 2011.



Source: Census 1989, 2001, and 2011.

The emigration of young adults, lower fertility, and lower mortality since 1989 have increased the relative weight of older cohorts in the total population, leading to a process of demographic aging. In 2011, there was approximately one older person for four individuals of working age (i.e., aged 15 to 64), down from six in 2001. Conversely, for one child there are currently three individuals of working age, compared with two in 1989. Albania is experiencing a substitution of old age for young age demographic dependency, although this process is among the least advanced in terms of a regional comparison (Gjonça and Gjonça 2011). The Albanian population remains among the youngest in Europe, with a median age of 33.6 years in 2011, against an EU-27 average above 41 years (Eurostat).

Albania's last stage of the fertility transition is documented in the second paper. There is also an increasing amount of literature on international migration, which is synthesised in the first paper. Here we provide updated estimates of the numbers of migrants and the age-sex patterns of out-flows.

Since there are no reliable statistics on Albanian migration in the country (or abroad), we estimated the numbers indirectly from two successive censuses (1989 and 2001, 2001 and 2011) by using the life-table survival method[1]. The number of individuals who left Albania during the 1990s was at least 600,000, involving 1.5 times more men than women. In the subsequent decade, more than 500,000 individuals emigrated and women were as numerous as men. Thus, the male outflow did not level off, and women experienced an increase after 2001, leading to a convergence with the men's

[1] Populations are forward-projected under the hypothesis of closed national borders and compared with the actual number of residents at the second Census (intercensal immigrants are not considered; see also Appendix data assessment).

level. As Albania's population has declined since 1989, these numbers represent slightly less than a fifth of the number of residents that would have been observed in 2001 and in 2011, had the borders remained closed during the respective preceding decades.

Albanian emigration was among the highest worldwide, with an annual net migration rate of -1.8% during the 1990s and 2000s (United Nations 2011)[2]. In comparison, the annual crude rate of natural increase was on average 1.4% in the 1990s and 0.4% in the 2000s, against 2% at the end of the communist period. Emigration was clearly the main factor of population change at the national level since the fall of communism.

Internal migration was high as well. The number of people who changed prefecture or municipality of residence in the 1990s was more than 250,000 and 410,000, respectively, against 230,000 and 290,000 in the 2000s. To situate Albania worldwide, in terms of the intensity of internal migration, we used Courgeau's measure *k* (1973), which eliminates a confounding effect in international comparison due to differences in national zonings[3]. The measure indicates the extent to which the intensity of migration increases alongside the consideration of ever more detailed disaggregations of national space (i.e. the progressive inclusion of ever more short-distance movements).

Courgeau's *k* in Albania is 1.7 for the 1990s, which exceeds all available estimates for 19 countries around the world (Bell and Muhidin 2009; the range was 0.34 to 1.5)[4]. Although the Albanian *k* declined in the last decade to 1.1, it remains high. Thus, Albanian internal and international migration was very high in worldwide comparative terms, with the latter flow clearly outbalancing the former in the 2000s.

The age profile has also changed significantly over the last two decades. Figure 3 presents annual age-specific rates of emigration by sex (obtained using the life-table survival method, as outlined in the Appendix data assessment, and smoothed using Wilson's (2010) multi-exponential model). During the 1990s, migration was dominated by young adults. But individuals between the ages of 40 and 60 significantly participated in the outflow, as well — women in particular. The post-communist crises had the effect of pushing families abroad. During the 2000s, by contrast, emigration became more selective. It concerned young adults between the ages of 20 and 30 to a greater extent — especially women.

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[2] Although there has been a rise in immigration in the last decade, it has remained comparatively low (5,000 individuals enumerated in 2011 entered Albania in 2001, 36,000 in 2011). The majority was composed of returnees (due to the Italian and Greek crisis in 2008 and 2011), who may emigrate again to other countries.

[3] Courgeau proposed to estimate the slope *k* of the linear equation connecting the migration rates according to different levels of detail in spatial zoning with the log of the squared number of zones. The underlying assumption is that the level of migration in a given country increases linearly with the number of pairs of spatial units considered, which has been confirmed by Bell and Muhidin (2009). The steepness of the increase in intensity of migration according to more and more detailed spatial disaggregations represents the area-adjusted level of internal migration (i.e., net of the effects of zoning).

[4] The number of Albanians who changed prefecture, district, and commune within the 12-year intercensal period was rated to 5-year transition data to ensure comparability by Bell and Muhidin (2009).

Women in fact left Albania at younger ages than men (with an earlier and higher peak in migration rates at age 22, as against the men's peak at 26 to 27 years of age). This could be related to the traditional age gap between spouses who move jointly, as much as to educational or marriage migrations of women.

FIGURE 3: AVERAGE ANNUAL EMIGRATION PROBABILITY BY SEX AND AGE, ALBANIA 1989–2001 AND 2001–2011.

Men



Women



Source: Census 1989, 2001, 2011.

Unlike the case of international migration, it is interesting to note that, in almost all prefectures, internal migration is higher among women than men (not shown). This is mainly explained by higher rates among women in the peak ages of migration. Up to a quarter of women aged 15 to 19 in 2006 resided in another prefecture in 2011 (not shown), which is, again, very high by international standards (see Bell and Muhidin 2009). Men evinced a much flatter age-profile of out-migration, peaking at 5 to 10%. A comparison of the rates of migration between prefectures for the twelve months

preceding the census in 2001 and 2011 confirms an increasing demographic selection of internal migration — more than that of international moves (Figure 4).

FIGURE 4: SEX AND AGE-SPECIFIC INTERNAL PREFECTURAL (SCALED) OUT-MIGRATION RATES, ALBANIA 2000-01 AND 2010-11.

Men



Women



Sources: Census 2001, 2011.

Whereas in 2000–2001, entire families left their regions of origin (i.e., the age-profile was flat), out-migration in 2010–2011 mainly concerned adults under the age of 30 and, particularly, women between 18 and 22. Thus, internal migration increasingly occurs during life stages characterised by major transitions, such as entering the workforce, higher level education, or getting married. This strong demographic selection of female migrants must impact regional levels of reproduction.

Although retrospective survey estimates of migration are plagued by selection biases (as the survey cannot collect information for people who left before the date of interview; see Appendix data assessment), they may provide useful information on

trends in a context where migration statistics are lacking. We therefore computed annual age-standardized (transition) rates of migration for moving 3-years synthetic cohorts aged 15 to 44 (i.e. populations by age, as observed in a given year). These were cumulated over age as in a life table to obtain a synthetic emigration rate (see Appendix data assessment and chapter 2).

With an annual rate of 40% in 1990, less than half of the population would have experienced an internal move under constant age-specific rates in the future (Figure 5). Internal (intercommunal) migration started at a high level in the context of institutional crisis and social upheaval that precipitated the fall of communist rule in 1991, and peaked during Albania's financial crisis of 1996–1998. The rate then declined by 2007. International migration started at lower levels (20%). The rate rose sharply to a first peak of almost 60% during the financial crisis, when it started to outpace internal mobility. This was followed by a slight decline and a second increase initiated in 2003.

If the 1996–1998 peak in emigration was essentially due to an increase in long-term movements (i.e., at least 11 months abroad), the second rise reflects trends in both short- and long-term departures. Temporary emigration (of 3 to 10 months) was lower than long-term emigration from the beginning of the observation period, and experienced a less steep rise in the 1990s, but the trend caught up during the second transition decade.

To investigate whether long-term departures were actually permanent, we also estimated a return rate standardised according to duration of residence for these migrants. Between the institutional and financial crises in 1990–1992 and 1996–1998, respectively, return migration increased at the same pace as long-term emigration—from 0 to 25%. This highlights the numerous back-and-forth movements of illegal migrants at that time. During the financial crisis, however, the return flow stabilised and progressively declined thereafter. Long-term emigrants increasingly settled abroad.

The overall trends in migration confound contrasting patterns by gender (Figure 6). Women mainly moved within Albania. Their rate of intercommunal migration was very high over most of the 1990s (between 50 and 60%) and did not decline before the second transition decade (to slightly less than 40%). Their emigration, by contrast, was initially lower, sharply increased between 1996 and 1999, and stabilised at more than 30%. It is worth mentioning that women left Albania permanently, since return migration overwhelmingly concerned men (not shown). Despite a continuous increase in female temporary movements abroad, the level remains very low.

FIGURE 5: TRENDS IN ANNUAL SYNTHETIC RATES OF INTERNAL, INTERNATIONAL LONG- AND SHORT-TERM EMIGRATION AND RETURN MIGRATION, ALBANIA, 3-YEAR-SYNTHETIC COHORTS 1990–2007.



Source: Albanian Living Standards Measurement Survey 2008.

FIGURE 6: TRENDS IN SEX-SPECIFIC ANNUAL SYNTHETIC RATES OF INTERNAL, INTERNATIONAL LONG- AND SHORT-TERM EMIGRATION AND RETURN MIGRATION, ALBANIA, 3-YEAR-SYNTHETIC COHORTS 1990–2007.



Source: Albanian Living Standards Measurement Survey 2008.

Men, by contrast, moved to the same extent within Albania and abroad in the early 1990s. While their trend in internal migration closely mirrored that of women, though at lower levels, their long-term emigration started to outpace domestic movements in 1997–1999. This was followed by a second peak in emigration after 2003. Temporary male migration started from a low baseline and displayed a similar trend to long-term female emigration until 2002, with a sharp increase during the financial crisis and a second rise in the most recent period. Thus, the bi-modal increase in international migration mainly reflected the trends in men; women experienced a migration plateau during the 2000s.

Later estimates based on preliminary data from the LSMS 2012 are not directly comparable because of less detailed information on migration when compared to the 2008 survey. However, the sex-specific trends of short- and long-term migrations since 2003 confirm a stable pattern, without any levelling off in the most recent period – despite the recent crisis in the main destination countries, Italy and Greece (not shown).

The different papers that constitute this thesis analyse, in greater detail, the underlying social processes of internal and international migrations alongside their interaction with the fertility of Albanian residents.

Content of the papers

The present thesis is constituted of the following five papers:

Lerch, M. (*under review*): "Internal and international migrations across the urban hierarchy in Albania", submitted at *Population Studies*.

Lerch, M. (2013): "Fertility decline during Albania's societal crisis and its subsequent consolidation", published in *European Journal of Population* 29(2), 195-220.

Lerch, M. (2013): "Urbanisation et transition de la fécondité en Albanie", published in *Revue Quetelet* 1(1), p. 41-62.

Lerch, M. (*in revision*): "Does indirect exposure to international migration influence marriage and fertility in Albania?", rejected by *Studies in Family Planning*.

Lerch, M. (2014): "The role of migration in the urban transition – a demonstration from Albania", published in *Demography 51(4)*, p. 1527–1550.

In the first paper, which is under peer review, we test the main postulates regarding the rise and diffusion of migration as elaborated in the hypothesis of a mobility transition. We aim to explain why emigration did not level off during Albania's recent period of economic development, and evaluate the consequences for Albania's recent process of urbanisation and population decline in peripheral areas. The spatial patterns of population mobility across a functional urban hierarchy since 1990 are described, and the diffusion of sex-specific rural-to-urban and international migration is investigated in a longitudinal and multivariate perspective using retrospective residence histories from the Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) 2008. We highlight different mechanisms of cumulative causation of migration, specific to and across internal and international flows.

The second paper, published in the *European Journal of Population*, documents the country's last stage of fertility transition in the context of the two contrasted periods of post-communist transformation. We test whether reproductive responses were congruent with the dominant model observed in other countries of Central and

Eastern Europe, characterised by a limitation of marital fertility and a strong postponement of the onset of motherhood. Using the Reproductive and Health Survey 2002 and the Demographic and Health Survey 2008–2009, we describe retrospective trends in marriage and parity-specific fertility and investigate socioeconomic differences in a longitudinal and multivariate analysis to identify the respective role played by economic crisis, uncertainty, and structural and value change at the contextual level.

The third paper, published in the *Revue Quetelet/Quetelet Journal* (in French), questions the relationship between a major proximate determinant of urbanisation and Albania's fertility transition, based on the same data. We test the usual assumption according to which the movement of people from rural to urban areas enhances their adoption of low fertility patterns. We investigate how the transitions to marriage and to higher birth parities are affected by rural socialisation, migrant selection, the interrelation of mobility with patterns of family formation, and (intergenerational) adaptation in urban areas over the last two decades.

In the fourth paper, which was rejected at an international journal and is currently in revision, we focus on the interactions between emigration and the fertility of women left behind, using panel data from the LSMS 2002–2004. As our knowledge on the issue is biased toward effects arising from direct exposure to emigration in sending families, we analysed in a longitudinal and multivariate perspective how marriage and family enlargement differs according to indirect exposure to emigration within the society, which concerns an increasing share of populations. We focus on social effects operating through community migrant networks, and on women's increased aspirations to move abroad, which are driven by the perception of migration prospects and benefits in the society at large.

The last paper, published in *Demography*, assesses the complex role of rural-to-urban and international migration in Albania's discontinued process of urbanisation and fast urban growth since the end of the World War II. Natural increase is recognised as the main driver of urban growth in less developed countries. We question whether the incomplete consideration of migration movements (i.e., the focus on internal flows) and the under-appreciation of their reproductive impact account for this conclusion, which contradicts urban transition theory. We indirectly estimate Albania's urban transition according to population censuses and various surveys, decomposing urban growth into its internal and international migration component, as well as into the reproductive contribution of migrants and non-migrants.

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Chapter 1. Internal and international migrations across the urban hierarchy in Albania[5]

Abstract

In this article, we integrate the analysis of internal and international migrations in post-communist Albania to increase understanding of the evolutions in population mobility. Using retrospective survey data, we first assess the spatial pattern of migration across the urban hierarchy. Longitudinal and multilevel models of the selection and diffusion of sex- and destination-specific migrations then show an immediate and large-scale onset of rural-to-urban movements in the 1990s, despite the economic crisis. International migrants were initially selected in the main urban agglomerations and well-located rural areas. Yet the rural exodus has been redirected abroad during the subsequent period of economic development. We show how cumulative causation of migration specific to and across destinations influenced this spatio-temporal diffusion of population mobility.

1.1 Introduction

The worldwide stock of international migrants has risen by half since 1990 (from 154 to 232 million; United Nations 2013). More than two thirds of these originated in developing countries, where rural-to-urban migrations have been large, as evinced by the increasing level of urbanisation (from 34 to 46%; United Nations 2012). Yet these internal and international flows (hereafter also referred to as out-/in-migration and e-/immigration, respectively) have dominated the policy arena distinctly in the past, and have been studied independently from each other. This limits our understanding of population mobility and hampers the monitoring of population geography. Moreover, despite the fact that a majority of the world's people is now living in cities, and that future demographic growth is expected to be concentrated there (United Nations 2012), our knowledge of migration in developing countries is biased towards rural societies. Whether we can expect a lower pressure for emigration when urbanisation proceeds at a fast pace, thereby absorbing rural out-migrants, or whether emigration is a substitute for, or even a consequence of rural-to-urban movements, are important questions for policies dealing with population redistribution and development.

These issues are addressed here in post-communist Albania, which has experienced both a fast catch up in urbanisation and large-scale emigration. We adopt a longitudinal and multilevel sending-country perspective to test the hypothesis of mobility transition (Zelinsky 1971), which predicts a increase and subsequent decrease in rural-to-urban and international movements over the course of the modernization process. We focus on two important factors in migration diffusion – the urban hierarchy and sex (Skeldon 1990) – and investigate the interlinkages between the two flows. Because the urban hierarchy is the spatial locus where migrations not only emerge but also intersect, it constitutes a relevant spatial typology for integrating the analysis of internal and international movements. How migrant selection and destinations vary across the sexes is important in understanding underlying family strategies and migrant-cohort effects on subsequent flows. Moreover, although it is

[5] This article is currently under review at an international journal.

recognized that destination-specific migration streams develop their own inertia over time (Massey 1990), similar cross-migratory feedback effects remain underappreciated, despite their importance for the spatial patterning of population mobility.

After a brief overview of the contemporary history of internal and international migrations in Albania, we anticipate the country's post-communist mobility transition. We then present data and methods, and describe the geography of net-migration across the urban hierarchy and abroad. To increase our understanding of the underlying social processes, we undertake a multivariate analysis of the selection and diffusion of first rural-to-urban and international movements. The article concludes with a summary and discussion of the main results. Rural-to-urban migration started on a large scale immediately after the end of communism despite the crisis in the 1990s, and unexpectedly declined in the subsequent period of economic development. Following an early onset of male emigration in the main urban agglomerations and well-located rural areas, the rural exodus was effectively redirected abroad. This incongruence with the hypothesis of a mobility transition is accounted for by circular causal effects linking rural-to-urban and international migrations. Cumulative causation of emigration also surged during the crisis, and shifted the focus of family reunifications in particular from domestic to foreign destinations.

1.2 The Albanian context

Driven by a late demographic transition (i.e. the sequential fall in death and birth rates), annual demographic growth in Albania surpassed 2% in the post-war period. Located on the border of Western Europe, the society was completely isolated from the outside world under one of the most restrictive communist regimes, denying to its people the right to emigrate. Movements across the "yellow line", demarcating the city borders, were regulated and strictly controlled, although a significant share of rural exodus was diverted to the surrounding areas in the final decade of communism (Sjöberg 1992, 1994). In 1990, one third of the 3.2 million inhabitants were aged under 15, and two thirds lived in rural and mountainous areas (Statistical Committee 1991). The society was among the poorest in Europe, with an average gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of 675 US (current) dollars (United Nations web page).

The first social upheaval against the regime in 1990 marked the onset of large scale population mobility, which developed in three phases alongside a discontinuous transition in the social system (see Carletto et al. 2006; Vullnerati 2007; Caro 2011). The first phase (1990-95) was characterized by an initial state of anarchy related to the violent demonstrations against the regime and the collapse of the political and economic system. Approximately 7% of the population left the country between 1990 and 1992, most of them illegally and temporarily to the neighbouring countries of Italy and Greece (INSTAT 1999). The previously restrained internal movements developed on a large scale. Following multiparty elections in 1992, the political and economic transition set in, although the regional context was unstable because of civil wars in the former Republic of Yugoslavia.

The second period (1996-2001) was marked by a financial crisis related to the collapse of illegal pyramidal banking schemes, which attracted deposits at a fast pace by promising high payments as incentives for further enrolment, until the system became unsustainable. Large segments of society were further impoverished. The

situation escalated into renewed social upheavals alongside the Kosovo war and the rise of criminal networks. This led to a second peak in international migration, which was sustained by the attractive force provided by the regularisation of Albanians without documents in Italy and Greece at the turn of the new century. The stock of emigrants increased to more than a fifth of the resident population in 2001, and there was a rapid catch up in urbanisation, with 42% living in official urban areas, in addition to 16% in surrounding rural communes (INSTAT 2004a; Schuler et al. 2010).

Despite strong economic development in the 2000s (annual growth in GDP was 7%; World Bank 2007) and the financial crisis hitting Greece and Italy since 2008 and 2011, emigration continued unabated in the third period (2002-11; return flows have increased recently but remain comparatively low; INSTAT 2012a). More than 1.7 million Albanians lived abroad in 2010, according to immigrant statistics (Vullnetari 2012). The official level of urbanisation also crossed the 50% bar in 2011 (INSTAT 2012a).

As in other post-communist countries, the drivers of population mobility in Albania included demographic, socioeconomic and political factors (Black et al. 2007). The communist policy of rural retention of population resulted in increased demographic pressure in a context of poor economic and sanitary conditions (Darques 2004; King 2004). The coincidence of the peaks of internal and international migration with the major economic and political crises confirms the role of insecurity and poverty in a context of increasing unemployment caused by the closing down and shrinkage of State industries and administration (World Bank 2007). Moreover, the process of land privatisation atomised agricultural plots and generated conflicts over land ownership, undermining the widespread subsistence agriculture and increasing demand for external sources of income (UNDP 2000).

During the period of communist isolation, foreign countries were idealized and domestic cities were attributed a higher social status (Pojani 2009; Caro 2011). With Albania's opening up to the world, not only did their attractiveness as places of modernization increase, but the countryside was also neglected during economic restructuring. Whereas the high emphasis on agricultural production and rural industrialization had promoted close interactions between rural and urban areas in the past, migration from peripheral areas after 1990 depleted the labour force and professional services. This led to a vicious cycle of poverty, hampered rural development initiatives and disrupted social life (Darques 2004; King 2004; Carletto, et al. 2006). A growing dissatisfaction about life in Albania was also reported as a motive for emigration, along with pessimism about the future (King and Vullnerati 2012).

The geography of internal migration involved movements all over the country. The majority originated in poor areas and headed towards the main centres of the economy – particularly the capital Tirana (INSTAT 2004a; Zezza et al. 2005; Caro 2011). Emigration was initiated in the more developed southern and coastal border areas with the European Union, and diffused progressively to the interior and the north (INSTAT 2004a; Agorastakis and Sidiropoulos 2007; Azzari and Carletto 2009; Vullnetari 2009). This regional diffusion was accompanied by a changing demographic and socioeconomic composition of migration flows.

In the 1990s, men dominated international departures, whereas women mainly moved within the country (INSTAT 2004a). The dangerous nature of illegal and physically demanding journeys, as well as patriarchal norms, may have played a role

in attributing to men the responsibility for caring economically for the family and in structuring the family settlement process abroad (Gjonca 2006; King and Vullnerati 2012). This took usually in the form of step-wise migration involving first men and later on the spouse and other family members. With increasing opportunities to rejoin family members who had regularised their status in Italy and Greece, emigration indeed became more feminized after the end of the 1990s (Stecklov et al. 2010). Male internal and international migrants mainly cited economic motives, whereas a majority of women mentioned family reasons (INSTAT et al. 2010). This is in line with the early marriage and high fertility among those women moving within Albania (Lerch 2013). With the end of compulsory female participation in the labour force after the fall of communist rule, and the revival of patriarchal culture during the economic crisis, women withdraw from economic activity in large numbers (INSTAT 2004b). Yet compared to internal migrant women, those moving abroad mentioned more frequently economic motives (i.e. 3% versus 26%; INSTAT et al. 2010), and qualitative evidence highlighted women's motivation to escape traditional gender roles – although marriage remained a social prerequisite for those planning to leave the country (Pojani 2009; Vullnetari 2009; Caro 2011). International flows have also been sustained by a growing diversification of destinations and the diffusion of the opportunities to move among lower skilled population groups (Azzari and Carletto 2009).

Emigration sustained economic growth through remittances, which lifted many recipient households above the absolute poverty line (Carletto, et al. 2006; World Bank 2007). The spatial redistribution of population also transformed economic geography. The decentralized communist economic policy maintained relatively balanced development between prefectures (half of them had a GDP per capita above the national average in 1990; SEED data). In 2011, however, Tirana and the nearby sea-port prefecture Durres were home to 45% of Albania's population (against 34% in 1989) and were the only regions with a GDP per capita above the national average (INSTAT 2012b). Disparities with secondary cities also widened in terms of living standards, amenities and the quality and reliability of urban infrastructure – as in a majority of post-socialist countries (World Bank 2006). The sudden liberalisation of Albanian population mobility in this fast changing socioeconomic context provides a unique setting to investigate the selection and diffusion of internal and international movements.

1.3 The mobility transition and its mediating factors

While the theories of internal and international migration have evolved separately from each other in the last forty years, interest in both forms has increased recently along with the recognition of the commonalities in their root causes, and of the interlinkages between them (Pryor 1981; UNDP 2009; King and Skeldon 2010; Z. Liang and Chunyu 2013). A transitional sending-country perspective is particularly relevant because it enables us to consider the evolutions in different processes alongside each other in their multidimensional context.

The hypothesis of a mobility transition

In his hypothesis of a mobility transition, Zelinsky (1971) conceptualized rural-to-urban and international migration as a spatio-temporal diffusion process, hypothesising that its intensity would parallel the increase and subsequent decrease in population growth during the first demographic transition and modernization process. Population pressure on social institutions motivates multiple demographic

responses – such as migration – to meet aspirations for maintaining or increasing living standards and take advantage of new opportunities arising from economic development (K. Davis 1963). The related extension of transport infrastructure facilitates mobility (Ravenstein 1885), while rising geographical inequalities in employment opportunities attract rural dwellers into cities (Todaro 1980).

Zelinsky's model of the spatial diffusion of migration is inspired by two principles documented by Ravenstein (Ravenstein 1885, 1889) in the history of Great Britain: the majority of migrants move short distances because of the high costs of mobility, and migratory behaviour diffuses in time and space alongside the regional propagation of economic development. When development expands evenly, a pattern of step-wise replacement migrations emerges, in which a region's departures towards more developed areas are compensated for by arrivals from economically less advanced ones – leading to a relatively balanced system of cities. Individuals may also move up step by step the settlement hierarchy in search of better employment opportunities (Ravenstein 1885, 1889). Emigration originates mainly in the centres of the national economy, which concentrates financial capacities and international transport connections.

Skeldon (1990) tested this model against the empirical evidence in developing countries, and highlighted two mediating factors in the spatial and temporal diffusion of migratory behaviour: urban hierarchy and sex differences. The spatial pattern of population mobility also depends on the macro-economic and political context.

Diffusion of migration across the urban hierarchy

Skeldon's first amendment to the hypothesis of mobility transition takes into account the unequal diffusion of development in less developed countries, where external factors – such as export-oriented industries, foreign direct investments and government subsidies – play an important role. As these tend to be concentrated in specific regions, usually the capital or other strategic places, the urban hierarchy is more differentiated, with a large primate city. In this context, the expansion of economic linkages down the urban hierarchy leads to a transformation of short- into long-distance movements, which progressively short-circuit lower and less attractive levels of the hierarchy (Skeldon 1990).

As opportunities to move abroad diffused and compete with the prospects of internal migration, the macro-economic context exerts short-term influences on migrant destinations. Historical and contemporary evidence shows how domestic cities absorb the rural exodus and channel the outflow abroad in periods of economic development. In times of economic restructuring or crisis, however, migrants are redirected to more attractive international destinations (K. Davis 1963; Thomas 1973; Massey 1988; Skeldon 2008; Salinari and De Santis 2011).

The ending of national and urban border control in Albania and the succession of periods of crises and development since 1990 lead us to expect a complex *urban geography of migration*. The main direction should be upwards within the urban hierarchy, including not only short-distance movements of people who were diverted to the cities' outskirts during communism (Sjöberg 1994), but also long-distance flows composed of others who were retained in remote areas. The strong urban bias and discontinuous pace of development should be reflected in a majority of migrants heading towards Tirana and abroad. Our *hypotheses on the urban selection and diffusion of migrations* are concerned with the higher barriers to foreign destinations. We expect urban populations to initiate emigrations, which should diffuse down the

urban hierarchy more progressively, selecting the wealthier social strata to a greater extent, when compared to out-migration.

Diffusion of migration by sex

Skeldon's (1990) second amendment to the mobility transition is based on the observation that men generally dominate in the early phases of internal and international migration, whereas women progressively make up the majority of both flows. Besides migrant-cohort effects related to family reunification, this trend is sustained by structural changes in the economy attracting women into export-processing and urban service sectors. Yet despite the fact that culture prescribes gendered social roles, its importance in the gendered selection of internal and international migration remains under-researched (DeWind and Holdaway 2008).

Because Albanian women retreated from the labour market and mainly stated family motives for mobility, our *hypotheses on sex differentials* in internal and international migration imply a role for gendered social norms in a patriarchal society. The predominance of family reasons for female migration should be confirmed by a weaker selection according to wealth and education when compared to men, for whom higher skills increase the probability of finding a job in the upper levels of the urban hierarchy. Migrant women should also be less selected in rural than in urban areas, when compared with men. In the countryside sib groups are larger, which decreases the chance for women to move in the context of a household income diversification strategy; and gender inequality is more pronounced, limiting their freedom to move independently (Stecklov et al. 2010).

Period trends in internal and international migration should also differ by sex. We expect a more progressive diffusion across the urban hierarchy of male when compared with female emigration because of men's role in the initiation of the phenomenon. During the crises in the 1990s, we expect to find that international migration diffused mainly among men, whereas women will have experienced a stronger diffusion of internal migration. In the subsequent period of economic growth in Albania, a redirection of male (labour) migrants towards domestic cities should be expected. The rising opportunities for family reunification abroad, by contrast, should attract female (family) migrants to foreign destinations. In other words, men are expected to move abroad to a lesser extent and increasingly to favour domestic cites, whereas rising female emigration should parallel women's declining out-migration.

Cumulative causation of migrations

Apart from contextual and individual factors, migration streams also develop their own inertia over time because of the social diffusion in the sending areas of the incentives and opportunities to move (a process also called cumulative causation; Massey 1990). Social relations with emigrants abroad enable new candidates to overcome the barriers to mobility, which are related to limited information, high costs and the complex organization of trips and accommodation, as confirmed in Albania (Carletto et al. 2005). Qualitative research reports a similar process of chain migration within the country (Caro 2010). Yet cumulative causation is not only destination-specific, but also arises from a wide range of interlinkages across different migration flows, as reviewed by Mung et al. (1996), Skeldon (2006) and King and Skeldon (2010).

At the individual level, step-wise movements up the urban hierarchy drive emigration because of increases in skills and experience in modern labour markets, as well as

access to international transport connexions and networks. In Albania, such step-wise migrations were indeed reported by qualitative studies in landlocked northern areas (King and Vullnetari 2003), and the geographic focus of internal movements was towards the coast, having experienced large-scale emigration (INSTAT 2004a; Agorastakis and Sidiropoulos 2007). The extent to which direct moves to foreign countries progressively substitute for these step-wise rural-to-urban and international migrations seems to depend on the geographical proximity of the sending and the destination country: Mexican cities located along the border with the U.S. have functioned continuously as a step for emigrants heading North (B. Davis et al. 2002; Fussel 2004), whereas in China out-migration and transcontinental emigration to the U.S. or Europe were substitutes for each other (Z. Liang and Chunyu 2013). As Albania's secondary cities are all (but one) located on the borders with The European Union, continuous step-wise migration should be expected.

The New Economics of Labour Migration also argues that the moves of different family members to different destinations form an integrated strategy to diversify income and capital accumulation (Stark and Bloom 1985). The financial resources raised abroad may aim to increase the capacity of the origin family to resettle in cities. This seems to be confirmed by the higher likelihood of internal movement for Mexicans who have relatives in the U.S. (B. Davis, et al. 2002). Alternatively, emigration drives rural-to-urban migration when returnees move to the economic hubs, rather than to their regions of origin. Qualitative studies in Southern Albania and in the suburbs of Tirana do indeed suggest the dominance of such a J-shaped migrant trajectory alongside a reunification in cities with the family left behind, which is enabled by remittances (Labrianidis and Kazazi 2006; Caro 2011; Vullnetari 2012). However, having family members in domestic cities may also increase access to information and networks among those left in rural areas, and thereby trigger direct emigration.

Thus, our *hypotheses on cumulative causation* predict that an individual's prior internal migration will increase the risk of a first emigration and vice-versa. Moreover, family- and community-level migration capital should not only increase the chance of moving to the same destination, but also to its domestic or international alternative.

1.4 Data and Methods

To increase our understanding of Albania's population redistribution since 1990, we describe geographic patterns of migration across the urban hierarchy and abroad. We then analyse the selection and diffusion of first internal and international migrations by sex in a longitudinal, multivariate and multilevel perspective.

The main data used for this analysis were taken from the 2008 Albanian Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS). The LSMS is regularly implemented by the National Institute of Statistics with technical support from the World Bank. The survey provides retrospective information on socioeconomic conditions and migration within and from Albania. The sample of 3,600 households including 14,875 individuals is representative at the national, regional and urban-rural level. Households were sampled according to a classic, stratified multistage design; the non-response rate was 2% (for more information, contact INSTAT).

We reconstructed communal and international residence trajectories over the period 1990 to 2007 for the interviewed household members and the household-head's children living permanently elsewhere (hereafter also referred to as former

members). Besides place of residence at survey date, household members stated the number of months spent abroad each year since 1990, and the years and places of departure of their last three internal movements. For former household members, the head-of-household proxied the years of departure and the durations of the last three trips abroad. We also used proxy information on the year of parental-home leaving and subsequent migration within Albania to indicate the former members' first two independent internal moves. Prior moves with the parental household are reconstructed by imputing the migration history of the head-of-household to his children. Information on sex, age and the level of education at survey date was declared by the interviewed household members, and was provided by the head-of-household for former members.

To analyse migration across the urban hierarchy we linked Schuler's et al. (2010) multidimensional typology of municipalities to these residence trajectories. The typology was elaborated based on geo-referenced data from the Albanian Population and Housing Census 2001, and refers to the hierarchy of urban agglomerations. These include an official urban centre and surrounding rural (de-facto suburban) communes which meet morphological, demographic and socioeconomic criteria of urbanisation. Three classes of urban centres were distinguished according to administrative importance, population size and economic centrality: the capital Tirana, and cities of national and regional importance (hereafter also referred to as secondary and peripheral cities, respectively). Agrarian communes were distinguished according to their accessibility, as proxied by steepness of the territory: the plain and the mountains.

International migration is defined as residing for at least three months abroad. Internal migration implies a change in place of residence across the levels of the domestic urban hierarchy: the rural mountains, the rural plain, suburbs of regional cities, regional cities, suburbs of national cities, national cities, suburbs of Tirana, Tirana-city. This typology satisfies the need for a functional approach to space in the study of migration and accounts for urbanization beyond the cities' official borders. The urban hierarchy also proxies the differential prevalence of push and pull factors of migration across Albania. Bottom levels are characterized by a high young age population dependency and low living standards, which contrasts with more advanced population ageing and higher living standards at the top of the hierarchy (Schuler et al. 2010).

We first describe net-migration between each pair of the urban hierarchy's levels (including the outside world) over the period 1990 to 2007, considering all movements of the 16,057 current and former household members aged 15 to 64 during the period. The migrants' place of residence is allowed to vary over time. Determinants of the first internal move across the urban hierarchy and the first international migration in the period 1990 to 2007 are then analysed using discrete-time survival analysis. Both events are modelled separately in a multilevel perspective to investigate their interlinkages at different levels of social organisation.

We specify binary logistic regressions applied to person-years of observation (Allison 1995) to account for the time-varying nature of the determinants of migration. Unlike in the descriptive analysis, the model’s sample is restricted to the children of the household heads (i.e. current and former members) to ensure relevant measurements of household wealth and family-level migration capital over time. The clustering of siblings at the family level is accounted for by estimating robust standard errors using the generalized estimating equations method (GEE; K.-L. Liang and

Zeger 1986). We specify different models for men and women to investigate gendered social processes. The statistical significance of gender differences in the effects of covariates is assessed using a 1-degree-of-freedom Wald chi-square statistic (Allison 1995).

Individuals are observed annually from the year they reached age 15 within the observation period (1990-2007). Exposure terminates either with the event of interest (out- or emigration), truncation at age 40 or the end of the observation period. The samples for the model of out-migration comprise 3,876 men and 3,140 women, or 33,666 and 27,940 person-years of exposure, respectively. Returnees are indexed by emigration capital, person-years spent abroad were excluded and Tirana's population was not considered because of the small number of out-migrants. The samples for the international migration model comprise 4,304 men and 3,560 women (38,428 and 33,016 person-years). Suburban areas of different city-categories were regrouped for the models due to the small numbers of respondents (tests confirmed a similar spatial pattern of migration).

According to our hypotheses, the conditional likelihood of engaging in (rural-to-urban or international) migration in a given year is expected to depend on sex, place of residence, socioeconomic status, prior migrant experience (of the alternative type), migration capital in the family and community, and period. Socioeconomic selection is measured by level of education at survey date and time-varying household wealth. The latter is proxied by the cumulative (and lagged) number of durables acquired year on year by the original (i.e. parental) household, as stated in the survey-module on acquisition of durables. We tested different specifications of wealth effects (linear, logarithmic and quadratic) and retained that providing the best balance between model fit and parsimony of the model according to the decline in the quasi-likelihood under the independence model criterion (penalized by the number of parameters; QICu; Pan 2001).

Time-varying (and lagged) individual migration capital of the alternative type is measured year on year as the cumulative number of past internal migrations (in the emigration model) and international movements (in the out-migration model). We also constructed two time-varying (and lagged) indicators for family networks of migrants across the urban hierarchy and abroad, cumulating year on year out- and emigrants from the household, as well as departures abroad among the extended family (siblings of the head-of-household and his spouse). Indicators of local migration capital were derived from the Census 2001 and linked to the sample of person-years. Based on retrospective information, we redistributed the enumerated population aged 15 to 59 according to the commune of residence in 1989 and calculated the relative stock of out-migrants. The intensity of local emigration is proxied by the sex-ratio of this redistributed population: a lower value (i.e. below 104) indicates a higher emigration, which in the 1990s predominantly involved men.

The urban gradient of migration is first assessed for the entire period of observation in a reference model that includes only the effects of the urban hierarchy and time-varying age (introduced as a linear and quadratic function). We then adjust the model to evaluate to what extent the urban gradient is confounded by the spatio-temporal variations in socioeconomic population composition and networks. Time-trends in migration are assessed in distinguishing the three main periods (1990-95, 1996-2001 and 2002-07). We also investigate the spatial and social diffusion of migratory behaviour in specifying heterogeneous effects of the urban hierarchy and of individual and family migration capital according to period. We present results only

from those step-wise adjusted models improving the balance between fit to the data and parsimony, as assessed from the decline in QICu.

1.5 Patterns of Albanian migration across the urban hierarchy and abroad

Following Plane (2005), the schematic diagram in Figure 1 presents net-migration between each pair of the urban hierarchy's levels (including the outside world) as a percentage of the total, over the period 1990-2007. The width of the arrows represents the relative importance of the net flow; only those representing at least one percent are shown. The direction indicates its sign from the perspective of the lower level in the urban hierarchy.

All net flows were to the benefit of the upper levels of the hierarchy, and a majority of the underlying population exchanges are unidirectional (not shown), thereby confirming a rural exodus. The Albanian system of net-migration involved both short-distance movements across local urban borders and flows linking the lowest to the highest level of the hierarchy, with a strong focus abroad.

