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On the political and democratic preconditions of equal recognition*

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Alan Patten's *Equal Recognition* is a compelling justification of a liberal, procedural conception of recognition. This conception is built upon a convincing conception of moral equality, but it does not offer a full theoretical discussion of recognition. I argue that the liberal recognition provided by Patten is too formal and narrow to address all relevant issues regarding conflicts of recognition in democratic societies. In particular, it does not consider the political and democratic preconditions that should be granted to minority groups or immigrants in order to provide them fair opportunities to effectively (and not only formally) reach equal recognition.

Keywords: Integration, recognition, citizenship, democratic justice, Muslims

Introduction

Alan Patten's *Equal Recognition* (2014, henceforth *ER*) provides a compelling defence of a liberal conception of equal recognition. In particular, the book is a great contribution to the debate on liberal neutrality as the principle to assess (liberal) reasons for providing cultural recognition to minority groups. In this light, a neutrality of treatment among conceptions of the good is a tool to foster the recognition of cultural communities and groups. His general argument can be summarized as follows: (1) individuals should be granted a moral and political equal opportunity for self-realization; (2) self-realization entails valuable options and valuable cultural identities; therefore (3) to the extent that certain cultural practices and values are part of some people's conception of the good, the state should protect and even support these practices. In some circumstances, cultural rights are justified in order to provide individuals equal opportunities. (4) Cultural rights presuppose recognition, and hence, equal recognition is a necessary element of a sound conception of liberal justice. (5) Nonetheless, cultural rights (i.e. linguistic rights) are not unconditionally granted: equal recognition is in competition with other values and resources (such as efficiency, budget allowances, etc.), so cultural rights – and therefore recognition – can be suspended if the right circumstances

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justify it. In sum, while equal recognition is an ideal that should guide liberal policies, its failures are not necessarily a moral wrong, but need to be justified.

These arguments are built upon a sound and convincing conception of moral equality. But they do not offer a full-fledged theoretical discussion of recognition. Indeed, my comments focus almost exclusively on Patten's (and more generally, on a liberal) conception of recognition. In a nutshell, I believe that his model of *equal recognition* says quite a lot about (liberal) equality through neutrality of treatment, but not enough about the symbolic and political conditions needed for granting members of minority groups their recognition as moral equals and autonomous political subjects. In particular, I argue that Patten's conception of recognition is unable to support a more process-oriented and dynamic conception of recognition of culturally differentiated individuals as free moral equals, which is needed to ground a fair, liberal and democratic politics. The fact that Patten equates equal recognition with equal accommodation (*ER*, p. 29) illustrates the *thin* and *static* character of the former. What such a conception of equal recognition ultimately aims to reach is a sort of liberal harmony, a situation in which cultural minority groups accept the terms of their accommodation because of the procedural fairness of the recognition – granted or denied. It seems to me that these ontological views of the political and of recognition reduce the possibility of democratic recognition playing a role in democratic justice. On the one hand, it assumes that recognition is mainly provided through rights, and therefore that it is possible to accommodate cultural conflicts in a just and stable way. Against this view, I endorse Tully's idea (2000, p. 477) that 'struggles over recognition [...] are not amenable to definitive solutions beyond further democratic disagreement, dispute, negotiation, amendment, implementation, review'. On the other, the price of such a liberal conception of recognition is a tendency to *displace* the political (Honig 1993) and therefore *de-politicize* the recognition process. I argue that such a liberal conception of recognition is ultimately not suited to address the vulnerabilities and the lack of symbolic inclusion (Ferrarese 2009) attached to belonging in a cultural or social minority. Therefore, this raises important issues regarding the opportunities provided to the members of such minority communities to be equally respected as persons¹ and to be recognized in the polity. Through a cursory discussion of the integration of Muslims in Switzerland, I will examine the limits of a formal conception of recognition and argue for the need to promote democratic and political forms of recognition to improve equality in contemporary liberal societies.

