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Lambelet, Sébastien

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Urban regimes and exchanges of policy resources: a necessary reconciliation

Defending the relevance of urban regime analysis in three Swiss cities

Sébastien Lambelet¹

¹Research assistant/PhD Student

Institute for Environmental Governance and Territorial Development

Department of Political Science and International Relations

University of Geneva

40, Bd. du Pont-d'Arve, 1205 Geneva, Switzerland

sebastien.lambelet@unige.ch

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Introduction

Urban regime analysis has established itself as a dominant paradigm in the field of urban politics (Imbroscio 1998; Davies 2002; Davies 2003:253). Despite the variety of their concerns, nearly half of the authors contributing to the *Oxford Handbook of Urban Politics* (Mossberger, Clarke, and John 2012) refer to Stone's founding book *Regime Politics*. Nevertheless, over the last years, urban regime analysis has been the subject of increasing criticism. Some scholars argue that time has come to "bury it with honors" since its impacts in other subfields of political science prove to be rather limited (Sapotichne, Jones, and Wolfe 2007). Other scholars, including Stone himself, argue that regime analysis conserves its relevance for studying contemporary local politics if adaptations are made to its initial framework (Mossberger 2009; Burns 2015).

Joining the second group of scholars, this article aims at identifying configurations of policy resources exchanges allowing the formation of urban regimes. According to the "iron law" of urban regime analysis (Stoker 1995:61; Stone 2015:116), resources have to be commensurate with the policy agenda pursued by the governing coalition. However, since *Regime Politics*, urban regime scholars have surprisingly offered few empirical insights on specifying the precise nature of these resources and their exchanges. Stone himself recognizes this lack (2005:30).

To contribute filling this gap, this article traces the evolution of urban renewal projects in three Swiss cities (Zurich, Bern and Geneva) and analyses the uses and the exchanges of five policy resources (land, law, money, expertise and democratic support). Despite a common aim, these projects are based on diverse configurations of resources exchanges and reveal various balances of power within the governing coalitions that pursue them. These results suggest that the urban regime framework keeps its analytical relevance in the current era of the postindustrial city and

that it has the capacity to travel easily to new countries if it abandons the ambition of identifying governing coalitions ruling an entire city.

The remainder of this article is structured as follows. First, I summarize scholarly debate about the criteria defining an urban regime and particularly the resource's criterion. Second, I make some methodological claims to adapt urban regime analysis to the recent evolution of urban politics and justify my cases selection on various aspects. Third, I trace the evolution of three urban renewal projects in three Swiss cities to identify the configurations of resources exchanges underlying them. Finally, I compare my three cases and join the current debate about the relevance of urban regime analysis.

Four consensual criteria to define an urban regime but a lack a clarity on the resource's criterion

In *Regime Politics*, Clarence Stone defines an urban regime as "an informal yet relatively stable group *with access to institutional resources* that enable it to have a sustained role in making governing decisions" (Stone 1989:4 [original emphasis]). This definition has been widely accepted in the literature (Stoker and Mossberger 1994:197; Stoker 1995:58-59; Mossberger and Stoker 2001:813; Mossberger 2009:42) and subsequent work has identified four criteria as the core features of an urban regime (Mossberger and Stoker 2001:829; Stone 2005:329; Mossberger 2009:49):

- the presence of a governing coalition including public and private actors;
- a jointly defined agenda targeting the interests of this coalition;
- a scheme of long-term cooperation leading to self-confidence among involved actors; and finally,
- the capacity to mobilize policy resources to sustain this agenda.

The three first criteria were largely discussed in the literature and these debates contributed to specify them. On the first criterion, debates crystallized on whom to integrate in the governing coalition (eg. Dowding et al. 1999; Mossberger and Stoker 2001). On the criterion of the policy agenda, debates concentrated on whether or not maintaining attractive economic conditions for business actors was always the top priority for local authorities (DeLeon 1992; Imbroscio 2003, 2004; Kilburn 2004; Stone 2004). Finally, based on the third criterion, major criticism emphasized the inability of urban regime analysis to explain change (Stoker 1995; DiGaetano 1997; Davies 2002; Rast 2015).

On the contrary, the last criterion stipulating the necessity to mobilize policy resources was not the subject of similarly debates and some lack of clarity remains on this point. Although highlighted in italics in Stone's original definition (1989:4), the terms *institutional resources* remain vague and have not been specified in subsequent work. Most scholars referring to this original definition insist on the informal mode of cooperation between coalition partners operating without an encompassing structure of command (Stoker and Mossberger 1994:197; Stoker 1995:58-59; Mossberger and Stoker 2001:813), but neither specify the term *institutional* nor give concrete examples of institutional resources. The recent symposium published for the 25th anniversary of *Regime Politics* is no exception on that point. Scholars defend the current

validity of urban regime analysis and propose modifications to its initial framework (Hankins 2015; Jones-Correa and Wong 2015; Rast 2015) but do not tackle this gray zone about policy resources.

Therefore, a significant discrepancy exists in urban regime studies. At the theoretical level, there is a wide consensus arguing that the exchange of fragmented policy resources between public and private actors constitutes a key element of an urban regime (Mossberger and Stoker 2001:829). Stoker defines this exchange as the "iron law" of urban regime analysis (1995:61) and Stone insists, in his most recent contribution, that this "iron law" conserves its analytical relevance, despite the switch from the industrial to the post-industrial city (2015:103&116). However, at the empirical level, only a few scholars determine precisely *which* policy resources are exchanged by coalition partners. Following Peterson's (1981) idea that local governments are dependent from private resources to govern the city, several scholars only underline the passive role of local authorities, limited to securing, as far as they can, optimal economic conditions to attract business actors (*eg.* Stone and Sanders 1986; Elkin 1987; Kantor 1988). These studies do not examine in detail which policy resources are brought by each side of the coalition in governing arrangements. Adopting a comparative perspective, other empirical studies focus on public-private relations and modes of cooperation at a general level of abstraction, but do not enter a micro-level analysis specifying policy resources exchanges (John and Cole 1998; DiGaetano and Lawless 1999; Dormois 2006).

Regime Politics remains an exception as Stone (1989) precisely identifies policy resources exchanges. In Atlanta's coalition, the downtown business elite has access to a wide amount of resources ranging from money and land to organizational support and technical expertise (Stone 1989:192-193). It only lacks electoral support brought by the black middle class able of mobilizing voters and winning mass elections (*Ibid.*, 197). Nevertheless, Stone is less precise on the identification of policy resources in his subsequent work. Presenting his typology of urban regimes, Stone differentiates immaterial and material resources and argues that governing coalitions have to own both, although material ones are more useful (1993:11). Then, he indicates that the control of legal bases, business investments and development expertise are necessary to form a development regime (*Ibid.*:19), but does not specify necessary resources for other types of regime.

Adding confusion in the debate, some scholars use the term "resources" to refer to contextual variables influencing the bargaining position of cities in a globalized context (Kantor and Savitch 1993; Kantor, Savitch, and Haddock 1997; Savitch and Kantor 2002; Kantor and Savitch 2005). Others give insights about policy resources brought by local authorities in a governing coalition, but prefer the term "governing strategies" to designate them (DiGaetano and Klemanski 1993). In the end, the dominant explanation about regime formation stipulates that business actors bring economic resources and local authorities bring political resources to the governing coalition (Mossberger and Stoker 2001: 813). Nevertheless, as stressed by Imbroscio (1998), this reductive view assumes a too rigid division of labor between state and market. It omits that local authorities also own many infrastructures (*eg.* airports, stadiums, mass transit systems) and can play a more active role in governing their own city.

