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# **In Search of the Bloc Bourgeois**

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Working paper

# In Search of the bloc bourgeois

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## **Abstract:**

This paper proposes an analysis of the social bloc that could support the political strategy of a radical change of socio-economic model in France. The bloc bourgeois would gather the most well-off and educated groups of the traditional left and right social blocs that had structured French political competition until then. The analysis is based on French survey data on policy preferences. With the help of a latent class model, a partition of the French electorate in several clusters is analysed. This sheds light on the composition of the respective social bases of the left and the right as well as on the possibility of existence of the bloc bourgeois.

**Keywords:** Socio-economic model, France, political economy, Social blocs, institutional change, neoliberalism

## Introduction

Contrary to a widespread cliché, the French socio-economic model is anything but “impossible to reform” and one could on the contrary argue that it has undergone significant institutional change since the 1980s.<sup>1</sup> What is true however is that some of these “structural reforms”, from the *plan Juppé* of 1995 for social protection to the 2016 labour market flexibility enhancing *loi travail*, have met considerable social resistance and later led incumbent governments to electoral defeat. Nevertheless, these obstacles have not deterred mainstream political parties from keeping on with their intentions to radically alter the French socio-economic model. But whereas there was in the 1970s a competition between the left and the right concerning the direction that these transformations should take, towards socialism or social democracy for the former, towards a more liberalised economy for the latter, the matter seems to be settled since the 1980s. Neoliberal reforms have been widespread since then, first focusing on financial deregulation and privatisations, and now affecting the employment relationship and social protection.

If the objective is relatively clear, the means to achieve it is more evasive. Implementing a radical economic transformation project demands a social base that both left and right governments failed to find. Analysing the problems faced by the left government in France, Lipietz (1984) identified the crisis of Fordism as a crisis of hegemony, with the Fordist period defined as the outcome of a partial and temporary alliance between a fraction of industrial capital and wage-earners. The crisis of Fordism expressed the dissolution of the dominant social alliance. Finding a new model implied thus to build a new social alliance.

The aim of this paper is to analyse the possibility of a social base for the neoliberal economic, social and political transformation project in France. Following Amable and Palombarini (2009), the concept of social bloc is used to assess the stability of a political strategy for institutional change. Stability is defined as the existence of a dominant social bloc, i.e. a set of social groups whose demands are taken into account in the definition of public policy and institutional design. The identification of this potential dominant social bloc is performed with a statistical analysis of individual demands, in order to endogenously determine the social groups that could be united by a political strategy geared towards neoliberal reforms and European integration. Using data from the 2012 French electoral study (FES2012), a latent class analysis defines social groups on the basis of the proximity of the policy demands of the individuals that compose them. The aim is to see how these groups could possibly be aggregated in a potentially dominant social bloc.

The paper proceeds as follows. Next section presents the theory of social blocs. Then, the gradual break-up of the traditional left and right social alliances and the difficulties of the search for an alternative socio-political alliance are presented. The following sections turn to the empirical analysis of the policy preferences and present the latent class model's results. The possibilities of aggregating a new social bloc, the *bloc bourgeois*, are then discussed in another section. A brief conclusion follows.

## Social blocs

The main concept upon which the analysis that follows is built is that of a social bloc. In the French theory of regulation, the concept is directly taken from Gramsci and represents “a stable system of relations of domination, alliances and concessions between social groups (dominant and

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<sup>1</sup> Amable (2017).

subordinate).” (Lipietz, 1994, p. 340). In Lipietz’ view, the hegemonic bloc must be comprehensive and only a small proportion of interests are discounted; “A social bloc is *hegemonic* when its interests correspond to those of the whole nation”. Amable & Palombarini (2009) have a different position. They define social groups by a community of interests as they are perceived by the group members that may, under condition of organisation, lead to the expression of demands for specific policy options or institutional change in various areas. A social bloc gathers social groups that express different and sometimes antagonistic demands.<sup>2</sup> It is unified by a political strategy that aims to satisfy the most important demands of the relevant social groups. The role of political leadership is to select among social demands those that will be satisfied and those that will be left out. This choice is made under different economic and internal compatibility constraints. But the main criterion political actors take into account is the ability of the different social groups to supply political support, which includes but is not limited to vote. Support does not imply a perfect satisfaction of all the demands of all the social group that form the bloc. Not all groups are equal inside a bloc and the chosen political strategy reflects the hierarchy of groups in terms of political support.

A social bloc is dominant when the strategy that unifies its constituent groups is politically successful. The contestation stemming from social groups whose demands have been disregarded (the dominated groups) is limited to a minority position of the political representation space or repressed with the help of legitimate violence. Therefore, it is not necessary that only a small proportion of social groups be excluded from the dominant social bloc. And several social blocs may be competing for dominance, as was the case in France for several decades.

### **The break-up of the left and right social blocs**

In the French case, one can distinguish two different social blocs corresponding to political strategies (Amable et al. 2012), a liberal/post-Gaullist alliance on the right and a socialist-communist (PS-PCF) alliance on the left. The left social bloc included the majority of the public sector employees and of the working classes. The core of the right bloc were the medium and superior categories of the private sector, the self-employed and professionals, and farmers. The policy expectations of these blocs were strongly antagonistic. The left bloc expected an extension of social protection and industrial democracy, an economic policy promoting real wage increases and a greater state control on the economy. The expectations of the right bloc were a mix of social conservatism and public intervention in the economy, at least until the crisis of the 1970s, and a more or less soft transition to a neoliberal model of capitalism from then on.

Both the left and the right social blocs started to gradually fall apart in the 1980s. On the right, the 1980s saw the growing divergence between a radical neoliberal core, favouring drastic market liberalisation reforms, and a more moderate fraction that wanted to preserve the essential elements of the social model. As analysed in Gauron (1983, 1988), tensions were present during most of the 5<sup>th</sup> Republic. On the left, after Mitterrand’s electoral victory in 1981, the U-turn in economic policy in 1982/1983 (Lordon 1998) established an enduring contradiction between on the one hand the supply-side economic policy that PS-led governments wanted to implement, geared towards European Monetary Unification (EMU) and the achievement and deepening of the Single Market, and on the other hand the policy expectations of the left bloc.

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<sup>2</sup> In fact, one should distinguish between social groups, defined by a proximity of position in the socio-economic structure, from socio-political groups, to which corresponds a proximity in the policy demand space. For the sake of simplification, this distinction is ignored.

