China in South America. Development consequences for Argentina and Brazil

Bona, Leandro Marcelo; Páez, Sergio Martín

UNIVERSITÉ DE GENÈVE
GENEVA SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
Department of History, Economics and Society

Political Economy Working Papers | No. 4/2022

China in South America. Development consequences for Argentina and Brazil

Leandro Marcelo Bona (Université de Genève, Institut d'Histoire Économique Paul Bairoch, AEyT FLACSO/CONICET, UNLP)

Sergio Martín Páez (Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro)

Working paper

UNIVERSITÉ DE GENÈVE

Department of History, Economics and Society, University of Geneva, UniMail, bd du Pont-d'Arve 40, CH-1211 Genève 4. T: +41 22 379 81 92. Fax: +41 22 379 81 93

China in South America. Development consequences for Argentina and Brazil

Leandro Marcelo Bona[1]
Sergio Martín Páez[2]

Abstract

From the beginning of the 21st century, China has played a dominant role in international trade and geopolitics. China has been experiencing great economic growth for decades, a significant increase in its share in the global production of goods, its own novel technological developments. One of the consequences of this phenomenon is the increase in China's demand for commodities and supplies to maintain its levels of growth, which has resulted in significant increases in the foreign sales of food-exporting countries. This study presents information of recent commercial and financial links between South American countries (particularly Argentina and Brazil) and China, in order to analyze them in terms of economic development. The evaluation of these relations as a form of competence based on the deepening of the exploitation of natural resources using the dependency approach.

1. Introduction

From the beginning of the 21st century, China has played a dominant role in international trade and geopolitics. China has been experiencing great economic growth for decades, a significant increase in its share in the global production of goods, its own novel technological developments, and an unparalleled reduction of poverty (Rosales, 2019).

One of the consequences of this phenomenon is the increase in China's demand for commodities and supplies to maintain its levels of growth, which has resulted in significant increases in the foreign sales of food-exporting countries. Argentina and Brazil—the two largest South American economies in Mercosur—are among the main beneficiaries. However, these countries' possibilities of allocating any foreign currency generated to sustainable development projects and redistribution of income have been questioned. Since demand from China has driven economic growth, the focus of these countries in primary production could reduce their autonomy, bringing back old dependency relationships (Svampa and Slipak, 2018).

In Latin America, economic paths are subject to the fluctuations in the international prices of exported goods, international liquidity, and internal political conflicts. These aspects have been highlighted by dependentist and structuralist authors (Marini, 2007; Furtado, 2003; Prebisch, 1981; Katz, 2018).

[1] Institut d'Histoire Économique Paul Bairoch, AEyT FLACSO/CONICET, UNLP.
[2] Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro.

This study presents information of recent commercial and financial links between South American countries (particularly Argentina and Brazil) and China, in order to analyze them in terms of economic development. The evaluation of these relations as a form of competition based on the deepening of the exploitation of natural resources (led by fractions related to the agribusiness and the financial sector) is going to be done in the context of the international (re)emergence of China and its derived transformations. For this purpose, this study has seven sections. After the introduction, the second section includes a description of the characteristics necessary to understand current dynamics in China and South American countries. The third section provides a historical outline of the structural economic reforms in China, Argentina and Brazil throughout the last decades of the 20th century. Section four analyzes the commercial relations between these two countries and China. The next segment observes the relations in terms of foreign direct investment. Section six presents evidence of financial links. Lastly, we offer the final remarks.

2. China in South America

It is generally accepted that China has become relevant since the beginning of the 21st century with its international (re)emergence given the resulting changes in geopolitical and economic relations. As for Latin America, the discussion has to do with how to best become part of this new global dynamic in a way that will ensure both the sustainability of its economic expansion and the creation of employment.

Global accumulation has become an expansion model fueled by two articulated poles: The United States of America (USA) and China. The former plays the role of "ultimate consumer" at the global level, while the latter performs as the "world factory," the main producer of manufactures. At the same time, China has become a large consumer of European, Japanese, and Asian machinery and equipment, and Global South commodities (Medeiros, 2006; Pinto, 2011; Panitch and Gindin, 2012; Pinto and Gonçalves, 2015).[3]

Donald Trump's interregnum (2016-2020) and the emergent nationalism in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic opened up the space for "decoupling theories." However, these new trends spark debates in connection with the next trends in a world in reorganization (Treacy, 2021).

Commercial and investment flows from China expanded exponentially during the second decade of the 21st century, as part of a generalized strategy of China's influence. First, China Goes Global and lately the New Silk Road involved a number of investments in infrastructure and natural resources with the participation of 144 countries out of a total of around 200 nation states. As China established itself as a new economic, financial, and diplomatic power, international analysts started to talk about a hegemonic conflict scenario (Arrighi, 2015; Merino, 2019).

Studies focused on the Chinese impact on the Latin American accumulation dynamics have highlighted the chiaroscuros of the new international scenario. On the one hand, it entailed relief regarding the Balance-

[3] This growing demand for commodities in China and the low interest rate policy of the U.S. Federal Reserve entailed a rise in international prices of commodities traded by Latin America. This boom mainly favored countries producing minerals and oil and, to a lesser extent, agricultural producers (Ocampo, 2007; Pinto and Gonçalves, 2015).

of-Payment Constraint[4] through an increase in the price and the quantities of commodities exported. The counter effect has been the reinforcement of the predominance of primary products in the export basket, a tendency that was amplified by China's own investments in commodities sectors (Svampa and Slipak, 2015; Natch, 2013). On the other hand, the trade opening resulting from the dismantling of industrialization mechanisms led by the State (Bértola and Ocampo, 2012) opened the way to competition, in some cases under accusations of dumping, to Chinese manufactured products. Finally, the Chinese financial expansion also made it possible for countries suffering from instability resulting from the fluctuation in commodity prices to execute currency swaps with the purpose of strengthening their reserves (like Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela, among others).

3. The "China Effect"

Occupying a peripheral place in the global economic system, China and Latin American countries have started a structural transformation process in the last decades of the 20th century. Dependentist authors highlighted that Latin American countries suffered from subordinated relations with the core countries. Marini described dependency as: "(…) a relation of subordination between formally independent nations, where production relations of subordinate nations are modified o recreated in order to guarantee the reproduction of amplified dependency" (Marini, 2007, 111). According to this approach, underdevelopment is connected to the development of the industrialized countries and so, both phenomena are related. In this sense, development is not an evolutionist process to follow, and dependency do not rely only in external aspects (such as the competence on the World market), but also in internal social alliances (Dos Santos, 2002).