To sum up, urban regime analysis still holds an unsystematic view of policy resources exchanges occurring in governing coalitions. The goal of this article is to tackle this gap by focusing on five policy resources: land, law, money, expertise and democratic support. These five policy resources were essential for the governing coalition of Atlanta and analyzing how they are mobilized and exchanged by coalition partners in recent urban projects in another country will show that urban regime analysis remains a powerful tool to investigate urban politics despite the heavy criticism it has recently faced.

Methodological claims and case selection

This article relies on a comparison of three major urban renewal projects in three Swiss cities. To my view, policy resources exchanges have been overlooked in the empirical analysis since urban regime scholars were obsessed with identifying one single longstanding coalition similar to the one of Atlanta. Given that the exercise of power is now less steady (Stone 2015:112) and that the implication of business organizations in local politics has decreased (Hanson et al. 2010), the emergence of such coalitions seems rather unlikely in the current period of time. Therefore, I argue that urban regime analysis should leave aside the macro perspective of the whole city and rather be used as an analytical tool to study governing arrangements aiming at realizing major development projects. Operating such a change in the level of analysis allows urban regime analysis to travel more easily to new countries and to identify more precisely exchanges of policy resources. Concentrating the analysis on urban renewal projects is also consistent with two current trends of urban politics. First, following the back-to-the-city movement, urban renewal has become the key issue for local governments in the current era of the post-industrial city (Atkinson and Bridge 2005; Ehrenhalt 2012; Hyra 2012). Second, urban projects have become a new policy instrument at the centerpiece of the policy agendas of municipalities and public-private cooperation now concentrates around the planning and the realization of these major projects (Kühne 1997; Pinson 2004, 2009). Let me now justify my case selection on various aspects.

First of all, I concentrate on Switzerland, a country which has a federalist structure similar to the one of the US, with three levels on the federalist scale (the municipal level, the cantonal level which corresponds to the state level of the US and the federal level). Swiss municipalities benefit from a strong autonomy in international comparison (Hesse and Sharpe 1991; Horber-Papazian and Jacot-Descombes 2014), both in fiscal policy as they can set a part of their tax-levels independently, and in planning policies as they control zoning, validate land use plans and deliver building permits. Federal funds can be allocated to urban projects, but cities are in competition to obtain them (Thétaz 2010; Pflieger 2013:200ss). Therefore, studying Switzerland, I do not face the issue of the national state playing the central role in urban policies that some scholars stress in France or in the UK (Le Gales 1995; Harding 1997; Davies 2003). Swiss municipalities are the corner stone of the Swiss bottom-up state (Linder 2010:55ss) and analyzing the local level is the key for understanding the dynamics of Swiss politics. As Stone emphasized several times the importance of the local level for regime formation (2004:16; 2005:328; 2015:107ss), applying urban regime analysis to Switzerland seems coherent and promising.

Second, I select the cities of Zurich, Bern and Geneva which represent the three centers of the largest Swiss metropolitan areas¹. These three urban areas experienced a significant demographic and economic growth since 2000, both in the city-center and in their suburban municipalities (see Table 1). As several scholars demonstrate that the economic context influences the capacity of local authorities to form governing coalitions (John and Cole 1995; Savitch and Kantor 2002; Kilburn 2004), keeping this variable as constant as possible across the cases is important to focus on resources exchanges within coalitions.

Table 1: Evolution of the number of inhabitants and jobs since 2000 in the urban areas of Zurich, Bern and Geneva

		Number of inhabitants in 2000	Number of inhabitants in 2013	Variation 2000-2013 (%)	Number of jobs in 2001 (% tertiary sector)	Number of jobs in 2012 (% tertiary sector)	Variation 2001-2012 (%)
Zurich	Municipality	337'900	384'786	13.9%	341'213 (88.8%)	450'561 (92.8%)	32.0%
	Agglomeration ²	1'047'442	1'232'634	17.7%	689'879 (80.1%)	872'385 (84.8%)	26.5%
Bern	Municipality	122'484	128'848	5.2%	149'492 (87.7%)	185'132 (91.5%)	23.8%
	Agglomeration	340'376	364'221	7.0%	237'025 (80.6%)	293'774 (85.3%)	23.9%
Geneva	Municipality	174'999	191'557	9.5%	130'701 (92.2%)	173'023 (93.8%)	32.4%
	Agglomeration ³	466'306	541'266	16.1%	259'564 (82.3%)	359'894 (85.3%)	38.7%

Source: Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO) 2015a, 2015b and 2015c).

Finally, I select one major urban renewal project for each city under study (see Table 2). The three projects denote a critical juncture in the development of their city. They are mentioned several times in the governing objectives set at the beginning of a new legislature and represent a top priority for local authorities. Thus, I can assume that if local authorities are not able to form a governing coalition on these projects, this reveals a serious inability to govern their city at a larger scale.

To identify the network of actors and the exchanges of policy resources for each urban project, I rely on several primary sources (press articles, annual reports, project conventions, Parliamentary debates). I complement these data with 36 semi-structured conducted with mayors, business representatives, heads of administration, members of City Parliaments or inhabitants associations between April 2013 and February 2015. A comprehensive list of the interviewees appears in the Appendix.

¹ Basle has more inhabitants than Bern but in terms of commuter-flows, Basle has merged with the Zurich metropolis since 2000 (Dessemontet, Kaufmann, and Jemelin 2010:2795).

² All the neighboring municipalities having at least one sixth of their population working in the city-center are included in the agglomeration according to the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO) (see Schuler et al. 2005).

³ In this table, only the Swiss part of the Geneva agglomeration is taken into account.

Table 2: Selected urban projects

City	Project's name	Goals	Planning starting year
Zurich	Europaallee	New CBD next to the central railway station. 6'000 workplaces, 300 housings, a high-school, a hostel and a senior's residence by 2020.	2003
Bern	Wankdorf-City	New business district in the north-east of the city. 5'000 workplaces by 2015. A hostel, 150 housings and thousands of additional workplaces by 2018.	1999
Geneva	Praille-Acacias-Vernets (PAV)	Renewal of the city's largest industrial zone into a mixed neighbourhood. 13'000 jobs and 6'500 housings by 2050.	2005

Zurich: a new CBD next to the railway station

Zurich is the Swiss economic capital and the seventh most important financial center worldwide (QFCA 2014), thanks to the importance of its banking and insurance sector. All national transport infrastructure (highway, railway and airways networks) are structured around Zurich's metropolis and its dynamism has always generated fascination among urban planners (Eisinger and Reuther 2007). However, Zurich's development was regularly shaped by social tension with its inhabitants (Cattacin 1994; Hitz, Schmid, and Wolff 1995; Schmid 2006). In the 1970 and the 1980s, the local population regularly manifested its opposition to huge development projects and forced authorities to reconsider their development strategy (Kühne, 1997:19ss.)⁴. To preserve the downtown from high buildings and land speculation, local authorities planed the office buildings necessary for the development of the financial sector in peripheral areas. Defined as a "territorial compromise" by several scholars (Hitz *et al.* 1995; Schmid 2006), this development strategy lasted until the end of the 1990s.

This article focuses on the development of a new center business district (CBD) around Zurich's railway station. This new CBD is known as one of the most contested urban projects in Zurich's history (Wolff 2012:113). At his origins, some investors including major Swiss banks and building firms wished to build high office buildings over the railway lines of the main station. For four decades, this project named *Eurogate* was blocked by the territorial compromise and 80 million Swiss francs were invested in an unfruitful planning. In 2001, *Eurogate* was definitely abandoned. Two years later, the real estate division of the Swiss Federal Railways and the Municipality of Zurich jointly started a new project named *Europaallee*. This new governing coalition succeeded to renew Zurich's CBD, thanks to several changes that occurred in both organizations at the turn of the millennium.