Even at the end of the 1970s, a nonnegligible fraction of PS<sup>3</sup> were hostile to the full implementation of the left economic manifesto (*Programme commun de gouvernement* elaborated with the communist party and PS' satellite *Radicaux de gauche*) and were inclined to adopt a more orthodox macroeconomic policy and, later, to implement more or less drastic "structural reforms" orienting the French socio-economic model in a more liberal market economy direction. This would have consequences for both the political alliance and the social base of the left; both would have to change for PS to stay in power. In the decades that followed Mitterrand's victory in 1981, this change proved too difficult to achieve. The failure was epitomised by former minister and president of the European Commission Jacques Delors<sup>4</sup> renouncing to be PS' presidential candidate in 1995 because he considered that the pro-European integration and pro-structural reforms economic policy he wanted to implement required a political coalition impossible to form.

The European issue appeared increasingly related to that of "structural reforms". European integration took a specific turn in the 1980s with the Single Market and EMU. The Single Market promoted competition at the level of the union and more or less directly affected a series of institutions that had been the core of the socio-economic model of the post-war period, in particular the public sector. The controversial social protection reform of 1995 was justified by Prime minister Juppé as a consequence of the requirements of the Maastricht treaty regarding public deficits. For the former Medef's vice-president Kessler, Europe was "a machine to reform France against its will". Pascal Lamy, former chief of staff of Jacques Delors at the European Commission, considered that "the reordering and the 'marketisation' of the French economy [...] were made by Europe, thanks to Europe and because of Europe".<sup>5</sup> Economist Jean Pisani-Ferry stated bluntly that "Europe was our structural adjustment program. [...] France has let European integration play the role that the IMF or the World Bank play for poorly governed countries".<sup>6</sup>

Consequently, "Europe" emerged progressively as a salient political divide cutting across the left and the right blocs as it became clear during the referendums on the Maastricht (1992) and the constitutional (2005) treaties.<sup>7</sup> For a part of the left bloc, European integration appeared to lead to the imposition of a series of reforms that were the opposite of the evolutions that they wanted for the socio-economic model: restrictive monetary and budget policies, privatisation of public sector activities, increasing labour market flexibility, threats to the social protection system, etc. The situation was somewhat different for the right bloc, where the opposition to European integration stemmed partly from the will to keep control of macroeconomic policy but was also related to the (im)possibility to implement policies catering for specific economic interests or the consequences of increased competition for some protected activities, as well as linked to the will to defend national sovereignty in other areas of public policy, including immigration.<sup>8</sup>

The pro-European integration social groups were split across the traditional left and right blocs. The most skilled and better-off parts of both blocs expressed similar demands regarding the continuation of the integration process. The less affluent or skilled groups of both the left and right

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<sup>3</sup> Roughly one third of PS in 1979 (Fulla 2016).

<sup>4</sup> Delors who, in 1985, longed for an alliance of the 'wise of all sides' and rejoiced that the U-turn in economic policy had found a support beyond the traditional partisan cleavages, although he bemoaned that the 'economic compromise' had not yet found its equivalent in the social and political realms (Delors and Alexandre 1985).

<sup>5</sup> Lamy (2005) *Le Débat* Le modèle français vu d'Europe. Entretien

<sup>6</sup> *Le Figaro* 2005.

<sup>7</sup> For a discussion of Europe as a new political divide, see Sauger et al. (2007).

<sup>8</sup> Amable (2017).

blocs expressed less confidence in that process.<sup>9</sup> The rising importance of the European integration issue in the 1990s and 2000s brought the pro-EU groups closer together, as the analyses of the 1992 and 2005 referendums on respectively the Maastricht treaty and the constitutional treaty showed.<sup>10</sup> The possibility to structure political competition around the issue of European integration appeared as a way to escape from a political deadlock once summed by Jean-Claude Juncker as the impossibility to implement allegedly necessary (structural) reforms without losing the following election.

Confronted with such a problem, the left first tried to find a new compromise and extend their social base on the right rather than change it drastically. In the late 1990s, Prime minister Jospin contended that PS' sociological base had been renewed and extended and that the challenge was to find the best trade-off between social classes split over several issues including redistribution (Jospin 2000). His spectacular failure at the 2002 presidential election showed how challenging that was.

The need to find an alternative social support became gradually more pressing. In 2011, shortly before the presidential election, the so-called progressive think tank Terra Nova urged "the left",<sup>11</sup> in fact PS, to jettison the working classes because their policy demands would be impossible to satisfy: economic demands because globalisation and the evolution of modern capitalism had allegedly made the welfare state unsustainable and the neoliberal reforms inevitable; "cultural" demands because these were authoritarian and clashed with the "values of the left".<sup>12</sup> Terra Nova (2011) recommended that the mainstream left look actively for a new, rather fuzzy, social base, '*la France de demain*', away from the traditional constituency of the left. If François Hollande did not heed this recommendation during his left-oriented 2012 presidential campaign, his presidency was certainly marked by the search for a new social base,<sup>13</sup> and the successive governments of his mandate were formed excluding not only parties to the left of PS but eventually also the left wing of PS. Under his presidency, structural economic policy spectacularly took a neoliberal direction, culminating with a labour market reform, the *loi travail*, more radically neoliberal than any previous reform implemented by right governments. Regarding the social base for such a project, the construction of a new social bloc excluding the working classes ambitioning to be dominant, the *bloc bourgeois*,<sup>14</sup> gathering the high-skilled and affluent pro-EU social groups demanded that the political actors looking for it should actively go beyond the traditional left/right cleavage and promote a European divide instead.

The search for a social base likely to support the transition of the French socio-economic model towards a neoliberal market economy in connexion with the deepening of European integration was not limited to the left. Already in the 1970s, the liberal fraction of the right had expressed similar ambitions. President Giscard d'Estaing in the 1970s was the first leading French politician of the post-

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<sup>9</sup> See Jacquier (2016) on the economic drivers of the support for European integration.

<sup>10</sup> Lehingue (2007).

<sup>11</sup> Terra Nova (2011).

<sup>12</sup> The Terra Nova report made more or less explicit reference to some political science analyses focusing on the cultural divides (Inglehart 1990) or based on a two-dimensional view of the political space: economic and cultural (Kitschelt 1993).

