Interest group cooperation and lobbying success in the acceptance process of the wind energy projects in Switzerland

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Master in Public Management Thesis

Interest group cooperation and lobbying success in the acceptance process of the wind energy projects in Switzerland

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1. Introduction

Following the reactor disaster of Fukushima in 2011, the Federal Council has developed the Energy Strategy 2050. With it, an energy regime that enables the progressive withdrawal from nuclear energy production and the expansion of renewable energy sources should emerge in Switzerland. However, every transformation of the energy system has implications for a significant number of stakeholders. On the one hand, the federal government, cantonal and municipal administrations are responsible for the implementation of political requirements and have potential to advance the transformation of the Swiss energy system. On the other hand, the energy companies play an important role in development, engineering and construction of the projects. At the same time, the population is also concerned by the energy system transformation and approves it on national, cantonal and communal referendums. Finally, in the acceptance of the energy projects, interest groups play an important role as well, especially during consultation procedures, parliamentary debates or referendum campaigns. When involved in a policy process, they face the important strategic choice between either joining forces with others or working alone. Therefore, this may have an impact on their effective influence on political decision-making. For instance, interest groups can form long-term coalitions with the same policy actors or collaborate with each other only on a particular decision. Moreover, active cooperation contributes to a share of resources and information between partners. Thus, it may potentially boost lobbying success of the weaker advocates by compensating for low financial and staff resources (Junk, 2020).

In this Master's thesis, we examine whether the cooperation between interest groups and policy actors increases their lobbying success. Precisely, we analyse the interest groups' cooperation and their success in two acceptance processes of the wind energy projects in Switzerland.

The research design of this Master's thesis is innovative for two reasons. First, previous studies used to focus on one type of the cooperation network. For instance, several researchers examined the influence of the advocacy coalition on the final policy outcome (Sabatier, 1998; Jordan, 1990), while others analysed the advocacy success of the interest groups as part of inter-organisational networks (Beyers and Braun, 2014) or ad-hoc issue coalitions (Mahoney, 2007). However, few studies looked into the connection between different types of the cooperation network. In the present Master thesis, we used two approaches to define a "lobbying coalition": a preference similarity approach and an organisational approach. The first approach focused on positional "camps" on an issue, while the second one identified the ties between organisations as general organisational characteristics (Junk, 2019c).

Second, our project is innovative because we examined the correlation between the interest groups' strategies and their success in the wind energy promotion process in Switzerland, particularly in the canton of Neuchâtel. Previous researchers focused more on social acceptance of the wind energy projects in Switzerland. For instance, Ebers and Wüstenhagen (2017) examined the influence of procedural and distributional justice on social acceptance of wind parks in Switzerland. They determined that minimizing ecological impacts of the wind projects could significantly increase their social acceptance. Earlier, Götz (2014) explored the relationship between general attitudes toward wind energy, local acceptance of specific wind projects and respective intentions to act on those attitudes in Switzerland. However, Kriesi and Jegen (2001) conceptualized the actor constellation in the Swiss energy policy domain in 1998. They particularly focused on the configuration of power in a period of transition between two policy equilibra.

In Switzerland, wind energy is perceived as green and renewable. Moreover, it has the backing of the Federal Council and Parliament, which in 2006 declared it to be in the country's interest. Nevertheless, it faces a strong opposition from several local and national environmental associations due to concerns about

landscape preservation and negative effects on ecosystems. This is the reason why we find it interesting to analyse the strategies used by organisations to block or move forward the decision-making on wind energy projects.

In the next section, the important key concepts are defined and the literature review on the relationship between the interest groups' cooperation and the advocacy success is presented. Moreover, this includes the formulation of four hypotheses. Then, the main variables, measurements and data sources for the empirical analysis are described. Thereafter, each hypothesis is tested using two different analyses: the Social Network Analysis and the documentary analysis. The comparison of the empirical results follows. Finally, the main findings are summarised and put into perspective in the conclusion.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1. Definition of the main concepts

- Lobbying success

The present study focuses on behavioural tactics and advocacy strategies in a decision-making process. Different approaches of measuring lobbying success have been used. In this Master's thesis, we assessed the preference attainment based on data about the interest groups' preferences and the final policy outcomes. Several scholars, such as Bunea (2013), refer to both influence and lobbying success when they define the Preference Attainment Approach. On the one hand, it is considered that the distance between an outcome and the policy preferences of an actor may reflect the influence of this actor. On the other hand, other forces, such as a favorable institutional context, could potentially move the outcomes closer or further away from an actor's ideal point. At the same time, we decided to focus on the lobbying success which doesn't assume causality but recognizes that convergence is not necessarily a direct result of specific actions exerted by an interest group (Dür et al., 2015). Precisely, we analysed whether the final result of the decision-making process incorporates the claims and demands raised by each interest group (Dür, 2008). In addition, we measured interest groups' success per each binding decision by looking at the extent to which each decision satisfied their demands.

- Cooperation between interest groups and policy actors

As mentioned in the introduction, the present study focuses on two forms of a lobbying coalition in order to better understand the effects of collective lobbying in decision-making processes in Switzerland.

Firstly, we use the term "advocacy coalition" to define a constellation of actors actively promoting the same policy position on an issue (Sabatier, 1998; Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier, 1993). According to this definition, coalitions form around beliefs, and particularly around policy core beliefs. This is a much broader theoretical construct than a discrete set of groups that have organized themselves for a single issue fight. Therefore, in order to achieve the goals generated by the actors' beliefs, advocacy coalitions are assumed to be instrumentally rational and try to make governmental institutions behave in accordance with their policy cores. Furthermore, the Advocacy Coalition Framework proposed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith perceives policy change as a transformation of a hegemonic belief system within a policy subsystem. At the same time, Jordan (1990) also saw the policy network as a statement of shared interests in a policy problem. Consequently, according to the author, a policy community exists where there are effective shared "community" views on the problem. Meanwhile, Kübler (2001) used the ACF to explain the process of change in the field of drug policy in Switzerland. As a result, he was able to identify two major coalitions

competing within the drug policy subsystem, and one minor coalition that entered temporarily into the drug policy subsystem. Finally, his analysis confirmed that the policy change happened when the dominant coalition was overthrown by another one, which became stronger over time.

However, some scholars question whether the shared preferences are a sufficient condition for speaking about a "coalition". It was found that an approach based on preference similarity doesn't provide any evidence about an active cooperation between the policy advocates. In fact, actors of the same advocacy coalition "may be working hand in hand, or they may not even know the other is working on the issue" (Mahoney and Baumgartner, 2015). Therefore, we use the organisational approach to coalitions to analyse the institutionalised ties that foster cooperation between like-minded actors on many issues. Moreover, many researchers found this approach useful for their studies. For instance, Hula (1999) found that interest groups form coalitions to pursue their strategic goals at reduced costs, shape public debate by influencing a broader platform, gather information, and receive symbolic benefits. He emphasized the need to understand interest groups as part of a network and the relationships among them as relationship ties. At the same time, Granovetter (1983) examined the interpersonal networks and argued that the strength of interpersonal ties relates to the overall capacity of a network to diffuse knowledge, enhance social mobility or ensure social cohesion. Furthermore, according to the Network Theory, more open networks, which are characterized by weak ties and multiple connections between the actors, result in a higher probability of introducing new ideas and opportunities. Granovetter found that organizational decision makers use their social networks to overcome the uncertainty and distrust, as well as to reduce transaction costs. In contrast, Judge (1993) used the concept of policy communities to talk about networks characterized by stability of relationships, continuity of a highly restrictive membership, vertical interdependence based upon shared delivery responsibilities and insulation from other networks and invariably from the general public. Meanwhile, Beyers and Braun (2014) determined that joining forces produces substantial benefits compared to individual lobbying and, mostly, these benefits refer to gaining direct access and the realisation of favourable policy outcomes. According to the authors, the central position of an interest group within a large inter-organisational network gives more access to the policymakers. Moreover, they demonstrated that well-connected groups tend to display higher access to policy-makers.

2.2. Research hypotheses

- The degree of conflict over an issue

Many studies on interest groups' success in policy processes highlighted the importance of the degree of conflict over an issue. According to Klüver (2011), if policy issues are highly conflictual, then it creates a difficult environment for interest groups. The author measured the degree of conflict by the dispersion of actors' policy preferences over an issue. She divided the number of interest groups forming a smaller advocacy coalition on an issue by the number of interest groups constituting the larger one. Policy preferences are composed of basic policy choices and causal assumptions, which are needed to achieve the Deep Core beliefs of each actor in a given policy subsystem (Sabatier, 1998). Consequently, if many groups contest a policy issue, the decision-makers are confronted with countervailing forces that attempt to push the policy output in opposing directions. Interest groups should therefore find it very difficult to lobby policy-making successfully because they are fighting against a strong opposition. By contrast, if the majority of actors share the same policy goal, it should be easier for them to achieve their preferences because all actors are pushing the legislator in the same direction. Moreover, Klüver affirmed that interest groups, which are

fighting for the same goal, can be regarded as one lobbying team whose aggregated efforts are decisive for the achievement of the common policy objective.

At the same time, Hula (1999) found that coalition formation is not only a good vehicle for studying lobbying generally, but also it is the best way to study how lobbyists make strategic decisions in a competitive environment. According to the author, an issue is competitive for a lobbyist when he or she is confronted by other lobbyists representing members who desire policy outcomes imposing some cost on, or denying some benefit to, his or her own members. Meanwhile Mahoney (2007) found that civil society organisations are, in particular, less likely to be successful in their lobbying goals if they are engaged on a highly conflictual issue than if they are active on an issue where they face weak opposition. She determined that being part of a large lobbying coalition greatly enhances an organisation's chances of achieving its preferences. Consequently, they are more likely to have a high advocacy success. Based on these findings, we argue that in the context of a high-conflict issue, the interest groups, which belong to a large advocacy coalition, have a higher success on the issue than those which belong to a small one. Moreover, when the overall degree of conflict is high, being a member of a large advocacy coalition is also associated with a higher success in a decision-making process. As a result, we formulate our first hypothesis as following:

Hypothesis 1*: If the degree of conflict over an issue is high, then the interest groups belonging to a large advocacy coalition have a higher success than the groups from a small one.*

- Cooperation with central actors

Several studies determined that the network position of a group has a significant impact on its policy influence. For instance, according to Bonacich (1972), the quality of ties and the number of them are important to determine the centrality of groups within a network. Consequently, she found that interest groups that are tied to well-connected groups are more powerful than groups which have a similar number of cooperative relationships with less connected groups. At the same time, Fischer and Sciarini (2015) determined that occupying a central position in a network gives an actor access to other actors' resources or information. In fact, it makes him more powerful compared to non-central organisations. Meanwhile, Christenson and Box-Steffensmeier (2013) calculated the eigenvector centrality of each actor and concluded that interest groups which collaborate with other well-connected interest groups have a greater effect on the probability that a justice rules in their favor. The authors found that in the judicial venue, particularly powerful interest groups are better informed and more attractive network partners. Consequently, they are more likely to influence decision-making processes due to their credibility. Lynch (2004) came to the same conclusion. In addition, he determined that decision-makers tend to consider the identities of the interest groups more than the raw number of them. Moreover, Christenson and Box-Steffensmeier suggested that well-connected organisations might also expect a bigger policy impact within other venues, such as within the legislative or executive. Another way an interest group might play a central role is as a middleman between two other groups (Heaney and Lorenz, 2013). Betweenness measures the number of times an interest group lies on the shortest path between several other groups. Consequently, the high betweenness interest groups are more likely to gain access to timely and sensitive information due to their high status. It was also determined that policymakers are more likely to rely on interest groups with high betweenness as contacts that minimize their transaction costs for managing the advocacy community. However, both the degree and betweenness measure of centrality are applicable and help characterize the extent to which any particular group plays a central role in the network (Freeman, 1979). In this Master thesis, we use the degree

to measure the centrality of policy actors in the overall network. Moreover, instead of focusing only on interest groups, we decided to analyse the cooperation between them and all the actors involved in a policy process. As it was determined by Heaney and Lorenz (2013), an interest group is able to join several coalitions, which may include different actors. This means that it may join one coalition to help advertise its issue positions to the public, a second coalition to lobby on an important provision of a pending bill, and a third coalition to advance its interests in the courts. Therefore, we assume that if an interest group cooperates with an actor having a higher degree of centrality, then it has a higher overall success. We also assume that if an interest group cooperates with a less central actor, its overall success is still high because of its position in the network.

Hypothesis 2*: If an interest group cooperates with an actor having a higher degree of centrality, then it has a high overall success.*

- Coalition size and the degree of consensus

As mentioned above, our first hypothesis focuses on the coalition based on the policy preferences similarity, while the second one concentrates on the actors' active cooperation. Consequently, we find it interesting to analyse the combined impact of both forms of cooperation. It was previously shown that interest groups decide to engage in collective advocacy when other organisations share their issue concerns (Hojnacki, 1997). Moreover, Nelson and Yackee (2012) and Berry and Wilcox (2018), found that if an interest group belongs to a large coalition which has reached consensus on its preferred policy direction, then it is more influential in the policy process compared to a single interest group. Even if expanding the size of a coalition requires resources, there are several potential benefits. For instance, according to the authors, coalition size provides a signal to public officials regarding proposal viability. Additionally, the strategic recruitment of coalition members allows for the introduction of new technical and political information into the policymaking process. In fact, an expanded and unanimous coalition produces a ''louder'' signal regarding the policy support or opposition, and increases the influence of its members on a decision-making process. Consequently, we formulate the third hypothesis as following:

Hypothesis 3: *If an interest group belongs to a large coalition with a high degree of consensus, then its overall success is higher compared to those groups which belong to smaller and non-unanimous coalitions, and vice versa.*

3. Data and Methodology

Initially, this project plan encompassed the study of five wind park projects in Switzerland: "Montagne de Buttes", "Crêt-Meuron", "Schwyberg", "Bel Coster" and "Mollendruz". After the data collection, we decided to focus on the first two to get the most coherent and complete analysis. In this part, we explain how our methodology came from three steps of data gathering and one survey. The first step consisted in establishing the process tracing in both cases by identifying the most important steps as well as the key decisions based on their binding nature. The second step consisted in identifying the actors involved in each acceptance process and their respective roles. After the analysis, we kept only those actors that mobilised in at least two venues of policy action. The third step consisted in mapping the actor's agreement with seven arguments about the wind parks, which represented the main frames of the wind power issue. Finally, the last step was to elaborate a survey and send it to all relevant actors mobilised in the decision-making processes.

3.1. Cases selection

The first figure provides information about similarities and differences between the acceptance processes of the "Crêt-Meuron" and "Montagne de Buttes" wind parks.

Figure 1:

Common points	
Crêt-Meuron	**Montagne de Buttes**
Building place: Canton of Neuchatel	**Building place**: Canton of Neuchatel
Appeal to the Federal Court: Yes	**Appeal to the Federal Court**: Yes

Differences	
Crêt-Meuron	**Montagne de Buttes**
Period of the process: 2001-2020	**Period of the process**: 2011-2020
Size of the wind park: 7 turbines	**Size of the wind park**: 19 turbines
Promoters: Eole RES Bureau Planair Société de production d'énergie "Crêt-Meuron"	**Promoters**: Groupe E Greenwatt Verrivent SA SIG

We observe that two wind parks are different in terms of their size. "Crêt-Meuron" wind park is more than two times larger than the one of "Montagne de Buttes". Moreover, the acceptance process of the wind park "Crêt-Meuron" began in 2001, while the second one is more recent and began in 2011. They also have completely different promoters, and different communes are concerned by the construction of these two parks. It is worth mentioning that according to several scholars, the size and location of the wind park projects have a significant impact on their social acceptance. It was found that an increasing number and size of wind turbines on the mountain ridges that are clearly visible even from a very great distance cause controversies in the public (Broekel and Alfken, 2015) and lead to opposition (Petrova, 2013; Walker et al., 2014). Consequently, we expect that the "Montagne de Buttes" project will be characterized by a lower degree of conflict and a higher acceptance compared to the one of "Crêt-Meuron".

Despite all these differences, the wind parks are similar in two aspects. The first common point is that they both take place in the Canton of Neuchâtel. In fact, the same federal and cantonal authorities are involved in both processes. Moreover, the same cantonal sections of national interest groups are mobilised in these policy processes. Consequently, it allows us to compare the strategies of the common actors in both acceptance processes. Additionally, the presence of the large number of common actors accelerated the data collection. The second common point is that the appeals against both wind parks were launched and sent to the Federal Court. In fact, we were also able to compare the outcome of the Court's judgement in both cases.

3.2. Data collection

- **Documentary analysis**

The reconstruction of the detailed chronology of the entire policy process is based on a documentary analysis. The most important phases and binding policy decisions were identified through a detailed examination of the official documents, media articles, press releases and the actors' websites. The official documents, such as the cantonal cllocation plan of the wind parks "Crêt-Meuron" and "Montagne de Buttes"

as well as the cantonal master plan of the wind parks in Neuchâtel, were found on the websites of the Canton of Neuchâtel (www.ne.ch) and the Federal Office of Energy (OFEN) (www.ofen.admin.ch). We also consulted the database of the Administrative Jurisprudence of the Canton of Neuchâtel (www.jurisprudenceadm.ne.ch) which contains the decisions, rendered by the Council of State and the departments of the cantonal administration in matters of litigation. Additionally, we consulted the databases of the Cantonal Court of Neuchâtel (www.jurisprudence.ne.ch) and the Federal Court (www.bger.ch) which contain the Court's judgements concerning the policy process of both wind parks.

a) Acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park

We found 36 articles about the wind park "Montagne de Buttes". They were published on the websites of national (Aargauer Zeitung, Le Temps, RTS, NZZ, 20 Minutes) and regional journals (La Liberté, Arcinfo, Canal Alpha, La Côte). At the same time, we found 21 press releases related to the policy process of the wind park "Crêt-Meuron". They were all press releases and public statements published on the websites of the actors from 2011 until early 2020.

b) Acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park

We found 57 articles about the wind park "Crêt-Meuron". They were published on the websites of national (Le Temps, RTS, 20 Minutes, Agence télégraphique suisse), regional (RTN, La Liberté, L'Express/ L'Impartial, Arcinfo, Journal du Jura, Canal Alpha, Tribune de Genève, Gauchebdo, Der Bund) and local journals (Journal du Haut, Le Chaumonnier). Moreover, we found 22 press releases related to the policy process of the wind park "Crêt-Meuron". The majority of them was found on the website of Jura Crêtes (www.juracretes.ch), while some press releases were also published on the websites of the organisations from 2001 until early 2020.

- **Survey description**

The survey elaborated for our analysis was based on theoretical assumptions and concepts coming from the literature. Precisely, the definition of the key actors is based on the combination of decisional, positional, and reputational approaches (Magill and Clark, 1975). The decision-based method identifies actors who mobilise in the decision-making process. Following this approach, the detailed chronology of the decision-making process related to the acceptance of both wind parks was reconstructed. More specifically, we selected the most important phases of the process from 2001 until early 2020 for "Crêt-Meuron" and from 2011 until early 2020 for "Montagne de Buttes". Moreover, we identified and built the timeline of the binding policy decisions. Then, we made a list of all collective actors that had participated in different phases of the process. We also used the position-based method to identify the actors who have certain decision-making powers in the political process. The reputation-based method was used to find out how relevant actors are perceived by the other actors in the subsystem. In the questionnaire, the respondents themselves had the opportunity to assess the importance of the actors already selected and to add missing actors, whom they consider important, to the established list. This subsequently generated an additional criterion to check the correctness of the actors selection made.

A questionnaire was sent to the identified collective actors via email. The Federal and Cantonal Courts were identified as relevant organisations due to their position in the decision-making process. However, they didn't take part in a survey. The data collection lasted from April, 22nd until June, 10th 2020.

Our questionnaire was composed of four parts. In the first part, we asked organisations to indicate, on the scale from 0 to 5, if they agree with general arguments concerning the wind parks. The organisations were able to add missing arguments. In the second part, the organisations were asked to indicate the importance of the key decisions, their mobilisation on them, as well as their level of success in each key decision. They were also asked to specify the type of action they resorted to in the policy process related to the wind parks and the efficacy of this type of action. In order to answer the questions from the second part, the organisations needed to use the scale from 0 to 5. It was possible for organisations to add other key decisions and types of action. In the third part, we asked organisations to indicate the importance of actors involved in the acceptance process of wind parks. Moreover, we asked them to choose the three most important actors involved in this policy process. In addition, we asked organisations to indicate with which other actors they were involved in technical and political cooperation. In both cases, they could indicate if they took initiative or/and reacted on a demand of cooperation. In the fourth part, the question about resources was adjusted according to the type of organisation. We asked associations to indicate their year of foundation, number of members, political staff and annual budget. Meanwhile, promoters were asked to indicate the year of foundation of the company, number of employees working on those projects and the amount of annual sales in 2019. While federal, cantonal and communal authorities were asked to estimate the number of people per month that the organization devotes annually to the projects. Organisations were also asked to indicate, on the scale from 0 to 5, the importance of the issue of wind parks for them, their level of preference attainment in the policy process related to wind parks, as well as the level of expertise of their organisation.

a) Acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park

For the survey related to the project of Montagne de Buttes, a set of 24 collective actors was selected. It was composed of the federal, cantonal and communal authorities, energy companies, associations and courts. Those formed the elite of the acceptance process of the wind park "Montagne de Buttes". However, we didn't send the questionnaires to the Cantonal and Federal Courts. Despite their importance in terms of decision-making power, they were not directly mobilised in the acceptance process. Consequently, we sent the questionnaires to 22 collective actors.

The response rate for the survey on the policy process related to the wind park "Montagne de Buttes" was 77%. 17 out of 22 organisations took part in the survey. Even if the communes of Val-de-Travers, La Côte-aux-Fées and Les Verrières designated one and the same person to be responsible for the development of the "Montagne de Buttes" project, they were treated as three separate collective actors. This decision was made because different actors cooperated with each of the three communes. Generally, among those who took part in our survey, fifteen organisations provided responses to all questions of the survey. However, the Federal Office for the Environment and the Federal Office for Spatial Development answered only partially. Fourteen organisations filled out the questionnaire and sent it back via email. At the same time, interviews were conducted at the request of three organisations, among which are WWF, Birdlife and the Federal Office of the Energy.

b) Acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park

As regards to the survey related to the project of Crêt-Meuron, a set of 26 collective actors was selected. It was composed of the federal, cantonal and communal authorities, energy companies, associations and courts. Those formed the elite of the acceptance process of the wind park "Crêt-Meuron". However, the

questionnaires were sent to all actors except the Cantonal, Federal Courts and the Grand Council of Neuchâtel for the same reasons given above. Finally, we sent questionnaires to 23 collective actors.
The response rate for the survey on the policy process related to the wind park "Crêt-Meuron" was 56,5%. 12 organisations out of 23 took part in the survey. Among those who took part in our survey, ten organisations provided responses to all questions of the questionnaire. In contrast, the Federal Office for the Environment and the Federal Office for Spatial Development answered partially. Eight organisations filled out the questionnaire and sent it back via email. Meanwhile, interviews were conducted at the request of four organisations, among which were WWF Neuchâtel, Birdlife, Communal Council of La Chaux-de-Fonds and the Federal Office of the Energy.

3.3. Cases description

- Chronology of the binding decisions

a) Acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park

The project of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park caused controversies among the local population and policy stakeholders. Nevertheless, a public inquiry into the building permit was launched by the communal authorities in november 2019. Up to now, there is a treatment of oppositions, and the final decision has not been made yet. Consequently, the project is characterized by an intermediate success. The "Crêt-Meuron" wind park is being developed in the land of three landowners located in the communes of Les Hauts-Geneveys and Fontaines. On 29 August 2001, the State Council of Neuchâtel approved the master plan sheet for the construction of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park. Subsequently, the addition of a new coordination sheet for the Neuchâtel cantonal master plan was approved by the Federal Council on 4 December 2001. In a ruling dated 31 March 2005, the Cantonal Administrative Court accepted the appeals of the associations Les Amis de Tête-de-Ran, Stiftung Landschaftsschutz and Patrimoine suisse. At the same time, the judges cancelled the decision taken by the Department of Land Management (DGT) of the canton of Neuchâtel. In contrast, on 31 August 2006, the Federal Court accepted the public law appeal filed by the company Eole-Res, cancelled the 2005 ruling and referred the case back to the lower court for a new decision. Following this referral, the Cantonal Administrative Court ruled again on 26 April 2007, considering that the study on which the disputed land-use plan was based took appropriate account of all the determining factors. It dismissed the associations' appeals against the decision of the Department of Land Management of the canton of Neuchâtel. On 15 August 2007, the State Council sanctioned the "Crêt-Meuron" cantonal allocation plan. According to judges, the plan had to be modified because the initially planned wind turbine model was no longer available on the market. It tells the DGT to adapt the regulation by fixing the top of the wind turbines at 99 metres. In a decision of 19 September 2012, the Cantonal Administrative Court rejected the appeals of the associations Les Amis de Tête-de-Ran and Les Amis du Mont-Racine against the modification of the cantonal development plan. However, it admitted the appeal of the Stiftung Landschaftsschutz and referred the case back to the DGT for a new decision. On 26 June 2013, the Federal Council approved the revision of the Neuchâtel master plan and the sheet on the development of wind energy potential. On 3 September 2013, the Grand Council adopted a law revising the 1966 decree. This amendment added a fourth type of zone, namely wind farm zones. The cantonal referendum took place on 18 May 2014, at the end of which the amendment to the decree was accepted by around 65% of the voters. In a decision dated 1 July 2015, the Federal Court rejected the appeals of the associations Les Travers du Vent and Les

Amis du Mont-Racine on the modification to the decree on 3 September 2013. Consequently, it concluded that the creation of the wind park zones is not incompatible with the maintenance of the protected area.