⁴ For instance, inhabitants rejected the construction of a subway line through a popular ballot in 1973 and regularly organized demonstrations claiming the right to live in the downtown for low-income social classes through the 1980s.

As landowner of the main station and its surroundings, the SRF had an interest in the *Eurogate* project but never wished to invest in it (Interviewee 10). At that time, their real estate strategy related only to the development of the railway network (Gerber 2008a:38) and creating new neighborhoods was not part of their tasks as a federal agency. This radically changed in 1999, when federal authorities transformed the SFR in a state-owned limited company. From that point forward, federal authorities have demanded that real estate operations generate rents to partly finance the maintenance and the development of the railway network (*Ibid.*:33). Responding to that demand, the SFR has created an independent real estate division, which seeks profitability similarly to any other real estate company. Since then, the SFR has perceived the surroundings of Zurich's main station as a gold mine and has been interested in taking the lead responsibility for its further development. Nevertheless, having followed the planning high and lows of *Eurogate* for decades, the SFR made two important decisions before starting a new planning procedure (Interviewee 10). First, it sought consensus with municipal authorities instead of pursuing its own planning as bankers did with the project *Eurogate*. Second, it abandoned the idea of building over the railway lines as it generated huge starts-up costs associated with a high financial risk. Instead, the SFR planned to progressively remove unused railway lines previously used for freight services at the edges of the main station to make land available for construction.

On the side of Municipality, several changes also occurred between *Eurogate* and *Europaallee*. First of all, a forum of discussion between municipal authorities, business actors and the civil society was organized between August 1996 and May 1997 in order to define a common development strategy for the city (Arras and Keller 1997). It led to a wide consensus about the necessity to strengthen the cooperation between state and non-state actors in future development projects (*Ibid.*: 45ss). Some scholars perceive this forum as the first step of a deeper transformation of Zurich's governance, switching from a maintenance to a development regime (Crivelli and Dlabac 2006; Devecchi 2010, 2012).

A political change also occurred in the municipal government. Between 1986 and 1998, the local minister responsible for urban planning and construction was the socialist Ursula Koch, whose leitmotiv was "*Die Stadt ist gebaut*" [The city is constructed]. She prioritized housing construction and quality of life in the city-center and aims at stopping gigantic office buildings projects arguing that Zurich should not be planned as Hong-Kong, Tokyo or Singapore (Koch 1988). Koch's philosophy also contributed to block the project *Eurogate* for decades. In 1998, Koch was replaced by Elmar Ledergerber whose main objective was to reaffirm the position of Zurich as a global city. Even if he was also socialist, Ledergerber wished to restore the image of municipal authorities often negatively perceived by business actors as a brake to development during Koch's mandate (Interviewees 3, 7, 9 and 11). In 2002, Ledergerber was elected mayor and stayed at this position until 2009. During this period, the redevelopment of the city-center was defined as a top priority by the local government several times (Stadtrat Zürich 2006, 2010). This new political will was also linked to the fact that the surroundings of Zurich's main station were often perceived as an unsafe area and contributed to display a negative image of the city (Interviewees 3, 6 and 11).

To sum up, all these changes allowed the SFR and the Municipality of Zurich to engage in a cooperative process in the early 2000s and to jointly start the planning of the *Europaallee* project.

In 2003, they organized an international architectural competition to shape the contours of the future neighborhood and to identify its development potential. Doing so, they jointly mobilized the resource expertise. This architectural competition led to the formulation of a “private land use plan”⁵ (resource law) determining the size and the location of future buildings. This plan was transmitted to the City Parliament in 2005.

The land use plan required that future buildings would all be submitted to an individual architectural design competition, with the Municipality involved in the jury. With this clause, local authorities had a guarantee regarding the architectural design exemplarity of the future CBD. In exchange, they allowed a higher density of construction than the one set out in the general planning law (Gemeinderat Zürich 2006:3180ss) offering a greater economic profitability to the SFR. Thanks to this higher density rate, the SFR was able to assume all building costs including public infrastructure that is normally taken in charge by the Municipality, such as public spaces, roads, and connections to the water and electricity supply systems. In terms of policy resources, the local government conceded a legislative exception (resource "law") in exchange of the guarantee to renew Zurich's CBD without any monetary expense⁶ (resource "money").

Choosing to develop a private land use plan instead of a public one is not insignificant. It allowed the SFR to have a strong influence on the planning legal bases which I interpret as a joint mobilization of the legal resource. This choice also forced the City Parliament to vote on the whole plan without modifying some details of the agreement reached between the SFR and the municipal government (Interviewee 9). This strategy recalls the one of Atlanta's biracial coalition preventing the entrance of new stakeholders in the governing coalition and keeping it as narrow as possible (Stone, 1989:201).

The Parliament adopted the land use plan in January 2006 quasi-unanimously⁷, thanks to the argument that the municipal government had been involved in the project since its beginning. However, inhabitants of the adjacent local district launched a referendum against this decision and succeeded in collecting the 2'000 required signatures (*Gemeindeordnung Stadt Zürich*, art. 12b). They feared an excessive gentrification of the city-center and denounced the very high real estate gains profiting only the SFR and not the Municipality.

Coalition partners took the opportunity offered by the voting campaign to promote the project and to show their narrow cooperation. They were very confident about the result of the ballot and never considered the possibility to lose it (Interviewee 11). They even saw it as an opportunity to get a stronger democratic legitimacy for their common development strategy:

⁵ Free translation from the German terms „privater Gestaltungsplan” (*Bauordnung Stadt Zürich*, art. 4)

⁶ The Municipality took in charge only half of the costs of the general architectural competition organized in 2003 since it shared it with the SFR.

⁷ Only the members of the extreme-left party abstained.

"At first, I admit that [the referendum] annoyed us but then we noticed that it was a chance, since we could get a higher legitimacy. If we won the vote, not only the Parliament would have accepted [the project] but also the population."[own translation]⁸

A. Steiger, project manager of *Europaallee* for the SFR real estate.

This strategy proved to be effective since 65.5% of the population supported the land use plan in September 2006. After the ballot, some opponents owning a building in the perimeter of the land use plan appealed to court. However, their appeal was rejected by the cantonal administrative court in 2007. So, opponents tried to mobilize the resource democratic support and the resource law to block the project, but in the end both policy resources remained in the hands of the governing coalition. Afterwards, the way was clear for the SFR to realize the territorial transformation. Construction works started in 2009 and first buildings including new offices for the largest Swiss banks (UBS, Credit Suisse), a commercial center and the cantonal high school for education were inaugurated in 2012. Although construction work is planned until 2020, the SFR succeeded in renting all remaining office space already in December 2014, when Google decided to locate its most important research and development center outside the USA in the new neighborhood.

The success of the project *Europaallee* denotes a turning-point in Zurich's development history. The CBD has finally been transformed and densified, putting an end to the territorial compromise that emerged in the 1970s. Since this first achievement, the governing coalition including the SFR and the Municipality of Zurich has continued to renew the city-center. On the other side of the railway lines of the main station, it currently plans a new neighborhood, named *Zollstrasse*, including 15'000m² of gross floor area for offices, 7'000m² for shops and 140 housings. The private land use plan commonly elaborated after an international architectural competition was adopted by the City Parliament in January 2014. No referendum was launched against the project this time, showing that the governing coalition gained democratic support over the long run with the electoral victory on *Europaallee*. In *Zollstrasse*, construction work will start in 2017.