<sup>13</sup> When in 2013 a journalist pointed out to Hollande that his decision to let Mittal Steel mothball the Florange blast furnaces would entail significant political costs, Hollande simply replied: '*among blue-collar workers, yes, but it does not matter*' (Amar, 2014, p. 65).

<sup>14</sup> Amable & Palombarini (2014, 2017). This bloc is characterized by the absence of working classes, which were present in the traditional left and right blocs.

war period to have an explicitly neoliberal agenda.<sup>15</sup> He called for the emergence of a new social alliance, the “central group”, that would, according to him, gather two thirds of the French population united by “common cultural attitudes” and “similar lifestyles” (Giscard d'Estaing, 1984, p. 246). François Bayrou, a centre-right politician several times a minister in conservative governments, tried unsuccessfully to follow Giscard's footsteps, with the promotion of European integration coupled with “structural reforms” for manifesto. His electoral failures illustrated the difficulties for a politician identified with the support of a traditional social bloc to transcend the left/right cleavage and reach out to social groups coming from the opposite bloc.

## Identifying socio-political groups

The possibility of a new dominant social bloc can be investigated with the analysis of the structure of the political demands by the different socio-political groups. In order to identify these groups, a bottom-up approach is adopted in what follows. Rather than consider already defined social groups, on the basis of occupation for instance, the analysis will start from the demands expressed by individuals. These individuals will be allocated into endogenously-defined groups according to the similarity of their policy demands. Demands will be identified by the answers given to the electoral study of 2012 (Sauger 2012), a post-election survey comprising 2014 face-to-face interviews, representative of the French population registered on the electoral roll.

The 2012 electoral survey (FES2012) is chosen for two reasons. First, the date corresponds to a turning point for the stability of the traditional social blocs. Apparently, the traditional opposition between the right and left blocs was the same as it ever was, but in fact the breakup of the two blocs was already under way. François Hollande was designated as the presidential candidate for PS following a primary that was open beyond the traditional left constituency, with the aim of gathering a broader, and in fact different, social base. As mentioned before, Hollande, once elected, oriented his political strategy away from the traditional support of the left, eventually facing an internal opposition among PS deputies. The second reason is that, in comparison to other available surveys,<sup>16</sup> FES2012 is remarkable by the quality of the questionnaire regarding policy preferences. The questionnaire includes precise questions on sensitive policy options, which can be used for the empirical exercise performed here.

One can distinguish four different areas of demands regarding policy options or institutional change. The first one is the broad economic domain, with the general orientation of economic policy (wage policy, public expenditure, etc.) and the structural reforms issue. The most sensitive structural reforms concern the employment relationship and social protection. Some questions regarding these aspects are selected for the empirical analysis.

Regarding labour market reform, one central issue debated in the 2000s was the replacement of all open-ended and fixed-term employment contracts by a single employment contract. The so-called *contrat de travail unique* (CTU) would have workers' rights in terms of benefits and entitlements as well as firms' firing costs increasing with tenure. Formally, the new contract would be open-ended, but firms would be relieved of some of their obligations in case of employment termination: no obligation to propose a redeployment plan for fired workers in case of collective dismissal, or to give an economic motive for the termination of the contract and therefore no possibility for a judge to

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<sup>15</sup> Giscard d'Estaing is one of the very few politicians to have claimed the label: 'The most scientific form of modern economic thought is the liberal thought [... it is necessary] to give it a modern name: neo-liberalism' (Armand & Giscard d'Estaing, 1968, cited in Bourdieu & Boltanski 2008, p. 33).

<sup>16</sup> Other electoral surveys or those from international sources (ESS, ISSP).



check whether such a motive is valid. The single employment contract was one of the reforms promised by conservative Nicolas Sarkozy during the 2007 Presidential campaign, but was never implemented after his election.<sup>17</sup> The proposition popped up again before the 2012 Presidential election, and the centre-right candidate to the Presidential election, François Bayrou, included it in his program. Some prominent PS politicians expressed an interest for this measure before and after the election.<sup>18</sup> A question in FES2012 asked respondents for their opinion on the *contrat unique*. As for all questions, there was a possibility of no answer. Another question related to labour market regulation and social protection asked whether the respondent thought that the unemployed could find a job if they really wanted to. Although this is not a question directly implying a policy decision, the responses could be informative on how receptive the respondent would be to labour market flexibility-enhancing policies or welfare state retrenchment.

Regarding social protection, an important reform of the Sarkozy presidency concerned pensions. It included many changes, the most significant being a two-year extension of the working period necessary for obtaining a full pension. The reform led to a significant union-led contestation in autumn 2010 and one electoral promise of PS candidate François Hollande was to partially reverse it. Social protection financing was also a reform discussed in the years preceding the 2012 election. A project put forward by Sarkozy was to partially substitute a financing of social protection by VAT to the current system based on employers' and employees' social contributions. The drop in social contributions would lower labour costs, and it was expected that this would boost employment. But the transition would have distributional as well as institutional consequences: VAT is a regressive taxation and the contribution-based funding legitimates the involvement of trade unions in the management of unemployment insurance. Two questions were considered, one on the fairness of Sarkozy's pension reform,<sup>19</sup> the other on the desirability of a rise of the value-added tax (VAT), with the implication that the extra receipts would finance the social protection system.

Two questions dealt with the size of the public sector. One asked the respondent whether the number of civil servants should increase or decrease. A second question asks whether the respondent has a positive or negative appreciation of privatisations. A traditional question on how favourable the respondent is to the income inequality-reducing action of the government was also included, as well as a question on whether the priority of economic policy should be to improve firms' competitiveness or employees' condition.

The second policy area to consider is that of European integration. As mentioned before, the issue of European integration is central to the breakup of the traditional left and right blocs and the unification of a tentative bloc bourgeois. One question dealt directly with the desirability of the pursuit of European integration: respondents were asked whether they would like to see more power given to the French state or to "Europe".

The third area concerns the broadly "cultural" issues: the attitude towards immigration as well as the tolerance towards alternative lifestyles. Regarding immigration, respondents could give their opinion on whether to stop or continue it. They were also asked whether they thought that homosexual couples should have the right to adopt children.

Finally, in France as in other countries, the environment issue has seen its importance increase as a political divide. A sensitive question in France has been nuclear energy, because of the size of the

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<sup>17</sup> See Amable (2014).

<sup>18</sup> For instance Manuel Valls, Hollande's Prime minister.