In order to capture the different paths followed by peripheral countries, dependency theory highlights the importance of the type of insertion in the global market since the expansion of the capitalist relations (commercial partners, productive specialization, labor relations) and its present situation, as a result of this historical situation (Dos Santos, 2002). For example, the specialization in raw materials has been a key element to understand the class formation of Latin American elites, as well as their political tendencies. Also, these generally low-value added activities are central to comprehend these countries difficulties to recreate a powerful internal market and the industrial gap with the core countries, due to the retarded industrialization of peripheral nations (Marini, 2008). During the thirty years of the golden age, peripheral countries made efforts to improve their productive capacity, but traditional dependency relations marked a limit for recreating productive and social systems similar to the ones in the core (Katz, 2018). For practical analysis, raw material specialization leads to underdevelopment, which refutes the comparative advantage mainstream theory.

[4] The external restriction has to do with the insufficiency of foreign currency in peripheral economies to pay for imports, to make foreign debt payments, to accumulate reserves (and, consequently, to maintain the stability in the exchange rate) (Thirwall, 1979), in a region with high capital flight (Kar and Freitas, 2012).

In this sense, Argentina started to change its capitalist development model in the decade of 1970 with military governments that saw the industry as the fundamental basis of a worker movement defying domination relations and that was, therefore, to be dismantled (Bona and Páez, 2020). According to military leaders, the foreign debt crisis of the 1980s reinforced the idea that industrialization had failed in the region and it was adequate to start a neo-liberal reform process, which was becoming consolidated in the West (CEPAL, 1996). In Brazil, the long-lasting military dictatorship (1964-1985) only started the abandonment of the industrialization model led by the State when the debt crisis (1982-1991) conditioned the economic capacity of the country (Bona and Páez, 2020).

In other latitudes, China was receiving an "invitation to development" from the United States of America as a strategy to increase the disagreements in the Socialist Bloc (Medeiros and Serrano, 1999; Pinto, 2011). This strategic partnership gave rise to one of the conditions for the beginning of the Eastern economic miracle: the inclusion of the Asian giant in the product and capital markets of the United States of America, which allowed for an increase in its exports and its access to international financial flows.[5] While the USA was consolidating the U.S. dollar as the international monetary standard and was driving a new era in finances after its liberalization and internationalization, China turned into the "world factory"[6]. The global manufacturing industry restructuring started with the explosion of high technology, and new global value chains emerged (with the incorporation of computing) (Panitch and Gindin, 2012). These transformations worked as a mechanism to weaken the organization and identity of the working class (Garcia Linera, 2020). During these years, Latin American countries were affected by the failed sovereign debt restructuring negotiations, which entailed political strategies of recessive imports controls and promotion of exports through aggressive exchange rate policies. The actual restructuring came with a U.S. project (the "Brady Plan"), which included a package of policies designed by international agencies, called the "Washington Consensus"[7] (Ocampo *et al.*, 2014).

The purpose of the economic policy changed from full employment to controlling the levels of inflation (in some cases, hyperinflation in the 1980s). In this regard, the independence of the Central Bank ensured the "structural adjustment" by limiting the State's ability to respond to democratic pressures regarding social

[5] The difference between China and the other Asian states which were "invited" to development by the USA (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) was that China never abandoned its autonomous defense strategy and its anti-imperialism rhetoric led by the State/party (Medeiros, 2008a).

[6] Between 1978 and 1989, the Asian country started a process to open up and selectively and gradually liberalize its economy. The main points of this new roadmap of the Chinese project were: (i) the decentralization of economic decisions through the delegation of power to the provinces and local authorities; and (ii) the adoption of management models and technologies of the West. These main points were introduced in stages based on the legitimation of the "strategic principle of opening up to the external world" and "peaceful evolution" (Pinto, 2011). China scored a triple transformation: from a planned economy to a market economy, from a closed economy to an open economy, and from a rural society to an urban society (Rosales, 2019).

[7] Reforms in peripheral countries revolved around four elements: (i) liberalization of trade, (ii) deregulation of markets, especially the financial market, (iii) privatization of State-owned companies (mainly in the areas of transportation, energy, pensions, and public utilities), (iv) relaxation of regulations/precarization of the labor market (Antunes, 2009). This resumption resulted in an increase in the profit rate, which had fallen in the 1970s (Duménil, 2007). At the same time, the liberalization of trade and the deregulation of markets entailed the dismantling of the government apparatus of intervention in productive development, to promote not only industrial but also agricultural development (Arceo and Basualdo, 2006).

expenditure. This might have been the first time in the history of Latin America that economic liberalism agreed with political liberalism (Panitch and Gindin, 2012). Even though these policies emerged as provisional, the proposal was implemented with high initial acceptance, due to the previous experience of hyperinflation (Abeles, 1999) and, in turn, it reaffirmed the structural power of dominant classes and brought together their interests with the ability to access international financial flows.

In the early 1990s, China also experienced unrest in connection with internal and external factors. The Tiananmen Square protests and the collapse of the Soviet Union entailed strong questioning of the process of decentralization and opening up. After several rounds of negotiation and with the support of provincial leaders and of the People's Liberation Army, the Great Compromise was established, which ensured the reform and opening-up process for a term of 100 years, with the aim of making China a rich and powerful nation by the middle of the 21st century. The configuration of the Great Compromise meant, on the one hand, the acceleration of the "strategic principle of opening up to the external world" through the expansion of special economic zones, and, on the other hand, the promotion of internal development, through the increase of public investment in infrastructure and industrial policies aimed at generating administrative and productivity gains for Chinese businesses (Andreas, 2010; Pinto, 2011).

During the last decade of the 20st century, China went from being a centrally planned economy to being a "socialist market economy," where diverse forms of ownership are stimulated (State, private, and foreign capital joint ventures) (Picketty, 2019). In this context, the privatization policy was implemented, as a result of which large enterprises remained under State ownership and small enterprises were assigned to their managers and provincial political leaders (internal privatization), which resulted in the emergence of a first capitalist class with strong connections with the Party (Naughton, 2007; McNally and Wright, 2010). China managed to improve its export basket and reached a manufacturing percentage in international sales exceeding 90% (Rosales, 2019). During this term, there was a change in the profile of industrial exports, which used to be focused on products with low added value (textiles and clothing), to include an increasingly diverse array of consumer and capital goods.