A formal conception of recognition

For Patten, recognition is a 'form of moral and political relation between the state and its citizens' (*ER*, p. 163), and such a relation is morally legitimated when based on the neutrality of treatment of conceptions of the good. Thus, recognition is 'a form of accommodation extended by the state to particular conceptions of the good' (*ER*, p. 157), namely a 'customized form of accommodation of an identity-related component of a conception of the good' (*ER*, p. 158). While identity is central to recognition, cultures are only instrumentally valuable for individuals. Hence, as Patten argues, cultural *survival* is not a legitimate aim of any liberal state; cultures do change, and liberal states must be neutral about their contents

(with the exception of some worthless conceptions of the good). In substance, there is not a moral justification for the survival of cultures and thus liberal states do not have a responsibility in this matter. According to these liberal, individualistic moral assumptions, what recognition is about is not the specific content of a culture, but the opportunities provided to *all* individuals to have a chance to foster their conception of the good without being coerced or mistreated by the state. In this light, equal recognition basically means equal opportunities in a culturally differentiated world. Equal recognition provides individuals the opportunities for self-determination and, hence, autonomy. To do that, the state must not unfairly favour some conceptions of the good over others; it has to be procedurally neutral and give all a fair chance to be recognized.

Patten's understanding of recognition appears quite close to what liberals generally call 'equal concern' (Dworkin 2000), namely the idea that the state should have the same consideration for the interests and opportunities of all citizens (instead of playing favourites). Clearly such an understanding of recognition is much narrower than other theories of recognition which emphasise the ethical recognition of one's moral authenticity, one's (positive) deep identity, or one's (negative) social or political differences (see Young 1990, Taylor 1994, Honneth 1995, Fraser 2005). Patten fully endorses such narrowness. He does not argue that these theories of recognition are wrong; he says that these theories are more foundational and 'hence more sweeping in [their] implications' (*ER*, p. 163). In order to be more systematic, he situates his approach in the standard liberal package, and considers recognition 'as a phenomenon that arises well *downstream* from concerns about the foundations of justice' (*ER*, p. 163, emphasis is mine). In his view, the morality of recognition can be grounded and assessed on the basis of the procedure determining it, namely neutral treatment. Being part of the liberal family, Patten's approach to recognition unsurprisingly resonates with the arguments put forward by other liberal authors, in particular Kymlicka (1995); he shares with the latter a formal and narrow conception of recognition which is ultimately provided through legal or constitutional acts. In sum, Patten's equal recognition is a formal and juridical act accomplished by the state to accommodate a cultural group in a procedurally neutral way. His conception is not formal because it is procedural; it is formal because the recognition process can lead to a formal and definitive response from the state to the claims of cultural groups. In this light, equal recognition does not entail that all cultural communities or groups have the same share of actual recognition (i.e. cultural rights) from the state; it entails that all cultural groups have a procedural equal chance to obtain recognition when the criteria are met.

So far, so good. But what if *downstream* recognition results from or contributes to obscure *upstream* injustices? In other words: is Patten's formal conception of recognition strong enough to guarantee *upstream* fair opportunities for all groups seeking recognition and a fair chance to preserve their cultural identities or conceptions of the good? For Patten, standard liberal theories already have plenty of ammunition for condemning social and political injustices (as state-sponsored racism, sexism, second-order citizenship, etc.); therefore, recognition (or misrecognition) is not an issue that pertains to the upstream features of a just basic structure of society. I am sceptical about this argument. Even in accepting

Patten's liberal framework, I argue that some political and institutional preconditions must be met in order to produce fair downstream recognition. It is unclear, for instance, how marginalized minorities or vulnerable cultural groups can voice their conception of the good in the polity with a reasonable and fair chance to be heard and, eventually, to be recognized. Such groups are not what Patten has in mind, because they do not fit within formative processes constituting the social lineage account of culture he proposes; nonetheless, the cultural complexity of contemporary societies makes recognition an urgent issue, even for less institutionalized minority groups, and, in my view, it is relevant to assess whether *ER* captures their moral claims or not.

Patten's liberal model of recognition is thoughtful and internally consistent; nonetheless, its scope is too *narrow* to fully apprehend the complexity of contemporary multicultural societies. In particular, I suggest that it is more fruitful to shift the analysis from culture *per se* to the political effects of being culturally different in a given polity. Such a move entails a *broader* conception of what culture means and hence of (political) recognition. To approach cultural conflicts as a strictly political phenomenon means avoiding ultimately undecidable considerations about the intrinsic or instrumental value of culture or their internal anthropological consistency. Instead, we shall focus on the political conditions (or subject positions) experienced by the members of cultural minorities. This means that the general standard for assessing the validity of a claim to recognition is not the intrinsic quality of a particular culture (I agree with Patten on this), but the fact that an individual or a group lacks equal political power, symbolic legitimacy, or social (moral) esteem in the public realm due to their cultural difference. In this light, neutrality as a category is called into question because of its culturally hegemonic determinations (Dumm 1994, p. 168). I take it as an 'intuitive idea' about democracy that liberal states should conceive mechanisms that try to re-establish a minimal political equality among individuals in order to allow them the opportunity to fairly participate in democratic activities. Some forms of political recognition (as inclusion in formal or informal deliberative forums, subsidies for cultural-religious associations of migrants, public support for minority languages, some kinds of affirmative action, etc. (see Levy 2000)) might be suited to this purpose, for they increase the chances that individuals will be respected as participants in the same collective societal project and therefore will be not only formally but also symbolically included as morally equal peers in the polity.