Figure 2: Timeline of the binding decisions of the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park



b) Acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park

At the same time, the project of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park can be considered as successful because it has received a building permit from the Canton of Neuchâtel in 2019. The "Montagne de Buttes" wind park is being developed in the land of three communes: La Côte-aux-Fées, Les Verrières and Val-de-Travers. On June 26, 2013, the Federal Council approved the revision of the Neuchâtel master plan and the sheet on the development of wind energy potential. The cantonal referendum took place on May 18, 2014, at the end of which the amendment to the decree was accepted by around 65% of the voters. In a decision dated July 1, 2015, the Federal Court rejected the appeals of the associations Les Travers du Vent and Les Amis du Mont-Racine on the modification of the decree on September 3, 2013. On May 5, 2019, the Canton of Neuchâtel lifted oppositions to the wind park project, and the process continued to advance. Then, in May 2019, the Canton of Neuchâtel signed the building permit. Finally, in June 2019, the communes of La Côte-aux-Fées, Les Verrières and Val-de-Travers lifted oppositions to the wind park project.

Figure 3: Timeline of the binding decisions of the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park



3.4. Issue salience and tone measurements

Based on the analysis of media articles, press releases and the actors' websites, we measured the salience of the issue regarding the wind parks "Montagne de Buttes" and "Crêt-Meuron". Two types of salience for each key binding decision were analysed. Firstly, we counted the number of newspaper articles and identified the author's attitude towards the subject. Secondly, we counted the number of press releases and website publications to determine the issue salience based on actors' statements. Then, the content analysis allowed us to identify the tone of each of them.

a) Acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park

Overall, both graphs show that the most salient period corresponded to the vote on the initiative "Avenir des Crêtes" in 2014. It was launched by the initiative committee which was composed of the policy actors defending the preservation of the environment. The members of the committee demanded the organisation of the public consultations and referendums before each installation of wind turbines on the cantonal territory. However, the majority of the population of Neuchâtel rejected it and voted in favour of the counter-proposal of the Grand Council of Neuchâtel, which supported the construction of five wind parks composed of 59 turbines. In contrast, there were no other decisions which could have gained a similar level of attention. On both graphs, the rest of the decisions had almost the same degree of salience.

Figures 4 and 5:





At the same time, several differences were observed between the tone of the media articles regarding the issue of "Montagne de Buttes" wind park and the tone in the press releases and website publications. The tone was measured by looking at the author's attitude towards the subject. As a result, we identified positive, neutral and negative tones, represented by green, grey and red colours respectively. Generally, the neutral tone was predominant in media articles. The author's positive attitude was identified only in one article published in the communal newspaper. In contrast, the positive tone was detected in the majority of press releases and website publications. Considering the rejection of the initiative in 2014, the negative tone came from the environmental interest groups opposed to a counter-proposal of the Grand Council. Overall, the attitude of policy actors towards the issue of "Montagne de Buttes" wind park was rather positive.

Figures 6 and 7:





b) Acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park

Interestingly, both acceptance processes had three common binding decisions. It was found that the vote on the initiative in 2014 was the most salient decision in the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park as well. At the same time, we observed an increase of media salience on the decision of the Federal Court to cancel the Cantonal Court's ruling in 2006. However, it was less salient in press releases and website publications. Finally, other decisions were characterized by a low degree of salience.

Figures 8 and 9:





The tone of the media coverage regarding the issue of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park was always neutral, except for the media articles published in communal newspapers. In contrast, the negative tone was predominant in actors' statements over the Federal Court decision to cancel the ruling of the Cantonal Court in 2006, as well as over the vote on the initiative in 2014. However, the positive tone dominated in actors' statements over the cantonal approval of the cantonal master plan sheet and over the Confederation's approval of the master plan in 2013. Finally, concerning the other two decisions, a neutral tone was present.

Figures 10 and 11:





3.5. Variables and measurements

In order to determine whether an increased interest group's cooperation leads to a higher success in the acceptance process of the wind parks in Switzerland, we perform a Social Network Analysis (SNA) and a documentary analysis. On the one hand, the SNA conceptualizes a policy-making process as a network of actors. Moreover, it is used to identify the coalition structures and to assess the organisations' centrality within a policy network (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). On the other hand, a documentary analysis is used to reconstruct the chronology of the policy issue and detect the binding decisions. Moreover, it allows us to identify relevant actors, their policy preferences, as well as the collaborative ties between them and other actors of the network.

Lobbying success

The dependent variable of this study is the lobbying success, and it is measured through the attainment of a group's policy preference. It indicates whether and to what extent policy outputs move towards the actors' preferences (Vannoni, 2016). The distinction is made between two types of lobbying success: the overall preference attainment and the preference attainment on a key binding decision. The first measures the extent to which the final policy output moves towards the interest group's preferences. It means that if, at the moment of participation in the survey, the interest group indicates a high level of success, then the final outcome of the policy process approaches the group's preferences. In contrast, if the interest group indicates a low level of success, then the final outcome moves in the opposite direction. The main data comes from the survey where organisations were asked to answer the following question: *On a scale of 0 to 5, please indicate if, at this stage, your organisation has achieved its objectives in the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron"/"Montagne de Buttes" wind park?* Here, the overall self-reported success ranged between 0 ("preferences not achieved at all") and 5 ("preferences completely achieved"). At the same time, the data on preference attainment were also gathered through the analysis of the official documents and actors' statements. Moreover, the same measure of lobbying success was used. For example, if the building permit is attributed to the wind park, then the overall success of an interest group, which is completely against its construction, is equal to 0. In contrast, if the building permit is attributed to the park, and some of its negative impacts were mitigated, then we consider that the group partially achieved its preferences. Finally, if the

building permit is attributed to the wind park, then the overall success of the interest group, which was promoting it, is equal to 5. An interval measure of the lobbying success was inspired by the studies focusing on interest groups' policy preferences and success. For instance, Baumgartner et al. (2009) measured whether a pro-status quo side fully achieved its preferences, only partially, or not at all.

Meanwhile, in order to obtain information about the interest group's preference attainment on each key binding decision, we asked the following question: *If your organization has mobilized to influence decisions, please indicate the success your organization has experienced.* Consequently, it ranged between 0 ("preferences not achieved at all") and 5 ("preferences completely achieved"). Furthermore, in the documentary analysis, the same measuring scale was used to determine the interest group's success on each key binding decision. For example, for the binding decision taken in the administrative venue, we assessed whether a rule-making agency modified the rule in accordance with the demands of a group. As a result, we obtained an interval measure of the advocacy success depending on how many modifications were requested, and how many were actually modified in the final rules. In the legislative venue, this variable measured the extent to which an adopted law satisfied the demands of the interest group. Meanwhile, in the judicial venue, we measured the extent to which the court's ruling approached the group's position. Finally, within the direct democracy venue, we assessed whether the ballot proposition supported by a group was accepted by the voters.

Advocacy coalitions and the degree of conflict over an issue

The formation of the advocacy coalitions is based on the share of the same policy beliefs, which are needed in order to achieve the deep core beliefs in the policy subsystem (Sabatier, 1998). Consequently, based on the analysis of the official documents (documents related to the planification of the wind park, court's judgements and press releases), a list of relevant general arguments about the wind parks was made. The data on policy beliefs of each policy actor were gathered from the survey, where the organisations were asked: *On a scale of 0 to 5, please indicate the extent to which your organization agrees or disagrees with the general arguments about wind parks.* It ranges between 0 ("don't agree at all") and 5 ("completely agree"). Furthermore, in the documentary analysis, we identified the policy preferences of each actor as well. If the organisation agreed with the argument, then we put "5", otherwise it is "0". However, if an interest group partially agreed with the argument, we put "3". Subsequently, we used Klüver's (2011) method to calculate the degree of conflict over an issue. Firstly, based on the data gathered from the survey and in the documentary analysis, we determined which actors shared the same policy beliefs and divided them into two advocacy coalitions. The organisations which had rather an intermediary position on the issue of wind parks were assigned to the "Intermediary actors" group. Secondly, the data on policy actors' mobilisation on each decision allowed us to identify who were actively mobilised to influence it. In the survey, we asked organisations: *On a scale of 0 to 5, please indicate the level of mobilisation of your organisation on the key binding decisions*. The list of binding decisions taken in each acceptance process figured in the questionnaires. Next, in order to calculate the degree of conflict per binding decision, we divided the number of actors forming a small advocacy coalition by the number of actors constituting a larger one. This measure ranged from 0 ("no conflict") to 1 ("maximum conflict"). Finally, the overall degree of conflict was calculated by summing up the degrees of conflict per binding decision and dividing it by the total number of decisions. In the documentary analysis, we used the same methodology.

Furthermore, several studies confirmed that the issue salience is related to the conflict expansion. For instance, according to Hojnacki et al. (2008), as issues become more salient to the public, to actors in

government, and to members of the media, they are characterized by more expansive conflict. If a topic is of interest to a large proportion of the public, the number of interest groups that mobilise on policy issues and seek to influence the decision-makers increases. Consequently, the level of conflict is presumed to be high. However, the conflict and opposition are presumed to be lower when participants are fewer in number (Baumgartner, 1989). At the same time, the researchers found that the tone in media coverage has multiple significant effects. The tone "is important because it can provide the audience with templates for understanding politics" (Eberl and Wagner, 2017a). Firstly, it influences the audience members to think in a certain way about a particular issue. Moreover, it appears that if the content is negatively framed, people tend to have more negative attitudes towards the topic (Brunken, 2006). While frames can be generated by a variety of political actors seeking to either change or protect the status quo by configuring or reconfiguring issues to their advantage, their efforts to influence policy debates are often at cross purposes. They must compete against each other for issue leverage and to obtain their desired ends. This strategy is typically defined by a high level of conflict and well organized opposition on both sides of the debate (Walker, 1991). Often, interest groups will decide "to go public" (Schattschneider, 1960) to enlarge the scope of the conflict. This is explained by the fact that the success of an interest group depends on its ability to expand or contain an issue and its related policy discourse (Altheida and Gilmore, 1972). In fact, we found it interesting to do an additional analysis of the connection between the level of salience, the tone of the media coverage and the degree of conflict per each binding decision.

Actor's network centrality

In order to determine the degree of centrality of the actors in the overall network, we began by gathering data on cooperation. Here, the cooperation refers to a directed tie which goes from one actor to the other and that does not have to be reciprocated or mutually activated by both parties. In the survey, we asked organisations: *In the following table, please tick the collaborations on a technical level and the collaborations on a political level. In each case, please specify whether your organisation took the initiative in the collaboration (e.g. sent information to the relevant stakeholder) and/or reacted to a request (e.g. received information from the relevant stakeholder). Both are possible simultaneously.* We defined technical cooperation as an exchange of information on technical and scientific advances concerning the construction of the wind park and its effects on the environment and nature, birds and humans, etc. Meanwhile, political cooperation referred to the exchange of information and collaboration on political affairs, that allow the organization to participate in the process, exchanges of positions, joint drafting of appeals, co-organization of meetings and round tables; etc. During the analysis of documents related to the planification of the wind park, court's judgements, press releases and media articles, the cooperation between actors was coded by hand. For instance, if two actors sent a common opposition, filed a common appeal or organised a conference, then it was coded as a mutual cooperation.

The next step consisted in calculating the degree of centrality of each policy actor. We used Freeman's (1979) approach to degree centrality which measures the in-degree, the out-degree and the degree percentage of the entire network for each actor. We took into account both the cooperation ties coming from the actor as well as those directed towards him or her. The data gathered from the survey allowed us to determine the political and technical degree of centrality in each network of actors. However, in the documentary analysis, we calculated general centrality of the policy actors.

Coalition size and the degree of consensus

On the one hand, the variable *Coalition size* provided information about the "active" cooperation between the policy actors. Precisely, as mentioned earlier, we define coalition lobbying as any coordinated effort by interest groups to lobby decision-makers with the aim of obtaining the desired policy outcome. In order to measure the coalition size, we counted the number of policy actors with whom each interest group has developed a cooperation tie. On the other hand, the variable *Degree of consensus* referred to the agreement upon the policy preferences with the coalition participants. In fact, it captured the "passive" cooperation between the policy actors. Precisely, we counted the number of coalition members with whom the interest group shared the policy preferences. Thereafter, we divided this number by the total number of coalition participants. Consequently, we obtained an intervall measure of the degree of consensus, which varied between 0 ("minimal consensus") and 1 ("maximum consensus"). Additionally, the result was multiplied by 100 in order to measure the percentage ratio and include the data in the regression analysis. Moreover, in order to determine whether the degree of consensus increases the effect of the coalition size on the lobbying success, we created an interaction term and included it in the analysis. Additionally, in the SNA, the regression analysis included only those interest groups which indicated their policy preferences and their cooperation relationship with other policy actors. In the documentary analysis, we included only those interest actors for which the policy preferences and cooperation ties were identified.

4. Empirical results: Social Network Analysis and documentary analysis

Two different methods were used to test the hypotheses. In the first part, the empirical findings based on the SNA are presented. Each hypothesis is tested separately for the acceptance process of "Montagne de Buttes" wind park and for the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park. In the second part, the hypotheses are tested in the documentary analysis. Then, the results from the SNA are compared to those from a documentary analysis. The discussion of the empirical results follows.

4.1. Empirical evidence in the Social Network Analysis

4.1.1. Advocacy coalitions and the degree of conflict

- **Acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park**

Seven most important arguments about the wind parks were identified through the analysis of the documents. Consequently, it was determined that the policy actors frequently mentioned the wind park's impact on the environment, birds, landscape and cultural heritage. Moreover, they were concerned about its contribution to the Energy Strategy 2050 and its efficiency in terms of electricity production. In contrast, the arguments about the impact of the wind parks on property values, health and the region's economic attractiveness were less mentioned. Figure 12 shows the extent to which the policy actors agreed or disagreed with the most important arguments. They represent the positions of the actors on the wind parks' issue. Overall, in the "Montagne de Buttes" policy process, a clear division was observed between the actors' policy beliefs. The majority of actors strongly agreed with the fact that wind parks contribute to the realisation of Energy Strategy 2050. In contrast, Stiftung Landschaftsschutz, Helvetia Nostra and Birdlife strongly disagreed with this argument, while Pro Natura has an intermediate position.

Firstly, 5 out of 7 interest groups considered that the wind parks have a negative impact on the environment and birds. Interestingly, the Federal Office for the Environment also agreed with this affirmation. At the same time, Suisse Eole strongly disagreed with it, while Stiftung Landschaftsschutz had an intermediate position. Secondly, 4 out of 7 interest groups strongly believed that the impact of the wind parks on the landscape and cultural heritage is negative. Meanwhile, WWF and Nos oiseaux indicated intermediate positions, but Suisse Eole strongly disagreed with this affirmation. Among the federal authorities, the Federal Office for the Environment (OFEV) was a unique actor which considered that the wind parks have a negative impact on landscape and cultural heritage. In contrast,

the Federal Office of the Energy (OFEN), the Service of the Energy and for the Environment of Neuchâtel (SENE) and promoters disagreed with this statement. Thirdly, the majority of actors neither agreed nor disagreed with the argument related to the wind parks' efficiency in terms of electricity production. There were only two interest groups, Stiftung Landschaftsschutz and Helvetia Nostra, which believed that the wind parks don't produce sufficient quantities of energy. In contrast, Suisse Eole and WWF strongly believed in wind energy efficiency. Finally, all organisations, except the Federal Office for Spatial Development (ARE), Stiftung Landschaftsschutz and Nos oiseaux, believed that the wind parks have no negative effect on property value. Moreover, almost all actors disagreed with the last two arguments related to the negative impact of the wind parks on health and the region's economic attractiveness.

Figure 12: Policy beliefs of the actors involved in the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park

Arguments about the wind parks	Negative impact on the environment and birds	Contribution to the Energy Strategy 2050	Negative impact on the landscape and cultural heritage	Negative impact on property value	Efficiency in terms of electricity production	Negative impact on health	Negative impact on the region's economic attractiveness
OFEN	0	5	1	0	5	0	0
OFEV	4	5	4	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
ARE	3	5	3	3	3	1	1
SENE	0	5	0	0	5	0	0
Commune de La Côte aux Fées	3	4	3	n.a	3	n.a	n.a
Commune des Verrières	3	4	3	n.a	3	n.a	n.a
Commune de Val de Travers	3	4	3	n.a	3	n.a	n.a
Groupe E	0	5	1	0	5	0	0
SIG	1	5	1	1	5	1	0
Verrivent SA	1	5	2	0	5	0	0
Suisse Eole	0	5	1	1	5	1	1
Stiftung Landschaftsschutz	3	1	4	3	2	1	3
Pro Natura	5	3	5	2	3	2	1
Helvetia Nostra	5	0	5	n.a	0	n.a	n.a
Birdlife	4	1	4	4	3	2	2
WWF	4	5	3	n.a	4	n.a	n.a
Nos oiseaux	5	4	3	3	3	3	3

On the basis of the above data, we were able to regroup the actors in two coalitions: "Pro-wind parks" and "Anti-wind parks". Those from the first coalition were strongly in favour of the promotion of renewable energies and the realisation of Energy Strategy 2050. In contrast, actors from the second coalition intended to preserve the environment and landscape, as well as to protect birds and their habitats. Moreover, they considered that the impact of the wind parks is harmful in this regard. Simultaneously, those who had an intermediate position on the majority

of arguments belong to the group of "Intermediary actors". According to them, the wind parks are harmful in some aspects, but their negative impacts can be mitigated.

In the following section, we examined how the interest groups' membership in the advocacy coalitions influences their self-reported success. Moreover, we analysed whether their success changes when controlling for the degree of conflict over an issue.

Figure 13: Degree of conflict over a first binding decision: Confederation's approval of the cantonal master plan in 2013

Pro-wind parks	Intermediary actors	Anti-wind parks
OFEN	ARE	Stiftung Landschaftsschutz
SENE	OFEV	Pro Natura
Groupe E		Helvetia Nostra
SIG		Birdlife
Verrivent SA		
Suisse Eole		

Despite that a high number of policy actors were mobilised on the first binding decision, it had a low level of salience (figures 4 and 5). Moreover, no media articles related to the first issue were found (figure 4), and only two positive actors' statements were detected (figure 7). Here, a small "Anti-wind parks" coalition is composed of four interest groups, while a large one is composed of six organisations. Consequently, we do the following calculation:

"Anti-wind park coalition" / "Pro-wind park coalition" = 4 / 6 = **0,67**

The degree of conflict over the first issue is equal to 0,67**,** which is relatively high. Consequently, we confirm the findings of Baumgartner (1989), which affirmed that a high number of actors mobilised on the issue leads to a higher degree of conflict. Consequently, we expect that the interest groups from both coalitions struggle to achieve their preferences because of the strong opposition. Nevertheless, we suppose that the interest groups from a large coalition will have a higher overall success.

Next, the figure 14 provides information about the level of success of six interest groups mobilised on the first binding decision.

Figure 14:



We observe that all interest groups had a low success on the Confederation's approval of the cantonal master plan in 2013. Despite that Suisse Eole was a member of a larger coalition, it couldn't fully achieve its preferences. However, we observe that the level of success of this group is higher compared to those which belonged to a small coalition. As a result, the first hypothesis is confirmed.

Figure 15: Degree of conflict over a second binding decision: Vote on the initiative "Avenir des Crêtes" in 2014

Pro-wind parks	Intermediary actors	Anti-wind parks
SENE	Nos oiseaux	Stiftung Landschaftsschutz
Groupe E		Pro Natura
SIG		Helvetia Nostra
Verrivent SA		Birdlife
Suisse Eole		
Degree of conflict: 4 / 5 = **0,8**		

Figure 16:



The second binding decision was characterized by a high degree of conflict. Moreover, the figures 4 and 5 show that this issue is highly salient. At the same time, the presence of both positive and negative tones in the actors' statements shows that the actors competed against each other to reconfigure issues to their advantage and influence the policy debate (Schattschneider, 1960). We observe that Suisse Eole was a member of a large coalition, while the rest of the interest groups belonged to a small one, except Nos oiseaux. All the groups from a small coalition had a lower success on a second binding decision compared to the interest group from a large one. Consequently, the hypothesis is confirmed in this case.

Figure 17: Degree of conflict over a third binding decision: the Federal Court's decision to refuse the opponents' appeal in 2015

Pro-wind parks	Intermediary actors	Anti-wind parks
SENE	ARE	Stiftung Landschaftsschutz
SIG		Pro Natura
Degree of conflict: 2 / 2 = **1**		

Figure 18:



The table above shows that a few policy actors mobilised to influence the decision of the Federal Court, which is probably explained by a low level of the issue salience (figures 4 and 5). However, the degree of conflict over this issue was very high. According to Klüver, Beyers and Braun (2014), sometimes the decisions might only lead to the mobilization of a small circle of interest groups, however, they might be fundamentally divided about the issue. Consequently, both interest groups had a very low success. As a result, we confirm that a high degree of conflict creates a different environment for interest groups, thus, making them less successful. Meanwhile, on the figure 18, we observe that both coalitions are equivalent in terms of their size. Moreover, both interest groups belong to the same coalition. As a consequence, no further comparison can be made.

Figure 19: Degree of conflict over a fourth binding decision: the decision of Canton to lift oppositions in 2019

Pro-wind parks	Anti-wind parks
SENE	Stiftung Landschaftsschutz
Groupe E	Pro Natura
SIG	Helvetia Nostra
Verrivent SA	
Degree of conflict: 3 / 4 = **0,75**	

Figure 20:



The figure 19 shows that a little amount of policy actors mobilised to influence the present decision. Moreover, it was characterized by a low level of salience (figures 4 and 5). Nevertheless, we observe that the coalitions were strongly opposed to each other. On the figure 20, we observe that the level of lobbying success on the issue is very low. Moreover, both Pro Natura and Stiftung Landschaftsschutz belong to a small advocacy coalition. As a result, we confirm that a high degree of conflict makes it difficult for interest groups to achieve their preferences. Additionally, we confirm that on high-conflict issues, the interest groups from small coalitions have a low success.

Figure 21: Degree of conflict over a fifth binding decision: the decision of Canton to attribute the building permit in 2019

Pro-wind parks	Anti-wind parks
SENE	Stiftung Landschaftsschutz
Groupe E	Pro Natura
SIG	Helvetia Nostra
Verrivent SA	
Degree of conflict: 3 / 4 = **0,75**	

Figure 22:



The figure 21 shows that exactly the same actors mobilised on a fourth and a fifth decisions. Consequently, the degrees of conflict were identical. Furthermore, both Stiftung Landschaftsschutz and Pro Natura had a low level of success. Here again, we confirm that a high degree of conflict makes it difficult for interest groups to achieve their preferences. Furthermore, we confirm that on high-conflict issues, the interest groups from small coalitions have a low success.

Figure 23: Degree of conflict over a sixth binding decision: the decision of the communes to lift oppositions in 2019

Pro-wind parks	Intermediary actors	Anti-wind parks
Groupe E	Commune de la Côte aux Fées	Stiftung Landschaftsschutz
SIG	Commune des Verrières	Pro Natura
Verrivent SA	Commune de Val-de-Travers	Helvetia Nostra
		Birdlife
Degree of conflict: 3 / 4 = **0,75**		

Figure 24:



We observe that a bigger number of actors mobilised on this decision, which is correlated with a slight increase in the issue salience (figures 4 and 5). Additionally, the tone of the media articles and the actors' statements was also more diverse compared to the previous decisions. Consequently, we observe that there was an attempt to influence the policy debate by using positive or negative tones (figures 6 and 7). At the same time, even if the "Anti-wind parks" coalition was larger on this issue, two of its members had a low level of success. As a result, we invalidate the first hypothesis in this case.

Next, we calculated the overall degree of conflict by summing up the degrees of conflict per each binding decision and divided the result by the total number of these decisions.

