Protest and the forum: forms of participation in the global justice movement

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Forms of participation in the global justice movement

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The European Social Forum (ESF) is an open space for debate but also a space for protest. Its participants not only attend workshops and discuss alternatives to neoliberal globalization and ways to build another Europe, but also use their broad repertoires of protest within and around the forum. This chapter discusses the use of various forms of action within the global justice movement (GJM), tackling the issue at two distinct levels of analysis. In the first part, we look at the relationship between protest and the arena we chose for our analysis, that is, the ESF. We first discuss the forum as a form of protest in its own right, or more precisely as a space where multiple and heterogeneous forms of protest against neoliberal globalization are planned and practised. The acceptance of variegated action repertoires with the one condition of nonviolence emerges as a distinct common aspect of the protest activities connected with the ESF. Notwithstanding this acceptance, tension in connection with specific protest events and certain forms of action also reveals the forum as a contested protest space. This tension mirrors general strains within the social forum process, concerning in particular the boundaries of the movement and internal decision making. However, the common basis within the ESF also proved to be solid with regard to forms of action.

In the second part, we analyse the use of various forms of action by individual participants in the May 2006 ESF in Athens, based on the survey we conducted there in the context of the Demos project. Here, we follow the research tradition on political participation (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Dalton 2002; Milbrath 1965; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba *et al.* 1978) to inquire into the differences in the forms of participation by those who attended the Athens ESF, distinguishing among three general forms: party related activities, demonstrative protest, and confrontational protest. Although we treat these general forms as three distinct ways of engaging in politics, they can be seen as increasingly demanding in terms of commitment and as increasingly radical in their expression.

We first look into the relationship among the three general forms of participation and their connection with the different areas of the GJM. We argue that the overlapping use of action forms by the various movement areas constitutes a factor contributing to the solidity of the ESF protest space, notwithstanding its characteristic as a contested space. We then examine how the use of these forms of participation is influenced by three sets of factors: the structural characteristics

of the people involved (gender, age, social status (being a student), and position within the group most important to the respondent); their attitudes towards politics (as indicated by degree of identification with the global justice movement, being a radical leftist, degree of political and institutional trust, and level of satisfaction with decision making processes); and their views about democracy as well as globalization. In other words, we aim to look at how certain social, political, and cultural characteristics and values of participants in the ESF influence their political activities.

The latter factor is of particular interest for us, as it allows us to study the relationship between forms of action and the democratic views of participants in the ESF and more generally in the global justice movement. The focus here will be on three aspects that give us a broad picture of how activists place themselves vis-à-vis democracy and globalization: their views about how collective decisions should be taken, about strategies to enhance democracy, and about strategies to tame globalization. Concerning the first aspect, we shall focus more specifically on four key features of deliberative democracy (see Chapter 4 in this volume): whether the quality of arguments (rather than resources) should primarily make the difference in decision making; whether mutual acceptance is always important in a political conflict; whether participation (rather than delegation) should always be a priority in decision making; and whether political decisions should be taken by consensus (rather than voting). The latter two aspects, in particular, define the deliberative-participative model of democracy (della Porta 2005a) often stressed by the movement.

The arena: the ESF as a protest space

The ESF: a multiple and heterogeneous protest space

Social forums in general, and the ESF in particular, have been described as communicative spaces and also as an organizational form typical of the highly networked nature of the GJM. The organization and holding of social forums at the global, regional, and local levels can also be considered as a form of protest. In fact, the first edition of the World Social Forum (WSF) in January 2001 was conceived as a counter-event to the World Economic Forum in Davos. It was meant to intercept media attention, but also to propose a counter-model to the dominant ways of discussing and practicing global governance. At the first ESF in Florence in November 2002, its character as a protest event found expression in the slogan, 'Against war, racism and neoliberalism'. The 'Call of the European Social Movements' published on that occasion explicitly states: 'We have gathered in Florence to express our opposition to a European order based on corporate power and neoliberalism' (ESF 2002). In addition, the call locates the ESF in a series of protest events: 'We have come together through a long process: the demonstrations of Amsterdam, Seattle, Prague, Nice, Genoa, Brussels, Barcelona' (ibid.). Similar statements have also characterized the subsequent editions of the ESF.[1]

More than a clearly defined form of protest, however, the ESF is a space where different forms and conceptions of protest against neoliberal globalization may be planned and practised. As often underlined, in fact, the ESF is not a homogeneous actor; according to the WSF Charter of Principles adopted in 2001, to which the ESF also refers, it is not an actor at all. The charter defines the social forum as 'an open meeting place for reflective thinking, democratic debate of ideas, formulation of proposals, free exchange of experiences and interlinking for effective action, by groups and movements of civil society that are opposed to neo-liberalism' (WSF 2002). At the same time, the charter under-lines that the WSF does not intend to be a body representing world civil society. In fact, the meetings of the WSF and ESF do not deliberate on behalf of the forum as a body, and no one is authorized to express positions claiming to be those of all its participants.

The protest space provided by the ESF is in fact populated by organizational actors engaging in multiple and heterogeneous protest activities. An analysis of organizations involved in the European Social Forum process, based on funda-mental documents of these organizations and interviews with their representa-tives, has shown that they employ different strategies to reach their goals: protest, lobbying, constructing concrete alternatives, promoting political educa-tion, trying to raise citizens' awareness (see della Porta and Mosca 2006; della Porta and Reiter 2006a). Most of these groups do not limit themselves to a single strategy but employ and mix various approaches. Contrary to the assumption that lobbying and protest are opposite strategies used by different actors, we found evidence for the use of both by a significant percentage of the sampled groups.

Within the protest space provided by the ESF, different organizations, but also the same organization, may therefore express their opposition to neoliberal globalization in different ways: by organizing seminars or workshops, leafleting, circulating petitions, organizing demonstrations or vigils, participating in the concluding demonstration of the ESF, and so on. These variegated action reper-toires are not only tolerated within the social forum framework, but are seen pos-itively as part of the diversity that the GJM considers one of its strengths, rather than a weakness. In fact, the WSF and the ESF encourage the acceptance of diversity in forms of action, with the one condition of non-violence. The WSF charter speaks of openness to 'the diversity of activities and ways of engaging of the organizations and movements that decide to participate in it'. In this context, it stresses transparency, the sharing of experiences, and the encouragement of 'understanding and mutual recognition amongst its participant organizations and movements', by strengthening and creating new national and international links with the aim of increasing 'the capacity for non-violent social resistance to the process of dehumanization the world is undergoing and to the violence used by the State' (WSF 2002).

