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Cesalli, Laurent; Goubier, Frédéric

How to cite

CESALLI, Laurent, GOUBIER, Frédéric. Anton Marty on Naming (Nennen) and Meaning (Bedeuten): A Comparison with Medieval Supposition Theory. In: Modern Views of Medieval Logic. Kann, C. ; Loewe, B. ; Rode, C. ; Uckelman, S.L. (Ed.). Leuven : Peeters, 2018. p. 29–54. (Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales. Bibliotheca)

This publication URL: <https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:144283>

ANTON MARTY ON NAMING (*NENNEN*) AND MEANING (*BEDEUTEN*)

A COMPARISON WITH MEDIEVAL SUPPOSITION THEORY*

Laurent CESALLI & Frédéric GOUBIER

(University of Geneva, Department of Philosophy)

0. Introduction

Can two semantic theories belonging to very different periods of time be compared? And if so, what can be gained from such an enterprise? In the following, we will consider the case of Anton Marty's (1847-1914) semantics of names and the medieval theory of supposition.¹ The *tertium comparationis* is offered by the fact that Marty is making use of the distinction between *suppositio materialis* and *formalis*, a distinction that is found in a few late medieval logicians such as William of Sherwood, Walter Burley and John Wyclif and which had a certain success in post-medieval scholastic.² Although the three authors mentioned do not describe formal supposition in exactly the same way, they do describe the same notion. Insofar as Sherwood can be considered as emblematic of the medieval position, we chose his *Introductiones in logicam*, which Marty may have known at least partly through Carl Prantl's *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*,³ as a basis for comparing Marty's semantics with the medieval theory of supposition. Whatever role Prantl may have played, Marty's master, Franz Brentano, who wrote himself a history of medieval philosophy,⁴ certainly

* We express our gratitude towards our anonymous referees for their constructive comments. We would also like to thank Sara Uckelman and Markus Erne for their careful reading of the text.

¹ The main text we will focus on is A. MARTY, *Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie*, Halle a. S. 1908 [= U]; as for the theory of supposition, we will mainly rely on WILLIAM OF SHERWOOD, *Introductiones in logicam* (1230/1240), hrsg. von H. BRANDS und Ch. KANN, Hamburg 1995 [= IL].

² For Sherwood, cf. IL, p. 136: 43f. (text quoted below, p. 6). For the other main tenants of formal supposition, cf. WALTER BURLEY, *De puritate artis logicae. With a Revised Edition of the Tractatus brevior*, ed. Ph. BOEHNER, St. Bonaventure (New York) 1955, *Tractatus longior, prologus*, p. 2; JOHN WYCLIF, *Tractatus de logica*, ed. M. H. DZIEWICKI, London 1893, vol. I, p. 39. Note that the Pseudo Richard Campsall also mentions formal supposition in his *Logica contra Ockham* (PSEUDO-RICHARD OF CAMPSALL, *Logica Campsall*, ed. E. E. Synan, *The Works of Richard of Campsall*, vol. 2, Toronto 1982, §51.01 and 51.06). Formal supposition seems therefore to be present only among realist logicians.

³ C. PRANTL's *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande* was published for the first time between 1855 and 1890.

⁴ F. BRENTANO, *Geschichte der mittelalterlichen Philosophie*, hrsg. von K. HEDWIG, Hamburg 1980. The booklet is in fact quite disappointing because it presents an oversimplified view of medieval philosophy and is aimed at justifying the presupposition according to which the development of medieval philosophy runs as follows: construction (11th-12th centuries), climax (13th century), decline (14th-15th centuries). In his (unpublished) *Logik-Vorlesung* (second half of the eighties), Brentano mentioned the supposition theory and distinguished between *suppositio*

also contributed to his knowledge of medieval thought. It is not our aim to discuss at length the question of Marty's sources,⁵ nor do we want to compare the use of the notion of *suppositio* in Marty, Brentano and, say, Tarski.⁶ Rather, we want to focus on Marty and consider Sherwood's definitions of *significatio*, *suppositio* and *appellatio* as points of reference or terms of comparison. Thus, we will begin with some remarks on the two passages in which Marty uses supposition theory; in a second step, we will present some of Sherwood's basic semantic notions and Marty's semantics of names; finally, we will attempt to draw some comparative conclusions.

1. Marty's use of medieval supposition theory

On two occasions, Marty refers explicitly to the medieval theory of supposition, distinguishing between different types of supposition: *materialis*, *formalis* and *simplex*. In both passages, the use of medieval notions aims at clarifying some of Marty's ideas about meaning (*Bedeutung*). In the first passage (§38), supposition is used to explain the distinction between two semantic functions of indicating (*Kundgeben*) and meaning (*Bedeuten*). The idea is that while every constituent of language indicates something, not every constituent of language means something. For example the syllable 'daugh-' as part of the spoken word 'daughter' indicates that the speaker has a presentation of that syllable, but doesn't mean anything. What that syllable is lacking is meaningfulness (*Sinnigkeit*):

If one wanted to object that an individual sound or even a syllable such as *B* or *Bi*, as in *Bild*, indicates [*gibt kund*] that the speaker represents something, namely that sound, one should respond that it must not only be asked what our linguistic expressions indicate, but also what they mean [*bedeuten*]. But even if we only

materialis, *simplex* and *realis* (!). Contrary to Marty who, as we shall see, distinguishes for every type of supposition a meaning and a naming of the name (*Bedeuten* / *Nennen*), Brentano considers that a name taken in *suppositio simplex* stands for its meaning (*Bedeutung*, which is here the content of a presentation, that is, for the Brentano of that period, an immanent object) and that a name taken in *suppositio realis* stands for what the name names (individual, transcendent objects like individual human beings for the name '*Mensch*'). Cf. A. CHRUDZIMSKI, *The Ontology of Franz Brentano*, Dordrecht 2004, p. 128 (n. 116 for a transcription of the relevant passage of Brentano's *Logik-Vorlesung*).

⁵ We cannot exclude that Marty relied on other sources than Sherwood via Prantl. He could have had an access to works belonging to the modern neo-scholastic tradition making use of supposition theory and mentioning the *suppositio formalis*. For example, A. STÖCKL, *Lehrbuch der Philosophie*, Mainz 1887, p. 195 as well as T. PESCH, *Institutiones logicales secundum principia S. Thomae Aquinatis ad usum scholasticum*, Freiburg in Br. 1889, vol. I, p. 294-295.

⁶ Hartmut Brands and Christoph Kann pointed out the specificity of the medieval treatment of autonomy within supposition theory with respect to modern conceptions of material supposition, as for example in Tarski, cf. *IL*, p. 270-271, note 174. Cf. also H. BRANDS, "Die zweifache Einteilung der formalen Supposition bei William of Sherwood", in S. KNUUTTILA et al. (eds.), *Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy*, Helsinki 1990, vol. II, p. 445-454 and C. PANACCIO, "Tarski et la *suppositio materialis*", in: *Philosophiques* 31/2 (2004), p. 295-309.

consider the former, nevertheless, this way of a sound being a sign – that is, the indication [*Kundgabe*] of a psychic experience directed towards itself – is not that which is proper to meaningful sounds. The meaningfulness [*Sinnigkeit*] (what scholastic philosophers called *suppositio formalis*) is something else. To be a sign merely in this way (which is related to the *suppositio materialis* of the Scholastics) is also true of a meaningless sound.⁷