Inhabitants of the mountains moved to all upper levels of the urban hierarchy, except secondary city centres. Although the largest population losses were to foreign countries, we show below how this changed over time. While the majority of international migrants originated from the rural plain, domestic movements from there were more focussed on Tirana's agglomeration and secondary cities.

Net migration from the suburbs of regional towns was equally distributed across the local yellow line and Tirana-city, with a dominant focus abroad. Migrants from regional towns also short-circuited secondary cities to a certain extent, as they headed predominantly to the centre of Tirana and abroad. Populations from the suburbs of secondary cities, by contrast, moved mainly into nearby centres and, particularly, abroad. The secondary cities' net outflow to foreign countries was also larger than to Tirana. The population in the suburbs of Tirana essentially moved across the local yellow line and to foreign countries. Tirana migrants almost exclusively left the country.

FIGURE 1: SPATIAL PATTERNS OF NET MIGRATION ACROSS THE URBAN HIERARCHY, POPULATION AGED 15 TO 64, ALBANIA 1990-2007.



Sources: LSMS 2008. Note: NM = net migration.

These patterns of population redistribution exerted different demographic impacts across the urban hierarchy. While rural areas have been depopulated, the only urban agglomeration that experienced a net gain from migration was Tirana, where net in-migration was larger than net emigration. Regional and, particularly, secondary cities were the urban areas most affected by demographic losses, experiencing large scale emigration and also being short-circuited by movers from lower levels of the urban hierarchy. Tirana also appears less attractive than foreign locations, as almost two thirds of the total rural exodus (from the plain and the mountains) was redirected abroad. Yet, cities were also important sources of emigration, accounting for almost half of the total net international flow.

1.6 Selection and diffusion of migration in Albania

1.6.1 Out-migration

Table 1 shows the odds ratios from the sex-specific out-migration models. The likelihood of migration was a bell-shaped function of age, with a significantly stronger selection of young adults among women when compared to men. Results from the reference models also show significant sex-differences across the urban hierarchy (M1). Male out-migration did not significantly differ across the hierarchy, except for a higher risk of leaving the mountains. The likelihood of migration for women, however, manifested a clear centre-periphery gradient, surprisingly with higher levels in rural areas, particularly in the mountains.

Out-migration selected mainly the poor, as evinced by the negative linear effect of wealth over the entire period of observation, which was however not significant among women (M2). Men were positively selected according to educational attainment, whereas no significant differences were observed among women. This supports the hypothesis of non-economic motives for female migration.

When considering the entire period of observation, few indicators of migration capital had a significant impact (prior individual emigration was not included in the women's model because of its low prevalence; M2). A higher rate of domestic migration from the community significantly boosted the likelihood of out-migration – with a significantly stronger effect among men than women. This control in the model totally accounted for the higher likelihood observed for women in mountainous areas and strongly reduced it for men (compare M2 with M1). Thus, the barriers to internal mobility constituted by remoteness appear to have been lifted by the development of local networks, which sustained the depopulation of peripheral areas.

TABLE 1: FACTORS DETERMINING THE FIRST OUT-MIGRATION WITHIN THE URBAN HIERARCHY (DISCRETE-TIME LOGISTIC REGRESSION), MEN AND WOMEN AGED 15 TO 39, ALBANIA 1990-2007

	Men												Women							
	M1			M2			M3			M4			M1		M2		M3		M4	
Variables	**OR**	**S**	**SD**	**OR**	**S**	**SD**	**OR**	**S**	**SD**	**OR**	**S**	**SD**	**OR**	**S**	**OR**	**S**	**OR**	**S**	**OR**	**S**
Age	1.28	***	***	1.29	***	***	1.29	***	***	1.29	***	***	1.75	***	1.76	***	1.76	***	1.77	***
- squarred	0.995	***	***	0.995	***	***	0.995	***	***	0.995	***	***	0.99	***	0.99	***	0.99	***	0.99	***
Place of residence																				
Sec. Cities	0.78		***	1.31		***	1.18		***	1.16		***	0.28	***	0.36	***	0.34	***	0.34	***
Reg. Cities	1.31		***	0.90		**	0.85		**	0.84		**	0.53	***	0.42	***	0.41	***	0.41	***
Suburbs	1.21			1.35			1.32			1.30			1.07		1.16		1.13		1.12	
Rural plain	1.00			1			1			1			1		1		1		1	
Rural mountains	2.86	***	***	1.59	**	*	1.64	**	*	1.65	**	*	1.35	**	0.97		1.03		1.03	
Completed education																				
Primary				0.72	**		0.74	**		0.75	**				0.87		0.93		0.93	
Secondary				1			1			1					1		1		1	
Tertiary				2.13	***	**	2.09	***	**	2.08	***	**			1.24		1.25		1.25	
Household wealth				0.90	***	*	0.96			0.90	***	***			0.97		1.03		1.03	
Nbr out-migrants from household				0.91			0.92			0.66	***	*			0.97		0.99		0.91	
Nbr emigrants from household				0.94			1.00			1.00					0.96		1.01		1.01	
Individual emigration capital				0.99		-	1.04		-	1.32	**	-								
Community out-migration				1.04	***	**	1.04	***	**	1.04	***	**			1.02	***	1.02	***	1.02	***
Community emigration (population sex-ratio)				1.01			1.01			1.01					1.01		1.01		1.01	

TABLE 1: CONT.

Variables	Men												Women							
	M1			M2			M3			M4			M1		M2		M3		M4	
	OR	S	SD	OR	S	SD	OR	S	SD	OR	S	SD	OR	S	OR	S	OR	S	OR	S
Period																				
1990-05							0.88			1.33							1.11		1.12	
1996-01							1			1							1		1	
2002-07							0.42	***		0.44	***						0.55	***	0.54	***
Period-interacted effects																				
Household wealth 1990-05										1.19	*	-								
Household wealth 1996-01										1										
Household wealth 2002-07										1.14	*	-								
Individual emigration 1990-05										0.85		-								
Individual emigration 1996-01										1										
Individual emigration 2002-07										0.43	*	-								
Nbr out-migrants from hh 1990-05										1.54	**								1.10	
Nbr out-migrants from hh 1996-01										1									1	
Nbr out-migrants from hh 2002-07										1.63	***	*							1.14	*
N of events	361			361			361			361			545		545		545		545	
N of person-years	33666			33666			33666			33666			27940		27940		27940		27940	
QICu	3852			3779			3751			3739			5126		5095		5069		5071	

Source: LSMS 2008. Notes : OR = Odds ratio, S = Statistical significance, SD = Statistically significant difference between sexes, SR = sex ratio, hh= household, *** = <0.01, ** = <0.05, * = <0.1.

Out-migration was unexpectedly high from the beginning of the 1990s and declined after 2001 among both sexes (M3). There was also no diffusion of out-migration across the urban hierarchy over time – as evinced by non-significant interaction effects (not shown). Moreover, the negative wealth effect lost statistical significance among men when the period trend was controlled for (compare M3 with M2). To further investigate the sensitivity of wealth effects to period we specified interaction effects of both variables in the male model (M4). Results confirm the role of the financial crisis among men. Whereas in the early 1990s migrants were positively selected according to wealth, the likelihood was highest among the poorest strata between 1996 and 2001. In the 2000s, all wealth strata tended to move to the same extent.

The intriguing absence of cumulative causation of out-migration at the individual and family level (M3) can also be explained by heterogeneous effects over time (M4). Having family members elsewhere in Albania actually increased male out-migration in the early 1990s and in the 2000s, but decreased it in the intermediate period. A family step-wise urban-ward migration seems to be confirmed, although the financial crisis may have motivated rural families with members in cities to stay in the countryside in an attempt to secure a multi-site livelihood.

Women's out-migration was driven by domestic family migration capital only in the 2000s. As women usually moved for, or after marriage, they may have relied on the migratory capital of the husband and his family (which is not observed in our data). In the 2000s, however, women may increasingly migrate for educational or work purposes, and thus may have relied on their own network.

Male returnees from abroad had a higher risk of internal migration during the 1990s, when compared to the 2000s. This decreasing likelihood of J-shaped migrant trajectories may have arisen from a negative selection of returnees, in the context of the recent opportunities to regularize the residence status abroad. Family-level emigration capital did not significantly influence the likelihood of out-migration in either period (not shown). This contradiction with qualitative studies which have found evidence for family reunification in cities could be due to the patrilocal perspective of our network variable: emigrants may have reunified in cities with their wives (and own children, who are not observed in our data), rather than with the family of origin.

1.6.2 Emigration

Men's likelihood of leaving Albania over the period 1990 to 2007 was highest in the agricultural plain and the suburbs of urban agglomerations, followed by secondary cities and mountainous areas; it was lowest in Tirana and regional cities (M1 in Table 2). A similar urban gradient is observed among women; however, their low likelihood of emigration from mountainous areas suggests gendered restrictions on leaving the country.

Unlike internal migrants, international migrants were selected mainly among the median educational and wealth strata of society (M2). Like Stecklov et al. (2010), we found that the selection of the better educated was stronger for women than for men, as shown by the significantly lower odds ratio of female emigration associated with a primary school diploma. Although this finding is in line with the more frequent economic reasons stated among women who left Albania, it does not necessarily contradict the notion of family motives, as education may increase women's bargaining power to move abroad, as well as their value on the transnational

marriage market. Despite stated motives, women may also be more often economically active in foreign when compared to domestic labour markets.

If international migration capital in the family increased the likelihood of leaving Albania for both sexes (M2), local capital significantly increased only men's likelihood. Individuals' prior internal movements boosted the likelihood of departure abroad among men – thereby confirming a step-wise migration. Yet it lowered the likelihood for women, who moved abroad to a higher extent when residing in internal migrant sending families. Men's likelihood of emigration, by contrast, was independent from this domestic family migrant network. Moreover, there seems to be a destination-specific specialization of migration at the local level, as the likelihood of moving abroad was lower for both sexes in communities with larger networks within Albania.

The control in the model of the variations in these migration capitals across time and the urban hierarchy intensified the urban gradient of emigration among both sexes: the higher likelihood of leaving Tirana or secondary cities decreased, whereas the lower risk in mountainous areas increased (compare M2 with M1). Thus, the higher endowment of Albania's main cities with international migrant networks explains the high risk of emigration. The specialization of mountainous areas in internal migration, by contrast, accounts for their lower participation in international movements.

The likelihood of emigration increased sharply between 1990-95 and 1996-2001 (M3). This was followed by a decline in the last period, although the trend was not significant among women. The trend in men also differed across the urban hierarchy, as evinced by significant period-interacted effects (not shown). Figure 2 displays these results in the form of predicted annual probabilities of first male emigration according to place of residence and period (as obtained from a model including only age, the two mentioned variables and their interacted effects). Tirana's population had the highest likelihood of moving abroad in 1990-95, but the trend stabilized during the crisis and levelled off in 2002-07. Secondary cities, suburban areas and the rural plain show intermediary levels in 1990-95; here the probabilities increased sharply during the crisis and stabilized thereafter. The 1990-95 probabilities were lowest in regional cities, which also experienced a more limited increase followed by a decline later on. Mountainous areas, by contrast, experienced a continuous rise in emigration through 2002-2007. Thus, male migration diffused down the urban hierarchy over time, and the levels remained high in secondary cities and rural areas.

TABLE 2: FACTORS DETERMINING THE FIRST EMIGRATION (DISCRETE-TIME LOGISTIC REGRESSION), MEN AND WOMEN AGED 15 TO 39, ALBANIA 1990-2007

	Men												Women							
	M1			M2			M3			M4			M1		M2		M3		M4	
Variables	**OR**	**S**	**SD**	**OR**	**S**	**SD**	**OR**	**S**	**SD**	**OR**	**S**	**SD**	**OR**	**S**	**OR**	**S**	**OR**	**S**	**OR**	**S**
Age	1.44	***		1.46	***		1.47	***		1.47	***		1.53	***	1.63	***	1.64	***	1.64	***
- squarred	0.99	***		0.99	***		0.99	***		0.99	***		0.99	***	0.99	***	0.99	***	0.99	***
Place of residence																				
Tirana	0.55	***		0.39	***		0.39	***		0.39	***		0.58	***	0.29	***	0.29	***	0.29	***
Sec. Cities	0.78	***		0.63	***	*	0.63	***	*	0.64	***	*	0.77	**	0.46	***	0.47	***	0.47	***
Reg. Cities	0.59	***		0.60	***		0.61	***		0.61	***		0.67	***	0.73	**	0.74	**	0.75	**
Suburbs	1.01		**	0.96		**	0.97		**	0.97		**	0.65	**	0.61	***	0.61	***	0.62	***
Rural plain	1			1			1			1			1		1		1		1	
Rural mountains	0.78	***	***	1.00		*	0.99		*	0.98		*	0.48	***	0.73	**	0.72	**	0.73	**
Completed education																				
Primary				0.76	***	*	0.73	***	*	0.74	***	*	.	.	0.63	***	0.61	***	0.61	***
Secondary				1			1			1					1		1		1	
Tertiary				0.49	***		0.49	***		0.49	***				0.49	***	0.49	***	0.49	***
Household wealth				1.11	***	**	1.06	*	*	1.06	*	*			1.25	***	1.19	***	1.18	***
- squarred				0.99	***		0.99	**		0.99	**				0.99	***	0.99	**	0.99	**
Nbr out-migrants from household				0.99		***	0.99		***	0.99		***			1.13	***	1.13	***	1.13	***
Nbr emigrants from household				1.10	***		1.10	***		1.04					1.09	***	1.08	***	1.10	
Individual out-migration capital				1.59	***	***	1.55	***	***	1.55	***	***			0.41	***	0.40	***	0.40	***
Community out-migration				0.99	***	***	0.99	***	***	0.99	***	***			0.96	***	0.96	***	0.96	***
Community emigration (population sex-ratio)				0.99	**		0.99	**		0.99	**				1.00		1.00		1.00	

TABLE 2: CONT.

Variables	Men								Women							
	M1		M2		M3		M4		M1		M2		M3		M4	
	OR	S	OR	S	OR	S	OR	S	OR	S	OR	S	OR	S	OR	S
Period																
1990-05					0.62	***	0.60	***					0.59	***	0.57	***
1996-01					1		1						1		1	
2002-07					0.86	**	0.84	**					0.86		0.89	
Period-interacted network effects																
Nbr emigrants from hh 1990-05							1.40	**							1.46	**
Nbr emigrants from hh 1996-01							1								1	
Nbr emigrants from hh 2002-07							1.06								0.98	
N of events	1586		1586		1586		1586		773		773		773		773	
N of person-years	38428		38428		38428		38428		33016		33016		33016		33016	
QICu	13030		12891		12855		12853		7222		6984		6966		6965	

Source: LSMS 2008. Notes : OR = Odds ratio, S = Statistical significance, SD = Statistically significant difference between sexes, SR = sex ratio, hh= household, *** = <0.01, ** = <0.05, * = <0.1.

FIGURE 2: PREDICTED ANNUAL PROBABILITIES OF FIRST EMIGRATION (FROM A DISCRETE-TIME LOGISTIC REGRESSION), ACCORDING TO PLACE OF RESIDENCE AND PERIOD, MEN AGED 15 TO 39, ALBANIA 1990-2007



Sources: LSMS 2008.

Among women, the rise in emigration in the late 1990s and the plateauing in the 2000s did not significantly differ across the urban hierarchy (not shown).

The only significant heterogeneous effect of migration capital according to period was related to having family members abroad, which particularly increased the likelihood of departure among both sexes in the early 1990s, when networks were scarce (M4). Later on, international migration capital developed rapidly and constituted a defining feature of Albanian society, so that local networks may have substituted to a certain extent for family networks in assisting new emigrants.

1.7 Discussion and conclusion

Developing countries have been not only the main sources of international migration, but have also experienced a sustained rural exodus. Yet the independent study of these two flows hampers the monitoring of population mobility and of the resulting transformations in population geography. To increase our understanding of the spatial patterns and evolutions of rural-to-urban and international migrations we described their urban geography and investigated the determinants of their diffusion alongside each other in Albania within the framework of the hypothesis of mobility transition. The country is a particularly interesting setting because of the sharp increase in population mobility during the post-communist crisis. Although continuous

urbanisation was to be expected in the subsequent period of political and economic consolidation, emigration also did surprisingly not level off.

Our results confirm the importance of the urban hierarchy in the shaping of Albania's mobility transition. The functional approach to space clearly reveals a rural exodus, thereby confirming a role for demographic pressure and economic and social isolation in peripheral areas. Because of the diversion of urban-ward movements during communism, and the spatial polarization of development during the economic and political transition, internal migrants mainly moved to nearby cities or the capital. Secondary centres had to cope with a difficult transition and have been short-circuited. Yet instead of a gradual diffusion, the multivariate models showed how first internal migration immediately emerged throughout the urban hierarchy and rapidly spread to the poor during the financial crisis, depleting remote localities through chain migrations. Moreover, the domestic rural exodus unexpectedly levelled off during the 2000s. This points to a catch up of urbanisation, related to the regained freedom to realize previously restrained preferences for urban residence after the fall of communism, rather than a development-induced phenomenon.

Conversely, first international migration diffused down the urban hierarchy over time, a pattern evident in men, who initiated the phenomenon. The wealth selection of emigrants confirms the importance of financial barriers, while the high likelihood in the capital's agglomeration in the early 1990s proves the importance of international information and transport connections. The relatively high levels in secondary cities and the rural plain can be explained by geographic proximity to the main destination countries. But unlike out-migration, the risk of emigration unexpectedly did not level off in the 2000s, which points to a redirection abroad of the rural exodus. The recent trend in urbanisation in Albania may therefore be driven to a larger extent by rural depopulation than by net urban in-migration.

This immediate onset of rural-to-urban migration during the crisis, and its redirection abroad in a favourable economic context, challenges the hypothesis of a mobility transition. Our analysis has suggested two main reasons for this particular diffusion of destination-specific migration in Albania: circular causal effects linking rural-to-urban and international movements, and cumulative causation of emigration which particularly redirected female migrants abroad.

Urbanisation not only facilitated the onset of emigration, but cities' locational advantages and the early development of migrants networks also attracted male rural-to-urban migrants to engage in subsequent international moves. International departure by women from internal migrant-sending households was facilitated by indirect access to these resources. Emigration also enabled resettlement in urban areas in a context of limited financial resources and secure saving opportunities as alternatives to housing in the 1990s. This was evinced by the returnees' urbanwards movements, as well as by the role of remittances in increasing the capacity of families left behind to reunify there (Caro 2010).

Moreover, the gendered pattern of population mobility has been a mark of the patriarchal society of Albania. Internal migration of women was clearly driven by family motives. The lagged onset of female emigration was also not diffused across the urban hierarchy, but immediately gained momentum throughout the country when opportunities for family reunification expanded abroad. Women's risk of emigration was also lowest in mountainous settings, where patriarchy exerted more authority. Although their out-migration was high there, it was channelled by community-migrant networks and was often related to early marriage and high fertility (Lerch 2013).

Moreover, unlike the case of men, women's departure from Albania was not triggered by community but only by family networks, which confirms a protective attitude towards women.

With the sharp rise in emigration during the financial crisis, however, networks developed at a fast pace and provided this family support abroad. Women's decreasing risk of rural-to-urban migration, and increasing or plateauing international migration when men regularized their residence status in foreign countries, may thus be interpreted as a shift in the spatial focus of family migration. Women may also instrumentalize opportunities for family reunification to gain more freedom abroad and to engage in economic activity, as indicated by their stronger selection according to skills when compared with domestic migrants. According to this interpretation, emigration in the 2000s was sustained by a redirection abroad of the migrant-cohort effect, which in the 1990s was focussed on domestic cities. This redirection explains why a majority of the rural exodus was lost to foreign countries.

Other factors must also have played a role, as men experienced a similarly increasing or plateauing risk of emigration from rural areas, secondary cities and other suburban areas in the 2000s. Although we did not test socioeconomic cumulative causation of migration, informed speculation may account for this unexpected pattern. In sending areas, selective receipt of remittances may have played a part in household disparities in wealth (INSTAT 2004c), whereas large-scale population redistribution exacerbated regional inequalities of development and disarticulated the urban hierarchy's bottom levels from the capital. This may explain the increase in relative poverty during the 2000s (Mastromarco et al. 2010) and thereby motivated persistent emigration. Thus, to curb international departures from peripheral areas and revive the decaying secondary cities, the widening inequalities across the urban hierarchy should be addressed.

Moreover, de Haas (2007a) has related the Moroccan case of unabated emigration to persistent gaps in economic opportunities with destination countries, and highlighted the importance of increasing aspirations for international mobility during the process of economic development (DeHaas 2007b). The enduring step-wise rural-to-urban and international migrations in Albania may indeed be related to different motives when compared to the 1990s, as access to networks has diffused throughout the country. Young people moved to cities for higher level education and may have emigrated later on because of difficulties in finding a job – particularly for women, as well as aspirations for further education and professional advancement. Thus, urbanisation not only enabled the onset of international migration, but may also have triggered new patterns such as opportunity-seeking mobility, thereby explaining the large share of emigration originating from urban agglomerations.

The close interlinkages and substitutability of internal and international migrations in Albania also highlights a role for geography and the macroeconomic and political context in the shaping of mobility transitions. The country is located at the labour frontier of an economic core area (the European Union), where emigration tends to be high. Foreign destinations are accessible and easily substitutable for domestic cities as a new mode of rural exodus (Skeldon 1997). This has particularly been the case for secondary cities located on the routes abroad. Moreover, the short-run influences of the crisis on migrant destination choice had long-term implications on the course of mobility transition, through the surge in cumulative causation. The redirection of labour migration abroad enabled movements towards cities, where aspirations for future emigration were raised. Internal and international migrant networks also rapidly increased and facilitated departures to foreign destinations in

the context of new legal channels, leading to the loss of a significant share of population to foreign countries, despite the recent economic and political stabilization of Albania.

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Chapter 2. Fertility decline during Albania's societal crisis and its subsequent consolidation[6]

Abstract

Cross-sectional comparisons of the decline in fertility in former socialist countries point to a bi-phasic response: a crisis-induced family limitation followed by the postponement of childbearing during economic and political consolidation. In this article, the last two decades of Albania's fertility transition are documented. The bi-phasic response model is tested in a period analysis of adaptations in marriage and parity-specific fertility to the socio-economic and political transformations since the fall of communist rule. We find that the timing and patterns of changes in Albanian family behaviours generally adhere to the model. Socioeconomic differentials and trends are congruent with the major role played by the crisis and structural change. However, the Albanian case also highlights the enduring importance of traditional family formation models during the crisis, as well as among specific subpopulations more recently. These results are discussed with reference to a sociological account of Albanian society.

2.1 Introduction

The fall of the socialist regimes in 1989 provoked rapid demographic change on the Eurasian continent. Extensive migration developed in many countries, and the level of fertility dropped at unprecedented rates to worldwide record-low levels. Populations therefore aged at a fast pace, especially in the Western Balkans, where international emigration was very high. If advanced aging is defined as the proportion of elderly people, relative to the working age population (15–64), exceeding that of children, Croatia and Slovenia were the first countries in the region to enter this stage, at the same time as Western Europe, around 2005. Bosnia-Herzegovina reached this stage in 2011, while Serbia can be expected to do so very soon, followed by Montenegro, Macedonia, and Albania before 2030 (United Nations 2011). Given these realities and prospects for Europe's poorest region, an increased understanding of the causes of fertility decline is crucial to predicting its demographic future.

The lessons drawn from the fertility trends documented in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), as well as in an increasing number of countries of the former Soviet Union, may provide information on the current stage and the future prospects of fertility in other post-socialist countries. Despite cultural and economic differences, cross-sectional comparisons point to a bi-phasic fertility response to the post-socialist transformations. Initial crisis-induced limitations of childbearing at higher parities have been followed by fertility postponement during subsequent economic and political consolidation (Billingsley 2010). However, little is known about family behaviours in the Western Balkans, despite the fact that the region has been characterised by acute crises, including civil wars, social upheavals, and economic depression.

In this regional context, Albanians have experienced very marked social transformations. A society which in 1990 was mainly rural and completely isolated has diversified strongly and opened up to the outside world. In this article, we

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document the rapid collapse of Albanian fertility, starting from Europe's highest level in 1990 (i.e. three children per women) towards sub-replacement levels more recently. We test the bi-phasic model of fertility response through an analysis of the society's reactions in terms of family behaviours to the political, economic, and social transformations of the past two decades. The examination of aggregate trends in marriage and parity-specific fertility aims to answer two main questions. First, did the social upheavals of the 1990s provoke crisis-induced family limitations? Second, has the onset of family formation been postponed during Albania's subsequent economic and political consolidation? The role played by competing factors in fertility change is then investigated through multivariate analysis of marriage and parity progressions.

We start by introducing the two decades of economic and political transition in Albania and then discuss family behaviours in former socialist countries in order to motivate our hypotheses. Following the presentation of the data and methods used for this study, Albania's fertility transition between 1989 and 2007 is then documented based on a range of independent estimates. Marriage and parity progressions are analysed based on survey data, with a focus on period fluctuations and socioeconomic differentials and trends. Change in Albanian family behaviours has generally adhered to the bi-phasic response model. Socioeconomic differentials and trends are congruent with the major role played by the crisis and structural change. However, the Albanian case also highlights the enduring importance of traditional family formation models during the crisis, as well as among specific subpopulations more recently. These results are discussed with reference to a sociological account of Albanian society.

2.2 The Albanian context

Albania is a small country located between Italy, Greece and the former Republic of Yugoslavia, with Italy to the west across the Adriatic Sea, and Greece and the former Republic of Yugoslavia over the southeastern and northeastern mountains respectively. After the establishment of communist rule in 1944, Albania’s mainly rural population lived in complete autarchy for several decades under Enver Hoxha's totalitarian regime. The onset of the first demographic transition was late by European standards. Although mortality probably started to decline in the 1930s, the onset of fertility transition did not occur before the 1960s, starting from a total fertility rate (TFR) of 6.8 (Falkingham & Gjonca, 2001). With a yearly demographic growth rate of 2.4% since the Second World War, the country’s population of 3.2 million in 1989 was not only very young (Meski and Iaquinta 1991), but also among the poorest on the European continent. Two-thirds were working in agriculture with minimal machinery, and urban households were poorly provided with sanitation infrastructure (Central Directory of Statistics 1991; see Table 1).

Having been denied the right to move internally or abroad, thousands of young people, dissatisfied with harsh living conditions and slow reforms, invaded western embassies in the capital, Tirana, in July 1990 and were granted asylum in Europe. This first paroxysm of social upheaval was characterised by an anarchic context: inflation reached 200%, food was scarce because of a drought as well as strikes in cooperatives, and public riots destroyed governmental buildings and productive infrastructures. Within two years, nearly 10% of the population had illegally crossed the borders into Greece and Italy (INSTAT 1999), and a large rural exodus was initiated. After the ruling Socialist Party won the first multiparty parliamentary election in 1991, generalised strikes led to the collapse of the production system. In the spring of 1992, elections were held again, and the opposition (Democratic Party) finally won.

Meanwhile, the population became dependent on international food aid through the following summer (Vickers and Pettifer 2000).

The Albanian economy is among the few to have experienced rapid recovery from 1993 onward. As industrial production had been virtually interrupted and land had been redistributed on a per capita basis, youth employment in the agricultural sector increased alongside total output, even though the small farm plots often did not ensure the self-sufficiency of poor families (UNDP 2000). A large share of the economic growth can, in fact, be attributed to migrant remittances, which represented up to 20% of gross domestic product (GDP) during the 1990s and significantly alleviated poverty Zwager et al. 2005. Insecurity also continued to prevail throughout the country because of the rise in organised crime, the murders of political party representatives, and disputes between new and former landowners (Vickers and Pettifer 2000).

The second paroxysm of the Albanian crisis occurred when illegal pyramidal investment schemes collapsed in 1996–97 (Korovilas 1999). A large proportion of households and emigrants lost their savings, and remittance flows temporarily dropped. The economic crisis brought on a political one. The government was widely criticised for its nepotism and, more specifically, for its management of the crisis. These contestations resulted in civil turmoil and led to a state of emergency when weapons were stolen from the arsenal of Tirana. The international community intervened militarily in 1998 in order to prevent a civil war (Vickers and Pettifer 2000). Furthermore, the international embargo against war-torn Serbia, as well as the Kosovo conflict on the northern border in 1998–99, exacerbated the crisis and contributed to the escalation of organised crime networks (Bideleux and Jeffries 2007).

By the end of the first decade of transition, living conditions were still difficult. Despite large inflows of remittances, one in four Albanian households remained poor in 2002. Income inequality appeared moderate—with a Gini index below 30%—but mainly reflected differences in household wealth rather than regional economic disparities (INSTAT 2004b). Although urban areas experienced significant improvements in sanitary infrastructure, rural dwellings remained poorly equipped. In a context of high unemployment and underemployment, there was a scarcity of opportunities to meet basic needs and overcome financial constraints. According to the Albanian Census of 2001, unemployment rates had doubled since 1989 to reach 26% in urban areas, and the situation was particularly difficult for young people. Married women with children had the greatest difficulty in finding jobs. They faced higher general unemployment rates than men (with a 10-point difference in cities) and were overrepresented among the discouraged jobless (INSTAT 2004a). Consequently, they retreated massively from the labour market.

TABLE 1: SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS OF ALBANIA, 1989, 2001, 2008.

	1989	**2001/02**	**2008**
Population	3'182'417	3'069'275	3'170'000
% urban	35.7	42.2	50.0
Numbers of cars	few	133'533	264'828
GDP per capita (current international dollars PPP)	2'850	4'371	7'293
Remittances in % of GDP	('93) 20	15	10
Income poverty (headcount %)			
Total		25.4	12.4
Urban		19.5	10.1
Rural		29.6	14.6
Gini coefficient of income		0.28	0.41
Non-income dimensions of poverty (%)			
Toilet inside, urban dwellings	66.5	87.6	96.7
Toilet inside, rural dwellings	22.0	28.1	68.7
Piped water inside, urban dwellings	63.6	86.2	94.2
Piped water inside, rural dwellings	5.0	15.5	44.3
Unemployment rate %			
Urban	13.2	26.1	(total) 13.8
Gross school enrolment (%)			
Secondary level	78.5	44.9	70.6
Tertiary level	6.6	17.0	19.0

Source: Population Censuses 1989 and 2001, LSMS 2002, 2008, LFS 2009, Transmonee 2010 database, INSTAT (2004c), INSTAT (2004b), World Bank (2005), Zwager et al. (2005).

Social development also stalled during the 1990s. Following extraordinary success in schooling during communism, gross enrolment in secondary education[7] declined significantly, from 79% to less than 44% (World Bank 2005). With many public facilities destroyed during the two civil riots, the proximity and quality of secondary schools became an impediment to education (Hazans and Trapeznikova 2006). Schooling has also not been considered to be an effective means of escaping from poverty when compared with emigration or local employment opportunities (DeSoto et al. 2002). Inequality in individual educational attainment in fact stemmed from differences in family endowments, with the poor having less access to secondary levels (INSTAT 2004cc; Picard and Wolff 2010). Girls were particularly disadvantaged in rural areas when they were firstborn or competing with several brothers (Hazans and Trapeznikova 2006).

[7] The gross enrolment ratio is defined as the total rate of enrolment in a specific level of education relative to the official school-age population of that level.

Compared with the 1990s, the second transition decade has been characterised by significant improvements in many aspects of life. The economy recovered quickly following the financial crisis, with GDP growing continuously until recently at an average annual rate of 7% (World Bank 2007). At the same time, income inequality increased, with a Gini index of 40% in 2008, but the proportion of Albanians in poverty fell by half to 12% (INSTAT et al. 2009). The disparity in sanitary equipment between urban and rural areas also started to decrease. Unemployment declined to 14% in 2009 but remains high among young people (INSTAT, website). Secondary school enrolment has only recently started to recover, whereas tertiary enrolment has increased continuously from 7% in 1989 to 19% in 2008 (World Bank 2005; Gabhadino et al. 2010). New opportunities for young people have indeed emerged in the context of a diversifying labour market, with a 2.5-fold expansion in the tertiary sector, which contributed 58% of GDP in 2008 (INSTAT, website).

Alongside this recent stabilisation of the socioeconomic situation, the country has also consolidated politically. Negotiations started with the European Union (EU) in 2003 for the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, and Albania became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and applied for status as an EU candidate country in 2009. These changes, sustained by strong transnational ties between half of Albanian households and their emigrated family members over the past two decades Carletto et al. 2006, have contributed to the rapid modernisation of Albanian society. The increase in urbanisation from a level of 36% in 1989 to more than 50% today testifies to this evolution, as does the diffusion of car ownership (which was forbidden under communist rule), of Western fashions, and of consumerism throughout the country.

2.3 Fertility decline in former socialist countries and the hypothesis of a bi-phasic response in Albania

Similar socioeconomic transformations to those found in Albania have been observed throughout the post-socialist era. Political systems collapsed first, and countries experienced a structural caesura, marked by institutional instability and economic crisis. Material hardship and unemployment increased in the face of sharply declining wage levels and social transfers. Later on, the political situation stabilized and economies were restructured, leading ultimately to economic growth and the countries' integration into world trade and politics (Philipov and Dorbritz 2003). In Albania, these four phases can be collapsed into two when distinguishing the first decade of economic and political crisis from the subsequent years of consolidation since 2000. During these transformations, the TFR declined sharply in all the countries concerned. Couples had to adapt their family behaviours to the increasing direct and indirect costs of childbearing, which were caused by higher living costs, diversified and competitive labour markets, and new freedoms leading to the rise of individualism and leisure activities (Frejka 2008).

However, birth order components of the fertility decline have varied across countries. Cross-sectional comparisons reveal two general patterns. In CEE, the postponement of first births resulted in falls in the TFR to lowest-low levels during the 1990s (Sobotka 2004), although some countries have recently experienced a partial recovery because births have been recuperated at older ages (Potancokova et al. 2008; Sobotka et al. 2008a). In contrast to this trend, fertility decline in Southeastern Europe, Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia resulted mainly from birth limitation at higher parities (i.e. a stopping behaviour; Sardon 2000; Sobotka 2003). A recent rebound in the TFR has also been observed in Central Asia (Spoorenberg

forthcoming). In an intermediate group composed of the Baltic countries, Bulgaria, and Romania, an initial family limitation followed by fertility postponement drove the fertility decline (Billingsley, 2010).

This contrast in patterns of fertility change arose to some extent from differences in the progress achieved in national fertility transitions up to 1989. The two-child family model was already diffused in CEE, while the TFRs in Central Asia and in the Albanian-speaking countries of the Western Balkans remained near or significantly above three children. However, in Russia and in most countries of the Caucasus and Southeastern Europe—which were hardest hit by the crisis and featured lowest-low fertility levels as well—people continued to marry at a young age, and entry into motherhood remained universal until recently (Sardon 2000; Sobotka 2003). A time-series analysis of age-specific birth rates for 25 countries has shown how the predominance of a stopping versus a postponement pattern was related to the extent of the economic crisis: "Postponement was linked to improvements in the economic context, whereas stopping behaviour was related to worsening economic conditions" (Billingsley, 2010, p. 27). The main question investigated in this article is therefore whether a bi-phasic model of fertility responses corresponds to the bi-phasic socioeconomic change observed in Albania since 1989.

According to this model, the main drop in fertility at higher parities should have occurred during the two paroxysms of economic crisis and social upheaval (in 1991–92 and 1996–98). The expected stopping behaviour related to economic hardship would be confirmed by a decline in parity progressions without a shift in the timing of births. Since a positive income effect is expected, the drop in childbearing should have concerned larger families to a greater extent, because they already faced higher costs of childrearing. In other words, it should be positively correlated with parity. However, Albanian marriages may be less prone to the income effect because of patrilocal residence rules which mean that young couples are not necessarily required to be financially autonomous.

Social and psychological uncertainty exacerbated economic hardship in former socialist countries during the crisis. The disappearance of the totalitarian regimes left a cultural and societal vacuum, while a new civil society and the market economy were still only emerging. In the absence of recognised institutions, rules, or widely accepted norms—a state referred to as social anomie—there was an increasing sense of disorientation in family formation decisions (Philipov 2002). Postponement of family events was to be expected as people adopted cautious behaviour when facing difficulties in evaluating and managing the probable consequences of "life-defining events such as childbirth" (Rodin 2011: 228). Given Albania's social and political transformations in a regional context of civil wars, uncertainty may have temporarily depressed union formation and marital fertility. In this case, unlike the case for income effects, family events would have been postponed in the 1990s.

However, parity-specific fertility trends in countries which experienced acute social upheavals do not systematically confirm the effect of economic crisis and uncertainty. In Armenia, the rates of second births remained constant (Billingsley 2011b), and in Tajikistan fertility decline halted during the civil war. It was the subsequent food crisis that depressed the occurrence of all family events, but childbearing at higher parities rebounded later on (Clifford et al. 2009). More prominently, entry into motherhood was often contra-cyclical to crisis symptoms. Russian women who were affected by unemployment in the early 1990s had higher fertility compared with those who were not; a paradox explained by the importance of starting a family in reducing uncertainty about one’s future life course (Kohler and Kohler 2002). In Central Asia,

the revival of religious traditions has been advanced to account for earlier marriages during the period immediately before and after the fall of the communist regimes Dommaraju and Agadjanian 2008, while in rural Mongolia, constraints to early union formation may have been leveraged by the tradition of transferring wealth at birth (Spoorenberg 2009).

These accounts underline the importance of cultural and social contexts in individual demographic responses to the post-socialist crisis. Gal and Kligman (2000) and others have indeed argued that as a result of the economic downturn in the later years of socialism, individuals increasingly distinguished their idealised private spheres—where the family unit struggled for economic survival—from the distrusted public sphere represented by the Socialist Party and the nation of workers. If the fall of regimes primarily affected the public sphere, traditional family structures remained the main source of livelihood, and represented continuity with the past.