In recent years, China has become the second largest economy of the World (first one in PPP terms), the main exporter, the second importer, the principal creditor of the USA and the leader of digital technologies (5G). In terms of military competition, China is still far from the USA (its budget represents one third of the North American's), but has reached the second place in the World (Treacy, 2021). As Frank (2007) pointed out, the center of the global economy was going back to Orient, as it has always been[8].

After the era of the "Pacific Ascension" proclaimed by Deng Xiaoping, that consisted in a non-interventionist exterior politics and a low profile among the international arena, the nation started a new phase, "China goes out", in the direction of Xi Jinping since 2013. Two main projects express this change: The Belt and the Road Initiative and the "Made in China 2025". The first one is a project of six territorial and sea corridors that connect China with Latin America, Europe, Africa and the Middle-Orient, and

[8] Different USA representatives had argued that China is the major challenge for North American hegemony. In 2019, NATO designated China as a "systemic challenge".

implies massive infrastructure investment from China. The "Made in China 2025" pursues making China the absolute leader of innovation, through growing R+D investments.

In parallel, Latin America also intended to expand its exports as part of the new regulatory framework defined in the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1993. The adoption of international standards also applied to the promotion of foreign investments in connection with the execution of bilateral investment treaties (BIT), which basically replicated U.S. law and adopted U.S. courts as if they were global courts (Treacy, 2021).

From the financial point of view, the abundance of international liquidity resulting from financial deregulation and foreign debt securitization processes forced Latin American countries to a radical change in their external financing pattern. A strategy was adopted aimed at obtaining increasing foreign capital flows to accumulate foreign currency, control inflation, and integrate national financial markets with international financial circuits (Kulfas, 2007).

With the financial turmoil in the Asian Southeast in 1997, the region entered a crisis and experienced what Bértola and Ocampo (2012) termed the "lost half-decade": stagnation or drop in the GDP per capita and increase in inequality and poverty. In its most extreme versions, this period showed serious socio-economic crises, such as in the cases of Brazil (1998), Ecuador (1999), Argentina (1998-2001), and Bolivia (2003), which paved the way for challenging the Washington Consensus neo-liberal policies.

In this scenario, China's rise brought significant changes in the capitalist dynamics at the turn of the century. Its economy has been growing 10% per year for more than 30 years and it is now considered the "world's factory," which entails serious challenges to semi-industrialized nations such as Argentina and Brazil. After entering the WTO in 2001, China has become a more important player in multilateral institutions—such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and G-20—as well as in bilateral negotiations with other countries, which shows an upgrade in its ranking in the inter-state system. Even under the effects of the pandemic, China managed to cushion the global downturn with a relatively meager but positive growth (2.3%) in 2020 (IMF, 2021).

The transmission mechanisms of the Chinese dynamics have allowed for an almost synchronized growth in several countries across many regions in the world: Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe. China's growing demand for commodities, the maintenance of a low-interest rate by the U.S. Federal Reserve, and the increase in commodity prices have all given place to high growth rates in Latin American economies. The surge in prices has benefited mining and oil products to a large extent over agricultural products (Ocampo, 2007; Pinto and Gonçalves, 2015). Like commercial flows, China's direct foreign investment flows have grown rapidly–from USD 3 billion in 2003 to USD 128 billion in 2015, when China became the third largest foreign investor in the world after the USA and Japan (Treacy, 2020).Taking all this into account, we will now review the main points of China's commercial relationship with and investment flows in Argentina and Brazil, two of the countries that now have China as their main commercial partner and which have redefined the profile of the region.

4. China-Argentina and China-Brazil Trade Integration (2000-2020)

Between 2008 and 2018, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) reduced their share in world exports of goods from 4% to 2%. This is in stark contrast with the performance of the Asians, who in the same period increased from 28% to 34% (WTO, 2021). The relative stagnation of Latin American exports shows how difficult it is for the region to overcome a productive structure with low diversification, exporting primary and manufactured products based on natural resources (CEPAL, 2016a; Saludjian and Carcanholo, 2013). The links between South American countries with the Asian giant become important. Only Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela have a trade surplus with China (CEPAL, 2021b). At the other extreme, Mexico's trade deficit equals over two thirds of the aggregate deficit of Latin America and the Caribbean with China (CEPAL, 2016b). If we look into long-term trends, the trade relationship between the region and China shows virtually no trade until China entered the WTO in 2001, while in the following years trade clearly increased, reaching 3/3.5% of the GDP and has become especially relevant for the nations in the Southern Cone. Finally, since 2012 a reduction of trade, due to the global reduction in economic growth and the decrease in South American commodity prices (table 1).

Table 1. Argentina and Brazil exports, imports, and trade balance with China. Current USD million. 1990-2020.

Year	Argentina			Brazil		
	Imports	Exports	*Balance*	Imports	Exports	*Balance*
1990	32	241	*209*	203	382	*178*
1991	188	248	*59*	75	226	*151*
1992	170	128	*-42*	57	460	*403*
1993	215	163	*-52*	157	779	*622*
1994	217	225	*8*	197	822	*626*
1995	608	286	*-322*	418	1 204	*786*
1996	698	607	*-90*	1 252	1 114	*-138*
1997	1 005	871	*-134*	1 317	1 088	*-229*
1998	1 167	682	*-486*	1 134	905	*-229*
1999	992	508	*-484*	943	676	*-267*
2000	1 157	797	*-360*	1 222	1 085	*-137*
2001	1 066	1 123	*56*	1 328	1 902	*574*
2002	330	1 092	*762*	1 554	2 521	*967*
2003	721	2 478	*1 758*	2 148	4 533	*2 386*
2004	1 401	2 630	*1 229*	3 710	5 442	*1 731*
2005	1 529	3 154	*1 626*	5 355	6 835	*1 480*
2006	3 122	3 476	*354*	7 989	8 402	*413*
2007	5 093	5 167	*74*	13 661	10 777	*-2 884*
2008	7 104	6 355	*-749*	21 738	16 520	*-5 218*
2009	4 823	3 666	*-1 156*	16 937	20 995	*4 058*
2010	7 649	5 799	*-1 850*	27 829	30 748	*2 918*
2011	10 573	6 033	*-4 540*	24 414	44 305	*19 891*
2012	9 901	5 068	*-4 832*	36 467	41 078	*4 610*
2013	11 312	5 512	*-5 801*	39 632	46 021	*6 388*

2014	10 709	4 460	*-6 249*	39 352	40 612	*1 260*
2015	11 743	5 174	*-6 569*	31 999	35 155	*3 156*
2016	10 467	4 425	*-6 042*	24 414	35 133	*10 719*
2017	12 314	4 325	*-7 989*	29 095	47 488	*18 394*
2018	12 072	4 211	*-7 862*	36 716	63 930	*27 214*
2019	9 259	6 818	*-2 441*	37 464	63 358	*25 894*
2020	8 656	5 244	*-3 412*	36 738	67 788	*31 050*

Source: Own preparation based on ECLAC and World Bank.