In parallel, the governing coalition has also started to renew the surroundings of three suburban railway stations located around Zurich's CBD⁹. Removing unused railway lines, the SFR aims at constructing several towers reaching 80 meters high, although skyscrapers have always been controversial through Zurich's history (Gimmi 2011) and only 80 meters high buildings currently exist in whole Switzerland (*Handelszeitung.ch*, 2014/02/13). Regarding the exchanges of policy resources, the governing coalition always follows a *modus operandi* similar to the one of *Europaallee*. As summarized in Table 3, the private actor brings land, money and implementation expertise. The early implication of the municipal government in the projects secures the support of the City Parliament and the local population, thereby bringing democratic support to the coalition. Finally, the legal resource and planning expertise are jointly mobilized

⁸ Here is the original quote in German: "Zuerst hat uns [das Referendum] geärgert, ich muss es nicht verstecken, aber dann haben wir gesagt es ist eine Chance, weil wir eine höhere Legitimation kriegen. Wenn wir die Abstimmung gewinnen hat nicht nur den Gemeinderat ja gesagt sondern auch die Bevölkerung"

⁹ Tiefenbrunnen in the South, Oerlikon in the North and Alstetten in the West.

as coalition partners commonly elaborate private land use plans to limit Parliamentary intervention.

Table 3: Policy resources exchanges, dominant actor, and type of regime for the case of Zurich.

Exchanges of policy resources			Dominant actor in the coalition
Owned by the local government	Democratic support		Private actor (Real estate division of the Swiss Federal Railways)
Jointly mobilized	Law (private land use plan) and expertise (planning stage)		
Owned by the private partner	Land, money and expertise (realization stage)		Type of urban regime
Mobilized by opponents	Successfully	-	Development regime (see Stone 1989, 1993)
	Unsuccessfully	Democratic support and law	

Despite the fact that urban governance has become less cohesive and less steady in the last decades (Stone 2015:112), the case of Zurich shows that the emergence of a development regime similar to the one of Atlanta remains possible nowadays. A second similarity is striking between the two cases. As the CAP in Atlanta, the SFR real estate division holds a dominant position in Zurich's coalition, since it determines the location of further development, sets its speed of progress, influences the legal bases to achieve it and benefits from huge land rents at the end of the day. On the contrary, the gains of the Municipality are mainly urbanistic. Renewing its CBD without monetary expenses is certainly advantageous for a city government, but local authorities do not recover any part of the generated land rents even if they take an active role in the planning process. I now turn to the case of Bern.

Bern : a new business district replacing a slaughterhouse

Bern is the Swiss capital and the capital of the canton which bears his name. Among the largest Swiss cities, Bern is the only one having more workplaces than inhabitants (Gemeinderat Bern 2009:10) and represents the most important administrative center in Switzerland. 15% of the labor force works in the public administration (Stadt Bern 2014:90). Before the semi-privatization of the Swiss Post and the Swiss Federal Railways in 1999¹⁰, this ratio reached 25%. (*Ibid*: 88), since, taken together, these two state-owned companies have twice more employees than the entire federal administration. Thus, it was particularly important for local authorities that these previous state actors maintain their national headquarters in Bern after their privatization. To do so, local authorities started to renew their largest industrial area and created the project *Wankdorf-City* on which I focus in this article.

Covering an area of 339 hectares, the Wankdorf neighborhood was defined in 1989 as the largest cantonal area with strong development potential. It currently hosts numerous firms, a

¹⁰ These two agencies act currently on a liberalized market but remain the full property of the Swiss Confederation. Therefore, I use the term "semi-privatization".

football stadium, an ice hockey arena, a congress center, military barracks and housings for 24'000 inhabitants (Gerber 2008b:18ss). The main landowners of the area are public bodies including the Swiss Confederation, the State of Bern, the Municipality of Bern and the Bern bourgeoisie¹¹. A first general land use plan covering the whole Wankdorf area was elaborated in the early 1990s, and signed by all these public bodies in 1996. This general land use plan generated knowledge about the area as it contained several urbanistic data such as volume of traffic, building density rates or numbers of parking lots. However, it resulted from a top-down planning procedure with the canton in the driver's seat and did not lead to a concrete densification of the perimeter.

In the early 2000s, two factors accelerated the process of densification. First, the project of a suburban train station planned for more than ten years was finally realized. Inaugurated in 2004, this station connects the Wankdorf to Bern's main station in three minutes and makes the neighborhood far more accessible than before. Second, cantonal authorities introduced a new policy instrument to regulate motorized traffic flows named *Fahrleistungsmodell* in German. This instrument fixes a quota of daily traffic flows to each constructible area, namely 7'500 for the whole Wankdorf area. If a future construction generates traffic flows exceeding the quota, the cantonal administration does not deliver any building permit, until the landowner proposes adequate compensatory measures. As a consequence, this system generates a strong competition among landowners, each one fearing to face a used up contingent if it builds too late (Interviewee 13).

The Municipality of Bern has owned for decades many plots of land located directly next to the new station. To keep the advantage of being the first landowner building on this highly strategic area, the local government elaborated the *Wankdorf-City* project, aiming at replacing the slaughterhouse implanted in the area by high office buildings offering around 5'000 workplaces (Stadtrat Bern 2003:8). Choosing this location for further development also had the strong advantage of avoiding opposition by inhabitants as no housings were located next to it (Interviewees 16 and 22).

To realize *Wankdorf-City*, the local government first activated the legal resource. It elaborated a zoning law allowing a higher density rate on the surroundings of the new station. This zoning law generated an important land rent for the Municipality, since the majority of the area was in its own land portfolio. Second, the Municipality established a land use plan for the area and submitted it to a popular ballot with the new zoning law. On these two points, a popular vote was not mandatory. However, since it exceeded 7 million Swiss francs (*Gemeindeordnung Stadt Bern*, art. 36f), citizens had to validate the municipal contribution to the financing of the new train station. Therefore, the local government preferred to submit a package with the three objects to the verdict of voters to legitimize its whole development strategy in the Wankdorf. This strategy proved to be very effective since 86% of the voters accepted this package in

¹¹ In the canton of Bern, bourgeoisies are recognized by the cantonal constitution as public bodies (*Gemeindeordnung Stadt Bern*, art. 107) and contribute to social and cultural prosperity. In the city of Bern, the role of the bourgeoisie is particularly relevant, since it owns about one third of land property over the municipal territory (Arnet 1998:125).

February 2003 and gave a strong democratic legitimacy to the *Wankdorf-City* project since its early stages of planning.

Thus, the planning phase of *Wankdorf-City* is characterized by a public monopoly of policy resources. The Municipality owns land, law, democratic support and shares expertise with other public landowners in the area, thanks to the general planning procedure of the 1990s. Finally, its use of the financial resource is moderate, since it pays only one quarter of the costs of the new railway station¹² and secures higher financial gains with the zoning modification¹³. Therefore, local authorities do not need to engage in a cooperation with private stakeholders in this first stage.

The need of cooperation with the business sector became apparent in the realization stage, since the municipal administration did not have the necessary knowledge to build an office complex hosting thousands of workplaces (interviewee 22) and did not wish to assume the financial risk linked to it (Interviewee 16). Following its general development strategy, it planned to sign a land lease contract with private investors financing construction. However, the Municipality took charge of the costs of public infrastructures necessary for the development of the new neighborhood (roads, public spaces, connections to water, electricity and gas supply networks). It could have asked the investors to take charge of these costs, but this clause allowed the Municipality to control the implementation of the project and to benefit from a higher land rent (Interviewees 13 and 22). These modalities were submitted to a new popular vote before starting to search potential investors. In this way, the local government conserved an important room for maneuver in choosing the investors and in negotiating implementation details. The local government was totally explicit on this point in the message it addressed to the voters before the ballot (Stadtrat Bern 2005:32). Again, its strategy worked perfectly, since 87.6% of the voters approved these modalities in September 2005.