Figure 25: Advocacy coalitions in the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park and the degree of the overall conflict

Pro-wind parks	Intermediary actors	Anti-wind parks
OFEN	WWF	Stiftung Landschaftsschutz
SENE	Nos oiseaux	Pro Natura
Groupe E	Commune de la Côte aux Fées	Helvetia Nostra
SIG	Commune des Verrières	Birdlife
Verrivent SA	Commune de Val-de-Travers	
Suisse Eole	ARE	
	OFEV	
The overall degree of conflict: (0,67 + 0,8 + 1 + 0,75 + 0,75 + 0,75) / 6 = **0,785 = 0,8**		

Figure 26:



The figure 25 indicates that the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park was characterised by a high level of conflict. Consequently, it might have been hard for all interest groups to fully achieve their preferences. Nevertheless, the figure 26 shows that on the highly controversial decision-making processes, the interest groups from a small coalition didn't have a lower overall success than a group from a large one. Moreover, Pro Natura had a higher overall success than Suisse Eole, despite that it was a member of a small advocacy coalition. At the same time, Birdlife, WWF and Nos oiseaux had the same level of overall success as Suisse Eole. In this case, only Stiftung Landschaftsschutz and Suisse Eole confirmed the first hypothesis.

In the documentary analysis, it was found that the communes lifted the oppositions to a building permit for the wind park "Montagne de Buttes" in 2019. Up to now, this is considered as the final policy outcome. In fact, the interest groups which were in favour of the construction of the wind park should have indicated a high level of preference achievement. Generally, we observe that five out of six interest groups had a high level of overall success. Consequently, this means that the final outcome of the "Montagne de Buttes" policy process moved very close to their policy preferences. There was only Stiftung Landschaftsschutz which had an intermediate overall success. According to the website of this national interest group, it fights for the protection of Swiss landscapes.

Consequently, this means that Stiftung Landschaftsschutz considered that the wind park "Montagne de Buttes" contributes to the realisation of the Energy Strategy 2050, it is not harmful for birds and their habitats, but the impact of the wind park "Montagne de Buttes" on the landscape remains to be seen. At the same time, we observe that Suisse Eole was a unique interest group which belonged to a large coalition. Considering that this organisation was in favour of the wind energy promotion, the attribution of building permit for the park "Montagne de Buttes" corresponded to a full achievement of its preferences. Meanwhile, Pro Natura and Birdlife indicated a high level of overall success even if they belonged to a small coalition. Consequently, this means that both organisations considered that the negative impact of the wind park "Montagne de Buttes" on the environment and birds, as well as on the landscape and cultural heritage, was mitigated. Finally, two intermediary interest organisations, WWF and Nos oiseaux, also had a high level of success in the present decision-making process. This proves that the final outcome of the acceptance process satisfied the preferences of these two interest groups.

To conclude, our findings confirm the results of the study conducted by Mahoney (2007), who found that in the systems, where policymakers are accountable to the public in direct elections, the officials need to ensure the votes they take on individual policy proposals are supported by large proportions of the electorate. In fact, it is important for interest groups to form coalitions with a large number of actors which pursue the same goal on the issue. Moreover, we found the same results as Klüver (2011), who affirmed that on high-conflict issues, the interest groups that belong to the larger advocacy coalition should find it much easier to shape the policymaking in their favour. In contrast, this theory wasn't confirmed in the case of the overall decision-making process.

The differences in the level of the overall success between the interest groups belonging to the same coalition might be explained by other factors, such as the active collaboration with the policy makers. The interviews with the organisations and the documentary analysis provided evidence about the collaboration between five interest groups, Suisse Eole, Pro Natura, WWF, Birdlife and Nos oiseaux, the promoters of the wind park and three communes. In contrast, Stiftung Landschaftsschutz refused to participate in the working group dedicated to the development of the project. As a result, it might explain its intermediate level of overall success in the present process.

- **Acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park**

The same analysis of the actors' policy preferences was done in the case of the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park. Overall, the figure 27 shows that the division between actors was slightly different compared to the one in the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park. Unfortunately, the promoters of the wind park "Crêt-Meuron", several interest groups, cantonal and communal authorities didn't respond to our survey. In fact, the number of members in the advocacy coalitions might be lower than the actual number.

Generally, the majority of the actors were involved in both "Crêt-Meuron" and "Montagne de Buttes" decision-making processes. As a result, their policy beliefs changed only slightly. Among the new actors, we found the Commune of La Chaux-de-Fonds, Patrimoine suisse, Neuchâtel Ski de Fond and Tourisme neuchâtelois. We observe that the communal authorities of La Chaux-de-Fonds agreed with the wind parks' contribution to the realisation of the Energy Strategy 2050. However, they also believed that the wind parks have a strong negative impact on the landscape and cultural heritage. The same beliefs were also shared by Patrimoine suisse, Neuchâtel Ski de Fond and Tourisme neuchâtelois. Moreover, these interest groups strongly believed that the wind parks have a negative impact on the land property and that they are not efficient in terms of energy production. They were also sceptical about the contribution of the wind parks to the realisation of the Energy Strategy 2050. At the same time, compared to other actors, they were more concerned about the negative impact of the wind parks on the health and economic attractiveness of the region.

Figure 27: Policy beliefs of actors in the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park

Arguments about the wind parks	Negative impact on the environment and birds	Contribution to the Energy Strategy 2050	Negative impact on landscape and heritage	Negative impact on property value	Efficiency in terms of electricity production	Negative impact on health	Negative impact on the region's economic attractiveness
OFEN	0	5	1	0	5	0	0
OFEV	3	5	3	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
ARE	3	5	3	3	3	1	1
SENE	0	5	0	0	5	0	0
Commune Chaux-de-Fonds	n.a	4	5	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Suisse Eole	0	5	1	1	5	1	0
Stiftung Landschaftsschutz	3	1	4	3	2	1	3
Pro Natura	5	1	5	2	0	2	1
Birdlife	4	1	4	4	3	2	2
WWF	4	5	3	n.a	4	n.a	n.a
Patrimoine suisse	5	1	5	5	2	4	4
Neuchâtel Ski de Fond	4	3	5	4	1	3	4
Tourisme neuchâtelois	5	1	5	4	1	3	3

On the basis of the above data, we split actors into two coalitions and one group of intermediary actors. The figure 16 provides information about their composition. On the one side, we observe that the coalition in favor of the wind parks was composed of the administrative authorities, competent in energy production, and one interest group, Suisse Eole. On the other side, the coalition against wind parks was composed of six interest groups and one commune. At the same time, WWF, OFEV and ARE were intermediary actors.

The figures below provide information about the interest groups' membership in the advocacy coalitions and their self-reported success.

Figure 28: Degree of conflict over a first binding decision: the approval of the master plan sheet by Canton in 2001

Pro-wind parks	**Intermediary actors**	**Anti-wind parks**
Suisse Eole	WWF	Stiftung Landschaftsschutz
SENE	OFEV	Pro Natura
OFEN	ARE	Birdlife
		Patrimoine suisse
		Neuchâtel Ski de Fond
Degree of conflict: 3 / 5 = **0,6**		

Figure 29:



The result of the calculation indicates that the degree of conflict over a first binding decision was relatively high. Moreover, we observe that a significant amount of actors mobilised to influence it. However, the figures 8 and 9 show that the present issue had a low salience. Consequently, we confirm that a high number of mobilised actors leads to a higher conflict.

Meanwhile, the "Anti-wind parks" coalition was large on this issue. Nevertheless, the level of success of all of its members varied between 0 and 2. In contrast, WWF managed to achieve its preferences on this decision even if it was an intermediary actor. At the same time, Suisse Eole mobilised on this decision, but didn't indicate its level of success. However, given that the final decision moved closer to its preferences, we assume that Suisse Eole had a high level of success on this issue. To sum up, on this decision, a high degree of conflict made it difficult for all interest groups to achieve their preferences. However, this was not the case for WWF. At the same time, despite being members of a large advocacy coalition, the interest groups had low success. As a result, the hypothesis is invalidated.

Figure 30: Degree of conflict over a second binding decision: the cancellation of the Cantonal Court's decision by the Federal Court in 2006

Pro-wind parks	Anti-wind parks
Suisse Eole	Pro Natura
SENE	Birdlife
	Patrimoine suisse
	Neuchâtel Ski de Fond
Degree of conflict: 2 / 4 = **0,5**	

Figure 31:



The figure 30 shows that the second decision was characterized by an intermediate degree of conflict. At the same time, it significantly gained attention of the media (figure 8). Moreover, several local journals and policy actors used a negative tone to present the issue (figures 10 and 11). Meanwhile, the figure 31 also proves a high importance of this issue because a significant number of interest groups were mobilised.

We observe that the "Anti-wind parks" coalition was larger on this issue. However, its members had different levels of success. Precisely, Patrimoine suisse and Pro Natura had a very low success, while Neuchâtel Ski de Fond had an intermediate success. In contrast, Birdlife managed to be successful on the present issue. We are uncertain about the trustworthiness of Birdlife's answers in the questionnaire because this group was opposed to the construction of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park from the beginning of the process. In fact, the decision of the Federal Court to cancel the Cantonal Court ruling goes against the policy preferences of the members of the "Anti-wind parks" coalition. However, it can be assumed the differences in the level of success among the members of the same advocacy coalition might be potentially explained by the active cooperation between them and other policy actors (Junk, 2019c). This will be verified further in the documentary analysis.

To sum up, all interest groups from a large coalition, except Birdlife, had a lower success than the interest group from a small one. As a result, the first hypothesis is invalidated.

Figure 32: Degree of conflict over a third binding decision: the sanctioning of the cantonal allocation plan by Canton in 2007

Pro-wind parks	Anti-wind parks
Suisse Eole	Pro Natura
SENE	Patrimoine suisse
	Neuchâtel Ski de Fond
Degree of conflict: 2 / 5 = **0,4**	

Figure 33:



The figure 32 shows that a few number of actors mobilised to influence a third decision. Moreover, the degree of conflict on this decision was low. At the same time, the figures 8 and 9 indicate it had a low level of salience. Nevertheless, despite the absence of a strong opposition, the interest groups from a larger coalition had a very low level of success. Only Neuchâtel Ski de Fond had a higher success than Suisse Eole, which was a member of a small coalition. Consequently, Suisse Eole and Neuchâtel Ski de Fond confirmed the first hypothesis, while it was rejected in the cases of Patrimoine suisse and Pro Natura.

Figure 34: Degree of conflict over a fourth binding decision: the acceptance of the opponents' appeal by Canton in 2012

Pro-wind parks	Anti-wind parks
SENE	Stiftung Landschaftsschutz
	Pro Natura
	Patrimoine suisse
	Neuchâtel Ski de Fond
	Tourisme neuchâtelois
Degree of conflict: 1 / 5 = **0,2**	

Figure 35:



The figure 34 shows that five interest groups mobilised to influence the decision of the Cantonal Court in 2012. Furthermore, they were all members of a large coalition. At the same time, the present issue was characterised by a low level of salience (figures 8 and 9) and by a low degree of conflict. However, the interest groups reported different levels of success, despite the share of the same policy preferences. We observe that Stiftung Landschaftsschutz reported a very high success, while Tourisme neuchâtelois had no success at all. Meanwhile, the rest of the associations had a low success on the issue, despite being members of a large coalition. In fact, this might be explained by the differences in the active cooperation between the interest groups and policy actors. As a result, Stiftung Landschaftsschutz is the only group which confirmed the first hypothesis. However, the hypothesis was rejected for the majority of interest groups.

Figure 36: Degree of conflict over a fifth binding decision: Confederation's approval of the cantonal master plan in 2013

Pro-wind parks	Intermediary actors	Anti-wind parks
Suisse Eole	OFEV	Stiftung Landschaftsschutz
SENE	ARE	Pro Natura
OFEN		Birdlife
		Patrimoine suisse
		Neuchâtel Ski de Fond
		Tourisme neuchâtelois
Degree of conflict: 3 / 6 = **0,5**		

Figure 37:



The fifth binding decision had a low level of salience (figures 8 and 9) and an intermediate level of conflict (figure 36). However, we observe that a significant number of interest groups were mobilised to influence the present decision. At the same time, the interest groups from a larger coalition were less successful than Suisse Eole. Only Neuchâtel Ski de Fond had the same level of success, but not a higher one. As a result, the hypothesis was invalidated.

Figure 38: Degree of conflict over a sixth binding decision: the adoption of the law on decree by Canton in 2013

Pro-wind parks	Anti-wind parks
Suisse Eole	Stiftung Landschaftsschutz
SENE	Pro Natura
	Patrimoine suisse
	Neuchâtel Ski de Fond
	Tourisme neuchâtelois
Degree of conflict: 2 / 5 = **0,4**	

Figure 39:



The present binding decision was characterised by a low degree of conflict (figure 38) and a low level of the issue salience (figure 8 and 9). Meanwhile, the figure 39 shows that a significant number of interest groups were mobilised on this decision. Nevertheless, despite the absence of a strong opposition, all interest groups from a larger coalition had a lower success than Suisse Eole. As a result, the hypothesis is not confirmed.

Figure 40: Degree of conflict over a seventh binding decision: Vote on the initiative "Avenir des Crêtes" in 2014

Pro-wind parks	Anti-wind parks
Suisse Eole	Stiftung Landschaftsschutz
SENE	Pro Natura
	Birdlife
	Patrimoine suisse
	Neuchâtel Ski de Fond
	Tourisme neuchâtelois
Degree of conflict: 2 / 6 = **0,33**	

Figure 41:



The figures 8 and 9 show that the seventh binding decision was highly salient. However, the degree of conflict over the issue was low. In contrast, the same binding decision was highly conflictual in the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park. The lower response rate to the survey related to the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park might explain the difference in findings. Meanwhile, the figure 41 shows that Suisse Eole managed to fully achieve its preferences on this issue, despite being a member of a small coalition. At the same time, all interest groups from a larger coalition had low success. Consequently, the first hypothesis is rejected.

Figure 42: Degree of conflict over an eighth binding decision: the Federal Court's decision to refuse the opponents' appeal in 2015

Pro-wind parks	Intermediary actors	Anti-wind parks
SENE	ARE	Pro Natura
		Patrimoine suisse
		Neuchâtel Ski de Fond
		Tourisme neuchâtelois
Degree of conflict: 1 / 4 = **0,25**		

Figure 43:



The last binding decision gained a low level of attention in the media and among the policy actors (figures 8 and 9). Consequently, a few number of actors mobilised on this issue. As a result, the present decision had a low degree of conflict. Nevertheless, all members of a large coalition had a low level of success. As a result, the hypothesis is not confirmed.

Figure 44: Advocacy coalitions in the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park and the overall degree of conflict

Pro-wind parks	Intermediary actors	Anti-wind parks
Suisse Eole	WWF	Stiftung Landschaftsschutz
SENE	OFEV	Pro Natura
OFEN	ARE	Birdlife
		Patrimoine suisse
		Neuchâtel Ski de Fond
		Tourisme neuchâtelois
		Commune de la Chaux-de-Fonds
Overall degree of conflict: (0,6 + 0,5 + 0,2 + 0,4 + 0,5 + 0,4 + 0,33 + 0,25) / 8 = **0,4**		

Figure 45:



The results show that in the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park, the overall degree of conflict was relatively low. Nevertheless, all interest groups from a larger coalition, except Birdlife, reported a low or intermediate success. In contrast, Suisse Eole was a member of a smaller coalition but had a high level of success. At the same time, WWF belonged to a group of "Intermediary actors". Consequently, as expected, his level of overall success was intermediate. Considering that the approval of the building permit is currently underway, the final outcome of the process moves towards Suisse Eole preferences. Meanwhile, in the documentary analysis, it was found that Birdlife launched a collective petition against the project of "Crêt-Meuron". As a consequence, we consider that the answer given by this association in the questionnaire doesn't represent its actual level of overall success. However, as it was previously discussed, the differences between the level of success of the interest groups from the same advocacy coalition might be explained by the active cooperation with various policy actors. Finally, we conclude that in the present process, a degree of conflict had no impact on the overall success of the members of

a large advocacy coalition. Consequently, we didn't confirm what was previously found by Klüver (2011), neither by Mahoney (2007).

Traditionally, two broad coalitions, the "pro-growth" and the "pro-ecology", constituted the basic structure of the energy policy domain in Switzerland (Broadbent, 1998). The first coalition had three basic components, which corresponded to the 'ruling triad' in Broadbent's study: cantonal governments, the business community and the three major center-right parties (PRD, PDC, UDC). In contrast, the second one was composed of policy actors who were sceptical about the possibilities for continued growth and who pleaded for the preservation of nonrenewable resources, for energy saving and for the reduction of the destructive external effects of energy production on the environment (Jaspers, 1990). The results of our analysis confirmed the existence of two opposing coalitions, "pro-wind parks" and "anti-wind parks". It was determined that the first one prioritizes the transition to renewable energy over the environment and landscape protection, while the second one has the opposite preferences.

Furthermore, in the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park, it was confirmed that when a degree of conflict over a binding decision is high, the members of a small coalition have a lower lobbying success. At the same time, the overall degree of conflict and the advocacy coalition membership didn't have an impact on the majority of the interest groups' overall success. Meanwhile, in the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park, there was no correlation between the advocacy coalition membership and the level of lobbying success on binding decisions. Moreover, the overall degree of conflict and the advocacy coalition membership didn't have an impact on the interest groups' overall success. Additionally, big divergences were found in terms of the level of success among the interest groups from the same advocacy coalition. We assume that this problem might be overcome when we analyze the active cooperation between the policy actors.

4.1.2. Cooperation with central actors

In this part, the aim was to examine the interest groups' cooperation with central actors and its impact on their level of overall success. In this analysis, all relevant policy actors were taken into account.

- **Acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park**

The figure 46 shows both the technical and political centrality of the actors involved in the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park. The red line indicates the average degree of centrality.

Figure 46: Technical and political centrality of the policy actors in the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park



We observe that the degree of technical centrality of policy actors is quite similar to their degree of political centrality. On the graph, Vol au Vent, Paysage Libre Suisse, Nos oiseaux, Suisse Eole and Travers du Vent have a low degree of centrality. In contrast, among all of the interest groups, Pro Natura and Helvetia Nostra are the most central. Consequently, those associations are important from both technical and political perspectives. Meanwhile, WWF, Birdlife and Stiftung Landschaftsschutz have intermediate degrees of centrality.

Next, the following graphs illustrate the cooperation between the interest groups and other policy actors of the subsystem. The cooperation ties are represented by green arrows pointed in one direction (in or out) and in both directions at the same time (in and out).

Figure 47: Cooperation between Suisse Eole and policy actors



The figure 47 shows that Suisse Eole had a low degree of centrality despite its high expertise level in relation to the wind parks. However, Suisse Eole cooperated technically with three central actors, among which were two promoters and the commune of Val-de-Travers. Moreover, the interest group cooperated politically with Pro Natura, which had the highest degree of political centrality among all of the actors. Furthermore, the graph representing the interest groups' overall success (figure 26) shows that Suisse Eole indicated a high level of overall success (4 out of 5) in a present decision-making process. In fact, Suisse Eole confirmed that the cooperation between a non-central interest group and central actors is correlated with a higher overall success.

Figure 48: Cooperation between Stiftung Landschaftsschutz and policy actors



The figure 48 shows that the degree of centrality of Stiftung Landschaftsschutz was intermediate. This interest group cooperated with a large number of actors having a high degree of centrality. Nevertheless, the interest group had only an intermediate overall success in the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park. As a result, the hypothesis was invalidated by Stiftung Landschaftsschutz.

Figure 49: Cooperation between Pro Natura and policy actors



We observe that Pro Natura was the most central actor in the present subsystem. Moreover, this interest group exchanged information on technical and scientific advances concerning the construction of the wind park with many other central actors. The organisation was also involved in political collaboration with the majority of actors having a high degree of centrality, as well as with seven not central actors. On the figure 26, we observe that Pro Natura had the highest degree of overall success (5 out of 5) among all interest groups. As a result, Pro Natura confirmed that the cooperation between a central interest group and other central actors is correlated with a high overall success.

Figure 50: Cooperation between Birdlife and policy actors



The figure 50 shows that the degree of centrality of Birdlife was intermediate. Generally, we observe that the group cooperated with a significant number of policy actors. Moreover, the majority of them had a higher degree of centrality compared to Birdlife's one Consequently, the cooperation between this interest group and central actors led to a higher overall success. As a result, the second hypothesis was confirmed.

Figure 51: Cooperation between WWF and policy actors



Meanwhile, WWF had the same degree of centrality as Birdlife. Moreover, both groups cooperated with almost the same policy actors and indicated a high degree of overall success (4 out of 5). Consequently, WWF also confirmed that the cooperation between an interest group and central actors is correlated with a higher overall success.

Figure 52: Cooperation between Nos oiseaux and policy actors



Finally, the figure 52 shows that Nos oiseaux was a non-central actor. However, the group cooperated technically with Groupe E, which had the highest degree of technical centrality. Moreover, Nos oiseaux cooperated politically with the most central actor, Pro Natura. At the same time, it cooperated with Birdlife, OFEV and WWF, which had a

higher degree of centrality compared to Nos oiseaux. Additionally, the interest group had a high level of the overall success (4 out of 5). Consequently, based on the results, the second hypothesis was confirmed.

To sum up, the second hypothesis was validated in five out of six cases. Consequently, the majority of the interest groups mobilised in the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" confirmed the correlation between the cooperation with central actors and a higher overall lobbying success (as affirmed by Bonacich, 1972). Moreover, during the interviews with the organisations, we found that Pro Natura, WWF, Birdlife and Nos oiseaux were working closely with the promoters and the communes on the development of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park project. Furthermore, Suisse Eole, Pro Natura and the communes were engaged in the discussions on the mitigation of the negative impacts. In fact, our results confirmed that this cooperation contributed to the interest groups' high overall success. In contrast, Stiftung Landschaftsschutz was also contacted by the communes, but refused to participate in the working group. In fact, this explains its intermediate success in the decision-making process.

- **Acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park**

The figure 53 provides information about the degrees of centrality of all relevant policy actors in the decision-making process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park.

Figure 53: Technical and political centrality of the policy actors in the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park



We observe that the most central actors of the present subsystem are Pro Natura, Tourisme neuchâtelois, Neuchâtel Ski de Fond and SENE. Meanwhile, Patrimoine suisse has an intermediate degree of centrality. In contrast, the majority of the policy actors are concentrated in the left corner of the graph. All of them have relatively low degrees of centrality.

Next, the following graphs illustrate the cooperation between each interest group, involved in the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park, and the policy actors. Here again, the symmetrical collaboration between actors is represented by the green arrows.

Figure 54: Cooperation between Suisse Eole and policy actors



The figure 54 shows that Suisse Eole had a relatively low degree of centrality. However, this group was more central than OFEN, Val-de-Ruz and Eole Res. At the same time, its degree of centrality was much lower compared to SENE, Pro Natura and Patrimoine suisse. At the same time, Suisse Eole cooperated with the two most central actors. Moreover, it indicated a high level of overall success in the process related to the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park. Consequently, the cooperation between Suisse Eole and the most central actors was correlated with its higher overall success. As a result, Suisse Eole confirmed the second hypothesis.

Figure 55: Cooperation between Stiftung Landschaftsschutz and policy actors



We observe that Stiftung Landschaftsschutz had a non-central position in the present network of actors. The group cooperated with four actors which had a much higher degree of centrality. At the same time, the figure 45 shows that Stiftung Landschaftsschutz had an intermediate level of overall success. Consequently, we conclude that Stiftung Landschaftsschutz had a higher overall success due to the cooperation with the actors, who had a higher degree of centrality.

Figure 56: Cooperation between Pro Natura and policy actors



Figure 56 shows that Pro Natura had the highest degree of centrality among all of the actors of the coalition and of the whole network. Consequently, it should have had a high overall success because of its important position in the network. We notice that Pro Natura cooperated with an important number of actors, having a relatively low degree of centrality, and only one very central actor. At the same time, the figure 45 shows that Pro Natura had a low degree of overall success. As a result, the second hypothesis was invalidated by Pro Natura.

Figure 57: Cooperation between Birdlife and policy actors



We observe that Birdlife had a low degree of centrality. At the same time, it cooperated with the most central actors of the network, Pro Natura and SENE. The group also cooperated with other actors with a similar degree of centrality. Moreover, the figure 45 shows that Birdlife had a high overall success. Consequently, based on the results, the second hypothesis was confirmed. However, the case of Birdlife is problematic because the association indicated a high level of overall success, which doesn't correspond to the real one. In fact, the obtained result may lead to the erroneous conclusions.

Figure 58: Cooperation between WWF and policy actors



The figure 58 shows that WWF had a relatively low degree of centrality compared to other policy actors of the coalition and of the overall network. Nevertheless, we observe that it cooperated with two very central actors and one interest group, which had an intermediate degree of centrality. At the same time, the figure 45 indicates that WWF had an intermediate degree of overall success in the present process. Consequently, we conclude that the cooperation between a non-central interest group and central policy actors contributed to a higher lobbying success.

Figure 59: Cooperation between Patrimoine suisse and policy actors



We observe that Patrimoine suisse had an intermediate degree of centrality in both the coalition and the whole network. The interest group cooperated with the four most central actors and with an important number of actors, having a lower degree of centrality. In this process, Patrimoine suisse had an intermediate overall success. As a result, we determine that the cooperation between this interest group and central actors had no impact on its lobbying success. Consequently, the second hypothesis was invalidated.

