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Benyahya, Meriem; Lenard, Teri; Collen, Anastasija; Nijdam, Niels Alexander

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
# Privacy-Enhancing Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment for Connected and Automated Vehicles

## Background

CAVs' cutting edge technologies represent advantageous conditions for cyber attacks and data breaches.

Personal Identifiable Information (PII) data is likely to be collected and processed (eg route taken, stop points) in the CAV's environment.

TARA was mandated by ISO/SAE 21434 and UNECE R155 to ensure acceptable level of risk with regard to cybersecurity requirements.



## Problem

Privacy threats and their related impacts are not adequately addressed in TARA.


Threat scenarios are derived using STRIDE but not based on a privacy oriented threat modeling tool.

Unlike safety and financial impacts, privacy and operations impacts are underestimated:

$$i_{sum} = 10(i_s + i_f) + i_o + i_p$$

## Results

### Improvement avenues



### Extended CIA triad properties

For granular analysis of the damage scenarios, the ISO 27000 CIA triad is extended to consider:


- (i) identification tracking and profiling attacks,
- (ii) system or data users' responsibilities and
- (iii) overall compliance to GDPR or other legislations.

Security goals	Designation	Description
Confidentiality	C	Assuring that information is accessed only by authorized users
Integrity	I	Ensuring that information is accurate and complete
Availability	A	Making data accessible when needed by authorized users
Unlinkability	U	Protecting from associating an identifier or a pseudonym with an individual
Accountability	Ac	Assuring that actions can be traced back to a specific individual
Compliance	Com	Achieving an alignment with the GDPR data processing principles

### Merging STRIDE & LINDDUN to GDPR for an improved threat modelling

STRIDE	Security goal	GDPR principle
Spoofing	A	Security
Tampering	I	Security
Repudiation	Ac	Accountability
Information disclosure	C	Security
Denial-of-service	A	Lawfulness, transparency and fairness

(+) automated tool for security threats modelling  
(-) not adapted to data privacy threats



LINDDUN	Security goal	GDPR principle
Linkability	U	Data minimization
Identifiability	U	Data minimization
Non-repudiation	Ac	Accountability
Detectability	Ac	Accountability
Disclosure of information	C	Security
Unawareness	A	Lawfulness, transparency and fairness
Non-compliance	Com	Lawfulness, transparency and fairness

(+) focused on privacy threats  
(-) does not address all GDPR requirements

### Privacy enhancement within the impact rating

Sensitivity	Privacy impact ( $i_p$ )	Value ( $V$ )	Weight ( $w_p$ )
	Linkability to PII	Privacy-preserving	
High	High	None	100
High	High	Yes	10
Medium	High	Yes	5
High	Medium	Yes	5
Medium	Medium	None	10
Medium	Medium	Yes	1
Not sensitive	Easy to link	None	1
Sensitive	Difficult to link	None	2
Not sensitive	Difficult to link	Yes	1
Not sensitive	Difficult to link	None	1

$$i_p = V * w_p$$

$$i_{sum} = \sum_{j \in \{s, f, o, p\}} w_{i,j} j$$

Impact sum ( $i_{sum}$ )	Impact level
0	0 - none
1-19	1 - negligible
20-99	2 - moderate
100-999	3 - major
$\geq 1000$	4 - severe

Based on a refinement of the ISO/IEC 29100, the privacy impact is analysed to reflect data sensitivity, linkability and the deployed mitigation techniques.

To compute the privacy impact, a privacy weight is associated to the impact value.

The impact level is derived from the impact sum wrapping up the safety, financial, operational and privacy impact.

## Future Orientations

Analyse the relationship between the privacy risks evolution and the vehicle SAE level.

Define a computation method for Privacy Assurance Level (PAL) similar to the Cybersecurity Assurance Level (CAL) but dedicated to data privacy.

Consider privacy threats in assessing the residual risk (the risk of unknown threats) within the TARA process.

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## Acronyms

CAV: Connected and Automated Vehicles  
ISO: International Organization for Standardization  
LINDDUN: Linkability, Identifiability, Nonrepudiation, Detectability, Disclosure of data, Unawareness, and Noncompliance  
PII: Personal Identifiable Information  
SAE: Society of Automotive Engineering  
STRIDE: Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial-of-service and Elevation of privilege  
TARA: Threat Analysis and Risk Assessment  
UNECE: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe



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
GENEVA SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS  
AND MANAGEMENT  
Institute of Information Service Science



Meriem Benyahya  
PhD candidate  
[meriem.benyahya@unige.ch](mailto:meriem.benyahya@unige.ch)



Teri Lenard  
PhD candidate  
[teri.lenard@unige.ch](mailto:teri.lenard@unige.ch)



Anastasija Collen  
Senior researcher  
[anastasija.collen@unige.ch](mailto:anastasija.collen@unige.ch)



Niels A. Nijdam  
Director I-Sec  
[niels.nijdam@unige.ch](mailto:niels.nijdam@unige.ch)