After two years of research, the Municipality found interested investors to realize *Wankdorf-City* and managed a great double hit as three major companies decided to locate their national headquarters in the new neighborhood. First, the Swiss Federal Railways wished to concentrate its headquarters on a single location. As a new private actor, SFR had no more formal obligation to stay in the Swiss capital. It hesitated to go in Olten, a small city between Bern and Zurich, but the project *Wankdorf-City* convinced the board of directors to stay in Bern (Interviewees 17). The SFR was the first investor signing a land lease contract with the Municipality and assumed the construction costs of its own buildings concentrating 1'800 workplaces. Its move also made its previous headquarters in the city-center available for the University of Bern, thereby rendering a service to cantonal authorities.

The second business actor joining *Wankdorf-City* was the construction company Losinger-Marazzi. The firm belongs to the French group Bouygues and is one of the leading construction firms in Switzerland. Losinger signed the second land lease contract and took the responsibility to realize two other buildings hosting more than 3'000 workplaces. A significant part of the firm

¹² The rest is paid by the Swiss Confederation, the SFR and the canton of Bern.

¹³ The Municipality pays 7.3 million Swiss Francs (Stadtrat Bern 2003:14) and the property tax following the zoning modification is around 9 million, without taking into account the important land rent coming from its own land portfolio.

was historically implanted in Bern but left it in 2006 for the suburban municipality of Köniz. For the local government, a preliminary condition to conclude the land lease agreement was that Losinger-Marazzi comes back to the city of Bern (Interviewee 16).

Finally, the Swiss Post also decided to locate its headquarters in Wankdorf-City as a tenant of one building constructed by Losinger-Marazzi. For a while, the Swiss Post hesitated to locate its headquarters in a building they own next to Bern's main station but, in the end, it was more profitable to go in Wankdorf-City and to lease the building located in the center (Interviewee 23). Bern's mayor also engaged himself to convince the Swiss Post to choose *Wankdorf-City* (Interviewee 22), although he could have let Losinger doing it, since the Municipality did not sign any contractual agreement with the Swiss Post. This political engagement shows that *Wankdorf-City* held a great importance for local authorities that adopted a proactive attitude to realize it.

So, in the realization stage, the Municipality mobilized the land resource and delegated the construction work requiring expertise and money to Losinger-Marazzi and the SFR by signing land lease contracts. Nevertheless, money was jointly mobilized as the Municipality financed public infrastructure to control implementation and to participate in the architectural competitions organized for each building. At the end, public infrastructure costs were higher than expected and required another popular ballot to free up an additional credit of 25 million Swiss francs. Being coherent with previous votes, 70% of voters accepted this credit in September 2010, although budget overspend are traditionally unpopular. Therefore, the government strategy of having submitted the project *Wankdorf-City* to popular ballots since its beginnings proves to be effective from an ex-post perspective.

The headquarters of the SFR were inaugurated in summer 2014, the ones of the Swiss Post in summer 2015. However, the Municipality did not wait these inaugurations to start the planning of a second phase following the same *modus operandi*. Already in 2009, it spent 3 million Swiss francs to redeem the land lease contract of a glass factory valid until 2015. This sum was invested only to destroy the factory more rapidly to make land available for construction. Keeping its proactive attitude, the Municipality then elaborated a masterplan and started to look for other potential investors. In 2014, a consortium composed of Losinger-Marazzi and *Die Mobiliar*, one of the most important insurance company in Switzerland, signed the land lease contract for this second phase aiming at constructing supplementary offices for the SFR, a hostel, and 150 housings. Assumed by Losinger-Marazzi, construction work will start in 2016.

Since *Wankdorf-City*, cooperation with the SFR and Losinger-Marazzi has continued on other development projects. The SFR takes the lead in the transformation of the main railway station that is currently under planning and partly financed by the Municipality. Losinger-Marazzi realizes and finances a preliminary study for the renewal of the former gas factory located at the south edge of the city. This shows that mutual trust between the municipal government and these companies that were historically implanted in Bern has developed beyond the project *Wankdorf-City*.

To conclude on the case of Bern, let me define its type of regime. One of the first criticism Imbroscio (1998) addressed to urban regime analysis was its too rigid division of labor between state and non-state actors. He argued that local authorities could also take an active role in the

accumulation process of economic development based on their own land property and defined this type of regime as a local-statist regime (1998:11). However, he had trouble finding viable examples of such a regime in contemporary America. To my view, the case of Bern corresponds to a local-statist regime. Profiting from its land property, the Municipality of Bern defines the location of further development, sets its speed of progress, determines its legal bases independently and benefits from its land rents. As summarized in Table 4, the Municipality only engages in a cooperative process with business actors for the realization of its projects, thereby holding a dominant position in the governing coalitions it forms.

Table 4: Policy resources exchanges, dominant actor, and type of regime for the case of Bern.

Exchanges of policy resources			Dominant actor in the coalition
Owned by the local government	Land, law, democratic support, expertise (planning stage).		Public actor (Municipality of Bern)
Jointly mobilized	Money		
Owned by the private partner	Expertise (realization stage)		Type of urban regime
Mobilized by opponents	Successfully	-	Local-statist regime (see Imbroscio 1998)

Geneva: the impossible mutation of an industrial area as a symptom of an non-regime

Geneva hosts numerous international organizations and ranks on the thirteen position of the most important financial center worldwide (QFCA 2014). It is the center of a transnational agglomeration of 946'000 inhabitants (Grand Genève 2014) including two French departments and one district of the neighboring Swiss canton. Geneva faces the second most severe housing shortages of Switzerland after Basle (FSO 2014). 82% of the existing housing stock of the canton was constructed before 1991 (OCSTAT 2015) and the vacancy rate on the housing market has been below 0.4% since 2002 (OCSTAT 2014)¹⁴. Cantonal authorities are unable to reverse this trend. Since 2001, they have rarely achieved to build 1'600 new housings per year, a target they fix themselves in the general planning objectives (République et Canton de Genève 2013). As a consequence, Geneva exports his growth outside of its territorial boundaries. 65% of the housings constructed in the agglomeration between 2000 and 2014 was constructed in the neighboring French districts.

In terms of urban planning, the canton of Geneva is different from its counterparts in the rest of Switzerland, since all planning competences (delivering of building permits, validation of land use plans and zoning modifications, steering and monitoring of urban projects) are concentrated in the hands of cantonal authorities (Sager 2002:193; Ladner et al. 2013:74). Municipal governments and Parliaments are allowed to give recommendations but cantonal authorities can ignore them. However, in practice, they rarely do so. Thus, this institutional configuration leads

¹⁴ The cantonal housing legislation defines a vacancy rate below 2% as a situation of housing shortages (*Loi sur les démolitions, transformations et rénovations de maisons d'habitation* (LDTR), art. 25, al. 2).

to a higher number of involved public bodies and increases coordination costs for the planning and the implementation of any urban project (Interviewee 29).

This article focuses on the project *Praille-Acacias-Vernets* (PAV) which has been designated by the cantonal government as a top priority to solve the issue of housing shortages during the last three legislatures (Conseil d'Etat 2005, 2009; République et Canton de Genève 2015). PAV is currently an industrial area of 230 hectares located at the south-west of the historical downtown and includes three different municipalities (Geneva, Carouge and Lancy). This area hosts more than 1'500 small and medium business offering around 19'000 workplaces. Two stations of the suburban train line connecting Geneva's main station to the neighboring French city of Annemasse that is currently under construction will serve the PAV area from 2019 onwards.