The principles contained in the WSF charter – in particular the acceptance of diversity in forms of action with the condition of non-violence – found their first European expression in the protests against the G8 summit in Genoa in 2001, that

is, more than a year before the first ESF. Agreed upon at the WSF, the counter-summit was organized by a light ad hoc structure, the Genoa Social Forum (GSF), which stipulated a 'work agreement' (echoing the WSF charter elaborated roughly at the same time) binding the signatories to 'respect all forms of direct, peaceful, nonviolent expression and action declared publicly and transparently' (GSF 2001). At the Florence ESF (and at subsequent editions of the forum), a work agreement similar to the one in Genoa was not formally signed, but informally applied.[2]

An important function of the ESF as a protest space consists in the planning and promotion of protest events beyond the forum itself. The very fact that such protest events were perceived as being promoted by the WSF or the ESF jars with a strict definition of the forum as an open space for debate, that is, limited to providing an opportunity for organizations, groups, and networks to meet, exchange ideas, and discuss and co-ordinate future common action (Whitaker 2004). In fact, the assembly of social movements, which does in its calls promote specific protest events, is convened after the official end of the WSF or ESF, albeit implicitly part of these events. Strictly speaking, the role of the assembly is limited to being an instigator or catalyst of protest events, and any concrete planning is conducted by those networks and organizations willing to collaborate on that task.

Considering this tenuous connection between the ESF (and even the assembly of social movements) and protest events beyond the forum, it must be underlined how successful it has been as an instigator of protest events. This is particularly true for the first of these events, the 15 February 2003 demonstrations against the imminent war in Iraq, considered to have been the largest ever mobilization of the peace movement. The demonstration held in Rome, said to have involved three million people, is listed in the 2004 *Guinness Book of World Records* as the biggest anti-war rally in history.

The February 15th Global Day of Action was promoted by the assembly of social movements at the Florence ESF in November 2002, which called on the movements and citizens of Europe to organize 'massive opposition to an attack on Iraq' and 'to start organizing enormous anti-war demonstrations in every capital on February 15'. One month later, this call was confirmed by the European Preparatory Assembly (EPA) in Copenhagen, which also saw the presence of the newly founded US umbrella organization United for Peace. In January 2003, a specific February 15 preparatory workshop was conducted at the third WSF in Porto Alegre. Temporary national coalitions were set up containing a whole range of organizations and national social movements. Although the originally planned worldwide website never materialized, the websites of the national coalitions were linked to each other. An intensive e-mail circuit was set up, connecting all of the European and eventually also the US peace movements. A worldwide symbol of the protests (a missile crossed out by the words 'Stop the War') and identical slogans to be used at all demonstration sites ('No war in Iraq', 'Not in my name', and 'No blood for oil') were agreed upon (see Verhulst forthcoming).

As an instigator and catalyst of protest events, the ESF was successful not only in terms of the number of participants in these events, but also in permeating them with its spirit. As mentioned above, the principles defined in the WSF charter – acceptance of diversity in the forms of action with the condition of non-violence – were taken up in the 'work agreement' of the GSF, which bound the signatories to 'respect all forms of direct, peaceful, nonviolent expression and action declared publicly and transparently'. Similar formulas in general characterize the demonstrations promoted by the ESF and also by the national movements promoting the ESF.[3]

However, in spite of the successful February 15 demonstrations, the ESF's capacity to build a frame for mobilizations was judged as insufficient by parts of the GJM. Attac France (2004), for instance, criticized that decision making on common actions had largely been reduced to setting the dates of common global events, underlining that this was obviously important but clearly insufficient.[4] Specific criticism has been raised in connection with the politically ambitious common mobilization of the movement and the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) on 19 March 2005, called for by the assembly of social movements at the London ESF.[5] Criticizing the ESF's weakness in co-ordinating action, groups of the radical Left in particular called for the forum to become a space for the construction of a GJM with common action strategies and the organization of common European campaigns and mobilizations (see Chapter 9 in this volume). In this context, some of these groups questioned the consensual decision making within the social forum process, revealing tension between certain types of political radicalism and deliberative democratic models.

The ESF: a contested protest space

The acceptance and encouragement of diversity in forms of action by the ESF has not been unproblematic, as a look at specific protest events organized during the days of the forum shows. The main such event, the big concluding demonstration, is part of the official forum programme and directly organized by the ESF. In addition, single components of the forum stage specific protest events as a part or continuation of their forum activities. Some of the protest events organized during the days of the forum led to friction not only with state authorities,[6] but also within the ESF. Concentrating on the latter, tension has been provoked by disagreement about appropriate action forms, by the presence of groups considered external to the ESF, and by dissatisfaction with the decision making process – that is, by aspects intimately connected with the identity of the movement. This tension can be seen as mirroring general strains within the ESF process. In fact, the WSF and ESF have increasingly been recognized as plural and contested rather than simply as open spaces (Osterweil 2004b: 187). Processes both of dialogue and collaboration, and of criticism and competition develop not only between the forum and external groups and forces, but also within the forum itself.

Divergences within the GJM about acceptable forms of action had already become apparent before the first ESF in Florence. In the preparatory phase for

the Genoa G8 counter-summit, the acceptance of diversity in forms of action was an evident straining factor between the movement and its potential allies. Notwithstanding the work agreement mentioned above, preoccupation with violent action repertoires was an argument in the refusal to participate, not only by moderate catholic groups, but also by the traditional Left trade union confederation CGIL.

In the aftermath of Genoa, self-critical reflection within the movement saw a more fundamental opposition to violence gaining ground. At the mass demonstration concluding the first ESF in Florence, the self-critical reflection as a result of the Genoa events found expression in a partial revision of the movement's attitudes (della Porta and Reiter 2004, 2006b). The organizers paid closer attention to the self-policing of the demonstration, introducing a steward service, which had been rejected for the anti-G8 counter-summit on grounds of principle. In addition, the autonomous sector downgraded its action repertoires, with the 'disobedients', for instance, abandoning their traditional habit of wearing protective gear. The enormous success of the demonstration concluding the Florence ESF (between 500,000 and 1,000,000 participants, according to police, and twice as many according to the organizers, without a single act of violence) made any tension remaining after the Genoa anti-G8 protests evaporate. However, at protest events organized by single sectors of the movement during the days of the forum – for example, at the US military base Camp Derby – preoccupation about possibly escalating forms of action had signalled the persistence of differences between more moderate and more radical areas of the movement.[7] At the same time, however, preoccupation emerged around the tendency to label as violent certain effective, high-profile forms of direct action internally accepted as legitimate (della Porta *et al.* 2006a: 142ff., 191ff.).