Figure 60: Cooperation between Neuchâtel Ski de Fond and policy actors



The figure 60 shows that Neuchâtel Ski de Fond was the most central actor from a political perspective. However, it has an intermediate degree of centrality from a technical perspective. We observe that this group cooperated with the majority of actors, but they all had a lower degree of centrality. Nevertheless, considering the important position of Neuchâtel Ski de Fond, we expected it to have a high degree of overall success. However, the figure 45 shows that this interest group was unsuccessful in a present decision-making process. Consequently, the second hypothesis was invalidated in this case.

Figure 61: Cooperation between Tourisme neuchâtelois and policy actors



Finally, we notice that Tourisme neuchâtelois had a high degree of centrality in the whole network. At the same time, it cooperated with two central actors and a lot of actors, having a lower degree of centrality. Surprisingly, despite that Tourisme neuchâtelois was a central actor, which cooperated with other central actors, it was completely unsuccessful. As a result, the second hypothesis was invalidated.

To sum up, the cooperation with central actors led to a higher overall success of four out of eight interest groups, which mobilised in the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park. In contrast, despite an important position in the network, three central interest groups, among which were Pro Natura, Tourisme neuchâtelois and Neuchâtel Ski de Fond, had a low overall success. Nevertheless, the results of both acceptance processes confirmed that a non-central interest group had a higher success due to the cooperation with a central actor. In contrast, in the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park, the second hypothesis didn't work for the interest groups with a high degree of centrality. As a result, only a half of the interest groups confirmed the theory of Bonacich (1972).

4.1.3. Coalition size and the degree of consensus

In this section, we examined the impact of the coalition size and the share of the policy preferences between the members of the same coalition on the lobbying success. In order to do the analysis, we took both types of cooperation into account. Firstly, we counted the number of allies with whom each interest group was engaged in both technical and political cooperation. Secondly, we counted the number of actors with whom the interest group shared the same policy preferences. Finally, we analysed whether being a member of a larger and unanimous coalition leads to a higher overall lobbying success, and vice versa.

- **Acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park**

A multivariate regression analysis included the variables presented in the figure 62.

Figure 62:

Variables	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Overall Success	6	4	0.632	3	5
Coalition Size	6	9.5	3.881	6	13
Degree of Consensus	6	43	17.181	27	71

Here, the dependent variable is the *Overall Success,* which ranges between 3 and 5. The first independent variable is a *Coalition Size*. The smallest coalition is composed of six policy actors, while the largest one includes 17 actors. The second independent variable is the *Degree of Consensus*. It measures the proportion of the coalition members sharing the same policy preferences. The minimal degree equals 0,27, while the maximal one is equal to 0,71. However, they were multiplied by 100 in order to be included in a regression analysis. Additionally, we created the interaction term between the coalition size and the degree of consensus. Consequently, we expect that the coalition size, when interacted with the degree of consensus, is associated with a higher lobbying success. This is explained by the fact that the decision-makers are more likely to respond to the demands of the coalition which sends a consistent message (Nelson and Yackee, 2012).

Figure 63:

Regression table: Determinants of the overall lobbying success in the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Coalition size	0.090	0.205	0.624
	(0.114)	(0.178)	(0.599)
Degree of consensus		0.023	0.113
		(0.027)	(0.124)
Interact = Coalition size*Degree of consensus			-0.011
			(0.014)
Constant	3.149**	1.049	-2.709
	(1.113)	(2.678)	(5.858)
R2	0.13	0.31	0.46
Adj. R2	-0.08	-0.15	-0.36
N	6	6	6

Standard errors in parentheses.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The results found in the regression analysis were not statistically significant. In all three Models, the coefficients of the first independent variable are positive. In fact, this indicates a positive relationship between a coalition size increases and the overall lobbying success. However, given that the p-value of three coefficients is higher than 0,1, we accept that there is no correlation between the coalition size and the overall lobbying success. At the same time, the coefficients of the second independent variable are positive as well. Consequently, it means that an increase in a degree of consensus leads to an increase in the overall success. However, both coefficients are not statistically significant. In fact, we accept that there is no correlation between the degree of consensus and the overall success of the interest groups. Moreover, the coefficient of the interaction term is not statistically significant either. To conclude, statistical results don't confirm that large coalitions are more successful when they are united, and vice versa. It is worth mentioning that a very small number of actors included in the statistical analysis might have an impact on the final results. In some situations, the number of independent variables may approach, or even exceed the sample size, leading to a high dimensional data. In fact, when a regression analysis uses this data, it produces unstable coefficient estimates with inflated standard errors, leading to reduced statistical power and erroneous conclusions regarding relationships between independent and dependent variables (Bühlmann & van de Geer, 2011). For this reason, we found it more interesting to verify the third hypothesis separately for each interest group.

Figure 64: Interest groups' coalition size and the degree of consensus in the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park



The figure 64 provides two types of information. It shows the number of actors with whom each interest group formed a coalition. Moreover, it indicates the number of actors with whom each interest group shared the same policy preferences. Firstly, we observe that Suisse Eole cooperated actively with six actors and shared the same preferences with the majority of them. Consequently, we consider that this coalition was relatively large and unanimous. At the same time, the interest group had a high level of the overall success. As a result, Suisse Eole agreed upon the policy direction with the majority of coalition members, which subsequently led to its higher lobbying success. Secondly, Stiftung Landschaftsschutz was a member of a large coalition, composed of ten policy actors. However, the interest group shared the same policy preferences only with two of them. Consequently, its coalition had a low degree of consensus. The figure 26 shows that Stiftung Landschaftsschutz had an intermediate overall success. Consequently, we observe that being a member of a large coalition is insufficient, if an interest group wants to fully achieve its preferences. In fact, in order to have a high overall success, the degree of consensus between Stiftung Landschaftsschutz and coalition participants should have been high as well. Meanwhile, Pro Natura cooperated with more than a half of all the policy actors. However, it shared the same preferences only with three of them. As a result, we deduce that Pro Natura managed to be successful only due to the expanded size of a coalition. In contrast, the degree of consensus had no impact on it. Next, the figure 64 shows that Birdlife was a member of a large coalition, but shared the same policy preferences only with two out of ten coalition members. At the same time, this interest group had a high overall success (figure 26). Consequently, we conclude that despite a low degree of consensus, a large size of a coalition helped Birdlife to be more successful in a present decision-making process. Meanwhile, WWF cooperated with nine policy actors and shared policy preferences with the half of them. The figure 26 shows that this organisation had a high level of success. As a result, we conclude that despite an intermediate degree of consensus, being part of a large coalition leads to a higher level of overall success.

Finally, Nos oiseaux cooperated with a small number of actors. Moreover, its coalition had an intermediate degree of consensus. Nevertheless, the interest group had a high overall success in a present decision-making process. As a result, we notice that Nos oiseaux was successful without being a member of a large and unanimous coalition. This result contradicts the previous findings in the scientific literature.

To conclude, in the majority of cases, we found that interest groups from larger coalitions have a higher overall success. However, the degree of consensus among the coalition members had an impact only on the overall success of Suisse Eole and Stiftung Landschaftsschutz. Simultaneously, other interest groups didn't confirm this correlation. As a result, we can't affirm that the interest groups belonging to larger and unanimous coalitions have a higher overall success. Nevertheless, the results confirm that a collaboration between an interest group and a large number of actors is associated with a higher overall success in the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park.

- **Acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park**

Next, the figure 65 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables included in a multivariate regression analysis related to the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park.

Figure 65:

Variables	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Overall Success	8	2.5	1.414	0	4
Coalition Size	8	6.125	1.642	5	9
Degree of Consensus	8	63.375	23.194	20	100

The present statistical analysis includes data on eight interest groups. Here, the overall success ranges between 0 and 4. Meanwhile, the smallest coalition is composed of five policy actors, while the largest one includes nine actors. At the same time, the minimal degree of consensus equals 0,2 (x100), while the maximum is equal to 1 (x100). Finally, the interaction term between *Coalition Size* and *Degree of Consensus* was created as well.

Figure 65:

Regression table: Determinants of the overall lobbying success in the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Coalition size	0.079	0.056	-1.899
	(0.350)	(0.331)	(2.185)
Degree of consensus		-0.031	-0.194
		(0.023)	(0.182)
Interact = Coalition size*Degree of consensus			0.032
			(0.035)
Constant	2.013	4.104	14.231
	(2.211)	(2.630)	(11.499)
R2	0.01	0.26	0.39
Adj. R2	-0.16	-0.03	-0.07
N	8	8	8

Standard errors in parentheses.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The figure 65 provides information about the impact of the coalition size, degree of consensus and the interaction term on the overall lobbying success. The regression analysis showed no statistically significant results for the above mentioned reasons. Nevertheless, in the first two models, the coefficients of *Coalition Size* are positive. This means that an increase in a coalition size leads to an increase of the overall lobbying success. However, in a third Model, we included the degree of consensus and the interaction term. Consequently, a sign of the coefficient became negative. Consequently, here an increase in a coalition size was associated with a decrease in the overall success. The coefficients are not statistically significant though. As a result, we conclude that there is no correlation between a coalition size and the overall lobbying success. At the same time, in both Models, we observe that an increase of a degree of consensus was associated with a decrease of the overall success. However, both coefficients of *Degree of Consensus* are not statistically significant. As a consequence, there is no correlation between the degree of consensus and the overall lobbying success. Moreover, the coefficient of the interaction term is not statistically significant either. Consequently, we conclude that being a member of large and united coalitions is not associated with a higher overall success, and vice versa. In the next section, the third hypothesis was tested separately for each interest group.

Figure 66: Interest groups' coalition size and the degree of consensus in the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park



The figure 66 shows the number of actors in each interest group's coalition and the degree of consensus between their members. We observe that Suisse Eole cooperated actively with five policy actors and shared the same preferences with three of them. In fact, it was a relatively large coalition with a high degree of consensus. At the same time, the figure 45 shows that Suisse Eole had a high overall success in a present decision-making process. Consequently, Suisse Eole confirms the third hypothesis. Meanwhile, both Stiftung Landschaftsschutz and

Patrimoine suisse were members of larger coalitions compared to Neuchâtel Ski de Fond and Tourisme neuchâtelois, which had a low level of success. At the same time, despite a high degree of consensus, Stiftung Landschaftsschutz and Patrimoine suisse could only partially achieve their preferences. In fact, these interest groups confirmed the relationship between the coalition size and the overall success. At the same time, a degree of consensus had no impact. Simultaneously, Pro Natura cooperated with seven policy actors and shared the policy preferences with a half of them. Consequently, a large size of coalition helped Pro Natura to move the final policy outcome slightly closer to its preferences. However, even if the degree of consensus was relatively high, the interest group couldn't achieve a higher overall success. Next, Birdlife cooperated with a small number of actors, but its coalition had a relatively high degree of consensus. In fact, the interest group had a high level of overall success because it shared the same policy preferences with a large number of coalition participants. In contrast, as in the case of Suisse Eole, the coalition size didn't influence Birdlife's overall success. At the same time, WWF also cooperated with a small number of actors. Moreover, its coalition had a very low degree of consensus. Nevertheless, WWF had an intermediate overall success in a present decision-making process. As a result, the third hypothesis is not confirmed in this case. Finally, both Neuchâtel Ski de Fond and Tourisme neuchâtelois were members of small coalitions. However, both of them had a very high degree of consensus. As a consequence, both Neuchâtel Ski de Fond and Tourisme neuchâtelois confirm the correlation between a small size of coalition and a low overall success. In contrast, the degree of consensus has no impact on the success of these interest groups.

To sum up, the results confirm that interest groups from larger coalitions have a higher overall success. Furthermore, two interest groups showed that a cooperation with a small number of actors was associated with a lower overall success. However, the degree of consensus among the coalition members had an impact only on the overall success of Suisse Eole and Birdlife. Simultaneously, other interest groups didn't confirm this correlation.

Generally, in both cases, the regression analysis didn't provide statistically significant results. In contrast, in the hypothesis testing for each interest group, a correlation between the coalition size and the overall lobbying success was confirmed. At the same time, in both acceptance processes, only Suisse Eole confirmed that being a member of a large and unanimous coalition is associated with a higher preference attainment. Consequently, our findings only partially confirmed the results of Nelson and Yackee (2012).

4.2. Empirical evidence in the documentary analysis

It is common that the researchers draw upon multiple methods and data sources to verify findings or corroborate evidence. Bowen (2009) found that if the documentary evidence is contradictory rather than corroboratory, the researcher is expected to investigate further. However, when there is convergence of information from different sources, readers of the research report usually have greater confidence in the trustworthiness or credibility of the findings. In this Master thesis, we do Social Network Analysis and documentary analysis to verify our findings.

4.2.1. Advocacy coalitions and the degree of conflict

- **Acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park**

The table below provides information about the actors' policy beliefs in the decision-making process related to the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park. They were identified through the analysis of the official documents, press releases and publications on the actors' websites. This analysis included the data about the organisations, which were missing in the Social Network Analysis. Consequently, this allowed us to compare the findings and to test the first hypothesis in the case of other interest groups.

Figure 67: Policy beliefs of the actors in the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes"wind park

Arguments about the wind parks	Negative impact on the environment and birds	Contribution to the Energy Strategy 2050	Negative impact on landscape and heritage	Negative impact on property value	Efficiency in terms of electricity production	Negative impact on health	Negative impact on the region's economic attractiveness
OFEN	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
OFEV	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
ARE	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Conseil d'Etat	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	5	n.n	0
Commune de la Côte aux Fées	n.n	5	3	5	n.n	n.n	0
Commune des Verrières	n.n	5	3	n.n	n.n	n.n	0
Commune de Val de Travers	3	5	3	5	n.n	n.n	0
Groupe E	0	5	n.n	n.n	5	n.n	0
SIG	0	5	n.n	n.n	5	n.n	0
Verrivent SA	0	5	n.n	n.n	5	n.n	n.n
Suisse Eole	0	5	n.n	n.n	5	0	n.n
Stiftung Landschaftsschutz	5	5	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Pro Natura	3	5	n.n	n.n	3	n.n	n.n
Helvetia Nostra	5	5	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Paysage Libre Suisse	5	0	5	5	0	5	5
Birdlife	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
WWF	3	5	3	n.n	3	n.n	n.n
Vol au Vent	n.n	n.n	5	5	0	n.n	5
Travers du Vent	5	0	5	5	0	5	5
Nos oiseaux	5	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n

Based on the above data, we could split the actors into two coalitions and one group of intermediary actors. On the one side, the coalition "Pro-wind parks" was composed of Federal authorities, Canton of Neuchâtel, promoters and one interest group. On the other side, the coalition "Anti-wind parks" was made up only of interest groups. They all work for the purpose of preserving the environment, birds, landscape and the cultural heritage of the region. Finally, three communes and three interest groups belonged to the group of "Intermediary actors".

Figure 68: Deep core beliefs of the actors in the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park

Pro-wind parks	Deep core beliefs	Intermediary actors	Deep core beliefs	Anti-wind parks	Deep core beliefs
OFEN	Contribution to sufficient, stable, diversified, economical and **sustainable energy supply**; promoting **efficient use of energy**, increasing the share of **renewable energy** and **reducing CO2 emissions**.	WWF	**Preservation of biodiversity** and natural resources, **limitation of pollution and waste of natural resources**.	Stiftung Landschaftsschutz	**Protection,** maintenance and valorisation of Swiss **landscapes**
OFEV	**Climate protection**, **preserving biodiversity** and natural resource management.	Birdlife	**Preservation of biodiversity**	Helvetia Nostra	**Protection of landscapes**, historical sites, people, their homeland, **nature**.
ARE	Promotion of **sustainable development**, the development of transport and their infrastructure as desired across the country as well as the objectives of the **energy policy** of the Confederation.	Pro Natura	**Protection of nature** (animal habitats, animals and plants' diversity)	Nos oiseaux	**Protection of birds**, taking the necessary measures to **protect birds and their environments**, in favor of **nature and landscape protection**
Groupe E	Contribution to the **energy transition** by distributing the different types of energy and **energy services**	Commune de la Côte aux Fées	-	Paysage Libre Suisse	**Protection of the landscape against** its industrialization by **wind power plants**.
SIG	Contribution to the **implementation of the energy** and **environmental policies** of the canton.	Commune des Verrières	-	Vol au Vent	**Defend and preserve the regional landscape against** its occupation and destruction by **industrial wind farms.**
Verrivent SA	-	Commune de Val-de-Travers	-	Travers du Vent	**Preserve** the Val-de-Travers **against any construction** likely to jeopardise its **natural qualities,** in particular **the construction of industrial wind farms.**
Suisse Eole	**Promotion of wind energy,** its ecological, economical and social benefits				
Canton of Neuchâtel	-				

Through the analysis of the actors' websites, the deep core beliefs of each actor were detected. Consequently, we observe that the promotion of renewable energy and its contribution to the realisation of the environmental policy are the main objectives of actors of the "Pro-wind parks" coalition. In contrast, the main objective of actors from the "Anti-wind parks" coalition consists in preserving the regional landscape. At the same time, both Pro Natura and Birdlife are intermediary actors and they work for the preservation of biodiversity. On the one hand, we notice that the deep core beliefs of WWF are similar to those of Pro Natura and Birdlife in terms of biodiversity preservation. On the other hand, WWF also works towards pollution limiting just like the actors of the "Pro-wind parks" coalition. Finally, the deep core beliefs of three communes are missing because this information doesn't figure on their websites. To sum up, the data from the table above proves that the actors were correctly assigned to the advocacy coalitions.

Next, we proceed to the hypothesis testing.

Figure 69: Degree of conflict over a first binding decision: Confederation's approval of the cantonal master plan in 2013

Pro-wind parks	Intermediary actors	Anti-wind parks
OFEN	Commune de la Côte aux Fées	Travers du Vent
OFEV	Commune des Verrières	
ARE	Commune de Val-de-Travers	
Groupe E		
SIG		
Verrivent SA		
Canton de Neuchâtel		
Degree of conflict: 1/7 = **0,14**		

Figure 70:



In the documentary analysis, we could only find evidence of the mobilisation of Travers du Vent on the first binding decision. This is explained by the fact that a small amount of the official documents related to the present issue was detected. Moreover, the issue didn't gain a significant level of attention neither in the media articles, nor among the policy actors'. Nevertheless, a lot of organisations mobilised to influence the present decision. Nevertheless, a degree of conflict over a first binding decision was low. From the figure 70, we deduce that Travers du Vent mobilised as a member of the "Anti-wind parks" coalition. However, given that an important number of the "Pro-wind parks" coalition members mobilised on the issue, Travers du Vent was unable to achieve any of its preferences. As a result, the final decision was made in their favour of a large coalition. Consequently, the first hypothesis is validated.

Figure 71: Degree of conflict over a second binding decision: Vote on the initiative "Avenir des Crêtes" in 2014

Pro-wind parks	Intermediary actors	Anti-wind parks
Suisse Eole	Commune de la Côte aux Fées	Stiftung Landschaftsschutz
Canton de Neuchâtel	Commune des Verrières	Helvetia Nostra
	Commune de Val-de-Travers	Travers du Vent
	Pro Natura	
	WWF	
	Birdlife	
Degree of conflict: 2/3 = **0,67**		

Figure 72:



The figure 71 shows that the second binding decision was both conflictual and highly salient (figures 4 and 5). Nevertheless, the figure 72 shows that all members of a larger coalition were unsuccessful, while the interest group from a smaller coalition fully achieved its preferences. Moreover, we notice that Birdlife and Pro Natura were members of the "Intermediary actors" group. However, their level of success was similar to the groups from a larger coalition. This could be explained by the active cooperation between these groups on this particular binding decision. In the documentary analysis, it was found that Birdlife, Pro Natura, Helvetia Nostra and Stiftung Landschaftsschutz released a common statement addressed to the public. They motivated the population of the canton of Neuchâtel to vote in favour of the initiative "Avenir des Crêtes". At the same time, Travers du Vent released its own statement and also called to vote for the initiative. However, the majority of the population of the canton of Neuchâtel rejected the initiative. This shows that the activities of these interest groups were not able to increase the public interest in the issue (Mahoney, 2007). In contrast, Suisse Eole and WWF managed to successfully influence the public opinion in their favour. Probably, this could be explained by a match between their policy preferences and the preferences of the public. To conclude, on this binding decision, the advocacy coalition membership had no impact on the interest groups' success.

Figure 73: Degree of conflict over a third binding decision: the Federal Court's decision to refuse the opponents' appeal in 2015

Pro-wind parks	Anti-wind parks
ARE	Stiftung Landschaftsschutz
	Helvetia Nostra
Degree of conflict: 1/2 = **0,5**	

Figure 74:



The figures 4 and 5 indicate that the present decision was characterized by a low level of salience. Consequently, we observe that a smaller number of policy actors mobilised to influence it. Meanwhile, the figure 73 shows that a degree of conflict was intermediate. At the same time, despite being members of a bigger advocacy coalition, both Helvetia Nostra and Stiftung Landschaftsschutz had no success at all. However, even if the "Anti-wind parks" coalition was larger than the "Pro-wind parks" one, it was composed only of two members. Consequently, it should be very difficult for such a small number of actors to push the policy outcome in their favour.

Figure 75: Degree of conflict over a fourth binding decision: the decision of Canton to lift oppositions in 2019

Pro-wind parks	Anti-wind parks
ARE	Stiftung Landschaftsschutz
Canton de Neuchâtel	Helvetia Nostra
	Nos oiseaux
	Travers du Vent
Degree of conflict: 2/4 = **0,5**	

Figure 76:



The figure 75 shows that the present binding decision was characterized by an intermediate degree of conflict. At the same time, on the figure 76, we observe that members of a larger advocacy coalition had different levels of success. Precisely, Nos oiseaux achieved fully its preferences, while Travers du Vent was unsuccessful. Meanwhile, Helvetia Nostra and Stiftung Landschaftsschutz partially achieved their preferences. In the documentary analysis, it was found that the interest groups from the same advocacy coalition collaborated with different policy actors. For instance, Nos oiseaux was actively engaged in the working group related to the construction of the wind park "Montagne de Buttes". In fact, it had a possibility to influence the final decision by discussing with the promoters and the communal authorities. As a result, this led to a successful achievement of Nos oiseaux preferences. In contrast, it was determined that Travers du Vent was completely opposed to the wind park construction. Moreover, it didn't collaborate with promoters, nor with the authorities. Consequently, it had a low influence on the decision-making process. At the same time, it was found that in 2019, the communes took measures to satisfy the demands of Helvetia Nostra and Stiftung Landschaftsschutz in terms of landscape protection. However, according to the associations, those measures were insufficient. Consequently, we conclude that several negative impacts of the wind park were mitigated, but its construction still be harmful for the landscape and cultural heritage. As a result, the preferences of Helvetia Nostra and Stiftung Landschaftsschutz were only partially achieved. To conclude, the first hypothesis is confirmed only in case of Nos oiseaux.

Figure 77: Degree of conflict over a fifth binding decision: the decision of Canton to attribute the building permit in 2019

Pro-wind parks	Anti-wind parks
Groupe E	Stiftung Landschaftsschutz
SIG	Helvetia Nostra
Verrivent SA	
Canton de Neuchâtel	
Degree of conflict: 2/4 = **0,5**	

Figure 78:



The results show that both Helvetia Nostra and Stiftung Landschaftsschutz were members of a smaller coalition. Moreover, the present decision was characterized by an intermediate degree of conflict. Given that Helvetia Nostra and Stiftung Landschaftsschutz were not completely opposed to the wind park construction, the attribution of the building permit satisfied partially their preferences. At the same time, we observe that the final decision was in favour of the members from a larger coalition. As a result, the first hypothesis is confirmed.

Figure 79: Degree of conflict over a sixth binding decision: the decision of the communes to lift oppositions in 2019

Intermediary actors	Anti-wind parks
Commune de la Côte aux Fées	Stiftung Landschaftsschutz
Commune des Verrières	Helvetia Nostra
Commune de Val-de-Travers	
Degree of conflict: 0/2 = 0	

Figure 80:



We found no evidence of the mobilisation of the members of the "Pro-wind parks" coalition. However, we determined that Helvetia Nostra and Stiftung Landschaftsschutz sent a common opposition to the communes, which was lifted by the communal authorities. Unfortunately, due to the lack of data, we were not able to test the correlation between the advocacy coalition membership and the lobbying success in this case.