By correlating *Sinnigkeit* (meaningfulness) with the medieval *suppositio formalis*, Marty indeed grasps one of the very basic ideas of supposition theory: to make of the word – or at least the words the medievals would call ‘categoremes’ – an autonomous entity at both the semantic and the cognitive levels. The fact that for late medieval logicians, there is no supposition without proper signification, and that signification is what provides semantic autonomy to words, does make of supposition a manifestation of semantic autonomy.⁸ For the sake of exactness, we may argue that among the different kinds of supposition distinguished by the medievals – the *modi supponendi* –, William of Sherwood’s supposition *secundum habitum*, which somehow attests the kind of semantic relation the term is designed for, may have been a better candidate than the *suppositio formalis* for the role of manifestation of meaningfulness.⁹ On the other hand, given that formal supposition corresponds to the use of a word in accordance with its signification – to put it roughly –, it has some legitimacy as an indicator of semantic autonomy. As a matter of fact, the intrinsic link between supposition and signification supported by the mediaevals raises some problems in the case of non-autonomous syllables evoked by Marty. According to late medieval logicians, they cannot

⁷ U, §38, p. 210f.: “Wenn man einwenden wollte, auch ein einzelner Laut, oder eine Silbe wie B oder Bi in ‚Bild‘ gebe kund, daß er Sprechende etwas vorstelle, nämlich eben diesen Laut, so wäre zu erwidern, daß bei unseren Sprachmitteln nicht bloß zu fragen ist, was sie kundgeben, sondern auch, was sie bedeuten. (...) Und auch wenn man nur auf das erste blickt, so ist doch diese Art des Zeichenseins eines Lautes, nämlich die Kundgabe eines auf ihn selbst gerichteten psychischen Erlebnisses (...) nicht das, was den sinnvollen Lauten eigentümlich ist. Die Sinnigkeit (was die Scholastiker *suppositio formalis* nannten) ist etwas anderes. Bloß in jener (der *suppositio materialis* der Scholastiker verwandten) Weise Zeichen zu sein, gilt auch vom sinnlosen Laute.”

⁸ Cf. *IL* p. 4: 44-6:72. A commentator felt the need, a few decades later, to precise Sherwood’s idea: “Quoniam significatio est proprietas termini unde vox est; suppositio, appellatio, copulatio sunt proprietates termini unde terminus est” (*Dubitationes et notabilia circa Guillelmi de Shyreswode Introductionum logicalium*. Tractatus V: *De proprietatibus terminorum*, ed. J. PINBORG & S. EBBESEN, *Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Age Grec et Latin* 47 (1984), p. 119). The idea is actually quite common (cf. for instance PETER OF SPAIN, *Tractatus*, ed. L.M. DE RIJK, Assen 1972, p. 80, l. 11-13), even though the diachronic approach – first signification, then supposition – is not always accepted.

⁹ Cf. *IL* p. 132: 10-134: 14. The “habitual supposition” of a term is its relation to something insofar as that thing can be put under something else (*natum est ordinari sub alio*). For some of William’s colleagues (Peter of Spain, Lambert of Lagny, etc.), it would have been the *suppositio naturalis*, while for others the manifestation would have been provided by an effective supposition within a propositional context (e.g. for Roger Bacon, William of Ockham). At any rate, for each and every medieval logician, what guarantees the semantic autonomy is the *significatio*.

theoretically have a supposition, even *materialis*, since they do not have a signification; but then, they are not used significantly anyway. To be fair, it should be noted that late medieval authors did tackle the issue, for they were well aware that any non-significant sound can be used in language – they actually dedicated impassioned discussions to the topic.¹⁰ Marty is spared the difficulty: in the aforementioned passage, we have implicitly the idea that there is something corresponding to the *suppositio materialis* for meaningless parts of words, that is for expressions, that aren't *termini* or *partes orationis* properly speaking.

In the second passage in which Marty makes use of supposition theory (§124), the context is that of a typology of equivocation. Supposition is presented as a special case of equivocation or “meaning displacement” (*Bedeutungsverschiebung*). Technically, supposition falls under ‘analogy’: just as one and the same name can be used to refer to the cause and to the effect (‘sane’ for the food and the body), so one and the same name can be used to refer to a sign and what it signifies, for example the name ‘Hercules’ as referring to the antique hero and to the statue representing him. This last case involves natural meaning – the statue (normally) looks like Hercules. When conventional meaning is involved however, as in the case of linguistic expressions – the name ‘Hercules’ does not resemble Hercules in any respect –, then, according to Marty, what happens is precisely what the medieval logicians meant with their different types of supposition:

In this connexion <the scholastics> said that every linguistic means can “supposit” - that is, function, and specifically “mean” [*speziell* “*Bedeutend*”] - in various ways. Of course, it can stand for that which is its meaning in the proper sense of the word (...) as is the case when ‘human being’ “means” [*“Bedeutet”*] the content of the respective conceptual thought and names any individual human being. This, they called *suppositio simplex*. A word, however, can also have a *suppositio formalis* and *materialis*, and they understood the latter as the word’s function to name [*meinen*] itself, as when I say “*man* is a noun”. *Suppositio formalis* <is the case> when I say for example “*man* is a general concept”. (...) in this way, the <linguistic sign> here functions as the name of its own meaning (...).¹¹

¹⁰ For a sharp description of these discussions, cf. I. ROSIER-CATACH, “La *suppositio materialis* et la question de l’autonymie au Moyen Âge”, in J. AUTHIER-REVUZ, M. DOURY, S. REBOUL-TOURÉ (eds.), *Parler des mots. Le fait autonymique en discours*, Paris 2003, p. 21-55. For an example of the puzzles that arose in this connection, one can mention the proposition *p*: ‘*buba* non est nomen’, the difficulty being to explain how a proposition can be true, if its subject term is not a name. The solution is to say that in *p*, ‘*buba*’ is a name, but that it does not stand for itself, but for the sound ‘*buba*’ considered outside of *p* – cf. L. CESALLI, “Richard Brinkley, *De propositione* (*Summa logicae* V, 1-5)”, in *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge* 71 (2004), p. 203-254 (§25, p. 225).

¹¹ U, §124, p. 507f.: “Im Zusammenhang damit sprachen <die Scholastiker> davon, daß jedes Sprachmittel in verschiedener Weise ‘supponieren’, d.h. fungieren und speziell ‘bedeuten’ könne. Es könne natürlich stehen für das, was im eigentlichen Sinne seine Bedeutung genannt wird (...) wie wenn Mensch den Inhalt des betreffenden begrifflichen Gedankens ‘bedeutet’ und irgendeinen einzelnen Menschen nennt. Dies hießen sie die *suppositio simplex*. Dem Worte könne aber auch eine *suppositio formalis* und *materialis* zukommen, und unter letzterer verstanden sie die Funktion des Wortes, sich selbst zu meinen, wie wenn ich sage ‘*Mensch* ist ein

To sum up what we have here, Marty's mentions of the supposition theory seem to back or at least to illustrate his views on two issues: 1) the establishment of a level of autonomy for words which determines where the meaningfulness starts; 2) the set up of three sorts of actualisations of two kinds of semantic relations, namely, meaning and naming. Concerning the first point, we briefly evoked the way Marty puts his conception of meaningfulness (*Sinnigkeit*) under the banner of *suppositio formalis*. He considers the possession of formal supposition as the criterion for semantic autonomy. As for the second point, from what Marty says above, we can grasp that when a word means the content of a presentation and names the individual things corresponding to the presentation, we are dealing with a *suppositio simplex*;¹² from the examples he gives, we can presume that the supposition is *materialis* when what is named is the word itself ("‘Man’ is a substantive"); finally, we have a case of *suppositio formalis* when the presentation itself ("man is a general concept") is named. Not a high level of detail, but enough to get the impression that the way Marty puts some of his seemingly basic semantic conceptions under the auspices of supposition theory may not raise any problem in the case of semantic and cognitive autonomy, but could be at odds with the medievals' ideas when it comes to the use of *modi supponendi*. The choice made by Marty of the three kinds of supposition he thinks best illustrate the three above-mentioned semantic situations presupposes, as we shall see, a rather original conception of the late medieval concepts. At this point, it may be worth giving the floor to the original supposition theory, through one of its most emblematic spokesman, William of Sherwood, if we want to determine what Marty has done to it.