At subsequent editions of the ESF, tension and difficulties (re)emerged in relation to the concluding demonstrations, on the one hand connected with the boundaries of the movement, on the other hand with internal decision making. In Paris, some participants protested against the participation of a bloc of French Socialists, seen as an intrusion of outside forces. In Athens, the provocations of radical groups external to the ESF, using the demonstrators as human shields for attacks on the police, led to incidents partly involving also the official march. On this occasion, a lack of debate within the ESF on the modalities of the demonstration, and resulting lack of decision making, was lamented (see Bersani 2006).

With antagonisms, differences, and tensions developing within the social forum process, the ESF itself became the target of protest. In fact, protest against official forums, or certain of their aspects, has been present from early on and has continued up to the most recent editions. For example, at the 2002 WSF, a group of radical grassroots activists marched to the official forum site and occupied the VIP room, chanting 'We are all VIPS, we are all VIPS!' As a result, no VIP room was provided the following year. The 2007 WSF in Nairobi saw protests against the high prices for food.

The autonomous spaces organized during the forum days can be seen as a particular (albeit ambiguous) form of protest against the ESF. In the preparatory

phase of the first ESF in Florence, many autonomous and radical groups remained ambivalent towards the forum, criticizing the support given by local authorities as well as the prevalence of large and bureaucratic organizations. This protest potential found an outlet in the autonomous spaces, permitting the pursuance of a 'one foot in, one foot out' strategy by being independent from the official forum but present on the official programme, by maintaining at the same time a critical attitude towards the forum process and close contacts with it (see Chapter 2 in this volume).

A significant part of the protest directed against the ESF and organized during the forum days was aimed at its decision making processes, criticized by so-called horizontals as top-down and dominated by traditional established organizations (verticals). If shared experiences of protest (especially the Genoa G8 counter-summit) had generated mutual trust between 'verticals' and 'horizontals' in Italy (see Chapter 4 in this volume), this relationship had already become more strained by the second ESF. Reflecting a particularly conflictual preparatory phase, with a number of more horizontal groups withdrawing from the official forum, autonomous spaces reached their fullest expression during the 2004 London ESF. On this occasion, the accumulated tension erupted in several protest events specifically targeting the ESF. At the Iraqi plenary, the representative of the Iraqi Federation of Trade Unions, in favour of the Anglo–American occupation but invited because of strong support from many British trade unions, was shouted down. At the anti-racism plenary, autonomous horizontal groups rushed the stage where the city of London Mayor, Ken Livingstone, was supposed to speak. These groups protested against the 'verticals', in particular the Socialist Workers' Party and Socialist Action,[8] as well as against the influence of the Greater London Authority on ESF decision making.

At the London ESF, the decision making process in connection with the concluding demonstration also came under particular attack. The European Preparatory Assembly (EPA) in Brussels (4–5 September 2004) had turned down the UK proposal to aim the march against war and (US President) Bush.[9] Instead, the demonstration was intended to refer to the spirit of the ESF, that is, lasting peace and a Europe of progressive social development. The slogans, therefore, were to be against social cuts and war and for a Europe of social justice, with the 'No to Bush' slogan used by the British delegation only. The UK co-ordinating committee was accused of failing to implement the EPA's decision, resulting in a demonstration primarily against Bush. This outcome was attributed to a structural problem inherent in the ESF decision making: without a system of accountability to ensure the implementation of decisions taken at the EPA, local organizers retain de facto power over most decisions (see Maeckelbergh 2004; Cobas 2004; Bohn 2004). During the concluding demonstration, additional tension erupted over several arrests and the fact that instead of the agreed upon concert, speeches were given, monopolized by the English to the exclusion of all other European delegations.

Notwithstanding its contested character, the common basis of the ESF protest space proved to be solid. Divergences about acceptable action forms did not lead to irreconcilable conflicts. The attempts of horizontal groups to 'have a positive

effect by creatively engaging the forum from outside' (Juris 2004a) were largely successful. In general, they were able to organize their own horizontal projects, while at the same time challenging commonly accepted ideas and making conflicts visible at the official Forum. In addition, their actions had long term effects. The conflicts at the London ESF, for instance, contributed to the elimination of plenary sessions privileging VIP luminaries at the Athens ESF (2006) in an attempt to reduce internal struggle between horizontals and verticals and to leave more space for more horizontal activities such as workshops and seminars (see also Chapter 2 in this volume).

The use of forms of action by ESF participants

Overlapping action repertoires and movement areas

One of the factors contributing to the overall solidity of the multiple, heterogeneous, and contested ESF protest space can be found in the use of forms of action by ESF participants. If activists from the different areas of the GJM show preferences for more conventional or more unconventional tactics and forms of participation, they do not use these exclusively. We argue that the overlapping action repertoires of activists from different movement areas have contributed to preventing irreconcilable conflicts in and around the ESF protest space.

Repeated surveys conducted at the ESFs have shown the activists attending the various forums to be highly involved with protest (see Table 10.1).[10] Along with the organizations active in the social forum process, the individual activists of the GJM also show variegated past and present action repertoires, combining more conventional forms (like working in a political party or signing a petition) with more unconventional ones (like participating in non-violent direct action or in cultural performances as a form of protest). Although 'attending a demonstration' emerges as the most frequent form of action in our activist survey conducted at the Athens ESF, unconventional forms of action seem at least as widespread as conventional ones. At the same time, a clear rejection of violence emerges: only 6.3 per cent of the activists surveyed at the Athens ESF declared having used violent forms of action against property.[11]

In the following, we focus on three general forms of action that we recoded on the basis of the more specific political activities respondents declared having used:[12] party related activities (voted in last national election, tried to persuade someone to vote for a political party, worked in a political party); demonstrative protest (signed a petition/public letter, boycotted products, attended a demonstration, handed out leaflets, participated in cultural performances as a form of protest, took part in a strike); and confrontational protest (practised civil disobedience, took part in non-violent direct action, took part in an occupation of a public building, took part in an occupation of abandoned homes and/or land, took part in a blockade, used violent forms of action against property). The latter two can be considered as forms of protest, while the former is a more institutional way of doing politics.