<sup>19</sup> For this question and others concerned, the initial range of response from 0 to 10 was re-expressed as going from 0 to 5 or 6 depending on the profile of responses.

nuclear program launched after the oil shocks and the controversies regarding the safety issue. A question on the desired future of nuclear energy: stop it or go on with it is considered.

## The identification method

### *The latent class model*

The objective is to identify the social groups that could form a new social bloc. These groups will be defined by the proximity among their members regarding policy preferences. In order to achieve this, it is helpful to start from the expression of these preferences at the individual level, and see how one can endogenously determine social groups. An adequate method for doing this is latent class modelling. The objective of the latent class analysis is to find a categorical structure for the individuals of FES2012. The model considered in the empirical analysis has the following form:

$$f(y_i) = \sum_{x=1}^K P(x) \prod_{t=1}^T f(y_{it}|x) \quad (1)$$

$y_{it}$  is the answer of individual  $i$  to one of the  $T$  survey questions included as active variables in the model.  $x$  is a latent variable designating the cluster (group) to which the individual  $i$  may belong ( $1 \leq x \leq K$ ).  $f$  is the density corresponding to particular set of  $y_i$  and  $P(x)$  is the probability to belong to a certain cluster. One supposes a multinomial distribution for the  $y_{it}$  and a model of multinomial or ordered logistic regression according to the variable. The values of the latent variable are also assumed to come from a multinomial distribution and a multinomial regression model is used.

There is no definitive criterion for choosing the number of clusters. Information criteria (AIC, BIC...) are often used. The simulations performed by Nylund et al. (2007) lead to the conclusion that the indicator giving the best results is a log-likelihood difference-based test (bootstrap likelihood-ratio test), using samples obtained by bootstraps to estimate the value of the statistics.<sup>20</sup> This test is used in determining the number of clusters in the model presented in the next subsection.

### *Model estimation*

A series of models were estimated,<sup>21</sup> increasing each time the number of clusters until the bootstrap likelihood ratio test indicated the lack of significance of adding another cluster to the model. After a series of estimations, a 19-cluster model was eventually rejected by the test. The chosen model comprises therefore 18 clusters for the sample of 2014 respondents to the French electoral survey.

The 18 clusters are defined by the policy expectations of the individuals. One may also want to look at the variables influencing (probabilistic) cluster membership. Although it would have been

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<sup>20</sup> The test provides information on the improvement that an additional cluster provides to the model. If the difference in model fit (measured with the squared likelihood  $L^2$ ) is not significant, the more parsimonious model is chosen. If it is significant, the less restricted model is chosen instead. The test is based on the reduction in  $L^2$  that can be expressed in terms of twice the increase in log-likelihood LL associated with the increase in number of clusters from  $n$  to  $n+1$ . The associated p-value is estimated by means of a parametric bootstrap, whereby the model is estimated for a certain number (here 500) of replication samples (the so-called Monte Carlo simulation) that are generated from the probability distribution defined by the Maximum Likelihood estimates of the restricted ( $n$ -cluster model). The estimated bootstrap p-value, is defined as the proportion of bootstrap samples with a larger -2LL-difference value than the original sample.

<sup>21</sup> The models were estimated with Latent Gold 5.0.

possible to include predictors directly in the latent class analysis, it would have been cumbersome to do so while testing the significance of the different variables. Also, these variables would have influenced the outcome of the classification, which was not desirable. Therefore, the so-called three-step approach was chosen instead. After having estimated the model of interest (first step), individuals were assigned to latent clusters using the posterior cluster membership probabilities (second step), and then the association between the assigned cluster memberships and external variables could be investigated. The corresponding results will be presented after the characterisation of the clusters.

## **The 18-cluster model**

### ***Policy preferences***

A succinct description of the groups is given in Table 1, with the relative weight of each one in the sample, their main policy demands and some general characteristics. Cluster 1 gathers individuals opposed to neoliberal reforms (single labour contract, pension reform, income inequalities, decrease in the number of civil servants...) and broadly in favour of European integration. Cluster 2 are somewhat similar to cluster 1 in terms of policy expectations but differ with respect to European integration. A majority of this cluster would want more power given to the French state rather than to the European Union. Cluster 3 are divided on the issue of the single employment contract, and rather hostile to giving more power to the European Union. They are not particularly favourable to immigration or gay rights; they tend to agree with the idea that the unemployed could find a job if they really wanted to. They are not in favour of neoliberal policies such as privatisations, the pension reform or reducing the number of civil servants; they are pro-redistribution and favourable to an economic policy oriented towards wage-earners. Cluster 4 are divided on the issue of the single labour contract as well as other neoliberal reforms (income inequality policies, number of civil servants). They are rather hostile to immigration and gay rights and do not want more power given to the European Union. Cluster 5 are not in favour of giving more power to the EU and are on the whole hostile to neoliberal reforms. Cluster 6's policy preferences lead them to support European integration. They support some neoliberal reforms (pension reform, privatisations) without necessarily being strongly in favour of all of them, such as the single labour contract. They support inequality-reducing state intervention but they consider that economic policy should be geared towards improving firms' competitiveness.

Cluster 7 are split on the matter of giving more power to the EU or the French state and the decrease in the number of civil servants. They are rather opposed to the single labour contract but not to the pension reform. They are mildly opposed to redistribution (relatively to the population average), in favour of nuclear energy, privatisations and homosexuals' rights, but not strongly supportive of immigration. Also, they favour an economic policy favouring competitiveness over wages. Cluster 8 are against more power given to the EU, favourable to the single labour contract but opposed to the pension reform, and in favour of an economic policy improving wages. They are no supporters of redistribution or immigration and divided on gay rights. Cluster 9 are split on the European integration issue, rather against the single labour contract but in favour of the pension reform. They want an economic policy for competitiveness and are no supporters of gay rights or immigration. Cluster 10 are pro-European integration, broadly in favour of neoliberal reforms, and against immigration and gay rights. Cluster 11 are not in favour of more power given to the EU and express some views in favour of neoliberal reforms (the unemployed could find a job, less civil servants...).

The policy demands of Cluster 12 are not in favour of European integration. They expect the redistributing action of the state and are otherwise split or undecided on most neoliberal reforms. They do not support immigration or gay rights. The most significant characteristic of cluster 13 is that

they express no definite policy preferences (“no answer” to most questions). The policy expectations of cluster 14 do not favour European integration or most neoliberal reforms (single labour contract, pension reforms, privatisations) but the group support an economic policy oriented towards wages as well as immigration and gay rights. Cluster 15 are divided on European integration and in favour of most neoliberal reforms (CTU, pension reforms, privatisation, decrease in the number of civil servants) and nuclear energy; they are against redistribution, immigration and gay rights. Cluster 16 are pro-European integration and express otherwise standard conservative policy demands: in favour of the single labour contract and the pension reform, and against redistribution.