It is also important to notice that considering recognition as something that should be conceived of in relation to political processes entails a more modest view of the state's role as the authoritative actor granting recognition. In Patten's liberal proceduralism, the state is implicitly seen as being able to neutrally assess the conceptions of the good expressed by the minority groups: '[n]eutrality of treatment means that state's policies must be equally accommodating of rival conceptions of the good' (*ER*, p. 115). Thus, the state is seen as an impersonal actor capable of neutrally discriminating, comparing and fairly assessing the social, political and legal conditions and opportunities provided to minorities for being treated neutrally and fairly by the cultural majority. Is this view empirically sound? There are plausible reasons to believe that the state, even if it is not dominated by the cultural majority, is strongly influenced by the cultural norms and values of the majority, and this has an impact

on public policies, administrative behaviours, bureaucratic organizations and expertise. Indeed, in contexts where minorities are weakly represented or politically invisible, the chances for them to be fairly accommodated cannot merely be granted procedurally. They require both material and symbolic resources, opportunities and political spaces enabling the preconditions of a fair downstream state-driven recognition.

Moreover, one of the aims of *ER* is to reconcile the abstract discussion of principles with the concrete empirical and contextual aspects of recognition, in particular by focusing on the fair reasons either to grant recognition or to suspend the state's obligation to guarantee cultural rights to minorities. In a sense, then, this approach to recognition is not based on a 'view from nowhere'; being grounded in politics, it is empirically informed by the characteristics of the multicultural realities to which it applies, namely power positions, historical particularities, etc. According to these non-ideal assumptions, the acceptance or refusal of recognition has moral and political implications for individuals, which ought to be considered. For instance, the state should assess the effects of misrecognition in terms of mutual respect and self-respect for the members of the cultural minority in the public sphere. Does a lack of recognition only have implications for the social esteem of groups or does it also have implications for their members' self-respect as moral equals? I cannot address this issue here, but there are reasons to believe that a strict, formal liberal perspective cannot fully apprehend it. If the state does not have the cognitive capacities to fairly assess the lack of opportunities for groups to sustain and live up to their standards or their conception of the good, some forms of political (and democratic) resources should be granted to minorities in order to improve their chances of being heard by the state and hence recognized. But to do that, a broader understanding of political subjectivity should be considered.

In sum, the robustness of Patten's model of equal recognition seems to rely heavily on the implicit democratic (pre)conditions allowing a fair process of accommodation. In my view, such preconditions are not fully spelled out and this weakens the conception of equal recognition he supports. Without such political and democratic preconditions, it is unclear how neutral / equal treatment can be reached in a given polity. On the one hand, there are reasons to believe that some democratic protections should be granted to the members of minority groups in order to prevent their political domination by the majority; on the other, there should be democratic procedures allowing both the expression of struggles for recognition and their political containment. In other words, a richer conception of citizenship and democracy is needed to support Patten's conception of equal recognition.

Through a more empowered and inclusive conception citizenship, liberal states would ideally aim, first, to improve the political resources of the members of groups which are disadvantaged in the public realm because of their cultural particularities; secondly, to give symbolic recognition to cultural differences that are stigmatized or presumed abnormal, providing them political respect and visibility; finally, to reinforce, through democratic integration, the legitimacy of liberal polities. For liberal states, the key democratic and political issues consist in determining whether some types of political recognition would improve the integration of minority groups into the community of citizens, providing them

with the political resources that give them, on one hand, the liberty to pursue their conception of the good and, on the other, a fair chance to participate actively and successfully in the determination of common values. It follows that groups whose practices call into question the basic values of citizenship, such as equality and liberty, should not be politically recognized by liberal states (Fraser 2005). This does not mean that, in some very particular cases, liberal states cannot tolerate them (Kukathas 1997) or that the members of cultural groups should not have the opportunity (as everybody else) to use their rights and their political power to publicly promote their conception of the good or to preserve their cultural practices; but the explicit recognition, through minority rights, of groups whose practices and traditions violate the rights on which liberal states are built (and whose protection and implementation is their primary task) are not compatible with the conception of citizenship that normatively grounds liberal democracies. Like Patten, I support this view, although, apart from the most evident and well-known cases (physical abuses, restrictions of freedoms, etc.), it is often empirically and normatively difficult to determine exactly when and to what extent a cultural practice goes against liberal citizenship values and rights.