In Albania, individual family behaviours may have not responded to crisis symptoms because the collapse of state authority and regulation during the 1990s led to the re-establishment of old customary laws (the *Kanun*) in some regions (Fisher 1999), and generally increased the family's role as a major social safety net (INSTAT 2005). Revival of the traditions of a patriarchal society also affected women's freedom. They complained of the "destructive power of public opinion" and gossip (Pritchett-Post 1998: 236), and many were withdrawn from school for security reasons or to avoid the risk of potential love affairs while waiting for an early, and often arranged, marriage. Although we are unable to test different pathways of institutional influences, their relevance may be indicated by a continuing trend in marital fertility and, particularly, in early marriages despite the context of economic hardship and uncertainty in the 1990s. Family formation has indeed been shown to be more subject to normative pressures and behavioural control than fertility at higher parities (Billari et al. 2009).

According to the bi-phasic model of fertility responses, the postponement of marriage and of motherhood was to be expected by the start of the second decade of the Albanian transition. Rise in age at first birth was indeed more marked in countries where the economic context significantly improved, wage levels decreased less, and enrolment in tertiary education increased the most (Sobotka 2003; Billingsley 2010). Delayed onset of childbearing is therefore commonly associated with structural transformation in the labour market and with ideational change in society. With the emergence of new economic opportunities, individuals are required to adjust their skills in order to take advantage of them. Longer educational enrolment postpones family events, and higher attainment increases the opportunity costs of childbearing. This behavioural innovation can then be expected to diffuse in society through social interaction (Kohler et al. 2002).

Political and economic stability also enhances ideational changes in the family sphere. As the former socialist societies in Europe have been strongly West-orientated since 1990, Thornton and Philipov (2007) have suggested that there is a (re-)embracement of so-called “development idealism”—a system of beliefs and values favouring the Western family model as a means to attaining a modern society. In the same vein, Lesthaeghe and Surkyn (2002) expected the individualisation characteristic of Western society, changing values of children and parenthood, and gender equality to diffuse into Eastern Europe and to cause the onset of the second demographic transition. However signs of this second transition, involving diversification of life courses and living arrangements, were rare at the end of the 1990s. Although societies that underwent a successful economic transition tended to

embrace more self-expressive values (Inglehart and Baker 2000), fertility postponement still mainly characterised the better educated and urban populations, and markers of the second demographic transition failed to account for this trend Sobotka 2008b.

Albania ranked last among the former socialist countries in the 2009 Social Institution and Gender Index[8]. Compared with the past, women still face difficulties in accessing secure positions in the labour market and are poorly represented in parliament (7% in 2005 against 32% in 1990; INSTAT 2007). Their decision-making power within the couple increases with age and the first birth, meaning that marriage and motherhood remain important for a woman's social status. Pre-marital sex and cohabitation are very rare (INSTAT et al. 2010). Women have not only been suspicious of new living arrangements because of the rise in human trafficking, but also value marriage and family highly as their "main focus of life" (Murzaku and Dervishi 2003). Moreover, the proportion using modern means of contraception is low (24% in 2008–09) despite the fact that the majority of the population is aware of them and that contraception has been accessible and free since 1996 (USAID 2007). In this context, postponement of marriages and motherhood will have been driven mainly by structural transformations in the labour market rather than by ideational change, for which there is only weak evidence.

The competing factors of fertility change did not affect post-socialist society homogeneously. In addition to the timing and patterns of fertility decline, socioeconomic differentials provide further information on the respective role of each factor. Following the end of state planning, inhabitants in cities were exposed to a more significant increase in the costs of childraising than those in the countryside. Not only are price levels higher in urban contexts, but rural households could, at least in part, rely on subsistence farming to cope with the end of the free distribution of food. It follows that income effects will have been sharper in cities, leading to a more marked decline in childbearing in the city setting than in the countryside. Given the traditionally large difference in family sizes between urban and rural Albania (see Section 5), the comparison should focus on first and second births. The role of uncertainty during the crisis, by contrast, would be evinced by the absence of variation in the postponement of marriage and births according to place of residence, as social anomie and insecurity were generalized throughout the country. However, institutional influences are likely to be more intense in rural areas, where traditional social structures exert more authority. Crisis symptoms might be expected to be offset there to a larger extent, leading to earlier marriages and higher levels of childbearing when compared with cities.

During the subsequent period of economic and political consolidation, we would expect marriage and birth postponement to be a mainly urban phenomenon, because structural change essentially concerned the labour markets of cities. Compared with the countryside, local opportunities for education and work are more developed there, as are the opportunities to move abroad.

Since education increases the probability of employment and income, it constitutes a main factor for escaping poverty during the crisis. If income effects are at work,

[8] This Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) index focuses on the root causes behind gender inequalities and is based on 12 social institutional variables characterising the family code, women's physical integrity, preferences for a son, civil liberties, and ownership rights (see http://genderindex.org/methodology).

higher-educated women should be subject to fewer financial constraints on traditional family formation. Compared with the lower skilled, the higher-educated may exemplify not only an earlier entry into motherhood, as observed in Poland (Kotowska et al. 2008), but also a higher progression toward second births, as encountered in Russia (Gerber and Berman 2010) and Armenia (Billingsley 2011b). Institutional influences, by contrast, leave less room for individual choice and may eliminate educational differentials in marital fertility and especially in marriage.

During the following decade, the role of ideational change in challenging the moral primacy of traditional social institutions would be evinced by increasing differentiation in family behaviours according to educational attainment, which empowers women, rather than according to place of residence. Unlike in the crisis decade, higher education should now postpone entry into motherhood and be associated with a larger decline in second births, as observed during consolidation phases in other countries (Sobotka, et al. 2008a; Muresan and Hoem 2010; Billingsley 2011a). However, the predominance of structural effects would be confirmed by a more marked postponement of marriages and motherhood among higher-educated women living in cities, because they were offered more opportunities in the labour market and so faced higher opportunity costs of childbearing.

2.4 Data and methods

The bi-phasic model of responses to socioeconomic change at the contextual level is tested from a period perspective. Given the absence of annual estimates of women by age and parity, we estimate national trends in family formation and enlargement indirectly from 5,697 and 7,584 retrospective birth histories, collected respectively in 2002 by the Reproductive Health Survey (RHS) and in 2008–09 by the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS)[9]. Synthetic parity progression ratios (SPPRs) are estimated for the years 1988–2007 (Henry 1952; Feeney and Yu 1987; Ni-Bhrolchain 1987; Hinde 1998). Similarly to death rates, which are conditional on the number of years of exposure since birth, parity progression rates (*qx*) are conditional on the time *x* elapsed since the woman's previous birth or marriage (for progressions to the first birth). This duration-specific probability of progressing from one parity to the next is obtained by dividing the number of women who had their *(j+1)*th birth during the reference period after *x* cohort years of exposure since their *(j)*th birth by the total number of women who had a *(j)*th birth *x* years ago but who had not progressed further by the start of the period. Assuming an upper limit of birth intervals, the conditional period probabilities *qx* are cumulated as in a life table from the first cohort year (indicating a birth in the same year as the previous event) to the 10th cohort year to estimate a SPPR (*aj*).

$$a_j = 1-(1-q_0)(1-q_1)(1-q_2)...$$

[9] These two independent samples of women of childbearing ages are representative at the national and urban/rural levels. Respondents were selected within households sampled according to a classic stratified multistage design. The non-response rate was less than 7% (for more information, see Morris et al.., 2005 and INSTAT et al.., 2010). Both surveys were implemented by the Albanian Institutes of Statistics and Public Health with technical support from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and Macro International, respectively. They represent the main information source on family planning and fertility issues in Albania.

This measure can be interpreted as the probability of a woman who has a (*j*)th child giving birth to another child if she ever experienced during her lifetime the duration-specific risks observed in the reference period. Parity progression to first, second, and third births is then computed; the number of higher order births is too limited for robust estimations. The conditional rates of first union (herein called marriage) are cumulated over 29 years starting at age 15.

SPPRs present several advantages for parity-specific analyses compared with other fertility indicators. First, unlike the incidence-based TFRs by birth order, SPPRs refer to parity-specific exposure cohorts and thus are not biased by the changing parity distribution of women during periods of fertility change. Second, exposure is counted backward in SPPRs rather than forward as in period parity progression ratios based on age-specific fertility tables. The results are therefore more up-to-date because they include the most recent estimates of the usually larger progression rates found at lower durations of exposure. This is particularly important in former socialist societies characterised by an early entry into motherhood and a compressed period of family enlargement. Further, SPPRs are not affected by the cumulative tempo effect on higher parity progression ratios resulting from the postponement of previous events (as observed in fertility tables, in which women are shifted into older ages, where the progression rates estimated from prior parity cohorts are lower).

The Nelson-Aalen empirical cumulative hazard function estimate of the survivor function is computed for moving left- and right-truncated three-year synthetic cohorts (Allison 1995). This smoothing of estimates enables a focus on period trends net of the noise implied by sampling fluctuations. Next, 95% confidence intervals are computed to ascertain the statistical significance of period differences. The results are based on weighted observations using survey weights to account for the differential sampling designs of the RHS and DHS. The RHS is used to cover the period 1988–2001, and the DHS provides estimates for 1994–2007. The use of both samples aims to limit uncertainty in information on Albanian fertility, which is discussed more in detail in the following section through a confrontation of different independent estimates of the TFR. Table 2 presents the number of women at risk and the number of events for selected three-year synthetic cohorts indexed by the central year.

The analysis of aggregate trends in family behaviours aims to assess the timing and patterns of fertility change in Albania. The expected drop in marriage and subsequent births is measured by the SPPR, while the postponement of events is described by the standardised mean age at marriage and the average birth interval (conditional on occurrence until the mentioned age and duration limits). Comparative trends in first quartile ages not only document heterogeneity in timing, but should be more sensitive to the influences of traditional social institutions which promote early marriage and fertility, and which thus particularly affect progression rates at lower durations of exposure.

TABLE 2: NUMBER OF WOMEN (AGED 15 TO 44) AT RISK AND NUMBER OF FAMILY EVENTS, SELECTED 3-YEARS SYNTHETIC COHORTS, 1988-2007.

	Central year of synthetic cohort				
	1989	**1995**	**2000**	**2004**	**2006**
Marriage					
At risk population	2141	1922	1776	2078	2548
N events	668	616	438	333	351
1st birth					
At risk population	976	967	722	586	586
N events	590	642	453	340	311
2nd birth					
At risk population	1050	1404	1195	952	859
N events	400	616	528	376	307
3rd birth					
At risk population	673	1474	1856	1646	1516
N events	147	273	382	247	192

Source: RHS 2002 and DHS 2008/9.

The importance of competing factors of behavioural change is deduced by a socioeconomic analysis of marriage and family enlargement. Socioeconomic differences are tested through multivariate discrete-time logistic regressions, which estimate the log-odds of marriage and of having a first, second, and third birth (Allison 1995). Events and person-months at risk between 1989 and 1999 are estimated based on women born between 1955 and 1984, interviewed during the RHS, whereas estimates for the years 2000–07 are based on the birth cohorts of 1966–92 from the DHS sample. Exposure time to marriage and parity progression are measured, respectively, from age 15 on and after the previous event; exposure starting before the beginning of the observation period is left-censored by that date (i.e. 1989 or 2000). Additionally, exposure is right-censored at age 35, after 10 years have elapsed since the previous birth (for parity progressions) or by the end of the observation period (1999 or 2007). Survey weightings are also applied.

The piece-wise constant effect of time-varying age or duration since the previous event is controlled for in the model. The analytical focus is on period trends in distinguishing the years of political and economic consolidation from the first crisis decade (i.e. 2000–07 versus 1989–99) and on the differences between the four socioeconomic groups defined according to place of residence (urban/rural) and educational attainment (post-compulsory secondary versus a lower level). Using information on the year and month of the last change of residence and on the current and prior urban status, place of residence is allowed to vary over time to account for the steep rise in the rate of urbanisation. This enables women's appropriate child-cost environment to be identified at each duration spell. In the model of marriage and first birth, time-varying educational enrolment and attainment is imputed to eliminate the problem of anticipatory analysis and to control for the low risk of family formation during education (see Hoem and Kreyenfeld 2006; Zabel 2009). Based on information on the highest educational level and grade (of that level) completed, a

normative Albanian secondary educational career is assumed, which starts after an eight-year primary school at age 15 or 16 (depending on the month of birth)[10]. Women are considered to be enrolled continuously until the highest grade they attended in secondary school. Secondary education is considered to be completed in August of the year women are supposed to have completed school (i.e. after the fourth academic year for those who do not continue into higher education, and after the fifth academic year for those who do)[11]. In the models of higher order births, educational attainment at survey date is used.

Two models are specified for each event of interest (i.e. marriage and first, second, and third births). The first model indirectly standardises the general period trend for compositional effects of the exposure population and provides a test of the socioeconomic differentials with reference to low-skilled women in rural areas. In the second model, the interaction effects between the period dummy and socioeconomic group are introduced to document socioeconomic variations in period trends[12]. The independent effects of the socioeconomic group then indicate behavioural differences during the first (crisis) decade. The results are presented in terms of odds ratios (i.e. exponentials of the log-odds).

2.5 Fertility and family behaviours during Albania's transition

Before turning to our parity-specific analysis, an introductory note is now due on Albania's fertility transition, which was atypical compared with the rest of the European continent. The national transition was delayed by at least 15 years and followed a different path (Sardon 2000). The TFR declined from 6.8 in 1965 to 3 in 1990 in spite of a pro-natalist environment. Compulsory female participation in the labour force and women's role as housekeepers in a patriarchal society implied high burdens. When combined with significant progress in child health, these led couples to decide to have fewer births. Another principal factor was the spectacular increase in female education (Falkingham and Gjonca 2001). Since women holding a post-compulsory diploma had a completed fertility close to the replacement level for several decades, the national fertility transition was driven by both the spread of education among successive birth cohorts and the declining number of children born to women who remained poorly skilled (Lerch et al. 2010). This explains why fertility decline between 1979 and 1989 occurred mainly in rural areas—from a TFR of 4.9 to 3.5 versus a constant 2.6 in cities—and resulted essentially from lower childbearing

[10] Albania's educational system contains three levels: primary, secondary, and tertiary. Compulsory school of eight years lasts until age 15, followed by a four-year vocational training or a four/- to five-year secondary general school (which can be complemented, respectively, by a three-year technical school or university degree).

[11] Although anticipatory analysis persists regarding tertiary education, we do not control for enrolment in and attainment of that level for the following reasons: not only does tertiary school attendance correlate with urban status, but our assumption of continued enrolment from age 15 up to the level attained may be violated. Part-time education is common at that level in Albania, and the transition context motivated many people to adjust their higher-level education after spells out of school.

[12] Besides the test of statistical significance of period trends and socioeconomic differences, the improvement in the balance between the model's fit and it's parsimony is compared with that of a reference model excluding period trends and interaction effects. The Bayesian information criterion (BIC) is used, which is based on the log-likelihood test, and additionally accounts for the number of events and for the increasing complexity of the model.

within marriage (Dumani 1995). At the same time entry into motherhood remained universal and occurred early in women's lives, without important changes in the average age at the event between 1950 and 1989 (on average at age 24.3; Falkingham and Gjonca 2001).

The average number of children per woman continued to fall during the economic and political transition. It was 2.3 in the 12 months preceding the Albanian Census 2001 and reached half the pre-transitional level in 2006–09 (i.e. 1.6; Lerch, et al. 2010). However, exactly what happened is unknown (see Figure 1). Official data based on vital statistics indicate an initial drop from a TFR of 3 to 2.6 in 1993 and a steep decline from 1996 to replacement and sub-replacement (1.4) levels in 1999 and 2004, respectively. Estimates from retrospective birth histories of the RHS and the DHS indicate a higher level for 1994–96 (3.2 children per women) and a later completion of the fertility transition after 2001. We provide a third indirect estimation for the 1990s using the own-children method applied to data from the Census 2001 (see Cho et al. 1986)[13]. This indirect estimation is situated between official figures and survey estimates and confirms the declining fertility trend during the 1990s.

Fertility is underestimated by official sources, which have been affected not only by the under-registration of births since 1991 but also by the difficulty of estimating the at-risk population. Annual reporting of the number of women in the population register is not disaggregated by age, and the estimation method used by the Albanian Institute of Statistics—i.e. post-Census projections—may overestimate the female population in a context of large-scale emigration (Lerch and Wanner 2008). The smaller difference between the official statistics and indirect estimations for the 2000s may, in turn, indicate improvements in birth reporting (all districts do now report, for example).

Given the high level of literacy of Albanians, indirect estimations from retrospective birth histories and the census should not be plagued by the omission of events or by event or age misreporting. Under-enumeration of children in the census should also not affect the results significantly, because the number of infants was higher than the number of births reported by vital statistics for the 12 months preceding enumeration (Lerch and Wanner 2008)[14]. Compared with these usual biases, selection bias is probably much more important, given that after the high levels of emigration experienced since 1990, only remaining people were enumerated or interviewed. However, the direction of this bias may change with the evolution in migrant selectivity over the migration process.

[13] Individual records of children aged less than 10 years are matched to married mothers residing in the same family nucleus to obtain the age of the mother at birth. Numbers of births by age of mother and numbers of women by age are then estimated for the 1990s through reverse-survival of the children and women enumerated at the census.

[14] Estimates based on the own-children method may be also be biased due to uncertainty in mortality estimates. However, the age displacement of births arising from the false linkage of children to women who are not their biological mothers should be limited given the use of family nucleus identifiers.

FIGURE 1: TOTAL FERTILITY RATE (TFR) ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT SOURCES, ALBANIA 1990-2008.



Sources: INSTAT, RHS 2002 Morris et al. 2005, DHS 2008/9 (INSTAT et al. 2010), author's estimation from the 2001 Census. Note: Own children estimates refer to periods between 1 April and 31 March.

In the initial years of transition, permanent emigration concerned mainly men and higher-skilled populations. Female migrants may have postponed births prior to departure in order to facilitate mobility, and may have had lower fertility intentions. Although referring to cohorts born in the 1950s, fertility estimates for immigrants enumerated in the Greek Census 2001 do not indicate a selection of women according to age at entry into motherhood but do confirm a lower fertility (Bagavos et al. 2008). In the past decade, by contrast, opportunities to emigrate have diffused to poor and low-skilled populations. As illegal migrants progressively regularised their situations abroad, family motives for migration became dominant, and the proportion of women increased markedly. Emigration may have thus become less selective, with a greater representation of those women marrying early and having large families. An analysis of the 2003 immigrant cohort in Italy does confirm a strong arrival effect on first birth, which is congruent with family motives for migration, as well as a higher TFR compared with residents in Albania (i.e. 2.75 in 2005; Mussino and Strozza 2012). The same is observed among recent immigrants in Greece in 2005 (the TFR was 2.5; Tsimbos 2008).

In other words, the indirect estimations from Albanian survey and census data may overestimate the level of fertility during the 1990s, when higher-skilled women left the country to a larger extent, but should be less biased for the past decade, which is characterised by a less selective emigration; fertility may even be underestimated. Despite the different levels obtained from different sources, we can conclude that the declining trend is confirmed.

In 2002, birth limitation at higher parities was indeed widespread among women interviewed during the Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS), but entry into

motherhood remained early and universal until the end of the 1990s Gjonca et al. 2009. However, the census-based period parity progression ratio to the first birth was only 86% in 2000–01 despite the fact that the mean age at the event remained constant compared with a decade earlier (Falkingham and Gjonca 2001; i.e. 24.5 years; Lerch, et al. 2010). This combination of lower intensity but stable timing points to a quantum rather than a tempo-induced decline in motherhood or marriage, which in Albania are traditionally linked and occur close together in time.

In the past decade, fertility has fallen rapidly to one child per woman in Tirana and to 1.3 in other urban areas in 2006–09 INSTAT, et al. 2010. While such low levels have been reached without postponement in some post-communist countries, in Albania postponement of births may have become widespread.

2.5.1 National trends in marriage and parity-specific fertility

The analysis of marriage and parity-specific fertility starts in 1989 before the first paroxysm of social upheaval that accompanied the fall of the communist system in 1991. Figure 2 illustrates the national trends up to 2006. Rates are plotted on the left-hand side and the timing of events on the right-hand side; the dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. The results from the two independent survey samples converge for overlapping years, indicating a limited selection of respondents to the DHS because of emigration in the 2000s.

Two main features of the final stage in Albania's fertility transition can be highlighted. First, during most of the 1990s, marriage remained near universal, and transition to the second birth still the norm. Although the RHS survey may overestimate fertility at higher parities in the early 1990s, results for lower parities are in line with independent estimates[15]. Thus, the decline in fertility during the crisis decade resulted primarily from lower levels of childbearing at higher parities, as evidenced by the sharp fall in third births. Birth intervals remained constant, which points to stopping behaviour.

Birth limitation was strongest and statistically significant in the respective years following the onset of the two political and economic crises. The rate of third births dropped from almost 90% to 65% in 1992–93, whereas second and first births remained surprisingly unaffected. Trends in the timing of marriage even indicate a short-lived tendency to marry earlier in the mid-1990s. This is particularly the case among younger women, as evidenced by the statistically significant drop in the first quartile age. A similar temporary trend towards early entry into motherhood was observed among women interviewed by the LSMS (Gjonca, et al. 2009).

During the subsequent financial crisis, the amplitude of the fall in childbearing was more correlated with parity: rates of third births, again, declined significantly in 1997 (by more than 10 points), and the rate of second births initiated a statistically significant decline in 1998. However, first birth was still universal among married women. Unlike in 1992–93, Albanians also responded to the second social upheaval

[15] The product of the synthetic progression ratios to marriage and the first birth, as well as the sum of the average age and duration at the events, converge for 1990 and 2000–01 with the results based, respectively, on vital statistics (Falkingham & Gjonca, 2001) and on the census (Lerch et al.., 2010). Further, the constant rates of second births during the 1990s is in line with the trend in period parity progressions estimated from vital statistics for 1990 and from the 2001 census (i.e. rates remained above 60%).

through changes in marriage patterns. The mean and, to a lesser extent, the first quartile age at marriage declined significantly, to 22.5 and 19 years respectively, at the turn of the new century. This suggests that the previous response of a temporary trend towards early marriage was reversed during the second paroxysm of the Albanian crisis, when family events were postponed. More specifically, the shift back and forth in marriage timing during the 1990s helps to explain the similar mean ages at entry into motherhood in 1990 and 2000–01, as estimated from the vital statistics and the 2001 census respectively.

FIGURE 2: SYNTHETIC PARITY PROGRESSION RATIOS (LEFT-HAND SIDE) AND STANDARDIZED MEAN AND FIRST QUARTILE AGES (RIGHT-HAND SIDE), ALBANIAN WOMEN 1989-2006.



FIGURE 2: CONT.



Sources: RHS 2002 (for 1989-2001) and DHS 2008/9 (for 1994-2006). Note: dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals.

The second main observation refers to fertility decline at lower parities and to a retreat from universal marriage in the first decade of the new century. The decline in second births intensified, but the rate had not fallen below the 80% bar by 2006. Rates of marriage and first births fell significantly, to below the 90% bar. The decline in marriage clearly resulted from a tempo effect, as indicated by the increase in the mean age at the event from 22.5 years to more than 24 years by the end of the observation period. Moreover, heterogeneity in age at marriage has increased since 1989. This is evidenced by the slower upward trend of the first quartile age compared with the mean: the former only increased by one year to 20 years of age, meaning that a significant proportion of women continued to marry very young.

In a similar way to third births in the 1990s, the more recent fall in first and particularly second births has been due essentially to stopping behaviour, because birth intervals remained constant throughout the observation period. Thus the one-child family model has started to be diffused in Albania.

2.5.2 Socioeconomic differentials and trends

As shown in Table 3, the declines in marriage and parity progressions between 1989–99 and 2000–07 were statistically significant after taking into account compositional effects in a multivariate analysis. Compared with the reference model controlling only for socioeconomic differences, the model's quality substantially increased when allowing for the period trend (as evinced by the decline in the BIC). To understand the causes and social diffusion of changes in family behaviours, the focus now turns to socioeconomic differentials and trends.

The likelihood of marriage was an inverted U-shaped function of age (Table 3). No clear difference was apparent between urban and rural areas. Enrolment in secondary school was associated with a lower odds ratio in both residence contexts. Educational attainment, however, only mattered in cities: higher-skilled women had a significantly lower odds ratio of marriage, whereas the behaviour of the lower-skilled did not significantly differ from that of their rural counterparts, defined as the reference category. Although the model did not improve when allowing for interaction effects between period and social groups, trends differed significantly. Considering the evidence of the previous section, this result can be interpreted as showing differentials in marriage postponement. Postponement intensified the most among higher skilled city-dwellers, followed by the rural population, who experienced similar changes across educational strata. Compared with the reference trend observed among the low-skilled rural population, the delay in marriage was, surprisingly, least pronounced among low-skilled city dwellers. Heterogeneity in marriage patterns consequently increased in cities.

TABLE 3: ODDS RATIOS OF SEQUENTIAL PROGRESSIONS TO MARRIAGE, FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD BIRTHS ACCORDING TO SOCIOECONOMIC GROUP AND PERIOD (DISCRETE-TIME LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS), ALBANIAN WOMEN AGED 15-34, 1989-1999 AND 2000-2007 SYNTHETIC COHORTS.

			First union				First birth				Second birth				Third birth			
Variable			**O.R.**	**S.**	**O.R.**	**S.**	**O.R.**	**S.**	**O.R.**	**S.**	**O.R.**	**S.**	**O.R.**	**S.**	**O.R.**	**S.**	**O.R.**	**S.**
Age	**Duration since previous event**																	
(1st union)	*(1st birth)*	*(2nd & 3rd birth)*																
…	< 1 year	< 2 years					1		1		0.28	**	0.28	**	0.32	**	0.32	**
15-19	1 year	2 years	0.37	**	0.37	**	0.36	**	0.36	**	1		1		1		1	
20-24	2 years	3 years	1		1		0.74	**	0.74	**	1.26	**	1.26	**	0.94	ns	0.95	ns
25-29	3 years	4 years	1.03	ns	1.02	ns	0.49	**	0.49	**	1.34	**	1.34	**	0.99	ns	1.00	ns
30-34	> 3 years	> 4 years	0.50	**	0.49	**	0.14	**	0.15	**	0.80	**	0.80	**	0.59	**	0.59	**
Socioeconomic group																		
LS rural (ref)			1		1		1		1		1		1		1		1	
ER rural			0.29	**	0.30	**	0.36	**	0.44	**								
HS rural			0.97	ns	0.98	ns	1.12	**	1.20	**	0.91	ns	0.91	ns	0.81	**	0.85	**
LS urban			1.03	ns	0.90	ns	0.94	ns	1.03	ns	0.78	**	0.74	**	0.58	**	0.49	**
ER urban			0.25	**	0.27	**	0.61	**	0.74	*								
HS urban			0.71	**	0.79	**	1.09	**	1.17	**	0.63	**	0.66	**	0.29	**	0.28	**
Period																		
1989-1999 (ref)			1		1		1		1		1		1		1		1	
2000s			0.67	**	0.71	**	0.76	**	0.87	**	0.70	**	0.71	**	0.67	**	0.64	**

TABLE 3: CONT.

Variable	First union				First birth				Second birth				Third birth			
	O.R.	**S.**	**O.R.**	**S.**	**O.R.**	**S.**	**O.R.**	**S.**	**O.R.**	**S.**	**O.R.**	**S.**	**O.R.**	**S.**	**O.R.**	**S.**
Interaction: group & period																
LS rural (ref)			1				1				1				1	
ER rural			0.93	ns			0.60	ns								
HS rural			1.00	ns			0.75	*			1.00	ns			0.90	ns
LS urban			1.37	**			0.76	**			1.14	ns			1.44	**
ER urban			0.80	ns			0.56	*								
HS urban			0.72	**			0.79	**			0.87	ns			1.05	ns
N person-months without events	334981		334981		67197		67197		147917		147917		225870		225870	
N events	3197		3197		3107		3107		2973		2973		1485		1485	
Differential BIC with model without period and interaction	-105		-90		-41		-13		-77		-58		-59		-44	

Sources: RHS 2002, DHS 2009. Notes: LS = low skilled (at best primary), HS = high skilled (secondary and more), ER = enrolled in secondary level, OR = odds ratio, S = statistical significance (* = stat sign at 0.1 level, ** = stat sign at 0.05 level).

The highest odds ratios of having a first birth were observed either in the same year as marriage or two years later. In a similar way to marriage, enrolment in secondary school was associated with a very low fertility. However, women who completed the secondary level had higher fertility than the lower-skilled, particularly during the crisis decade. No significant difference in first births between urban and rural areas was observed. Although taking account of interaction effects did not improve the model, period trends did differ according to socioeconomic group, with the decline in first births being least pronounced among the lower-skilled rural population.

The odds ratios of family enlargement followed a typical inverted U-shaped function of duration since the previous birth. The results for second births confirm a dominant urban/rural gradient with a lower odds ratio in cities, particularly among the higher-skilled population. The decline in childbearing through 2000–07 concerned all socioeconomic groups to the same extent, meaning that the onset of the diffusion of the one-child family model still mainly concerns high-skilled city dwellers. The odds ratio of third births exemplified the clearest socioeconomic gradient: the highest level of fertility was found among the low-skilled rural population, followed by their higher-educated counterparts and the low-skilled city-dwellers. High-skilled women in cities exemplified the lowest level of childbearing, which is congruent with their pioneering role in the historical fertility transition in Albania. The declining trend in third births concerned all groups to the same extent, except for the lower-educated urban population, who experienced a less marked fall compared with the reference trend observed in the countryside. This implies that not only marriage behaviour but also family enlargement became increasingly heterogeneous in cities.

2.6 Discussion and conclusion

Socioeconomic and political change since 1990 in Albania has adhered to a bi-phasic transition model of crisis and consolidation, observed throughout the post-socialist era. In this article, we have documented Albania's sharp fertility decline to approximately half its pre-transitional level. Based on international observations, we postulated that fertility has adapted to the socio-economic and political transformations in two stages. Crisis symptoms were expected to encourage family limitation, whereas structural changes in the labour market, it was supposed, would postpone the onset of family formation during economic and political consolidation. The results from the descriptive analysis generally conform to the expected timing and patterns of fertility change. The demographic dynamics underlying the decline in the TFR reflected behavioural changes, and did not merely result from a structural effect of rapid urbanisation and the spread of education in Albania. Furthermore, socioeconomic differentials and trends were congruent with the main anticipated motives of transformations in family behaviours.

Most of the fertility decline at higher parities lagged behind the onset of the two social upheavals in the 1990s and resulted from stopping behaviour. Women at higher parities, as well as those residing in urban areas, exemplified the most marked birth limitation, confirming the dominance of an income effect. In addition, the earlier first births observed among better-educated married women may reflect their exposure to fewer economic constraints, although Gjonca et al. (2009) have interpreted a similar result as a catch-up of the delay in entry into motherhood caused by time spent at school.

Despite these expected crisis-driven responses, the two-child family model surprisingly persisted until the onset of the financial crisis in 1996. Women also continued to marry young, and a significant number even brought the event forward in the mid-1990s. Although considerable uncertainty exists regarding the level of fertility during this period, because of potential biases due to selective emigration, our retrospective survey estimates are congruent with evidence from other sources. We therefore believe that they are at least representative of those Albanians who did not want or were unable to leave during the crisis, and we can speculate on the reasons for the enduring importance of traditional family formation patterns. Uncertainty could have led to a rush into marriage, but this fails to explain the almost universal transition to the second birth during the economic crisis. The cultural context may have played a role. Not only was economic and social insecurity alleviated by individuals' reliance on extended kinship structures, but the re-emergence of old customs and norms also filled the cultural and regulatory vacuum inherent in the fall of one of the most rigid communist regimes in the world. Cultural revival led to an emphasis on patriarchal values promoting early marriage and the traditional family. The constant level of second births, as well as the standardised marriage timing across all socioeconomic groups except for high-skilled city-dwellers, is indeed suggestive of the importance of institutional influences.

However, these trends were eliminated by large-scale impoverishment during the second social upheaval in 1996–98, which exerted the clearest crisis effects on childbearing at higher parities, including on second births. Albanians also delayed the transition to marriage earlier than expected, which may indicate a weaker influence of traditional social institutions in the face of high levels of uncertainty during the civil turmoil and the Kosovo War.

Recent trends have confirmed a crucial change toward postponed family formation and the onset of the diffusion of the one-child family model. The spread of these new family behaviours throughout Albania depressed the TFR to sub-replacement levels. Marriage postponement intensified most among higher skilled city-dwellers, and the one-child family model remained more prevalent in cities, as was the case in other CEE countries. This helps to explain the recent fall in urban fertility to lowest-low levels in 2006–09 (INSTAT, PHI, & Macro International, 2010). The major differentiation in reproductive patterns between urban and rural areas points to a dominant role being played by new opportunities in the labour market, which are more available in cities, rather than by ideational change.

Despite the strong Western orientation of Albanian society and major changes in lifestyles, significant signs of the second demographic transition have yet to appear. Although postponed marriage constitutes a historical transformation of the Albanian family, the event remains closely related to entry into motherhood. Family enlargement is still compressed over a relatively short age interval, and second birth remains the norm in rural areas even though it is no longer universal. Moreover, the incidence of early marriages has not declined much, especially among low-skilled city dwellers, who have also continued to have higher fertility. A large part of this population, in fact, originated from the countryside, and it has been shown elsewhere how the Albanian rural exodus is closely related to traditional models of marriage and family formation (Lerch 2011). The increasing heterogeneity in family behaviour mirrors the diversity in social influences arising from the transition and modernization of society as well as the rise in income inequality that has accompanied economic development. Traditional family formation models may remain attractive for a

significant share of women because of the limited perspectives that many are offered on the labour market, and the continuing importance of patriarchal culture in Albania. Although significant progress has been achieved in socioeconomic development, gender equality has only recently been given higher priority with the definition of a national gender strategy in 2008 which aims to promote women's participation in society.

Although this analysis has confirmed the transformation from an early and high fertility to restricted and delayed childbearing in post-communist Albania, two observations did not fit the bi-phasic response model. First, as in other post-communist countries which have experienced acute social upheaval, demographic responses in Albania in the 1990s indicated the importance of the social and cultural environment. Individual fertility responses to the post-socialist crisis may have been influenced not only by coping strategies at the family or community level but also by the social effects of a re-traditionalisation of society. An institutional analysis would be most appropriate to test these hypotheses. Second, behaviours that were attributed to an improvement in the socioeconomic context had already appeared during the second paroxysm of the Albanian crisis. As in other more developed CEE countries, marriage postponement and the one-child family model may have been initiated in cities to cope with uncertainty and crisis, but then have been diffused during the consolidation phase through social interaction (Kohler et al., 2002), and intensified because of new economic opportunities (Sobotka, 2008).

An increased understanding of interrelations and feedback effects between successive behavioural adaptations to the post-communist transformations would provide useful information for predicting fertility in Albania, including a potential recovery. Following the adjustment of family size to crisis circumstances, the recent decline to very low levels of fertility has mainly reflected the emergence of new family behaviours initiated by a growing urban population. With ongoing urbanisation and the recent boom in higher education, one might expect the postponement of marriage and the one-child family model to spread further in society and to hasten the onset of advanced demographic ageing.

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Chapter 3. Urbanisation et transition de la fécondité en Albanie[16]

Résumé

Parallèlement au rapide développement du processus d'urbanisation, la fécondité albanaise a diminué de moitié depuis la fin du régime communiste. Pour vérifier cette apparente corrélation au niveau macro-démographique, une analyse de l'impact de l'exode rural sur les comportements nuptiaux et féconds à l'aide de données individuelles et longitudinales des deux dernières décennies a été effectuée. Resituer ces dynamiques dans leur contexte évolutif s'avère en effet crucial pour la compréhension du rôle de l'exode rural dans la transition de la fécondité albanaise. Nos analyses multivariées comparent le mariage et la fécondité des non-migrantes à celle des migrantes ainsi que de leurs enfants au cours de leur parcours migratoire. Les résultats montrent que l'exode rural vers les centres urbains n'a pas altéré les comportements familiaux traditionnels en Albanie mais au contraire y est resté étroitement associé. Ainsi, la transition de la fécondité a été freiné en raison d'une résistance des migrantes face aux transformations que connaît la famille albanaise contemporaine.

Abstract

While Albania's population urbanized at a fast pace, its level of fertility fell by half since the end of communist rule. This apparent correlation at the macro-demographic level is examined through an analysis of the impact of rural exodus on marriage and fertility behaviours. Using individual and longitudinal data for the last twenty years, we situate these dynamics in their changing context. The revelations are indeed crucial in understanding the effect of rural exodus on Albania's fertility transition. Our multivariate analyses compare marriage and fertility patterns of non-migrants to family behaviours among migrants (as well as their descents) during their residential trajectory. Results show that rural outmigration did not alter traditional family behaviours in Albania, which remained closely related to each other. The fertility transition was delayed because of the migrants' resistance to the recent transformations of the contemporary Albanian family.

3.1 Introduction

En 1989, l'Albanie affichait le plus haut niveau de fécondité d'Europe et comptait, avec un tiers de sa population habitant dans les villes, parmi les pays les moins urbanisés. Depuis, la société a connu des transformations économiques et sociales majeures, passant d'une isolation complète sous un régime communiste totalitaire à une soudaine extraversion, une libéralisation économique et un pluralisme politique. Durant les deux dernières décennies, une large part de la population a migré à l'étranger et plus de la moitié des Albanais vit aujourd'hui dans les villes. Parallèlement à cette rapide urbanisation, la fécondité a diminué de moitié pour atteindre 1.6 enfants par femme. Ainsi l'exemple de l'Albanie semble confirmer l'hypothèse de la transition de la mobilité, qui stipule des interrelations entre la baisse de la fécondité et l'augmentation de la mobilité géographique et du niveau d'urbanisation des populations (Zelinsky 1971). L'apparente corrélation au niveau

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macro-démographique entre ces phénomènes est vérifiée par une analyse de l'impact de l'exode rural sur les comportements nuptiaux et féconds des femmes albanaises.