2. A sketch of William of Sherwood's theory of supposition

We said it, William of Sherwood does not seem to disagree about semantic autonomy: according to him, it is brought by signification, which goes with the acquisition of a semantic capacity, actualised in the supposition. He defines *significatio* or meaning as "the presentation of a certain form to the intellect" ("*Est igitur significatio praesentatio alicuius formae ad intellectum*" (IL, p. 132: 6-7)). For a thirteenth-century logician like Sherwood, this content is a universal form – i.e. humanity in the case of the name 'homo'. *Significatio* is a propositional-context-independent semantic property that belongs to a term in virtue of conventional imposition alone.

Substantiv'. <Die> *suppositio formalis* <ist gegeben> in einem Falle, wie wenn ich sage 'Mensch ist ein Allgemeinbegriff'. (...) so fungiert <das Sprachzeichen> hier als Name für seine eigene Bedeutung (...)"

¹² Contrary to what he does for the two other types of supposition (*materialis* and *formalis*), Marty does not give any example of *suppositio simplex*. However, in accordance with what he writes, one can think of an example like 'man is a rational animal' as relevant.

Suppositio on the other hand, is a propositional-context-dependant semantic property.¹³ Sherwood defines it as follows: “Supposition is the subordination of one concept to another” (“*Suppositio autem est ordinatio alicuius intellectus sub alio*” (IL, p. 132: 7-8)). With such a definition, Sherwood puts forward both the syntactical and the cognitive character of supposition: it is a notion at the crossroad of semantics and syntax, the semantic part being intimately connected to the noetic level. His basic idea is quite intuitive: talking (at least assertively) is saying something of something, that is, putting something – what we talk about – under something – what we say of it.¹⁴ It delimits an extension and a quantification with respect to a syntactic situation: if we take a certain proposition as an input, the output will be a certain domain of quantification and a certain quantification for the subject (and possibly the predicate). For such a formal system to work, the theory has to distinguish several kinds of supposition; it does it in two steps, the first depending on the sort of *suppositum* (the word itself, the concept, the things etc.) and the second, on the quantification (universal, existential etc.). In another move, the theory will also provide a way to evaluate the modifications of the domain of quantification – but it is a refinement we do not need to consider now. The first step is of particular interest to us. According to William of Sherwood, it includes material, formal and simple suppositions. He defines them as follows: “<Supposition> is called material when a word itself supposes either for the vocal sound absolutely, or for the word itself composed out of sound and signification, like for instance, when I say ‘man (i.e. the latin *homo*) is a disyllable’ and ‘man is a name’ ” (“*Et dicitur materialis, quando ipsa dictio supponit vel pro ipsa voce absoluta vel pro ipsa dictione composita ex voce et significatione, ut si dicam ‘homo est disyllabum’, ‘homo est nomen’* ” (IL, p. 136: 40-43)). “<Supposition> is formal, when a word supposits its significate” (“*Formalis autem est, quando dictio supponit suum significatum*” (IL, 136.43s.)) – that is, when it is used according to its significate. “<Supposition> is simple,

¹³ For details about supposition theory, cf., for instance, L.M. DE RIJK, *Logica Modernorum. A contribution to the history of early terminist logic*, Vol. 2, Part one: *The origin and early development of the theory of supposition*, Assen 1967; D.P. HENRY, “Suppositio and Significatio in English Logic”, in: H.A.G. BRAAKUIS, C.H. KNEEPKENS, L.M. DE RIJK (eds.), *English Logic and Semantics from the End of the Twelfth Century to the Time of Ockham and Burley*, Nijmegen 1981, p. 361-387; P.V. SPADE, “The semantics of terms”, in N. KRETZMANN, A. KENNY, J. PINBORG, E. STUMP (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism 1100–1600*, Cambridge 1982, p. 188-196, A. DE LIBERA, “La logique médiévale et la théorie de la supposition”, in: *Travaux d'Histoire des Théories Linguistiques*, Paris VII, n°1, série II (1982), p. 31-57; S. READ, “Medieval Theories: Properties of Terms”, in: E.N. ZALTA (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (2002), at <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-terms>.

¹⁴ If supposition was first and foremost designed to take care of what we ‘put under’ – that is, roughly, what the subject term refers to – it was common to use it also for the predicate. In that respect, what matters are the delimitating and quantifying functions, rather than the syntactic position.

when a word supposits its significate for its significate, like ‘man is a species’ ” (“*Et est simplex, quando dictio supponit significatum pro significato, ut ‘homo est species’* ” (IL, p. 136: 45ss). Simple supposition is a specification of formal supposition: we have simple supposition, when a term is taken significatively *and* supposits for (i.e., roughly, refers to) its significate, namely the universal form. When, in contrast, a term is taken significatively and does not supposit for the universal form, but for the individual things falling under it, we have a case of personal supposition: “<Supposition is> personal, when a word supposits its significate, but for the thing” (“*Personalis autem, quando supponit significatum sed pro re, ut ‘homo currit’* ” (IL, p. 136: 47-48), a mode of supposition which, interestingly, is not mentioned by Marty.¹⁵

This brief incursion into William of Sherwood raises many questions with regard to Marty’s understanding of medieval supposition theory. For example, we would expect him to speak of *suppositio personalis* rather than of *suppositio simplex* in the case where the term ‘man’ names individual human beings; further, where a term “stands for” its own meaning, we would expect a case of *suppositio simplex* rather than of *suppositio formalis* without any further specification. The least we can say is that at first sight, Marty does not try very hard to abide by the medieval rules. But we should remember that we are dealing with different sets of notions, which could mean that Marty tends to ascribe the medieval notions to what he assumes to be the corresponding position in his own system. We indeed believe that Marty did not simply misread Sherwood. Rather, we want to argue that the shift Marty’s semantics seems to operate from the original supposition theory is justified by his own theoretical insights – that he had to shift, or that somebody had to shift for him. In order to understand what is at stake with the shift and what, in Marty’s approach, grounds it – that will constitute the topic of the fourth part of this paper –, we should now turn our attention toward Marty’s semantics of names, before comparing it with Sherwood’s.

3. Marty’s semantics of names

A name for Marty, is primarily a spoken name, secondarily a written name, but never a mental name: there is no mental language. The reason for that is that Marty understands language as being essentially a means of communication, and mental language, among human beings at least, cannot do the job.¹⁶ Nonetheless,

¹⁵ It is worth noticing that, besides *significatio* and *suppositio*, the Sherwoodian supposition theory has at its disposal another semantic tool to describe the relation between names and things: *appellatio*. Sherwood defines appellatio as an ‘actual correspondance’ (*convenientia*): IL, p. 134: 18-20: “Appellatio autem est praesens convenientia termini, i.e. proprietas, secundum quam significatum termini potest dici de aliquo mediante hoc verbo ‘est’ ”.

¹⁶ U, §8, p. 22: “We said that language, within the science and philosophy of language, is primarily understood as the intentional indication (*absichtliche Kundgabe*) of the inner life. However, what is primarily intended in this indication is a corresponding influence of the foreign inner life. As a

names are essentially connected with our mental states, or inner life as Marty puts it – Marty takes over the Brentanian threefold classification of psychic phenomena in presentations, judgements and phenomena of interest and distinguishes accordingly three classes of semantically autonomous linguistic expressions (*autosemantische Sprachmittel* or *Autosemantika*).¹⁷ A name is a presentation-suggestive (*Vorstellungssuggestiv*); thus, a name is the expression of a certain type of psychic phenomena – the phenomenon of presentation (*Vorstellung*). We have the same pattern for the other classes of *Autosemantika*: statements (*Aussagen*) express phenomena of judgment; expressions of interest (*Emotive*) express phenomena of love and hate. Names are, according to Marty, the most fundamental class of *Autosemantika* (statements and expressions of interest both presuppose names).