Figure 81: Advocacy coalitions in the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park and the overall degree of conflict

Pro-wind parks	Intermediary actors	Anti-wind parks
OFEN	Commune de la Côte aux Fées	Stiftung Landschaftsschutz
OFEV	Commune des Verrières	Helvetia Nostra
ARE	Commune de Val-de-Travers	Nos oiseaux
Groupe E	Pro Natura	Paysage Libre Suisse
SIG	WWF	Vol au Vent
Verrivent SA	Birdlife	Travers du Vent
Suisse Eole		
Canton de Neuchâtel		
Overall degree of conflict: (0,14 + 0,67 + 0,5 + 0,5 + 0,5 + 0) / 6 = **0,39**		

Figure 82:



The figure 81 shows that the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" was only slightly conflictual. Moreover, the "Pro-wind parks" coalition was larger compared to the "Anti-wind parks" one. We observe that as a member of a larger coalition, Suisse Eole achieved fully its preferences. At the same time, the interest groups, which belonged to the "Intermediary actors" group also managed to have a high overall success. As mentioned previously, this is explained by the fact that Birdlife, WWF, Pro Natura and Suisse Eole were parts of the same working group related to the construction of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park. In contrast, other members of a smaller coalition had a lower overall success. Meanwhile, Vol au Vent was completely unsuccessful in this decision-making process. Finally, based on the final results, being a member of a large advocacy coalition is correlated with a higher overall success. Nevertheless, we found that the active cooperation between the policy actors should be taken into account in order to explain the differences in the lobbying success of the actors.

- **Acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park**

The table below provides information about policy beliefs of the actors involved in the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park. The present analysis included all relevant policy, except SAT, SENE and Société de production d'énergie "Crêt-Meuron". The policy beliefs of the last three organisations were not found.

Figure 83: Policy beliefs of the actors in the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park

Arguments about the wind parks	Negative impact on the environment and birds	Contribution to the Energy Strategy 2050	Negative impact on landscape and heritage	Negative impact on property value	Efficiency in terms of electricity production	Negative impact on health	Negative impact on the region's economic attractiveness
OFEN	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
OFEV	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
ARE	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Conseil d'Etat	0	5	0	n.n	5	0	0
Commune Val-de-Ruz	n.n	5	0	n.n	n.n	n.n	0
Commune Chaux-de-Fonds	n.n	n.n	5	n.n	0	n.n	5
Eole RES	0	5	3	n.n	5	0	0
Société production d'énergie Crêt-Meuron	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Bureau Planair	0	5	3	n.n	5	0	0
Suisse Eole	0	5	0	n.n	5	0	0
Stiftung Landschaftsschutz	5	5	5	n.n	0	5	n.n
Pro Natura	3	5	3	n.n	3	n.n	n.n
Birdlife	5	5	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
WWF	3	5	3	n.n	3	n.n	n.n
Amis du Mont-Racine	5	5	5	n.n	0	5	n.n
Amis de Tête-de-Ran	5	3	5	n.n	0	5	5
Patrimoine suisse	5	5	5	n.n	0	5	5
Travers du Vent	5	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Paysage Libre Bejune	5	n.n	5	n.n	0	5	5
Neuchâtel Ski de Fond	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	5
Tourisme neuchâtelois	5	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	5

We observe that the "Pro-wind parks" coalition was composed of the Federal authorities, Canton of Neuchâtel, commune of Val de Ruz, promoters and one interest group. This coalition had a similar composition as the one in

the previous decision-making process. At the same time, the "Anti-wind parks" coalition was composed of nine interest groups and the commune of La Chaux-de-Fonds. This coalition was larger compared to the one in the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park. Finally, both WWF and Pro Natura formed a group of the intermediary actors.

Next, the figure 84 provides information about the deep core beliefs of each actor.

Figure 84: Deep core beliefs of the policy actors in the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park

Pro-wind parks	Deep core beliefs	Intermediary actors	Deep core beliefs	Anti-wind parks	Deep core beliefs
Suisse Eole	**Promotion of wind energy,** its ecological, economical and social benefits	Pro Natura	**Protection of nature** (animal habitats, animals and plants' diversity)	Stiftung Landschaftsschutz	**Protection,** maintenance and valorisation of Swiss **landscapes**
OFEN	Contribution to sufficient, stable, diversified, economical and **sustainable energy supply**; promoting **efficient use of energy**, increasing the share of **renewable energy** and **reducing CO2 emissions**.	WWF	**Preservation of biodiversity** and natural resources, **limitation of pollution and waste of natural resources**.	Birdlife	**Preservation of biodiversity**
Canton of Neuchâtel	-			Patrimoine suisse	**Protection**, **conservation** and safeguarding of built and **landscape heritage**
ARE	Promotion of **sustainable development**, the development of transport and their infrastructure as desired across the country as well as the objectives of the **energy policy** of the Confederation.			Neuchâtel Ski de Fond	Revitalizes the practice of cross-country skiing in Neuchatel, makes an important **contribution to the winter tourist offer** and actively helps the Nordic Centers to ensure the remuneration of their work
OFEV	**Climate protection**, **preserving biodiversity** and natural resource management.			Tourisme neuchâtelois	**Develops tourism** in the canton of Neuchâtel, defends the tourist interests of its members.
Commune de Val-de-Ruz	-			Commune de la Chaux-de-Fonds	-
Eole RES	**Develop**, finance, construct and operate utility-scale **renewable energy projects** across the country			Amis du Mont Racine	**Preserve the nature and landscape of the Neuchâtel crests.**
Bureau Planair	**Develop** and implement innovative solutions in the fields of **energy efficiency, renewable energies and environmental protection**			Amis de Tête de Ran	-
				Travers du Vent	**Preserve** the Val-de-Travers **against any construction** likely to jeopardise its **natural qualities,** in particular **the construction of industrial wind farms.**
				Paysage Libre Bejune	**Protection of the landscape against** its industrialization by **wind power plants**.

We observe that the main goals of the "Pro-wind park" coalition members is the promotion of renewable energy and its contribution to the realisation of environmental policy. In contrast, the deep core beliefs of the actors forming the "Anti-wind park" coalition are more diverse. Overall, multiple groups of actors having exactly the same deep core beliefs were identified. Among the actors, who work for landscape preservation, there are Stiftung Landschaftsschutz, Patrimoine suisse, Les Amis du Mont Racine and Paysage Libre Bejune. At the same time, Neuchâtel Ski de Fond and Tourisme neuchâtelois share the same goal which is to preserve and develop regional tourism. Finally, Birdlife aims to preserve the biodiversity, and Travers du Vent aims to preserve the nature of the region. To sum up, despite the diversity of the deep core beliefs between members of the "Anti-wind park" coalition, they share similar policy beliefs.

In the following section, the first hypothesis is tested per each binding decision, except the sixth one. On the cantonal decision to adopt a law on a decree in 2013, no mobilisation of the policy actors was detected in the documentary analysis.

Figure 85: Degree of conflict over a first binding decision: the approval of the master plan sheet by Canton in 2001

Pro-wind parks	Intermediary actors	Anti-wind parks
Suisse Eole	WWF	Amis de Tête de Ran
OFEN		
Canton of Neuchâtel		
ARE		
OFEV		
Eole RES		
Degree of conflict: 1/6 = **0,17**		

Figure 86:



The results show that the "Pro-wind parks" coalition was larger on the first binding decision, characterized by a low degree of conflict. Moreover, Suisse Eole was part of it and had a high level of success. In contrast, Les Amis de Tête de Ran belonged to a smaller coalition and was completely unsuccessful. As a result, the first hypothesis is confirmed.

Figure 87: Degree of conflict over a second binding decision: the cancellation of the Cantonal Court's decision by the Federal Court in 2006

Pro-wind parks	Anti-wind parks
OFEN	Stiftung Landschaftsschutz
	Patrimoine suisse
	Amis de Tête de Ran
Degree of conflict: 1/3 = **0,33**	

Figure 88:



The figures above show that three interest groups mobilised to influence the present decision. They were all part of a larger coalition. However, despite a low degree of conflict over a second decision, they had no success at all. As a result, the hypothesis is not confirmed in this case. At the same time, even if the "Anti-wind parks" coalition was larger compared to the "Pro-wind parks" one, it was formed only by three interest groups. Consequently, it is very difficult for such a small number of actors to push a decision-maker to rule in their favour.

Figure 89: Degree of conflict over a third binding decision: the sanctioning of the cantonal allocation plan by Canton in 2007

Pro-wind parks	Anti-wind parks
Suisse Eole	Commune de la Chaux-de-Fonds
Canton of Neuchâtel	
Eole RES	
Degree of conflict: 1/3 = **0,33**	

Figure 90:



In the documentary analysis, it was determined that among all of the interest groups, only Suisse Eole mobilised on this decision. It was found that in 2007, the model of wind turbines mentioned in the cantonal allocation plan were not available anymore. In fact, the State Council considered that the promoter of the wind park needed to find a new model of turbines and conduct a joint study of their impact on the environment and landscape. Consequently, the decision to sanction the plan moves slightly away from Suisse Eole preferences and satisfies them only partially. Finally, both Suisse Eole and the Canton of Neuchâtel were part of the same advocacy coalition, nevertheless the final decision was not in favour of the interest group. As a result, the first hypothesis is not confirmed.

Figure 91: Degree of conflict over a fourth binding decision: the acceptance of the opponents' appeal by Canton in 2012

Pro-wind parks	Anti-wind parks
Canton of Neuchâtel	Stiftung Landschaftsschutz
	Amis du Mont Racine
	Amis de Tête de Ran
Degree of conflict: 1/3 = **0,33**	

Figure 92:



In 2012, the Cantonal Court refused the appeal launched by Les Amis du Mont Racine and Les Amis de Tête de Ran, considering that they were not directly affected by the modification of the cantonal allocation plan. At the same time, the Court accepted the appeal of Stiftung Landschaftsschutz and sent the plan back to Canton for the revision. Nevertheless, due to the collective appeal and the cooperation with Stiftung Landschaftsschutz, two local associations could have an intermediate success on the decision. Moreover, the fact that three interest groups shared the same policy preferences could explain the active collaboration between them. The results show that the members of a larger coalition could partially achieve their preferences on a low-conflict decision. We confirm the first hypothesis in this case. Additionally, we find that the active collaboration between the interest groups provides explanation of their intermediate lobbying success.

Figure 93: Degree of conflict over a fifth binding decision: Confederation's approval of the cantonal master plan in 2013

Pro-wind parks	Anti-wind parks
OFEN	Travers du Vent
Canton of Neuchâtel	
ARE	
OFEV	
Commune de Val-de-Ruz	
Degree of conflict: 1/5 = **0,2**	

Figure 94:



As it was previously found, a large number of the members of the "Pro-wind parks" coalition mobilised to influence the present decision. Consequently, it explains why the final policy decision was in their favour and against the demands of Travers du Vent. As a result, the first hypothesis is confirmed.

Figure 95: Degree of conflict over a seventh binding decision: Vote on the initiative "Avenir des Crêtes" in 2014

Pro-wind parks	Intermediary actors	Anti-wind parks
Canton of Neuchâtel	Pro Natura	Stiftung Landschaftsschutz
Commune de Val-de-Ruz	WWF	Birdlife
Suisse Eole		Neuchâtel Ski de Fond
		Commune de la Chaux-de-Fonds
		Amis du Mont Racine
		Travers du Vent
Degree of conflict: 3/6 = **0,50**		

Figure 96:



The analysis of the media articles and the actors' statements showed that the vote on the initiative "Avenir des Crêtes" attracted the attention of many policy actors. Consequently, they mobilised to influence the final decision. At the same time, the figure 70 shows that the issue was characterized by an intermediate degree of conflict, and the "Anti-wind parks" coalition was larger. Nevertheless, all its members were not successful at all. In contrast, Suisse Eole had a high level of success even if it was part of a smaller coalition. Finally, the hypothesis is not confirmed in this case.

Figure 97: Degree of conflict over an eighth binding decision: the Federal Court's decision to refuse the opponents' appeal in 2015

Pro-wind parks	Intermediary actors	Anti-wind parks
ARE	Pro Natura	Stiftung Landschaftsschutz
	WWF	Amis du Mont Racine
		Travers du Vent
Degree of conflict: 1/3 = **0,33**		

Figure 98:



In 2015, the Federal Court rejected the appeal of Stiftung Landschaftsschutz, Les Amis du Mont Racine and Travers du Vent, and ruled in favour of the wind park promoters. However, the results show that three interest groups were members of a larger coalition. Moreover, the degree of conflict over the present issue was low. Consequently, we invalidate the first hypothesis in this case.

Figure 99: Advocacy coalitions in the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park and the overall degree of conflict

Pro-wind parks	Intermediary actors	Anti-wind parks
Suisse Eole	Pro Natura	Stiftung Landschaftsschutz
OFEN	WWF	Birdlife
Canton of Neuchâtel		Patrimoine suisse
ARE		Neuchâtel Ski de Fond
OFEV		Tourisme neuchâtelois
Commune de Val-de-Ruz		Commune de la Chaux-de-Fonds
Eole RES		Amis du Mont Racine
Bureau Planair		Amis de Tête de Ran
		Travers du Vent
		Paysage Libre Bejune
Overall degree of conflict: (0,17 + 0,33 + 0,33 + 0,33 + 0,2 + 0,33 + 0,33) / 7 = **0,29**		

Figure 100:



We found that the overall degree of conflict in the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park was low. Furthermore, the "Anti-wind parks" coalition was larger compared to the "Pro-wind parks" coalition. However, the interest groups from a larger coalition had a low overall success, while Suisse Eole managed to be successful. Meanwhile, Pro Natura and WWF were intermediary actors and had intermediate success, as expected. To sum up, we don't confirm the first hypothesis and consider that the active cooperation between the policy actors might explain the lobbying success in the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park.

To conclude, in the documentary analysis of the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park, the first hypothesis was confirmed. However, we found that it was necessary to examine the cooperation ties between policy actors in order to understand the differences in lobbying success. In contrast, in the documentary analysis of the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park, the first hypothesis was not confirmed. Finally, further analysis should be done in order to explain the success of the interest groups in this policy process.

4.2.2. Cooperation with central actors

- **Acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park**

The analysis included data on all interest groups, except Paysage Libre Suisse and Vol au Vent. Unfortunately, it was not possible to identify the cooperation ties between these two groups and other organisations. Consequently, the hypothesis was tested for eight out of ten interest groups.

The data on cooperation "in" and "out" were gathered through the analysis of the official documents. Figure 120 provides information on the policy actors' degree of centrality in the network. In fact, we considered that the cooperation occured between two actors when they sent a common letter to the rulemaking agency or made comments on a proposed rule, they supported or opposed a bill together, they filed a common appeal, they supported or opposed voting campaigns together.

Figure 101: Policy actors' degree of centrality in the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park



Generally, among the actors with a high degree of centrality, we find six interest groups. At the same time, WWF and Suisse Eole have an intermediate degree of centrality. However, other interest groups are less central. It is worth mentioning that it was easier to identify the cooperation between the interest groups than the cooperation between the authorities in the documents. Consequently, this may explain why the majority of interest groups have a higher degree of centrality than all other actors of the network.

Next, the following graphs show the cooperation ties between each interest group and policy actors involved in the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park.

Figure 102: Cooperation between Suisse Eole and policy actors



In a present network, Suisse Eole was a group with an intermediate degree of centrality, which cooperated with one very central actor and one actor with an intermediate degree of centrality. Moreover, both organisations had a higher degree of centrality compared to Suisse Eole. As a result, the findings confirmed that the cooperation between a less central interest group and more central actors led to a higher overall success.

Figure 103: Cooperation between Stiftung Landschaftsschutz and policy actors



Stiftung Landschaftsschutz had the highest degree of centrality in the network. In fact, we expected the interest group to have a high level of success due to its important position. Furthermore, the group cooperated with a large number of central actors. However, all of them had a lower degree of centrality compared to Stiftung Landschaftsschutz. In spite of it all, Stiftung Landschaftsschutz had only an intermediate overall success. As a result, the second hypothesis was not confirmed.

Figure 104: Cooperation between Pro Natura and policy actors



At the same time, Pro Natura occupied a very central position in this network. Moreover, it was engaged in cooperation with the two most central interest groups. We also notice that Pro Natura had the highest degree of overall success in the "Montagne de Buttes" policy process. As a result, the second hypothesis was confirmed.

Figure 105: Cooperation between Birdlife and policy actors



The graph shows that Birdlife had a relatively high degree of centrality. Moreover, it cooperated with the four most central actors. Consequently, Birdlife had a high overall success in this decision-making process. As a result, the hypothesis was validated.

Figure 106: Cooperation between WWF and policy actors



The figure 106 shows that WWF had an intermediate degree of centrality. However, the interest group cooperated with the three most central actors. Furthermore, it had the highest overall success in the "Montagne de Buttes" policy process. As a result, WWF confirmed that the cooperation with more central actors led to its higher overall success.

Figure 107: Cooperation between Nos oiseaux and policy actors



Nos oiseaux had the highest degree of centrality among all of the actors of the network. At the same time, it cooperated with other central actors but which had a lower degree of centrality. Given that Nos oiseaux had an important position in the network, it should have had a high overall success. However, we observe that the interest group had only an intermediate overall success. As a result, the second hypothesis was invalidated in this case.

Figure 108: Cooperation between Helvetia Nostra and policy actors



Meanwhile, Helvetia Nostra had a high degree of centrality, and it cooperated with the two most central interest groups and other organisations, which had a similar degree of centrality. However, it had only intermediate success in this process. As a result, Helvetia Nostra didn't confirm the second hypothesis.

Figure 109: Cooperation between Travers du Vent and policy actors



Finally, Travers du Vent occupied a central position in the present network. Moreover, it cooperated with two other central interest groups and three non-central actors. However, despite a high degree of centrality and the cooperation with more central actors, Travers du Vent had only a low overall success. Consequently, the second hypothesis was not confirmed.

To sum up, the hypothesis was validated by Suisse Eole, Pro Natura, Birdlife and WWF. In contrast, for the rest of the interest groups, a correlation between the cooperation with central actors and a higher overall success was not confirmed. As a result, we noticed that the cooperation with central actors led to a higher success only of those interest groups, which were not opposed to the construction of the wind park "Montagne de Buttes".

- **Acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park**

Here, the figure 110 shows the degree of centrality of all policy actors involved in the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park. The analysis included data on cooperation and overall success of all interest groups, except Paysage Libre Bejune. Unfortunately, no cooperation ties were identified between this organisation and other policy actors.

Figure 110: Actors' centrality in the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park



The graph shows that Eole Res is the most central actor in the network. Meanwhile, Les Amis du Mont Racine, Stiftung Landschaftsschutz, Pro Natura and Les Amis de Tête de Ran occupy central positions as well. However, their degrees of centrality are slightly lower. Suisse Eole and Patrimoine suisse have intermediate degrees of centrality, while other interest groups are less central.

The following graphs represent the cooperation ties between each of the eleven interest groups and policy actors.

Figure 111: Cooperation of Suisse Eole and policy actors



We observe that Suisse Eole had a relatively low degree of centrality. However, the graph shows that Suisse Eole cooperated with three actors, which had a higher degree of centrality. Moreover, the group had a high level of overall success, according to the documentary analysis. As a result, Suisse Eole confirmed that the cooperation with more central actors was correlated with its higher overall success.

Figure 112: Cooperation between Stiftung Landschaftsschutz and policy actors



At the same time, Stiftung Landschaftsschutz occupied a central position in the network of actors. However, it cooperated with less central actors and with one interest group, which had a similar degree of centrality. Despite the important position of Stiftung Landschaftsschutz, it had a low overall success. Consequently, the second hypothesis was not confirmed in this case.

Figure 113: Cooperation between Pro Natura and policy actors



The graph shows that Pro Natura had an intermediate degree of centrality. It cooperated with two more central interest groups and two actors with a lower degree of centrality. At the same time, Pro Natura had an intermediate overall success in a present decision-making process. Consequently, we conclude that due to the cooperation with more central actors, Pro Natura could partially achieve its preferences. However, it didn't lead to a higher success.

Figures 114: Cooperation between Birdlife and policy actors



At the same time, Birdlife was a non-central interest group, which cooperated only with actors having a higher degree of centrality. However, the group had a low overall success. As a result, the second hypothesis was invalidated in this case.

Figure 115: Cooperation between WWF and policy actors



Meanwhile, WWF was a non-central actor too. Moreover, it also cooperated with the actors having a higher degree of centrality. In fact, this cooperation increased WWF's power of influence on the policy process. Finally, even if the overall success of WWF was only intermediate, the findings show that a non-central actor is more successful when it cooperates with more central actors.

Figure 116: Cooperation between Patrimoine suisse and policy actors



Patrimoine suisse had a relatively low degree of centrality. However, despite the cooperation with three more central actors, the interest group had a very low overall success. As a result, the second hypothesis was not confirmed in this case.

Figure 117: Cooperation between Neuchâtel Ski de Fond and policy actors



Neuchâtel Ski de Fond had a low degree of centrality as well. The graph shows that this group cooperated only with Tourisme neuchâtelois, which had a similar degree of centrality, and the commune of La Chaux de Fonds, which had an intermediate degree of centrality. We observe that Neuchâtel Ski de Fond was a non-central actor, which didn't cooperate with the actors having a high degree of centrality. Consequently, it had a low overall success. As a result, the second hypothesis was confirmed.

Figure 118: Cooperation between Tourisme neuchâtelois and policy actors



The same goes for Tourisme neuchâtelois, which occupied a non-central position in the network and didn't cooperate with the actors having a high degree of centrality. As a consequence, the interest group had a low overall success. This leads to the confirmation of the second hypothesis.

Figure 119: Cooperation between Les Amis du Mont Racine and policy actors



Les Amis du Mont Racine had a high degree of centrality. Moreover, the group cooperated with another central interest group and other less central actors. In spite of it all, Les Amis du Mont Racine, had a low success in the "Crêt-Meuron" policy process. Consequently, the second hypothesis was not confirmed.

Figure 120: Cooperation between Les Amis de Tête de Ran and policy actors



Les Amis de Tête de Ran had an intermediate degree of centrality. Furthermore, the graph shows that the group cooperated with two actors having a high degree of centrality. Nevertheless, it had no positive impact on the level of success of Les Amis de Tête de Ran. As a result, the hypothesis was not confirmed.

Figure 121: Cooperation between Travers du Vent and policy actors



Finally, Travers du Vent had the lowest degree of centrality in the network. Nevertheless, the group cooperated only with one interest group having a high degree of centrality. However, Travers du Vent had a low overall success. As a result, the hypothesis was invalidated.

To sum up, in both acceptance processes, the hypothesis was validated for the interest groups, which were not opposed to the wind park projects. Precisely, Suisse Eole, Pro Natura and WWF had a higher overall success due to cooperation with central actors. Moreover, in the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind it was found that if an interest group doesn't cooperate with the actors having a high degree of centrality, it has a low overall success.

4.2.3. Coalition size and the degree of consensus

- **Acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park**

The figure 122 provides information about the variables included in the multivariate regression analysis.

Figure 122:

Variables	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Overall Success	8	3.75	1.488	1	5
Coalition Size	8	5.5	1.414	3	7
Degree of Consensus	8	49.375	12.716	29	67

This included data about both the active and the passive cooperation of eight interest groups. The dependent variable *Overall Success* ranges between 1 and 5. At the same time, the minimal value of the first independent variable *Coalition Size* is equal to 3, while the maximal is equal to 7. The second independent variable *Degree of Consensus* has the minimal value of 0.29 (x100) and the maximal one is equal to 0.67 (x100).

Figure 123:

Regression table: Determinants of the overall lobbying success in the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Coalition size	-0.643	-0.831	-1.285
	(0.340)	(0.428)	(1.810)
Degree of consensus		-0.037	-0.085
		(0.048)	(0.193)
Interact = Coalition size*Degree of consensus			0.008
			(0.032)
Constant	7.286***	10.136*	12.856
	(1.924)	(4.189)	(11.435)
R2	0.37	0.44	0.45
Adj. R2	0.27	0.22	0.04
N	8	8	8

Standard errors in parentheses.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Interestingly, the results of the regression analysis showed that there is a negative relationship between the coalition size and the overall success. In three Models, we observe that the increase in a coalition size is associated with a decrease in the overall lobbying success. Moreover, the relationship between the degree of consensus and the overall lobbying success was also negative. However, all the coefficients are not statistically significant. As a result, we determine that there is no correlation between these independent variables and the overall lobbying success. Furthermore, the analysis doesn't confirm that large and united coalitions are more successful in a decision-making process, and vice versa. As this was previously mentioned in the SNA, the regression analysis, which uses a high dimensional data, may lead to erroneous conclusions. For this reason, we verify the third hypothesis separately for each interest group.