Table 10.1 Past and present action repertoires of ESF participants in Florence, Paris, and Athens (percentages, total N)

	Florence 2002	*Paris 2003*	*Athens 2006*
Attended a demonstration	–	95.5 (2,080)	92.6 (1,194)
Signed a petition/public letter/call for referendum	88.8 (2,509)	96.3 (2,102)	84.2 (1,194)
Participated in an assembly/ congress/discussion group	91.3 (2,512)	83.3 (2,010)	–
Handed out leaflets	73.4 (2,498)	74.0 (1,970)	70.9 (1,194)
Boycotted products	65.8 (2,494)	74.7 (2,003)	68.8 (1,194)
Participated in cultural performances as a form of protest	–	–	58.2 (1,194)
Symbolic action	–	64.9 (1,885)	–
Took part in a strike	86.0 (2,507)	71.2 (1,950)	56.7 (1,194)
Took part in non-violent direct actions	–	–	54.7 (1,193)
Tried to persuade someone to vote for a political party	51.8 (2,494)	–	54.1 (1,193)
Practiced civil disobedience	–	–	42.5 (1,193)
Worked in a political party	33.5 (2,496)	–	41.2 (1,193)
Took part in an occupation of a public building	68.0 (2,509)	39.2 (1,904)	33.5 (1,193)
Took part in a blockade	67.9 (2,480)	47.7 (1,865)	31.2 (1,193)
Took part in an occupation of abandoned homes and/or land	25.9(2,488)	–	12.1(1,193)
Used violent forms of action against property	8.4 (2,494)	6.0 (1,830)	6.3 (1,193)

Let us look first at the distribution of the three general forms of participation in our sample (1,205 respondents) (Figure 10.1). The bars show the relative frequency of use. As we can see, all three forms are widespread among the respondents, with the share of people having used them ranging from 73 to 99 per cent. These are important figures, especially for demonstrative protest, but not so surprising if we consider that most of the attendants at the ESF are strongly committed activists or at least people often involved in politics.

Given these distributions, for the analyses below we have computed an alternative, more conservative measure that takes into account the average use of the three forms of participation, calculated based on the number of tactics in each form a respondent declared using (standardized to vary between 0 and 1). For each form, we distinguish between those who have used it above the average from those who have done so below the average (including no use at all). The dotted line in Figure 10.1 shows the distribution of this alternative measure across the three forms. It suggests that fewer people have used confrontational protest above the average (31.8 per cent of valid cases) as compared to party related activities (56 per cent) and demonstrative protest (52.4 per cent). Clearly, the latter form of protest is more demanding in terms of commitment and sometimes, as in the case of the most radical activities, in terms of the risk involved as well.

Figure 10.1 Use of general forms of participation (percentages).

Most activists do not show an exclusive preference for above average use of one of the three general forms of action, but mix them in various ways. Only 17.5 per cent, in fact, engaged above the average only in party related activities, 8.5 per cent only in demonstrative protest, and 4.1 per cent only in confrontational protest. Further, 19.3 per cent mixed above average use of party related activities and demonstrative protest, 7.4 per cent of demonstrative and confrontational protest, and 3.5 per cent of party related activities and confrontational protest. As many as 23 per cent of those surveyed at the Athens ESF did not engage above the average in any of the general forms of action, whereas 16.4 per cent did so in all three of them.

Looking at respondents' country of permanent residence indicates that our sample reflects more the characteristics of the specific segment of movement activists that travelled to Athens to attend the ESF, than the characteristics of the GJM in the various countries (della Porta 2007b) or national social movement traditions in general. This seems particularly evident in the case of the German respondents who privilege confrontational protest, either exclusively or in combination with party related activities or with demonstrative protest, and for the Spanish respondents who show a relatively high response rate only for demonstrative protest. Like in previous surveys of the ESF, respondents from the host country stand out as a special case, characterized also by the presence of people visiting the forum more out of curiosity than because of political activism (see also Bédoyan *et al.*2004). In fact, the percentage of those registering as 'low' for all three general forms of action is particularly high for Greek attendants of the ESF.

In light of these results, the correlation between the action forms of movement activists attending the Athens ESF and the movement area to which they

feel the strongest connection seems particularly significant. Based on a variable asking respondents to name the group that was most important to them, we distinguished among organizations of the traditional Left (27.7 per cent of valid cases), groups centring on new social movement themes (14.1 per cent), organizations working on solidarity/peace/human rights (13.3 per cent), New Left, anarchist or autonomous groups (12.6 percent), organizations dedicated specifically to global justice themes (10.7 percent), and groups working on other themes like regionalism or ethnic minorities (6.3 per cent). In addition, 15.3 per cent of the respondents declared not to be a member of any group. Crossing movement areas with a recoded variable also considering the variously mixed above-average use of the general forms of participation shows a strong correlation (Cramer's V = 0.223***).

Unsurprisingly, party related activities are particularly relevant for activists that declared a traditional Left organization to be most important to them. These activists, however, also combine party related activities with demonstrative and confrontational protest. Demonstrative protest, sometimes combined with party related activities, is important above all for activists of new social movement and solidarity/peace/human rights groups. Activists working specifically on global justice themes also concentrate on demonstrative protest, but some of them mix it with confrontational protest instead. Confrontational protest, also in combination with demonstrative protest and with party related activities, is privileged above all by activists of New Left, anarchist, or autonomous groups.

Our results seem to confirm that differences in the action repertoires of the activists at the Athens ESF mirror general tensions within the GJM, in particular between a more or less institutional alignment and between more or less radical attitudes. At the same time we notice an overlapping of action repertoires among the different movement areas that can explain the solidity of the ESF protest space, notwithstanding these tensions.

ESF participants and their action repertoires: structural characteristics and attitudes towards politics

We have described the ESF as a multiple and heterogeneous, and also as a contested protest space, and we have argued that the solidity of this protest space, notwithstanding repeatedly emerging tension, can be explained at least partly by the overlapping of action repertoires among the different areas of the GJM. The question now is how the position of participants in the Athens ESF with regard to the forms of protest relates to their structural characteristics, their attitudes towards politics, and especially their views about how decisions should be taken in general.