Names have three semantic functions: the function of indicating (*Kundgebung*), meaning (*Bedeutung*) and naming (*Nennung*).¹⁸ What a name

rule, one expresses one's own presentations, judgments, feelings etc., in order to bring about presentations, judgments and emotions in another psychic being, and indeed, ones which are analogous to one's own." ["Wir sagten, unter Sprache verstehe man in der Sprachwissenschaft und Sprachphilosophie vornehmlich die absichtliche Kundgabe des inneren Lebens. Die primäre Intention bei dieser Kundgabe aber ist eine entsprechende Beeinflussung des fremden Seelenlebens. Man äußert in der Regel seine eigenen Vorstellungen, Urteile, Gefühle usw., um in anderen psychischen Wesen Vorstellungen, Urteile und Gefühle, und zwar solche, die den eigenen analog sind (...), hervorzurufen."]. Cf. also *U*, 19, p. 53, where Marty calls language an organ in the etymologic sense of tool.

¹⁷ Marty defines *Autosemantika* and *Synsemantika* in a correlative way; *U*, §36, p. 205f.: "<In every language, there are> in part means of designation that, even considered in themselves, are the expression of autonomously communicable psychic phenomena, <and> in part ones for which that is not the case. *Autosemantic* and *synsemantic* seem to be the most suitable designations for the two fundamental classes under consideration here." ["<In jeder Sprache gibt es> teils solche Bezeichnungsmittel (...), welche schon allein genommen der Ausdruck eines für sich mitteilbaren psychischen Phänomens sind, teils solche, von denen dies nicht gilt. (...) autosemantisch und synsemantisch scheinen mir darum die angemessenen Bezeichnungen für die fundamentalen Klassen, auf die es hier ankommt."]. Thus, whichever part of language is able to express by itself a complete psychic phenomenon (i.e. either a presentation, a judgment or a phenomenon of interest) is an *Autosemantikon*; every other part of language is a *Synsemantikon*.

¹⁸ *Kundgebung*: *U*, §88, p. 384: "Just as a statement indicates a judgment on the part of the speaker, so does the pronouncement of a name express an act of presentation by the speaker, or expresses it as taking place within himself"; for the equivalence of *Äußern* and *Kundgeben*, cf. *U*, §58, p. 284 and §59, p. 285; *Bedeutung* and *Nennung*: *U*, §88, p. 384f.: "However, just as the immediate goal of the statement is to produce a judgment of a certain kind in the hearer, in the same way, that which suggests a presentation in the hearer – and in particular, the name – intends primarily to produce a presentation of a certain kind in the hearer; and just as that primary intention can be called the meaning of the statement, so can that analogue <i.e. the production of a presentation of a certain kind in the hearer> be called the meaning of the name. However, we usually speak not only of something that is meant by the name, but also of something which the name names, and so the question arises of how it relates to that which is meant." Cf. also *U*, §105, p. 436, text quoted below, note 21. [*Kundgebung*: *U*, §88, p. 384: "Wie die Aussage (...) ein Urteilen von Seite des Sprechenden äußert, so äußert (...) das Aussprechen des Namens (...) ein Vorstellen im Redenden oder drückt es als in ihm vorhanden aus." *Bedeutung* and *Nennung*: *U*, §88, p. 384sq.: "Wie aber der direkte Zweck der Aussage ist, im Hörer ein gewisses Urteil zu


indicates has to do exclusively with the inner life of the speaker. And that is threefold: first the presentation in the speaker of the uttered sound; second, the intention of the speaker to name something by means of that sound; third, the presentation in the speaker of that about which he is speaking.¹⁹ The *meaning* of a name has to do with the inner life of both the speaker and the hearer: what a speaker intends when he consciously utters a name is to bring about a certain presentation in the hearer, namely a presentation of the same kind as the one indicated in himself through the very act of uttering the name. That function of the uttered name – namely to bring about a certain presentation in the hearer – is the meaning of the name.²⁰ What names *name*, in the end, are the objects of the indicated and intended presentations respectively in the speaker and in the hearer.²¹ Schematically:

erwecken, so zielt auch das Vorstellungssuggestiv und speziell der Name primär eigentlich darauf, in ihm eine gewisse Vorstellung wachzurufen und wie (...) jene primäre Intention als die Bedeutung der Aussage bezeichnet wird, so heißt das Analoge die Bedeutung des Namens (...). <Wir sprechen jedoch> allgemein nicht bloß von etwas, was der Name bedeutet, sondern auch von etwas, das er nennt, und es fragt sich, wie sich dies zu dem Bedeuteten verhalte.”].

¹⁹ Cf. the synthesis given by L. LANDGREBE, *Nennfunktion und Wortbedeutung. Eine Studie über Martys Sprachphilosophie*, Halle 1935 [= Landgrebe 1935], p. 46-47.

²⁰ However, given that every presentation has a certain content, one can also say (as Marty himself sometimes does) that the meaning of the name is the content of the intended presentation in the hearer (see below, n. 20). For the meaning of the name as its function to bring about a certain presentation in the hearer, cf. *U*, §88, p. 384s. (text quoted above note 18). Cf. also A. MARTY, “Über subjectlose Sätze und das Verhältnis der Grammatik zu Logik und Psychologie I–III”, in: *Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie* 8 (1884), p. 56-94, 161-92, 292-340 (on page 300). The text is also printed in A. MARTY, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Bd. II.1, hrsg. von J. EISENMEIER, A. KASTIL, O. KRAUS, Halle a. 1918, the relevant passage being on page 69.

²¹ *U*, §105, p. 436: “However, through the intermediary of the functions of indicating (*Kundgabe*) and of meaning (*Bedeutung*), names also acquire that which we call naming. We speak of naming in relation to the objects which possibly do correspond in reality to the presentations produced by the names, or at least can correspond (without contradiction) to them. These <objects of the presentations> are that which is named (*das Genannte*).” [“Unter Vermittlung dieser äußernden [= Kundgabe] und jener Bedeutungsfunktion [= Bedeutung] aber kommt den Namen nun auch das zu, was wir das Nennen bezeichnen. Wir schreiben es ihnen zu mit Rücksicht auf die Gegenstände, welche den dadurch erweckten Vorstellungen eventuell in Wirklichkeit entsprechen oder wenigstens (ohne Widerspruch) entsprechen können. Diese [i.e. Vorstellungsgegenstände] sind das Genannte (...).”].



For example: when I utter the name ‘white’, that word itself *indicates* my presentation of its sound, my intention of naming something by means of it and my presentation “white”; its *meaning* is an intentional process (in the sense of an *intended* process) of producing in the hearer a certain presentation endowed with a certain content – therefore Marty refers to it sometimes as what he calls “the primary intention of the speaker” and sometimes as “the content of a certain presentation”;²² it *names* white things such as snow, clouds and white rabbits. Note that the three semantic functions of names are related: the meaning gives us access to what is named (i.e. the object), and we only get to the idea that a name names something other than itself thanks to the intention of naming indicated in the speaker through the uttering of the name.

Summing up, we can say that a name’s meaning is a semantic function involving *a*) the intention (of the speaker) to make the hearer have a certain presentation and *b*) the content of that presentation;²³ what a name names are the objects of that presentation.²⁴

3.1. *Presentations, their objects and contents*

But since we can name objects of very different kinds – like present objects but also past, future and merely possible, that is, non contradictory objects – the claim

²² See above, note 18. For the meaning of the name as the content of the intended presentation in the hearer, cf. *U*, §89, p. 388: “In the same way, one could say that the content of the presentation to be brought about in the hearer is that which is meant by the name, just as the content of the judgment to be brought about <in the hearer> is the meaning of the <uttered> proposition.” [“(…) so könnte man (…) auch davon reden, daß der Inhalt der im Hörer zu erweckenden Vorstellungen das durch den Namen Bedeutete sei, analog wie der Inhalt des zu erweckenden Urteils die Bedeutung der Aussage ist.”].

²³ Henceforth, we will use the term ‘meaning’ in the sense *a*).