Cluster 17 are divided on European integration and have conservative policy demands: favourable to the single labour contract, privatisations and the pension reform; against income redistribution and immigration. Cluster 18 are favourable to European integration, a pro-competitiveness economic policy and neoliberal reforms (single labour contract and pension reform); they are hostile to income redistribution and immigration. Clusters 17 and 18 are rather similar in their policy demands but cluster 17 are not so keen on a policy oriented towards competitiveness and would rather welcome a decrease in VAT whereas cluster 18 are favourable to an increase.

### ***Individual characteristics and cluster composition***

One can precise the identity of the different social groups by looking at variables that have not been taken into consideration for the definition of the cluster grouping, but define some common social characteristics of the clusters nonetheless. Cluster 1 membership is associated with a lower than average proportion of seniors: cluster 1 represents 10% of the individuals of the sample but gathers only 5% of those over 65. individuals (probabilistically) belonging to this cluster are better-off (over 16% of the cluster’s membership in the top two deciles of the distribution of household income)<sup>22</sup> and have a higher education level (28% of the membership with a university degree higher than bachelor) than the average population. The proportion of civil servants is high (20% of the civil servants of the whole sample in this group). Apart from the age structure (more middle-aged individuals) and the higher than average proportion of women (61% of the cluster), the main differences with cluster 1 are the income and education levels: cluster 2 have lower degrees (the cluster represents 9% of the individuals but regroups less than 5% of the individuals with a university degree) and income levels (the cluster gathers less than 3% of the individuals in the top two deciles of the distribution of household income) than cluster 1. The only distinctive characteristics of cluster 3 is a higher than average proportion of individuals with a technical education and a slightly higher proportion of workers (12% of the workers in the sample for a cluster representing under 9% of the sample).

Cluster 4 (8% of the sample) tend to have low income and education levels (15% of the individuals with a primary education level), with a majority of middle-aged individuals. Workers and craftsmen are overrepresented. Cluster 5 is composed of young (49% of the cluster under 40) highly educated (44% with a tertiary education) individuals working in the civil service (19% of the cluster). Cluster 6 (6% of the sample) is mostly composed of well-off (it regroups 14% of the top income decile) and highly educated (13% of the sample individuals with a university degree higher than bachelor) individuals. Cluster 7 has a high proportion of women (58% of the cluster), civil servants (21% of the cluster) and well-off highly educated (43% of the cluster have a tertiary education) individuals.

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<sup>22</sup> The income variable selected is the level of total household income divided the square root of the number of household size.

Class	weight	policy demands	characteristics
1	10.3%	Pro-European integration; hostile to neoliberal reforms;	young; high income; high education level; public sector employees
2	9.1%	not pro-European integration, hostile to some neoliberal reforms;	middle-aged; low income; low education level; clerks, workers, artisans, women
3	8.8%	Not pro-European integration ; hostile to some neoliberal reforms;	middle-aged; Low/mid income; technical education
4	7.9%	Anti-European integration ; favourable to some neoliberal reforms; anti-immigration; anti-gay;	Low income, low education level; old
5	6.7%	Anti-European integration ; hostile to some neoliberal reforms;	young, high education level; public sector
6	6.5%	Pro-European integration ; ambiguous on neoliberal reforms; pro-competitiveness pro-VAT increase;	High income and wealth, high education level; upward social mobility
7	6.4%	Undecided on European integration, undecided on neoliberal reforms except privatisations (pro);	High income; higher technical education; upward social mobility women
8	6.1%	Anti-European integration; pro-CTU; pro-redistribution, against nuclear energy, against immigration;	Women, young, mid income
9	5.4%	Divided on European integration; hostile to immigration and gays; favourable to some neoliberal reforms;	Men, old; high income; self-employed
10	5.4%	Pro-European integration; favourable to neoliberal reforms; anti-immigration; men;	Men, old; high income and education level
11	4.7%	not pro-European integration; pro-redistribution ; in favour of some neoliberal reforms; not favourable to immigration;	Old
12	4.7%	not pro-European integration; pro-redistribution; not favourable to immigration;	Young; mid income
13	4.3%	express no opinions on many issues;	Women; low income; low education level
14	4.3%	against neoliberal reforms; favourable to immigration;	Young; low income
15	3.9%	divided on European integration; favourable to neoliberal reforms; against immigration;	Old; high income
16	2.1%	pro-European integration; favourable to neoliberal reforms;	young, high/mid income
17	2.1%	divided on European integration; favourable to some neoliberal reforms; against immigration;	Old mid income
18	1.5%	pro-European integration; favourable to neoliberal reforms; against immigration;	High income

Table 1. Description of the 18 clusters

Cluster 8 regroups a higher than average proportion of young (42% of the cluster under 40), low-income (74% of the cluster below median household income) women (64% of the cluster) with a low level of education (73% of the cluster have at most a secondary education). Cluster 9 regroups proportionately more senior (49% of the cluster over 55) men (60% of the cluster) with a higher income (61% of the cluster above median household income) than the average population. Cluster 10 are very similar to cluster 9 in this respect but possess a higher than average education level (42% of the cluster have a tertiary education). Cluster 11 is characterised by a high proportion of seniors (55% of the cluster over 55) who tend to give no answer to many questions. Cluster 12 regroups young (55% of the cluster under 45) and not necessarily highly educated individuals (59% of the cluster have at most a secondary education).

Cluster 13 has a high proportion (62%) of women, young (27% under 25) and old (35% over 65) as well as religious (19% of the cluster) individuals. Most individuals of this cluster have a low level of education (70% of the cluster with at most secondary education) and income. Cluster 14 have a rather low income (40% of the cluster in the bottom three deciles of household income distribution) in spite of not having a low level of education (29% of the cluster have a tertiary education). Civil servants are particularly represented (20%) in this cluster.