Although we may think of democratic visions as influenced by political engagement and more specifically by the very use of certain forms of participation, it seems more plausible to look at how values impinge upon action rather than the other way around. Therefore, we consider form of participation as our dependent variable. The main goal of our analysis is to inquire into some of the potential explanatory factors for the use of each of the three general forms of participation

by ESF activists. We focus on three sets of factors. The first two have often been studied in the political sociology research tradition, which has stressed the role of individual resources for political participation (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba *et al.* 1978): the structural characteristics of individuals as well as their location both in society at large and in the more specific social groups to which they belong, on the one hand, and their political attitudes and orientations, on the other.

Concerning the first set of factors, we focus more specifically on the following aspects that we consider as relevant for the present analysis: gender, age, social status (being a student), and position within the group most important to the respondent.[13] Concerning the second set of factors, we look at the following aspects: degree of identification with the global justice movement, being a radical leftist, degree of trust towards various political and institutional actors (the United Nations, European Union, national government, national parliament, local government, judiciary, police, political parties, trade unions, non-governmental organizations, social movement organizations, churches, and mass media), and level of satisfaction with the decision making process on different levels (one's own group, groups and networks taking part in the global justice movement, the national political system, European Union, and United Nations).[14] Most importantly, we look at the impact of respondents' views about democracy and the GJM. Specifically, we examine their views about how decisions should be taken, the strategies the GJM should use to enhance democracy, and appropriate strategies to tame neoliberal globalization. Concerning the first aspect, the focus will be on four key features of deliberative decision making: the quality of arguments (as opposed to the importance of resources), mutual acceptance among opponents, participation of all interested persons (as opposed to delegation), and decision by consensus (as opposed to decision by voting).

Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we look at the presence of bivariate relationships between views about democracy and the GJM and the three general forms of participation we distinguished earlier (party related activities, demonstrative protest, and confrontational protest). Second, we run a series of logistic regressions (one for each form of participation) in order to examine the net effect of each explanatory factor under control of the other factors. Here, we will also include as controls the movement area to which the respondents belong and the effect of the other two general forms of participation.

In our bivariate analysis, we look at how views about decision making processes, about the strategies the GJM should use to enhance democracy, and about what should be done to tame neoliberal globalization impact upon the three general forms of participation (Tables 10.2, 10.3, and 10.4). In general, greater scepticism towards deliberative and participative decision making processes and strategies relying more on institutional actors seem more strongly connected with party related activities. Support for deliberative and participative decision making processes seems to channel political participation more towards demonstrative and confrontational protest. The different degrees of scepticism towards institutional actors and of the importance of taking protest to the streets appear as distinguishing elements between demonstrative and confrontational protest.

Table 10.2 Relationship between views about decision making processes and general forms of participation

	Party related activities		Demonstrative protest		Confrontational protest	
	% of above average use	N	% of above average use	N	% of above average use	N
Quality of arguments (versus resources)	n.s.		$V = 0.083^{+}$		n.s.	
Arguments rather than resources	57.3	756	55.2	748	32.5	748
More arguments than resources	55.2	221	45.7	221	32.6	221
More resources than arguments	56.1	66	48.5	66	34.8	66
Resources rather than arguments	48.6	35	60.0	35	40.0	35
Mutual acceptance (versus no acceptance)	n.s.		n.s.		n.s.	
Acceptance always important	55.9	740	54.3	735	32.1	735
Acceptance sometimes important	57.8	206	48.1	206	35.9	206
Acceptance scarcely important	60.5	76	52.7	74	25.7	74
Acceptance not important	55.4	56	60.0	55	41.8	55
Participation (versus delegation)	n.s.		$V = 0.110^{**}$		n.s.	
Participate always important	55.7	503	58.7	501	33.9	501
Participate sometimes important	54.8	279	47.8	276	30.8	276
Delegate sometimes important	62.2	188	52.7	188	37.2	188
Delegate always important	54.7	106	43.7	103	26.2	103
Consensus (versus voting)	n.s.		$V = 0.122^{***}$		$V = 0.167^{***}$	
Always consensus	52.0	225	63.6	225	47.6	225
Sometimes consensus	53.4	253	52.2	252	31.0	252
Sometimes voting	58.1	267	52.7	262	29.0	262
Always voting	59.9	309	46.4	317	26.8	317

Notes
$^{+}p \leq 0.10$, $^{*}p \leq 0.05$, $^{**}p \leq 0.01$, $^{***}p \leq 0.001$, n.s. non significant.

Regarding views about decision making processes, the quality of arguments (versus resources) and mutual acceptance (versus no acceptance) do not give significant results, although with a surprisingly high percentage of demonstrative and confrontational protestors among those for whom arguments and acceptance are less important. Those who see delegation as at least sometimes important and those who are more sceptical towards consensus as a decision making method are more drawn to an above average use of party related activities, that is, a more institutional form of political participation. In contrast, the percentage of activists with above average use of demonstrative protest is particularly high among those who see participation and above all consensus as always important in democratic decision making. Among those who see consensus as always important in decision making, above average use of confrontational protest is also particularly widespread. However, many confrontational

Table 10.3 Relationship between views about strategies to enhance democracy and general forms of participation