²⁴ The two semantic features of names – meaning and naming – are related in such a way, that the second always presupposes the first: what a name names is always given through its meaning. In that sense, Marty is able to agree with the medieval principle “*voces significant res mediantibus conceptibus*” (*U*, §105, p. 436, n. 1; cf. also the text quoted above, note 21).

that names name objects of presentations can only be accepted after one shows how this is to be understood for all kinds of objects, and not only for real, actually existing objects²⁵. This comes down to the questions of *a)* what a presentation is, *b)* what it is to be the object of a presentation, and *c)* what kinds of objects a presentation can have. We will now briefly go through those three questions before turning back to the difference between meaning and naming.²⁶

a) A presentation is a psychic phenomenon of ideal adequation (*Assimilation, ideelle Verähnlichung*) with respect to the difference of the “what” of an object.²⁷ This quidditative difference – the difference of the “what” – provides the ground for the identity and distinction of presentations: because dogs are essentially different from trees, “dog” presentations and “tree” presentations are different

25 This constraint arises in Martyan semantics in virtue of the principle that every psychic phenomenon has an object – this is the very distinctive mark of psychic phenomena as defined by F. BRENTANO in his *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt*, hrsg. von O. KRAUS, Hamburg 1974), vol. 1, p. 124 sq.: “Every psychic phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (also indeed mental) in-existence of an object (...).” [“Jedes psychische Phänomen ist durch das charakterisiert, was die Scholastiker des Mittelalters die intentionale (auch wohl mentale) Inexistenz eines Gegenstandes genannt haben (...).”]. Note that if Marty, in a first stage of his intellectual development, accepted Brentano’s thesis of immanent objects (i.e. this is what *Inexistenz* means here), he rejected it later (from 1904 onwards), not, however, insofar as he denied that every psychic phenomenon must have an object, but only insofar as he maintained that the objects of psychic phenomena are not immanent objects (immanent objects are, according to him, mere fictions of the figurative interior form of language – cf. *U*, §93, p. 397). For the thesis that every presentation must have an object, cf. *U*, §101, p. 421: “We found the true meaning of the theory that every act of presentation (or of consciousness in general) is a relation to an object (*Objektbeziehung*) in the thesis that each one is an actual or possible ideal assimilation (*Verähnlichung*) to something (which, precisely, is called its object).” [“Wir fanden den wahren Sinn der Lehre, daß jedes Vorstellen (resp. Bewusstsein überhaupt) eine Objektsbeziehung sei, darin, daß jedes eine wirkliche oder mögliche ideelle Verähnlichung mit etwas (was eben das Objekt genannt wird) sei.”]. The clause ‘or at least a possible object’ has to do with the theory of the relative determination (*relative Bestimmung*) – see below, note 29. According to this theory, a presentation of something that doesn’t exist now can be said to have an object, but counterfactually. This is not equivalent to not having any object (otherwise, every presentation without object would be equivalent, but a presentation of, say, Pegasus is not equivalent to a presentation of Jupiter). On that question, cf. A. CHRUDZIMSKI, “Die Intentionalitätstheorie Anton Martys”, in: *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 57 (1999), p. 175-214 (esp. p. 192-197).

²⁶ For a synthetic presentations of those questions, cf. B. SMITH, “Brentano and Marty: an inquiry into being and truth”, in: K. MULLIGAN (ed.), *Mind, Meaning, Metaphysics. The Philosophy and Theory of Language of Anton Marty*, Dordrecht 1990, p. 111-149.


²⁷ *U*, §102, p. 425: “While the act of presenting is essentially an adequation to the differences of the ‘what’ of an object, the act of judging is a conformity to its being or not being.” *U*, §102, p. 423: “Indeed, I believe one can say without hesitation, that it belongs to the essence of any psychic activity to be a process which has as a consequence that through it the psychic active subject becomes ideally conformed to something other than itself.” [“Während das Vorstellen wesentlich eine Adäquation mit den Unterschieden des Was eines Objektes ist, ist das Urteilen eine Konformation zu dessen Sein oder nicht Sein (...).” *U*, §102, p. 423: “Ja ich glaube, man kann unbedenklich sagen, es gehöre zum Wesen jeder psychischen Tätigkeit ein Vorgang zu sein, der zur Folge hat, daß dadurch das psychisch Tätige primär etwas anderem als es selbst ideel konform wird.”].

presentations. The adjective ‘ideal’ doesn’t mean here something like ‘abstract’ in the Platonic sense or ‘*an sich*’ in the Bolzanian sense, but rather something like ‘tending towards perfection’.

b) For x , to be the object of a presentation means to be such that if there is a certain presentation (i.e. a presentation of x), x is *de facto* ideally adequate to that presentation.²⁸ At first sight, this seems to imply that objects of presentations are always objects of actual presentations: a tree without an actual presentation “tree” isn’t an object of presentation. However, in a certain sense, a tree without a presentation “tree” can be said to be the object of a presentation “tree”, and conversely, a presentation “tree” without there being any tree can be said to be a presentation “tree”. When a presentation and its object exist simultaneously, the relation of ideal adequation between the presentation and its object is a correlation. If one of the terms is missing, then the relation of ideal adequation takes the form of a relative determination (*relative Bestimmung*).²⁹ Schematically:

²⁸ U, §103, p. 432: “And so it is clear what we have to understand the object of presentation to be. Something is apparently an object of presentation precisely if, for its part, it cannot be without being adequate to a certain act of presentation – if such an act takes place.” [“Damit ist klar, was wir unter dem Vorstellungsgegenstand zu verstehen haben. So heißt nämlich etwas offenbar dann, wenn es seinerseits nicht sein kann ohne, falls ein gewisses Vorstellen gegeben ist, ihm adäquat zu sein (...).”].

²⁹ U, §97, p. 411: “With that it is merely said that the existence of the actually given ground (*Fundament*) and the existence of certain other grounds cannot be the case at the same time, unless the relation is at the same time a fact [this is a case of correlation]; but this negative or hypothetical predicate does indeed really belong to the existing ground, even when the other grounds do not exist, and we wish to call it a relative determination (*relative Bestimmung*).” [“Es ist ja damit bloß gesagt, daß (...) die Existenz des tatsächlich gegebenen Fundaments und die gewisser anderer Fundamente nicht zugleich bestehen kann, ohne daß die Relation gleichfalls Tatsache ist [this is a case of correlation]; Aber dieses negative oder hypothetische Prädikat kommt dem bestehenden Fundament doch in aller Wahrheit zu, auch wenn die anderen Fundamente nicht existieren, und wir wollen es (...) eine relative Bestimmung nennen.”]. Thus a presentation of Pegasus, even if Pegasus does not exist, still is truly a presentation of Pegasus. But the mental act of representing does not (and cannot) stand to Pegasus in an ideal adequation which is a correlation; instead, it stands to a (possible) winged horse called Pegasus in an ideal adequation which is a relative determination. Nonetheless, as we will see (below, p. ###-##): the object (possible or actual) of a presentation of Pegasus is a real, existing winged horse and nothing else. The object of my actual presentation of Pegasus is so to speak a counterfactual or hypothetical object: that which, *if it were to exist*, would be the correlate of my presentation of Pegasus.




In other words it is sufficient for a relative determination that one of the terms of a possible correlation exists, while the other one can be merely possible. This leads us to our next point, that is, to a brief excursion into the Martyian ontology.

c) What kinds of objects are there for Marty? Martyian ontology has two essential features: first, everything that *is* also *exists (to be equals to exist)*;³⁰ second, there are two kinds of existent objects: real existent and non-real existent objects.³¹ Examples of the former are all substances (physical and psychical) and their qualities: Socrates, his individual accidents like e.g. his size at a precise moment of time, the soul of Socrates and its individual accidents like e.g. his rage against Protagoras. Examples of the latter are collectives (a forest, the Swiss people, an army etc.), relations (correlations and relative determinations), judgment contents, all *possibilia* (that is: past, future and merely possible real objects), the necessary and the impossible, space and time.³² This can be schematically summarized as follows:

³⁰ As a consequence there are, according to Marty, no non-existent entities: he sharply criticizes Bolzano and Meinong for their respective non-existents (*Objektive* and *Sätze an sich*). Cf. for example *U*, §74-75, p. 344-354.