Contrary to the renewal of the Wankdorf area which was initiated by public authorities, the first impulsions to renew the industrial zone of the PAV came from non-state actors. In 2004, the Institute of Architecture of the University of Geneva launched a two-years student workshop to identify the development potential of the area (Institut d'architecture de l'Université de Genève 2006), which was considered as marginal at that time (Della Casa 2005:8). In 2005, the Geneva section of the Federation of Swiss Architects (FSA) organized an international architectural competition imagining the design of the future neighborhood and generating a debate about its renewal. This architectural competition was a great success, since 520 architects coming from 40 countries submitted a proposition of densification (*Ibid.*:12). These private initiatives raised awareness among cantonal authorities and contributed to set the PAV as a top priority on the policy agenda. In the following years, the cantonal government quoted twice the PAV in the inaugural speech of the legislature (Conseil d'Etat, 2005, 2009)¹⁵ and defined it as the future downtown of Geneva (Conseil d'Etat 2007). This sudden change of strategy is rather surprising, since two major infrastructures were inaugurated in the PAV area at the same period of time, namely a new 30'000 seat football stadium and an open-air parking of 560 lots.

The State of Geneva owns around 60% of the plots of land located in the PAV area, a matter of fact that cantonal authorities have regularly stressed as a strong advantage to rapidly densify it (Conseil d'Etat 2007). However, when the industrial zone was created between the 1950s and the 1960s, the government signed land lease contracts with the firms coming to the area. The vast majority of these land lease agreements was granted for 99 years¹⁶ and is still valid until 2050 or even 2060. Thus, the State of Geneva owns the land but cannot use it. Authorities are constrained to negotiate with the firms and to offer them new locations for their economic activity if they wish to densify the area.

To concretize its densification strategy, the cantonal government first gave a mandate to the Industrial Land Foundation (FTI¹⁷) for elaborating a masterplan. The FTI is a foundation placed under state control which is responsible for managing and monitoring land lease arrangements with small and medium businesses all over Geneva. Thanks to its semi-public status, this

¹⁵ This speech is generally rather symbolic than programmatic and quoting an urban project in it is rather exceptional (Institut d'architecture de l'Université de Genève 2006:5).

¹⁶ Which is the maximum length of a land lease contract according to the Swiss civil code (Swiss Civil Code (SCC), art. 675ss).

¹⁷ This abbreviation comes from the French full-name which is *Fédération pour les terrains industriels de Genève*.

foundation has always maintained personal contact with all the firms implanted in the PAV area (Interviewees 24 and 33). Following its mandate, the FTI initiated a cooperative procedure preparing the firms for the territorial transformation and proposed them to locate their activities on industrial brownfields it owns at the periphery of Geneva. The masterplan was released in 2007. It entailed 10 areas of intervention to renew the PAV and aimed at creating 20'000 workplaces and 6'000 housings.

In 2008, this public-private cooperative process was suddenly interrupted, since the cantonal government decided to apply a new scheme of implementation. It considered this project as too important to be managed by an external organization and created a new steering committee gathering three cantonal ministers and three municipal magistrates, one for each of the three municipalities involved in the project. By doing so, the cantonal government took the leading role in the project and prioritized public-public over public-private cooperation. It also forced the FTI to exchange its plots of land in the PAV with an equivalent land surface located in peripheral industrial zones of the canton. As the land value of these plots of land was far from being equivalent, this exchange generated a net loss of 291 million Swiss francs in the balance sheet of the FTI in 2010 (Grand Conseil 2012:2).

Thanks to its semi-public status and its proximity to the firms implanted in the PAV, the FTI would have certainly been able to renegotiate land lease contracts and to make land available for construction (Interviewees 25 and 30). By creating a new steering committee excluding the FTI, the cantonal government lost its expertise. Since then, the process of renewal of the PAV has almost stopped, since the majority of the firms prefers to stay at their current location until the term of their land lease contracts. Therefore, by marginalizing the FTI and by taking the leading role in the project, the cantonal government wanted at all costs to affirm its authority (*power over*), but lost its capacity to act and to renew the PAV area (*power to*).

As soon as the government was in the driver's seat, it concentrated its efforts on the modification of the zoning law to allow a higher density rate in the PAV area. This legal modification was accepted by the City Parliaments of the three municipalities in 2009. Nevertheless, in the municipality of Geneva, the cantonal association for the defense of tenants launched a referendum against the law. With the help of left parties, it succeeded in collecting the 4'000 necessary signatures. As this referendum targeted a municipal recommendation, cantonal authorities could have ignored it. However, such a political decision would have been too costly, as the opponents would have come back at every further step of the planning procedure to block the project (Interviewee 32). Therefore, the cantonal minister in charge of the project preferred to negotiate with the referendum committee to avoid a popular ballot.

During the negotiations, the referendum committee obtained almost all the project's modifications it aimed at. First, it increased the projected number of housings and defined a one to one ratio between housings and workplaces in the whole area. Second, it forbade the construction of owner occupied apartments and demanded that social housings represent two thirds of the future housing stock of the PAV area. Finally, a follow-up commission gathering the members of the steering committee, the members of the referendum committee and representative of real estate agencies and building companies associations was created to ensure compliance with these agreements. All these modalities were enshrined in the zoning law

modifying the affectation of the PAV area (LPAV), which was accepted unanimously by the cantonal Parliament in June 2011.

Since it allowed a higher density rate on a perimeter of 140 hectares, this law generated a land rent of 400 million Swiss francs benefiting the State of Geneva (Interviewee 28; *Le Temps*, 2014/04/10). Instead of blocking this sum on a special fund dedicated to the renewal of the PAV, the cantonal government poured it back into its regular budget to balance it for two years (Interviewee 28). As a consequence, the government currently lacks the financial means to compensate the firms choosing to leave the PAV area, to redeem their land use rights or to pay depollution costs. Once again, a political mistake based on a short-term perspective destroyed a policy resource owned by the cantonal government and seriously hampered its ability to transform the PAV area.

After the adoption of the zoning law, the cantonal government continued to put the emphasis on the legal resource and on public-public cooperation with municipalities. It started to elaborate a global land use plan covering the whole PAV area. Contrary to the masterplan of 2007 in which municipalities were not involved (Interviewee 24), this global land use plan resulted from a political consensus between the State and the three municipalities of Lancy, Carouge and Geneva (Interviewee 29). This consensus also entailed a convention providing for a fair share of the costs of future public infrastructure (roads, parks, schools, and water and electricity supply systems) signed by the four public entities in December 2014.

However, the global land use plan includes mainly projects that will remain utopic as far as no solution is found to relocate firms¹⁸. Indeed, current legal bases make the territorial mutation financially impossible (Interviewee 28). With two thirds of social housings and no owner occupied apartments, investors do not benefit from sufficient margins to redeem land use rights, offer adequate compensation to the firms and assume depollution costs. Thus, the negotiation made with the opponents to avoid a popular ballot was counterproductive as it has rendered the territorial transformation infeasible. Since coming to office at the end of 2013, the new minister in charge of the project has aimed at modifying the law to break the deadlock, but the association for the defense of tenants has already threatened to launch a new referendum.