In the case of Argentina, the trade balance showed a growing negative balance with China between 2008 and 2018 (table 1). The exports recorded in 2008 were only exceeded more than a decade later (in 2019), while imports grew uninterruptedly during 2008-2018. This shows that Chinese growth has had a limited direct impact on Argentinian capital accumulation in the last decade and it has depended mainly on price effect. Only after the deepening of the Argentine debt crisis (2019) and the pandemic[9] did the drop-in imports result in a reduction in the trade deficit. These data lead to infer that China has consolidated as the main trade partner due to its growing weight in trade relative to the GDP (approximately 3.5%, in an economy which is not very open to foreign trade).

As for the content of the exchange, Argentina's trade model reproduces the historical peripheral pattern of provision of commodities and derivatives (mainly, soybean and its derivatives and, recently, beef) with imports of manufactured products and machinery. As shown by Duran Lima and Pellandra (2017), this pattern of insertion based on one or two products is also reproduced by the rest of Latin America and is a trend that has been increasingly deepening. On this point, Argentina's insertion in the Chinese accumulation pattern is in tune with the one recorded in the region (graph 1).

Graph 1. Argentina + Brazil bilateral trade balance with China by economic category. Current USD million. 2003-2020.

[9] In 2018, Argentina suffered a serious foreign exchange crisis. The government resorted to an IMF loan exceeding $44 million, which was not sufficient to prevent the impact of the crisis. In 2018 and 2019, the economy contracted significantly and by 2020 the country restructured its foreign currency debt with private creditors.



Source: Own preparation based on classification by SITC and ECLAC[10].

Brazil's case is significantly different from the Argentine case. First, the bilateral trade volume is way higher ($13.9 billion for Argentina versus $104.5 billion for Brazil in 2020, which represents less than 4% el GDP in the case of Argentina and double for the case of Brazil). Also, while the South American giant, like Argentina, multiplied commercial exchanges with China in a remarkable manner during the 21st century, its exports exceeded its imports, so China is a net provider of foreign currency for Brazil. Also, in 2019 and 2020, imports did not shrink, while exports continued at a growing pace, even in pandemics (table 1). Similarly, the Chinese (demand) growth was a driver for Brazilian growth (even when the other demand drivers were contractive).

Nevertheless, there are similarities between the Argentine case and the Brazilian case regarding the content of the bilateral foreign trade between these two countries (taken together) with China. Indeed, it can be seen a low contribution of added value in exported products (graph 1) with a focus on soybean, oil, and iron ore exports, and a preponderance of deficit in the industrial field. There is evidence of eroded contributions by these countries to the value chain of these products, as China is replacing imports of manufactured products with national production and only buying raw materials (Slipak, 2017). While the trade deficit with China is consolidating, we must bear in mind a second indicator: Asian economies which are growing at the pace of the Chinese economy and the increase in the demand for Argentine and Brazilian

[10] **Raw materials and derivatives**: Food and live animals, mainly for eating; Beverages and tobacco; Crude materials, inedible, except fuels; Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes. **Minerals and oils**: Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials. **Chemicals**: Chemicals and related products. **Manufactured goods**: Manufactured goods, machinery and transport equipment, and other manufactured articles.

primary products, especially soybean and its derivatives. In connection with this, soybean producers and farmers have become essential in the provision of foreign currency to South American economies[11].

In particular, Brazil and Argentina have become two of the main countries where the production of genetically-modified seeds has expanded. This, in addition to fertilizers, herbicides, new machinery, and production techniques, allowed for an exponential increase in agricultural productivity, especially regarding soybean. The agricultural frontier expanded, existing livestock and agricultural productions were displaced, and agribusiness grew, in connection with the transgenic technology suite. These changes led to numerous environmental concerns regarding the damage caused to human health, the conditions of the soil, and the sustainability of monocrops (Isidro and Forlani, 2019). This technological change plays a key role in explaining the export boom in the region.

These are highlights in the discussions about reprimarization in the region. Bértola and Ocampo (2012) established a direct relationship between this trend and the wider change in the Latin American development strategy from State-led industrialization to an export-oriented neo-liberal macroeconomic policy strategy oriented towards exports. In turn, Ray and Gallagher (2017) state that it is important to refrain from exaggerating the degree of reprimarization caused by China. The production of goods has decreased in relation to general growth of the GDP in the last two decades (mainly fueled by financial services and trade), but this is especially true for the manufacturing industry. Indeed, out of the three industries producing commodities (agriculture, mining, and manufactured products), only agriculture maintained its share of added value in the Latin American economy. South America's international insertion, with a prevalence of transnational companies, is based on primary production, with little added value, without a significant creation of employment, and without major structural changes (Belloni and Wainer, 2014).

At least part of the reprimarization in the last decade is attributed to the rise of China. The Asian giant is said to have contributed through two mechanisms: (i) the increase in the global demand (and prices) of raw materials, and (ii) the intensification of competition in the production of cheap manufactured products. On the one hand, Chinese investment and the demand for imports stimulated primary production. On the other hand, China has exceeded Latin America's share in the market of worldwide manufacturing exports and has become a major competitor in the industrial products markets of the main trading partners in the region, especially in the United States and even in Latin American countries. Therefore, domestic industrialists are concerned about how difficult it is to compete with China (Salama, 2017).

From the Chinese point of view, while the bilateral relationship with both countries has grown significantly, the relevance of the Latin American market is low because the Chinese trade surplus in industrialized products with the United States or the European Union is four times higher than the surplus with Latin America (de Freitas Barbosa, 2011).

---

[11] This scenario promoted a radical transformation in the productive structure of the Argentine agricultural industry, with an intensification in the use of land due to double cropping, with soybean displacing other crops in the core area, and with the incorporation of new lands (Páez, 2016).