L'effet négatif de l'urbanisation sur la fécondité mesurée au niveau national est généralement attribué à la transformation des comportements reproductifs des migrants suite à leur changement de lieu de résidence. Socialisées dans des régions caractérisées par une fécondité élevée, l'évènement migratoire provoque une rupture momentanée du processus de constitution de la famille et les comportements féconds des migrants tendent à converger vers des standards plus faibles prévalant en ville (Goldstein and Goldstein 1981; Brockerhoff 1998; Michael J. White et al. 1995). Etant donnée l'accroissement de la part des femmes habitants les villes au cours de l'urbanisation, la plus faible fécondité urbaine détermine progressivement la transition de la fécondité au niveau national. Ce schéma théorique se réfère au processus universel de modernisation et fait abstraction du contexte dans lequel les interactions entre migration et fécondité ont lieu. Or, le contexte socioéconomique et culturel influence ces interactions et reste essentiel à leur compréhension (Goldstein and Goldstein 1983). Resituer ces dynamiques dans le cadre des transformations de l'Albanie depuis 1989 s'avère en effet crucial pour la compréhension du rôle de l'exode rural dans la transition de la fécondité.

La section suivante introduit brièvement le contexte albanais. Les hypothèses concernant l'effet de l'exode rural sur la fécondité des migrantes, et par conséquent sur la transition de la fécondité nationale depuis 1989, sont ensuite spécifiées pour les deux dernières décennies. Suite à la description des données et méthodes, les parcours familiaux et migratoires des femmes sont analysés dans une perspective longitudinale et multivariée. Nous comparons l'entrée en vie reproductive et l'élargissement des familles des non-migrantes aux comportements des migrantes ainsi que de leurs enfants au cours de leur parcours migratoire. Notre analyse teste la sélection des migrantes selon le projet fécond, les effets de rupture de la migration sur le parcours reproductif ainsi que ses interdépendances avec la mobilité géographique; la convergence des comportements des migrantes vers les standards urbains est également évaluée. Les résultats sont enfin discutés au regard du contexte spécifique de l'Albanie.

3.2 Contexte albanais

L'Albanie est un petit pays montagneux situé sur la côte Est de la Mer Adriatique. Il se caractérisait par une démographie atypique par rapport aux autres pays du continent européen. La transition de la fécondité ne s'est amorcée que depuis 1965 – soit avec un décalage d'au moins 15 ans par rapport aux autres pays de la région (Sardon 2000). Bien que la baisse du nombre d'enfants par femme ait été rapide – de 6 à 3 en 1990, la fécondité est restée la plus élevée d'Europe (Falkingham and Gjonca 2001). Le niveau d'urbanisation de la population est resté faible jusqu'en en 1989, le processus ayant été freiné sous le communisme durant plusieurs décennies.

A la fin de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, moins d'un cinquième des 1.1 millions résidents albanais habitait les villes. Dans les années 1950, la première phase d'industrialisation socialiste a provoqué un intense exode rural. Le gouvernement a ensuite strictement contrôlé et limité la mobilité interne à partir de 1965 (l'émigration internationale était considérée comme une trahison d'Etat et punie de la peine de mort). Diverses mesures visaient à stabiliser la part de la population urbaine, telles que l'introduction de passeports domestiques et permis de résidence, l'allocation

régionale de la main-d'œuvre par le gouvernement central ainsi qu'une politique active de rétention des populations dans les zones rurales. Cette politique avait pour but d'augmenter la faible productivité du secteur agricole dans le contexte d'une isolation croissante de l'Albanie sur la scène internationale nécessitant une autosubsistance alimentaire. L'instauration des stricts contrôles de la migration interne a coïncidé avec la révolution culturelle et la fin de la collectivisation des terres agricoles (Borchert 1975). Par conséquent, le niveau d'urbanisation n'a guère augmenté entre 1960 et 1989 (de 31% à 36%; Sjöberg 1994; Sjöberg 1992).

Lors de la chute du régime communiste en 1991, l'Albanie comptait parmi les pays les plus pauvres d'Europe. Selon le recensement de 1989, la majorité de la population travaillait sur les champs agricoles et les logements urbains étaient faiblement équipés d'infrastructures sanitaires de base (Central Directory of Statistics 1991). Le maintien d'un niveau de fécondité élevé a accentué la pression démographique sur l'économie en crise. La distribution par habitant des terres agricoles, lors de leurs privatisations, n'a pas soulagé cette situation puisqu'elle a entrainé une atomisation des exploitations ne permettant que difficilement l'autosubsistance des ménages (UNDP 2000). Ainsi, les migrations internes et internationales ont constitué des réponses majeures de la population conséquemment à la nouvelle liberté acquise dans un contexte incertain: jusqu'en 2001, un cinquième de la population a quitté le pays et un quart vivait dans une autre commune que celle douze ans auparavant (INSTAT 2004). Les flux migratoires ont été les plus importants lors des deux crises majeures : la crise économique et institutionnelle consécutive à l'effondrement du système communiste et la crise financière de 1997, qui ont accentué la pauvreté dans le pays (World Bank 2007). En 2002, près d'un tiers des résidents des campagnes vivait en dessous du seuil de pauvreté et cela en dépit d'importants flux de transferts de fonds des migrants établis à l'étranger (World Bank 2003).

Selon nos estimations basées sur le recensement de 2001 et la typologie territoriale proposée par Schuler et al. (2010), depuis 1989 deux tiers des migrants internes provenaient des régions rurales, particulièrement celles situées dans les montagnes (Tableau 1). La majorité de ces migrants s'est établie dans une des villes et plus d'un cinquième dans les communes environnantes et intégrées au tissu urbain. L'exode rural s'est principalement concentré sur la capitale du pays, Tirana, qui totalise 14% des résidents Albanais. Par conséquent, le niveau officiel d'urbanisation a augmenté de 36 à 42% entre 1989 et 2001. Si les frontières des villes avaient été mise à jour, la population urbaine aurait représenté moins de deux tiers de la population au recensement de 2001 (Schuler et al. 2010).

TABLEAU 1: DISTRIBUTION RELATIVE DES MIGRANTS INTERCOMMUNAUX DEPUIS 1989 ET DES NON-MIGRANTS SELON LA TYPOLOGIE URBAINE DE SCHULER ET AL. (2010), POPULATION ALBANAISE ÂGÉ DE 15 ANS ET PLUS, 2001.

	Non migrants	Migrants	
		Origine	Destination
Agglomérations urbaines			
Villes	37.5	19.2	**50.8**
Communes rurales urbanisées et intégrées morphologiquement aux villes	13.4	10.7	**22.7**
Régions rurales			
Communes industrielles, minières, de services, touristiques	5.6	7.0	3.4
Communes majoritairement agricoles des plaines	8.1	7.6	5.5
Communes majoritairement agricoles des montagnes	9.6	**19.1**	3.6
Communes totalement agricoles des plaines	16.5	14.8	10.8
Communes totalement agricoles des montagnes	9.4	**21.6**	3.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
Effectifs totaux	1'697’631	412’544	412’544

Source: Recensement de la population 2001. Note: la typologie urbaine de 2001 est imputée aux informations concernant le village de résidence en 1989 (le statut migratoire est inconnu pour 26’399 individus en raison de l'absence d'information sur le village de résidence en 1989).

En comparaison avec la première décennie caractérisée par des crises, la seconde se distingue par une stabilité politique et une modernisation sociale, soutenue par une forte croissance économique et une émigration continue. En dépit de l'importante baisse et convergence des niveaux de pauvreté urbains et ruraux (INSTAT et al. 2009), l'urbanisation rapide poursuit son cours et dépasse la barre des 50% en 2009, comme l'atteste le niveau officiel.

Parallèlement à ce rattrapage du processus d'urbanisation, l'indice synthétique de fécondité (ISF) a diminué presque de moitié depuis 1989 pour atteindre 1.6 enfants par femme en 2006-9 (INSTAT et al. 2010). La limitation des naissances s'est diffusée, mais le mariage est resté précoce, universel et étroitement lié à la constitution de la famille dans les années 1990 (Gjonca et al. 2008). Depuis la chute du système communiste, l'Albanie a en effet connu une retraditionalisation sociale. Celle-ci s’explique notamment par la volonté de défier le régime précédant en se réappropriant d’anciennes coutumes ainsi que par l'importance sociale de la réputation familiale jadis si déterminante sous le communisme (Nixon 2009). Le rôle de la famille comme filet de sécurité sociale et économique a sans doute accentué cette retraditionalisation. Elle s'est manifestée durant les années 1990 par une anticipation temporaire des mariages – déjà précoces à l’époque (Lerch 2011).

Durant les années de stabilisation économique et politique, les comportements reproductifs ont connu une profonde mutation. La fécondité albanaise a continué à chuter comme le témoigne le faible ISF dans les villes en 2006-9 : 1,0 enfants par femmes à Tirana et 1,3 pour les autres villes du pays (INSTAT et al. 2010). Le mariage a progressivement été retardé (l'âge moyen a augmenté de 22 à 24 ans) et le modèle de la famille à enfant unique a commencé à se diffuser, particulièrement parmi les populations urbaines et plus éduquées. Une minorité de femmes continue toutefois à se marier très jeune et l'on observe une diversification croissante des comportements familiaux urbains (Lerch 2011).

3.3 Question de recherche et hypothèses

L'exode rural provient des régions périphériques caractérisées par une fécondité élevée et concerne majoritairement des femmes (à hauteur de 60%; INSTAT 2004). Le changement des comportements féconds des migrantes lors de leur arrivée en ville est donc susceptible de soutenir la transition de la fécondité. Le but de cette analyse est de vérifier l'importance de cet effet comportemental lié à l'exode rural. Les effets de la migration sur les comportements reproductifs sont généralement conceptualisés dans une perspective de parcours de vie. Le mariage et la fécondité des migrantes est susceptible de diverger de celle des non migrantes en raison de leurs expériences au cours des quatre étapes majeurs du parcours migratoire, à savoir: la socialisation préalable au lieu d'origine, la sélection migratoire, la rupture momentanée du parcours de vie due aux effets perturbateurs de la mobilité elle-même, ainsi que l'intégration au lieu d'accueil (voir Kulu 2003; Goldstein and Goldstein 1983). Au vue de l'évolution du contexte socioéconomique et démographique en Albanie, nous postulons des interactions différentes entre l'exode rural et la fécondité au cours des deux dernières décennies.

Selon la théorie économique néoclassique, les migrants sont sélectionnés parmi les populations pour lesquelles les bénéfices escomptés dépassent les coûts du déplacement géographique (Sjaastad 1962). Ils sont généralement plus éduqués et se caractérisent souvent par une fécondité inférieure à celle des non migrants au lieu d'origine. On évoque même l'hypothèse d'une sélection en fonction de la fécondité souhaitée. Les femmes, dont les souhaits de fécondité sont inférieurs à la moyenne au lieu d'origine, mais semblable à celle généralement plus faible au lieu de destination urbaine, connaitraient des probabilités à l'émigration plus importante, tel qu'il l'a été observé au Pérou ou au Ghana (Michael J. White, et al. 1995; Chattopadhyay et al. 2006).

Or, la constitution d'une famille peut aussi représenter la motivation même du projet migratoire, qui devient alors interdépendant avec l'évènement familial (Courgeau 1985; Mulder and Wagner 1993). Ainsi en Tchécoslovaquie communiste, les femmes immigrées dans les villes affichaient des niveaux de fécondité temporairement supérieurs aux non migrantes en raison de l'allocation des logements urbains aux jeunes familles (Boguszak et al. 1989). En l'absence d'aide institutionnelle, la migration des couples s'effectuent souvent par étape. L'établissement préalable de l'homme ou de la femme est suivi du mariage ou du regroupement familial ainsi que par un rattrapage du retard dans la réalisation des projets familiaux. De tels cas de figure sont avancés pour expliquer la fécondité plus élevée des migrantes à l'arrivée dans les villes du Guatemala et au Kirghizistan (Lindstrom 2003; Nedoluzhko and Andersson 2007).

Selon les hypothèses de sélection de femmes moins fécondes ou d'interdépendance entre évènements démographiques, les migrantes n'influencent guère la transition de la fécondité au niveau national. En effet, les femmes réalisent un projet fécond spécifique, prédéterminé selon leur profil socioéconomique et leurs valeurs au lieu d'origine. Les interdépendances entre comportements démographiques peuvent toutefois jouer un rôle sur la transition de la fécondité s'ils influencent les déterminants proches de celle-ci – tel l'âge au mariage. Ainsi, dans les années 1980 en Albanie, la surreprésentation féminine dans les villes a été attribuée aux migrations matrimoniales de femmes qui rejoignaient leur futur mari (Sjöberg 1989). Ces traditions nuptiales, exogames et patrilocales ont été instrumentalisées sous le communisme afin de contourner les restrictions de la mobilité interne (Sjöberg 1994; Vullnerati 2007). Au regard de la retraditionalisation de la société durant les années 1990, il est probable que cette interdépendance institutionnalisée entre migration et mariage ait perduré. Puisqu'elle intervient généralement à des âges jeunes et mène à une descendance nombreuse, les migrantes auraient maintenu une fécondité élevée et freiné ainsi la transition de la fécondité au niveau national.

Cependant, les comportements familiaux albanais se sont transformés parallèlement à l'amélioration de la situation économique et sociale durant la seconde décennie. Dans ce contexte de modernisation, les migrantes se sont peut-être mariées plus tardivement et l'émancipation par rapport aux normes culturelles est susceptible d'avoir baissé leur niveau de fécondité. Ainsi, l'importante chute de l'ISF dans les villes aurait été soutenue par un changement chez les migrantes des comportements nuptiaux et des souhaits de fécondité.

De même, la baisse de la fécondité des migrantes peut s'expliquer par des ruptures momentanées du parcours reproductif, en raison notamment de la séparation des époux et des conditions de vies difficiles en début de séjour au lieu d'accueil (Goldstein and Goldstein 1983; Brockerhoff 1998).

A plus long terme, le processus d'intégration structurelle et culturelle en ville joue un rôle déterminant. Plus la durée de résidence augmente, plus les comportements reproductifs des immigrants tendent à converger vers ceux de la population locale (Kulu 2003). Les effets de l'intégration structurelle sont toutefois difficilement prévisibles en Albanie. Bien que bénéficiant d'un niveau de formation intermédiaire, les migrantes ont des difficultés d'insertions sur le marché du travail comparativement aux non-migrantes tant dans les zones d'origine que d'accueil. Nombreuses sont celles qui ont quitté le marché du travail durant la crise et se sont déclarées comme étant femme au foyer (INSTAT 2004). La migration interne semble avoir transférer des populations pauvres des régions reculés vers les villes (Zezza et al. 2005). Bien que les migrants disposent d'un revenu supérieur aux non-migrants au lieu d'origine, leur niveau de consommation et leurs conditions de santé ou de logement ne s'est pas systématiquement amélioré (Hagen-Zanker and Azzarri 2008). Ainsi, la fécondité pourrait soit augmenter en raison des faibles coûts d'opportunité, soit diminuer en raison des conditions de vie difficile. Or, l'intégration culturelle des immigrantes est supposée baisser leur niveau de fécondité puisque la vie urbaine s'est rapidement modernisée depuis l'ouverture internationale du pays en 1990. La transition de la fécondité s'en trouverait ainsi accélérée par le déplacement des populations des régions rurales vers les villes et par l'adaptation de leurs comportements reproductifs.

Toutefois, la fécondité des migrantes pourraient être moins déterminées par les nouvelles contraintes matérielles et sociales de la vie urbaine, y compris ses normes

familiales, que par les valeurs auxquelles les migrantes ont été socialisées dans l'enfance. Puisque les régions d'origine sont souvent géographiquement reculées et sont restées isolées pendant des décennies, ces normes sociales feraient perdurer une fécondité élevée indépendamment du lieu de résidence ultérieur. En outre, les immigrants résident dans des zones urbaines spécifiques, comme à Tirana (Agorastakis and Sidiropoulos 2007). Cette concentration spatiale des migrants a favorisé l'importation de leur culture rurale patriarcale afin de maintenir une identité collective et d'organiser la vie sociale dans des espace souvent dépourvue d'infrastructures et de services urbains (Voell 2003). Au vu de l'importance des ressources communautaires dans les récits d'adaptation des immigrants (Caro 2011), les femmes pourraient ainsi rester soumises à une forte pression sociale promouvant le mariage précoce et la famille nombreuse. Les influences sociales du voisinage sur les comportements reproductifs jouent en effet un rôle non négligeable dans les villes en voie de développement (Montgomery et al. 2003). L'effet de socialisation seraient ainsi soutenu au lieu de destination, ce qui retarderaient la transition de la fécondité au niveau national.

Nous postulons qu'un tel effet de socialisation a été dominant durant les années 1990, lorsque le processus d'urbanisation n'était que dans ses débuts et la retraditionnalisation de la société plus marquée. L'émancipation des migrantes face à leur socialisation et l'adaptation de leurs comportements reproductifs devraient toutefois s'accroitre avec la transformation de l'habitat urbain, la modernisation de la société et la résidence prolongée des immigrantes en ville durant la seconde décennie. La fécondité des migrantes auraient ainsi convergé récemment vers les niveaux plus faibles des citadines de naissance. Ce phénomène devrait tout particulièrement concerner les enfants issus de l'immigration, tel que White et al. (2005) l'ont observé au Ghana, en raison de leur socialisation dans un contexte urbain davantage différentié.

3.4 Données et méthodes

Conformément à l'hypothèse de la transition de la mobilité, le rôle de l'exode rural dans la baisse de la fécondité albanaise est déterminé dans une analyse transversale. Nous vérifions dans quelle mesure les comportements nuptiaux et féconds des femmes participant à l'exode rural diffèrent au cours de leur parcours migratoire des non migrantes dans les campagnes durant les deux dernières décennies.

Nos hypothèses sont testées auprès de 5'007 et 6'690 biographies féminines récoltées respectivement durant l'enquête de santé et de reproduction en 2002 (Reproductive and Health Survey, RHS) et l'enquête démographique et de santé en 2008-9 (Demographic and Health Survey, DHS). Ces échantillons de femmes en âge reproductif sont représentatifs au niveau national ainsi que pour les zones urbaines et rurales. Ils ont été sélectionnés selon un échantillonnage aléatoire en grappe: une femme a été interviewée dans chacun des ménages tirés au hasard dans les aires d'énumérations de recensement qui ont été sélectionnées proportionnellement au poids démographiques des régions dans lesquelles elles se situent. Le taux de non-réponses est inférieur à 7% (pour plus d'information voir Morris et al. 2005 et INSTAT, et al. 2010). Outre l'histoire génésique, les enquêtes fournissent des informations relatives à l'année (et au mois dans le RHS) de la dernière migration

ainsi qu'au statut urbain du lieu d'origine et d'accueil[17]. Sont considérées comme migrantes, les femmes qui ont quitté une commune de résidence rurale depuis 1990. Etant donnée l'absence d'indications relatives au mois de la migration dans le DHS, on a considéré que l'évènement s'est produit au milieu de l'année. Les interrelations entre migration et fécondité sont testées auprès de deux cohortes synthétiques. La première de 1990 à 1999 est construite à partir du RHS et la seconde de 2000 à 2008 sur la base des données du DHS. Deux aspects de la reproduction sont présentement étudiés: l'âge à l'entrée en vie féconde (soit le mariage) et l'intensité de la fécondité légitime.

Des modèles de survie multivariés en temps discret (mesuré en personnes-mois) sont spécifiés afin de tester les relations entre d'une part la migration et le mariage, et d'autre part la migration et une naissance de rang supérieur (seconde ou plus élevée; Allison 1995). Nous estimons les rapports de côtes du mariage et des évènements génésiques. La durée d'exposition au risque est respectivement contrôlée par l'âge sous forme logarithmique et l'intervalle intergénésique sous forme linéaire et quadratique – chacune de ces variables évoluant dans le temps. L'exposition au risque d'un mariage débute après le 15^{e} anniversaire avec une troncature à 35 ans; les intervalles intergénésiques sont tronqués après dix ans. L'exposition au risque est également tronquée à gauche par le début et à droite par la fin des périodes d'observation. Puisque nous analysons tous les intervalles intergénésiques ouverts par femme au cours des périodes d'observation, le modèle contrôle la parité atteinte qui évolue dans le temps, tout comme le statut et les étapes migratoires. En effet, tant les situations décisionnelles, que les projets féconds des femmes changent au cours du parcours reproductif et migratoire. L'âge n'est pas contrôlé dans le modèle de la fécondité car il est corrélé avec la parité et l'intervalle intergénésique durant les années 1990; en outre, l'introduction de cette variable n'affecte pas les rapports de côte selon le statut migratoire.

L'intérêt principal de cette analyse porte sur l'effet de la variable indexant l'émigration des zones rurales, ses étapes et ses générations. Les femmes non-migrantes dans les villes ou dans les campagnes sont distinguées de la première et de la 1,5^{e} génération d'émigrées des campagnes, qui se définissent par un départ respectivement aux âges de 15 ans ou plus depuis 1990 et de 6 à 14 ans depuis 1980. Divers effets de la migration sont testés à des étapes différentes du parcours migratoires. Les comportements familiaux au cours de la période qui précède d'au moins une année la migration indiquent d'éventuels reports des évènements familiaux en vue d'un déplacement géographique. La période migratoire est ensuite indexée par une fenêtre temporelle de deux ans centrés autour de la date de migration dans le modèle du mariage et de trois ans dans le modèle de la fécondité (soit respectivement une année précédant et deux années suivant le déplacement géographique). Si le risque d'un évènement familial est élevé durant cette période, il y a interrelation entre comportements migratoires et reproductifs (Mulder and Wagner

[17] Les femmes interviewées par le RHS ont répondus aux questions suivantes: "Depuis quand (année et mois) vivez vous continuellement dans ce lieu de résidence?"; "Avant d'arriver ici, est-ce que vous avez vécu dans une ville, un village ou à l'extérieur de l'Albanie?". Les six femmes venant de l'étranger ne sont pas considérés dans cette analyse. L'énoncé des questions du DHS ont été: "Depuis combien d'années vivez-vous continuellement dans ce lieu de résidence?" "Avant d'arriver ici, est-ce que vous avez vécu dans une grande ville, une petite ville ou un village?". Les femmes provenant d'une grande ou petite ville ont été regroupées sous la classe urbaine. Le statut urbain du lieu de destination équivaut à celui du lieu d'enquête.

1993); s'il est faible, on peut en déduire un effet de rupture[18]. La durée écoulée depuis la migration est désagrégé annuellement dans le modèle du mariage et triennalement dans le modèle de la fécondité. Les effets de l'adaptation structurelle et culturelle sont évalués en fonction du report du mariage et de la baisse de la fécondité associés à la durée de résidence. Dans le cas inverse, on peut conclure à un effet de socialisation. Enfin, les comportements de la 1.5^{e} génération de migrants confirment s'il y a eu adaptation aux normes urbaines ou si la socialisation est intergénérationnelle.

Puisque les données sont rétrospectives, la sélection des émigrantes selon leur projet familial ne peut pas être observée. Elle peut toutefois être testée par la comparaison du gradient rural-urbain estimé par deux modèles différents. Dans le premier, on distingue les non-migrantes en villes des femmes originaires de la campagne sans distinction du statut ni du parcours migratoire tel que défini précédemment. Le second modèle contrôle le statut d'émigration des campagnes. Si le déficit de fécondité urbaine par rapport aux non-migrantes des zones rurales est supérieur (inférieur) au déficit par rapport à l'ensemble des femmes originaire des campagnes, il y a sélection de femmes moins (plus) fécondes. L'importance de l'exode rurale pour la compréhension des comportements familiaux en Albanie est évaluée en fonction du compromis entre ajustement aux données et parcimonie du second modèle comparé au premier. Nous recourons au critère d'information Bayésien (BIC) qui est basé sur la statistique du rapport de vraisemblance et tient compte de la complexité du modèle et du nombre d'évènements étudiés. La destination de la migration n'est pas considérée, puisque la majorité des mouvements a contribué à l'exode rural (voir Tableau 1).

Les différentiels de mariage et de fécondité selon le statut migratoire sont contrôlés pour les effets confondant du niveau d'éducation achevé en distinguant le niveau post-obligatoire des niveaux inférieurs. La rupture du parcours génésique liée à une émigration internationale du conjoint est un biais potentiel en Albanie que nous ne sommes pas en mesure de contrôler, faute de données. Les résultats ne devraient toutefois pas être significativement affectés, car les migrants de longue durée sont majoritairement célibataires (et se marient probablement après leur retour), tandis que les hommes mariés partent davantage pour de courts séjours (Carletto et al. 2006). Puisque les principaux pays de destination sont frontaliers avec l'Albanie (l'Italie et la Grèce), les allers et retours sont fréquents et les naissances retardées ont le temps d'être récupérées.

Au vue de l'universalité du mariage en Albanie et de la baisse des naissances de rang supérieur, les rapports de côtes du mariage sont interprétés comme des différentiels de calendrier, tandis que les estimations relatives aux naissances de rangs supérieurs sont commentées en termes de différentiel d'intensité.

3.5 Résultats

Les résultats des modèles de survie sont montrés dans le Tableau 2. Le rapport de côte du mariage augmente avec l'âge et la fécondité suit une courbe en U-inversée

[18] Des tests ont démontré que les effets de la migration sur le mariage et la fécondité sont similaires durant la période précédant ou suivant immédiatement le déplacement géographique. L'enchainement temporel des comportements migratoires et reproductifs peut en effet varier et les effets de rupture peuvent soit anticiper soit être consécutifs à une migration.

selon la durée écoulée depuis le dernier évènement génésique. La principale différence entre 1990-1999 et 2000-2008 concerne la fécondité de rangs supérieurs: après contrôle des effets des autres variables, le rapport de côte associée à la parité atteinte est inférieur dans la seconde décennie par rapport à la première, indiquant la diffusion de la limitation des naissances. Les femmes disposant d'un niveau de formation post-obligatoire se marient plus tardivement et ont une fécondité plus faible comparées aux femmes moins formées. Cette différentiation socioéconomique semble également se creuser dans le temps.

Les populations urbaines se marient plus tardivement que le groupe de référence constitué de la population d'origine rurale (Modèle 1). Cela est particulièrement le cas en 1990-1999, tandis qu'en 2000-2008 la différence est faible et statistiquement non significative. Si la prise en compte du statut d'émigration de la population d'origine rurale augmente la qualité du modèle (comme l'indique la baisse du BIC; Modèle 2), le gradient urbain-rural s'inverse étonnement parmi les non-migrantes: les femmes restées dans les campagnes se marient plus tardivement que celles des villes. Les émigrantes semblent donc être sélectionnées en fonction de l'âge au mariage. L'attente d'une émigration retarde le mariage jusqu'à l'année précédant le départ, mais ces deux évènements coïncident généralement parmi les migrantes et ceci à des âges plus jeunes comparés aux non-migrantes. Les rapports de côtes du mariage sont si élevés durant la période migratoire qu'il est difficile de conclure à un effet de rattrapage mais bel et bien à une interrelation entre comportements migratoires et nuptiaux. L'importante sélection migratoire selon l'intention de se marier jeune et l'interdépendance de cet évènement avec le départ en ville est susceptible d'expliquer l'étonnant retard du mariage parmi les femmes restées dans les campagnes. Elles attendent probablement, elles aussi, l'opportunité pour se marier et de partir.

Lorsque ces deux évènements démographiques ne sont pas synchronisés, les migrantes se marient également plus jeune que les non migrantes – et cela quelle que soit la durée de séjour. L'effet de socialisation semble ainsi dominer les comportements nuptiaux des femmes participant à l'exode rural. Puisque les enfants des émigrants, partiellement socialisés en villes, se marient également plus jeunes, on peut conclure à un effet de socialisation intergénérationnelle.

Contrairement à notre hypothèse, la sélection migratoire et son interdépendance avec un mariage précoce semble se renforcer au lieu de s'atténuer durant la période 2000-2008: les migrantes se marient d'autant plus jeune par rapport aux non migrantes. Les effets de socialisation persistent également. Après l'émigration, le rapport de côte du mariage diminue certes avec la durée de résidence mais reste très élevé par rapport aux femmes restées dans les campagnes. Cependant, l'anticipation du mariage parmi les enfants issus de l'émigration n'est statistiquement plus significative en 2000-2008, indiquant une tendance vers l'adaptation des comportements aux normes urbaines.

TABLEAU 2: EFFETS DE L'ÉMIGRATION DES FEMMES ISSUES DES ZONES RURALES SUR LE MARIAGE, COMPARÉS AU NON MIGRANTES SELON LE LIEU DE RÉSIDENCE (RÉGRESSIONS LOGISTIQUES EN TEMPS DISCRET, FEMMES 15-34 ANS, ALBANIE 1990-1999 ET 2000-2008.

	Mariage			
	1990-1999		2000-2008	
	Modèle 1	Modèle 2	Modèle 1	Modèle 2
	RC Sig	RC Sig	RC Sig	RC Sig
Age (éch. log)	26.61 **	14.91 **	11.39 **	7.27 **
Education[+]				
Au plus niv obl.	1	1	1	1
Post-obligatoire	0.75 **	0.76 **	0.55 **	0.57 **
Origine urbaine et statut migratoire				
Urbain	0.59 **	1.23 **	0.95 ns	3.01 **
Rural	1		1	
-Non migrant		1		1
-1.5e génération d'émigrants		1.48 *		1.43 ns
-Jusqu'à 1 ans avant l'émigration		0.76 **		0.98 ns
-Pendant l'émigration		8.32 **		21.61 **
-2e année après l'émigration		2.33 **		32.54 **
-3e année ou plus après l'émigration		2.00 **		3.70 **
N tronqués	168’993	168’993	163’365	163’365
N évènements	2’014	2’014	7’85	7’85
BIC	21’037	19’673	9’694	8’844

Source: RHS 2000 & DHS 2008/9. Notes: les individus ayant migré à l'âge de 15 ans ou plus avant 1990 sont exclus; [+] n'évolue pas dans le temps; * ou ** = statistiquement significatif à 90% ou 95%.

Comme pour le mariage, les non-migrantes des villes ont un niveau de fécondité inférieur à celui des femmes originaires des campagnes (Modèle 1 dans Tableau 3). Le contrôle du statut migratoire n'améliore pas l'ajustement du modèle 2. On n'observe d'ailleurs aucune différence significative de fécondité selon le statut d'émigration, la durée de résidence ou la génération de migrants en 1990-1999. Cela confirme un effet de socialisation.

TABLEAU 3: EFFETS DE L'ÉMIGRATION DES FEMMES ISSUES DES ZONES RURALES SUR LA FÉCONDITÉ, COMPARÉS AU NON MIGRANTES SELON LE LIEU DE RÉSIDENCE (RÉGRESSIONS LOGISTIQUES EN TEMPS DISCRET, FEMMES 15-44 ANS, ALBANIE 1990-1999 ET 2000-2008.

	Naissances de parité supérieure [b]							
	1990-1999				2000-2008			
	Modèle 1		Modèle 2		Modèle 1		Modèle 2	
	RC	Sig	RC	Sig	RC	Sig	RC	Sig
Parité atteinte	0.90	**	0.89	**	0.49	**	0.51	**
Année depuis dernier évènement génésique	1.09	**	1.10	**	1.07	**	1.07	**
- au carré	0.999	**	0.999	**	0.999	**	0.999	**
Education[+]								
Au plus niv obl.	1		1		1		1	
Post-obligatoire	0.85	**	0.85	**	0.61	**	0.60	**
Origine urbaine et statut migratoire								
Urbain	0.81	**	0.82	**	0.63	**	0.76	**
Rural	1				1			
-Non migrant			1				1	
-1.5[e] génération d'émigrants			0.84	ns			2.28	**
-Jusqu'à 1 an avant l'émigration			1.10	ns			0.65	*
-Pendant l'émigration			1.02	ns			0.94	ns
-3-5 années après l'émigration			0.98	ns			1.37	**
-6-8 années après l'émigration			0.97	ns			1.34	**
-9 années ou plus après l'émigration							1.14	ns
N tronqués	93'233		93'233		269'287		269'287	
N évènements	2'188		2'188		1'487		1'487	
BIC	19'717		19'752		17'367		17'375	

Source: RHS 2000 & DHS 2008/9. Notes: les individus ayant migré à l'âge de 15 ans ou plus avant 1990 sont exclus; [+] n'évolue pas dans le temps; * ou ** = statistiquement significatif à 90% ou 95%; [b] les intervalles sont tronqués après neuf années écoulées depuis l'évènement génésique précédant.

Durant la seconde décennie, le différentiel urbain-rural se creuse mais se réduit légèrement après contrôle du statut migratoire. Les émigrantes semblent donc être davantage sélectionnées dans les régions rurales parmi les femmes désirant plus

d'enfants en 2000-2008. En effet, les différentiels de fécondité selon le statut d'émigration sont significatifs. Si les candidates à l'exode rural reportent les naissances en vue d'un départ, celles-ci sont récupérées durant la période d'intégration structurelle et particulièrement dans les années consécutives. Le niveau de fécondité des migrantes est significativement supérieur à celui des non-migrantes entre la troisième et la neuvième année de résidence, ce qui indique un effet dominant de la socialisation aux normes familiales rurales[19]. La fécondité élevée des enfants issus de l'émigration des campagnes confirme cette interprétation, bien qu'il s'agisse ici en partie d'un effet générationnel. Certaines de ces femmes aux parités supérieures se sont mariées durant la décennie précédente et continuent à afficher des comportements familiaux traditionnels.

3.6 Discussion et conclusion

Parallèlement à la réémergence des mouvements migratoires depuis la fin du régime communiste en Albanie, la fécondité a diminué de moitié. Des populations plus fécondes se sont déplacé des régions périphériques vers les villes et leurs alentours, où elles se sont confrontées à de nouveaux styles de vie et de nouvelles contraintes matérielles ou sociales susceptibles de motiver le désir d'une famille plus restreinte. Notre analyse a tenté de vérifier dans quelle mesure l'exode rural a contribué à la baisse de la fécondité albanaise au niveau national. Le calendrier du mariage et l'intensité de la fécondité des non-migrantes ont été comparés à ceux des migrantes issus des campagnes en considérant leur parcours migratoire ainsi que la génération de migrants. Nous avons postulé que les interactions entre migration et fécondité ont évolué dans le temps au gré des transformations de l'Albanie depuis 1989. Durant la première décennie marquée par de crises économiques et politiques, nous avons anticipé une interdépendance entre l'émigration rurale et le mariage traditionnel ainsi qu'une fécondité élevée parmi les migrantes en raison d'un effet de socialisation dominant. Durant les années consécutives de stabilisation économique et de modernisation sociale, nous avons supposé une émancipation des migrantes par rapport aux normes traditionnelles et une adaptation accrue de leurs comportements aux réalités urbaines. Or, nos résultats ne montrent guère de telles évolutions entre les deux périodes.

L'exode rural des femmes a été très sélectif et cela en fonction des projets familiaux. Il a non seulement concerné celles voulant se marier à un jeune âge et avoir une famille nombreuse, mais leur mariage a aussi coïncidé avec le départ des campagnes. Au lieu de diminuer en importance, la sélection démographique et la synchronisation des évènements ont été maintenus comme dans le passé socialiste, si ce n'est de manière plus marquée encore. Ces résultats contrastent avec la diffusion du retard du mariage observée dans le pays. Ainsi, le changement historique des comportements nuptiaux semble concerner uniquement les non-migrantes. Le contexte urbain n'a pas non plus eu d'impact significatif sur la fécondité légitime des migrantes. C'est la socialisation aux comportements reproductifs dans

[19] Puisque l'approche est transversale, le différentiel de fécondité associée à la durée de séjour confond les expériences de deux types de migrantes différentes: celles qui ont migré à l'occasion de leur mariage et celle qui ont quitté les campagnes ultérieurement aux parités supérieures. Des analyses séparées pour les deux groupes ont démontré le même effet de socialisation sur leur fécondité (non montré).

les régions d'origine qui a déterminé leur niveau de fécondité au lieu de destination. Comme pour le mariage, le différentiel de fécondité selon le statut migratoire s'accroît lorsque le modèle familial à enfant unique se diffuse durant la seconde décennie. Aucun effet de rupture et d'adaptation au contexte urbain n'est observé. Ces phénomènes sont non seulement soutenus dans le temps mais aussi à travers les générations de migrantes. On décèle toutefois une tendance vers la convergence amorcée par la dernière cohorte d'enfants issus de l'émigration et socialisée dans un contexte davantage urbain.

L'étroite interdépendance entre migration et mariage précoce, ainsi que la sélection migratoire en fonction des projets familiaux, soulignent l'importance des migrations traditionnelles alors même que ré-émergent en Albanie des formes de mobilité modernes, tel que l'exode rural et la migration internationale de la main-d'œuvre. Si ce constat concurrence les effets supposés de la modernisation et les théories économiques de la mobilité, il s'inscrit dans un contexte spécifique. L'Albanie s'est caractérisée par une soudaine ouverture internationale, un rattrapage de l'urbanisation auparavant freinée par le régime communiste ainsi que par des traditions nuptiales exogames et patrilocales. Le pays a connu d'importantes transformations socioéconomiques dans un contexte de fortes pressions démographiques durant la crise institutionnelle et économique qui ont suivi l'effondrement du communisme. Suite à la levée des restrictions administratives de la mobilité, de futures conjointes ou jeunes couples mariés ont quitté les régions rurales soudainement dépourvue d'emplois et de services jadis administrés sous la planification centrale. L'extraversion internationale du pays a renforcé la position privilégiée des villes comme moteur de développement économique et de changement social, attirant les jeunes adultes des campagnes pour réaliser leur projet familiaux dans un environnement nouveau.