Figure 124: Interest groups' coalition size and their degree of consensus in the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park



Firstly, the figure 124 shows that Suisse Eole was a member of a very small coalition, which had a high degree of consensus. At the same time, if that the building permit was attributed to the wind park "Montagne de Buttes", then Suisse Eole achieved fully its preferences. Consequently, in this case, being a member of a unanimous coalition is correlated to a high overall lobbying success. In contrast, the size of a coalition had no impact. Interestingly, we obtained a completely different result compared to the one in the SNA. This might be explained by the fact that the cooperation ties between policy actors are hard to identify in the documents. As a result, the coalition size of Suisse Eole is much smaller than the one in the SNA. Secondly, Stiftung Landschaftsschutz cooperated with a significant number of policy actors. However, it shared the same policy preferences only with two coalition participants. The figure 124 shows that the final outcome of the present decision-making process satisfied a small amount of Stiftung Landschaftsschutz policy preferences. In fact, we determined that being a member of a large coalition contributes to a higher success. Nevertheless, the interest group didn't have a higher overall success because of a low degree of consensus. Thirdly, it was found that Pro Natura cooperated with an important number of actors, but it shared the same preferences only with two of them. At the same time, the group had a very high level of the overall success. As a consequence, we observe that a large size of a coalition contributed to Pro Natura's high level of success. In contrast the degree of consensus had no impact. Generally, both Stiftung Landschaftsschutz and Pro Natura showed the same results in the SNA and the documentary analysis. Fourthly, both Birdlife and WWF were members of small coalitions with an intermediate degree of consensus. Nevertheless, both groups had a very high overall success. Consequently, in these cases, the third hypothesis is invalidated. Next, Nos oiseaux and Helvetia Nostra had an intermediate level of overall success. Moreover, both groups were members of large coalitions. At the same time, the coalition of Nos oiseaux had a low degree of consensus, while the one of Helvetia Nostra was more unanimous. As a result, in the case of Nos oiseaux, a large size of a coalition contributed to its higher success. However, a low degree of consensus impeded the group from being more successful. Meanwhile, we observe that a large coalition size was positively correlated with a high overall success of Helvetia Nostra. In contrast, a degree of consensus had no impact. Finally, Travers du Vent was a member of a large coalition with an intermediate degree of consensus. Nevertheless, the interest group only partially achieved its preferences in a present decision-making process. In fact, in this case, the hypothesis was invalidated.

To conclude, only Nos oiseaux confirmed the impact of both the coalition size and the degree of consensus on the overall level of success. However, for the majority of interest groups, it was found that a large size of a coalition led to a higher success in a present decision-making process. At the same time, a degree of consensus had a little or no impact at all on their overall lobbying success.

- **Acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park**

Figure 125:

Variables	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Overall Success	11	2	1.265	1	5
Coalition Size	11	4.181	1.471	2	7
Degree of Consensus	11	84.091	19.253	40	100

In the present statistical analysis, the data about eleven interest groups were included. Here, the *Overall Success* ranges between 1 and 5. At the same time, the *Coalition Size* varies between 2 and 7, while the *Degree of Consensus* ranges between 0.29 (x100) and 0.67 (x100).

Figure 126:

Regression table: Determinants of the overall lobbying success in the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Coalition size	0.139	-0.010	-1.839
	(0.283)	(0.226)	(1.628)
Degree of consensus		-0.046**	-0.135
		(0.017)	(0.080)
Interact = Coalition size*Degree of consensus			0.021
			(0.018)
Constant	1.420	5.891**	13.911*
	(1.248)	(1.943)	(7.327)
R2	0.03	0.48	0.56
Adj. R2	-0.08	0.35	0.37
N	11	11	11

Standard errors in parentheses.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Given that more observations were included in the present analysis, we obtained more correct results. Precisely, the coefficient of the *Degree of Consensus* was statistically significant in the Model 2. It was also negative, which means that an increase in one unit in the degree of consensus was associated with a decrease in the overall success by 0.046. However, we didn't expect to observe this relationship between the variables. At the same time, in the Model 3, when we added an interaction term, the coefficient of *Degree of Consensus* lost its statistical significance. As a result, we concluded that a degree of consensus is not correlated with the overall lobbying success. Furthermore, the p-value of the interaction term coefficient was higher than 0.1. Consequently, we concluded that being a member of large and united coalitions is not associated with a higher overall success. Meanwhile, the results from Model 1 showed a positive relationship between the coalition size and the overall lobbying success. However, in the second and third models, the sign of the regression coefficient turned to a negative one. In fact, it means that when we take into account the degree of consensus and the interaction term between two independent variables, the relationship between the coalition size and the overall success is negative. However, the statically insignificant coefficients mean that there is no correlation between the size of a coalition and the overall success of the interest groups.

To conclude, when the interaction between two variables is not taken into account, coalitions with a higher degree of consensus have a lower overall success. In contrast, we didn't confirm that being a member of a large and unanimous coalition is associated with a higher lobbying success. For this reason, we test the hypothesis separately for each group.

Figure 127: Interest groups' coalition size and their degree of consensus in the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park



Firstly, the figure 127 shows that Suisse Eole cooperated with a small number of actors, but it shared the same policy preferences with the majority of them. As a consequence, given that the interest group achieved fully its preferences, we confirmed that a relationship exists between a high degree of consensus and a high overall lobbying success. In contrast, the size of a coalition has no impact on it. Again, the difficulty of the identification of the cooperation ties between policy actors in the documents might explain the difference between the results in the SNA and the documentary analysis. Secondly, Stiftung Landschaftsschutz and Les Amis du Mont Racine were members of larger coalitions compared to the groups which had a lower success. Moreover, both of them belonged to coalitions with a high degree of consensus. Consequently, Stiftung Landschaftsschutz and Les Amis du Mont Racine confirm that being a member of a larger coalition contributes to a higher success. However, a degree of consensus has no impact on it. Thirdly, both Pro Natura and WWF had an intermediate level of overall success. However, despite a large size of coalition, a relatively low degree of consensus impeded Pro Natura from having a high level of overall success. At the same time, WWF proved that even if a coalition is unanimous, a high overall success can't be reached when the coalition is small. Finally, Birdlife, Patrimoine suisse, Neuchâtel Ski de Fond, Tourisme neuchâtelois, Les Amis de Tête de Ran and Travers du Vent confirmed that a small coalition size is correlated with a low level of overall success. In contrast, the degree of consensus has no impact on it. Additionally, in the cases of Neuchâtel Ski de Fond and Tourisme neuchâtelois, the results from the SNA were confirmed by the documentary analysis. However, in two analyses, the final results were completely opposite in the case of Patrimoine suisse.

To conclude, the third hypothesis was validated in the cases of Pro Natura and WWF. At the same time, six out of eleven interest groups confirmed a correlation between a small size of a coalition and a low overall success. Simultaneously, Stiftung Landschaftsschutz and Les Amis du Mont Racine confirmed that a larger size of a coalition contributes to a higher overall success. In contrast, only the degree of consensus had an impact on the overall success of Suisse Eole.

Generally, in both acceptance processes, the majority of interest groups confirmed that the coalition size had an impact on their preference attainment. At the same time, in both cases, Suisse Eole only confirmed the impact of the degree of consensus on its level of overall success. Finally, the third hypothesis was totally confirmed only by Pro Natura and WWF, which were intermediary actors, and by Nos oiseaux.

5. Comparison between the results in the SNA and the documentary analysis

In the present section, we compared the results of the hypotheses testing for each group involved in the acceptance processes of the "Montagne de Buttes" and the "Crêt-Meuron" wind parks. We analysed whether the results in the SNA match with those obtained in the documentary analysis. Finally, we drew a conclusion about the impact of each type of cooperation on the success of the interest groups.

- **Acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park**

Figure 128:

Interest groups	Social Network Analysis			Documentary analysis		
	Hypothesis 1	Hypothesis 2	Hypothesis 3	Hypothesis 1	Hypothesis 2	Hypothesis 3
Suisse Eole	+	+	Coalition size + Consensus +	+	+	Coalition size -- Consensus +
Stiftung Landschaftsschutz	+	--	Coalition size + Consensus --	+	--	Coalition size + Consensus --
Pro Natura	--	+	Coalition size + Consensus --	+	+	Coalition size + Consensus --
Birdlife	--	+	Coalition size + Consensus --	+	+	Coalition size -- Consensus --
WWF	--	+	Coalition size + Consensus --	+	+	Coalition size -- Consensus --
Nos oiseaux	--	+	Coalition size -- Consensus --	+	--	Coalition size + Consensus +
Helvetia Nostra				+	--	Coalition size + Consensus --
Travers du Vent				+	--	Coalition size -- Consensus --

Firstly, we verified whether an interest group from a larger advocacy coalition had a higher success on highly conflictual issues. Moreover, we were able to analyse whether it was correlated with both a higher success on a key decision and a higher overall success. Secondly, we analysed the impact of the cooperation with the policy actors having a higher degree of centrality on the interest groups' overall lobbying success. Thirdly, we examined the impact of both the coalition size and the degree of consensus on the interest groups' lobbying success.

In the case of Suisse Eole, very similar results were found in both the SNA and the documentary analysis. Furthermore, among all of the interest groups, Suisse Eole was the only one which validated three hypotheses. Precisely, it was determined that being a member of a larger advocacy coalition contributed to the interest group's high overall success, as well as to its high success on key binding decisions. Moreover, Suisse Eole confirmed that the cooperation with more central actors was correlated with its high overall success. Additionally, in the SNA, this interest group had a high preference attainment because it was a member of a large and unanimous coalition.

Meanwhile, in the case of Stiftung Landschaftsschutz, we found exactly the same results in the SNA and in the documentary analysis. Firstly, it was determined that this interest group had a lower overall success because it was a member of a smaller advocacy coalition in a high-conflict decision-making process. However, the first hypothesis could be validated only on several binding decisions. Secondly, in both analyses, Stiftung Landschaftsschutz was a member of a large but non-unanimous coalition, which led to its intermediate overall success. In contrast, the active cooperation with the actors, who had a high degree of centrality, was not correlated with the interest group's success.

At the same time, in both the SNA and the documentary analysis, Pro Natura confirmed that the cooperation with central actors was correlated with its high overall success. Moreover, its high preference attainment in the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" was also explained by its cooperation with a large number of actors. Consequently, based on the results, it was found that the active involvement of Pro Natura in the working group, composed by the promoters, the communal authorities and the interest groups, fostered the active cooperation between them. As a result, this led to a final policy decision, which fully satisfied the preferences of this interest group.

Next, in the SNA and the documentary analysis, both Birdlife and WWF showed that a high overall success was due to their cooperation with more central actors. Based on the data gathered from the survey, a size of a large coalition also had a positive impact on the interest groups' high overall success. This is interesting to notice that on binding decisions, Pro Natura and Birdlife' levels of success were similar to the success of other actors of their advocacy coalition. Consequently, the first hypothesis was validated. However, the advocacy coalition membership wasn't correlated with their overall success. This is explained by the fact that in the Social Network Analysis, these interest groups were sceptical about the wind parks' construction. In fact, they were assigned to the "Anti-wind parks" coalition. In contrast, based on the policy preferences' analysis in the documents, Pro Natura and Birdlife had a more positive attitude towards the wind parks. Consequently, we assigned them to the "Intermediary actors" group. As a result, in the documentary analysis, the final outcome of the decision-making process moved closer to their policy preferences, which explained their higher overall success.

In contrast, in the case of Nos oiseaux, we obtained completely opposite results for all three hypotheses. Firstly, in the SNA, the interest group was less critical about the wind parks' issue. However, based on the documentary analysis, Nos oiseaux was a member of the "Anti-wind parks" coalition, which subsequently affected the final results. Secondly, in the SNA, Nos oiseaux had a very low degree of centrality. However, in the documentary analysis, Nos oiseaux was one of the most central actors. Finally, the data on the interest group's cooperation with policy actors were significantly different in both analyses. As a result, it was hard to determine which type of cooperation had an impact on its level of success. Nevertheless, if we rely more on the findings in the SNA, a high success of Nos oiseaux was explained by its cooperation with more central actors.

Finally, in the documentary analysis, it was found that Helvetia Nostra and Travers du Vent had a low overall success because they were members of a smaller advocacy coalition. However, the lack of data didn't allow us to correctly test the first hypothesis for each binding decision. At the same time, it was also determined that an intermediate overall success of Helvetia Nostra was due to its membership in a large but non-unanimous coalition.

Generally, we conclude that for all the interest groups, which were not opposed to the wind park construction, the engagement in an active dialogue with the organisations, within the framework of the working group, led to a high overall success. Moreover, as affirmed by Bonacich (1972), the active cooperation between these interest groups and more central policy actors explained their higher preference attainment in the present decision-making process. In contrast, other interest groups, which were opposed to the construction of the wind park, refused to cooperate with the members of the working group. As a result, they had a lower overall success in the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park. Nevertheless, due to the cooperation with a high number of actors, Stiftung Landschaftsschutz and Helvetia Nostra could partially achieve their preferences. Consequently, they partially confirmed the findings of Nelson and Yackee (2012). Additionally, this is worth mentioning that in both the SNA and the documentary analysis, only Suisse Eole and Stiftung Landschaftsschutz confirmed the findings of Klüver (2011). As a result, they showed that the advocacy coalition membership influenced their preference attainment on both high-conflict and less-conflict issues.

- **Acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park**

Figure 129:

Interest groups	**Social Network Analysis**			**Documentary analysis**		
	Hypothesis 1	**Hypothesis 2**	**Hypothesis 3**	**Hypothesis 1**	**Hypothesis 2**	**Hypothesis 3**
Suisse Eole	--	+	Coalition size + Consensus +	--	+	Coalition size -- Consensus +
Stiftung Landschaftsschutz	--	--	Coalition size + Consensus --	--	--	Coalition size + Consensus --
Pro Natura	--	--	Coalition size + Consensus --	+	+	Coalition size + Consensus +
Birdlife	+	+	Coalition size -- Consensus +	--	--	Coalition size + Consensus --
WWF	+	+	Coalition size -- Consensus --	+	+	Coalition size + Consensus +
Patrimoine suisse	--	--	Coalition size + Consensus --	--	--	Coalition size + Consensus --
Neuchâtel Ski de Fond	--	--	Coalition size + Consensus --	--	+	Coalition size + Consensus --
Tourisme neuchâtelois	--	--	Coalition size + Consensus --	--	+	Coalition size + Consensus --
Amis du Mont Racine				--	--	Coalition size + Consensus --
Amis de Tête de Ran				--	--	Coalition size + Consensus --
Travers du Vent				--	--	Coalition size + Consensus --

The figure 129 shows that in the case of Suisse Eole, the results from the SNA were almost all confirmed by the documentary analysis. Precisely, it was found that the cooperation between the interest group and more central actors led to its higher overall success. Additionally, Suisse Eole had a high preference attainment because it was a

member of a large and unanimous coalition. In contrast, being a member of a small advocacy coalition didn't impede the interest group from being successful.

At the same time, we obtained very similar results for Stiftung Landschaftsschutz as well. Firstly, being a member of a large advocacy coalition didn't lead the interest group to a higher overall success. Additionally, per binding decision, the correlation was not confirmed either. Secondly, the cooperation between Stiftung Landschaftsschutz and other central policy actors didn't help the interest group to have a higher preference attainment. Nevertheless, a cooperation with a high number of policy actors helped the organisation to move the final policy outcome closer to its preferences.

Meanwhile, the results of the survey showed that the Pro Natura was very opposed to the wind parks' construction, while it had an intermediary position on the issue in the documentary analysis. During the interview with a representative of the association, we discovered that Pro Natura was in favour of the wind park's project at the beginning of the process. However, given that the process lasted a long time, and a significant number of changes have been made by the promoters of the project without a collective consultation, Pro Natura developed a more negative attitude towards this particular wind park. As a result, in the SNA, it was a member of the "Anti-wind parks" coalition, while in the documentary analysis, Pro Natura was assigned to the group of the "Intermediary actors". Consequently, the results in the SNA didn't match with those in the documentary analysis. Precisely, in the documentary analysis, it was found that only a large size of coalition contributed to a slightly higher success of the interest group. In contrast, in the documentary analysis, three hypotheses were validated.

At the same time, Birdlife also showed diametrically opposite results in two analyses. This is explained by the fact that Birdlife indicated a high level of overall success in the survey. However, based on the documentary analysis, we determined that the interest group achieved only a small part of its policy preferences. Moreover, it was difficult to find data on Birdlife's cooperation activity in the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park. As a result, those factors explained the substantial differences between the findings. Consequently, the comparison between the results would make little sense.

Meanwhile, in both analyses, WWF confirmed that it had a higher overall success due to its cooperation with more central actors. Moreover, in both the SNA and the documentary analysis, WWF was a member of an "Intermediary actors" group. In fact, given that the building permit was attributed to the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park, the interest group's level of overall success was intermediate. Additionally, in the documentary analysis, WWF had a higher preference attainment because it was a member of a large and unanimous coalition. However, this was not confirmed in the SNA.

Next, in both analyses, Patrimoine suisse, Neuchâtel Ski de Fond, Tourisme neuchâtelois, Les Amis de Tête de Ran and Travers du Vent confirmed that a small size of a coalition is correlated with a low overall success. Furthermore, in the documentary analysis, Neuchâtel Ski de Fond and Tourisme neuchâtelois had a low overall success because they didn't cooperate with more central actors. In contrast, for the rest of the interest groups, the first two hypotheses were rejected in the SNA and the documentary analysis.

Generally, a long duration of the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park made it difficult to compare the results found in the SNA with those in the documentary analysis. Precisely, a big amount of data on cooperation couldn't be identified in the documentary analysis. As a consequence, this caused a problem in the hypothesis testing. Nevertheless, all the interest groups, which were not opposed to the wind park construction, confirmed the theory of Bonacich (1972). Precisely, their engagement in cooperation with more central actors led to a higher overall success. Interestingly, we came to the same conclusion in the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park. Moreover, in both processes, the majority of the interest groups, which cooperated with a high number of actors, had a higher overall success. At the same time, in the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron"

wind park, those interest groups, which were not members of a large coalition, had a lower overall success. However, it was determined by the majority of the interest groups that the impact of the degree of consensus was insignificant, which contradicts the results found in the study of Nelson and Yackee (2012).

6. Conclusion

The aim of the present Master thesis was to investigate the relationship between the interest groups' cooperation and the attainment of their policy preferences in the acceptance process related to the wind parks in Switzerland. Therefore, using the SNA and the documentary analysis, two types of cooperation between the policy actors were investigated. Firstly, we expected the interest groups to be less successful when they face strong opposition. However, being part of a large lobbying coalition should greatly enhance their chances of achieving policy preferences (Klüver, 2011). Consequently, we postulated that on the high-conflict issue, the interest groups forming a larger advocacy coalition have a higher overall success than those from a smaller one. In addition, we expected to find the same results for each key binding decision. Secondly, it was previously found that a central position in the network gives an organisation access to other actors' resources or information, thus enhancing the chances to achieve its policy preferences (Fischer and Sciarini, 2015). Consequently, we assumed that interest groups, which cooperate with more central actors, have a higher overall success. Thirdly, Nelson and Yackee (2012) found that an expanded and unanimous coalition produces a ''louder'' signal regarding policy support or opposition, and increases its influence. For this reason we postulated that interest groups from large and unanimous coalitions have a higher overall success, and vice versa.

The final results in the two processes differed from each other. However, several similarities could have been found. Firstly, in both decision-making processes, the cooperation with more central actors was a strong predictor of a higher overall success of the interest groups, which were not opposed to the wind park projects. However, it was not correlated with a success of the opposing groups. As a result, what was previously found in the judicial venue by Christenson and Box-Steffensmeier (2013), as well as by Lynch (2004), worked only for several interest groups involved in the acceptance processes of the wind parks in the canton of Neuchâtel.

Secondly, in the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park, the findings confirmed that being a member of a larger advocacy coalition on a high-conflict issue contributes to a higher lobbying success. Consequently, the findings of Mahoney (2007) and Klüver (2011) worked in this case. At the same time, in the whole decision-making process, only Suisse Eole and Stiftung Landschaftsschutz validated this theory. Nevertheless, we confirmed Klüver's findings in the documentary analysis, when Pro Natura and Birdlife were assigned to the group of "Intermediary actors", while Nos oiseaux was assigned to the "Anti-wind parks coalition". In contrast, the same hypothesis was not confirmed by the majority of the interest groups mobilised in the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park. It was validated only by WWF. As a result, we observed that the success of the interest groups could not be explained only by their share of policy preferences with other actors. In fact, it is very important to consider the existence of the "active" cooperation ties between them.

Thirdly, in the present Master thesis, we didn't find exactly the same results as Nelson and Yackee (2012). In both acceptance processes, only Suisse Eole could achieve its preferences due to collaboration with a large number of authorities and a share of the same preferences with them. However, this was not the case for the rest of the interest groups. Nevertheless, they showed that being a member of a large coalition was associated with a higher overall success. Furthermore, for several interest groups, a cooperation with a small number of policy actors led to a lower overall success. Finally, we conclude that an interest group that belongs to a large and unanimous coalition can increase its success when it shares the same policy preferences as a policymaker.

During the analysis, it was found that interest groups might develop different strategies in short-term and long-term decision-making processes. Our study focused on the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park, which has lasted for nine years, and the one of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park, which has lasted for nineteen years. According to Moyson et al. (2017), in such long-term policy processes, policy actors tend to revise their policy preferences in favour of alternative solutions, if they believe that the actual ones are no longer appropriate. Precisely, they are more likely to engage in a policy learning. In the present study, this was the case of Pro Natura, which revised its policy preferences during the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park. As a result, this produced different results in the SNA and the documentary analysis. However, even if the theory suggests that policy actors are more likely to engage in a revision of their policy beliefs in long term processes, Pro Natura was the only one interest group, which decided to do so.

At the same time, in the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes", we observed that the openness of the administration and promoters to a strong collaboration with the interest groups contributed to a "bargaining" or "problem-solving" mode of interaction (Scharpf, 1988). As a result, this fostered a policy change and led to a higher success of the policy actors engaged in the discussion. In contrast, the collaborative policy dialogue between the administration, the promoters and the interest groups was absent in the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park. In fact, it resulted in a lower interest groups' preference attainment compared to the first decision-making process.

The present Master thesis contributed to the current understanding of Swiss interest groups' cooperative strategies and their success in the acceptance processes of the wind parks. Firstly, the combination of a survey-based and a documentary analysis confirmed the reliability of the empirical results. Secondly, the use of two definitions of the concept of cooperation (the "advocacy coalition" and the "inter-organisational network") allowed us to broaden the understanding of the relationship between the advocacy strategies and the lobbying success. Thirdly, the inclusion of the full range of policy actors in our analysis helped us to explain the interest groups' mobilisation on multiple decisions and their multi-coalition involvements.

However, the present study had several limitations, which can be avoided in further studies of lobbying success. Firstly, a significant number of the relevant policy actors refused to participate in our survey. As a result, several interest groups and promoters, involved in the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park, were not included in the Social Network Analysis. Certain policy actors, mobilised in the process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park were also missing. As a result, the analysis of the official documents, media articles and the actors' statements were used to fill the gap. However, it was complicated to find the data on interest groups' cooperation and their preference attainment due to a limited access to the documentation. Secondly, our study used preference attainment to measure lobbying success. However, we didn't provide evidence about the interest groups' successful influence on the decision-making processes. Therefore, future studies should focus more on examining the causal link between the interest groups' strategies and the policy change.

How the cooperation between the interest groups and policy actors will develop in the coming years, and thus with the progress of the Energy Strategy 2050, remains to be analysed further. A correlation between the interest group's cooperation and a lobbying success have to be tested in other acceptance processes of the wind energy projects. Moreover, considering that local interest groups are different from one region to another, it could be interesting to compare the political processes, which take place in two different cantons. For instance, a study analysing the interest groups' cooperation in the decision-making processes happening in both the French-speaking and the German-speaking parts of Switzerland could provide further revealing results.