5. Chinese FDI in Argentina and Brazil (2000-2020)

Chinese investments in the world have made a quantitative leap since the beginning of the century, which redefines the accumulation process at a global scale. According to China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), the Asian giant has increased its foreign direct investment to the world from $5.5 billion in 2004 to $196 billion in 2016. If the investments made between 2004 and 2017 are added up, the total amount reaches $1.2 trillion. China has thus become the second largest investor at a global scale, only after the United States (CEPAL, 2018). While 89% of the Chinese companies investing abroad are privately owned, more than 63% of Chinese foreign stocks are owned by State-owned companies. The Chinese government directly controls FDI flows. Even if companies are nominally privately owned, they have close ties with the State as they are partly owned by local governments or their senior executives are members of the Communist Party (Monitor of Chinese OFDI in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2019).

FDI annual flows in China have increased 45% between 2012 and 2019, but the flows to Latin America have remained stagnated. Chinese FDI in Latin America was very modest in the 1990s and the first decade of this century, but it grew starting in 2010 with a number of major acquisitions of oil companies in Argentina and energy companies in Brazil. The distribution of Chinese FDI in Latin American countries has remained pretty stable during the last years, it is very focused on Brazil and Peru, and it largely ignores other countries receiving a lot of FDI from other sources such as Colombia, Chile, or Mexico (Pérez Ludueña, 2017).

A key aspect of the impact of Chinese investments in the region has to do with the sectors they are targeted at. 60% of the foreign currency inflows in Latin America and the Caribbean between 2000 and 2018 focused on raw materials, extractive industries which supply food, minerals, and energy to China. Chinese oil companies are currently present in most oil and gas exporting countries (Red China-LAC, 2022). In Argentina, there were two major acquisitions in the oil industry in 2010 and 2011. In the mining industry, there were some investments in Brazil, but the largest transactions were in Peru (Latin America and the Caribbean Network on China, 2019). In addition to oil and mining, major investments have also been made in agriculture and fishing, although the amounts recorded are way lower and the information available is less accurate[12].

The rest of the Chinese investments in the region are focused on the service industries (30.8%), while manufactured products only account for 8.6%, and technology purchases only account for 0.6% (graph 3). Indeed, investments in services have grown considerably after the 2008/9 crisis, even if the role of primary investments remains dominant. Once again, these indicators show that the industries where China chooses

[12] Some major agricultural projects were canceled after local governments and civil society groups expressed fierce opposition. The most controversial aspect of agricultural investments was land purchasing. Also, there were large investments in the trade area of agriculture with international operations, such as the acquisition of Noble's agricultural assets and a majority share in Nidera by China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Corporation (COFCO). These firms hold significant assets in Argentina (Perez Ludueña, 2017).

to focus its investments in the region have to do with providing basic supply to its internal market, but they are very unlikely to result in progress for Latin American countries in global value chains.

Graph 2. China investments in Brazil and Argentina in percentage by Chinese origin (public-private) and sector. 2003-2020.



Source: Own preparation based on data from Latin America and the Caribbean Network on China (2021).

Chinese investments in Argentina and Brazil have mainly focused on the agricultural and extractive industries (mining and energy). Projects also include some services which are directly part of the primary sector (primary product trade, technology solutions, and fertilizer trade).

An analysis of investments according to the source of the Chinese capital (public or private) and the sector of the economy (primary, manufacturing, and service sectors) shows that in the total amount of $56.194 billion invested in Brazil, Chinese State-owned companies, which accounted for 88% of that amount, clearly prevailed. The situation is the same in Argentina, with investments of around $11.657 billion, which represent 89% of the $13.101 billion invested in this country. The productive profile of Chinese preferences in these two countries shows that the primary and the service sectors account for most of the amounts invested, even if the service sector exceeds the primary sector in Argentina. Investments in the secondary sector are in the last place in both cases (graph 2).

It is becoming clear that Chinese investments in Argentina and Brazil have to do with a strategy of the Chinese government. These data show how key Latin America is for the Chinese supply process: the Chinese government chooses the industries which can provide commodities to attain local production processes. While in the last 10 years Chinese investments have increased in the service sector in Latin America and the Caribbean, these investments are still relatively scarce as compared with the primary sector. The increasing presence of China in the service sector also shows that its government is making a bet on industries producing non-tradable goods, *i.e.*, those whose products cannot compete with its local ones. This Chinese presence challenges US hegemony, and reinforces raw material specialization (Kaplan, 2021). All of the above notwithstanding, China's position in the FDI stock and flows in Latin America is still minor. Even with the growth of Chinese investments in Brazil, in the last decade two thirds of China's FDI was connected with European companies, followed by the United States with 17% of the total, and Latin American countries with 7%. Chinese investments do not reach 4% of the total invested in the last decade in Brazil (CEPAL, 2021b). In the case of Argentina, Chinese investments do not even represent 1% of the foreign investment in the country, which leads to think that the deepening of the commercial relationships between China and South America is far from replacing the supremacy of Europe and the United States in the region.

6. Banking sector and the financial channel

As part of the internationalization strategy, financial investments were also part of the process. In terms of the banking sector, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) announced the purchase of the majority block of shares of Standard Bank (a South African bank) in 2011 in Argentina and, in turn, obtained clearance to open a branch in Brazil in 2012. In terms of assets, ICBC is the largest bank in the world and is controlled by the Chinese government. So far, it has a relatively minor participation in both banking sectors that are led by national SOEs, local groups such as Bradesco, Itau or Macro and "Spanish" banks such as BBVA and Santander (Oglietti & Páez, 2022).

Besides, in the context of the decrease in the terms of trade since 2012, the Chinese government offered the possibility of executing swaps in national currency to guarantee international reserves for the countries in the region. Under these conditions, Argentina executed a swap for the equivalent of $11 billion in 2014. While the role of Argentina and Brazil are not key as an investment destination, we can identify these two elements: (i) a clear interest in the possibility of obtaining oil from the reserves of the SOEs and their future production, such as the unconventional gas field Vaca Muerta in the Patagonia and Pré-Sal at the Rio de Janeiro's coast; and (ii) the interest of local governments in taking advantage of the possibilities of the global multipolarity given China's growth, especially from a financial point of view. In this regard, some geopolitical challenges arise in connection with the U.S. hegemony during the 20th century: oil diplomacy and the dollar-based international monetary system.

From the point of view of Argentina and Brazil, the Chinese rise entails an increase in the possibilities of obtaining foreign currency in global terms, but the industries promoted are not major creators of employment, so social sustainability significantly depends on public policies fostering full employment.