Le nouvel essor des migrations matrimoniales s'insère également dans un contexte social marqué d'une réaffirmation de la culture patriarcale albanaise. Le mariage traditionnel a peut-être constitué un prérequis social au départ de jeunes femmes du foyer parental. Lors de l'arrivée dans les villes, les migrantes ont soit maintenu leurs préférences de fécondité soit sont restées sous l'influence sociale d'une communauté d'immigrés faisant perdurer ainsi des normes et des traditions rurales dans le nouvel espace de vie urbain. En outre, le faible coût d'opportunités des enfants pour les migrantes est susceptible de soutenir ces effets culturels et sociaux sur leur fécondité.

Une autre explication stipulerait une interrelation spécifique entre migration internationale, exode rural et fécondité. En effet, l'émigration internationale est dominée par les hommes tandis que les mouvements internes concernent principalement les femmes (INSTAT 2004). Moyennant l'hypothèse d'une orientation traditionnelle des émigrés internationaux, les comportements reproductifs des migrantes internes pourraient avoir résulté de mariages transnationaux entre un émigré et une Albanaise au pays d'origine, suivit du regroupement familial et de la réalisation des projets féconds au lieu de retour des émigrés. En effet, ceux-ci préfèrent s'installer dans les zones économiquement centrales que de retourner dans leurs régions reculées d'origine, entraînant ainsi une migration interne de l'épouse vers les centres urbains.

Quelques soient les raisons de la résistance des femmes participant à l'exode rural face aux transformations que connait la famille albanaise contemporaine, cette analyse a montré que le contexte socioéconomique et culturel peut jouer un rôle non

négligeable sur les interactions entre migration et fécondité. Alors que l'urbanisation et la baisse de la fécondité en Albanie semblaient associées au niveau macro-démographique, la transition de la fécondité est principalement attribuable à la transformation des comportements familiaux de femmes non-migrantes tant dans les campagnes que dans les villes. L'exode rural a freinée la transition de la fécondité au lieu de la soutenir. Elle n'a pas altéré les comportements familiaux des migrantes mais est resté liée à la constitution d'une famille albanaise traditionnelle menant à une descendance nombreuse. Ainsi, l'association entre migration et mariage semble avoir affectée la transition de la fécondité par un effet à long terme à travers l'entrée précoce en vie reproductive. Dans une société patriarcale, la constitution d'une famille à un jeune âge peut avoir des répercussions sur l'ensemble du parcours fécond, comme l'indique les effets de socialisation persistants sur la fécondité des migrantes en ville. Tant la sélection migratoire que son interdépendance avec le mariage patriarcal pourrait être à l'origine de ces effets de socialisation. Nos résultats soulignent donc une étroite interrelation entre les différents effets de la migration sur la fécondité qui mériterait davantage d'investigation.

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Chapter 4. Does indirect exposure to international migration influence marriage and fertility in Albania?[20]

Abstract

Our knowledge of the interactions between international migration and fertility in sending countries is biased towards family members left behind, who constitute a minority and decreasing share of populations. In this article, we assess the potential for social effects and investigate the role played by indirect exposure to emigration in family behaviour, using data from multiple survey rounds in Albania. Structural, economic and social effects at the household level had a limited importance. Marriages were postponed and marital fertility was reduced because of the transformation of the larger social context, as indicated by the importance of community migrant networks and by changes in women's aspirations, which are induced by the perception of the prospects and benefits of migration in the society at large. The effects of emigration on the fertility transition seem therefore to be independent of periodic fluctuations in population flows and their associated economic benefits.

4.1 Introduction

The role attributed to international migration during the first demographic transition (i.e. the sequenced fall in a population's death and birth rates) has changed. According to the Malthusian perspective, emigration relieves demographic pressure and leads to a postponement of population adjustments deemed necessary for long-term sustainability. The fertility transition is delayed, leading to higher demographic growth in the long run (Friedlander 1969). However, international migration in a globalised world is accompanied by an extension of social and economic relations across national borders. Living conditions in sending households and communities are transformed, and reproductive behaviours may change accordingly. Fargues has presented convincing evidence that contemporary emigration has accelerated the pace of national fertility transitions, thereby attenuating global population pressure (Fargues 2006).

Although cross-country analyses have confirmed a positive correlation between emigration to low fertility countries and a sending countries' fertility decline (Beine et al. 2008; Naufal and Vargas-Silva 2009), results from case studies based on individual data are mixed. Migration exerts competing pressures on the fertility of women left behind – including the transformations of demographic structures and of economic and social determinants. These may confound or compensate for each other, as they operate at multiple levels of social organisation. Our knowledge is biased towards effects arising from the direct exposure to migration within the family left behind, despite the fact that this population is shrinking with the progress in the fertility transition and the development of the migratory phenomenon. The number of dependents declines with smaller family size, and is further depleted by family reunifications and chain migrations of extended kin. The world-wide trend in postponed marriages and childbearing above the peak ages of migration also implies a rise of a new generation of "individualistic" migrants who no longer leave a nuclear

[20] This article has been rejected for publication by an international journal.

family behind (Fargues 2011). Consequently, an increasing share of the population is exposed only indirectly to the migration phenomenon.

In this article, we assess the main channels through which emigration influences childbearing patterns in Albania – a former communist country which has experienced large-scale international movements – to inform thinking on the sustainability of its role in the fertility transitions of less developed countries. While controlling for effects of direct exposure to emigration, we focus on the impact through the change in the larger social context, which has been considered by many analysts to be crucial for female autonomy and fertility decline (Charbit and Petit 1996; Hugo 2002; Omondi and Ayiemba 2003; Haas and Van Roooij 2010). We analyse social effects at the community level and fill a gap in the literature in evaluating the role of women's changing aspirations as induced by the perception of migratory prospects and benefits in the society at large. The use of multiple rounds of survey data enables us to situate these effects in women's reproductive careers, by investigating family enlargement and a major proximate determinant of fertility – female age at marriage. Given the feedback effects of marriage patterns on female autonomy and childbearing, the investigation of this life course transition should increase our understanding of the interactions between emigration and family behaviours.

The next section introduces the Albanian context. We then review international evidence of the emigration-fertility nexus in order to specify our expectations related to indirect exposure in Albania. Following the description of data and methods, we assess the prerequisites for migrants' social diffusion of low fertility patterns, comparing their level of period fertility abroad to that of residents. We then analyse the reproductive behaviours of women left behind in a longitudinal and multivariate modelling perspective to take into account the different effects of emigration operating at multiple levels of social organisation. The Albanian case challenges our understanding of the role of migration in national fertility transitions. Conventional factors which directly affect women left behind had a limited importance. Indirect exposure to the migratory phenomenon was the main driver of postponed marriage and reduced fertility. The influence of migration on Albania's fertility transition seems therefore to be long-lasting and independent of period fluctuations in population flows and the associated economic benefits.

4.2 The Albanian context

Albania is an interesting setting for our purpose because of its large scale international migration and the social transformations since the fall of communist rule. Located within Europe on the border of the Adriatic Sea, the society existed in complete autarchy for more than three decades under Enver Hoxha's totalitarian regime. People were denied the right to move internally or abroad, and the fertility transition was late, starting with a total fertility rate (TFR) of 6.8 in the 1960s to reach 3 children per woman by 1990 (Gjonca et al. 2008). Two thirds of the population still lived in rural and mountainous areas and the level of sanitary and economic development was low.

During the first decade of transition to democracy and a market economy, Albanians experienced social upheavals alongside economic crises and became aware of the much higher living standards in Western Europe. This constituted a major incentive to move abroad to find a new livelihood (King and Vullnetari 2003, Carletto et al. 2006).

Initiated in a tumultuous period, emigration then followed a typical South-European pattern. The first waves were dominated by male workers, and were followed by a feminisation caused by increasing family reunifications since the end of the 1990s, when many illegal migrants were “regularised” in the main destination countries, Italy and Greece (Azzari and Carletto 2009; Stecklov et al. 2010). The emigrant stock represented a third of the resident population in 2009 (Kupiszewski et al. 2009).

Migration was an integral part of Albania's post-communist society. Almost three quarters of communities experienced “a lot” of emigration according to the 2002 Living Standard Measurement Survey, and more than 60% of inhabitants intended to leave the country in 1992, against 18% in 2009 (Papaganos and Sanfey 2001; Kupszewski et al., 2009). As the main destination countries, Italy and Greece, were characterised by lowest-low levels of fertility, the potential for an international diffusion of new reproductive behaviour was high. With the opening up of Albanian society, the economy restructured at a fast pace. This was sustained by large in-flows of migrant remittances, which represented up to 20% of annual GDP and significantly alleviated poverty (Zwager et al. 2005). The delay in urbanisation was caught up, and modern life-styles were diffused. On the other hand, traditional social institutions have also gained renewed importance in social organisation because of a regulatory and political vacuum during the first crisis decade (Fisher 1999; Nixon 2009). Persistent traces of patriarchy continued to promote early marriages and high fertility through a value emphasis on pre-marital virginity, son-preference, as well as social pressure and intergenerational influences (Lerch 2013b).

In a setting of continuous birth limitation, the appearance of the one-child family model in cities and progressively postponed marriages, the TFR in 2006-9 was half the level observed in 1990 (1.6, down from 3; Lerch 2013a). This rapid decline, alongside the sudden exposure of Albania's society to the modern world, provides a unique setting in which to investigate the role played by international migration in the adoption of low fertility patterns.

4.3 The emigration-fertility nexus and expected effects arising from indirect exposure in Albania

There has been a shift over the last fifty years in the debate about the consequences of migration for the empowerment and family behaviours of the women left behind. The mainly negative view of the 1970s-80s emphasised these women's dependency on emigrated husbands and their maintenance in poorly-developed reproductive contexts (Brown 1983; Griffith 1985, Unesco 1985). Recent assessments, however, are more nuanced. An increase in female autonomy and a lower fertility have been highlighted, although there is considerable diversity in country-specific evidence. The competing effects of emigration on family behaviours fall into three main groups: structural effects, economic consequences and social change.

The literature is biased towards economic and structural effects on family members left behind. Spousal separation is among the most direct consequences of migration, with negative effects on childbearing through the interruption of sexual intercourse, although the births deficit is often partially recuperated upon the return of the migrant (Lindstrom and Saucedo 2002; Clifford 2009; Agadjanian et al. 2011). During the absence of household members, women take on an increased workload to compensate for the lost labour. This can not only conflict with childrearing (Davis 2011), but also provide women with more responsibilities and thereby increase their

decision-making power within the family (Yabiku et al. 2009). Their freedom in reproductive matters may increase accordingly. Moreover, male-dominated outflows affect the gender balance of local marriage markets. Since there is a scarcity of men, women's period of marital search may be extended, leading to postponed marriages.

As the main rationale of migration is the improvement of the household's living standards, financial benefits in the form of remittances transform the economics of reproduction. The additional income source may increase fertility preferences and alleviate financial constraints to family formation, enabling women to meet social norms (Abernethy 2006; Agadjanian, et al. 2011). Moreover, a strategy of household income diversification through migration may favour high fertility because it maintains intergenerational wealth flows from children to parents. The future anticipated benefits attached to an additional child, who is expected to migrate at adult age, outweigh the current costs (Stark 1981). Alternatively, rising living standards resulting from remittance receipts may change the value of children and general consumption aspirations. Rather than sustaining high fertility, parents may prefer smaller families, in which they can invest more in each child (Becker 1981; Fargues 2006; Davis 2011).

Emigration also exerts more diffuse effects in society because it constitutes a channel of international social interaction, which hastens fertility transitions in less developed countries (Bongaarts and Watkins 1996). Social interaction within migrant networks is particularly prone to the diffusion of new ideas and behaviours because it is intentional, systematic and often embedded in strong family ties (Levitt 1998). Emigrants experiencing new reproductive contexts may thus diffuse these in their country of origin – especially when the fertility differential with the country of destination is strongly positive (Lindstrom and Saucedo 2002; Fargues 2006). Alternatively, the presence of high fertility norms at destination may increase the level of childbearing among women left behind (Bertoli and Marchetta 2013).

The intensity of social diffusion depends on the extent to which emigrants adapt their own attitudes and behaviours to the norms observed at destination. A main intervening variable is thus the duration of residence abroad, as it determines the opportunities to integrate. Mexican women exposed to permanent migration had a lower fertility than those in temporary migrant households (Massey and Mullan 1984; Lindstrom and Saucedo 2007). Moreover, diffusion of new reproductive behaviours has been argued to be more effective when occurring within the strong ties of marriage rather than through weaker family ties (White 2011).

However, the limited evidence available on the objects of social diffusion indicates that migrants tend to transmit knowledge of modern contraceptive means rather than family ideals (Lindstrom and Munoz-Franco 2005). Thus the larger social context plays a crucial role in obstructing or enhancing the adoption of new reproductive practices. Moreover, as families reunify abroad and migrants move before they marry and have children, an increasing share of women left behind can be expected to be concerned only by the contextual effects of emigration, which constitute the focus of this analysis.

Besides the intensity of population mobility, its gender composition is important in terms of the social effects in origin communities. Male breadwinner outflows from Mexican communities strengthened the patriarchal family culture, which implies a lower bargaining power for women, thereby increasing fertility. A higher participation of women in community emigration, by contrast, was associated with lower fertility,

highlighting the importance of social interaction within female networks for the diffusion of innovative reproductive behaviour (Lindstrom and Saucedo 2002, Agadjanian, et al. 2011). Given the diversity of Albania's social changes since the fall of communism – modernisation which competes with persistent traces of patriarchy- we may expect the social diffusion of low fertility to increase with the scale of the community migrant network, as well as with the representation of women in the outflows.

Social change should also determine how women respond to the structural effects of male-dominated out-flows on marriage markets. When marriage postponement is not socially acceptable, women may marry at a younger age and choose to marry older men to avoid the increasing competition for mating partners of their own age. Given men's social role as family bread-winners abroad in these communities, early female marriages may also be motivated by women's specialisation in reproductive functions (Choi 2011). Yet given the large-scale departures of Albanian men, we might expect the strong structural effects on the local marriage markets to undermine the social pressures on women to marry young, and thus to contribute to the emerging postponement of the event.

Beyond personal networks at the family or community level, emigration also transforms the sending society at large. Remittances sustain consumption and investments, which promote local development (Taylor 1999). New fashions and life styles also penetrate the society during the migrants' visits back home. This demonstration of the benefits and modernity brought about by international migration is liable to transform individual aspirations, and, more specifically, to increase the incentives for future departures. In their eagerness to develop their migration opportunities, young people left behind may also engender a boom in further and higher education. As only a minority of candidates will successfully move abroad, the resident population ends up with a higher educational level than without migration prospects (Stark et al. 1998).

This indirect exposure to the migration phenomenon in the society at large may thus induce a postponed and lower fertility because of new individualistic life projects and the transformation of social structures. More women spend longer periods in school and face higher opportunity costs of childbearing relative to the prospects of a better paid job. Despite its importance for fertility transitions in sending countries, this hypothesis has never yet been tested rigorously at the individual level. There was indeed a recent boom in further and higher level education in Albania, and a large share of the population considered migrating but ultimately decided to stay (about a third of the adult residents in 2009; Kupiszewski, et al. 2009). This leads us to expect later marriage and lower fertility among women who have perceived the benefits and prospects of migration, particularly when they are highly skilled.

4.4 Data and research strategy

To assess the potential impacts of the social effects of migration on Albanian fertility, we first compare the TFR of migrants abroad with that of the resident population. Family behaviours in Albania are then investigated according to the direct and indirect exposure to emigration in a multivariate perspective.

The main data used for this analysis are taken from the Albanian Living Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS). The LSMS is regularly implemented by the Albanian

Institute of Statistics (INSTAT), with technical support from the World Bank, and provides information on socioeconomic conditions and international migration, additionally reporting women's marriage and birth history. During the first baseline survey in 2002, which was representative at the national and urban/rural level, 3,599 households were interviewed. Sample selection followed a stratified two-step cluster sampling with replacement and the non-response rate was lower than 10% (World Bank and INSTAT 2003). A community questionnaire was also administered. In the countryside, communities were defined as villages including the surrounding residential areas, whereas in urban municipalities community leaders defined the boundaries. A subsample composed of 1782 households was then re-interviewed during two panel waves in 2003 and 2004 (ISER 2004; INSTAT 2005).

The TFR of emigrants refers to the period 1997-2001 and is estimated using the own children method of fertility estimation (see Cho et al. 1986) applied to the population of Albanian nationality in the IPUMS sample of the Greek Census in 2001 (i.e. 2,960 children aged less than five years and 1,1891 women aged 15 to 53)[21]. However, the conventional age-standardized TFR inflate the level of immigrant fertility during periods of family reunification because births are only observed at destination. Immigrants often do catch up with childbearing immediately upon arrival in order to recuperate the delay accumulated prior to the move (due to spousal separation, migratory preparations, etc.; Toulemon 2004; Parrado 2011). To control for this tempo effect of immigration on fertility estimates, we also computed Toulemon's fertility indicator (Toulemon 2004). It is obtained as a weighted sum of the average pre-migratory number of children ever born to arrival cohorts (classified by age at immigration) and the post-migratory duration-specific fertility rates, with the weights being the age structure of immigrants at arrival. Estimates for women left behind refer to the period 1998-2001 and are based on the birth histories of 4,497 women aged 15 to 53 years, interviewed during the LSMS 2002.

The multivariate analysis relies on the prospective data available for the subsample of households that participated in the LSMS 2002 baseline survey and at least the first of the two panel waves in 2003 and 2004. The binary dependent variables constitute the occurrence of a marriage or a higher order birth during the inter-survey periods of 12 months each, as reported in the household rosters of the panels. The first birth is of little interest since it is tied to and shortly follows marriage. The analytical samples are composed of 655 unmarried women aged 15-39 and 1,203 married mothers aged 15 to 49 in 2002, living respectively in 233 and 279 communities.

The different effects of migration are estimated by discrete-time binary logistic regression of marriage and higher order births among 1,204 single women-years and 2,279 married mother-years, respectively. We use survival analysis to control for time-varying individual characteristics, spousal separation, remittance receipts and the development of family migrant networks (see below). Exposure to the events starts with the onset of the first person-year or the attainment of the lower age-limit; it terminates either after experiencing the events of interest, by reaching the upper age-

[21] Age-specific fertility rates are obtained through a linkage of children to their mothers living in the same household to obtain the age of mother at birth. Unfortunately, comparative estimates cannot be provided for migrants in Italy because Albanians are indistinguishable from other nationalities in the IPUMS samples of the Census 2001.

limits or the end of the second person-year. As the average interval between marriage and the second birth is 5 years in Albania (Lerch 2013a), the samples do not include the same women. Standard errors of the estimated odds ratios (i.e. exponential of the logged odds) are adjusted for the clustering of women at the community level.

To account for the lag between the observation of the events and the women's situation at the time of marriage planning or conception, all independent variables refer to the start of each person-year of observation (i.e. they are measured based on the previous survey round). Thus, the use of panel data enables the effects of emigration to be situated within the process of family formation, avoiding the usual bias implied by the anticipatory analysis inherent to retrospective data. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the covariates as well as details on their definition.

Indirect exposure to social effects is proxied by the intensity and the gender-balance of migration at the community level, where social interaction can be expected to matter most. High emigration communities were defined as those where "a lot" of people went to work abroad according to the community leader, who responded to the LSMS 2002 community survey; 70% of women-years lived in such settings. The gender composition of the migrant network, by contrast, is estimated indirectly by the sex-ratio of the community population aged 15-65 at the Albanian Census 2001; to eliminate the confounding effect of internal migrants, these were redistributed according to their community of residence in 1989. A value above 104 indicates dominant female migration, whereas a lower value means dominant male migration. The average community had 97 men for 100 women.

The sex ratio in the marriage model refers to the single population. It thus tests the net effect of gendered social interaction, on the one side, and of the structural impacts due to gender selective outflows on the relative availability of men in the local marriage market, on the other. Sex ratios are estimated separately for each five-year age-group of women to account for the standard age-segmentation of mating[22]. Since young women are overrepresented among singles and male emigration was highest at these ages, the average community-level sex ratio among singles is low (i.e. 72 men for 100 women). The relevance of using the community's intensity and gender balance of emigration as proxies for social effects is confirmed by the very weak correlations (at best) between these variables and other contextual impacts of migration, such as the improvement in local living conditions.

The LSMS 2002 also provides the question “did you ever consider moving abroad, even temporarily?”. 19% of single woman-years and 26% of mother-years responded positively. Willingness to migrate was motivated to a larger extent by individual factors than by household structures. It was more prevalent among young and higher educated adults, in the median wealth strata and in urban areas (Castaldo et al. 2007). As these populations were the most exposed to the modernization of society, we interpret this willingness as a new aspiration in life induced by the demonstration of the benefits and prospects of migration in the society at large. Although the predisposition to move could be related to other processes –such as limited local employment opportunities for women, high community intensity and social

[22] The ratio of the number of men to the number of women aged five years less on average is computed (i.e. the numbers of men aged 20-29, 25-34, 30-39, etc are divided respectively by the number of women aged 15-24, 20-29, 25-34, etc)

acceptance of migration – correlation tests showed only very weak associations (at best).

Because women may limit the number of dependent children to facilitate emigration, or may bring forward family events to increase their opportunity to reunify with a partner abroad, we tested the exogeneity of the predisposition to migrate. The residuals of a selection model to the willingness to move, which includes the average willingness of other household members as instrument (i.e. uncorrelated with the women's family events), were introduced as additional regressors in the marriage and birth models. Since in both cases these residuals did not have a significant effect on the event of interest, there is no overlap in unobservable characteristics that affect migration intentions and family behaviour. We therefore kept with a reduced-form equation. The postponement of family events in order to adjust skills to increase the opportunity to move abroad is tested using interaction effects of the willingness to migrate and educational attainment.

The role of indirect exposure to migration is controlled for different effects at the household level, to which a smaller share of women were exposed. Current (lagged) spousal separation concerned 5% of mother-years. When interaction effects with the women's status on the labour market are specified to test the role of labour compensation, the adjusted main effect of spousal separation can be interpreted as a disruption effect. Prior spousal separation was observed for 15% of mother-years. When fertility recovers upon the return of the husband, recuperation effects are at work; alternatively, female empowerment and social diffusion of new reproductive patterns can be deduced.

Temporary migration of current household members concerned 16% of single women-years and 10% of mother-years. Moreover, 33% of single women-years and 61% of mother-years had at least one extended family member (i.e. sibling) living permanently abroad. The sex of siblings was not distinguished as exploratory tests showed no differential effect. Labour compensation is again tested through interaction effects with women's economic activity, so that the main effects of family networks can then be interpreted as social effects. Exploratory tests showed that the models fit best when using linear functions of the network variables. Annual cash and in-kind remittance receipt, as measured by a dichotomous variable, concerned more than a fifth of women-years. We also controlled for heterogeneous effects according to the household's poverty status. Women who migrated abroad were not considered because of the low prevalence in the sample (less than 2%).

TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND DEFINITION OF COVARIATES, WOMEN-YEARS AGED 15-49 EXPOSED TO MARRIAGE OR HIGHER ORDER BIRTHS, 2002-04 ALBANIA.

Variable *(and details of definition)*	**Measure**	**Exposed to :**	
		marriage	**higher order birth**
Age	mean	20.0	
Age at first child	mean		22.4
Number of children ever born	mean		2.7
Duration since last birth (years)	mean		7.6
Urban residence	percent	44.9	49.4
Post-compulsory education	percent	23.1	40.3
Enrolled in school	percent	32.8	
Economically active	percent	33.3	46.7
Poor	percent	28.5	25.2
Exposure to migration			
Considered emigrating *(binary)*	percent	18.7	26.0
Remittance receipt *(binary)*	percent	23.8	22.1
Siblings permanently emigrated *(cumulated years of residence, in the marriage model; number of siblings abroad, in the birth model)*	percent	32.8	60.7
Temporary emigration *(number of months spent abroad since 1997)*	percent	16.1	10.2
Husband currently abroad *(in months)*	percent		5.4
Prior emigration of husband *(in months since 1997 up to the penultimate year preceding observation)*	percent		15.1
Community has experienced "a lot" of emigration abroad	percent	70.1	68.0
Sex-ratio of community population left behind *(N of men for 100 women)*	mean	72	97
Total	Number	1204	2279

Source: LSMS 2002-4, Census 2001.

The models also control for confounding effects of known socioeconomic determinants of reproductive behaviour in Albania (see Gjonca, et al. 2008; Lerch 2013a). In the marriage model, we control for women's age (introduced as a linear and quadratic function), place of residence (urban / rural), educational attainment

(distinguishing post-compulsory education from lower levels), and three dichotomous variables for school enrolment, economic activity and poverty. In the fertility model, we account for the linear effects of parity, birth interval and age at first birth as a proxy for the timing of marriage (which is unknown prior to the panel surveys). The above mentioned socioeconomic confounders (except school enrolment) are also controlled for.

As the transition to marriage is almost universal in Albania, we focus on the role emigration played in its timing, which is indicated by main and age-interacted effects. If the main effect lowers the likelihood of marriage but interaction effects increase with age, marriage postponement can be deduced. If the main effect increases the likelihood of marriage, but interaction effects decline with age, migration has the effect of bringing the event forward in time. To analyse the stopping pattern of marital fertility, by contrast, only main effects are needed.

Given the simultaneous analysis of different effects of migration, there is a risk of colinearity in the regressors. We therefore start with estimating different "single-effect" models including the socioeconomic confounders and only one indicator of migration. A first series of models only includes main (and age-interacted) effects; heterogenous effects are then explored through the use of socioeconomic interacted variables. We complete the analysis with a "multiple-effects" model including all indicators of migration to comment on the competition between effects operating at different levels of social organisation.

4.5 Results

Differences in the TFR between emigrants and the resident population of Albania

The age-standardized TFR was only slightly lower for emigrants in Greece than for Albanian residents in 1998-2002 (1.9 vs. 2.3, with a 95%-confidence interval of 2–2.6). Mussino and Strozza (2012) and Tsimbos (2008) even reported a higher migrant fertility for 2005 in both Italy and Greece (i.e. 2.75 and 2.5, respectively). Our own and particularly their estimates refer to a period characterised by numerous family reunifications, which led to high levels of childbearing immediately upon arrival in Italy (Mussino and Strozza 2012).

The Toulemon indicator of fertility, which controls for this tempo effect, evinces a similar phenomenon in Greece. The adjusted level of migrant fertility is indeed significantly lower than among Albanian residents (1.5 vs. 2.3; not shown). Descriptive statistics did not indicate a strong migrant selection according to educational attainment. Migrants either adapted to the reproductive regimes at destination or were selected from women with lower fertility preferences at origin. Thus, the potential for international diffusion of low fertility in Albania is confirmed.

Marriage of women left behind

Tables 2 and 3 show the results from the single- and multiple-effects marriage models, respectively. As the coefficient of demographic and socioeconomic confounders remained unaffected by the introduction of the indicators of migration exposure (except in the cases of interactions, discussed below), we do not show those from the single-effect models. The likelihood of marriage is an inverted U-shaped function of age (see Table 3). Most socioeconomic control variables have statistically significant effects, which are consistent with known marriage differentials

in Albania. More educated women are less likely to marry, especially when enrolled in school. Women living in poor households also marry less, which may result from financial constraints. The main effects of urban residence and women's economic activity were not statistically significant.

The role of migration is shown alongside the single-effect models' improvements in the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC, which takes into account model fit and parsimony) compared to a reference model including only the confounders (Table 2). The most important factor for marriage was clearly the gender balance of local out-flows (M6 in Table 2). This model is the best according to the BIC. A more equal representation of single men and women in the community was significantly associated with postponed female marriage, whereas a scarcity of men brought the event forward. The intensity of community migration was significant neither in the single-effect nor in the multi-effects model (see M5 in Table 2 and M2 in Table 3). Women's marriage is primarily determined by the structural consequences of migration for the marriage market and gendered social interaction at the community level, rather than by the level of migration.

Although the model including the women's willingness to move performed less well according to the BIC, this variable nevertheless affected marriage (M4 in Table 2). The main and age-interacted effects were small and not significant. These were in fact confounded by heterogenous effects according to educational attainment: among women willing to leave Albania, those holding a post-compulsory diploma were characterised by a significantly reduced likelihood of marriage. The main effect of educational attainment, by contrast, weakened when this socioeconomic interaction effect was controlled for in the model. Thus, a share of the lower likelihood of marriage among higher educated women was due to their frequent willingness to move abroad, which may have motivated continuous education. Structural, economic and social effects arising from direct exposure to migration in sending households were not significant in the single-effect models.

Interesting differences in the results emerge from the multiple-effects when compared to the single-effect models of marriage (Table 3). Postponement of the event associated to permanent emigration of siblings indeed increased. Yet its main effect and the interaction effect with economic activity – indicating respectively a role for social diffusion and labour compensation – were only significant when the gender balance in the local marriage market was controlled for (M1; Table 3). Thus, the marriage postponement associated to the presence of sibship members abroad was negatively confounded in the single-effect model by the opposite impact on marriage associated with these women's frequent residence in communities dominated by male emigration.

However, the within-sibship social diffusion lost its significance when remittances were controlled for in the model (compare M1 and M2 in Table 3). The lower likelihood of marriage associated to economic activity and the presence of siblings abroad, by contrast, was robust when competing effects of migration were controlled for (M2). This points to a dominant role for labour compensation.

TABLE 2: EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE TO MIGRATION ON MARRIAGE, RESULTS FROM SINGLE-EFFECT DISCRETE-TIME LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS (WITH SOCIOECONOMIC CONFOUNDERS; NOT SHOWN), WOMEN AGED 15-39, ALBANIA 2002-4.

	Exposure to emigration & interacted confounders	**Main & age-interacted effects** OR S		**Main, age- & socioeconomic interacted effects** OR S	
M1	**Person-years of sibship permanent migration**	0.93	ns	0.94	ns
	Interaction with age	1.004	ns	1.004	ns
	Economic activity (*ref* = non active)	0.93	ns	1.09	ns
	Interaction with activity			0.95	ns
	BIC differential (M ref - M)	-7		-9	
M2	**Person-months of household temporary migration**	1.03	ns	1.03	ns
	Interaction with age	0.998	ns	0.997	ns
	Economic activity (*ref* = non active)	0.86	ns	0.83	ns
	Interaction with activity			1.03	ns
	BIC differential (M ref - M)	-5		-9	
M3	**Remittance receipt (*ref* = no receipt)**	0.47	ns	0.37	ns
	Interaction with age	1.04	ns	1.04	ns
	Poverty (*ref* = non poor)	0.55	***	0.46	****
	Interaction with poverty			1.92	ns
	BIC differential (M ref - M)	-9		-12	
M4	**Considered emigrating (*ref* = not considered)**	1.02	ns	0.34	ns
	Interaction with age	0.99	ns	1.06	ns
	Post-compulsory education (*ref* = lower levels)	0.43	****	0.55	***
	Interaction with education			0.23	***
	BIC differential (M ref - M)	-9		-10	
M5	**High community emigration (*ref* = none or low)**	0.64	ns		
	Interaction with age	1.02	ns		
	BIC differential (M ref - M)	-9			
M6	**Sex-ratio of marriage market**	0.95	***		
	Interaction with age	1.002	****		
	BIC differential (M ref - M)	**4**			
Number of woman-years		1204		1204	
Number of events		116		116	

Source: LSMS 2002-4, Census 2001. Note: OR = Odds ratios; S = Statistical significance <0.01=****, <0.05=***, <0.1=**; M ref = model of reference including only socioeconomic confounders; M = M ref including only one modality of exposure to emigration; socioeconomic confounders not shown (except those interacted).

TABLE 3: DETERMINANTS OF MARRIAGE, RESULTS FROM MULTIPLE-EFFECT DISCRETE-TIME LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS, WOMEN AGED 15-39, ALBANIA 2002-4.

Explanatory variables	**M ref**		**M1**		**M2**	
	OR	S	OR	S	OR	S
Intercept	-10.5	****	-9.36	****	-9.37	****
Age	2.11	****	2.36	****	2.45	****
Age squarred	0.99	****	0.98	****	0.98	****
Post-compulsory education (*ref* = lower level)	0.43	****	0.43	****	0.56	**
Urban (*ref* = rural)	0.94	ns	0.87	ns	0.83	ns
Enrolled in school (*ref* = not enrolled)	0.21	****	0.24	****	0.24	****
Economic activity (*ref* = not active)	0.90	ns	1.08	ns	0.98	ns
Poverty (*ref* = poor)	0.55	***	0.59	***	0.49	***
Person-years of sibship permanent migration			0.89	***	0.91	ns
- interaction with age			1.01	***	1.01	***
Person-months of household temporary migration					1.00	ns
- interaction with age					1.00	ns
Remittance receipt (*ref* = no receipt)					0.14	ns
- interaction with age					1.09	ns
Considered emigrating (*ref* = not considered)					0.55	ns
- interaction with age					1.04	ns
High community emigration (*ref* = none or low)					1.41	ns
- interaction with age					0.98	ns
Sex-ratio of marriage market			0.94	****	0.93	****
- interaction with age			1.003	****	1.003	****
Socioeconomic interactions:						
- Permanent emigration & econ. activity			0.95	**	0.95	**
- Temporary emigration & econ. activity					1.03	ns
- Remittances & poverty					2.12	ns
- Considered emigrating & education					0.18	***
N of woman-years	1204		1204		1204	
N events	116		116		116	
BIC differential (M ref - M)	ref		-3		-41	

Source: LSMS 2002-4, Census 2001. Note: OR = Odds ratios; S = Statistical significance <0.01=****, <0.05=***, <0.1=**.

Thus, living in a typical migrant sending community which was dominated by the outflow of men promoted young female marriages, unless the absence of the

women's own siblings called for labour compensation in the parental household. Other effects of migration remained not significant in the multiple-effects model.

Higher order births of women left behind

Tables 4 and 5 show the results of the single- and multiple-effects models of higher order births, respectively. The introduction of the indicators of migration again did not change the coefficients of demographic and socioeconomic confounders (those from the single-effect models are therefore not shown). Fertility declines with parity and duration since the previous birth (Table 5). Socioeconomic control variables were in the expected direction, but not statistically significant. Migrant selection according to local fertility regimes was also controlled for, but was excluded from the final model as its effect was not significant and did not affect the results (not shown).

However, in a way which is consistent with patriarchal norms, women who had an early onset of childbearing had a significantly higher fertility than those who postponed family formation (Table 5). Earlier marriage in communities experiencing male-biased emigration (Table 3) thus leads to larger families.

The most important effect of migration for marital fertility was related to women's willingness to move abroad, as this single-effect model was the best according to the BIC (M5 in Table 4). The willingness to migrate strongly and significantly decreased fertility. This effect did not differ according to educational attainment.

The model that accounts for the community-population's sex ratio was the second-best: more gender-balanced (or female-dominated) emigration significantly reduced fertility, whereas male dominated outflows increased the likelihood of births (M7). The intensity of community migration had no significant impact in the single-effect model (M6).

Although the quality of the single-effect model including husband's migration status worsened, current separation significantly decreased fertility. Yet there were no differences according to women's economic activity during the period of separation. Births also appear to be partially but significantly recuperated upon the husband's return (M1 in Table 4). This post-migration recovery in fertility negates the idea of a within-couple diffusion of new reproductive patterns. Other effects arising from direct exposure to migration did not significantly affect the likelihood of higher order births when competing effects are disregarded.

TABLE 4: EFFECTS OF EXPOSURE TO MIGRATION ON HIGHER ORDER BIRTHS, RESULTS FROM SINGLE-EFFECT DISCRETE-TIME LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS (WITH SOCIOECONOMIC CONFOUNDERS; NOT SHOWN), MOTHERS AGED 15-49, ALBANIA 2002-4.

	Exposure to emigration & interacted confounders	Main effects only		Main & socioeconomic interacted effects	
		OR	S	OR	S
M1	**Months of spousal separation**	0.83	***	0.85	***
	Months of prior spousal separation	1.03	****	1.03	****
	Economic activity (*ref* = non active)	1.42	ns	1.45	ns
	Interaction: separation & activity			0.87	ns
	BIC differential (M ref - M)	-2		-7	
M2	**Number of siblings permanently abroad**	0.94	ns	0.94	ns
	Economic activity (*ref* = non active)	1.45	ns	1.42	ns
	Interaction with activity			1.02	ns
	BIC differential (M ref - M)	-4		-8	
M3	**Person-months of household temporary migration**	0.89	ns	0.89	ns
	Economic activity (*ref* = non active)	1.46	ns	1.46	ns
	Interaction with activity			1.01	ns
	BIC differential (M ref - M)	-4		-9	
M4	**Remittance receipt (*ref* = no receipt)**	1.27	ns	1.17	ns
	Poverty (*ref* = non poor)	0.83	ns	0.75	ns
	Interaction with poverty			1.51	ns
	BIC differential (M ref - M)	-4		-8	
M5	**Considered emigrating (*ref* = not considered)**	0.44	***	0.51	ns
	Post-compulsory education (*ref* = lower levels)	0.91	ns	0.99	ns
	Interaction with education			0.67	ns
	BIC differential (M ref - M)	**4**		**0**	
M6	**High community emigration (*ref* = none or low)**	0.73	ns		
	BIC differential (M ref - M)	-3			
M7	**Sex-ratio of marriage market**	0.98	**		
	BIC differential (M ref - M)	-1			
	Number of mother-years	2279		2279	
	Number of events	85		85	

Source: LSMS 2002-4, Census 2001. Note: OR = Odds ratios, S = Statistical significance <0.01=****, <0.05=***, <0.1=**; M ref = model of reference including only

socioeconomic confounders; M = M ref including only one modality of exposure to emigration; socioeconomic confounders not shown (except those interacted).

TABLE 5: DETERMINANTS OF HIGHER ORDER BIRTHS, RESULTS FROM MULTIPLE-EFFECT, DISCRETE-TIME LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODELS, MOTHERS AGED 15-49, ALBANIA 2002-4.