	Party related activities		Demonstrative protest		Confrontational protest	
	% of above average use	N	% of above average use	N	% of above average use	N
Contact political leaders	n.s.		V = 0.155***		V = 0.161***	
Most important	55.8	78	46.1	76	25.0	76
Second most important	51.8	112	37.8	111	23.4	111
Third most important	64.4	99	46.5	99	18.2	99
Fourth most important	59.9	147	45.5	145	25.5	145
Fifth most important	55.8	624	58.8	622	38.0	621
Practice democracy in group life	n.s.		n.s.		n.s.	
Most important	51.4	296	54.8	294	31.3	294
Second most important	59.8	194	55.2	194	32.0	194
Third most important	55.7	230	52.4	229	33.2	229
Fourth most important	60.9	243	53.5	241	33.8	240
Fifth most important	59.6	109	43.5	108	27.8	108
Take to the streets	n.s.		V = 0.115**		V = 0.169***	
Most important	62.5	168	50.6	168	40.5	168
Second most important	59.5	163	53.1	162	38.5	161
Third most important	57.0	235	59.0	234	36.8	234
Fourth most important	51.4	321	55.6	320	30.0	320
Fifth most important	55.4	177	41.4	174	16.7	174
Spread information to the public	n.s.		V = 0.121**		V = 0.133***	
Most important	56.4	287	44.3	287	24.1	286
Second most important	54.4	338	55.1	336	29.5	336
Third most important	55.4	267	53.6	263	38.4	263
Fourth most important	59.1	149	63.1	149	40.3	149
Fifth most important	68.8	32	50.0	32	31.3	32
Promote alternative models	n.s.		n.s.		n.s.	
Most important	60.1	386	55.6	383	32.1	383
Second most important	57.0	293	52.4	290	32.1	290
Third most important	52.3	199	49.7	199	26.8	198
Fourth most important	54.1	146	50.3	145	37.9	145
Fifth most important	53.6	56	50.0	56	30.4	56

Notes
[+]$p \leq 0.10$, *$p \leq 0.05$, **$p \leq 0.01$, ***$p \leq 0.001$, n.s. non significant.

protestors can also be found among those who see delegation as sometimes important.

Turning to the strategies the GJM should use to enhance democracy, activists with above average use of party related activities are particularly numerous among those who give some credit to contacting political leaders. In contrast, the percentage of demonstrative and confrontational protestors is particularly high among those who see this strategy as least important. Practising democracy in

Table 10.4 Relationship between views about strategies to tame globalization and general
forms of participation

	Party related activities		Demonstrative protest		Confrontational protest	
	% of above average use	N	% of above average use	N	% of above average use	N
Strengthen national government	n.s.		n.s.		V = 0.172***	
Strongly disagree	52.3	421	57.0	419	42.5	419
Disagree	60.2	372	53.3	368	29.2	367
Agree	56.6	244	50.4	242	24.8	242
Strongly agree	51.7	29	53.6	28	14.3	28
Strengthen EU	V = 0.111**		V = 0.103**		V = 0.171***	
Strongly disagree	55.2	359	58.4	356	43.5	356
Disagree	54.1	340	46.7	338	28.8	337
Agree	55.4	298	55.3	295	25.1	295
Strongly agree	76.3	76	46.7	75	25.3	75
Strengthen UN	V = 0.133***		n.s.		V = 0.177***	
Strongly disagree	47.3	283	56.7	282	45.4	282
Disagree	57.6	262	49.6	258	30.2	258
Agree	58.6	355	54.3	352	29.0	352
Strongly agree	67.9	156	52.3	155	21.3	155
Build new institutions to involve civil society at EU level	V = 0.115**		V = 0.094*		n.s.	
Strongly disagree	37.8	45	48.9	45	35.6	45
Disagree	51.9	81	41.8	79	31.6	79
Agree	53.7	438	49.8	434	32.6	433
Strongly agree	61.8	557	57.0	554	31.8	554
Build new institutions to involve civil society at international level	0.86*		n.s.		n.s.	
Strongly disagree	62.5	24	58.3	24	41.7	24
Disagree	47.5	61	42.6	61	32.8	61
Agree	52.3	375	50.8	370	27.6	369
Strongly agree	60.0	667	54.6	663	33.8	663

Notes
[+]$p \leq 0.10$, *$p \leq 0.05$, **$p \leq 0.01$, ***$p \leq 0.001$, n.s. non significant

group life and promoting alternative models sees particular support among demonstrative and (to a lesser extent) confrontational protestors. The percentage of confrontational protestors is particularly high among those for whom taking to the streets is the most important strategy to enhance democracy.

Regarding strategies to tame neoliberal globalization, activists with an above average use of party related activities see the strengthening of existing institutions like the EU and the UN as adequate, albeit at the same time advocating the building of new institutions to involve civil society at the EU and international levels. To the contrary, the percentage of demonstrative protestors is particularly

high among those who disagree strongly with strengthening institutions like the EU and the UN. Many demonstrative protestors, however, can also be found among those advocating the building of new institutions to involve civil society at the EU and international levels, an option that does not seem to find significant support among confrontational protestors.

Next, we discuss the results of multivariate analyses with statistical controls (Table 10.5). We run three separate logistic regression models, one for each of the three general forms of participation (party related activities, demonstrative protest, and confrontational protest), and show the odds ratios for their occurrence under the effects of the selected indicators of structural characteristics, political attitudes, and views about decision making.[15] Each regression also includes an indicator of respondents' belonging to a specific movement area. Finally, we

Table 10.5 Effects of selected independent variables on general forms of participation (odds ratios)

	Party related activities	*Demonstrative protest*	*Confrontational protest*
Woman	0.79	1.48	0.94
Age	0.99	1.03**	0.98
Student	0.74	1.34	1.03
Leader in the group	1.34	1.53	1.41
Identification with the movement	1.71**	1.48*	1.27
Radical Left	1.35	1.24	1.69*
Political and institutional trust	1.56***	1.01	0.75*
Satisfaction with decision making processes	0.99	0.90	0.54**
Quality of arguments (versus resources)	1.22	1.10	0.89
Mutual acceptance (versus no acceptance)	0.88	1.02[+]	1.00
Participation (versus delegation)	1.02	1.22	0.88
Consensus (versus voting)	0.89	1.15	1.31*
Movement area (ref.: other)	***		**
NSM themes	1.46	1.00	0.51
Solidarity/peace/human rights	1.37	1.01	0.19**
New global themes	0.98	1.26	0.37[+]
Traditional Left	5.81***	1.06	0.70
New Left/anarchism/autonomy	2.64[+]	0.82	1.06
Party activities	–	2.14**	0.89
Demonstrative protest	2.10**	–	4.74***
Confrontational protest	0.86	4.39***	–
Nagelkerke R^2	0.23	0.27	0.32
–2 log likelihood	468.254	468.674	464.795
Degrees of freedom	19	19	19
N	428	428	428

Notes
[+]$p \leq 0.10$, *$p \leq 0.05$, **$p \leq 0.01$, ***$p \leq 0.001$.

control for the effect of multiple activities by including in each model two varia-
bles that measure the usage of the other two forms of participation.