In this context, as it was said above, China has become the principal partner of countries like Argentina and Brazil in the 21Ist century and has signed Free Trade Agreements with Chile, Peru and Costa Rica (and is negotiating a new FTA with Panama, Colombia and Ecuador). Between 2005 and 2020 Chinese policy banks (particularly the Chinese Development Bank and the Import and Export Bank of China) financed governments and state own enterprise projects in Latin America for more than the USA 136,8 billion, more than any other country in this period. The principal receptive countries were Venezuela (US 62.2 billion), Brazil (US 29.7 billion), Argentina (US 17,1 billion) and Ecuador (US 18.4 billion) (graph 3). With the exception of Brazil, three of the most exposed countries in terms of sovereign debt in the 21Ist century. Most of that money was used for energy (68% of the total amount of these loans) and infrastructure (18%) projects (Bona and Flores Zendejas, 2022). In the same period, commercial banks of China made 40 loans, all of them in energy, infrastructure and mining (Myers, 2021).

Graph 3. Financial loans from Chinese banks in selected Latin American Countries. Billions of US dollars. 2005-2020.

Source: www.thedialogue.org.

The Belt and the Road Initiative has incorporated Argentina since early 2022, and is planned to continue its influence, according to the China-CELAC Forum[13]. Diplomatically, the "Five Principles of Pacific Coexistence" that China offer[14] do not threaten military, nor politically, third countries.

In this new global scenario, for China LA is a supplier of energy, mining and food, which are needed to support Chinese economic and consumption expansion (and so loans and investments are concentrated in export infrastructure, energy and mining sectors). But even if China has been improving its cooperative relations with the region (for example via the development of Confucius Institutes in LA), historical constraints (such as language or culture) still represent a barrier for a consolidation of the Asian giant in LA. At the same time, China's first trade partner is the USA (which has considered the region part its traditional "areas of influence") and has been financing USA current account deficit in the last decades, so meanwhile China could expand its relationship with LA countries, also needs to take care of its own link with the USA. The China-USA partnership is not only commercial, but also productive and financial (Stallings, 2021).

7. Final Remarks

From a peripheral place in the global economic system, both China and Latin American countries have started a structural transformation process in the last decades of the 20th century. Argentina and Brazil gradually dismantled the industrialization institutions led by the state while at the same time commercial liberalization was promoted; both countries deregulated markets and privatized part of the state activities. China, in turn, accepted the "invitation to development" from the United States, and implemented a gradual and selective opening-up policy, while decentralizing economic decisions. This way, the Asian giant rose by the beginning of the new century as a growing power and Latin America consolidated a dependent and peripheral accumulation regime.

With the financial crisis in Southeast Asia in 1997, China started to emerge as the center of the Asian dynamics. At the same time, some Latin American countries experienced crises and the region suffered a "lost half decade." In the most extreme versions, such as the Argentine case, the continuity of the neoliberal policies of the Washington Consensus was challenged and there was relative autonomy for the emergence of alternative political projects.

The consolidation of China in the international arena favored the Argentine and Brazilian economic recoveries thanks to a larger supply of foreign currency, which considerably relaxed the external restriction. From the point of view of Chinese interests and as shown in this study, the roles of Argentina and Brazil are secondary in terms of commercial integration and as an investment destination. The insertion in the Chinese accumulation regime makes South America the supplier of commodities and the destination of

[13] The CELAC groups 33 Latin American countries. The China-CELAC Forum, created in 2015, expresses the growing interest of China to develop commercial and cultural links with LA.

[14] The "Five Principles of Pacific Coexistence" are based on non-intervention in internal affairs, mutual respect on sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-mutual aggression, equality and mutual benefit and pacific coexistence.

investments facilitating such supply (infrastructure and direct investments in the extractive activities). Therefore, the old dependence relations continue to ratify these tendencies.

In this context, the question of rivalry between China and the US emerges in LA. Regarding the increasing influence of China (in terms of investment, credit and trade), the Asian giant could become a new potential imperial power. But traditional and historical influence of the US in the region, together with its military supremacy, obliges to be prudent.

References

- Abeles, Martín (1999). "El proceso de privatizaciones en la Argentina de los noventa: ¿reforma estructural o consolidación hegemónica?", en Revista Época, Año 1, Nro. 1
- Andreas, J. (2010). ¿Un modelo Shanghai? *New Left Review* Nº 65, 57-79.
- Arceo, E. y Basualdo, E. (comp.) (2006). *Neoliberalismo y sectores dominantes. Tendencias globales y experiencias nacionales*. Buenos Aires: CLACSO.
- Arrighi, G. (2015). *Adam Smith en Pekín*. Madrid: Akal.
- Barbosa, N. (2020). De Dilma a Bolsonaro: la política económica de Brasil de 2011 a 2019. *El trimestre económico*, 87 (347), 597-634.
- Basualdo, E. (2007). Acerca del concepto de patrón o régimen de acumulación y conformación estructural de la economía. Buenos Aires: AEyT FLACSO.
- Basualdo, E. (2019). *Fundamentos de economía política. Los patrones de acumulación, de los clásicos al neoliberalismo del siglo XXI*. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI.
- Basualdo, E., Barrera, M., Bona, L., González, M, Manzanelli, P. y Wainer, A. (2017). *Endeudar y Fugar. Un análisis de la historia económica argentina de Martínez de Hoz a Macri*. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI editores.
- Belloni, P. y Schorr, M. (ed.) (2019). *La economia política de Cambiemos. Ensayos sobre un nuevo ciclo neoliberal em Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Batalla de ideas.
- Belloni, P. y Wainer, A. (2014). El rol del capital extranjero y su inserción en la América del Sur posneoliberal. *Problemas del desarrollo,* 177(45), 87-112.
- Bértola, L., y Ocampo, J. A. (2012). *The Economic Development of Latin America since Independence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bisang, R., Brigo, R., Lodola, A. y Morra, F. (2018). Cadenas de valor agroalimentarias. Evolución y cambios estructurales en el siglo XXI. Secretaria de Gobierno de Agroindustria – Dirección General de Programas y Proyectos Sectoriales y Especiales (DIPROSE).
- Boito (2012). Governo Lula: a nova burguesia nacional no poder. In: BOITO JR; GALVÃO (Orgs.). Política e classes sociais no Brasil dos anos 2000. São Paulo: Alameda.
- Bona, L. (2019). ¿Neoliberalismo hegemónico? Apuntes sobre el Estado, el bloque de poder y la economía política en la Argentina reciente (2016-2018). *Pilquen, Sección Ciencias Sociales 22*, 39-54.