Explanatory variables	**M ref**	**M1**	**M2**	**M3**
	OR S	OR S	OR S	OR S
Intercept	2.02***	5.21****	5.71****	5.80****
Age at first child	0.89****	0.89****	0.89****	0.88****
Children ever born	0.41****	0.40****	0.38****	0.38****
Years since last child	0.85****	0.85****	0.85****	0.85****
Urban (*ref* = rural)	0.94ns	0.81ns	0.80ns	0.81ns
Post-compulsory education (*ref* = lower level)	0.88ns	0.88ns	0.87ns	0.96ns
Economic activity (*ref* = not active)	1.47ns	1.50**	1.42ns	1.35ns
Poverty (*ref* = poor)	0.82ns	0.85ns	0.91ns	0.82ns
Number of siblings permanently abroad				0.89ns
Person-months of household temporary migration				0.63ns
Months of prior spousal separation			1.03****	1.04****
Months of current spousal separation			0.83***	0.84***
Remittance receipt (*ref* = no receipt)				1.32ns
Considered emigrating (*ref* = not considered)			0.43***	0.49ns
High community emigration (*ref* = none or low)		0.66**	0.63***	0.64**
Community population sex-ratio		0.97***	0.97***	0.97***
Socioeconomic interactions:				
- Permanent emigration & econ. activity				1.04ns
- Temporary emigration & econ. activity				1.00ns
- Current spousal separation & econ. activity				0.88ns
- Remittances & poverty				1.29ns
- Considered emigrating & education				0.70ns
N of mother-years	2279	2279	2279	2279
N events	85	85	85	85
BIC differential (Mref - M)	ref	-3	-1	-31

Source: LSMS 2002-4, Census 2001. Note: OR = Odds ratios; S = Statistical significance <0.01=****, <0.05=***, <0.1=**.

The differences between the results from multiple- and single-effects models are again instructive regarding the interplay of different effects of migration (Table 5). The negative effect on fertility associated with the intensity of community migration increased and became significant when combined with the gender-composition of the out-flow (M1). Thus, social effects of large-scale emigration were negatively

confounded in the single-effect model by the fact that men often constitute the majority of movers in these communities, which has competing influences on childbearing.

Furthermore, the multiple-effects model that additionally controls for the husbands' migratory status and the women's predisposition to emigrate is the best according to the BIC (M2 in Table 5). Thus, the reduction in marital fertility related to high and gender-balanced (or female-dominated) community emigration, as well as to women's willingness to move, competes with the fertility disruption-and-recuperation effects associated with spousal separation. Other impacts of migration remained not significant in the multiple-effects models.

4.6 Discussion and conclusion

Albanian society experienced rapid socioeconomic and political transformations following three decades of autarchy under communist rule. Large scale international migration since 1990 was a driving force of these changes. We investigated its role in the completion of the national fertility transition. As spouses and kin reunify abroad, and migrants increasingly move before a postponed marriage, the number of family members left behind is shrinking. We thus analysed how women's marriage timing and fertility was affected by social interaction with community migrant networks and by increased individual aspirations, which were induced by the perception of migration prospects and benefits in the society at large. Using panel survey data, we were able to control these effects for other impacts arising from direct exposure to migration within sending households, avoiding the usual bias related to anticipatory analysis.

The results challenge our understanding of the impact of emigration on fertility transitions in sending countries. Direct exposure is shown to have had a limited importance. The fertility-disruption effect of spousal separation seemed to be compensated for by a recuperation of births upon the return of the husband. Income effects were not significant. The need to compensate for lost labour in the household only postponed women's marriages. Single women may have filial duties towards their parents, who would have been left socially isolated in a patrilocal society following the emigration of sons and the early out-marriage of daughters.

The low tempo-adjusted TFR among migrants abroad confirmed the prerequisite for an international social diffusion of low fertility patterns into Albania. Yet fertility reduction was not diffused through the strong ties of marriage. Social effects through other family members who were either temporarily or permanently established abroad were also not significant or not robust when competing effects of migration were controlled for. This low empowerment of women in migrant sending families is congruent with their move into informal, subsistence and vulnerable household economies (Iara 2009; Mendola and Carletto 2009). Even women's short-term migration did not empower them because it was often bound to a household strategy to deal with economic shocks (Stecklov, et al. 2010).

A major conclusion of our analysis is that family behaviours were strongly affected by indirect exposure to emigration. Birth reduction was diffused through weak ties to community members abroad. As observed elsewhere, fertility was lowest and marriage was postponed to a larger extent when women could interact with female networks. Yet despite the strongly skewed marriage markets, male-biased emigration

strengthened patriarchal norms of early family formation, which increases fertility. This may be explained by women's high competition for the material security provided by a marriage into a wealthy migrant-sending family. Engaging in the mating process while being young and socially more desirable may indeed increase their success. The direction of causality could also be inversed, as marriage plays an important role in the local institutionalization of the migratory phenomenon. The arrangement of traditional unions between emigrants and women in sending communities is a means of ensuring the formers' loyalty towards the population left behind, including economic support (Guilmoto and Sandron 2000). A third of women who married in our sample during the observation period left the country. They most probably joined their husbands abroad, which would corroborate the high fertility of Albanians immediately upon arrival in Italy and Greece.

This paradoxical predominance of weak ties over strong ties in the diffusion of new fertility behaviour can be explained by their importance as bridges between strongly tied networks and the society at large. Weak ties increase both access to information and exposure to the demonstration of innovation (Granovetter 1973). This is particularly pertinent in patrilocal societies, in which strong and hierarchical family ties are crucial vectors of behavioural control. Moreover, the success of migratory projects often rests on the support of, and cooperation within the family (Stark and Bloom 1985). Given the strains on social relations exerted by distance, the fulfilment of the implicit migratory contract between migrants and those left behind is more likely in the context of stable family and gender roles, which maintain the status quo in the reproductive sphere.

Our results also confirm the important role played by the perception of migration prospects and benefits in the society at large, which triggered a spread of human capital in Albania. Women aspiring to international mobility had lower marital fertility, and the higher skilled among them postponed their marriages. Since many emigration candidates ended up staying in the country, these anticipatory family behaviours ultimately sustained the national fertility transition. The Albanian evidence confirms a major role for international migration in fertility decline through the transformation of the larger social context, rather than through a change in women's situation within sending families. More research is needed not only to increase our understanding of the pathways of influences at the contextual level, which include social and economic processes - but also to develop more precise measurements of these mechanisms.

We conclude that migration does not stop influencing the sending country's fertility transition when spouses and kin join migrants abroad, when people emigrate before marriage, or when remittance flows decline. As long as social relations with the sending society are maintained, the cumulative development of migrant networks abroad promotes social change, which supports the emergence of new family behaviours that weaken the root causes of future migration. Furthermore, the feminisation of outflows can be expected to particularly intensify the social diffusion of low fertility. The main effects of migration on Albania's fertility transition therefore seem to be sustainable and independent of period fluctuations in population flows and their associated economic benefits.

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Chapter 5. The role of migration in the urban transition: a demonstration from Albania[23]

Abstract

Although it is recognized that natural increase has been the main driver of post-war urban growth in developing countries, urban transition theory predicts a dominant role for population mobility in the early and late phases of the process. To account for this discrepancy between theory and empirical evidence, we demonstrate the complex role played by internal and international migration in the pattern of urban growth. Using a combination of indirect demographic estimations for post-war Albania, we show that the dominant contribution of natural increase from the 1960s to the 1990s was induced by a limited urban in-migration; this was due to the restrictions on leaving the countryside which were imposed under communist rule and, thereafter, to the redirection abroad of rural out-migrants. Although young adults in cities also engaged in international movements and significantly reduced their fertility, the indirect effects of rural-to-urban migration attenuated the fall in urban birth rates and postponed demographic ageing. In-migrants swelled urban cohorts of reproductive age and delayed the urban fertility transition. Despite a high level of urban natural increase in Albania, we thus conclude that the role of population mobility dominated in the early and most recent phases of urban growth. The results also have implications for our understanding of demographic processes during the second urban transition in developing countries.

5.1 Introduction

The worldwide level of urbanization has increased at a fast pace since the end of the Second World War, with more than half of the global population living in urban areas in 2009 (United Nations 2012). Although this transformation from a mainly rural to a predominantly urban society (referred to as the urban transition) constitutes a potential for cultural and economic development, it has also brought about social and environmental challenges related to the pace of urban growth. The increase from 300 million urban inhabitants in developing countries in 1950 to 2.6 billion in 2010 (United Nations 2012) has outpaced the absorption capacity of labour markets and the development of infrastructure and social services. This has undermined public health and exacerbated the risks of environmental hazards. Since the majority of future increments to the world population are expected to be concentrated in these cities, monitoring of the demographic sources of urban growth remains crucial in order to better meet population needs.

It is recognized that urban natural increase – rather than rural-to-urban migration – was the main driver of post-war urban growth in developing countries (Preston 1979; Chen et al. 1998). Yet urban transition theory predicts a dominant role for population mobility in the early and late phases of the process. To account for this discrepancy between theory and empirical evidence, we investigate the complex role played by migration. We consider internal and international movements (hereafter referred to as out-/in-migration and emigration/immigration, respectively), and assess to what extent the growth contribution of urban natural increase depends on the demographic selectivity of migrants, as well as on the changing destination of rural outflows. The

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focus on the spatial redistribution of population and reproductive potential is also timely, as developing countries are completing their first demographic transition (i.e. the sequential fall of death and birth rates) – implying a low, if not negative, level of natural increase. The United Nations (2012) indeed expect a large share of urban growth in the future to take place in China and South-Eastern Asia, where fertility is already low. Since the demographic impact of international migration should increase in this global context, we propose a procedure of indirect estimation to account for it in appraisals of urban transitions.

The different effects of migration are explored using cross-sectional data for developing countries, and are demonstrated in a case study of Albania. This former communist country is an interesting setting because it has experienced not only contrasting migration regimes since 1944, but also marked population pressure alongside institutional and economic transformations, which are considered the main drivers of urban transition. Moreover, the post-communist period witnessed a steep rise in urban growth, leading to congestion effects in urban labour markets, schooling and medical facilities, as well as to health challenges related to environmental degradation (Pojani 2009). The present study assesses the underlying demographics to inform urban planning and development strategies.

Following an introduction to the case study context, we review demographic models of the urban transition and discuss the role of migration in order to anticipate urban growth patterns in Albania. A combination of indirect demographic estimations of the sources of post-war urban growth is then analysed, highlighting the changing patterns of population mobility according to the socioeconomic and institutional context. We show how the dominant contribution of natural increase from the 1960s to the 1990s was induced by restriction on rural-to-urban migration under communist rule and, thereafter, by its redirection abroad. A decomposition of the change in the urban crude birth rate since 1989 provides further evidence that rural-to-urban migrants indirectly sustained its level because they swelled urban cohorts of reproductive age and delayed the urban fertility transition. While non-migrants' lowest-low fertility and age-selective emigration have triggered demographic ageing in cities, rural-to-urban migration has postponed the process. Despite a high level of urban natural increase in Albania, the analysis concludes that population mobility did indeed dominate urban growth in the early and also the recent period. The results have implications for our understanding of demographic processes during the second urban transition in developing countries.

5.2 The Albanian context

Albania is an outlier in the puzzle of urbanization trends in Central and Eastern Europe (Hamilton et al. 2005; Mykhnenko and Turok 2007). While both total and urban populations stagnated in many countries during communism, Albania's demographic trajectory kept to the model observed in developing countries. In 1944, a predominantly rural society was dispersed across a mountainous territory. With the establishment of communist rule, major advances in public health led to a rapid decline in mortality, but fertility remained high until the 1960s. Demographic pressure was therefore sustained in the Albanian countryside during the second half of the 20th Century, although the fall in the total fertility rate (TFR) was rapid – from 6.8 in 1965 to 3 in 1990 and 2.3 in 2001 (Falkingham and Gjonca 2001; Gjonca et al. 2008). With the onset of birth postponement and the appearance of the one-child family model,

the TFR reached sub-replacement levels in the 2000s (Lerch 2013a; INSTAT et al. 2010).

The country experienced a discontinuous pace of economic development, which was related to institutional and political changes that also strongly affected population mobility. In the 1950s and 1960s an accelerated process of communist modernization emphasised the development of heavy industry and transport infrastructure. Economic growth then stagnated in the 1970s and reversed in the 1980s. The severing of Albania's last two diplomatic relationships with foreign countries (the USSR and China) led to a stall in technological transfers and a degradation of industrial equipment (Ditter and Gedeshi 2000).

During the communist period, Albanian society existed in complete autarchy under one of the most restrictive regimes in the world. The population was denied the right to move abroad. Internal movements were also strictly controlled from the mid-1960s onward, through interregional allocation of the labour force in the context of industrial decentralisation, rural retention and a zero urban growth policy (Sjöberg 1992, 1994). These political measures coincided with a cultural revolution and institutional changes in agriculture (i.e. the completion of land collectivisation). They also aimed to increase agricultural production during the period of international isolation, with the stated goal of self-sufficiency (Borchert 1975). With only 36% of the population living in urban areas in 1989, the country was among the least urbanised and poorest in Europe.

The post-communist privatization process was accompanied by a sharp rise in unemployment, as former industries closed down and the public sector contracted (World Bank 2007). Rural institutions transformed with the per-capita distribution of land, which atomized agricultural plots and undermined the widespread subsistence agriculture. Social upheavals, during the collapse of the regime and economy in 1991-92, and a banking crisis in 1996-97, exacerbated uncertainty. As Albania opened up to the world, people engaged in large-scale migration to find a new living in the neighbouring countries of the European Union (Italy and Greece). Rural residents also moved en masse to domestic cities, where social and economic change was concentrated (King and Vullnetari 2003; INSTAT 2004a). Although remittances played a crucial role in sustaining household consumption and in the country's fast-paced economic recovery since 1993, one third of rural households still lived under the national poverty line in 2002 (INSTAT et al. 2009).

The second transition decade, by contrast, saw a political and economic consolidation with high rates of GDP growth (7 % annually) and the development of the service sector (World Bank 2007). Although there was a marked decline in rural poverty, to 15% in 2009 (INSTAT, et al. 2009), unemployment remained high, especially among young mothers, who retreated from the labour market in large numbers following the end of compulsory participation under communism (INSTAT 2004b). The labour market situation was worse in secondary cities than in the capital, which was the main beneficiary of Albania's new economic extraversion; underemployment remains widespread in rural areas. The trend in migration continued unabated: the number of emigrants represented more than a third of Albanian residents in 2011, and there was a rapid catching up in the process of urbanization, with more than half of population living in cities (INSTAT 2012).

5.3 Demographic models of urban transition and the complex role of migration

The urban transition arises generally – but not necessarily, as shown in this case study – from urban population growth, which is driven by migration and natural increase (in addition to the reclassification of rural areas). The respective contribution of these components depends on the demographic and socioeconomic context. In this respect Albania is an interesting case study, because of the fast rate of completion of the first demographic transition alongside discontinuous institutional and economic change. Its contrasted migration regimes also provide a unique setting for demonstrating the role played by population mobility. To anticipate urban growth patterns in Albania, we review demographic models, report international assessments and discuss the complex effects of migration.

Demographic and mobility transition

Zelinsky (1971) provided a national model of population change during the historical process of urbanization in contemporary developed countries. According to his hypothesis of a mobility transition, an increase in migration parallels the course of the first demographic transition alongside modern economic development. From a demographic point of view, push factors of migration are emphasised (Kinsley Davis 1963; Dyson 2011). During the demographic transition, the high level of natural population growth in rural areas exerts strains on resources, which are exacerbated by technological and institutional innovations in the agriculture sector leading to a redundant labour force (i.e. enclosure, selective inheritance). Demographic pressure is relieved by fertility decline and rural out-migration to domestic cities or foreign locations. The economic point of view emphasises pull factors of migration related to regional inequalities during the take-off phase of modern development. Opportunities in the expanding industrial or service sectors of cities attract potential migrants (Todaro 1980; Kelley and Williamson 1984), and the development of transport infrastructure facilitates mobility (Ravenstein 1885; Massey 1988). With a fall in birth rates in increasingly urbanized and developed societies, Zelinsky predicts a decline in rural out-migration alongside a rise in intra- and inter-city movements, as well as in immigration.

Demographic trends in Eastern Europe during communism conformed to Zelinsky's model, although the decline in the rural exodus was determined by state policies and administrative restrictions (Fuchs and Demko 1978). These institutional and economic changes were very marked in Albania and should have induced a discontinuous pace of rural exodus. Starting with a sustained level in the early phase of demographic transition and communist modernization, we would expect a later decline because of the imposed population immobility, the spatially balanced industrialization and the subsequent economic stagnation. Social liberalisation in 1990 and the process of privatisation should have again pushed people out of agriculture into cities, particularly in the last decade when the urban economy experienced sustained growth.

Differentiating the demographic transition in rural and urban areas

Although Zelinsky's hypothesis is contextualized by the first demographic transition, it focuses on the level, patterns and destinations of migration. This reflects its empirical basis, which is constituted by the historical experience of Western Europe, where migration played a major role in urban growth. Cities were indeed demographic sinks

up to the mid-19th Century. Death rates declined at a similar pace when compared to the lagged trend in birth rates, so that urban natural increase remained limited (Kingsley Davis 1965; Bairoch 1985). But in developing countries the international diffusion of public health led to a faster decline in death rates when compared to birth rates. Urban natural increase was higher and consequently dominated urban growth (Kingsley Davis 1965; Preston 1979; Bairoch 1985). To monitor these differences in growth patterns, the first demographic transition in rural and urban areas must be differentiated.

Vries' (1990) model decomposes the population growth of a closed country (i.e. without international migration) in its urban and rural sector. He distinguishes three phases in the historical process of urbanization according to the relative importance in urban growth of rural-to-urban migration and urban natural increase (Vries 1990; Dyson 2011). In the first phase, populations are stabilized through a continuing inflow of migrants that compensates for high mortality. In the second phase, as sanitary improvements become effective in lowering death rates, urban growth is sustained by natural increase. In the third phase, the drop in urban death rates to below the rural level leads to higher urban than rural natural increase (assuming similar birth rates[24]), which consequently dominates urbanization.

Migration also exerts “feed-back effects” on the pattern of urban growth, which are mediated by the level of urbanization (Keyfitz 1980; Montgomery et al. 2003). The primary role attributed to rural-to-urban migration in the early phase is related to the small size of cities. Sustained in-migration then accelerates urban growth, which hastens the dominance of natural increase in a larger population. Urban in-migration must also decline with the depopulation of rural areas. Since death rates were already low in the 1950s in Albania, urban natural increase should have progressively dominated urban growth over the course of urbanization.

However, fertility decline is particularly fostered by the dense social interaction and rapid structural changes in urban society, including the spatial separation of production and reproduction, rising living costs and the increased value of education (Tabutin 2000). At the end of the first demographic transition, the urban TFR may therefore fall below the generational replacement level, and populations start ageing. When natural increase becomes negative, urban growth must again be dominated by migration (Rogers 1982).

Urban growth patterns in developing countries and the complex role of migration

Recent evidence for developing countries challenges urban transition theory. The role of urban natural increase in fact remains dominant in urban growth – even at relatively high and (not infrequently) low levels of urbanization (i.e. above 60% and under 30%; Chen, et al. 1998). Admittedly estimates are biased because of the establishment of migrants in the outskirts of cities, as well as the difficulty of distinguishing rural reclassification from its demographic drivers. But there is also a tendency to overlook the complexity in the dynamics and impacts of migration, which are potentially important in contexts of socioeconomic change and low fertility. More specifically, a demographic model of urban transition should include international migration and the interactions between growth components (Weeks 2011).

[24] Although age-specific fertility is usually lower in urban areas when compared to rural ones, this is compensated by a lower dependency ratio of urban populations leading to similar crude birth rates.

Although international movements constituted an integral part of Zelinsky's hypothesis, they have usually been ignored in assessments of contemporary urban growth – although Berry and Kim (1994) highlighted their significance. The interactions between internal and international migration and natural increase also remain under-appreciated. This may account for the discrepancy between theory and empirical evidence in the patterns of urban growth in developing countries. To demonstrate the role of population mobility, we re-open the model of urban growth to international movements and disaggregate it by migrant status to distinguish direct, indirect and induced effects. These are discussed with reference to Figure 1, in which a stylized evolution in the urban growth components is plotted according to the increasing level of urbanization (starting with the end of Fries' first phase).

Direct effects of migration

A declining rate of in-migration leads to a reversal in urban growth patterns, with natural increase starting to dominate (at point B in panel (i) of Figure 1). In highly urbanized populations which have completed the first demographic transition, international migration becomes crucial for urban growth. With the onset of the second demographic transition in the 1960s in Europe, ideational changes manifested themselves in a diversification of family life courses, leading to postponed and strongly reduced fertility (Van de Kaa 1987). Given the ageing and natural decline of populations, demographic stabilisation depends on immigrants who may ultimately constitute the majority of residents in the future (Coleman 2006). Cities are particularly prone to this cultural diversification because they are the national entry-gates for immigrants, while higher-class families looking for environmental amenities move to the urban periphery (Berry and Kim 1994). The pattern also characterizes large cities in the United States, where older people's locational preferences for lower size-class areas increasingly dominate internal migration because of the ageing of population (Plane et al. 2005). The substitution of international for internal urban in-migration in the context of a shrinking rural reservoir of population has been referred to as the second urban transition of developed countries (Skeldon 2008). Its onset occurs at point K in panel (i) of Figure 1, leading to the dominance of urban growth by net immigration at point Z.

International urban migration matters in less urbanized contexts as well. Up to the 19th century, cities in the Americas and the Maghreb grew mainly through colonial settlement (Bairoch 1985), which often originated in European cities (Baines 1985). In contemporary West Africa, international migration has sustained urban growth in more developed coastal areas during periods of economic development, whereas return flows have led to a levelling off in times of crisis (Bocquier and Traoré 2000). Similarly, forced movements, trans-migration and the resettlement of Russians in the satellite states of the Soviet Union increased urban populations. Return movements depleted them during the period of post-communist crisis and nation-state building (Mitchneck and Plane 1995; Tammaru 2002; Mykhnenko and Turok 2007). A similar crisis-led emigration from Albanian cities should be expected to have taken place during the 1990s.

FIGURE 1: STYLIZED PATTERNS OF URBAN GROWTH AND THE EFFECTS OF MIGRATION.

(i) Direct effect



(ii) Induced effect



(iii) Indirect effect



Note: NI = natural increase; NM = net migration; other capital letters stand for the intersection between lines, which indicate a change in the patterns of urban growth (see text).

Induced effects of migration

The balance between international and city-ward out-migration from rural areas exerts induced effects on the demographic pattern of urban growth. Evidence from 19th Century Europe and contemporary developing countries indeed points to a substitutability of these out-flows. The dominance of one over the other has varied according to the relative economic attractiveness of their destinations, which has been determined by an alternation of their respective business cycles – especially when national economies were closely interlinked (Thomas 1973; Massey 1988; Hatton and Williamson 1998). Contemporary international migrants move within economic world regions from the so-called labour frontier – constituted by peripheral, small and isolated economies – to regional economic centres (Skeldon 1997). As Albania constitutes the immediate labour frontier of the European Union, the penetration of social influences and foreign capital has increased awareness of and information about foreign destinations. This may have redirected the rural exodus abroad during the crisis in the 1990s.

Skeldon (2008) defined the substitution of international for internal rural exodus during economic crises and structural adjustments as the onset of the second urban transition in developing countries, leaving domestic cities short-circuited by migration flows. Lower urban in-migration must induce a higher relative contribution of natural increase to urban growth, and may hasten the reversal in its demographic pattern (at point C rather than B in panel (ii) of Figure 1). Such an induced effect should also be expected to arise from the restrictions imposed on urban-ward movement in many developing countries (UNFPA 2007), and, particularly, from the zero-urban growth policy in communist Albania.

Indirect effects of migration

The importance of urban natural increase in developing countries' urban growth has also been related to the indirect demographic impact of migration (Martine 1972, 1975; Todaro 1984), which includes structural and behavioural effects. The arrival of mainly young adults inflates the level of natural increase because it augments the urban birth rate and lowers the death rate (Keyfitz and Philipov 1981; Rogers 1982; Montgomery et al. 2003); the inverse happens with age-selective emigration. These structural effects on urban growth can be expected to be particularly strong when pull factors – to which young people without strings attached are more sensitive – play a significant role in the migrant decision-making process (Williamson 1988). In the early phases of the mobility transition, men also tend to move mainly abroad, whereas women constitute the majority of rural-to-urban migrants (Ravenstein 1885; Skeldon 1997). This gender selectivity can arise from various social dynamics (including cultural prescriptions, gendered household tasks and low-skilled jobs in the urban economy) and should intensify the structural increase in urban birth rates.

Behavioural effects may delay the urban fertility transition. Although the level of childbearing of rural-to-urban migrants tends to be lower than that observed in the high-fertility settings from which they originate, and their family behaviours increasingly converge towards the urban standard with duration of residence, this process often takes more than one generation (Goldstein and Goldstein 1981; White et al. 1995; Brockerhoff 1998). The redirection abroad of a share of rural exodus may further delay this adaptation, if domestic migrants are negatively selected in terms of socioeconomic status, relative to those who can afford to move abroad. Poor

residents do indeed have higher fertility in developing countries' cities (Montgomery et al. 2003).

The inflation of urban natural increase by in-migration hastens its dominance in the process of urban growth (from point A to B in panel (iii) of Figure 1). Conversely, immigration in developed countries' cities extends the period during which natural increase dominates urban growth (until point Z rather than X in panel (iii)). As the rural exodus of Albania mainly originated from the North-Eastern and South-Eastern highlands, where fertility was traditionally higher, behavioural effects should be significant. Structural effects can be expected to a lesser extent, particularly in the first decade of transition in the societal system, which motivated undifferentiated migration in other post-communist contexts (Mitchneck and Plane 1995).

Exploring the role of migration in developing countries' urban growth

An exploratory analysis of cross-country decennial estimates of the components of urban growth in the developing world for the 1960s to the 1980s (United Nations 2001, 2011)[25] supports our main hypotheses. There is a weak positive correlation between net international migration and urban growth (r=0.30, statistically significant at 95%). The data also point to a substitutability of international and internal rural out-migration, as well as to its induced effect on the pattern of urban growth: international migration correlated weakly but negatively with net rural out-migration (r=-0.27), and positively with the decennial decline in the urban ratio of net in-migration to natural increase (r=0.29). The relevance of indirect demographic effects of population mobility on the level of urban reproduction is suggested by a negative correlation between urban in-migration and the decennial decline in natural increase (r=-0.47).

Since the socioeconomic and institutional context strongly affects population mobility, a case study approach is more relevant. In the remainder of this article, we estimate urban growth patterns in Albania and assess the role of migration within and across the national border. The pace and direction of rural exodus is analysed with reference to the changing context. In addition to population movements, we also estimate the demographic selection and reproductive contribution of migrants.

5.4 Direct and induced effects of migration during Albania's post-war urban transition

Decennial trends in Albania's urban transition can be documented from 1950 onward using indirect demographic estimation based on (often limited) statistical information from successive population Censuses (see Appendix). Table 1 shows urban statistics and annual estimates of the demographic components of urban and rural population growth.

During Albania's isolation under communist rule, natural increase is distinguished from net rural-to-urban migration. The former component is observed from vital statistics (Drejtoria E Statistikes 1991), whereas the latter is indirectly estimated as the residual between intercensal natural projections of total urban populations and

[25] Rates of urban natural increase and net rural-to-urban migration are indirect estimates (assuming closed countries; United Nations 2001). Since information on net international migration is only available at the national level (United Nations 2011), we assume that international migrants are selected proportionally to the urban-rural population ratio.

the observed number of inhabitants at the second Census (see Appendix for more details). Rates of urbanization are decomposed in the contributions of rural-to-urban migration and the rural-urban differentials in natural increase (United Nations 1980: 34).

A note of caution in the interpretation of these estimates is necessary since reclassification of rural areas is a confounding factor in the migration component. If urban growth was initially concentrated in Tirana and, later on, in a few large cities (implying an expansion of their borders until 1965), the number of cities also increased (from 26 in 1945 to 67 in 1989). Many of the new towns were in fact large villages which were allocated an industry, a cooperative state farm or administrative importance by the Central State, and thus fulfilled the criteria of the communist era's urban definition (i.e. historical towns and other industrial centres with more than 2000 inhabitants[26]; Sivignon 1975; Darques 2004).

According to these estimates, a fifth of the 1.2 million Albanians lived in urban areas in 1950 (Table 1). Urban and rural death rates were equally low (14p.1000), whereas rural birth rates increased from 39 to 48 p.1000 during the 1950s because of a pre-transitional rise in fertility (see Central Directory of Statistics 1991; Falkingham and Gjonca 2001). Consequently, rural natural increase was high (3.1%).

Yet population growth in rural areas was limited (1.5%, annually) because of large-scale rural-to-urban out-migration and reclassification (1.6%). Apart from the attractive forces of communist modernization, this reflected to some extent a substitution of internal for international emigration as a security valve for population pressure in the countryside. With the consolidation of the communist system and the sealing of national borders, rural residents who wanted to escape the impoverished context and the collectivisation of the countryside had no choice but to move into cities.

The high level of urban growth during the 1950s (7%) was therefore mainly driven by net in-migration and reclassification, representing nearly twice the rate of natural increase (4.5% and 2.3%, respectively). The rural exodus also sharply increased the rate of urbanization. The number of urban residents doubled within a decade, from 250 to 500 thousand in 1960, representing 31% of Albania's population.

[26] As Albania experienced a depopulation but no reclassification of urban and rural areas since the end of communist rule, the settlement size criteria was reduced to 400 inhabitants.

TABLE 1: INDICATORS OF URBANISATION AND DEMOGRAPHIC SOURCES OF URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION GROWTH AND URBANISATION (ANNUAL AVERAGE RATES), INTERCENSAL PERIODS, 1950-2011.

Census years:	1950		1960		1969		1979		1989		2001		2011
Intercensal periods:		*1950s*		*1960s*		*1970s*		*1980s*		*1990s*		*2000s*	
Total population	1'218'900		1'626'315		2'068'155		2'590'564		3'182'417		3'069'275		2'800'138
Urban population	249'875		502'531		686'627		870'430		1'137'562		1'294'196		1'498'508
Percent Urban	20.5		30.9		33.2		33.6		35.7		42.2		53.0
Rural population dynamics													
Total growth (r)		0.015		0.021		0.022		0.019		-0.012		-0.026	
Natural increase (NI)		0.031		0.032		0.025		0.022		0.012		…	
Net rur-urb migration (NM)		-0.016		-0.007		-0.004		-0.006		-0.007		…	
Net migration abroad (NMabr)		…		…		…		…		-0.018		…	
NM / NI		-0.52		-0.22		-0.16		-0.28		-0.53		…	
NMabr / NI		…		…		…		…		-1.41		…	
Urban population dynamics													
Total growth (r)		0.070		0.031		0.024		0.030		0.011		0.012	
Natural increase (NI)		0.023		0.020		0.016		0.015		0.011		…	
Net rur-urb migration (NM)		0.045		0.014		0.008		0.011		0.011		…	
Net migration abroad (NMabr)		…		…		…		…		-0.011		…	
NM / NI		1.96		0.71		0.49		0.75		0.99		…	
NMabr / NI		…		…		…		…		-1.01		…	
Rate of urbanisation (rU/R)		0.055		0.012		0.002		0.009		0.023		0.046	
Components of rU/R (in percent):													
Rur-urb differential in NI		-11.1		-105.7		-279.6		-57.6		-6.2		…	
NM		111.1		205.7		379.6		157.6		78.7		…	
Rur-urb differential in NM abroad		…		…		…		…		27.5		…	

Source: Drejtoria E Statistikes (1991), Central Directory of Statistics (1991), Census 2001, INSTAT (2012).

The patterns of rural and urban growth changed in the 1960s. The growth rate of the rural population increased to 2.1%, while the urban estimate dropped by more than half to 3.1%. These trends were mainly attributable to a decline in rural-to-urban migration to half the level observed in the previous decade, which is evidence of the effectiveness of the control of internal movements. The abolition of social classes and the narrowing urban-rural gap in income and social services may have reduced incentives for mobility, although poverty persisted in the countryside (Sivignon 1975). This restrained rural exodus, as well as the doubling of the urban population over the previous decade, led to an inflation of the relative contribution of natural increase to urban growth. The growth pattern inversed, with natural increase out-weighing rural-to-urban migration (2% and 1.4%, respectively). Since the population in the countryside still outnumbered that of the cities, and its rate of natural increase remained high (3.2%), the level of urbanization rose only slightly, to 33% in 1969.

Following the onset of Albania's fertility transition, rural natural increase started to decline in the 1970s. With internal movements further curtailed by the regime, the induced effects related to lower urban in-migration intensified: the contribution of natural increase to urban growth was double that of migration. Since urban and rural growth rates were close to each other, the level of urbanization stabilized.

During the last decade of communist rule, urbanization increased slightly to 36% in 1989 because urban growth recovered and surpassed the rural estimate (3% and 1.9%, respectively). Two demographic phenomena underlie this trend reversal. As the communist system started to weaken, urban in-migration rebounded slightly (to 1.1%), representing three-quarters of urban natural increase. The level of natural increase, by contrast, remained surprisingly stable in cities (1.5%). By 1989 the number of urban residents had more than doubled compared to 1960 (from 0,5 to 1,1 million).

In the 1990s, following the end of Albania’s isolation, the decomposition of urban and rural population growth also takes into account the net effect of international migration. The availability of more disaggregated data (at the individual level) permit a more detailed analysis. Rural-to-urban migration by age and sex can now be observed from the Census 2001 as the difference between urban in- and out-migrants; to identify migrants, the urban classification in 2001 was imputed to the individuals' reported place of residence in 1989 (see Appendix). Net international migration, by contrast, is indirectly estimated by the life-table survival method (Siegel and Swanson 2004) as the residual between forward-projected cohorts observed in 1989 and the enumerated population in 2001, which was redistributed across the imputed urban and rural residence in 1989 (see Appendix). The residual between total population growth and net migration cumulated over age and sex then provides an estimate of natural increase in urban and rural areas. The decomposition of the rate of urbanization considers net international migration as well.

Unlike the results for earlier periods, post-communist estimates of migration are not confounded by rural reclassification (which did not occur according to the Albanian Institute of Statistics). Conversely, they miss the spatial extension of cities beyond their official borders. Were the strongly urbanized rural communes on the outskirts of cities to have been reclassified, less than two thirds (instead of the official 42%) of Albania's population would have been considered as urban at the Census in 2001 (Schuler et al. 2010).

Despite its young age structure, the population of Albania declined from 3.2 to 3.1 million in the first decade of political and economic transition (Table 1). Just as the sealing of international and internal borders strongly affected the components of urban growth under communist rule, so did the end of border control in 1990. Population mobility constituted the main demographic response to the post-communist transformations. Unlike in the 1950s, however, emigration was substituted for internal movements: the rural exodus was three times larger to foreign than to domestic destinations, representing respectively 1.8% and 0.6% of rural inhabitants in the 1990s. Tirana was the principal focus of internal movements and experienced high intercensal population growth (from 238 to 341 thousands inhabitants, or 3% annually; INSTAT 2004a). As secondary cities were short-circuited by the exodus, urban primacy increased sharply; Tirana's population represented 127% of the following three largest cities in the urban hierarchy of 2001, against 98% in 1989 and 1979 (not shown). In the next section, we investigate whether the changing balance between internal and international migration did indeed mark the onset of the second urban transition in Albania.

Although emigration was lower from cities when compared to the countryside during the 1990s, it nonetheless represented 1.1% annually. Since these migratory losses were only just compensated for by net rural-to-urban migration, the growth rate of the urban population in the 1990s was equal to the rate of natural increase (1.1%) – or half the estimate for the previous decade. Urban natural increase remained determinant for urban growth for two reasons. Firstly, its level was sustained, which contrasted with a sharp fall in the rural estimate (from 2.2% to 1.2%, near the urban standard). The role of indirect effects of migration in this stability in urban birth rates is investigated in the next section. Secondly, the relative contribution of urban natural increase was inflated by limited urban in-migration. Unlike in the communist period, however, this was induced by the redirection abroad of a large share of the rural exodus.

Despite the declining rate of urban growth, the pace of urbanization increased sharply in the 1990s when compared to the two previous decades; 42% of the Albanian population lived in cities in 2001. This can be explained not only by rural-to-urban migration, but also by international outflows that originated disproportionally from rural areas. Demographic losses to foreign countries actually led to a historical decline of the population in the Albanian countryside (by -1.2%).

The decomposition of urban growth cannot be replicated for the most recent period, as data from the last Census in 2011 are not available. Principal results confirm a continuing trend in emigration, particularly from rural areas which experienced substantive intercensal population losses (-2.6% annually, INSTAT 2012). The urban population also continued to grow by an annual rate of 1.2% and the official level of urbanization crossed the 50% level. Recent trends in urban reproduction, however, deviated from the relative stability observed in the previous decades: according to our Census and survey estimates, the crude birth rate (CBR) declined from 15 to 9 per thousand urban inhabitants between 2000-2001 and 2005-2008 (see following section). Despite the larger share of the Albanian population already living in urban areas, one would therefore expect natural increase to have played a smaller role in recent urban growth when compared to emigration and the domestic rural exodus.

5.5 Indirect effects of migration on urban natural increase in Albania

Age and sex selectivity of migration flows during the 1990s

Given the emphasis put on economic crises and structural adjustments in the second urban transition of developing countries, a relevant indicator for its onset is the changing destination of labour migration. The demographic selectivity of migrants provides useful information on the underlying motives. Figure 2 presents annual sex and age-specific migration rates for urban and rural areas during the 1990s (obtained as outlined in the previous section and in the Appendix). As seen on the left-hand side, emigration from the countryside was more selective than the departures to urban areas. Emigration was clearly most pronounced between the ages of 15 and 34 (with a peak of 3.3% at age 20-24). Men emigrated to a larger extent than women did. Rates then sharply declined to less than a third, and sex differentials gradually diminished at higher ages. Net rural out-migration, by contrast, evinced a flat age-profile with two slight peaks between the ages 20 to 34 and around retirement age. Men and women were concerned to a similar extent.