To begin with party related activities, we observe that none of the structural
characteristics seems to increase the probability of engaging in party activities,
at least not in a statistically significant way. In other words, the above average
use of this form of participation does not seem to be related to gender, age, pro-
fessional status, or position within the group most important to the respondent.
Among the indicators of political attitudes, however, two have a significant
effect: identification with the movement, and political and institutional trust.
Activists who identify with the movement and those who trust political and insti-
tutional actors are more likely to be involved in party related activities. While a
strong identification with the movement is probably a requirement for participat-
ing in any type of political activity, political and institutional trust is especially
needed for more institutional participation such as involvement with political
parties. In addition, confirming what we found in the bivariate analyses, none of
the indicators of democratic views shows a statistically significant effect.

The two control variables have a significant and strong effect on party activi-
ties. On the one hand, activists belonging to the traditional Left are far more
likely to use party related activities than activists from other movement areas. A
similar impact can be seen for those who are in the movement area close to the
New Left, anarchism, or autonomy. For both the institutional and the radical
Left, party related activities remain more important than for other movement
areas. On the other hand, we observe an overlapping participation in party activi-
ties and demonstrative protest, as the latter have a significant and positive effect
on the former. In other words, the use of demonstrative protest makes the use of
party related activities more likely (or vice versa).

Turning to demonstrative protest, we find a statistically significant effect of
age, but the strength of the effect is extremely weak. All other structural charac-
teristics are not significant, although they all increase the likelihood of being
involved in demonstrative protest. The same applies to the indicators of political
attitudes, with the exception of identification with the movement, which makes
this form of participation more likely. In contrast, political and institutional
trust no longer has an impact. Among the four indicators of views about
decision making, only the one relating to the importance of participation as
opposed to delegation shows a statistically significant and positive effect (at the
10 per cent level).

Unlike for party related activities, movement area does not influence respond-
ents' involvement in demonstrative protest. The use of this kind of political
activity is independent from belonging to a specific area of the movement. It is,
however, strongly dependent on involvement in both party activities and con-
frontational protest. Both forms of participation strongly increase the likelihood
of being involved in demonstrative protest, but especially the latter.

Finally, the use of confrontational protest is not associated with the structural
characteristics of respondents. It is, however, influenced by three of the indicators
of political attitudes, although in opposing directions. On the one hand, quite

understandably, radical left activists are more likely to use confrontational protest. On the other hand, activists who trust political and institutional actors and those who are satisfied with decision making processes in general are less likely to be involved in this form of participation. Thus, the resort to more radical forms of protest is also a result of lack of trust in political and institutional actors as well as a lower degree of satisfaction with decision making processes. We also observe a significant and positive effect of one of the indicators of democratic views, namely the one concerning the importance of consensus as opposed to voting in decision making. The search for consensus and a radical action repertoire do not necessarily exclude each other, and we can assume that a combination of both can be found in particular among the so-called 'horizontals'.

In addition, movement area displays a statistically significant effect. Activists who belong to the area of solidarity, peace, and human rights are much less inclined to make use of confrontational protest than are activists in other areas. The very issues raised by organizations active in this field seem to lead to a more peaceful way to engage in protest politics. Similarly, but perhaps more surprisingly, activists close to the movement area stressing new global themes are also less likely to be involved in confrontational protest. Finally, we observe once again the overlapping between forms of action, as using demonstrative protest increases the likelihood of using confrontational protest.

In sum, looking at the impact of the various explanatory factors across the three general forms of participation, the structural characteristics of respondents have little or no effect; identification with the movement has a positive effect on party related activities and demonstrative protest, but not on confrontational protest; political and institutional trust increases the chances of being involved in party activities but diminishes the likelihood of using confrontational protest; the latter depends in particular on leftist radicalism and on a lower degree of political and institutional trust as well as of satisfaction with decision making processes; democratic views have little impact, with the exception of the stress on participation (for demonstrative protest) and consensus (for confrontational protest); movement area plays a significant role, especially insofar as traditional left activists are more involved in party related activities, while activists belonging to the area of solidarity, peace, and human rights as well as those who are close to the area stressing new global themes are less involved in confrontational protest; finally, we have observed a multiple activities effect between party related activities and demonstrative protest, on the one hand, and between demonstrative protest and confrontational protest, on the other.

Conclusion

Our analysis of the relationship between the forms of protest used by participants in the 2006 ESF in Athens and their conceptions of democracy has proceeded in two steps. In the first part, we discussed the ESF as a multiple, heterogeneous, and contested protest space. More than a clearly defined form of protest, the forum is in fact a space where different forms and conceptions of

protest against neoliberal globalization may be practised and planned. The acceptance of diversity in forms of action with the one condition of non-violence, which emerged as a distinct common aspect of the protest activities connected with the ESF, has not been unproblematic. Increasingly, in fact, the ESF has emerged as a plural and contested space, with the forum itself also becoming the target of protest. Notwithstanding the tension emerging in connection with certain forms of action and specific protest events, related in particular with factors concerning the identity of the movement like internal decision making, the protest space provided for by the ESF proved to be solid.

In the second part of our chapter, we analysed the forms of participation of global justice movement activists on the basis of the survey we conducted at the Athens ESF in 2006. The results of our survey show the specificity of this population as very deeply engaged in political activities. The large majority of the respondents have been involved in all three general forms of participation that we have defined (party related activities, demonstrative protest, and confrontational protest). Moreover, most respondents show an above average use of more than one of the three general forms of participation. In fact, we have argued that the overlapping use of different forms of participation by movement activists from various areas of the GJM at least partly explains the solidity of the ESF as a protest space.

Yet, some participants of the Athens ESF are more deeply involved in certain forms of participation than in others. Such variations are hardly explained by the different structural characteristics of the respondents in terms of gender, age, social position, social status, and position within the group of which they are part. More can be predicted about the use of the three forms of participation we have distinguished by looking at political attitudes. Specifically, we found that identification with the global justice movement increases the chances to become involved in party related activities and demonstrative protest (a positive effect can also be observed on confrontational protest, but it is not statistically significant). We also found an effect of political and institutional trust. However, while more trustful activists tend to be more involved in party activities, they are generally less active in confrontational protest. Finally, the latter, which is the most radical form of participation, also depends on self-placement on the extreme left side of the political spectrum (being radical leftists).