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8. Appendix

8.1. Matrices SNA: “Montagne de Buttes”

- Matrix 1:

Arguments concernant les parcs	Impact négatif sur environnem	Contribution à la Stratégie énerg	Impact négatif sur paysage	Impact négatif sur la valeur	Efficience en termes de produc	Impact négatif sur la santé	Impact négatif sur l'attractivité économique
OFEN	0	5	1	0	5	0	0
OFEV	4	5	4	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
ARE	3	5	3	3	3	1	1
Conseil d'Etat	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
SAT	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
SENE	0	5	0	0	5	0	0
Commune Côte aux Fées	3	4	3	n.a	3	n.a	n.a
Commune Verrières	3	4	3	n.a	3	n.a	n.a
Commune Val de Travers	3	4	3	n.a	3	n.a	n.a
Groupe E	0	5	1	0	5	0	0
SIG	1	5	1	1	5	1	0
Verrivent SA	1	5	2	0	5	0	0
Suisse Eole	0	5	1	1	5	1	1
Stiftung Landschaft	3	1	4	3	2	1	3
Pro Natura	5	3	5	2	3	2	1
Helvetia Nostra	5	0	5	n.a	0	n.a	n.a
Paysage Libre Suisse	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Birdlife	4	1	4	4	3	2	2
WWF	4	5	3	n.a	4	n.a	n.a
Vol au Vent	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Travers du Vent	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Nos oiseaux	5	4	3	3	3	3	3

- Matrix 2:

Mobilisation dans une décision clé	26.06.2013: Con	18.05.2014: Vota	1.07.2015: TF re	05.05.2019: Can	05.2019: Canton	06.2019: Commu
OFEN	4	0	0	0	0	0
OFEV	5	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
ARE	5	0	1	0	0	0
Conseil d'Etat	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
SAT	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
SENE	5	5	1	1	1	0
Commune Côte aux Fées	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	5
Commune Verrières	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	5
Commune Val de Travers	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	5
Groupe E	5	5	0	5	5	5
SIG	5	4	5	5	5	5
Verrivent SA	3	5	0	2	3	4
Suisse Eole	2	5	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Stiftung Landschaft	3	3	2	2	2	2
Pro Natura	4	5	1	1	1	1
Helvetia Nostra	3	5	n.a	5	5	5
Paysage Libre Suisse	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Birdlife	1	4	n.a	0	0	0
WWF	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vol au Vent	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Travers du Vent	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Nos oiseaux	0	1	0	0	0	0

- Matrix 3:

Succès dans une décision clé	**26.06.2013**: Con	**18.05.2014**: Vota	**1.07.2015**: TF re	**05.05.2019**: Can	**05.2019**: Canton	**06.2019**: Commu
OFEN	5	5	5	5	5	5
OFEV	5	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
ARE	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Conseil d'Etat	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
SAT	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
SENE	5	5	5	4	4	3
Commune Côte aux Fées	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Commune Verrières	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Commune Val de Travers	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Groupe E	5	5	5	5	5	5
SIG	3	5	5	5	5	5
Verrivent SA	5	5	5	5	5	5
Suisse Eole	2	5	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Stiftung Landschaft	0	0	2	2	2	2
Pro Natura	1	1	1	1	1	1
Helvetia Nostra	0	0	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Paysage Libre Suisse	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Birdlife	0	2	n.a	0	0	0
WWF	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Vol au Vent	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Travers du Vent	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Nos oiseaux	0	1	0	0	0	0

- Matrix 4:

Collaboration technique	OFEN	OFEV	ARE	Conseil d'Eta	SAT	SENE	Commune Cô	Commune Verriè	Commune Val-de	Groupe E	SIG	Verrivent S	Suisse Eole	Stiftung Lai	Pro Natura	Helvetia N	Paysage Li	Birdlife	WWF	Vol au Ve	Travers du	Nos oiseau
OFEN			1							1			1									
OFEV	1		1																			
ARE	1	1		1	1																	
Conseil d'Etat																						
SAT																						
SENE	1	1	1		1	1				1	1	1	1	1							1	
Commune de la Côte aux Fées					1			1	1	1	1			1	1	1		1	1			
Commune Verrières					1		1		1	1	1			1	1	1		1	1			
Commune Val de Travers					1		1	1		1	1			1	1	1		1	1			
Groupe E	1	1	1	1	1		1	1	1					1	1	1		1	1		1	
SIG	1	1		1	1	1	1	1	1						1	1		1	1			
Verrivent SA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1			1	1			1	1		1	
Suisse Eole	1								1	1	1											
Stiftung Landschaft																1					1	
Pro Natura				1	1				1	1	1	1		1		1	1	1	1		1	
Helvetia Nostra				1						1				1			1	1			1	
Paysage Libre Suisse																						
Birdlife										1	1				1				1			
WWF									1	1		1			1			1				
Vol au Vent																						
Travers du Vent																						
Nos oiseaux		1								1					1				1			

- Matrix 5:

Collaboration politique	OFEN	OFEV	ARE	Conseil d'Etat	SAT	SENE	Commune Cô	Commune Ve	Commune Val	Groupe E	SIG	Verrivent S	Suisse Eol	Stiftung Land	Pro Natura	Helvetia N	Paysag	Birdlife	WWF	Vol au Vi	Travers d	Nos oisea
OFEN																						
OFEV			1																			
ARE																						
Conseil d'Etat																						
SAT																						
SENE				1	1		1	1	1													
Commune Côte aux Fées								1	1					1	1	1		1	1			
Commune Verrières							1		1					1	1	1		1	1			
Commune Val de Travers							1	1						1	1	1		1	1			
Groupe E				1			1	1	1													
SIG		1		1	1	1	1	1	1					1			1				1	
Verrivent SA	1			1			1	1	1						1			1	1			
Suisse Eole																						
Stiftung Landschaft																1					1	
Pro Natura		1		1	1				1			1	1	1		1	1				1	
Helvetia Nostra		1		1					1	1		1		1			1	1			1	
Paysage Libre Suisse																						
Birdlife															1				1			
WWF									1	1		1			1			1				
Vol au Vent																						
Travers du Vent																						
Nos oiseaux															1			1	1			

- Matrix 6:

Acteurs	Succès dans le processus
OFEN	4
OFEV	5
ARE	5
Conseil d'Etat	n.a
SAT	n.a
SENE	2
Commune Côte aux Fées	4
Commune Verrières	4
Commune Val de Travers	4
Groupe E	4
SIG	4
Verrivent SA	5
Suisse Eole	4
Stiftung Landschaft	3
Pro Natura	5
Helvetia Nostra	n.a
Paysage Libre Suisse	n.a
Birdlife	4
WWF	4
Vol au Vent	n.a
Travers du Vent	n.a
Nos oiseaux	4

8.2. Matrices SNA: “Crêt-Meuron”

- Matrix 1:

Arguments concernant les parcs éoliens	Impact négatif sur environnement et oiseaux	Contribution à la Stratégie énergétique 2050	Impact négatif sur paysage et patrimoine	Impact négatif sur la valeur de la propriété foncière	Efficience en termes de production d'électricité	Impact négatif sur la santé	Impact négatif sur l'attractivité économique du territoire
OFEN	0	5	1	0	5	0	0
OFEV	3	5	3	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
ARE	3	5	3	3	3	1	1
Conseil d'Etat	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
SAT	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
SENE	0	5	0	0	5	0	0
Commune Val-de-Ruz	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Commune Chaux-de-Fonds	n.a	4	5	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Eole RES	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Société production d'énergie Crêt-Meuron	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Bureau Planair	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Suisse Eole	0	5	1	1	5	1	0
Stiftung Landschaft	3	1	4	3	2	1	3
Pro Natura	5	1	5	2	0	2	1
Birdlife	4	1	4	4	3	2	2
WWF	4	5	3	n.a	4	n.a	n.a
Amis du Mont-Racine	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Amis de Tête-de-Ran	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Patrimoine suisse	5	1	5	5	2	4	4
Travers du Vent	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Paysage Libre Bejune	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Neuchatel ski de fond	4	3	5	4	1	3	4
Tourisme neuchatelois	5	1	5	4	1	3	3

- Matrix 2:

Mobilisation dans une décision clé	**4.12.2001**: Cant	**31.08.2006**: TF a	**15.08.2007**: Ca	**19.09.2012**: TC	**26.06.2013**: Confé	**3.09.2013**: le canto	**18.05.2014**: V	**1.07.2015**: T
OFEN	4	0	0	0	4	0	0	0
OFEV	5	n.a	n.a	n.a	5	n.a	n.a	n.a
ARE	5	0	0	0	5	0	0	1
Conseil d'Etat	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
SAT	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
SENE	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Commune Val-de-Ruz	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Commune Chaux-de-Fonds	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Eole RES	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Société production d'énergie Crêt-Meuron	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Bureau Planair	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Suisse Eole	1	2	1	n.a	2	1	5	n.a
Stiftung Landschaft	3	0	n.a	4	3	3	3	n.a
Pro Natura	3	2	1	1	4	1	5	1
Birdlife	3	1	n.a	n.a	1	n.a	4	n.a
WWF	4	0	n.a	0	0	n.a	n.a	0
Amis du Mont-Racine	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Amis de Tête-de-Ran	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Patrimoine suisse	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Travers du Vent	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Paysage Libre Bejune	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Neuchatel ski de fond	3	3	3	3	3	3	5	2
Tourisme neuchatelois	0	0	0	4	4	4	5	5

- Matrix 3:

Succès dans une décision clé	**4.12.2001**: Canton appr	**31.08.2006**: TF ann	**15.08.2007**: Canton sa	**19.09.2012**: TC accep	**26.06.2013**: Confédéra	**3.09.2013**: le cant	**18.05.2014**: Votatic	**1.07.2015**: TF rejette
OFEN	5	5	0	0	5	5	5	5
OFEV	5	n.a	n.a	n.a	5	n.a	n.a	n.a
ARE	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Conseil d'Etat	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
SAT	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
SENE	5	5	5	0	5	5	5	5
Commune Val-de-Ruz	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Commune Chaux-de-Fonds	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Eole RES	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Société production d'énergie Crêt-Meuron	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Bureau Planair	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Suisse Eole	n.a	4	1	n.a	2	3	5	n.a
Stiftung Landschaft	0	0	n.a	4	0	0	0	n.a
Pro Natura	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	n.a
Birdlife	1	4	n.a	n.a	0	n.a	2	n.a
WWF	4	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Amis du Mont-Racine	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Amis de Tête-de-Ran	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Patrimoine suisse	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Travers du Vent	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Paysage Libre Bejune	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a	n.a
Neuchatel ski de fond	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2
Tourisme neuchatelois	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

- Matrix 4:

Collaboration technique	OFEN	OFEV	ARE	Conseil d'Etat	SAT	SENE	Commune Va	Commune Cha	Eole RES	Société proc	Bureau Planair	Suisse Eole	Stiftung Lanc	Pro Natura	Birdlife	WWF	Amis du Mont	Amis de Tête-d	Patrimoine sui	Travers du Ver	Paysage Libre	NE Ski	Tourisme neu
OFEN			1						1		1	1											
OFEV			1										1								1		
ARE	1	1		1	1																		
Conseil d'Etat																							
SAT																							
SENE	1	1	1		1	1			1		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1				1
Commune Val-de-Ruz																							
Commune Chaux-de-Fonds																							
Eole RES																							
Société production d'énergie Crêt-Meuron																							
Bureau Planair																							
Suisse Eole	1						1		1														
Stiftung Landschaft																					1		
Pro Natura					1				1		1		1		1	1	1	1					
Birdlife						1							1	1		1	1						
WWF														1	1								
Amis du Mont-Racine																							
Amis de Tête-de-Ran																							
Patrimoine suisse												1		1		1	1	1					1
Travers du Vent																							
Paysage Libre Bejune																							
Neuchatel ski de fond					1			1	1		1		1										
Tourisme neuchatelois				1	1		1	1									1	1	1			1	

- Matrix 5:

Collaboration politique	OFEN	OFEV	ARE	Conseil d'Etat	SAT	SENE	Val-de-F	Chaux-de	Eole RES	Société pro	Planair	Suisse Eole	Stiftung Landsch	Pro Natura	Birdlife	WWF	Amis du Mon	Amis de Tête-de	Patrimoine suiss	Travers du Vent	Paysage Libre B	NE Ski	Tourisme
OFEN																							
OFEV			1																				
ARE																							
Conseil d'Etat																							
SAT																							
SENE					1		1	1															
Commune Val-de-Ruz																							
Commune Chaux-de-Fonds																							
Eole RES																							
Société production d'énergie Crêt-Meuron																							
Bureau Planair																							
Suisse Eole																							
Stiftung Landschaft																							
Pro Natura		1		1	1							1	1				1	1	1		1		
Birdlife							1						1	1		1							
WWF														1	1								
Amis du Mont-Racine																							
Amis de Tête-de-Ran																							
Patrimoine suisse				1				1															1
Travers du Vent																							
Paysage Libre Bejune																							
Neuchatel ski de fond				1	1			1	1		1		1				1	1	1	1	1		1
Tourisme neuchatelois				1	1		1	1									1	1	1			1	

- Matrix 6:

Acteurs	Succès dans le processus
OFEN	3
OFEV	n.a
ARE	5
Conseil d'Etat	n.a
SAT	n.a
SENE	1
Commune Val-de-Ruz	n.a
Commune Chaux-de-Fonds	n.a
Eole RES	n.a
Société production d'énergie Crêt-Meuron	n.a
Bureau Planair	n.a
Suisse Eole	4
Stiftung Landschaft	3
Pro Natura	2
Birdlife	4
WWF	3
Amis du Mont-Racine	n.a
Amis de Tête-de-Ran	n.a
Patrimoine suisse	3
Travers du Vent	n.a
Paysage Libre Bejune	n.a
Neuchatel ski de fond	1
Tourisme neuchatelois	0

8.3. Matrices of the documentary analysis: "Montagne de Buttes"

- Matrix 1:

Position sur le sujet des parcs éoliens	Impact négatif sur environne	Contribution à la Stra	Impact négatif sur paysa	Impact négatif sur la va	Eoliennes sont efficientes	Impact négatif sur la santé	Impact négatif sur l'attra
OFEN	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
OFEV	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
ARE	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Conseil d'Etat	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	5	n.n	0
SAT	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
SENE	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Commune de la Côte aux Fées	n.n	5	3	5	n.n	n.n	0
Commune Verrières	n.n	5	3	n.n	n.n	n.n	0
Commune Val de Travers	3	5	3	5	n.n	n.n	0
Groupe E	0	5	n.n	n.n	5	n.n	0
SIG	0	5	n.n	n.n	5	n.n	0
Verrivent SA	0	5	n.n	n.n	5	n.n	n.n
Suisse Eole	0	5	n.n	n.n	5	0	n.n
Stiftung Landschaft	5	5	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Pro Natura	3	5	n.n	n.n	3	n.n	n.n
Helvetia Nostra	5	5	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Paysage Libre Suisse	5	0	5	5	0	5	5
Birdlife	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
WWF	3	5	3	n.n	3	n.n	n.n
Vol au Vent	n.n	n.n	5	5	0	n.n	5
Travers du Vent	5	0	5	5	0	5	5
Nos oiseaux	5	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n

- Matrix 2:

Mobilisation dans une décision clé	26.06.2013: Co	18.05.2014: Ve	1.07.2015: TF re	05.05.2019: C	08.05.2019: Ca	06.2019: Comn	22.11.2019
OFEN	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
OFEV	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
ARE	5	n.n	5	5	n.n	n.n	n.n
Conseil d'Etat	5	5	n.n	5	5	n.n	5
SAT	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	5	n.n	n.n
SENE	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	5	n.n	n.n
Commune de la Côte aux Fées	5	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	5	n.n
Commune Verrières	5	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	5	n.n
Commune Val de Travers	5	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	5	n.n
Groupe E	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	5	n.n	n.n
SIG	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	5	n.n	n.n
Verrivent SA	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	5	n.n	n.n
Suisse Eole	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Stiftung Landschaft	n.n	5	5	5	5	5	5
Pro Natura	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Helvetia Nostra	n.n	5	5	5	5	5	5
Paysage Libre Suisse	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Birdlife	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
WWF	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Vol au Vent	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Travers du Vent	5	5	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	5
Nos oiseaux	n.n	n.n	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n

- Matrix 3:

Preference attainment dans un	26.06.2013: Confédérati	18.05.2014: Votation sur l'	1.07.2015: TF rejette le rec	05.05.2019: Canton lève les o	05.2019: Canton attribue le	06.2019: Communes lèvent les oppos
OFEN	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
OFEV	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
ARE	5	n.n	5	5	n.n	n.n
Conseil d'Etat	5	n.n	n.n	5	5	n.n
SAT	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	5	n.n
SENE	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	5	n.n
Commune de la Côte aux Fées	5	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	5
Commune Verrières	5	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	5
Commune Val de Travers	5	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	5
Groupe E	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	5	n.n
SIG	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	5	n.n
Verrivent SA	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	5	n.n
Suisse Eole	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Stiftung Landschaft	n.n	0	0	3	3	3
Pro Natura	n.n	0	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Helvetia Nostra	n.n	0	0	3	3	3
Paysage Libre Suisse	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Birdlife	n.n	0	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
WWF	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Vol au Vent	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Travers du Vent	0	0	n.n	0	n.n	n.n
Nos oiseaux	n.n	0	n.n	5	n.n	n.n

- Matrix 4:

Collaboration entre acteurs	OFEN	OFEV	ARE	Conseil d'Eta	SAT	SENE	Cote aux Fées	Verrières	Val-de-Travers	Groupe E	SIG	Verrivent SA	Suisse Eole	Stiftung Landscha	Pro Natura	Helvetia Nostra	Paysage-Libre Sui	Birdlife	WWF	Vol au Vent	Travers du Vent	Nos oiseaux
OFEN				1									1									1
OFEV																						
ARE																						
Conseil d'Etat																						
SAT																						
SENE																						
Commune La Côte aux Fées																						
Commune Verrières																						
Commune Val-de-Travers																						
Groupe E																						
SIG																						
Verrivent SA																						
Suisse Eole	1																					
Stiftung Landschaftsschutz				1											1	1		1			1	
Pro Natura														1		1		1				1
Helvetia Nostra														1	1			1			1	1
Paysage-Libre Suisse																						
Birdlife														1	1	1						1
WWF														1	1							1
Vol au vent																						
Travers du Vent							1	1	1					1		1						
Nos Oiseaux	1												1		1	1		1				

- Matrix 5:

Preference attainment global	Preference attainment global
OFEN	5
OFEV	5
ARE	5
Conseil d'Etat	5
SAT	5
SENE	5
Commune de la Côte aux Fées	5
Commune Verrières	5
Commune Val de Travers	5
Groupe E	5
SIG	5
Verrivent SA	5
Suisse Eole	5
Stiftung Landschaft	3
Pro Natura	5
Helvetia Nostra	3
Paysage Libre Suisse	0
Birdlife	5
WWF	5
Vol au Vent	0
Travers du Vent	0
Nos oiseaux	3

8.4. Matrices of the documentary analysis: “Crêt-Meuron”

- Matrix 1:

Position sur le sujet des parcs éoliens	Impact négatif sur environr	Contribution à la Stratég	Impact négatif sur paysa	Impact négatif sur la vale	Eoliennes sont efficient	Impact négatif sur la san	Impact négatif sur l'attractivité écon
OFEN	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
OFEV	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
ARE	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Conseil d'Etat	0	5	0	n.n	5	0	0
SAT	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
SENE	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Commune Val-de-Ruz	n.n	5	0	n.n	n.n	n.n	0
Commune Chaux-de-Fonds	n.n	n.n	5	n.n	0	n.n	5
Eole RES	0	5	3	n.n	5	0	0
Société production d'énergie Crêt-Meuron	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Bureau Planair	0	5	3	n.n	5	0	0
Suisse Eole	0	5	0	n.n	5	0	0
Stiftung Landschaft	5	5	5	n.n	0	5	n.n
Pro Natura	3	5	3	n.n	3	n.n	n.n
Birdlife	5	5	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
WWF	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Amis du Mont-Racine	5	5	5	n.n	0	5	n.n
Amis de Tête-de-Ran	5	3	5	n.n	0	5	5
Patrimoine suisse	5	5	5	n.n	0	5	5
Travers du Vent	5	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Paysage Libre Bejune	5	n.n	5	n.n	0	5	5
Neuchatel ski de fond	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	5
Tourisme neuchatelois	5	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	5

- Matrix 2:

Mobilisation dans une décision clé	4.12.2001: Ca	31.08.2006	15.08.2	19.09.2	26.06.2013	3.09.2013:	18.05.201	1.07.2015:
OFEN	5	5	n.n	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n
OFEV	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n
ARE	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	5
Conseil d'Etat	5	n.n	5	5	5	n.n	5	n.n
SAT	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n
SENE	5	n.n	5	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n
Commune Val-de-Ruz	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	5	n.n	5	n.n
Commune Chaux-de-Fonds	n.n	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	5	n.n
Eole RES	5	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Société production d'énergie Crêt-Meuron	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Bureau Planair	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Suisse Eole	5	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	5	n.n
Stiftung Landschaft	n.n	5	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	5	5
Pro Natura	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	5	n.n
Birdlife	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	5	n.n
WWF	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	5	n.n
Amis du Mont-Racine	n.n	n.n	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	5	5
Amis de Tête-de-Ran	5	5	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Patrimoine suisse	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Travers du Vent	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	5	n.n	5	5
Paysage Libre Bejune	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Neuchatel ski de fond	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	5	n.n
Tourisme neuchatelois	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n

- Matrix 3:

Preference attainment dans une décisio	4.12.2001: Confédérati	31.08.2006: TF annu	15.08.2007: Canton s	19.09.2012: TC ac	26.06.2013: Confédér	3.09.2013: le canto	18.05.2014: Votation	1.07.2015: TF rejette l
OFEN	5	5	n.n	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n
OFEV	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n
ARE	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	5
Conseil d'Etat	5	n.n	0	0	5	n.n	5	n.n
SAT	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n
SENE	5	n.n	0	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n
Commune Val-de-Ruz	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	5	n.n	5	n.n
Commune Chaux-de-Fonds	n.n	n.n	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	0	n.n
Eole RES	5	n.n	0	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Société production d'énergie Crêt-Meuron	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Bureau Planair	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Suisse Eole	5	n.n	3	n.n	n.n	n.n	5	n.n
Stiftung Landschaft	n.n	0	n.n	3	n.n	n.n	0	0
Pro Natura	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	0	n.n
Birdlife	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	0	n.n
WWF	5	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	5	n.n
Amis du Mont-Racine	n.n	n.n	n.n	3	n.n	n.n	0	0
Amis de Tête-de-Ran	0	0	n.n	3	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Patrimoine suisse	n.n	0	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Travers du Vent	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	0	n.n	0	0
Paysage Libre Bejune	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n
Neuchatel ski de fond	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	0	n.n
Tourisme neuchatelois	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n	n.n

- Matrix 4:

Collaboration entre acteurs	OFEN	OFEV	ARE	Conseil d'Etat	SAT	SENE	Val-de-Ruz	Chaux-de-Fonds	Eole-Res	Société de prod en	Planair	Suisse Eole	Stiftung Landschaf	ProNatura	Birdlife	WWF	Amis du Mont-I	Amis de Tête-de-R	Patrimoine suisse	Travers du Vent	Fédération Paysag	NE Ski c	Tourisme r
OFEN				1		1			1														
OFEV									1														
ARE																							
Conseil d'Etat	1	1				1			1														
SAT																							
SENE	1	1		1					1			1											
Commune Val-de-Ruz																							
Commune Chaux-de-Fonds																	1	1				1	1
Eole-Res	1			1								1											
Société de prod energie Crêt-Meuron									1														
Bureau Planair									1														
Suisse Eole	1					1			1														
Stiftung Landschaft														1	1		1	1	1	1			
ProNatura													1		1	1	1						
Birdlife													1	1			1						
WWF				1										1									
Amis du Mont-Racine													1					1	1				
Amis de Tête-de-Ran													1				1		1				
Patrimoine suisse													1										
Travers du Vent													1										
Fédération Paysage Libre Bejune																							
Neuchatel du ski de fond																							1
Tourisme neuchatelois																						1	

- Matrix 5:

Preference attainment global	Preference attainment global
OFEN	5
OFEV	5
ARE	5
Conseil d'Etat	5
SAT	5
SENE	5
Commune Val-de-Ruz	5
Commune Chaux-de-Fonds	0
Eole RES	5
Société production d'énergie Crêt-Meuron	5
Bureau Planair	5
Suisse Eole	5
Stiftung Landschaft	0
Pro Natura	3
Birdlife	0
WWF	5
Amis du Mont-Racine	2
Amis de Tête-de-Ran	2
Patrimoine suisse	0
Travers du Vent	0
Paysage Libre Bejune	0
Neuchatel ski de fond	0
Tourisme neuchatelois	0

8.5. Degree of centrality calculations: SNA

- Table 1: Freeman's degree centrality measures: Symmetric technical collaboration between the policy actors in the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park

		1 Degree	2 NrmDegree	3 Share
10	Groupe E	18.000	85.714	0.091
12	Verrivent SA	16.000	76.190	0.081
15	Pro Natura	15.000	71.429	0.076
11	SIG	14.000	66.667	0.071
9	Commune Val de Travers	12.000	57.143	0.061
7	Commune de La Côte aux Fées	11.000	52.381	0.056
8	Commune Les Verrières	11.000	52.381	0.056
16	Helvetia Nostra	11.000	52.381	0.056
6	SENE	10.000	47.619	0.051
14	Stiftung Landschaft	9.000	42.857	0.045
18	Birdlife	9.000	42.857	0.045
19	WWF	9.000	42.857	0.045
5	SAT	9.000	42.857	0.045
2	OFEV	7.000	33.333	0.035
3	ARE	7.000	33.333	0.035
1	OFEN	7.000	33.333	0.035
4	Conseil d'Etat	6.000	28.571	0.030
21	Travers du Vent	6.000	28.571	0.030
13	Suisse Eole	5.000	23.810	0.025
22	Nos oiseaux	4.000	19.048	0.020
17	Paysage Libre Suisse	2.000	9.524	0.010
20	Vol au Vent	0.000	0.000	0.000

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

		1 Degree	2 NrmDegree	3 Share
1	Mean	9.000	42.857	0.045
2	Std Dev	4.338	20.657	0.022
3	Sum	198.000	942.857	1.000
4	Variance	18.818	426.716	0.000
5	SSQ	2196.000	49795.918	0.056
6	MCSSQ	414.000	9387.755	0.011
7	Euc Norm	46.861	223.150	0.237
8	Minimum	0.000	0.000	0.000
9	Maximum	18.000	85.714	0.091
10	N of Obs	22.000	22.000	22.000