Currently, a dialogue still takes place between public and private actors about the renewal of the PAV area. However, few concrete solutions have yet been found for its transformation and, since 2005, only a dozen of firms have accepted to relocate into more peripheral industrial areas (Interviewees 30 and 31). The only location where an agreement has been reached to make land available for construction relates to the military barracks located at the north-west of the PAV area. In 2018, the Swiss army will move to new military barracks constructed at the periphery of the canton, allowing the construction of 1'500 housings by 2020. Investors realizing these housings take a sum of 33 million Swiss francs at their charge to partly finance the construction of the new military barracks (Conseil d'Etat 2015). Although this project has been presented by local authorities as a model of a successful public-private cooperation (Conseil d'Etat 2015;

¹⁸ The most utopic projects are certainly, first, a public park planned at the current location of a huge commercial center whose owner holds a land lease right, and, second, the objective of having open rivers that are currently underground in the middle of the PAV. When I asked interview partners about the feasibility of both projects, most of them sidestepped the question arguing that they will not be implemented before decades but still need to be integrated in the global land use plan.

Interviewees 26, 28 and 29), the agreement reached to make land available for construction results from a public-public negotiation between the State of Geneva and the Swiss Confederation. It cannot be transferred to other locations in the PAV to provide for solutions relocating firms and solving the key issue putting the PAV into a deadlock. Even in two areas where international architectural competitions were already organized and financed by the State (DCTI 2012; DALE 2015), no solution has yet been found to relocate firms and make land available for construction. For the time, no one knows when the construction of the high buildings planned in these areas will start.

Since it destroyed money and expertise, the last policy resource at the disposal of the State of Geneva to realize the transformation of the PAV is the legal resource. The cantonal government regularly activates it to refuse building permits to all the firms implanted in the PAV area aiming at modernizing or extending their activity¹⁹. By doing so, the government hopes that the entrepreneurs will be discouraged and that they will finally leave the PAV before the term of their land lease contract. On the opposite side, the vast majority of entrepreneurs aims at staying in the PAV for the moment, since the State does not offer adequate solutions for their relocation, namely a financial compensation and an optimal new location. Entrepreneurs are confident with this strategy, since their land lease rights do not allow the State to expropriate them and force it to negotiate (Comptoir Immobilier 2012). In a nutshell, each side uses the policy resource it owns to counter the strategy of the other side and there is no exchange of policy resources. Summarized in Table 5, these elements denote the absence of a governing coalition which is characteristic of a non-regime.

Table 5: Policy resources exchanges, dominant actor and type of regime for the case of Geneva.

Exchanges of policy resources			Dominant actor in the coalition
Owned by the local government	Law. Destruction of money and expertise.		No coalition
Jointly mobilized	-		
Owned by the private partner	Land		Type of urban regime
Mobilized by opponents	Successfully	Democratic support (even if the vote did not take place)	Non-regime (see Stone 1993; Burns, Thomas, 2006).
	Unsuccessfully	-	

¹⁹ Recently, a firm specialized in the retail of electric material has appealed to the Federal Court to obtain its building permit. Nevertheless, cantonal authorities won their case since the Federal Court estimated that according a building permit in that area would have further threatened the territorial transformation (Swiss Federal Court 2014).

Discussion

Urban regime analysis has traditionally assumed a fixed distribution of policy resources within governing coalitions. Put simply, business actors control the economic sphere and should mobilize land, money and development expertise. On the other hand, local authorities control the political sphere and should provide popular support and adequate legal bases to the governing coalition. My analysis reveals a slightly different picture. Over the past years, the three cities of Zurich, Bern and Geneva have defined an ambitious political agenda and have benefited from a significant economic and demographic growth. Despite these common points, the way local authorities realize their agenda and conclude governing arrangements with business actors differs starkly from one city to the other, since the policy resources at their disposal also vary. Table 6 summarizes configurations of policy resources exchanges in the three cities.

Table 6: Policy resources exchanges, dominant actor, and type of regime in comparison.

		Zurich	Bern	Geneva
Exchanges of policy resources				
Owned by the local government		Democratic support	Land, law, democratic support, expertise (planning stage).	Law. Destruction of money and expertise.
Jointly mobilized		Law (private land use plan) and expertise (planning stage)	Money	-
Owned by the private partner		Land, money and expertise (realization stage)	Expertise (realization stage)	Land
Mobilized by opponents	Successfully	-	-	Democratic support (even if the vote did not take place)
	Unsuccessfully	Democratic support and law	-	-
Dominant actor in the coalition		Private actor	Public actor	No coalition
Type of urban regime		Development regime	Local-statist regime	Non-regime

In Zurich the renewing of the CBD relies primarily on the resources of a new private actor, namely the SFR real estate. The municipal government cooperates in the planning stage and secures popular support for the project but delegates the whole realization to its private partner. On the contrary, in Bern, local authorities adopt a proactive attitude towards development and define the planning stage on their own. They only start to cooperate with business actors for the realization of their project and determine precisely the tasks they delegate to them. Finally, in Geneva, the renewal of the PAV is currently blocked since the level of cooperation between public and private actors remains too low. The key to understand these differences is the way actors mobilize and exchange or not policy resources in each case.

First of all, land property plays the most significant role in the balance of power observed in the different cases. In Bern, land property is the resource allowing the Municipality to hold a monopolistic position in the planning stage and to choose its coalition partners for the realization. In Zurich, on the contrary, the Municipality follows the impulses given by the SFR as a private landowner. In Geneva, both actors have rights on land but no consensual solution is found. Therefore, the project ends in a deadlock. Peterson already emphasized land as the factor of production "over which cities exercise the greatest control" (1981:25) but did only consider control over land use and not state-owned property. As Imbroscio (1998) suggested with its local-statist regime, the case of Bern shows that municipalities can exert a greater pressure to constrain private actors to follow their development objectives if they own land and are able to make it available for construction.

The legal resource also exerts a significant influence on the balance of power in the governing coalition. Local authorities can use it to set precise planning objectives and to constrain private actors to accept them as they did in Bern, but they can also use them to concede important financial gains to the private partner as they did in Zurich. In the first case, public authorities hold a dominant position; in the latter, private interests dominate. However, using the legal resource against private interests is counterproductive and prevents the formation of governing coalitions as I observe in Geneva.

As Stone (1989) already emphasized in Atlanta, legitimizing the agenda of the governing coalition and winning mass elections remains the task of local authorities. However, my study also reveals some differences on this point. As the case of Bern demonstrates, activating democratic support on its own can also be a way for local authorities to constrain private partners to accept their planning objectives. On the contrary, winning a referendum can be a way for a governing coalition to reduce opposition and get stronger legitimacy for its development strategy as in Zurich. In any case, allowing opponents to enter in negotiation with the governing coalition seriously threaten the feasibility of urban projects as I observe for the PAV in Geneva.

Not surprisingly, money and expertise remain a main purpose for public authorities to seek cooperation with business actors. However, even on that point, local authorities have some room for maneuver. As they do in Bern, they can decide to elaborate the necessary planning studies on their own and to finance the public infrastructures of the new neighborhood to exert a greater control over their private partners. On the contrary, they can opt for a joint mobilization of expertise by organizing common architectural competitions and delegate the full financial responsibility to the private partner as in Zurich. In any case, if local authorities destroy, deliberately or not, these two resources it will put their projects in a deadlock as I observe in Geneva.

Most of these results should not seem revolutionary to urban regime scholars. Indeed, they mainly confirm the empirical validity of the "iron law". In the two cities where projects are successful, governing coalitions are able to mobilize commensurate resources with the ambitions of their political agendas. On the contrary, in Geneva, public-private cooperation remains insufficient and leads to a lack of resources to carry out the territorial transformation of the PAV.

I think that confirming the empirical validity of the "iron law" is precisely what urban regime scholars need to do to respond to current criticism. In this vein, my results primarily show that urban regime analysis keeps its relevance in the current period of the postindustrial era and has the capacity to travel to other countries.