Cluster 15 gathers older (67% of the cluster over 55), religious (22% of the cluster) and relatively well-off individuals (27% of the cluster with wealth over 300,000 euros). Cluster 16 are more difficult to define but they are more religious than the average (18% of the cluster). There are relatively few younger individuals in cluster 17 (only 11% of the cluster under 40). The cluster has a high (31%) proportion of self-employed. Cluster 18 regroups well-off (55% of the cluster in the top three deciles of household income distribution) and educated (39% of the cluster have a tertiary education) individuals.

In order to come to a general characterisation of the cluster grouping, the third step of the three-step model mentioned above is performed. Different variables likely to influence cluster membership are considered. Individual characteristics such as sex and age were included in the variables possibly explaining group membership. In addition, income, education, occupation and religious participation (the respondent attends a religious service at least twice a month) were considered. Various indicators for the education level were considered for inclusion in the model. Elimination of non-significant variables led to keep indicators for technical education and higher education. Occupation variables proved to be jointly insignificant with the exception of the indicator for civil servants. The results are presented in Table 2 and broadly confirmed the characterisation obtained by considering the statistics of cluster composition that were exposed above.

### ***Political self-positioning***

The political hue of each group may be assessed with the help of the self-positioning of their members on a left right scale (0 to 10). For the sake of simplification, this was re-expressed in five categories: far left (0 to 2), left (3 and 4), centre (5), right (6 and 7) and far right (8 to 10). Table 3 presents the results of a regression of individuals' political position on cluster membership. These may be summed up as follows. Clusters 1, 5, and 8 have broad left leanings. Clusters 2 and 3 are somewhat more centre-left than cluster 1. Clusters 4 and 11 appear split but the weight of right and far right is larger (40% of the group) than left and far left (29%) in cluster 4. Cluster 6 are centre-left. Clusters 7 and 12 are centrists. Clusters 9, 10, 15, and 18 are strongly right. Unsurprisingly, cluster 13 express no clear opinion. In spite of having a strong component of the far left, the opinions of cluster 16 appear widespread. Cluster 14 are far left, cluster 17 far right.

Cluster	woman	under 40	over 65	household income per person	technical education	higher education	civil servant	religious
1	-0,04 (-0,41)	0,01 (0,12)	-0,41 (-2,77)	2,19 (2,34)	-0,58 (-4,28)	0,69 (5,93)	0,37 (3,62)	-0,90 (-2,59)
2	0,29 (2,77)	-0,23 (-1,98)	-0,45 (-2,58)	-3,42 (-1,97)	0,22 2,07	-0,31 -2,20	-0,01 -0,03	0,10 0,50
3	0,00 (-0,01)	-0,12 (-0,86)	0,05 0,40	-1,88 -1,09	0,29 2,71	-0,10 -0,72	0,20 1,25	-0,45 -1,49
4	-0,14 (-1,42)	-0,41 (-3,25)	-0,22 -1,79	-5,76 -2,59	0,08 0,82	-0,74 -3,07	-0,06 -0,35	-0,03 -0,16
5	0,01 (0,08)	0,38 (2,31)	-0,55 -1,96	-0,98 -0,51	0,05 0,33	0,35 2,96	0,39 2,78	-0,78 -1,21
6	-0,07 (-0,61)	0,11 (0,93)	0,02 0,13	3,88 4,16	0,04 0,32	0,69 5,45	-0,21 -1,33	-0,11 -0,54
7	0,26 (2,22)	0,14 (1,03)	-0,11 -0,68	3,17 2,81	0,20 1,65	0,28 2,15	0,35 2,46	-0,23 -0,79
8	0,42 (2,94)	0,35 (2,44)	0,12 0,73	-4,26 -2,51	0,10 0,87	-0,32 -1,92	0,26 1,54	0,10 0,54
9	-0,26 (-2,26)	0,01 (0,06)	0,32 2,42	3,88 4,07	0,22 1,66	0,21 1,55	0,03 0,19	-0,15 -0,62
10	-0,25 (-2,21)	0,16 (1,12)	0,29 2,15	3,84 3,84	-0,13 -0,96	0,32 2,47	-0,41 -1,77	0,11 0,65
11	-0,03 (-0,24)	0,13 (0,82)	0,39 2,54	-3,04 -1,01	0,02 0,18	-0,38 -1,77	-0,34 -1,28	0,16 0,91
12	-0,02 (-0,14)	0,39 (2,74)	0,00 0,02	4,16 2,65	0,19 1,37	-0,47 -2,48	-0,45 -1,17	0,22 1,04
13	0,21 (1,84)	0,40 (2,68)	0,35 2,37	-1,10 -0,69	-0,18 -1,59	-0,33 -1,87	-0,18 -0,83	0,38 2,68
14	-0,01 (-0,07)	0,19 (1,42)	-0,23 -1,24	-4,52 -2,57	-0,15 -1,27	0,17 1,19	0,34 2,17	-0,04 -0,20
15	-0,10 (-0,77)	-1,08 (-2,38)	0,22 1,51	4,37 4,74	-0,33 -2,07	0,29 1,74	-0,77 -1,96	0,56 3,43
16	-0,20 (-1,10)	0,15 (0,67)	0,20 0,89	-3,43 -0,83	-0,01 -0,07	0,09 0,45	0,08 0,32	0,44 2,02
17	0,04 (0,28)	-0,77 (-2,01)	0,12 0,64	-1,97 -1,13	0,01 0,08	-0,96 -1,61	0,13 0,53	0,21 0,91
18	-0,12 (-0,61)	0,16 (0,76)	-0,11 -0,36	4,87 4,92	-0,05 -0,24	0,51 2,50	0,28 1,25	0,41 1,67

Table 2. Predictors of cluster membership. Z statistic under the regression coefficient.