Moreover, while Patten is very clear (and right) about the rejection of intrinsic and perfectionist criteria to determine whether a minority can obtain recognition, he is not precise enough about the citizenship-driven resources and democratic procedures necessary to provide to all groups fair preconditions to fairly compete for recognition. If, following Young (1990, p. 251), we assume that 'justice requires that each person should have the institutionalized means to participate effectively in the decisions that affects his or her actions and the condition of that action', it is conceptually, morally and politically difficult to disconnect equal recognition from the social, political, cultural and economic opportunities offered to groups and individuals to function in the polity. Moreover, when the legal accommodations of cultural conflicts are perceived (for good or bad reasons) as illegitimate or undemocratic, the chances are high that individuals or groups will not endorse the terms of their inclusion in liberal societies. Therefore, broader political processes are needed in order to settle conflicts among groups / conceptions of the good and to promote a stable and legitimate conception of equal recognition. In adopting a political and not only a juridical understanding of just accommodation (see Williams 1995), it is possible to consider several other ways to foster the political integration of cultural minorities. Just to mention a few among others: systematic dialogue between authorities and the representatives of cultural groups, deliberative forums, public support to fund group activities promoting intercultural exchange, the formal recognition of the existence of groups, enhancing the representation of immigrants in political institutions, and increasing social esteem of minority groups through symbolic and actual policies. These devices certainly do not provide answers to all issues besetting cultural conflicts. But they can contribute to the creation of preconditions that would allow minorities to accept the state decisions regarding their claims to recognition, even if these decisions are negative. Some forms of democratic inclusion (see Young 2000), formal and informal processes of consensus-building (Lijphart 1977), presence (Phillips 1995)², and political procedures allowing the empowerment of minority groups are thus necessary preconditions for giving the members of cultural groups a fair chance, but also for creating a legitimate context in which they could accept a possible lack of recognition. In particular,

democratic inclusion could increase the chances for minority group to benefit from a fairly decent, neutral and equal treatment.

The recognition of immigrants

Patten's discussion of the case of immigrants illustrates some of the limits of his conception of recognition. In a nutshell, he suggests four main elements: firstly, he endorses Kymlicka's (1995) voluntary acceptance theory, namely the idea that immigrants who chose to emigrate, can be considered as voluntarily waiving their cultural rights in the country of immigration. Therefore, in some circumstances, the receiving society can make the waiving of a full set of cultural rights (i.e. linguistic rights) a condition of admission to immigrant status (*ER*, p. 293). This is the case when the protection of (sub)national languages is at stake. Secondly, when cultural minorities are not strong enough to provide their members a valuable range of options, individual assimilation into the majority culture may be a better option. In particular, 'if the integration policies are reasonably successful over time, immigrants do not need to re-create the original culture in the receiving society' (*ER*, p. 284). Immigrants are supposed to be able to keep their autonomy and freedom despite their integration in a cultural society different than their own: 'it is possible for immigrants [...] to be free in a new societal culture if they can manage to learn the culture's language and master the rudiments of its way of life, and if the receiving society is willing to accept them with toleration and openness' (*ER*, p. 284). Thirdly, in the case of the lack of recognition of their cultural specificities, immigrants are compensated by standard liberal citizenship rights. They 'are given some added degree of control over their own lives, and [...] to this extent their autonomy is respected' (*ER*, p. 296). Finally, in a democratic context, the authority to determine the contents of integration and immigration policies rests in the hands of citizens, who have some compelling attachment-based reasons to justify some priority to national groups over immigrants (*ER*, pp. 291-94).

My aim here is not to discuss the case Patten makes about waiving linguistic rights in order to be admitted to immigrant status. It seems to me that, with regard to linguistic rights, Patten's argument is plausible. Instead, what seems to me to be important are the direct and indirect implications about the ways in which a larger conception of social, cultural and political integration of immigrants is conceived³, especially when 'toleration and openness' cannot be said to be the main characteristics of the members of the cultural majority.