If we accept that labour migration is more selective than amenity-seeking migration, Albanian cities indeed appear economically less attractive than foreign destinations, as they have been short-circuited especially by young male migrants. However, the internal movement of entire families, including dependants at young and old ages, can be related to the professional depletion and declining quality of rural services following the end of central planning. These moves were mainly to the capital, because it was better provided with amenities and offered more employment opportunities than secondary cities.

FIGURE 2: ANNUAL AVERAGE AGE-SPECIFIC NET RURAL-TO-URBAN AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION RATES OF URBAN AND RURAL POPULATIONS BY SEX, ALBANIA 1989-2001.



Rural



Urban

Source: Central Directory of Statistics (1991), Census 2001.

A first question related to the structural effect of migration on the sustained level of urban natural increase during the 1990s in Albania is whether rural-to-urban movers replaced the young emigrants from cities. Figure 2 shows that although international migration was lower from cities than from the countryside, the age-selection was stronger, especially for men. Male rates of emigration peaked between the ages 15 and 24 (at 2.5%) and then declined to approximately half that level at ages 30 to 44. Among women, however, the propensity to migrate gradually increased with age, peaking between 30 and 44 years. This higher intensity and earlier peak in male compared to female emigration indicates male-dominated student and labour mobility followed by the reunification of families previously formed in Albania. International migration thus brought about an ageing of the urban population. Rural-to-urban migration, by contrast, compensated for the bulk of the negative structural effects on

urban birth rates by swelling the younger female cohorts in cities, as evinced by the peak in in-migration rates at ages 20-29.

It is also interesting to note that, unlike rural emigration, the increase in rural-to-urban migration started at younger ages for women when compared with men. Two reasons can account for this difference. Firstly, joint internal movements of young couples involve men at older ages than women because of the traditional age-gap between spouses. Secondly, young women may move in the context of marriage-migrations and join the husband's family in cities. These exogamous marriage traditions in the patrilocal society of Albania were instrumental in circumventing governmental restrictions on internal movements under communist rule (Sjöberg 1994). After the fall of the regime, the society experienced a return to traditionalism (Nixon 2009) and persistent traces of patriarchy promoted early marriage and large families (Lerch 2013b). Thus, traditional patterns of family formation related to mobility may have sustained in-migrants' fertility level in cities.

Reproductive behaviour of the urban population according to in-migrant status, 1989-2008

The resurgence of rural-to-urban migration in the 1980s and 1990s was not only accompanied by a sustained level of urban natural increase, but also by a stalling urban fertility transition. The urban TFR remained at 2.5 between 1979 and 1989, against a drop from 4.9 to 3.5 in rural areas (Dumani 1995). The subsequent reduction to 2 children per woman in cities in 2000-2001 was again lower than the drop in rural areas (to 2.5; Lerch et al. 2010). This relative stability of the urban TFR around the generational replacement level ended in 2006-2009, when women only had 1.3 children (INSTAT, et al. 2010).

To investigate the behavioural effects of rural-to-urban migration in this slowdown of the urban fertility transition, Table 2 provides indicators of the onset and level of childbearing for the urban population in 1989, as well as for the subsequent in-migrant and non-migrant populations in 2000-2001 and 2005-2008. The percentages ever married at age 20-24 and the total and marital fertility rates (TFR, TMFR) are shown. The underlying age-specific information for 1989 is provided by Dumani (1995). Estimates for 2000–2001 are based on the own children method applied to the 2001 Census (see Cho et al. 1986), whereas weighted birth histories from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) 2008/9 were used for 2005-2008 (see Appendix).

Differences in the percentages ever-married and in the level of fertility according to post-1989 in-migrant status are statistically significant at the 95% level, unless stated otherwise. They confirm the pioneering role in Albania's fertility transition played by long-term urban residents: the fall of their TFR to lowest-low levels in 2005-2008 (1.2) was due to both a decline in marital fertility and the progressive postponement of marriage (which is almost universal; out-of-wedlock births are negligible). The trend was initiated by Tirana's non-migrant population, while secondary cities lagged behind (with a TFR of respectively 1 and 1.6 in 2005-2008; not shown). Thus, the importance for fertility decline of structural changes and social diffusion in urban areas is confirmed. However, this contrasts with the higher fertility of post-1989 in-migrants, representing a fourth of women of childbearing age. In 2000-2001, they had one child more than non-migrants (i.e. 2.7) and even surpassed the urban TFR observed in 1989 by half a child. This can be explained by a higher marital fertility

compared to non-migrants (4.3 against 3.8, respectively) and an earlier onset of motherhood (68% of women had been married at age 20-24, against 42%).

TABLE 2: TOTAL AND MARITAL FERTILITY RATE (TFR, TMFR), PERCENTAGE EVER MARRIED AT AGE 20-24 OF THE URBAN POPULATION ACCORDING TO POST-1989 IN-MIGRANT STATUS, 1989, 2000-2001, 20005-2008.

	1989	2000-01		2005-08	
	Total	Non-migrants	In-migrants	Non-migrants	In-migrants
TFR	2.2	1.7	2.7	1.2	2.0
%married 20-24	49	42	68	34	70
TMFR	4.1	3.8	4.3	3.0	3.1
Share of total (%)		77	23	76	24

Sources: Dumani (1995), Census 2001, DHS 2008/9.

The post-1989 in-migrants' fertility level dropped near to the generational replacement level in 2005-2008 (i.e. 2.0). By contrast with the case of non-migrants, this declining trend resulted essentially from family limitation (the difference in marital fertility almost vanished and lost its statistical significance). The constant share of ever-married among in-migrants aged 20-24 (70%, against 34% among non-migrants) shows that onset of motherhood continued to be early. Clearly, the post-1989 in-migration stock inflated the urban TFR closer to the level of generational replacement during the two decades of transition, although marital fertility converged more recently to the non-migrants' level. Again, this process was initiated by in-migrants in Tirana, with those of other cities following the trend (not shown).

Decomposing the indirect effects of migration on urban birth rates

The CBR is given by the weighted sum of age-specific marital fertility rates, with the weights being the age-specific percentages ever married among women and the relative population structure by age and sex. Estimates of the urban CBR for post-1989 in-migrants and non-migrants were thus obtained using the information underlying Table 2 in addition to the population structures (see Appendix). Given the young age, early marriage and high marital fertility of post-1989 in-migrants, their CBR was twice the level of non-migrants in 2000-2001 and 2005-2008 (2.5% and 1.7% against 1.2% and 0.7%, respectively; Table 3). In-migrants thus contributed one third of the urban CBR, despite the fact that they represented less than one fifth of the urban population.

TABLE 3: CRUDE BIRTH RATE (CBR) OF THE URBAN POPULATION ACCORDING TO POST-1989 IN-MIGRANT STATUS AND THE DECOMPOSITION OF DECENNIAL CHANGES ACCORDING TO STRUCTURAL AND BEHAVIOURAL EFFECTS OF MIGRATION, ALBANIA 1989, 2000-2001 AND 2005-2008.

	1989	2000-2001				2005-2008			
	Total	Total	Non-migrants	In-migrants	% of in-migrants	Total	Non-migrants	In-migrants	% of in-migrants
Level of urbanisation	36%	42%				~50%			
Urban reproduction, p.1000									
Birth rate (unweighted)	21	15	12	25	19	9	7	17	18
Difference 1989 - 2001 / 2005-08	*ref*	-6	-9	4		-12	-14	-4	
Birth rate (pop-weighted)		**15**	**10**	**5**		**9**	**6**	**3**	
Decomposition of the decline in urban crude birth rate since 1989 by in-migration status: structural and behavioural effects, in population weighted p.1000 points									
Age-sex structure	*ref*	-4	-4	0		-3	-4	1	
Marriage timing		0	-1	1		-2	-3	1	
Marital fertility		-3	-3	0		-8	-7	-1	
Interaction effects		1	1	0		3	3	0	

Sources: Central Directory of Statistics (1991), Dumani (1995), Census 2001, DHS 2008/9, LSMS 2008.

The effects of migration on the urban age-sex structure can be considered to be temporary, while the behavioural influences on the urban fertility transition may be more long lasting. An assessment of their respective contributions is important, therefore, for monitoring urban demography. We decomposed the decline of the urban CBR between 1989 and 2000-2001 and 2005-2008 into the effects of the changing age-sex structure, marriage behaviour and marital fertility of non-migrants and in-migrants, respectively, using an adapted version of Yi's et al. (1991) method (see Appendix). Results are shown in Table 3.

Between 1989 and 2000-2001, the fall in the urban CBR from 21 to 15 births per thousand urban inhabitants was mainly due to the ageing of the non-migrant population, which was driven by selective emigration: compared with the urban population twelve years earlier, women in reproductive age in 2000-2001 were under-represented, depressing the CBR by 4 points. This negative effect was intensified by non-migrants' marriage postponement and lower marital fertility (depressing the CBR by 1 and 3 points, respectively). Earlier marriages among post-1989 in-migrants, by contrast, inflated the urban CBR by 1 point. This was further sustained by their similarly young population structure and high marital fertility when compared to the urban population in 1989.

The urban CBR continued to fall until 2005-2008, to 9 per thousand inhabitants, mainly because marriage was further postponed and marital fertility reduced among non-migrants. This depressed the CBR by respectively 3 and 6 points when compared to the 1989 estimate. The continuing emigration of young urban dwellers also exacerbated the negative structural effects. Post-1989 in-migrants, by contrast, inflated the CBR by 2 points not only because they married early, but also because of increasing selection among young women (compared to the arrival cohorts of the 1990s). However, the recent diffusion of birth limitation among in-migrants started to contribute to the fall in the birth rate (by 1 point).

To sum up, the demographic process of urbanization in Albania was more complex than the conventional dichotomy between net rural-to-urban migration and urban natural increase. While emigration led to an annual decline of 1.1% in the urban population during the 1990s (Table 1), its demographic selectivity depressed the urban birth rate by 0.4 percentage points in 2000-2001 (Table 3). Net rural-to-urban migration compensated for these effects by increasing the number of urban residents by 1.1% and contributing 0.5 percentage points to the urban birth rate. Abstracting from mortality, the indirect effect of population mobility on urban growth was approximately half its direct effect after only one decade of freedom of movement in Albania.

5.6 Discussion and conclusion

Later assessments of urban growth patterns in developing countries have established a dominant role for urban natural increase, even more so in the recent past when a majority of the world population already lived in cities (UNFPA 2007). Yet urban transition theory predicts a dominant role for population mobility in the early and late phases of the process because of high urban mortality and a low level of urbanization, and the completion of the urban fertility transition, respectively. The empirical paradox, we argued, may be resolved by opening up the urban growth model to international migration and by its disaggregation to account for the reproductive contribution of migrants. We combined the use of micro data with

indirect demographic estimation and decomposition methods to assess direct, induced and indirect effects of internal *and* international movements on the patterns of urban growth in Albania.

Albania has undergone a differentiated pace of urbanization since the end of the Second World War. The process first accelerated in a period of rapid communist modernization and unprecedented population growth in the 1950s. Since population movements were constrained within sealed national borders, rural-to-urban migration and reclassification were important in international comparison, and represented the main sources of the marked urban growth. With the regime's subsequent retention of residents in the countryside, urbanization stalled. During the post-communist crisis, the process caught up at a fast pace despite a rise in urban emigration. Given the renewed freedom of movement, the transformation in rural institutions and the structural changes in the economy, the rate of rural exodus again surpassed most experiences in the developing world. The release of the demographic pressure that had accumulated over the preceding three decades actually led to depopulation in the countryside. Yet Albania shifted from its first, restrained urban transition into its second because the (male) labour force component of rural outflows was redirected to more attractive destinations abroad to sustain a living for the families left behind.

In a way which is congruent with international evidence, our results for the 1960s to the 1990s highlight the sustained level of urban natural increase and its significant contribution to urban growth. However, migration contributed to this trend in two ways. Restriction of rural exodus under communist rule and its subsequent redirection abroad during the economic and political transition limited urban in-migration. This induced a higher relative contribution of urban natural increase to urban growth, which hastened the reversal in demographic patterns. Yet reduced and postponed childbearing consistently diffused down the urban hierarchy, leading to lowest-low levels of the TFR among long-term residents. Combined with the selective emigration of young adults, this accelerated the pace of demographic ageing in cities. Rural-to-urban migrants actually sustained indirectly the level of urban natural increase. Although young adults were less selected among these migrants than among those who ventured abroad (especially when domestic pull factors were weak in the 1990s), they swelled the depleted urban cohorts at childbearing ages. The earlier onset and higher level of in-migrant fertility also slowed down the pace of the urban fertility transition. Thus, rural-to-urban migration postponed the onset of advanced ageing in cities.

Rural socialisation and marriage-migrations can be seen to explain migrants' birth differential compared with the urban standard (Lerch 2013c), and these behavioural effects appear to be related to the gender-selection of internal and international migration in the context of a patriarchal culture and the post-communist crisis. Males were attributed a breadwinner role abroad, whereas women retreated from the labour market and assumed the responsibility of family maintenance in the new social and economic centres of Albania. However, to further postpone the ageing of urban populations, a continuing inflow of young and recently married migrants is necessary because of their recent and partial adoption of urban fertility patterns (i.e. birth limitation without postponement). More evidence on this diversification of the urban fertility transition would contribute to easier prediction of urban demography in Albania. Income inequality has risen along with development, and the economic geography of internal movements has pointed to an urbanization of poverty (Zezza et al. 2005). As in other world regions, the diversification in childbearing patterns may

indicate the coexistence of two parallel paths of urban fertility transition, such as the emergence of new family models among affluent populations and birth limitations among the deprived (Basu 1986; Cosio-Zavala 1995).

An appraisal of the components of urban growth in Albania must acknowledge the limitations of indirect demographic estimation (see also Appendix). Rural-to-urban migration may have been overestimated during communist rule because of the crude method of estimation, imposed by the limited data, and the impossibility of distinguishing migration from rural reclassification. But this is unlikely to explain the collapse in migration in the 1960s and its sharp recovery in the 1990s. In the post-communist period, the complex role of population mobility was even underestimated, as the significant sprawl of urban growth beyond unchanged city borders was not accounted for. Moreover, we have not investigated the behavioural effects of selective urban emigration, which may have left more fertile populations behind, nor have we discussed the influence of emigrants and remittances on socioeconomic change in Albania, including on reproductive and migratory behaviour and the development of urban housing. We can therefore conclude that population mobility was indeed the main source of the early and the most recent urban growth. The sustained importance of natural increase has been explained by variations in socioeconomic development and migration regimes, depressing or redirecting abroad the rural exodus, as well as by the demographic selection of migrants, which increases their reproductive contribution to urban growth.

Beyond Albanian demography, lessons drawn from this case study have two implications for the demographic and economic processes of urbanization in developing countries. Firstly, the substitutability of internal and international rural out-migration highlights the extent to which administrative barriers to city-ward movements only postpone or redirect abroad the release of demographic pressure in the countryside. What is more, rural emigration increases the concentration of human activity in urban areas, which allows a more effective allocation of resources to provide public services, increase wellbeing and sustain economic growth.

Secondly, the role of migration in the postponement of demographic ageing in Albania’s cities was in fact predicted by the second urban transition model for high-income countries – with the notable difference that immigrants there originated from abroad (Skeldon 2008). This similarity in demographic challenges and behaviours in urban Albania can be explained by the communist suppression of the urbanization process, while the fertility transition progressed. It also highlights the importance of international social interaction for the diffusion of low fertility (Bongaarts and Watkins 1996), particularly in cities. Thus, the paths of the second urban transition attributed, respectively, to more and less developed countries are not mutually exclusive in a globalized world. When combined, they may represent an opportunity for economic development: current crisis-driven demographic pressure in the countryside is released abroad, preventing an urban explosion, whereas the cities' demographic potential for future economic growth is ensured through a rural-to-urban redistribution of reproduction.

Moving from a fast onset of urbanization to autarchy under dictatorship, thereafter followed by liberation and exposure to the global world, Albania is a demonstrative example for the role played by migration in the urban transition. However, our cross-country exploration of urban growth patterns suggests that similar direct, induced and indirect effects of population mobility may be observed in other countries – particularly where urbanization is caught up in the context of low fertility. In China and

Southeastern Asia, assessments and projections of urban growth in the 1990s and beyond indeed showed a dominant role for rural-to-urban migration (Liang et al. 2008; Guest 2009). Considering the economic prospects for this world region, the contribution of international flows may increase significantly. Chinese women also engaged in marriage-migrations to resettle in economically more developed areas (Davin 2008), while immigrants may become crucial to balance the distorted population sex-ratios brought about by a son-preferred pattern of childbearing. Thus the indirect demographic effects of population movements are likely to postpone the dependency burden these cities will have to cope with, and may set the demographic conditions for a consolidation of economic development in the future.

This analysis confirmed the importance of international movements and the interactions between migration and fertility for an increased understanding of urban growth. Approximations of net rural-to-urban migration based on urban-rural growth differences can thus be misleading because of differential rates of emigration and the indirect effects on natural increase. Similarly, the conventional decomposition of urban growth into rural-to-urban migration and natural increase confound the complex effects of population movements in the estimates of the latter – especially when indirectly obtained. The main conclusion is therefore a need for more disaggregation in assessments of national urban transitions. Accounting for different components of urban growth, including their interactions, should help in monitoring urban demography in a mainly urban world that will soon complete its first demographic transition.

5.7 References

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5.9 Appendix: Data sources and methodological details

Components of urban and rural growth

The components of intercensal urban and rural population growth during communism are estimated based on published numbers of total inhabitants in urban and rural areas at the Censuses in 1950, 1960, 1969, 1979 (Drejtoria E Statistikes 1991) and the numbers by sex and 5-year age group at the 1989 Census (Central Directory of Statistics 1991). Annual intercensal *crude rates of natural increase* are obtained by averaging the estimates based on vital rates published by place of residence for selected years around Census dates (Drejtoria E Statistikes 1991). *Net rural-to-urban migration* is indirectly estimated as outlined in the fourth section of the article. The obtained migration stocks are reverse-projected to the mid-point of the Census intervals to provide an estimate of the net flow (assuming that migrants were distributed linearly over the period).

The demographic decomposition of urban and rural growth during the 1990s relies on published data from the Census 1989 and exhaustive individual data for the population enumerated in 2001. *Urban in- and out-migration* stocks by sex and age are observed based on the 2001 Census through an imputation of the village/municipality-specific urban status in 2001 to the information on the individuals' residence in 1989. For 122,575 individuals (4% of the total population) the prior urban status could not be imputed because the village code referring to 1989 did not find any counterpart in the administrative structure of 2001. These cases were redistributed according to migrant status proportionally to the known distribution by sex and age. To indirectly estimate *net international migration* between the 1989 and 2001 Census, the base population in 1989 (published by 5-year age groups) was subdivided by single age using a 5-year moving average. We then applied the life table survival method (Siegel and Swanson 2004), as outlined in the fourth section of the article. Net stocks of internal and international migrants aged 15 and more in 2001 are reverse-survived to the mid-point of the Census interval to estimate net flows.

Net rural-to-urban and international migration flows of children aged under 15 during the 1990s are estimated using a special procedure. The United Nations (1980) recommends applying the child-woman ratio observed among the urban population to the estimated number of female migrants, assuming that children were born before migration. However, this assumption is violated in the Albanian case, where women often move at low birth parities and form their families at destination (Lerch 2013c). Therefore, the number of child-migrants aged 0 to 14 is estimated in applying the sex-specific child-adult ratio of migrants, implied by the intercensal exposure population and the Western standard migration rate schedule (United Nations 1992: 43), to our estimates of adult migration flows.

Demographic sources of urban and rural growth are presented in annual average rates with the intercensal exposure population defined as the average of the population enumerated at the first and second Census, adding half of the net international migration flow.

One should be cautious when interpreting the estimates of migration under communist rule. Under-enumeration may be significant in the early Censuses. Although no quality assessment of the 2001 Census was undertaken, the quality is

generally considered as good. Age heaping is non-significant in Albania. The strongest bias may result from the impossibility of distinguishing reclassification of rural areas from net rural-to-urban migration during the communist period (as discussed in the fourth section of the article). Since the fall of communist rule, however, the urban definition and the official city borders have not been updated and no new city has been promoted, according to personal communication with the Albanian Institute of Statistics. While this facilitates the demographic analysis of urban growth in the 1990s, it provides a biased picture of the process of urbanization: the rate of urbanization was indeed very low for all districts with a major city (not shown). Although a high level of urbanization may account for that low rate, urbanization also statistically stagnated in the district of Tirana despite the fact that this city was the main internal migration magnet in the 1990s. A great deal of recent urbanization is in fact unaccounted for by official statistics because these exclude informal settlements around cities. Moreover, net rural-to-urban migration during the 1990s may be further underestimated if the internal migrants enumerated in 2001 indicated as their prior place of residence the urban centre located near to their rural village of departure.

Potential estimation biases are confounded in different components of urban growth depending on which was obtained as a residual of the demographic balancing equation. The under-registration of deaths by vital statistics of the 1950s and 1960s may lead to an underestimation of net rural-to-urban migration, whereas the crude indirect method may overestimate the migration component. Estimations of migration based on the cohort (or life-table) survival method have been shown to be not very sensitive to assumptions about mortality levels (United Nations 2001). Yet rural emigration would nevertheless be overestimated if internal migrants observed in 2001 indicated as their former place residence the urban centres near their village of departure in 1989. Urban (rural) natural increase during the 1990s may also be overestimated (underestimated) by assuming too low a rate of child-migration as implied by the standard rate schedule.

Decomposing the change in urban crude birth rate

The estimation of *structural and behavioural effects of migration on the level of urban reproduction* is based on a decomposition of CBR differences into the effects of the relative population structure by age and sex (*c(x)*), age-specific shares of women ever married (*g(x)*) and marital fertility rates (*m(x)*), following Yi et al. (1991):

$$CBR_{00\text{–}01} - CBR_{89} = \sum_{15}^{49}\left[\Delta c(x)\cdot g_{00\text{–}01}(x)\cdot m_{00\text{–}01}(x)\right] + \sum_{15}^{49}\left[c_{00\text{–}01}(x)\cdot \Delta g(x)\cdot m_{00\text{–}01}(x)\right] + \sum_{15}^{49}\left[c_{00\text{–}01}(x)\cdot g_{00\text{–}01}(x)\cdot \Delta m(x)\right]$$
$$- \sum_{15}^{49}\left[\Delta c(x)\cdot \Delta g(x)\cdot m_{00\text{–}01}(x)\right] - \sum_{15}^{49}\left[\Delta c(x)\cdot g_{00\text{–}01}(x)\cdot \Delta m(x)\right] - \sum_{15}^{49}\left[c_{00\text{–}01}(x)\cdot \Delta g(x)\cdot \Delta m(x)\right]$$
$$+ \sum_{15}^{49}\left[\Delta c(x)\cdot \Delta g(x)\cdot \Delta m(x)\right]$$

First, differences between the reference CBR in 1989 and the in-migrants' and non-migrants' estimates (for 2000–2001 and 2005-2008) are respectively decomposed according to the main age-specific effects of the population structure, marital exposure and level of marital fertility (the three terms on the right hand side of the first line). Two-way and three-way age-specific interaction effects are estimated as well (the terms on the second and third lines, respectively). All contributions are then summed over age. Structural and behavioural effects of post-1989 in-migrants and

non-migrants are finally weighted by the respective shares in the urban population of 2000-2001 and 2005-2008.

The percentages of ever-married women and marital fertility rates are based on various sources. Figures for 1989 are provided by Dumani (1995). For 2000-01, the own-children method was applied to the 2001 Census data (Cho et al. 1986). For 2005-2008, the weighted sample of women and their birth histories from the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) 2008/9 were used, allowing marital status and the post-1989 in-migrants status to vary over the four person years of observation.

The age–sex structure of the total urban population in 1989 was provided by Central Directory of Statistics (1991). The age–sex structure according to intercensal in-migrant status in 2000–2001 was estimated using direct information for the population aged 12 and over at the 2001 Census; for a child born during the intercensal period, the mother's in-migrant status is imputed. Since the DHS 2008/9 does not provide information on migration for the total population, the relative age-sex distributions of the in-migrant and non-migrant urban population in 2005-2008 was estimated based on the Living Standards Measurement Survey 2008 (LSMS), allowing the post-1989 in-migrant status to vary over the four person-years of observation.

Conclusion

Summary and discussion of results

The majority of the world's less developed countries are currently in the completion phase of their first demographic transition. The low demographic dependency of children and older people means that they are about to experience tremendous opportunities for economic and social development. Given the declining levels of fertility and the post-transitional youth bulge, migration flows and their impact on birth rates will increasingly determine demographic change at the national and urban-rural level. This will redistribute labour force and reproductive potential in space, which will have consequences for population and economic geography.

Despite the increasing number of rural-to-urban and international migrants worldwide, and their demographic and socioeconomic impacts in sending and receiving regions, the migration component of population change is still too often considered as a nuisance or bias in the demographers' model of a closed population. When internal and international migrations have been given the attention they deserve, they have usually been analysed in isolation from each other; and their interactions with natural population dynamics in less developed countries have been underappreciated.

In the present thesis migration was conceptualized as a spatio-temporal diffusion process arising from individual or family strategies to maintain or enhance living conditions by benefitting from new opportunities elsewhere, within or across national borders. We measured rural-to-urban and international migration, and investigated their social diffusion and interlinkages with each other, as well as how they interacted with fertility from a sending country perspective. To appreciate the demographic impact of migration we distinguished direct (numerical) effects, induced effects on the pattern of population change (i.e. natural increase versus migration), and indirect effects on the rate of natural increase. The latter dimension was decomposed into the impact on population age-sex structures and behavioural influences on fertility, which resulted either from the individual experience of mobility or from exposure within the family and in the society at large.

This integrated understanding of population mobility and reproductive behaviours enabled us to assess its role in the national mobility, fertility and urban transition. This is an important issue, as the majority of the future growth of the world population will be concentrated in the cities in developing countries, providing large opportunities for development when accompanied by sound urban governance and planning. Yet the monitoring of urban demography is challenging because it arises from a complex interplay between different components of population change linking urban and rural areas within a system of internal and international migrations. Understanding these demographic interactions becomes increasingly important in an intermediate to low fertility setting.

The analysis was applied to the case of Albania. Under communist rule, the country was characterised by complete isolation from the outside world, the highest population growth and the lowest level of urbanization in Europe. The communist regime retained population pressure within the country, particularly in rural areas, and maintained the society at a poor standard of living within an international context of affluence in Western Europe. Since 1990, this mainly rural society has transformed into a mainly urban one, and has lost a third of its population to foreign countries. The

rapid rise and large scale of population mobility in worldwide comparative terms suggests the choice of this country as a laboratory for investigating demographic and socioeconomic impacts (King 2005).

Demographic change since 1989 were thus analysed in the context of the country's opening up to the world. The Albanian setting was particularly interesting for an analysis of demographic responses, as the post-communist economic and political transition was characterised by crises and subsequent consolidation, resumed international influences, and a rapid diversification of society and its institutions. We exploited this unique setting of restraint followed by suddenly released demographic and socioeconomic change to investigate the initiation, evolution, and interactions of different migration streams, and how they were related to reproductive dynamics.

We explored several new methodological avenues to better assess how different components of population change are interrelated with each other. In the first paper on the mobility transition, we relied on a functional urban typology to integrate the analysis of rural-to-urban and international migrations. This increased our understanding of the diffusion, interlinkage and substitutability of these two types of migratory behaviour, as well as of the resulting pattern of urbanisation. It also evinced urban in-migration beyond official city borders, which usually goes unobserved in developing countries, leading to the (often) erroneous impression of important rural-to-rural movements.

In the second paper on Albania's fertility transition, we used a robust method for estimating trends in family behaviours in countries with deficient current demographic statistics. We investigated the timing, pattern, and socioeconomic differentials in these changes to contextualize the subsequent analysis of demographic interactions. In the third paper on the interrelationships between the rural exodus and the fertility transition, we demonstrated how this contextualisation within the general processes of demographic, socioeconomic and cultural change provides rich insights into the causes of behavioural differentiation between migrant and non-migrant populations.

The fourth paper on fertility of women exposed to emigration within the sending households and society adds to the literature by using prospective survey data. This enabled us to account for different effects of emigration, eliminating the usual bias of anticipatory analysis, and to address the effects on a major proximate determinant of fertility — women's transition to marriage. In patrilocal societies, marriage of course implies women's departure from the relevant household context for analysis, which cannot be observed in retrospective surveys. Moreover, a comprehensive investigation of social effects on fertility was proposed. We assessed their prerequisites among migrants abroad and then investigated the role played by women's social interaction with emigrants at the community level, and by their rising aspirations induced by the perception of migratory prospects and benefits in the society at large.

In the last paper, we clarified the complex role of migration during the urban transition. A significant contribution here was accounting for international flows and estimation of migrants' reproductive contribution to urban growth, which have been disregarded in recent assessments in developing countries. To account for these different components in appraisals of urban transitions in countries where demographic statistics are deficient, a new procedure was elaborated that combines the use of individual-level data with indirect estimation and decomposition techniques.

Results showed that the geographical and socioeconomic drivers of migration were consistent with the hypothesis of a mobility transition. Besides curiosity about the outside world, the onset of male international migration in the 1990s was driven by population pressure on the socioeconomic system in transition, as well as by the need to cope with a difficult context of crisis. Given the end of administrative restrictions on internal mobility and the central role of cities in Albania's modernisation, there was also an immediate onset of large-scale rural-to-urban migrations, in particular among women. The domestic rural exodus leveled off during the second transition decade, whereas emigration continued unabated. The outflow abroad transformed from a temporary into a permanent stream and was sustained by the spatial and social diffusion of migratory opportunities down the urban hierarchy. The increasing selection of young migrants also pointed to a transformation of an initially crisis-led phenomenon into an opportunity-seeking and family life project, implying a feminisation of emigration.

However, the immediate onset of rural-to-urban migration during the crisis, and its redirection abroad in a favourable economic context, challenges the hypothesis of a mobility transition. We accounted for this incongruence by an investigation of the interlinkages of internal and international migrations, which are summarised in Figure 1 along with the changing socioeconomic and demographic context, as well as the evolution in the numbers of Albanians residing in the countryside, in cities, and abroad since 1990.

International movements in the post-communist era were predominantly initiated in cities, and the rural exodus was the main source of urbanisation prior to 1990. We can thus conclude that urbanisation was an enabling factor of the onset of emigration. The post-communist rural exodus was not only motivated by people's aspirations for urban residence, but also constituted an intermediary step, providing access to international migrant networks and locational advantages for moving to economically more attractive places abroad. At the same time, international labour migration enabled people to resettle in cities in a context of scarce domestic financial capital. Many returnees did not return to their remote community of origin, but established themselves in the main cities before reunifying with the family which was previously left behind in rural areas.

The circular causation between international and rural-to-urban migration came to an end in the 2000s. The peak in the international departures provoked by the financial crisis of 1996–1998, and the regularisation of illegal migrants in Italy and Greece, enlarged networks abroad. This facilitated further emigrations and redirected the rural exodus to foreign countries, particularly among women. This substitution of international for internal movements redirected family reunifications from domestic cities to foreign locations.

FIGURE 1: CHANGES AND INTERACTIONS IN MIGRATION AND FERTILITY DURING ALBANIA'S SPATIAL REDISTRIBUTION OF POPULATION, 1989–2011 (the vertical order of demographic change and interactions according to period is approximate).



Moreover, the fast growing urban settings were exposed to the social and economic influences of globalisation, which increased aspirations for moving abroad, particularly among young people in education. The bottom of the urban hierarchy, by contrast, disarticulated from the remaining settlement system because of large population losses to foreign countries, as well as the development bias and strong spatial focus of the rural exodus towards the capital. In this context, moving from Albania's periphery across the border was more convenient, better assisted by networks, and provided more opportunities for employment when compared with a move to the main domestic centres.

These trends in migration accompanied Albania's fast completion of the first demographic transition. The crude birth rate declined dramatically, by half after 1990 as the fertility transition was completed in the 2000s. The number of children per woman recently converged to the sub-replacement levels observed throughout Central and Eastern Europe, and the underlying transformations in the process of family formation kept to the model observed in these countries. Family size continued to decline during the crises. Marriages were postponed during the subsequent period of economic and political consolidation, particularly in urban areas where opportunities in the labour market increased the most. As in the communist period, when fertility decline was driven by the diffusion of education and women's compulsory participation in the labor market, structural transformations of the post-communist society have played a major part in the recent trend towards low fertility. Significant signs of the onset of the second demographic transition – such as a value change in the reproductive sphere – have yet to emerge.

Traditional early marriages and the two-child family model were also maintained during the crises. Marriage and fertility behaviors have diversified more recently – particularly in cities, as the new patterns observed throughout Europe emerged alongside the persistence of traditional models among subpopulations, in particular among low-skilled in-migrants from rural areas. We argued elsewhere that these resistances to the contemporary transformation of the Albanian family can be explained by the continuing relevance of patriarchal culture in reproductive behavior and the organisation of society (Lerch 2013).

The rising population mobility and declining fertility confirms the multiplicity of demographic responses to socioeconomic transformations, as anticipated by Davis in his seminal paper of 1963. We examined whether this congruence in the (inverse) trends of migration and fertility was fortuitous or whether it arose from the interrelationships of demographic phenomena. The results confirmed complex and competing demographic interactions operating at different levels of social organisation. Although internal and international migration indeed affected family behaviors in Albania, the direction of influence depended on women's modality of exposure to the migration phenomenon.

Women's own experience of migration to domestic cities or abroad was conditional on marriage, often at a young age. Their access to migratory opportunities was tied to prior departures of other family and community members or of a future husband. These provided the means to resettle at destination, as well as assistance and support from social networks, including a protective family environment. Unlike the experiences in most developing countries, internal migrants also maintained high fertility in cities because of persistent effects of their rural socialisation.

Although Albanians abroad evinced a low (tempo-adjusted) level of fertility, exposure to international migration within the family left behind also did not change reproductive behaviors. The birth deficit during spousal separation was partially recuperated upon the husband's return, and remittances did not play a significant role. Women also married earlier in male migrant-sending communities.

Despite the fact that rural-to-urban and international migrations opened up Albania to the world and acted as a catalyst for social and economic change, fertility decline was surprisingly not driven by those families who engaged in this new means of ensuring a livelihood and social mobility. This was related to patriarchal culture, and to migrant women's limited structural and spatial integration in the public sphere, particularly in urban destinations.

The close interdependence between women's marriage and spatial mobility confirms the major role of family motives in female migration. Female migrants' young age at marriage is also congruent with patrilocal norms, which traditionally ensured the transfer of the responsibilities for protecting (and controlling) women from their own to their husbands' family. However, early marriage not only provided women with the social freedom to move, but may also have remained attractive because of the limited prospects available to many women on the Albanian labour market. The low activity rate of internal migrants is in line with their high fertility. Family limitation among those who move abroad, however, may be explained by the increased importance of economic motives, more frequent opportunities for work in foreign labour markets, as well as by the isolation from an extended family's support in childrearing.

We also explained the high fertility of urban in-migrants by "cumulative causation" of the interactions between migration and fertility. Events at a particular stage in the life-course trigger others through feedback effects. A traditional, early marriage extends women's reproductive period, and the age gap with the husband tends to rise, so that women's bargaining power in reproductive matters may be reduced. Women may thus conform to a larger extent to social expectations of larger families.

Marriage-migrations not only determine women's family environment, but also their larger social living context. Although women may have engaged in mobility to increase their freedom in a modern urban context, the rural exodus was so large that traditional social institutions have been redistributed in the urban areas as well. Chain migrations and spatial clustering in urban agglomerations of patriarchal families and communities favoured the local reproduction of rural family culture. The role of patriarchal socialisation and social effects on women's reproductive behavior may thus be significant in the migrant sending communities, as well as in the cities' in-migrant neighbourhoods. International migrants, by contrast, were more dispersed abroad, which may have increased social interaction with the receiving society and thus triggered the diffusion of low fertility.

To summarise, the resistances to the ongoing changes of the Albanian family model, among women who have experienced or been directly exposed to mobility, point to a role for traditional social institutions in both migratory and fertility decision making. Traditional social institutions and migratory opportunities have indeed played a fundamental role during the post-communist economic and political transition. Patriarchal culture filled a regulatory and cultural gap during the 1990s. Extended kinship structure acted as a main social and economic safety net, and migration was a primary source of family livelihood. Kinship structures thus provided their members

with access to migration opportunities, and coordinated the moves of different family members to different destinations. These institutions also pooled the resulting benefits and, more generally, ensured trust in the fulfillment of the implicit migratory contract between migrants and family members left behind. The traditional marriages among women may have constituted a way of institutionalising these relationships of mutual obligations between migrant men and the society left behind. We argue that the interlinkages between patriarchal institutions and the migratory phenomenon contributed to the moral primacy of patriarchy in society, implying its continuous relevance in the reproductive sphere.

Thus, if one considers the fertility behaviours of the population which either experienced or was directly affected by migration, the Albanian case seems to confirm Friedlander's (1969) Malthusian view. Migration relieved demographic pressure on the household and postponed the adaptations in fertility deemed necessary to ensure long-term sustainability. Whereas migration stabilised family systems, fertility change has been initiated in non-migrant (sending) families. Does this mean that the apparent association between declining birth rates and the increase in urbanization and international migration was an artifact? We argue against this. Appreciation of the role of migration in national fertility transition must also acknowledge compositional effects, as well as economic and social effects, on the sending society at large.

On the one hand, compositional effects were important because the main factors of the selectivity of migration – age, sex, marital, and socioeconomic status – constituted the main determinants of the population's reproductive potential. In the 1990s, the strong focus of the rural exodus towards domestic cities can account for the continuously early onset of family formation and the dominance of the two-child family model in Albania, including in urban areas. The redirection abroad of young women from rural areas in the 2000s, however, lead to a shrinking share of young women in high fertility settings, which mechanically depressed the birth rate at the national level.