Cluster	far left	left	Centre	right	far right
1	<b>1,24</b>	<b>0,74</b>	<b>-0,81</b>	<b>-0,97</b>	<b>-3,42</b>
	7,80	6,06	-3,69	-3,19	-13,49
2	<b>0,63</b>	<b>0,32</b>	<b>0,22</b>	-0,06	0,13
	3,53	2,36	1,98	-0,41	0,51
3	<b>0,86</b>	0,17	<b>0,30</b>	-0,26	-0,02
	4,97	1,16	2,74	-1,64	-0,07
4	<b>0,46</b>	-0,32	0,13	<b>-0,41</b>	<b>1,16</b>
	2,47	-1,73	1,22	-2,42	5,70
5	<b>0,63</b>	<b>0,79</b>	-0,15	-0,23	-0,75
	3,32	5,74	-0,95	-1,34	-1,32
6	-0,07	<b>0,78</b>	<b>0,26</b>	-0,09	-1,83
	-0,25	5,81	2,29	-0,58	-0,74
7	-0,17	0,05	<b>0,53</b>	0,17	0,32
	-0,59	0,28	4,92	1,34	1,34
8	<b>0,51</b>	<b>0,30</b>	0,16	-0,07	0,44
	2,53	1,99	1,19	-0,46	1,84
9	<b>-3,15</b>	<b>-0,60</b>	-0,21	<b>0,96</b>	<b>0,89</b>
	-16,52	-2,19	-1,30	8,40	4,07
10	-1,40	-0,13	-0,01	<b>0,59</b>	<b>0,96</b>
	-1,23	-0,70	-0,08	5,19	4,35
11	-0,02	<b>0,35</b>	0,01	-0,02	<b>0,63</b>
	-0,06	2,25	0,09	-0,12	2,68
12	0,32	0,26	<b>0,31</b>	0,23	0,15
	1,37	1,62	2,39	1,69	0,50
13	0,29	0,09	0,23	-0,12	-0,18
	1,32	0,52	1,90	-0,74	-0,52
14	<b>1,79</b>	-0,01	<b>-0,70</b>	<b>-0,86</b>	-2,32
	9,35	-0,07	-2,52	-2,45	-1,31
15	-1,72	-1,95	-0,11	<b>0,58</b>	<b>1,28</b>
	-0,87	-1,27	-0,67	4,53	5,84
16	<b>0,74</b>	0,12	0,00	0,12	0,15
	3,09	0,54	0,01	0,61	0,41
17	-0,44	-0,71	-0,39	0,06	<b>1,69</b>
	-0,83	-1,72	-1,47	0,28	6,90
18	-0,49	-0,25	0,23	0,36	<b>0,71</b>
	-0,77	-0,77	1,11	1,71	2,44

Table 3. Self-positioning on a left-right scale. Z statistic under the regression coefficient.



## Aggregating a social bloc

### *The possible social blocs*

From these results and considering the policy preferences, the left bloc can be said to include clusters 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, and 14. The right bloc comprises clusters 4, 9, 10, 15, 17 and 18. Other clusters can be considered either as centre-left or centre-right (6, 7 and 12), or neither specifically left or right (11, 13 and 16). These clusters are at the periphery of the left and right blocs and could join one or the other depending on the political strategies followed by conservative or social-democratic parties or durably stay outside of either bloc. Table 4 shows the partition of clusters according to the social blocs to which they could be aggregated, their appreciation of neoliberal reforms and their position with respect to European integration.

Blocs		Neoliberal reforms		
		pro	Unclear/split	anti
Left	Pro-EU			1
	Unclear			14
	Anti-EU		8	2, 3, 5
Centre-left or centre- right	Pro-EU	6		
	Unclear		7	
	Anti-EU		12	
Right	Pro-EU	10, 15		
	Unclear	9, 17		
	Anti-EU	18	4	
Unclear	Pro-EU	16		
	Unclear	11	13	
	Anti-EU			

Table 4. The clusters and the divides on European integration and neoliberal reforms

As mentioned previously, the European integration issue splits both the left and right blocs. Regressing the answers to two questions regarding respectively whether the EU is a risk for social protection and national identity on group membership, one obtains the results documented in Table 4. On the left, cluster 1 are pro-EU partly because they do not think that it threatens either the social model or even the national identity. Cluster 14 do not think the EU is a threat to the national identity. For the other clusters of the left bloc on the other hand, the EU represents a threat to both social protection and national identity (2 and 3) or simply to social protection (5). Such risks are also perceived by some clusters of the right bloc: loss of national identity (groups 9 & 17).

### *The possibility of a bloc bourgeois*

The possibility of aggregating a social bloc around the key policy options of the continuation of European integration and the implementation of neoliberal structural reforms can be assessed. Cluster 6 is the key social group for such a policy, being in favour of European integration as well as significant neoliberal policies (pension reform, privatisations, competitiveness). What other groups could possibly be aggregated to Cluster 6 in order to form a bloc? Figure 1 represents a summary of the respective positions of the 18 clusters on all policy issues taken into account for the empirical

analysis and shows the compatibility of group preferences with a political strategy based on European integration and neoliberal reforms. Plain (yellow) cells indicate that a group have policy preferences compatible with the political strategy mentioned. Hatched cells represent the opposite case. Blank cells indicate that a group are split or undecided on the particular policy option considered, which may indicate that one should not a priori exclude a compatibility with the political strategy geared towards the aggregation of a new social bloc.

The aggregation a social bloc hinges on the possibility to find a political strategy based on the satisfaction of policy demands sufficiently important for the groups potentially forming the bloc. The demands of these groups must be sufficiently compatible to guarantee the stability and political support of the bloc. Starting from cluster 6 as the core group, clusters 1, 15 and 16 share the same pro-European integration leaning. However, cluster 1 is strongly opposed to neoliberal reforms or policy orientations, making their integration in the prospective social bloc next to impossible. Clusters 16 and especially 15 on the other hand express policy demands compatible with such an integration. Moving to neoliberal policy orientations, cluster 7, split on the issue of further European integration, express demands close to those of cluster 6. More generally, taking clusters broadly in favour of neoliberal economic policy and structural reforms and favourable or not opposed to European integration, one could obtain a new social bloc gathering groups 6, 7, 9, 10, 15, 16 and 17, which would represent roughly 26% of the sample. Some groups are sometimes more favourable to neoliberal economic policy than cluster 6. The extension of the social bloc beyond the core social group would therefore probably require the elaboration of a political strategy oriented towards labour market and social protection reforms.