Since the multiculturalism backlash about a decade ago (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010), democratic societies are marked by deep controversies about the means of integrating (or failing to integrate) immigrants. In particular, the retreat from multiculturalism results – at least in part – from a lack of public support for public policies accommodating cultural minorities (Joppke 2004). In this light, the democratic (and moral) authority attributed to citizens to decide how to accommodate immigrants paves the way for a conception of integration leading to an implicit injunction to their *unilateral adjustment* to the majority cultural values and practices. I take unilateral adjustment as being a form of assimilation. Such a position, especially when it is justified by a normative framework stipulating recognition as a moral foundation of a state's action, is problematic for at least two reasons.

On the one hand, if individuals believe, as Patten argues (*ER*, pp. 134-36), that some of their (cultural or religious) values have a non-negotiable character, the unilateral adjustment to majority values can be seen both as difficult to endorse and as morally wrong. On the other, the idea that immigrants should adjust in order to have better cultural opportunities to be free seems quite restrictive, for it does not consider the political process and resources needed to keep cultural opportunities up to the standards of autonomy.

Indeed, assuming that integration is a democratic imperative needed to provide moral and political legitimacy to the overall democratic polity (Anderson 2010, Gianni 2016), a conception of integration as adjustment to majority values raises important issue for democratic justice, namely the reproduction of forms of normalization, binary categories, hierarchies and a lack of moral and political agency of minority subjects. The standard liberal package of rights and protections for minorities can reasonably avoid the worse forms of discrimination, but it cannot guarantee that immigrants will be recognized as moral actors who must be politically integrated into the receiving societies in order to participate in the intersubjective definition of common values. Indeed, what adjustment cannot foster is the idea of integration as being a process aimed at an inclusive political co-determination of common norms. In this light, equal recognition is more than the outcome of liberal neutrality; it should also be the product of a political process aimed at producing, through democratic dialogue and inclusion, an extension of the spheres of mutual respect and, eventually, social esteem. Formal recognition granted through rights is not sufficient to guarantee the mutual acknowledgement of the culturally distant individual as an equal moral being; the acknowledgment of the equal moral autonomy of all requires a relational and dialogical process of mutual recognition which can, in some cases, result in political conflicts and controversies.

Muslims in Europe

The case of Muslims effectively illustrates the limits of Patten's conception of equal recognition. To make a long story very short, for about twenty years, Muslims have generally been seen as the most difficult cultural-religious group to integrate into European societies. In public discourses, Islam is frequently referred to as being against freedoms (freedom of expression and of choice), against secularism and *laïcité*, against rational thought, and against different sexual orientations and gender equality. In other words, Islam and Muslims are increasingly portrayed in Western societies as being a threat to democratic values and social stability (see Modood 2007, Parekh 2008). Although such representations often rely on shaky, if not false, empirical grounds, the multiculturalism backlash beginning in 2001 has brought to the fore the more 'muscular' and restrictive conceptions of accommodation for Islam and Muslims in Europe.

In this context, cases exist which show that the desire of non-Muslim citizens to place limits on the social and political visibility of Islam in Western public spheres often leads to undemocratic results. The ban on minarets voted in by a 57,5% majority of Swiss voters in 2009 exemplifies how the democratic use of popular rights can lead to the restriction of

religious minority rights, in this case the rights of Muslims (see Vatter 2011). Patten argues that ‘democracy is not just a mechanism for expressing raw, uninformed preferences. At its best, it is a process in which citizens try to decide what to think about the issues they face and then act [...] according to their best judgements’ (*ER*, p. 23). However, the point is to make sure that what citizens think and how they act towards minorities is compatible both with citizens legitimate judgements about how to deal with minorities and what a neutral state should do. In the exercise of a state’s practical reason, the formal-legal requirement put on immigrants or minority groups to adjust to majority cultural norms is grounded on the idea that the latter are intrinsically good (at least the majority). This leads to a situation where political integration is not thought of as an exchange of reasons between the cultural majority and the cultural minorities about the content of shared values and common principles, but merely as a discussion among the members of the cultural majority about what they are supposed to do about the minority groups or individuals. In this case, the majority requires loyalty to contingent norms, laws or decisions which are not endorsed morally or by sound arguments, though they are politically enforced.