³¹ *U*, §66, p. 317: “Accordingly, the domain of the existent or of that which can be truly known is divided into two provinces, namely that which exists and is real and that which exists without being real. Non-being as such can impossibly be something real. But not everything non-real is a non-being, and not every being is a real being.” [“Dementsprechend zerfällt uns das Gebiet des Existierenden oder mit Wahrheit Anerkennlichen in zwei Bezirke, dasjenige was existiert und real ist, und dasjenige was existiert, ohne real zu sein. (...) Das Nichtseiende als solches kann unmöglich ein Reales sein. Aber nicht alles Nichtreale ist ein Nichtseiendes, und nicht alles Seiende ein Reales.”].

³² Cf. *U*, §66, p. 317-318, but also A. MARTY, *Raum und Zeit*, Halle a. S. 1916, Teil I, §30, p. 176-178 and Teil II, § 23, p. 244-245.



Note that the non-existent is an empty place. It is, so to speak (and literally) a negative domain of the ontology. Still, it has to be represented here, because even if there are no non-existent entities, the non-existent plays an important (and negative) role in Martyian epistemology and semantics: it is the realm of the counterfactual. The real Socrates does not exist now (he is not factual), but he did exist in the past. In that precise sense, one can say that the real Socrates “belongs” to the (empty domain of the) non-existent (but this does not imply that there is now a non-existent entity which is Socrates). We will come back on that point.

At this point, one can legitimately raise three questions: *a)* Why is it necessary to admit non-real entities? *b)* Why do non-real entities have to be existent? *c)* What are the distinctive features of *irrealia*? We cannot give detailed answers to those questions here. Nevertheless, we will mention some crucial elements and point to the texts of Marty in which he argues at length for his peculiar ontology. Thus, in brief: as to the first question (*a*), one can answer that according to Marty, the objectivity of knowledge requires the admission of non-real entities within the ontology. More precisely: it is a fact that there are entities that must be (they are given), but can neither be real nor merely fictitious.³³ As to the second question

³³ Let’s take the most obvious examples. Relations: the relation of similarity between two real things cannot be itself real since in that case it would be one and the same individual determination shared by two numerically distinct entities; the relation of intentionality between a mental act and its transcendent object cannot be real either, because it cannot belong to the physical, nor to the psychological domain of the real. Collectives: a collective cannot be real without starting a pernicious regress (for any collective *c*, if *c* is itself a real entity, there has to be a collective *c'* composed out of the elements of *c* and *c* itself). Judgment contents: the notion of truth is intrinsically linked to the notion of existence, thus, a true judgment will always posit (rightly) the existence of something; but since we can form true judgments about the past, the future, the merely possible

(b), it can be relatively easily answered – although the matter in itself is rather complicated – by pointing at Marty’s notion of existence. For according to Marty, ‘to exist’ means nothing else than ‘to be rightly cognizable’. In other words, ‘to exist’ equals ‘to be able to be the subject of a true judgment’.³⁴ Finally, the third question (c) gets a clear cut answer: there are two distinctive and related features of *irrealia*: first, they are causally inert (they are “anergetic” objects); second, they do not come into being and pass away by themselves, but always and only as “companion-entities” of real entities (they have no *Werden*, but *ein bloßes Mitwerden*, they are not perceived for themselves, but only and always perceived *together with* a real entity, they are, as Marty puts it *komperzipiert*). This means that *irrealia* are temporal entities and that the concept of every non-real entity includes the concept of a real one.³⁵ This ontology of existent *irrealia* allows Marty to maintain a theory of truth as strict correspondence (correlation) between a judgment and its content. As he often repeats it: the existence of *irrealia* is of foremost importance for the theory of meaning (*Bedeutungslehre*).³⁶ The theory thus gets a great uniformity: although we may formulate true judgments about actual, as well as about non-actual objects, the correlate of a true judgment is in any case a non-real content.³⁷

or impossible (all of which can impossibly be real), the fact that we can formulate true judgments requires the existence of non-real judgment contents.

³⁴ More precisely: ‘to exist’ equals ‘to be that which is correctly judged’. In other words: if the judgment ‘A is B’ is true, then “the-being-B-of-A” (that which is judged) has to exist. But it does not mean, that only that which is *actually* judged correctly exists: the existence of whatever exists is perfectly independent of our acts of judging, but a judgment can only be true or correct if that which is judged exists. Cf. *U*, §62, p. 295 : “Existent is that which can be accepted through a correct judgment, non-existent, that which can be rejected in a such judgment and I already insisted on the fact that the ‘is’ and ‘is not’ of the thetic [i.e. existential, *de secundo adjacente*] sentence mean that something can rightly be accepted or rejected.” [“(…) seiend sei das, was in einem richtigen Urteil anerkannt, nicht seiend, was in einem solchen verworfen werden kann und <ich> hatte von dem ‘ist’ und ‘ist nicht’ der thetischen Aussagen betont, sie bedeuteten, daß etwas mit Recht anerkannt resp. geleugnet werden könne.”].

³⁵ Let’s take our examples again: the relation of similarity between two real things is a non-real entity whose existence (non causally) depends of the existents of some monadic properties (say, their colour) of those things. The relation of intentionality is a non-real entity whose existence depends (non causally) on a real mental act (say a presentation). The content of judgment “the existence of Socrates” is a non-real entity whose existence depends (non causally) of the existence of (the real) Socrates.

³⁶ *U*, §102, p. 426: “If the judgment conforms to the content in the sense of an actual correlation, that is: if the content to which it conforms is given, then we call it true or correct.” [“Besteht für das Urteil Konformität mit dem Inhalt im Sinne einer wirklichen Korrelation d.h. wird der ihm konforme Inhalt vorgefunden, so nennen wir es wahr oder richtig.”].

³⁷ Consider the following putatively true judgments: “Socrates exists” – its actual correlate: the actual existence of Socrates. “Pegasus does not exist” – its actual correlate: the actual non-existence of Pegasus; note that the object: the non-existence of Pegasus *exists*, because it can truly be cognized now that Pegasus does not exist. “Socrates does not run” (actually, he is sleeping and is not a sleepwalker) – its actual correlate: the actual non-running of Socrates (which is a non-real entity whose existence (non causally) depends of the actual sleeping of

One last point, before going back to the difference between meaning and naming: the distinction between object and content of a presentation. Let us recall the example of the presentation “white”. Its *objects* are white things like clouds and white rabbits (in this case, Marty speaks also of the object of the presentation in a wider sense, i.e. in the sense of its extension in a traditional sense). Its *content* however, is that in the white things, in respect to which the presentation “white” applies indeterminately to all white things, that is: the individual whiteness of every single white thing (in this case, Marty speaks of the object in a narrow sense).³⁸ Thus Marty’s account of universality implies something like tropes (numerically distinct, individual accidents) but nothing like universal entities. Marty is a nominalist in respect to universals, and universality, in this view, boils down to a semantic relation between a presentation and singular, metaphysical parts of things (universality is nothing but semantic under-determination). If my presentation “white” applies to many different things, it is only in virtue of the many singular whitenesses of those things and not in virtue of any general or universal entity.

3.2. *Meaning and naming*

Let us now turn back to the question of meaning and naming. The meaning of the name ‘white’ is the name’s function to produce a presentation “white” (in the hearer); furthermore the name ‘white’ names individual white things. What about the name ‘Pegasus’? There is no such thing as a flying horse to be correlated to the presentation “Pegasus”. Nonetheless, says Marty, we can name Pegasus

Socrates). “Socrates was sleeping” (he just woke up and is presently running) – its actual correlate: the actually existing past-sleep of Socrates, etc.