Moreover, the selection of emigrants among median educated populations sustained the diversification in the patterns of family behaviours in the 2000s. The rising representation of the lowest and highest skilled women in Albania increased polarisation in behaviours, as the former group was characterised by the earliest marriages and highest fertility, whereas the latter postponed and limited family events the most. This was particularly pronounced in cities because of the in-migration of low-skilled people from rural areas. Thus, the changing selectivity of emigration over time sustained the national fertility transition through the transformation of demographic and socioeconomic population composition.

On the other hand, our results also showed how the diffuse effects of migration have influenced reproductive behaviours in Albania. We believe that urban fertility levels declined because of the consequences of rural-to-urban movements in terms of urbanisation rather than as a result of these movements per se. The urban living context was transformed, resulting in more diverse and denser populated cities, which increase the social diffusion of new behaviours. The development and structural change of the urban economy raised the costs of living. Higher-level education, which is concentrated in cities, not only postponed and limited fertility, but also increased the aspirations of women to roles outside of the family and emancipated them with regards to patriarchal norms (Morris et al. 2005). In the largest city (Tirana), where these transformations have been most pronounced,

fertility indeed reached lowest-low levels. As long-term residents were most exposed to these contextual changes, they responded to a greater extent in terms of their family behaviours when compared to in-migrants.

The contextual effects of urbanisation on Albanian fertility also depended on the dynamics of emigration. Demographic decline in rural areas increased the share of the population exposed to the transformations in the urban context. Remittances were invested in urban housing and business, particularly in the retail sector, which modernised consumption patterns and leisure activities, thereby triggering lower fertility. The massive scale of emigration also increased the prospects for future departures and thereby sustained a boom in higher level education. In this way the prospects of migration contributed to the declining trend in birth rates through altering the educational composition of Albania's population.

The willingness to emigrate was also interpreted as a new value orientation linked to a life-project abroad. Anticipatory reproductive behavior aimed to ensure as smooth a realisation as possible of this project by limiting family size prior to the move. But as many of these women did finally stay in Albania, this sustained the national fertility transition. Moreover, our results highlighted a major role in the promotion of low fertility patterns for social interaction of women in communities with female networks abroad.

Hence, rural-to-urban and international migration mattered for fertility decline through the transformation of the larger social context rather than through its impact on women's status within internal migrant and emigrant-sending families. The main conclusion is that there is a dominant role for compositional, contextual and social effects of migration in the transformation of reproductive patterns.

In this thesis, we have emphasised the role of migration in demographic change, with a particular focus on fertility. Our sending country perspective, as well as data limitations, led us to somewhat disregard the selection of international migrants according to reproductive behavior or preferences, as well as the processes of fertility adaptation abroad. This deserves more research in the future, as the insights would be important for understanding migration potential. For example, the interdependencies between female marriage and mobility played a crucial role in the recent large-scale redirection abroad of the rural exodus. The feminisation of emigration in the 2000s also coincided with the transition to adulthood of a generation characterized by considerably smaller sibships, when compared to the past. Autonomous or marriage-related migrations among women may have constituted a new avenue of ensuring a family livelihood for families without sons.

Implications and demographic prospects for Albania

This investigation of the interlinkages between components of demographic change has increased our understanding of the transformations of Albania's population geography. We can conclude that emigration relieved demographic pressure on low-quality and fragmented agricultural land in the periphery, as well as on saturated urban labor markets. Given the redirection abroad of the rural exodus, Albania moved from its first, restrained urban transition directly into its second, leaving domestic cities increasingly bypassed by population flows. At the same time, these international departures prevented an explosion of urban growth, although rural-to-

urban migrants sustained the strains on the labour markets and infrastructure in the main cities.

The urban-wards and international outflows from rural areas also accelerated the process of urbanisation in Albania, thereby enabling a spatial concentration of resources to provide public services and drive economic development. But the short-circuiting of secondary cities by migrants, combined with continuous emigration from these border areas, strongly increased urban primacy. This motivated further internal and international departures because it accentuated community and economic decay in the periphery. The conservation of cultural heritage is also endangered – as in the case of the historical city centres in the south of the country.

The results have further implications for our understanding of urban demography in Albania. Urban emigration and the progressive redirection of rural out-migrants to foreign countries induced an increasing relative importance of natural increase in post-communist urban growth. This was sustained by in-migration, which redistributed reproductive potential from rural to urban areas, thereby increasing the pressure on local maternal care, health and school facilities.

Yet today's demographic pressure on urban areas may turn into a future potential for economic development, as the higher fertility of rural-to-urban migrants ensures population reproduction over a longer period of time. This demographic gain will be important because the cities' long-term resident population has started to age at a fast pace. Yet with the recent redirection of family reunification from domestic cities to foreign countries, this potential of urban demography may be increasingly lost.

Migration can be expected to remain the main driver of population change in a context of low fertility. As there has so far been no evidence of significant value changes in the reproductive sphere, we acknowledge that the society is unlikely to experience the onset of the second demographic transition in the near future. However, this does not mean that fertility decline will stop. Given the experiences in other countries in the Western Balkans, as well as the prospects of ongoing urbanisation and structural changes in Albanian society, we can still expect continuing postponement of marriages and the diffusion of the one-child-family model. Indirect (own-children) estimates from the Census 2011 do indeed confirm a continuous shift of first births towards higher ages and a decline in family enlargements, when compared to 2001. This corroborates (own-children) estimates from the LSMS 2012 survey, which evince a continuous drop in the total fertility rate since 2008/9.

Expectations of continuous low fertility imply a limited number of dependent children in the future, so that Albania will experience its window of demographic opportunity for development when the cohorts born in the 1990s reach working ages. However, this window of opportunity may only last one or two decades, as the older working age population, which has been less depleted during the past twenty years of emigration, will retire by the late-2020s and beyond. The costs of social support will increase again. The capacity to retain and attract the demographic window of opportunity towards domestic cities will be determinant for economic and social development in the future. Indeed, because of the very existence of the youth bulge, the number of international migrants may stabilise or even increase in the next decade, unless the propensity of emigration declines strongly and rapidly to half the current levels (INSTAT 2014).

If the role of emigration was beneficial in the context of societal crisis and demographic disequilibrium during the completion phase of the first demographic transition, it now constitutes a main factor of population decline because of direct and indirect effects. The indirect effects are best illustrated by a multi-regional simulation of Albania's population from 2011 to 2031 (for the methodology, see INSTAT 2014). Holding fertility levels constant and assuming zero emigration alongside constant rates of internal migration implies a positive natural increase in all prefectures (but one), with the highest rates projected for Tirana and the coastal area where the other main cities are located. However, assuming the inverse—zero internal migration, but constant rates of emigration—implies a negative level of natural increase in all prefectures, except Tirana and in the Northern mountains (where fertility is higher).

Demographic outlooks are particularly worrying because the propensity to emigrate has not levelled off, despite the strong growth of the domestic economy and the recent financial crises in Italy and Greece. This not only tends to confirm Gedeshi's view (2002), arguing that the country is trapped in a vicious cycle in which continuous outflows are deemed necessary to sustain a living at home, but also underlines the persistent relative disparities in social and economic opportunities in Europe or overseas when compared with Albania. We thus expect Albania's population to continue declining and, in particular, to age at a rapid pace because of continuous departures abroad and the related loss of reproductive potential. The unabated trend in the international outflow may indeed relocate outside the country the window of demographic opportunity for development in the future.

General conclusions

We aim to close this conclusion with a more general discussion on the main lessons of our case study for the understanding of demographic change in other countries, which are currently in the completion phase of their first demographic transition. We also take this opportunity to draw some lines for future research.

The relevance of these generalisations depends on the representativeness of the Albanian case. On the one hand, Albania is clearly a topical case, which we exploited for its practical value in identifying the demographic impacts of migration. The complete isolation and the effective control of urban-ward and international migration during communist rule contrasted with the subsequent opening up to the outside world and the liberalisation of population mobility. This international extraversion of society was exacerbated by an acute post-communist crisis and a fast diffusion of modernisation. In addition to the small size of the country, we have to acknowledge that this context provoked levels of population mobility that are unlikely to be observed elsewhere.

The diffusion of demographic change and the underlying social processes, however, may well be. Historical demographic trends in Albania kept to the model observed in developing countries. Even though mortality and fertility declined in the absence of economic growth at the end of communist rule, the society experienced significant structural transformations, such as major advances in the health and educational domain, as well as a high level of female labour force participation (although it declined later on). Our parity-specific analysis of fertility also evinced how post-communist trends generally conformed to the patterns found across Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Although Albanian migration initiated in a

tumultuous period, it also evolved in a typical pattern, observed in Southern Europe and many developing countries, with a recent increase in family reunifications, as well as processes of cumulative causation through chain migrations, rising inequalities and people's new aspirations. Moreover, our international exploration of urban growth patterns pointed to the existence of similar direct, induced and indirect effects of migration in other developing countries as well.

Albania now ranks among middle income countries and forms the immediate labour frontier of a world economic core area (the European Union). As international migration tends to be highest in settings located in a similar economic and geographic position (Skeldon 1997), lessons from this case study may well be useful for generalisations – despite the particular political history.

First, the Albanian case confirms that the economic and political context at the macro-level influences the destination of migrants. Crisis circumstances redirect population flows towards foreign countries in the short-run. This has consequences for the subsequent course of mobility transition through cumulative causation of emigration, which may compete with incentives for rural-to-urban movements. This may explain continuous international outflows despite a subsequent context of development in other sending countries as well.

Related to this is a second point: the role of geography in the course of the mobility transition. Geographical proximity between the sending and destination countries of international migration is a major determinant of the interactions of different flows, as it facilitates step-wise movements and the substitution of international for rural-to-urban migration. Comparative studies in sending countries located on the labour frontier of world economic core areas, and in others which are located more in the world's periphery, would be useful to disentangle the role played by geography from that attributable to international social and economic linkages in the patterning of population mobility.

Third, our results also have implications for the way demographers monitor migration. Given the rising dominance of urban population dynamics in a mainly urban world, the analysis of migration should be systematically differentiated according to the urban hierarchy for several reasons. Urban areas play an important role in the initiation of emigration, even of flows originating in the countryside, because cities constitute intermediary residential steps. Urbanisation may also lead to the rise of new types of international migration, such as opportunity-seeking mobility of young people in search of a professional career, thereby depleting the development of human capital. Candidates of rural-to-urban migration may also by-pass domestic cities towards more attractive foreign destinations, so that demographic and economic potential is lost. In this regard, particular attention should be paid to the degree of disarticulation between different levels of the urban hierarchy, as this affects the balance between domestic and international flows from lower levels.

Future research may establish the potential for international migration arising from urbanisation, as well as the conditions under which domestic urbanisation is foregone to the benefit of more developed countries. An international analysis of urbanisation that takes into account the interlinkages and substitutabilities of internal and international flows within the context of development would increase our understanding of the relationship between world urbanisation and the world economy. More generally, our knowledge about the socioeconomic processes of migration mainly refers to rural societies. As the majority of the world population is

now living in cities, an increased research focus on urban patterns of migration is timely.

Fourth, the importance of patriarchal kinship structures for fertility change, as well as for the interactions between demographic behaviours at the family level in Albania, confirms the cultural interpretation of the world-wide diffusion of the first demographic transition (Coale 1973; Cleland and Wilson 1987). Traditional institutions – rather than socio-economic transformations – play a leading role in demographic change as long as they remain competitive not only in terms of cultural ideology but also in providing arrangements for social security and risk-sharing (Lesthaeghe 1980; Ryder 1983). This is particularly the case during periods of crisis, when the state or the market is not able to fulfill these functions. A comparative analysis of fertility change and its interactions with residential mobility in the multicultural laboratory constituted by the Western Balkans would be particularly useful to determine the contexts in which culture overrides the importance of socioeconomic or political factors.

Fifth, our conclusion with regards to the dominant role played by the compositional, contextual and diffuse social effects of migration in the transformation of reproductive patterns is in line with recent differentiations of migration-driven processes of socioeconomic change into endogenous and contextual ones. Endogenous processes concern populations which are directly exposed to migration and refer to "intermediate, self-sustaining structures largely created or reinforced by migration processes themselves" (DeHaas 2010: 1590). These include remittances, networks, and the migration industry (recruitment agencies, trafficking networks, etc.). In other words, endogenous dynamics mobilise pre-existing institutions (or give rise to new ones) in order to reduce the risks inherent in migratory projects, to frame transactions, and to ensure coordination between migrants and family members left behind (Guilmoto and Sandron 2000). The kinds of institutions that assume these functions matters for the impact of migration. When traditional social institutions are mobilized, migration may indeed not work in challenging their moral primacy in the reproductive sphere.

Geography again matters, as the spatial concentration of migrants at destination influences cultural reproduction and thus the pace of fertility adaptation. Such neighborhood effects are as yet poorly documented, although they may explain why urban fertility decline stalls in certain world regions despite ongoing population urbanisation, as observed in Africa. A multilevel study of urban childbearing which takes into account migration would be a valuable contribution to our understanding of the diversity in urban fertility transitions.

Exogenous dynamics of migration, by contrast, refer to the contextual feedback mechanisms on the social, cultural, and economic setting at origin and destination (DeHaas 2010). These sustained (if not induced) the transformation of society and reproductive behaviors in many countries. Yet the shares of population exposed to endogenous and contextual processes of social change vary over time.

The stage attained in the course of mobility transition by a particular sending community should therefore mediate the impacts of migration on demographic reproduction. With continuous chain migration and family reunifications, the population directly exposed to migration within sending households declines, and the importance of contextual influences that support fertility decline increase. We have also mentioned the role of changing selection of migration flows for demographic structures and thus, indirectly, for birth rates. Selection also matters for social effects

on the reproductive behaviours of the society left behind. With the progressive feminisation of international migration, for example, opportunities for women left behind to interact with female migrant networks trigger fertility decline.

More research is needed to establish the relative importance of endogenous and exogenous processes of social transformation over the evolution of the migratory phenomenon. Geography may again matter for contextual influences, as proximity between the sending and destination country influences the intensity of transitional activities and the social interaction of migrants with the society at large. There is also a need to focus more on the contextual influences beyond social effects, such as those arising from local development, socioeconomic recomposition and differentiation in sending (and receiving) societies. More precise measurement of these processes should be developed to better assess their importance and advance understanding. How fertility changes over the mobility transition, as well as with the transnational relations and contextual changes it promotes, is a largely unexplored research line. Insights into these questions would enhance our understanding of the demographic transition and its interrelationship with development.

Sixth, this analysis has demonstrated the importance of better accounting for the complex interactions between components of population change for an increased understanding of the urban transition. As regional demographic regimes are still relatively differentiated during the completion phase of the first demographic transition, the induced and indirect demographic effects of migration are significant in cities, where natural increase is usually lower. Because of the international diffusion of low fertility patterns, we argue that in many urban areas of less developed countries, fertility would be low or very low, had its level not been sustained by the in-migration of women who were socialized to rural norms of childbearing. Traditional research questions linking urbanisation to the fertility transition in developing countries may thus be reformulated to address new contemporary issues. A question of rising importance is to what extent rural-to-urban migrations ensure demographic reproduction of the less developed countries' urban populations to maintain a favorable age structure for development in the future.

Given the above mentioned mediating factors of the mobility transition and of its interactions with the fertility transition — i.e. the economic, political and cultural context, the phase of mobility transition, and geography – the demographic impacts of migration on sending societies are to a certain extent an empirical matter (as with developmental impacts of migration in general; DeHaas 2010). The topical case of Albania has demonstrated the importance of period circumstances for population responses and their impacts, and how these patterns endure because of social diffusion and cumulative causation. Although crisis-induced emigration enabled rural-to-urban movements of families left behind, its diffusion down the urban hierarchy progressively redirected them abroad, leading to population decline. Fertility decline was driven neither by rural-to-urban migrants nor by emigrant-sending families, because traditional social institutions played a role in livelihood strategies (including migration), which strengthened their moral primacy in the family sphere. Emigration prevented an urban explosion during the crisis, and sustained the fast catch up of urbanization. Although rural-to-urban migrants increased pressure on the cities' social systems, they ensured the demographic reproduction of the fast aging urban population.

It is therefore important to explore from a comparative and multidisciplinary perspective the contextual constellations that favor either type of migration and

fertility change in migrant sending and receiving communities, as well as to situate the effects within context. We believe that a socio-demographic approach, as adopted in this analysis, is most fruitful in accounting for the complexity of migration and its effects with the aim of increasing our understanding of demographic interactions during the first demographic transition.

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Appendix data assessment

This appendix complements the different papers with a more detailed presentation and quality assessment of the data used.

Presentation of the data

The Population Census, conducted every 10 years by INSTAT and last held in 2011, plays a significant role in the statistical information system of Albania, as it constitutes the only reliable data on the exhaustive de facto population and the basis of sampling for surveys (see Table 1). The vital registration system, which records events such as births, deaths, and marriages, is organized within the framework of the activities of the Department of Interior through the Civil Status Offices (CSO) in collaboration with INSTAT. The population register kept by the CSO also provides limited information on internal migration (total number based on sex) in addition to an estimate of the de jure resident population. There is no reliable register of international migrants. This information on the components of population changes (in addition to projected numbers of international migrants) permits the yearly population estimates made by INSTAT. However, current statistics are affected by different biases (see section 3.3).

The Reproductive and Health Survey (RHS) conducted by the Institute of Public Health and supported by USAID, UNFPA, UNICEF, and CDC, was the first national information source on family planning and reproductive health issues. It was updated by means of the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) in 2008/9. The Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS), undertaken by INSTAT with the support of the World Bank, was the first national survey to measure internal and international migration. Socioeconomic determinants of fertility and child mortality can also be investigated on the basis of this survey.

On the whole, the definitions used in the data follow the international recommendations and are also adapted to the social situation of the country. The definition of household membership and place of residence at the census/survey date deserves special attention in a context of large-scale temporary emigration, as this determines the extent to which these people are reported as migrants, residents, or completely missed. The household is defined in the Albanian census, according to the housekeeping concept (United Nations 2008), as a *group of persons living together in one dwelling and who have a joint economy.* No information about homeless people is available.

Place of residence in the census is defined according to the UN definition of the place of *usual* residence: household members should be present or absent for less than 12 months but expected to return before an absence of more than 12 months. This definition differs from the UN recommendation suggesting a 12-month threshold (at least 6 months continuously) of *usual residence* (United Nations 2008) rather than *absence*, but is justified by the seasonal migration observed between Albania and neighboring countries.

The LSMS also adopted the housekeeping concept, although the duration of absence criteria is shorter (6 months). Thus, temporary migrants who spent a longer time abroad at the date of the census are not reported. The DHS applied the housekeeping concept (although it also considers as members people who slept in the household the night prior to the interview), and uses the same duration criteria of absence as the census.

TABLE 1: OVERVIEW OF CENSUSES AND POPULATION-BASED SURVEYS, ALBANIA.

Survey	**Sample**	**Representativeness**	**Respondent selection in HH**	**Definition household membership**	**Response rate / enumeration completeness**
Census 1989	3'182'417	exhaustive		(expected) absence for less than 12 months	Complete (INSTAT 1999)
Census 2001	3'069'275	exhaustive		Housekeeping concept; (expected) absence for less than 12 months	Considered as "good" (Ekonomi 2003); -4.4% under-enumeration (own est.)
Census 2011	2'800'00	exhaustive		Housekeeping concept; (expected) absence for less than 12 months	-3.5% under-enumeration (INSTAT 2012)
RHS 2002	10,316 households, 5696 women aged 15-44 interviewed, 5,866 men (15-49)	Metro Tirana, other urban, rural	Random selection of one eligible woman (aged 15-44 years)	Not kown	94%
LSMS 2002	3599 households, 16521 women	North-eastern mountains, coastal, central areas and Tirana; Tirana, other cities and rural	All members	normally live and eat their meals here, away for less than 6 months	More than 95%

TABLE 1: CONT.

Survey	Sample	Representativeness	Respondent selection in HH	Definition household membership	Response rate / enumeration completeness
LSMS 2003 panel	1782 households followed, 7973 individuals	National	All members	Ditto	More than 95%
LSMS 2004 panel	1780 households followed, 8110 individuals	National	All members	Ditto	More than 95%
LSMS 2008	3600 households, 14875 individuals	North-eastern mountains, coastal, central areas and Tirana; Tir, other cities and rural	All members	normally live and eat their meals here	98%
DHS 2008/9	8,994 households, 7,584 women aged 15-49	North-eastern mountains, coastal, central areas and Tirana; urban and rural	All women aged 15-49	Usually live here or stayed here last night, away for less than 12 months	98% of households; 98% of women

Sources: INSTAT 1999; basic documentation of surveys; United Nations 2005; author's estimates of 2001 census completeness.

All the surveys adopt a stratified multistage sampling, which is in accordance with international recommendations (UN 2005). For example, the sampling procedure of the LSMS 2002 was a stratified two-step cluster sampling with replacement, organized as follows (see also World Bank and INSTAT 2003):

The Enumeration Areas (EA) of the Census, which number approximately 100 households each, were distributed into 4 regional strata and further substrata according to the urban classification:

regional strata: central region, coast, mountains, and Tirana

substrata: some major cities, other urban and rural areas.

First stage sampling: A number of EA were randomly chosen within each stratum, in proportion to the size of the stratum. The 450 selected EA represent the primary sampling units (PSU).

Tirana specificities: The EAs for the city of Tirana were ordered according to their socioeconomic level. Three categories were defined based on previous knowledge and the PSU were systematically selected in each category.

Second stage sampling: Using a systematic sampling, 12 household units were selected in each of the 450 EA. These represented the secondary sampling units (SSU). Four of them were considered as replacement units in case of nonresponse among the first eight households.

The sampling in *RHS* followed a similar methodology. The enumeration areas were distributed in three strata (Metro Tirana, other urban areas, rural areas), and the urban strata were oversampled in order to give a sample sufficient for the computation of robust estimates of indicators. Within the selected PSU, a systematic sampling (based on a random start) provided the households in which one woman was randomly selected for interview. A third of these PSU were also randomly selected for the male sample. Furthermore, a third stage sampling has been added to select only one woman or man aged 15–44 or 15–49, respectively, from each household.

The sampling of the *LSMS 2008* and *DHS 2008/9* followed the same methodology. Both samples of households were chosen within the same selected EA based on an updated listing for the purpose of the surveys. This listing aimed at placing controls on the impact of internal and international migration since the 2001 census, which served as a sampling base. However, representation may not be ensured because the household listing was only updated in the selected PSU. The population weights of these PSU are based on the population at the 2001 census and no longer correspond to the population geography of Albania in 2008. The Northern and Southern regions experienced a sharp depopulation, while inhabitants increasingly concentrated in the Tirana-Durres area. Given the relative overrepresentation of the population in peripheral areas in 2001, the survey may overestimate fertility and migration. Confrontations with independent estimates show that these biases should be limited (see further down), thereby pointing to a spatial homogenization of demographic behavior.

The response rate for all of these surveys is very high (at least 95%), which encourages their use.

Census completeness and age heaping

Age heaping is not a problem in Albania.

Using indirect demographic estimation techniques (i.e. the General Growth Balance method (GGB)[27]; Nations 2002), INSTAT (1999) and Gjonca (2001) showed that the 1960, 1969, 1979, and 1989 censuses were quasi-complete relative to the respective preceding census and intercensal death registration (see Table 1).

No precise appraisal of the quality of the 2001 census is known because no postenumeration survey has been undertaken. The quality has been estimated as "fairly good" (Ekonomi 2003: 5). An assessment of the completeness of the 2001 census is indeed challenging because the fundamental hypotheses of the GBB method are violated to a significant extent: most notably, the absence of international migration, but also constant annual growth and death rates by age over the intercensal period, equal reporting of death for all ages, and equal errors or omissions in the census for all ages.

Yet when an external estimate of net migration is available, one may at least limit this bias in adjusting the second census before applying the GGB method. Accordingly, the addition to the enumerated population in 2001 of the total age- and sex-specific stock of Albanian immigrants around 2000 as reported by destination countries to the UN (i.e., 657,432 individuals) provides a relative census underenumeration of -4.4% relative to the 1989 census. The real underenumeration may be lower as our estimate is confounded by underreporting of Albanians abroad. If we consider that the census in 1989 was complete, underenumeration in 2001 is slightly higher or equal to the census in 2011, when the postenumeration survey estimated a rate of -3.5% (INSTAT 2012).

Birth and deaths registration

If deaths were significantly underregistered in 1950 (by 30% and 20% among women and men, respectively), the situation ameliorated toward quasicompleteness between 1979 and 1989 (INSTAT 1999). Birth registration "was somewhat incomplete in the 1950s, but [also] improved to more or less full coverage by the seventies (Gjonca 1996)" (Falkingham and Gjonca 2001: 309).

Yet this changed dramatically during the 1990s and 2000s. Forwarding of data from the regional to central statistical office was not always ensured or incomplete, events have been underreported during the crises, and information was lost (up to a third of

[27] The GGB method estimates indirectly the intercensal death rate at age x and above. It is obtained by subtracting from the intercensal "entry rate" into successive open-ended age segments of the population the growth rate of these age segments between both censuses. Intercensal entry means here the aging of cohorts from an age class x into the upper open-ended segment, and is also estimated directly from the age distributions at subsequent censuses. This indirect estimate of death rates above age x is compared with a direct estimate based on registered deaths during the intercensal period. The slope of the orthogonal regression relating both series of estimates by open-ended age groups (the direct estimate on the x-axis and the indirect on the y-axis) gives the coverage of death registration relative to the average completeness of both censuses. The differential completeness between both censuses can be derived from the intercept.

events) during the migration from a paper-based to an electronic registration system from 2008 to 2010. Moreover, emigrants who are no longer residents of Albania may continue to register births in the country, as indicated by the incongruence of regional birth statistics and census counts of infants from 2000 to 2001 (Lerch and Wanner 2008).

Quality of fertility estimates after 1989: comparison of sources

In the second paper, we assessed and discussed differences in the TFR as estimated from different sources. We can add here that the divergence further narrowed during the 2011 census, which confirms an improved measurement of fertility in Albania.

We further assess the quality of estimates of period parity progression to the first birth and its mean age based on surveys (RHS and DHS), using as external sources of comparison the 1989[28], 2001, and 2011 censuses and vital statistics that enable direct and indirect (own-children method) estimations. The convergence of estimates of progression rates to higher order births cannot be assessed because survey data does not allow robust computation of period parity progression rates for short periods of time (in contrast to synthetic parity progression rates), due to the low frequency of events by single age.

The period parity progression ratio to the first birth (PPR1) based on the 1989 census is 89%, which is not significantly lower than the RHS estimate of 93% from 1988 to 1991 (CI 89%–95%; Table 2). The women's mean age at first birth also converges with the RHS estimate (23.4 years against 24 years).

The estimates for 2001 based on the three different methods almost perfectly converge. However, the PPR1 based on the number of registered births from 2011 to 2012 is significantly higher when compared to the indirect estimates from the survey for 2005 to 2007 and the 2011 census, which converge. This may be related to the fact that more than two-thirds of registered births have been redistributed by birth order prorated to the known distribution, as information was incomplete. Survey estimates of mean age at first birth, in contrast, are higher than those obtained by the own-children and the direct method.

[28] As the necessary published data from the 1989 census is only available by 5-year age groups, the estimate was obtained as follows. We first estimated annual transition rates for 5-year age groups based on an estimate of the number of first births between April 1, 1989 and March 31, 1990 (Drejtoria E Statistikes. 1991. *Statistical Yearbook of Albania*. Tirana: Ministria E Ekonomise, Republika E Shqiperise.) and the number of childless women at the 1989 census (Central Directory of Statistics. 1991. *Population and Housing Census 1989: Principal Results*. Tirana: Republic of Albania.). Transition rates for single years of age were then obtained through a decomposition with a moving average of the logarithmic transformations of these annual transition rates referring to 5-year age groups.

TABLE 2: PROGRESSION RATIO TO THE FIRST BIRTH AND MEAN AGES, ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT DATA SOURCES, 1988–1990, 1999–2001, 2006–2011.

	Survey RHS & DHS		Census own children	CSO/Census
1990				
PPR1	0.93	CI=0.87-0.96		0.89
mean age	24.1	CI=23.8-24.3		23.4
2001				
PPR1	0.89	CI=0.83-0.93	0.85	0.89
mean age	24.6	CI=24.2-25	24.2	24.3
2011				
PPR1	*0.77	CI=0.68-0.86	0.81	0.92
mean age	26.1	CI=25.8-26.4	25.0	24.9

Source: RHS 2002, DHS 2008/9; 1989, 2001, 2011 censuses; Drejtoria E Statistikes 1991; Central Directory of Statistics 1991; Falkingham and Gjonca (2001). * 2005–07.

Thus, we can conclude that survey data provides a rather accurate picture of the progression to first births, although estimates vary slightly among different sources.

Quality of migration estimates after 1989: comparison of sources

To assess the representativeness of the LSMS 2008 survey with regard to the estimates of age patterns and intensity of emigration within and from Albania, Figure 1 confronts retrospective survey estimates of annual sex and age-specific emigration rates (referring to 5-year synthetic cohorts) with intercensal indirect estimates based on the 2001 and 2011 censuses.[29]

If retrospective survey estimates converge with census-based estimates among younger men (under 25), they clearly underestimate emigration at older ages. This can be related to two shortcomings of survey data. First, entire households that emigrated prior to the survey date obviously cannot be interviewed. As older generations usually head the household, the survey underestimation of migration at older ages can be explained by this selection bias. Second, information on permanent emigration is only provided by the head-of-household and refers to his children who left the household, and to his brothers and sisters. Thus, both biases

[29] The life-table survival method was applied to data from the 2001 and 2011 censuses. Sex and age-specific cohorts enumerated in the first census, as well as the annual number of births in the intercensus interval, were forward survived to the date of the second census, yielding an estimate of a hypothetical closed population. This population is compared with the observed population at the second census (in 2011, we only considered the population who also resided in Albania in 2001); the residual is an estimate of the emigrant stock. We then estimated intercensus emigration transition rates (net of mortality) by dividing the stock by the closed population in 2011; the rates were annualized and assigned to the age attained by each cohort in the middle of its exposure period.

have a cumulative effect in explaining survey underestimation at older ages when the household head left Albania (to reunify with his children abroad, for example) or when he named as household head one of his children, with whom he reunified elsewhere in Albania (in a city, for example).

FIGURE 1: COMPARISON OF ANNUAL AGE-SPECIFIC RATES OF EMIGRATION BETWEEN SOURCES BY SEX, 2003–2007, ALBANIA.

Men



Women



Source: LSMS 2008 (for 2003-07 5y-synthetic cohort), 2001 and 2011 censuses (annualized intercensal estimate; immigrants not considered in 2011).

For women, by contrast, the age profiles of both rate schedules converge, but the survey underestimates the level at all ages when compared to census-based estimates. This general underestimation among women may be explained by the fact that their move is tied to a larger extent to the presence of other family members abroad. The time lag between the child's and the parents' or siblings' emigration is shorter. The probability that nobody remains in Albania to proxy their absence increases for women when compared to men.

The importance of selection biases in the survey estimates of international migration is also confirmed by the stronger convergence with the census estimates in annual age-specific internal migration rates (Figure 2). Estimates from the census for 2007 match closely those referring to the synthetic cohort 2005–2008 obtained from the LSMS 2008.

FIGURE 2: COMPARISON OF ANNUAL AGE-SPECIFIC INTERNAL MIGRATION RATES BETWEEN SOURCES BY SEX, 2005–2008 ALBANIA.

Men



Women



Sources: LSMS 2008 (for 2005-8 5y-synthetic cohort); 2011 census (in-migrants in 2007, post-2006 immigrants not considered).

Thus, the representativeness of the survey estimates is higher for internal than for international migration because a selection bias obviously affects the latter estimates. We can nevertheless conclude that if the survey clearly underestimates the level of international migration, the age profiles in emigration rates are accurate for both sexes. Therefore, our analysis should not be significantly biased as we are primarily

interested in differences in the likelihood (rather than levels) of migration between groups and periods.

Age- and date-heaping of the main dependent variables used in the analyses

To assess the quality of the respondents' declarations of age, year of birth, and dates of occurrence of their demographic events, we computed Whipple indexes that indicate whether there is an attraction to "round" digits in the responses. Although Albania's population is highly literate, people may not exactly remember or may wrongly state the date of occurrence of demographic events in the past, particularly migrations. We limited the assessment of the quality of responses to those questions used to construct our main dependent variables for the analyses.

The index ascertains whether the distribution of digit-specific frequencies over a 5-digit interval (centered on digits 0 and 5) is linear (either declining, increasing, or stable). A value of 0 indicates a complete repulsion from digits 0 and 5; a value of 1 indicates perfect linearity; and a value of 5 indicates complete attraction to digits 0 and 5. Results are shown in Table 3.

All indexes are close to unity, which confirms an absence of attraction. The only indexes reaching values above 1.1 refer to the timing of migrations. A closer look at the frequencies confirmed that these were concentrated in the periods 1990–1992 and 1996–2001 (i.e., the main years of crisis and social upheaval, as well as of regularization of immigrants abroad).

It is worth mentioning that migratory events reported in the LSMS 2008 were concentrated in the second crisis period, whereas they were concentrated in the first period in earlier surveys. This confirms an intensifying selection bias over time, which is due to the transformation of temporary into permanent migrations between the 1990s and the 2000s.

TABLE 3: WHIPPLE INDEX FOR DIGIT PREFERENCES 0 AND 5 IN AGE AND IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS USED TO CONSTRUCT THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES FOR THE ANALYSES.

Data source & dependent variable	Whipple index
Census 2001	
Age men	1.02
Age women	1.02
RHS 2002	
Year of birth women (15-44)	1.02
Year of birth child	1.02
Age of mother at birth	1.01
Year of first marriage women (15-44)	1.09
Year when moved to current municipality	1.12
attraction on main crisis years (1990-2, 1996-2001)	yes
LSMS 2002	
Age of men	1.02
Age of women	1.06
Year of birth of men and women	1.03
Age of mother at birth	1.02
Year of children's permanent emigration	1.28
attraction on main crisis years (1990-2, 1996-2001)	yes
DHS 2008/9	
Age of men (hh-sample)	1.00
Age of women (hh-sample)	1.02
Year of birth women (15-49)	1.06
Year of birth child	0.98
Age of mother at birth	1.02
Year of first marriage women (15-49)	1.09
Year when moved to current municipality	1.12
attraction on main crisis years (1990-2, 1996-2001)	yes
LSMS 2008	
Age of men	1.00
Age of women	0.98
Year of 1st internal migration (since 1985)	1.11
attraction on main crisis years (1990-2, 1996-2001)	yes, 2nd period
Year of 1st emigration of former hh-members (since 1985)	1.07
attraction on main crisis years (1990-2, 1996-2001)	yes, 2nd period
Year of 1st emigration of current hh-members	1.08

Nevertheless, we can conclude that the quality of age and date reporting is very high in Albania.

The effect of unchanged urban definition and urban borders on the empirical rate of urbanization

To assess whether the picture of urbanization provided by the subsequent censuses of Albania is biased, we compared annual rates of urbanization (i.e., growth of the urban percentage) in the 26 districts over time. The Table 4 clearly highlights that the rates of urbanization were highest in peripheral districts. The lowest estimates were observed in more urbanized regions (Tirana, Durres, Gjirokaster, Vlore, Skhoder, and Korce).

This can be explained by different factors at different periods. In the 1950s, the higher increase in urbanization on the periphery reflects two factors: large-scale urban in-migration and the creation or promotion of new cities (i.e., Diber, Kukes, Kolonje, Mat, Puke, and Tepelene). Ideally, one should rely on population statistics by settlement size to allow a distinction between politically motivated reclassification of rural areas and the demographic processes underlying reclassification (i.e., the graduation of small settlements into the urban class due to population growth). However, such data is not available for the communist period. Urbanization in districts with today's large cities also rose at rates above the national average (such as Vlore and Durres), which is congruent to reality.

TABLE 4: ANNUAL RATES OF URBANIZATION BY DISTRICT, ALBANIA 1950–2001.

District	Rate of urbanisation (annualized)			
	1950-60	1960-1980	1980-89	1989-2001
Berat	0.045	0.005	0.004	0.000
Diber	**0.086**	**0.021**	**0.028**	0.033
Durres	0.043	0.000	0.002	0.008
Elbasan	0.046	0.005	0.001	0.000
Fier	**0.076**	**0.023**	0.006	0.018
Gramsh	**0.065**	**0.038**	**0.014**	**0.043**
Gjirokaster	0.008	0.008	0.007	0.003
Kolonje	**0.165**	**0.019**	**0.014**	**0.036**
Korce	0.027	0.000	0.006	0.007
Kruje	-0.009	**0.042**	**0.014**	-0.004
Kukes	**0.065**	**0.045**	0.005	**0.032**
Lezhe	0.036	0.034	**0.012**	0.017
Librazhd		**0.064**	0.018	**0.025**
Lushnje	0.012	0.004	0.009	0.015
Mat	**0.152**	**0.016**	**0.044**	0.016
Mirdite			0.009	**0.042**
Permet	0.052	0.022	0.020	**0.041**
Pogradec	0.051	0.003	0.017	0.019
Puke	**0.158**	0.027	0.022	**0.031**
Sarande	**0.073**	0.007	0.010	**0.026**
Skrapar	0.008	0.000	0.006	0.019
Shkoder	**0.093**	**0.076**	0.016	0.012
Tepelene	**0.231**	0.011	0.016	0.020
Tirane	0.022	-0.003	0.002	0.001
Tropoje	0.053	0.037	**0.051**	**0.021**
Vlore	0.059	0.001	0.007	0.015
Albania	0.041	0.004	0.007	0.013

Source: Sjorberg (1989); 2001 census.

From the 1960s to 1980s, however, all districts with large cities had low rates of urbanization. Tirana even experienced de-urbanization in the 1960s, which is evidence of the implementation of controls on mobility and/or faster growth of the rural population of the district. During the 1980s and 1990s, however, the low rate of urbanization in main urban districts could relate to diverted migration and suburbanization of the main centers of Albania beyond official urban borders, respectively. Urbanization remained highest on the periphery, which is due both to a local rural exodus into the small city centers as well as the demographic losses of rural population to foreign countries.

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