A significant characteristic of this bloc is that, contrary to the traditional left and right blocs, it would exclude the popular classes and have core groups with a high level of education and income. Considering the sociological composition (age, income, education), cluster 7 are not too dissimilar to cluster 6 and reinforce the bourgeois character of the bloc. Clusters 9, 10, 15, and 16 regroup individuals with high income and/or education level too. These groups would then correspond to the “bourgeois” identified in Amable & Palombarini (2014).<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> One may note that this bloc are not particularly ‘culturally progressive’ if one is to judge by the attitude regarding the right to adopt children by gay couples.

cluster	EU is a risk for	
	social protection	national identity
1	-0,13 -1,52	<b>-0,89</b> -7,43
2	<b>0,33</b> 2,75	<b>0,27</b> 2,74
3	<b>0,42</b> 3,16	<b>0,29</b> 2,79
4	<b>0,39</b> 3,43	<b>0,74</b> 5,93
5	<b>0,34</b> 2,57	-0,18 -1,71
6	-0,17 -1,72	<b>-0,70</b> -5,26
7	0,04 0,36	-0,04 -0,38
8	0,17 1,41	<b>0,34</b> 2,89
9	0,01 0,04	<b>0,26</b> 2,29
10	<b>-0,60</b> -5,29	-0,04 -0,39
11	-0,05 -0,43	0,11 0,93
12	<b>0,42</b> 2,67	<b>0,67</b> 4,21
13	-0,09 -0,80	-0,19 -1,69
14	0,18 1,37	<b>-0,35</b> -2,87
15	<b>-0,57</b> -4,58	-0,23 -1,89
16	<b>-0,57</b> -3,36	-0,09 -0,53
17	-0,03 -0,16	<b>0,34</b> 2,04
18	-0,11 -0,55	-0,31 -1,60

Table 5. Risks associated with European integration. Logit estimation. Z statistic between brackets.



Figure 1. Policy issue compatibility between classes. Plain: pro-European integration or pro-neoliberal reforms. Hatched: opposed to European integration or neoliberal reforms. Blank: split or undecided.

## Conclusion

2012 and the presidency of François Hollande represented a key-moment for the transformation of the French socio-economic model and the associated socio-political (dis)equilibrium. The gradual breakup of the social blocs that had structured political competition during most of the 5th Republic was completed, and this made possible the victory of an outsider with a “movement” formed barely one year before the 2017 elections whose social base was composed of the better-off segments of the traditional left and right social blocs.<sup>24</sup> By promoting the key issues for the formation of the bloc bourgeois, Emmanuel Macron was able to exploit an opportunity created by the emergence of the European integration issue as a key political divide.<sup>25</sup>

The analysis performed in this paper has shown that the core of the bloc bourgeois is rather narrow, and extending the bloc in order to integrate other social groups is a political necessity. The analysis suggests that this extension would not be possible, at least not to a significant extent, with “nonbourgeois” groups of the former left bloc. An extension on the right appears more feasible, based on the satisfaction of demands for the implementation of neoliberal reforms. But even such an extension would not guarantee a majoritarian social alliance.<sup>26</sup>

The stability of the bloc bourgeois depends crucially on the acceptability of neoliberal reforms by the groups of that social alliance. As shown by the empirical analysis, there exists potential conflicts within the extended bloc bourgeois on the area subject to ‘reforms’ and on the extent of the transformations. A unification of the bloc bourgeois on these issues would make it increasingly resemble the more affluent part of the traditional right bloc. Another possible issue is immigration. A “liberal” attitude in this respect is important for the core bloc bourgeois but possibly antagonises some groups of the former right bloc that would be necessary for the extension of the bloc. On the other hand, too repressive an attitude in this respect would be in contradiction with the expectations of the bourgeois part of the former left bloc.<sup>27</sup> But one should not overestimate the “progressive” or “culturally liberal” values of the bloc bourgeois. Our analysis has shown that the classes of the bloc bourgeois were not particularly culturally liberal in comparison to other classes. Finkelstein (2018) showed that a large fraction of Macron’s constituency (46%) were in favour of having as a head of state a “strong man” that would not have to worry about elections or the parliament. Of all supporters of other parties, only those of Front National were more in favour of that option (55%).

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<sup>24</sup> In the first round of the 2017 presidential election, he obtained his best results with the skilled workforce and professionals (37%) and his weakest score with workers (15%). He scored 35% of the voters with a university degree but only 17% of those under the secondary education level, 14% with voters whose monthly household income is under 1250 euros, but 32% for those above 3000 euros. Source: Ipsos/Sopra-Steria poll accessed at <https://www.ipsos.com/fr-fr/1er-tour-presidentielle-2017-sociologie-de-lelectorat>

<sup>25</sup> Amable & Palombarini (2018).

<sup>26</sup> A key element in Macron's victory in 2017 was the particular political institutions of France and their presidential character. The outcome of the legislative elections is strongly dependent on that of the presidential election. This, and a particularly low participation rate, made it possible for LREM to obtain an absolute majority in parliament while representing only 15% of the electorate in the first round

<sup>27</sup> A study of Macron’s party LREM (Cautres et al. 2018) reveals the existence of several fractions. The so-called “liberal progressive” holding economic neoliberal and culturally progressive values represent slightly less than a third of the party members, being outnumbered by the (liberal- and moderate-) ‘conservatives’ that represent together 42% of LREM membership.

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## Appendix

### *Questions used for the empirical analysis*

Respondent's position on

- the single employment contract: Very favourable / Somewhat favourable / Somewhat unfavourable / Very unfavourable / no answer, do not know.
- the power of the French state vs. Europe, from 0 (French state) to 5 (Europe), and no answer / do not know.
- Sarkozy's pension reform, from 0 (unfair) to 5 (fair), and no answer / do not know.
- the proposition 'the government should reduce income inequalities': strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / no answer, do not know.
- on nuclear plants, from 0 (stop) to 5 (continue), and no answer / do not know.
- immigration, from 0 (stop immigration) to 5 (welcome new immigrants), and no answer/do not know.
- the number of civil servants, from 0 (reduce) to 5 (increase), and no answer/do not know.
- privatisations: Very positive / Fairly positive / Fairly negative / Very negative / no answer, do not know.
- the priority for economic policy in the forthcoming years: improve firms' competitiveness / improve employees' condition / no answer, do not know.

Degree of approval of the proposition

- 'The unemployed could find work if they really wanted to': strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / no answer, do not know.
- 'Homosexual couples should have the right to adopt children': strongly agree / somewhat agree / somewhat disagree / strongly disagree / no answer, do not know.
- 'the VAT should be increased (to finance social protection)': from 0 to 6 and no answer/do not know

### **18-cluster model**

#### *Description*

Number of cases	2014
Number of parameters	1097
Degrees of freedom	917
Classification errors	0.16
Reduction of errors	0.82
Entropy-Rsquared	0.84
Standard R-squared	0.74

#### *Test 18 vs. 19 clusters*

Log-likelihood (LL)	-2LL difference	p-value
-34193.37	4093	0.20

Conclusion: reject the 19-cluster model.