³⁸ U, §107, p. 448: “As for the fact that concepts often grasp only partially the real or that which could be real, one can distinguish, for the concepts, an object in a narrow sense and an object in a broad sense. In the broad sense for example, the concept of something white (*Weißes*) would have as its objects everything that belongs to its extension, that is, everything that belongs to its domain of application; in still other words: everything of which, if it exists, it can be truly predicated ‘is white’. In the narrow sense however, one can speak of the object of that concept in relation to the aspect of the object in the broad sense, according to which that object in the broad sense is grasped in a presentation which is only partial. In other words: when that which is presented, if it existed, would be adequate to that which is presented in such a way that nothing would be found in it that would not have a corresponding equivalent in the presenting subject itself, then we can name it ‘object in the narrow sense’ or ‘content’.” [“<Es> kann mit Bezug darauf, daß (...) die Begriffe das Wirkliche und das, was für sich wirklich sein könnte, vielfach unvollständig auffassen, bei ihnen (...) ein Gegenstand im engeren und weiteren Sinne unterschieden werden. Im weiteren Sinne wäre also z.B. für den Begriff Weißes alles das ein Gegenstand zu nennen, was zu seinem Umfang, d.h. zum Bereiche seiner Anwendbarkeit gehört, d.h. alles, wovon, wenn es ist, das Weißsein in Wahrheit prädiert werden kann. Im engeren Sinne dagegen kann vom Gegenstand dieses Begriffes gesprochen werden mit Rücksicht auf diejenige Seite an dem im ersten Sinne Gegenstand Genannten, wonach dieses in einer solchen unvollständigen Vorstellung erfasst ist. Mit anderen Worten: wenn das Vorgestellte, falls es wirklich wäre, dem Vorgeestellten in der Art adäquat sein würde, daß in ihm nichts gegeben wäre, was nicht auch im Vorstellenden als solchen sein Gegenstück hätte, so können wir es ‚Gegenstand im engeren Sinne‘ oder Inhalt nennen.”].

(because we have a presentation “Pegasus” and a flying horse is a possible, that is, a non-contradictory entity).³⁹ What do we name then, if names have to name the objects of presentations and there are no such objects? As we have seen above, a presentation lacking an actual object is still a presentation, but the relation between it and its (non-actual, i.e. counterfactual) object cannot be a correlation. Instead, it has to be a relative determination (*relative Bestimmung*).⁴⁰ This is precisely the case with the presentation “Pegasus”. What it names is the object which, if it existed, would (necessarily) be the correlate of the presentation “Pegasus”.⁴¹ In short the object of the actual presentation “Pegasus” is a hypothetical or counterfactual object. But note that ‘hypothetical’ or ‘counterfactual’ does not mean ‘arbitrary’: it is necessary and independent of my power of creativity, that if a real flying horse exists, then it has to be the correlate of the presentation “Pegasus”.

4. Comparative remarks

Can two semantic theories belonging to very different periods of time be compared? Clearly, Marty would have answered that question positively, for by equating notions taken from the medieval supposition theory with his own ones, he actually did even more than a mere comparison: he not only presupposed the commensurability of the two theories, but he also postulated that the medieval supposition theory could have an heuristic or exemplary value in regard to his

³⁹ U, §105, p. 436: “Those <i.e. the objects> are that which is named (*das Genannte*) and even if those who say that only real things can be named go too far, nevertheless they are right at least insofar as only that which can exist without contradiction can be named.” Cf. also U, §103, p. 432: “In that sense, the presentation *Pegasus* has no real object, but it has an object absolutely speaking (*einen Gegenstand schlechtweg*).” [“Diese [i.e. die Gegenstände] sind das Genannte und wenn auch diejenigen zu weit gehen, welche sagen, daß nur Wirkliches genannt sein könne, so ist doch soviel richtig, daß dazu wenigstens nur das gehört, was ohne Widerspruch wirklich sein könnte.”]. Cf. also U, §103, p. 432: “Die Vorstellung “Pegasus” hat in diesem Sinne zwar keinen wirklichen aber einen Gegenstand schlechtweg.”.

⁴⁰ See above, note 27, as well as U, §100, p. 417: “We said that sometimes, the ideal similitude with something is tied to the presentation in the sense of a mere relative determination. That is the case, as we said above, always when that which is presented does not exist. Then, there is still an objectual determination; however, not in the sense of a correlation, but only in the sense of relative determination. But the one or the other is given for any presentation.” [“Wir sagten, manchmal knüpfte sich an das Vorstellen die ideelle Ähnlichkeit mit etwas bloß im Sinne einer relativen Bestimmung. Dies ist, wie oben wieder angedeutet wurde, der Fall, so oft das Vorgestellte nicht existiert. Dann ist es auch eine ‚Objektbeziehung‘ nicht im Sinne einer Korrelation, sondern nur im Sinne einer relativen Bestimmung. Das eine oder andere aber ist bei jeder Vorstellung gegeben.”].

⁴¹ One has to distinguish between Pegasus as object of presentation and Pegasus as part of a judgment content. The object of the presentation “Pegasus” is a counterfactual or hypothetical object (that is: that which, *were it to exist*, would be correlated to any presentation “Pegasus”). As part of the content of the true judgment “Pegasus does not exist”, it is an actually existing possible Pegasus (the judgment is true precisely because there is no real winged horse around, and for the same reason, the only Pegasus that can exist now – as it has to, because the judgment is true – is a possible and thus non-real Pegasus).

own semantics of names. In this respect, any idiosyncrasy of his interpretation of the medieval theory becomes of peculiar interest. And as a matter of fact, his interpretation displays a rather remarkable shift from the original. By looking for the reasons for such a shift, we expect to underscore some of the respective specificities of both the Martyian and Sherwoodian theories. We will first sum up the basic equivalences presupposed by Marty's use of supposition theory, before pointing at where and to what extent the shift from the medieval original takes place. Finally we will evaluate the consequences of the shift on ontological issues, focusing on Sherwood's and Marty's respective treatment of non-existence or counterfactuality.

4.1. *Basic equivalences and definitional shift*

As we have seen, Marty equates three modes of supposing with three semantic relations:

Suppositio simplex : standing for that which is the meaning,
that is, standing for the content of a presentation.⁴²

The next two equivalences proposed by Marty do not rely on the same terminology – a difference we shall come back to in a minute :

Suppositio materialis : the function of a name to refer to itself.

Suppositio formalis : to be the name of its own meaning.

Besides these six, Marty at least implicitly equates four other notions:

Significatio : meaning (*Bedeutung*)

Praesentatio : presentation (*Vorstellung*)

These equivalences, as we shall see, do not allow us to unconditionally support a full, return translatability of *suppositio* and Nennung, however intuitive it may have been to equate two notions which both describe the relations between words and things. At any rate, when trying to match the two theories' notions (beyond Marty's own equations), one should not look for one-to-one correspondences, but rather try to determine to what extent the notions used by Marty and Sherwood overlap. In order to do so, the shift caused by Marty's understanding of medieval notions has to be explained. The interpretative shift can be divided in three moments.

- (I) Marty uses simple supposition as an illustration of what should correspond to the medievals' personal supposition. According to the equivalences proposed above, Marty's description of simple supposition, namely that "man" means the content of the respective conceptual thought and names any individual human being, can be translated, in medieval terms, as "man" means the (common) form presented to

⁴² See above, note 20.

the intellect and supposits for individual men – which is a description of a personal supposition, not of a simple one. In other terms, Marty’s *suppositio simplex* is the medievals’ *suppositio personalis*.