While the role of political attitudes is in line with mainstream research on political participation (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba *et al.* 1978), we found little evidence of an impact of activists' views about democracy or about globalization on the form of their participation – be it their views about the decision making process, strategies to enhance democracy, or strategies to tame globalization. Some effects were found in the bivariate analyses, but they are generally not very strong and, moreover, they disappear when controlled in multivariate analyses, except for the impact of consensus on confrontational protest and partly for the impact of participation on demonstrative protest. Thus, while most of those who attend the ESF and perhaps other global justice movement events embrace a wide range of political activities, it appears that their social profile,

but above all the way in which they situate themselves vis-à-vis the movement and its organizations, account for differences in the intensity of commitment and participation, more than the ways in which they view the decision making process in politics. These findings suggest a more nuanced picture than the distinction between 'verticals' and 'horizontals'.

Notes

1 The 'about' section of the Athens 2006 website (online, available at: http://athens.fse-esf.org/4th-european-social-forum-athens-may-2006) states:

> The European Social Forum is, alongside Genoa and Seattle, one of the major events of the movement against neo-liberal globalization and war, deregulation of labor and poverty, climate change and environmental destruction, violation of democratic rights and sexism, racism and the threat of the far right.... We have marched together against the G8, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in Prague, in Genoa, in Evian. We took part, all together, in the siege of the European Union Summits in Thessalonica, Nice, Seville, Brussels. We met during the huge antiwar rallies on the 15th of February 2003, in the mass demonstrations against racism, in working class mobilizations defending pensions, public health and education, in rallies against the destruction of the environment, the 'anti'terrorist laws and repression.

Except when indicated differently, all web documents were accessed in February 2007.

2 Interview with a spokesperson of the Florence ESF, conducted 24 April 2004.

3 A press release of the Italian movements promoting the ESF, published on the occasion of mobilizations against the war in Iraq in 2003, talks of 'valorising and respecting the many and different practices of the movement', underlining specifically non-violence and civil disobedience. Online, available at: www.fiom.cgil.it/internazionale/forum/cs_forum.htm.

4 In its collective appraisal of the London ESF, the French Initiative Committee for the ESF underlined that the ESF's capacity to build a frame for mobilizations was still problematic, especially concerning the follow-up of thematic campaigns, and proposed the creation of a specific place to centralize and diffuse information (newsletter online, available at: www.euromovements.info/newsletter/french_comittee.htm).

5 In particular, it was lamented that after the setting of the date, no European team was put together to build a mobilization campaign or to establish contacts with ETUC (see Slegers 2005). Especially in those countries with closer connections between the GJM and trade unions, the common character of the mobilization was in fact far more visible than at the European level. Whereas the press release of the joint campaign for the March 19 demonstration of the Italian trade unions and movements (press release online, available at: www.fiom.cgil.it/uff_inter/europa/bolkestein/appello.htm) speaks of 'the anti-neoliberal movement, in all its associative and trade union components', the ETUC call for participation in the demonstration (ETUC document online, available at: www.etuc.org/a/485) does not mention the social movements or the ESF.

6 On the particular question of the policing of transnational protest, see della Porta *et al.* (2006a: chapter 5); della Porta *et al.* (2006b).

7 The only moment of tension with the police was caused by an unannounced protest event.

8 Socialist Action, a small Trotskyite group, had supported Livingstone's campaign as an independent in the election for Mayor of London in 2000, and some of its members became key advisors in his administration.

9 The minutes of the Brussels EPA are online, available at: www.ukesf.net/downloads/9d
   dec3f280478d6f93933eaff10149d5/mins_brussels_preparatory_assembly_4_5_Sept.rtf.

10 For the survey conducted at Paris, see Agrikoliansky and Sommier 2005; for the
   survey conducted at Florence, see della Porta *et al.* (2006a). An initial survey of GJM
   activists had been conducted at the Genoa G8 counter-summit in 2001 (see Andretta
   et al. 2002).

11 A different picture emerges for violence as a reaction to police intervention. According
   to the Paris survey (Agrikoliansky and Sommier 2005: 139), only 2.8 per cent declared
   having exercised physical pressure on a person, whereas 25.8 per cent declared having
   resisted police forces. Of the Florence activists, 29.2 per cent declared violence as self-
   defence necessary in the event of repression of a protest demonstration, another 46 per
   cent as justifiable. Experiences like participation in the Genoa anti-G8 demonstrations
   significantly strengthen this response (della Porta *et al.* 2006a: 170f.).

12 In the original variables, respondents had been asked whether they had engaged in
   certain political activities within the last five years. To these activities, we added elec-
   toral participation, based on a variable asking whether respondents had voted in the
   last national elections in their home countries. Respondents mentioning at least one of
   the specific political activities included in one of the general forms of action were
   considered as having used that general form.

13 Education is another important individual resource stressed in the literature. We ini-
   tially included this aspect in our analyses. However, we eventually decided to exclude
   it as it gave very poor results, probably because we are dealing with a population of
   highly educated people.

14 Being a radical leftist is based on self-placement on the left/right scale. We take this
   measure instead of the whole scale, as the large majority of ESF participants are on
   the left-hand side of the political spectrum. To measure satisfaction with the decision
   making process, we first created an additive variable based on the five different levels
   on which respondents expressed their level of satisfaction. To measure political and
   institutional trust, we first created an additive scale on the declared trust for each actor
   (two missing data allowed). The resulting scale was then recoded into an ordinal five-
   point variable.

15 Odds ratios represent the strength of a given effect and can be interpreted as follows:
   when the odds ratio is greater than 1, the independent variable has a positive impact
   on the dependent variable; when the odds ratio is smaller than 1, the effect is nega-
   tive; finally, when the odds ratio equals 1, there is no effect (although it might be sta-
   tistically significant). The effect can be considered to be multiplicative. For example,
   a coefficient of 2 means that having the characteristics described by the independent
   variables doubles the likelihood of having the characteristics described by the depend-
   ent variable (in this case, having participated in party activities, demonstrative protest,
   or confrontational protest). The same reasoning applies to coefficients lower than 1,
   but in the opposite direction. For the sake of parsimony, we excluded from the multi-
   variate analyses all the variables, discussed earlier, concerning the strategies to
   enhance democracy and the strategies to tame neoliberal globalization. Models includ-
   ing these variables, furthermore, did not yield interesting results (not shown).