- Bona, L. and Flores Zendejas, J. (2022). La Gran depresión y las dos "décadas perdidas". Una mirada comparativa de las crisis en Latinoamérica bajo los cambios en la hegemonía global. *Cuadernos de Economía Crítica*, 8(16), 13-41.
- Boyer, R. (2007). *Crisis y regímenes de crecimiento*. Buenos Aires: Miño y Dávila.
- Bresser-Pereira, L. (2012). Do antigo ao novo desenvolvimentismo na América Latina. D'AGUIAR, Rosa Freire (Ed.). *Desenvolvimento econômico e crise*. Contraponto Editora, 37-65.
- Carvalho, L. (2018). *Valsa brasileira. Do boom ao caos económico*. Sao Paulo: Todavía.
- Cavalcante, S. (2020). Classe média e ameaça neofascista no Brasil de Bolsonaro. *Crítica Marxista*, 130, 121-130..
- CEPAL (1996). AMÉRICA LATINA Y EL CARIBE QUINCE AÑOS DESPUÉS *De la década perdida a la transformación económica 1980-1995*. Santiago: FCE.
- CEPAL (2016a). Panorama de la Inserción Internacional de América Latina y el Caribe. La región frente a las tensiones de la globalización. Santiago: CEPAL.
- CEPAL (2016b). Relaciones económicas entre América Latina y el Caribe y China. Oportunidades y Desafíos. Santiago: CEPAL
- CEPAL (2018). Cepalstat.org
- CEPAL (2021). *Estudio económico de América Latina y el Caribe 2021*. Santiago: CEPAL.
- Couto, J. (2020). Alguns resultados macroeconómicos do primeiro ano do governo Bolsonaro. *A Economia em Revista*, 28 (3), 93-99.
- Datz, G. (2021). Placing Contemporary Sovereign Debt. The Fragmented Landscape of legal Precedetn and Legislative Pre-emption. In Flores, J. and Pénet, P., *Sovereign Debt Diplomacies: Rethinking Sovereign Debt from Colonial Empires to Hegemony*. Oxford University Press.
- De Freitas Barbosa, A. (2011). China e América Latina na nova divisão internacional do trabalho. Em Rodrigo Pimentel Ferreira Leão, Eduardo Costa Pinto, Luciana Acioly (éd.), *A China na Nova Configuração Global: impactos políticos e econômicos*, Brasilia, IPEA.
- Dos Santos, T. (2002). *Teoría de la dependencia. Balance y perspectivas*. México: Plaza y Janés.
- Durán Lima, J. y Pellandra, A. (2017). *La irrupción de China y su impacto sobre la estructura productiva y comercial en América Latina y el Caribe*. Santiago: CEPAL.
- Dweck, E. & Teixeira, R. A. (2017). A política fiscal do governo Dilma e a crise econômica. Campinas: IE/Unicamp.
- Economic Comision for Latin America and teh Caribean -ECLAC (2021). La Inversión Extranjera Directa en América Latina y el Caribe 2020. Retrived from https://www.cepal.org/es/publicaciones/46450-la-inversion-extranjera-directa-america-latina-caribe-2020.
- Fagnani, E. (2018). A Reforma Tributária Necessária: Diagnóstico e Premissas. São Paulo: Plataforma Política Social.

- Filgueiras et Al (2010). Modelo liberal-periférico e bloco de poder: política e dinâmica macroeconômica nos governos Lula. Os anos Lula: contribuições para um balanço crítico: 35-69.
- Furtado, C. (2003).
- Gaggero, A., Schorr, M. y Wainer, A. (2014). *Restricción eterna. El poder económico en el kirchnerismo*. Buenos Aires: editorial Crisis/Futuro Anterior.
- García Linera, A. (2019). "El odio al indio", en *Página/12*, 17/11/2019.
- Ghibaudi J. & Laltuf, I (2017). Uma aproximação à economia política do BNDES no período 2003-2014. Setores produtivos, grupos empresariais e o debate sobre sua ação. Capitulo 1. In VAINER, C. B., & VIEIRA, F. B. (Eds). BNDES: grupos econômicos, setor público e sociedade civil.
- Gramsci, A. (2011). *Prison Notebooks*. Columbia: Columbia University Press.
- IMF (2021). World Economic Outlook 2021. Available at https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2021/10/12/world-economic-outlook-october-2021
- Isidro, M. y Forlani, N. (2019). Right and agribusiness in Argentina and Brazil. Changes and continuities. *Universitas XXI, Revista de Ciencias Sociales y Humanas*, 31, 59-77.
- Kaplan, S. (2021). *Globalizing Patient Capital. The Political Economy of Chinese Finance in the Americas*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kar, D. y Freitas, S. (2012), Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2002-2010, Washington, <iff.gfintegrity.org/documents/dec2012Update/ Illicit_Financial_Flows_from_Developing_Countries_2001-2010-HighRes. pdf>.
- Katz, C. (2018). *La teoría de la dependencia. Cincuenta años después*. Buenos Aires: Batalla de ideas.
- Kulfas, M. (2007). Internacionalización financeira y fuga de capitales em América Latina. Argentina, Brasil, Chile y México en los años '90. Buenos Aires: AEyT FLACSO.
- Lang, L. y otros (2012). *Más allá del desarrollo*. Quito: Ediciones Luxemburg.
- Marini, R. (2007). *América Latina, dependencia y globalización*. Buenos Aires: CLACSO.
- McNally, C. A., y Wright, T. (2010). Sources of social support for China's current political order: The "thick embeddedness" of private capital holders. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 43(2), 189-198.
- Medeiros, C. (2006). *Desenvolvimento econômico e ascensão nacional: rupturas e transições na Rússia e na China. O mito do colapso do poder americano*. Rio de Janeiro: Record.
- Medeiros, C. A. y Serrano, F. (1999) "Padrões Monetários Internacionais e Crescimento", in Fiori, J. (org.) *Estados e Moedas no Desenvolvimento das Nações*, Rio de janeiro, Vozes.
- Merino, G. (2019). *Geopolítica y economía mundial: El ascenso de China, la era Trump y América Latina*. La Plata: EDULP.