Miller (2014) has recently suggested that the ban on minarets does not violate the right of freedom of religion and that a (national) majority has a right (with some conditions) of religious precedence over minority denominations. Interestingly enough, Miller’s argument resonates with the arguments put forward by the representatives of the right-wing party that launched the popular initiative. Starting from the assumption that a minaret is mostly an architectural device and not an Islamic prescription, they presented the ban as not calling into question the constitutional religious freedom of Muslims, but rather as a clear warning to radicals that political Islam is not accepted or acceptable in Switzerland. During the campaign, the public debate was structured by very broad considerations regarding Islam, such its (assumed) lack of potential to fit with democracy or the risks of Islamization and radicalism and, hence, by the broader issue of the protection of Swiss values and democracy against religious and political threats, especially threats regarding the condition of women. The debate on minarets has increasingly shifted towards a debate about sexual and gender equality (see Gianni 2013). What is relevant about this case is the implicit view, similar to that argued for by Patten, that religion should be protected by liberal states, while cultures should not (Scheffler 2007). Indeed, what can be observed in the case of Muslims in Switzerland (though not only there) is the trend to transform the religious practices and values of Muslims into cultural values, which are therefore negotiable. Such a move justifies the cultural and political adjustment of Muslim values to common norms without infringing non-negotiable religious freedoms.

In other words, the political choice to define what pertains to religion, and what pertains to culture raises important moral implications for equal recognition. On the one hand, pious Muslims feel that, by the ban of minarets, their religious rights have not been respected by Swiss citizens and the state; on the other, nominal and sociological Muslims, for whom the protection of religious right is not a priority, are stigmatized by public representations and legal decisions which depict them as a threat to democratic institutions and social cohesion. In both cases, therefore, the idea that pressure to assimilate into the societal culture of the

receiving society can be the solution to conflicts of recognition is at best too simple, and at worst self-defeating, because it calls into question the opportunity to reach a dialogical mutual recognition of individual autonomy and equal moral worth. In my view, without this precondition, (liberal) equal recognition cannot be a full, morally satisfactory form of recognition.

Conclusion

In sum, forms of political recognition, based on a richer, relational view of citizenship, are necessary preconditions for a morally sound equal recognition, and these cannot be easily provided solely by the standard package of liberal rights. A fair treatment of immigrants or minority groups entails material and symbolic political resources in order to enhance their capabilities for participating in the determination of common values and the functioning of society. As Patten rightly asserts, ‘people engaging in actual public deliberation appeal to general ideas of equality, liberty, neutrality, culture, and so forth, to make their case’ (*ER*, p. 24). Even the best formal procedure cannot avoid conflicts of interpretation concerning contextually relevant, but also principled, democratic and liberal values. In my view, thinking about equal recognition entails taking this ontological assumption seriously. Democratic theorists should conceive of politics as a never-ending, conflicting process rather than a way to constantly settle, through specific procedures, the ‘mess’ of society. Clearly, decisions and procedures that are successful in fairly regulating and accommodating the worst effects of political and social disruptions are needed; but it will not be possible to create social ‘harmony’ through legal constraints. Forms of political recognition are not definitive or inviolable devices, having a status external to politics. They are a part of politics; they should be politically determined and politically modified. This is what is needed to obtain effective, inclusive, and democratically just procedures and values to foster equal recognition in specific, historical and contingent liberal contexts. Patten’s *ER* is certainly a great contribution to the justification of procedures that allow a fair way of addressing claims to recognition in a liberal perspective; but a broader understanding of citizenship and democratic theory is needed to make such procedures suitable to reach the goal of a more inclusive and just accommodation of cultural differences.

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Notes on contributor

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Notes

¹ The relation between rights and respect is a difficult one, and I cannot fully address it here. For the sake of my argument I rely on Galeotti's (2010) reading of Darwall's conception of respect, namely the fact that the generalization of rights does not necessarily and automatically bring about equal respect: 'disrespect can be shown even while specific rights are fulfilled [...]. Respect is a claim, a universal claim of each of us toward all others, [...] which cannot be exacted in the pure and direct form of obtaining the relevant conduct from a recalcitrant other as it happens with other specific rights' (2010, pp. 84-86).

² I agree with Phillips that 'when policies are worked out *for* rather than *with* a politically excluded constituency, they are unlikely to engage with all relevant concerns' (1995, p. 13). In the same perspective, for Young (1997, p. 370) 'ensuring the representation of multiple perspectives gives voice to distinctive experiences in the society and relativizes the dominant perspectives which are assumed as normal and neutral'.

³ Some scholars prefer to use the concept of inclusion rather than integration (see Carens 2013, chapter 4). I use the notion of integration because it offers a more dynamic and process-oriented understanding of mutual adaptation than inclusion. I do not address the critical debate concerning integration policy, particularly the idea that integration can be seen as a technology of governance leading to a 'technocratic depoliticization' of social and cultural conflicts between majorities and minorities (see Lentin and Titley 2011).