Then, I would dare say that my results offer the opportunity to reconsider some aspects of urban regime analysis. First, my analysis shows various balances of powers within the governing elite. Local authorities are not necessarily in a weaker position than business actors. They benefit from several policy instruments to constrain them, among which land property seems to be the most efficient. As types of urban regime were previously differentiated mainly on policy agendas (see Stone 1993), configurations of resources exchanges could be a new criterion to distinguish types of urban regime adding sophistication to Stone's typology.

Second, my analysis suggests that forming a governing coalition does not only require to bring together fragmented policy resources (Mossberger, Stoker 2001:829) but also to jointly mobilize some of them. Sharing financial costs as in Bern or agreeing on legal bases ruling the construction of a future neighborhood as in Zurich can be two successful ways of jointly mobilizing a resource.

Finally, focusing on the issue of resources allows to identify whether social groups that are against the policy agenda defined by the governing coalition mobilize some resources to oppose development projects and how the governing coalition responds to that mobilization. By doing so, my analysis partly responds to the recent criticism formulated by Jones-Correa and Wong (2015) arguing that urban regime analysis tends to overlook any action undertaken by social groups that are outside the governing elite.

Conclusion

This article aimed at identifying configurations of policy resources exchanges allowing the formation of urban regimes. To do so, I analyzed major urban renewal projects in the Swiss cities of Zurich, Bern and Geneva and identified how five policy resources (land, law, money, expertise and democratic support) were mobilized to realize them. Over the last fifteen years, these three cities have benefited from economic and demographic growth and have defined similar development agendas. However, I observed various configurations of policy resources exchanges and different policy outcomes in each case. These results confirm the empirical validity of the "iron law" of urban regime analysis in the current era of the post-industrial city and show that urban regime analysis has the capacity to travel outside of the Anglo-Saxon world. They also suggest that urban regime analysis has much to gain if it focuses on major urban projects and abandons the ambition of identifying governing coalitions exerting preemptive power over an entire city. Therefore, it seems that the time to bury regime analysis, even with proper honors, is still far away.

Appendix

List of interviewees

Zurich - Europaallee

1. Ralph Baenziger, lead architect of Eurogate and opponent to Europaallee. Interviewed on 27th June 2013 in Zurich.
2. Kees Christiaanse, architect, developer of the master plan of Europaallee. Interviewed on 28th June 2013 on the phone.
3. Franz Eberhard, director of the office for urban development from 1997 to 2009. Interviewed on 12th June 2013 in Zurich.
4. Thomas Gehrig and Angelo Moser, UBS representatives. Interviewed on 24th June 2013 in Zurich.
5. Elmar Ledergerber, member of the city government head of the urban development office from 1998 to 2002, mayor from 2002 to 2008. Interviewed on 21st June 2013 in Zurich.
6. Kathrin Martelli, member of the city government from 1994 to 2010, head of the urban development office from 2002 to 2010. Interviewed on 27th June 2013 in Zurich.
7. André Odermatt, member of the City Parliament between 1995 and 2010, member of the city government head of the urban development office since 2010. Interviewed on 26th September 2013 in Zurich.
8. Niklaus Scherr, member of the City Parliament since 1978. Leader of the referendum committee against Europaallee. Interviewed on 13th June 2013 in Zurich.
9. Emil Seliner, member of the City Parliament from 2002 to 2010. President of the special commission working on the master plan of Europaallee. Interviewed on 17th June 2013 in Zurich.
10. Andreas Steiger, SFR employee since 1993 and project manager of Europaallee since 2003. Interview on 24th May 2013 in Zurich.
11. Brigit Wehrli, director of the office for city planning from 1997 to 2012. Interviewed on 23rd April 2013 in Zurich.

Bern - Wankdorf-City

12. Regula Buchmüller, director of the office for city planning since 2005. Interviewed on 4th November 2013 in Bern.
13. Daniel Conca, high-ranking civil servant at the real estate office of the city of Bern since 2008. Interviewed on 13th November 2013 in Bern.
14. Alec von Graffenried, director for sustainable development for Losinger-Marazzi since 2007. Interviewed on 4th December 2013 in Bern.
15. Jacqueline Hadorn, high-ranking civil servant in the office for urban development since 1993. Interviewed on 19th November 2013 in Bern.

16. Barbara Hayoz, member of the local government from 2005 to 2012, head of the financial and real estate office from 2007 to 2012. Interviewed on 13th November 2013 in Bern.
17. Lorenz Held and Stefan Holzinger, SFR real estate representatives, interviewed on 20th November 2013 in Bern.
18. Christoph Lerch, prefect of the Bern-Mittelland region since 2010. Interviewed on 22nd November 2013 in Ostermundigen.
19. Rudolf Muggli, member of the executive commission of the fund for land and housing policies from 1998 to 2010. Interviewed on 2nd December 2013 in Bern.
20. Stéphanie Pehner, member of the City Parliament and of the urban planning commission since 2007. Interviewed on 18th November 2013 in Bern.
21. Bruno Riedo, manager of the land property of the Bern bourgeoisie. Interviewed on 7th January 2014 in Bern.
22. Alexander Tschäppät, member of the local government since 2001, mayor since 2005. Interviewed on 16th December in Bern.

Zurich – Europaallee AND Bern – Wankdorf-City

23. Alexander von Teufenstein, executive representative of the real estate division of the Swiss Post. Interviewed on 19th June 2013 in Bern.

Geneva – Praille, Acacias, Vernets (PAV)

24. François Baertschi, member of the government of the municipality of Lancy since 2003, head of the department for city planning. Interviewed on 30th May 2014 in Lancy.
25. Yves Creteigny, director of the Industrial Land Foundation of Geneva since 2011. Interviewed on 10th December 2014 in Carouge.
26. Isabel Girault, director of the cantonal office for urbanism since 2011. Interviewed on 12th August 2014 in Geneva.
27. Christian Grobet, member of the cantonal Parliament between 1969 and 1981, 1993 and 2005 and since 2013, member of the cantonal government responsible for urban planning between 1981 and 1993 and vice-president of the Association for the protection of tenants (ASLOCA). Member of the referendum committee against the PAV. Interviewed on 3rd October 2014 in Grand-Saconnex.
28. Antonio Hodgers, member of the cantonal government since the 1st January 2014, head of the department for town and country planning. Interviewed on 8th July 2014 in Geneva.
29. Nathalie Luyet, director of the PAV project from 2012 to 2014. Interviewed on 23rd October in Lausanne.
30. Luc Malnati, urban architect at the Industrial Land Foundation of Geneva between 1998 and 2008, head of the masterplan PAV from 2006 to 2008, has its own architectural firm since 2008.

31. Philippe Moeschinger, director of the Industrial Land Foundation of Geneva between 1996 and 2011, member of the general direction and of the Boards of Directors of the Comptoir Immobilier since 2011. Interviewed on 11th November 2014.
32. Mark Muller, member of the cantonal government, head of the department for town and country planning between 2005 and 2012. Interviewed on 15th May 2014 in Geneva.
33. Rémi Pagani, member of the government of the city of Geneva since 2007, head of the department for construction and city planning. Interviewed on 30th June 2014 in Geneva.
34. Yves Perriraz, head of West Development by SFR real estate since 2013. Interviewed on 17th October in Geneva.
35. Nicolas Walder, member of the government of the municipality of Carouge since 2011, head of the department for city planning, environment and mobility. Interviewed on 9th July 2014 in Carouge.

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36. Jürg Stöckli, head of the SFR real estate and member of the Boards of Directors of the SFR since 2011. Interviewed on 2nd February 2015 in Bern.

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