- Morgan, M (2017). Extreme and Persistent Inequality: New Evidence for Brazil Combining National Accounts, Surveys, and Fiscal Data, 2001–2015. WID.world Working Paper Series 2017/12.
- Morgenfeld, L. (2018). Los desafíos de Macri ante Trump y el G20. *Revista Estado y Políticas Públicas* 11, 95-111.
- Natch, P. (2013). El dragón en América Latina: las relaciones económico-comerciales y los riesgos para la región. *Íconos. Revista de Ciencias Sociales* 45.
- Naughton, B. (2007). *The Chinese economy: Transitions and growth*. MIT press.
- O'Donnell, G. (1988). *El Estado Burocrático Autoritario. Triunfos, derrotas y crisis*. Buenos Aires: FCE.
- Ocampo, J. y otros (2014). *La crisis latinoamericana de la deuda desde la perspectiva histórica*. Santiago: CEPAL.
- Oderich, E. y Greco Martins, A. (2018). Agronegocio y desarrollo: contradicciones en el Brasil rural contemporáneo. *Revista Interdisciplinaria de Asuntos Agrarios*, 49, 65-84.
- Oglietti y Páez (2022). La mano visible de la banca invisible. Renta y lucro extraordinario de las finanzas en América Latina. Mármol izquierdo.
- Oliva, C. (2017). Argentina y China. Una relación basada en la continuidad y la profundización de los vínculos. *Cuadernos de Política Exterior Argentina (Nueva Época)*, 125, 83-87
- Páez, S. (2016). Soja en Argentina a principios del siglo XXI: el sistema agropecuario y la competencia por el uso del suelo productivo. *Cuadernos de Economía Crítica* 3(5), 135-169.
- Páez, S. (2020). States & market: who is worried about development? Political economy in Latin America at the beginning of the 21st century. Tese (doutorado). Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Instituto de Economia, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Economia da Indústria e da Tecnologia.
- Panigo, D., Bona, L. y Wahren, P. (2019). Contexto internacional, modos de desarrollo comparados y sus enseñanzas para el diseño de la nueva política industrial argentina. *Voces en el Fénix* 78, 96-107.
- Panitch, L., y Gindin, S. (2012). *La construcción del capitalismo global*. Madrid: Akal.
- Perez Ludueña, M. (2017). Chinese Investments in Latin America. Opportunities for growth and diversification. CEPAL. *Production Development Series* No. 208
- Pinto, E. (2010) Bloco no poder e governo Lula. Tese (Doutorado) – Instituto de Economia, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro.
- Pinto, E. C. (2011). O eixo sino-americano e as transformações do sistema mundial: tensões e complementaridades comerciais, produtivas e financeiras. Em Rodrigo Pimentel Ferreira Leão, Eduardo Costa Pinto, Luciana Acioly (éd.), *A China na Nova Configuração Global: impactos políticos e econômicos*, Brasilia, IPEA.

- Pinto, E. C., Pinto, J. P. G., Saludjian, A., Nogueira, I., Balanco, P., Schonerwald, C., & Baruco, G. (2019). A guerra de todos contra todos e a Lava Jato. Revista da Sociedade Brasileira de Economia Política.
- Pinto, E. y Gonçalves, R. (2015). Globalização e Poder Efetivo: a ascensão da China. Economia e Sociedade (UNICAMP. Impresso).
- Poulantzas, N. (1979) *Poder y clases sociales en el estado capitalista*. México: Siglo XXI.
- Prates, D. M., Fritz, B., & De Paula, L. F. (2020). Varieties of developmentalism: A critical assessment of the PT governments. Latin American Perspectives, 47(1), 45-64.
- Prebisch, R. (1981). *Capitalismo periférico. Crisis y transformación*. Buenos Aires: FCE.
- Ray, R. y Gallagher, K. (2017). China-Latin America Economic Bulletin 2017 Edition. Working Group on Development And Environtment in the Americas.
- Red Académica de América Latina y el Caribe sobre China, Red ALC-China (2019). Datos e informes disponibles en redalc-china.org.
- Rosales, O. (2019). *El sueño chino: cómo se ve China a sí misma y cómo nos equivocamos los occidentales al interpretarla*. Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI/CEPAL.
- Saad-Filho, A. (2019). Varieties of Neoliberalism in Brazil (2003–2019). Latin American Perspectives, 0094582X1988196. doi:10.1177/0094582x19881968
- Sader, E. (ed.) (2013). *10 anos de governos pós-neoliberais no Brasil*. Río de Janeiro: FLACSO - Boitempo.
- Salama, P. (2017). Brasil y China, caminos de fortalezas y desconciertos. Problemas del Desarrollo Vol. 177, Nº 88, 9-28.
- Saludjian, A. y Carcanholo, M. (2013) Integración latino-americana, dependencia de China y sub-imperialismo brasileño en América latina. *Mundo Siglo XXI* 29, p. 43-62.
- Serrano & Summa (2015). Aggregate demand and the slowdown of Brazilian economic growth in 2011-2014. Nova Economia, 25(SPE), 803-833.
- Serrano, F. (2002). "Do ouro imóvel ao dólar flexível". Economia e Sociedade, Campinas 11(19), 237-253.
- Serrano, F., & Summa, R. (2011). Política macroeconômica, crescimento e distribuição de renda na economia brasileira dos anos 2000. Observatório da economia global, (6).
- Singer, A. (2009). Raízes sociais e ideológicas do lulismo. Novos estudos-CEBRAP, (85), 83-102.
- Singer, A. (2015). Cutucando oncas com varas curtas: o ensaio desenvolvimentista no primeiro mandato de Dilma Rousseff (2011-2014). *Novos Estudos CEBRAP*, 102 (34), 43-71.
- Slipak, A. (2017). L'impact commercial de la Chine au Brésil et en Argentine au cours des "cycles progressifs": reprimarisation et consensus de Pékin. *Recherches Internationales* 119, 171-194.
- Svampa, M. (2012). Consenso de los commodities, giro ecoterritorial y pensamiento crítico en América Latina. Revista del Observatorio Social de América Latina (CLACSO). Año XIII Nº 32

- Svampa, M. y Slipak, A. (2015). China en América Latina: Del Consenso de los Commodities al Consenso de Beijing. *Revista Ensambles* 3, 34-63.
- Svampa, M. y Slipak, A. (2018). America Latina between old and new dependances, the role of China in inter-hegemonic dispute. *Hérodote*, 71(4), 153-166.
- Thirlwall, A. P. (1979). The Balance of Payments Constraint as an Explanation of International Growth Rate Differences. *Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro Quarterly Review*, 32 (128), 45–53.
- Treacy, M. (2021). Great chaos under heaven. The Routledge Handbook of Chinese Studies, 9.
- World Income Inequality Database (WIID) (2021). Available at https://www.wider.unu.edu/project/wiid-%E2%80%93-world-income-inequality-database