Network Centralization = 47.14%
Blau Heterogeneity = 5.60%. Normalized (IQV) = 1.11%

- Table 2: Freeman's degree centrality measures: Symmetric political collaboration between the policy actors in the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park

		1 Degree	2 NrmDegree	3 Share
15	Pro Natura	15.000	71.429	0.107
16	Helvetia Nostra	12.000	57.143	0.086
8	Commune Les Verrières	11.000	52.381	0.079
7	Commune Côte aux Fées	11.000	52.381	0.079
9	Commune Val de Travers	11.000	52.381	0.079
11	SIG	10.000	47.619	0.071
12	Verrivent SA	9.000	42.857	0.064
18	Birdlife	8.000	38.095	0.057
19	WWF	8.000	38.095	0.057
14	Stiftung Landschaft	7.000	33.333	0.050
6	SENE	6.000	28.571	0.043
10	Groupe E	6.000	28.571	0.043
4	Conseil d'Etat	6.000	28.571	0.043
21	Travers du Vent	4.000	19.048	0.029
2	OFEV	4.000	19.048	0.029
17	Paysage Libre Suisse	3.000	14.286	0.021
22	Nos oiseaux	3.000	14.286	0.021
5	SAT	3.000	14.286	0.021
13	Suisse Eole	1.000	4.762	0.007
1	OFEN	1.000	4.762	0.007
3	ARE	1.000	4.762	0.007
20	Vol au Vent	0.000	0.000	0.000

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

		1 Degree	2 NrmDegree	3 Share
1	Mean	6.364	30.303	0.045
2	Std Dev	4.096	19.505	0.029
3	Sum	140.000	666.667	1.000
4	Variance	16.777	380.428	0.000
5	SSQ	1260.000	28571.428	0.064
6	MCSSQ	369.091	8369.408	0.019
7	Euc Norm	35.496	169.031	0.254
8	Minimum	0.000	0.000	0.000
9	Maximum	15.000	71.429	0.107
10	N of Obs	22.000	22.000	22.000

Network Centralization = 45.24%
Blau Heterogeneity = 6.43%. Normalized (IQV) = 1.97%

- Table 3: Freeman's degree centrality measures: Symmetric technical collaboration between the policy actors in the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park

		1 Degree	2 NrmDegree	3 Share
6	SENE	15.000	46.875	0.150
14	Pro Natura	12.000	37.500	0.120
23	Tourisme neuchatelois	10.000	31.250	0.100
19	Patrimoine suisse	8.000	25.000	0.080
22	Neuchatel ski de fond	6.000	18.750	0.060
12	Suisse Eole	5.000	15.625	0.050
17	Amis du Mont-Racine	4.000	12.500	0.040
5	SAT	4.000	12.500	0.040
16	WWF	4.000	12.500	0.040
10	Eole RES	4.000	12.500	0.040
18	Amis de Tête-de-Ran	4.000	12.500	0.040
13	Stiftung Landschaft	4.000	12.500	0.040
11	Bureau Planair	3.000	9.375	0.030
15	Birdlife	3.000	9.375	0.030
8	Commune Chaux-de-Fonds	2.000	6.250	0.020
1	OFEN	2.000	6.250	0.020
7	Commune Val-de-Ruz	2.000	6.250	0.020
3	ARE	1.000	3.125	0.010
2	OFEV	1.000	3.125	0.010
21	Paysage Libre Bejune	1.000	3.125	0.010
4	Conseil d'Etat	1.000	3.125	0.010
9	Société production d'énergie Crêt-Meuron	0.000	0.000	0.000
20	Travers du Vent	0.000	0.000	0.000

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

		1 Degree	2 NrmDegree	3 Share
1	Mean	3.030	9.470	0.030
2	Std Dev	3.597	11.241	0.036
3	Sum	100.000	312.500	1.000
4	Variance	12.938	126.352	0.001
5	SSQ	730.000	7128.906	0.073
6	MCSSQ	426.970	4169.626	0.043
7	Euc Norm	27.019	84.433	0.270
8	Minimum	0.000	0.000	0.000
9	Maximum	15.000	46.875	0.150
10	N of Obs	23.000	23.000	23.000

Network Centralization = 39.82%
Blau Heterogeneity = 7.30%. Normalized (IQV) = 4.40%

- Table 4: Freeman's degree centrality measures: Symmetric political collaboration between the policy actors in the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park

		1 Degree	2 NrmDegree	3 Share
22	Neuchatel ski de fond	14.000	43.750	0.159
15	Pro Natura	11.000	34.375	0.125
23	Tourisme neuchâtelois	10.000	31.250	0.114
5	Patrimoine suisse	6.000	18.750	0.068
7	SENE	6.000	18.750	0.068
4	Conseil d'Etat	5.000	15.625	0.057
9	Commune Chaux-de-Fonds	4.000	12.500	0.045
18	Amis du Mont-Racine	3.000	9.375	0.034
17	WWF	3.000	9.375	0.034
6	SAT	3.000	9.375	0.034
19	Amis de Tête-de-Ran	3.000	9.375	0.034
14	Stiftung Landschaft	2.000	6.250	0.023
21	Paysage Libre Bejune	2.000	6.250	0.023
16	Birdlife	2.000	6.250	0.023
8	Commune Val-de-Ruz	2.000	6.250	0.023
13	Suisse Eole	1.000	3.125	0.011
20	Travers du Vent	1.000	3.125	0.011
10	Eole RES	1.000	3.125	0.011
2	OFEV	1.000	3.125	0.011
12	Bureau Planair	1.000	3.125	0.011
11	Société production d'énergie Crêt-Meuron	0.000	0.000	0.000
3	ARE	0.000	0.000	0.000
1	OFEN	0.000	0.000	0.000

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

		1 Degree	2 NrmDegree	3 Share
1	Mean	2.667	8.333	0.030
2	Std Dev	3.318	10.369	0.038
3	Sum	88.000	275.000	1.000
4	Variance	11.010	107.521	0.001
5	SSQ	598.000	5839.844	0.077
6	MCSSQ	363.333	3548.177	0.047
7	Euc Norm	24.454	76.419	0.278
8	Minimum	0.000	0.000	0.000
9	Maximum	14.000	43.750	0.159
10	N of Obs	23.000	23.000	23.000

Network Centralization = 37.70%
Blau Heterogeneity = 7.72%. Normalized (IQV) = 4.84%

8.6. Degree of centrality calculations: documentary analysis

- Table 1: Freeman's degree centrality measures: Symmetric political collaboration between the policy actors in the acceptance process of the "Montagne de Buttes" wind park

		1 Degree	2 NrmDegree	3 Share
22	Nos Oiseaux	6.000	28.571	0.136
14	Stiftung Landschaftsschutz	6.000	28.571	0.136
15	Pro Natura	5.000	23.810	0.114
21	Travers du Vent	5.000	23.810	0.114
16	Helvetia Nostra	5.000	23.810	0.114
18	Birdlife	4.000	19.048	0.091
1	OFEN	3.000	14.286	0.068
19	WWF	3.000	14.286	0.068
13	Suisse Eole	2.000	9.524	0.045
4	Conseil d'Etat	2.000	9.524	0.045
9	Commune Val-de-Travers	1.000	4.762	0.023
8	Commune Verrières	1.000	4.762	0.023
7	Commune La Côte aux Fées	1.000	4.762	0.023
12	Verrivent SA	0.000	0.000	0.000
6	SENE	0.000	0.000	0.000
5	SAT	0.000	0.000	0.000
17	Paysage-Libre Suisse	0.000	0.000	0.000
2	OFEV	0.000	0.000	0.000
3	ARE	0.000	0.000	0.000
20	Vol au vent	0.000	0.000	0.000
10	Groupe E	0.000	0.000	0.000
11	SIG	0.000	0.000	0.000

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

		1 Degree	2 NrmDegree	3 Share
1	Mean	2.000	9.524	0.045
2	Std Dev	2.174	10.353	0.049
3	Sum	44.000	209.524	1.000
4	Variance	4.727	107.194	0.002
5	SSQ	192.000	4353.742	0.099
6	MCSSQ	104.000	2358.277	0.054
7	Euc Norm	13.856	65.983	0.315
8	Minimum	0.000	0.000	0.000
9	Maximum	6.000	28.571	0.136
10	N of Obs	22.000	22.000	22.000

Network Centralization = 20.95%
Blau Heterogeneity = 9.92%. Normalized (IQV) = 5.63%

- Table 2: Freeman's degree centrality measures: Symmetric political collaboration between the policy actors in the acceptance process of the "Crêt-Meuron" wind park

		1 Degree	2 NrmDegree	3 Share
9	Eole-Res	7.000	31.818	0.113
6	SENE	5.000	22.727	0.081
17	Amis du Mont-Racine	5.000	22.727	0.081
13	Stiftung Landschaft	5.000	22.727	0.081
4	Conseil d'Etat	5.000	22.727	0.081
1	OFEN	4.000	18.182	0.065
14	ProNatura	4.000	18.182	0.065
8	Commune Chaux-de-Fonds	4.000	18.182	0.065
18	Amis de T[illegible]te-de-Ran	4.000	18.182	0.065
2	OFEV	3.000	13.636	0.048
12	Suisse Eole	3.000	13.636	0.048
19	Patrimoine suisse	3.000	13.636	0.048
16	WWF	2.000	9.091	0.032
15	Birdlife	2.000	9.091	0.032
22	Neuchatel du ski de fond	2.000	9.091	0.032
23	Tourisme neuchatelois	2.000	9.091	0.032
10	Société de prod énergie Crêt-Meuron	1.000	4.545	0.016
11	Bureau Planair	1.000	4.545	0.016
3	ARE	0.000	0.000	0.000
5	SAT	0.000	0.000	0.000
21	Fédération Paysage Libre Bejune	0.000	0.000	0.000
20	Travers du Vent	0.000	0.000	0.000
7	Commune Val-de-Ruz	0.000	0.000	0.000

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

		1 Degree	2 NrmDegree	3 Share
1	Mean	2.696	12.253	0.043
2	Std Dev	1.988	9.035	0.032
3	Sum	62.000	281.818	1.000
4	Variance	3.951	81.629	0.001
5	SSQ	258.000	5330.579	0.067
6	MCSSQ	90.870	1877.470	0.024
7	Euc Norm	16.062	73.011	0.259
8	Minimum	0.000	0.000	0.000
9	Maximum	7.000	31.818	0.113
10	N of Obs	23.000	23.000	23.000

Network Centralization = 21.43%
Blau Heterogeneity = 6.71%. Normalized (IQV) = 2.47%

8.7. Example of a questionnaire sent to the organisations

Enquête sur le processus politique concernant le parc éolien "Crêt-Meuron".

I. Position de votre organisation sur le sujet des parcs éoliens

1. Arguments généraux concernant les parcs éoliens

Vous trouvez ci-dessous une liste des arguments concernant les parcs éoliens.

Sur une échelle de 0 à 5, veuillez s'il vous plaît indiquer à quel point votre organisation est d'accord ou non avec les arguments suivants:

Arguments	Mon organisation est					
	0 Pas du tout d'accord	1	2	3	4	5 Tout à fait d'accord
Les éoliennes ont un impact négatif sur l'environnement, les oiseaux et leurs habitats	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
La construction des éoliennes contribue à la réalisation de la Stratégie énergétique 2050	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Les éoliennes ont un impact négatif sur le paysage et le patrimoine culturel	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Les éoliennes ont un impact négatif sur la valeur de la propriété foncière	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Les éoliennes sont efficientes en termes de production d'électricité	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Les éoliennes ont un impact négatif sur la santé humaine	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Les éoliennes rendent le territoire local moins attractif économiquement	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Autre (à préciser, s'il vous plaît)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Autre (à préciser, s'il vous plaît)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Autre (à préciser, s'il vous plaît)	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

II. Processus du parc éolien "Crêt-Meuron"

1. Mobilisation de votre organisation dans les étapes importantes du processus

Vous trouvez ci-dessous la liste des décisions clés du processus du parc éolien "Crêt-Meuron".

Dans la première colonne, veuillez s'il vous plaît indiquer l'importance que votre organisation accorde aux différentes décisions prises dans ce processus.

Dans la deuxième colonne, veuillez s'il vous plaît indiquer si votre organisation s'est mobilisée pour influencer les décisions.

Dans la troisième colonne, si votre organisation s'est mobilisée pour influencer les décisions, veuillez s'il vous plaît indiquer le succès qu'a connu votre organisation.

Décisions clés	Importance de la décision pour votre organisation De 0 (pas du tout importante) à 5 (très importante)	Mobilisation de votre organisation De 0 (aucune mobilisation) à 5 (très forte mobilisation)	Succès de votre organisation De 0 (pas du tout de succès) à 5 (très grand succès)
4 décembre 2001: la Confédération approuve la fiche du plan directeur pour la planification du Crêt-Meuron.	0 1 2 3 4 5 ☐☐☐☐☐☐	0 1 2 3 4 5 ☐☐☐☐☐☐	0 1 2 3 4 5 ☐☐☐☐☐☐
31 août 2006: le Tribunal fédéral annule la décision du Tribunal cantonal, entreprise en 2005, et lui renvoie la cause pour une nouvelle décision.	0 1 2 3 4 5 ☐☐☐☐☐☐	0 1 2 3 4 5 ☐☐☐☐☐☐	0 1 2 3 4 5 ☐☐☐☐☐☐

15 août 2007: le canton de Neuchâtel sanctionne le plan d'affectation cantonal et estime qu'il faut le modifier.	0 1 2 3 4 5	0 1 2 3 4 5	0 1 2 3 4 5
19 septembre 2012: le Tribunal cantonal accepte le recours des opposants et renvoie la cause pour la nouvelle décision au canton de Neuchâtel.	0 1 2 3 4 5	0 1 2 3 4 5	0 1 2 3 4 5
26 juin 2013: la Confédération approuve le remaniement du plan directeur neuchâtelois, et notamment la fiche E_24 consacrée à la valorisation du potentiel de l'énergie éolienne.	0 1 2 3 4 5	0 1 2 3 4 5	0 1 2 3 4 5
3 septembre 2013: le canton de Neuchâtel adopte une loi qui modifie le décret de 1966 sur la protection des sites naturels et ajoute les zones spécifiques destinées à la construction d'éoliennes.	0 1 2 3 4 5	0 1 2 3 4 5	0 1 2 3 4 5
18 mai 2014: la population neuchâteloise accepte le contre-projet à l'initiative "Avenir des Crêtes".	0 1 2 3 4 5	0 1 2 3 4 5	0 1 2 3 4 5
1 juillet 2015: le Tribunal fédéral conclut que la construction d'un parc éolien cantonal n'est pas incompatible avec la protection des forêts et des crêtes.	0 1 2 3 4 5	0 1 2 3 4 5	0 1 2 3 4 5
Autre décision (à préciser, s'il vous plaît)	0 1 2 3 4 5	0 1 2 3 4 5	0 1 2 3 4 5

2. Fréquence et efficacité de la mobilisation de votre organisation dans le processus

Vous trouvez ci-dessous une liste d'actions que les acteurs peuvent mener durant le processus.

Dans la première colonne, veuillez s'il vous plaît indiquer la fréquence avec laquelle votre organisation a mené les différentes actions.

Dans la deuxième colonne, si votre organisation a eu recours à cette action, veuillez s'il vous plaît indiquer comment votre organisation évalue l'efficacité de l'action entreprise.

Action	Recours de votre organisation à ce type d'action De 0 (jamais) à 5 (toujours)	Efficacité de ce type d'action pour votre organisation De 0 (pas efficace du tout) à 5 (très efficace)
Participer à des protestations sur le terrain	0 1 2 3 4 5	0 1 2 3 4 5
Participer à des procédures de consultation	0 1 2 3 4 5	0 1 2 3 4 5
Faire du lobbying informel auprès des décideurs politiques	0 1 2 3 4 5	0 1 2 3 4 5
Activer des relais dans les partis politiques	0 1 2 3 4 5	0 1 2 3 4 5
Fournir une expertise du type juridique ou technique	0 1 2 3 4 5	0 1 2 3 4 5
Alerter les médias, y compris les réseaux sociaux	0 1 2 3 4 5	0 1 2 3 4 5
Négocier avec les promoteurs privés	0 1 2 3 4 5	0 1 2 3 4 5
Autre (à préciser, s'il vous plaît)	0 1 2 3 4 5	0 1 2 3 4 5
Autre (à préciser, s'il vous plaît)	0 1 2 3 4 5	0 1 2 3 4 5
Autre (à préciser, s'il vous plaît)	0 1 2 3 4 5	0 1 2 3 4 5

III. Collaboration de votre organisation avec d'autres acteurs

1. Importance des acteurs

De nombreux acteurs sont impliqués dans le processus du parc éolien "Crêt-Meuron". Vous trouvez une liste de ces acteurs ci-dessous.

Dans la première colonne, veuillez s'il vous plaît cocher **tous les acteurs** qui, selon votre organisation, sont **importants** dans le processus du parc éolien "Crêt-Meuron".

Parmi les acteurs que vous avez jugés importants, quels sont, selon votre organisation, **les trois acteurs les plus importants**? Dans la deuxième colonne, veuillez s'il vous plaît cocher exactement trois acteurs.

Acteurs	Rôle important	Les 3 plus importants
Autorités fédérales		
Office fédéral de l'énergie	☐	☐
Office fédéral de l'environnement	☐	☐
Office fédéral du développement territorial	☐	☐
Autorités cantonales		
Conseil d'Etat neuchâtelois	☐	☐
Grand Conseil neuchâtelois	☐	☐
Département du développement territorial et de l'énergie - Service de l'aménagement du territoire	☐	☐
Département du développement territorial et de l'énergie - Service cantonal de l'énergie et de l'environnement	☐	☐
Autorités communales		
Commune de Val de Ruz	☐	☐
Commune de la Chaux-de-Fonds	☐	☐
Entreprises électriques		
Eole RES	☐	☐
Société de production d'énergie du Crêt-Meuron	☐	☐
Bureau Planair	☐	☐
Associations		
Suisse Eole	☐	☐
Fondation pour la protection et l'aménagement du paysage	☐	☐
Pro Natura	☐	☐
ASPO/Birdlife	☐	☐
WWF	☐	☐
Association des Amis du Mont-Racine	☐	☐
Association des Amis de Tête-de-Ran	☐	☐
Association de Patrimoine suisse	☐	☐
Les Travers du Vent	☐	☐
Fédération Paysage Libre Bejune	☐	☐
Neuchâtel ski de fond	☐	☐
Tourisme Neuchâtelois	☐	☐
Tribunaux		
Tribunal administratif neuchâtelois	☐	☐
Tribunal fédéral	☐	☐
Autres acteurs (à completer, s'il vous plaît)		
	☐	☐
	☐	☐
	☐	☐

2. Collaboration avec d'autres acteurs

Dans le processus du parc éolien "Crêt-Meuron", avec quels autres acteurs votre organisation a-t-elle **collaboré**?

Veuillez s'il vous plaît cocher dans le tableau suivant les collaborations sur un plan technique **(tableau de gauche)** et les collaborations sur un plan politique **(tableau de droite)**.

Merci de préciser à chaque fois si votre organisation a pris l'initiative dans la collaboration (par exemple, envoyé des informations à l'acteur concerné) et/ou réagi à une demande (par exemple, reçu des informations de l'acteur concerné). Les deux sont possibles simultanément.

S'il manque des acteurs, vous pouvez compléter la liste dans les lignes laissées vides et préciser le type d'échange d'informations avec les acteurs ajoutés.

Collaboration sur un plan technique	Collaboration sur un plan politique
Echange d'informations sur les avancées techniques et scientifiques concernant la construction du parc éolien et de ses effets sur l'environnement et la nature, les oiseaux et les êtres humains; l'efficience des éoliennes; etc.	Échanges d'information et collaboration concernant les affaires politiques, qui permettent à votre organisation de participer au processus; échanges de prises de position; rédaction conjointe de recours; co-organisation de réunions et tables rondes; etc.

Acteurs	Collaboration sur un plan technique	
	Prise de l'initiative	Réaction à une demande
Autorités fédérales		
Office fédéral de l'énergie	☐	☐
Office fédéral de l'environnement	☐	☐
Office fédéral du développement territorial	☐	☐
Autorités cantonales		
Conseil d'Etat neuchâtelois	☐	☐
Grand Conseil neuchâtelois	☐	☐
Département du développement territorial et de l'énergie - Service de l'aménagement du territoire	☐	☐
Département du développement territorial et de l'énergie - Service cantonal de l'énergie et de l'environnement	☐	☐
Autorités communales		
Commune de Val de Ruz	☐	☐
Commune de la Chaux-de-Fonds	☐	☐
Entreprises électriques		
Eole RES	☐	☐
Société de production d'énergie du Crêt-Meuron	☐	☐
Bureau Planair	☐	☐
Associations		
Suisse Eole	☐	☐
Fondation pour la protection et l'aménagement du paysage	☐	☐
Pro Natura	☐	☐
ASPO/Birdlife	☐	☐
WWF	☐	☐
Association des Amis du Mont-Racine	☐	☐
Association des Amis de Tête-de-Ran	☐	☐
Association de Patrimoine suisse	☐	☐
Les Travers du Vent	☐	☐
Fédération Paysage Libre Bejune	☐	☐
Neuchâtel ski de fond	☐	☐
Tourisme Neuchâtelois	☐	☐
Tribunaux		
Tribunal administratif neuchâtelois	☐	☐
Tribunal fédéral	☐	☐
Autres acteurs (à completer, s'il vous plaît)		
	☐	☐
	☐	☐
	☐	☐

Acteurs	Collaboration sur un plan politique	
	Prise de l'initiative	Réaction à une demande
Autorités fédérales		
Office fédéral de l'énergie	☐	☐
Office fédéral de l'environnement	☐	☐
Office fédéral du développement territorial	☐	☐
Autorités cantonales		
Conseil d'Etat neuchâtelois	☐	☐
Grand Conseil neuchâtelois	☐	☐
Département du développement territorial et de l'énergie - Service de l'aménagement du territoire	☐	☐
Département du développement territorial et de l'énergie - Service cantonal de l'énergie et de l'environnement	☐	☐
Autorités communales		
Commune de Val de Ruz	☐	☐
Commune de la Chaux-de-Fonds	☐	☐
Entreprises électriques		
Eole RES	☐	☐
Société de production d'énergie du Crêt-Meuron	☐	☐
Bureau Planair	☐	☐
Associations		
Suisse Eole	☐	☐
Fondation pour la protection et l'aménagement du paysage	☐	☐
Pro Natura	☐	☐
ASPO/Birdlife	☐	☐
WWF	☐	☐
Association des Amis du Mont-Racine	☐	☐
Association des Amis de Tête-de-Ran	☐	☐
Association de Patrimoine suisse	☐	☐
Les Travers du Vent	☐	☐
Fédération Paysage Libre Bejune	☐	☐
Neuchâtel ski de fond	☐	☐
Tourisme Neuchâtelois	☐	☐
Tribunaux		
Tribunal administratif neuchâtelois	☐	☐
Tribunal fédéral	☐	☐
Autres acteurs (à completer, s'il vous plaît)		
	☐	☐
	☐	☐
	☐	☐

IV. Informations générales sur votre organisation

1. Veuillez s'il vous plaît indiquer les informations suivantes concernant votre organisation

Année de fondation	
Nombre de membres	
Personnel (en équivalents temps plein) chargé du travail politique	
Budget annuel	

2. Importance de l'enjeu des parcs éoliens pour votre organisation

Sur une échelle de 0 à 5, veuillez s'il vous plaît indiquer l'importance de l'enjeu des parcs éoliens dans la réalisation des missions et objectifs de votre organisation.

0 Enjeu pas du tout important	1	2	3	4	5 Enjeu très important
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

3. Evaluation du succès dans le processus du parc éolien "Crêt-Meuron" par rapport aux objectifs de votre organisation

Sur une échelle de 0 à 5, veuillez s'il vous plaît indiquer si à ce stade, votre organisation a atteint ses objectifs dans le processus du parc éolien "Crêt-Meuron"?

0 Objectifs pas du tout atteints	1	2	3	4	5 Objectifs tout à fait atteints
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

4. Expertise de votre organisation en matière de parcs éoliens

Sur une échelle de 0 à 5, veuillez s'il vous plaît indiquer quel est le niveau d'expertise que votre organisation a en matière de parcs éoliens?

0 Aucune expertise	1	2	3	4	5 Expertise complète
☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

5. Personne de contact

Nom de la personne qui a rempli le questionnaire :

Nom de l'organisation :

N° téléphone :

Email :

Souhaitez-vous recevoir des informations sur les résultats de cette étude ? Oui ☐ Non ☐

Nous vous remercions de votre aimable collaboration.

Si vous avez d'autres remarques ou idées sur le sujet du parc éolien "Crêt-Meuron" ou sur le questionnaire, merci de les partager ci-dessous.