- (II) Second moment: Marty uses formal supposition as an illustration of what should correspond to the medievals’ simple supposition. Marty considers that when a term names its own meaning, it bears a formal supposition. Sherwood considers that when a name supposits for what it means, it bears a simple supposition. Marty’s *suppositio formalis* is the medievals’ *suppositio simplex*.
- (III) Third moment: Marty does not use the medievals’ personal supposition, although it should correspond to Marty’s meaning of contents and naming of things – that is, Marty’s simple supposition.

Let us sum up the shift with a board:

1: Terminology	2: Sherwood	3: Marty	4: Name in Sherwood of the notion described by Marty under the name given in 1	5: Name in Marty of the notion described by Sherwood under the name given in 1
<i>Supp. formalis</i>	YES	YES	<i>Supp. simplex</i>	<i>Sinnigkeit</i> ⁴³
<i>Supp. simplex</i>	YES	YES	<i>Supp. personalis</i>	<i>Supp. formalis</i>
<i>Supp. materialis</i>	YES	YES	<i>Supp. materialis</i>	<i>Supp. materialis</i>
<i>Supp. personalis</i>	YES	NO	(does not apply)	<i>Supp. simplex</i>
<i>Significatio</i>	YES	NO	(does not apply)	<i>Bedeutung</i> ⁴⁴
<i>Suppositio</i>	YES	YES	<i>Significatio / suppositio</i>	<i>Nennung / Bedeutung</i>
<i>Bedeutung</i>	NO	YES	<i>Significatio</i>	(does not apply)
<i>Nennung</i>	NO	YES	<i>Suppositio / appellatio</i>	(does not apply)
<i>Sinnigkeit</i>	NO	YES	<i>Suppositio in habitu suppositio formalis significatio</i> ⁴⁵	(does not apply)

4.2. Understanding the shift

In terms of semantics, Anton Marty and William of Sherwood share an important common basis: there is, for the latter, no *suppositio* without *significatio*, and for the former, no *Nennung* without *Bedeutung*. But the two do not grant this dependency the same role in their semantics.

⁴³ As for the *Sinnigkeit* of Sherwood’s *suppositio formalis*, see p. 3 of this paper.

⁴⁴ One of the notions which, in Marty’s semantics, tend to play a role similar to that of signification in Sherwood’s semantics, but which seems to be for Marty a translation of the medieval *suppositio*, is ‘standing for’ (*stehen für*). It can nevertheless hardly be considered a true technical notion in Marty’s works, which led us not to grant it a full entry in this board.

⁴⁵ See above, note 43.

For the medievals, the dependency tends to be static. The *significatio* locks the relationship between words and things, *via* concepts naturally linked to common things, allowing variations of supposition within this stable framework. And for those of the medievals who have recourse to the notion of *suppositio formalis*, the variations encompass both the supposition for the significate (*suppositio simplex*) and the supposition for the things under the significate (*suppositio personalis*). That is actually the very idea of ‘formal supposition’: a supposition in accordance with the form signified.⁴⁶ Thus, for instance, in ‘*homo est species*’, ‘*homo*’ means (*significat*) the common nature of men, which is also what it means in ‘*homo currit*’, although in the first case the supposition is simple – the *suppositum* is the common nature –, while in the second the supposition is personal – the *supposita* are individual men.

For Marty, by contrast, the dependency is dynamic. The goal of the meaning process is to trigger in the hearer the production of presentations of determinate contents. Thus, for instance, in ‘*Der Mensch rennt*’ (‘man is running’, according to Marty, a case of *suppositio simplex*) the meaning of ‘*Mensch*’ consists in generating in the hearer the presentation “Mensch”. Its *Nennung*, what it names, is constituted of individual human beings. In the case of ‘*Mensch ist ein Allgemeinbegriff*’ (‘man is a general concept’, an instance of *suppositio formalis*, according to Marty), things are slightly more complicated.


The shift can be sum up schematically. Let’s consider the semantic of the term ‘*Mensch*’ in two sentences, ‘*Der Mensch rennt*’ and ‘*Mensch ist ein Allgemeinbegriff*’:

⁴⁶ For someone like Ockham, who considers that a word signify individual signs, and not some common form, the framing by signification of simple and personal suppositions is not relevant. A term in simple supposition supposits for the concept, which is not the significate of the word ; a term in simple supposition does therefore not supposit significatively (WILLIAM OF OCKHAM, *Summa logicae*, ed. Ph. BOEHNER, St. Bonaventure (New York) 1951-1954, I, p. 64 : 27-28. For more details about Ockham treatment of these *modi supponendi*, see for instance C. PANACCIO, *Les mots, les concepts et les choses. La sémantique de Guillaume d’Occam et le nominalisme d’aujourd’hui*, Paris / Montréal 1992). Interestingly, interpreted with Ockham’s understanding of *significatio*, Burley’s definition of simple supposition (to supposit for the significate, roughly) would automatically be shifted and would correspond to Ockham’s understanding of personal supposition : “Suppositio personalis universaliter est illa, quando terminus supponit pro suo significato.”, *Summa logicae*, I, p. 64 : 24-25. Unfortunately, we have no indication that the source of Marty was displaying a casual mix of Ockhamian and ‘formalist’ definitions.


Terms, sentences and things

T_0 : 'Mensch'
 S_1 : 'Der Mensch rennt'
 S_2 : 'Mensch ist ein Allgemeinbegriff'
 T_1 : T_0 in S_1
 T_2 : T_0 in S_2
 $\uparrow$: a man

Relations

1. $R(x)$: a presentation of x
2.  x
 x is intended (by the speaker)
 to be produced (in the hearer)
3.  x
 x is named

The Martyian shift



Whereas in sherwoodian (static) semantics, the *significatio* is constant (the same item is at the end of the α -relation for both T_1 and T_2 , namely, Sherwood's $R(\uparrow)$), the martyian dynamic conception of meaning (*Bedeutung*) requires a variation of α -items for any variation of β -items. The shift proper consists in this: to name a presentation ($R(\uparrow)$), i.e. to make of a α -item a β -item, one needs a α -item of higher order: a meta-presentation of man ($R(R(\uparrow))$).⁴⁷ William of Sherwood is happy with only one α -item – the first-order one.

We do not know whether Marty has had under the eyes a proper version of Sherwood's – or of any other late medieval logician for that matter – definition of formal supposition. But what we do know is that Sherwood's definition, just like Burley's and Wyclif's, cannot fit into Marty's perspective. The medieval *suppositio formalis* is a clear attestation of that, for it corresponds, roughly, to the idea of the significative use of a word: its use in accordance with its signification. And such a use, for mediaevals like Sherwood, covers personal and simple suppositions, levelled under one signification – whether one speaks of the

⁴⁷ Marty is not the first to understand medieval supposition theory this way. We actually find an analogous shift in a text of Christian Weise (1642-1708), who equate *suppositio formalis* with the medieval *suppositio simplex* (Ch. WEISE, *Doctrina logica*, Leipzig / Frankfurt 1680 (2nd ed. ; 1st ed. 1680), p. 440).

universal form or of the things that fall under it, he speaks in accordance with the word's signification. There is no way Marty can accept that one and the same meaning covers naming things and naming meanings: when you are talking about the meaning itself, that is, when you are naming it, what you mean cannot be the same as the meaning you are naming. First and second order meanings have to be sorted out. In order to make room for these kinds of supposition in his system, Marty had to recreate a difference of level, which presupposes to decide what was named in each case, and what was meant.

Marty could not implement the mediaevals' 'livelled' approach: he had to shift. However, the shift did not necessarily have to involve formal and simple suppositions. The reasons why Marty kept formal supposition and understood it the way he did can only be guessed. But they may merely have to do with the fact that the medieval formal supposition is, in a way, all about 'supposing the form' (signified), a situation shared by personal and simple suppositions.⁴⁸ One can then consider, quite intuitively, that the 'supposed' form is what we are talking about – rather than the things bearing the form –, which in Martyan semantics implies that we name the 'form', as the object of the presentation whose content we mean. We then end up with Marty's understanding of formal supposition, i.e., the mediaeval's simple supposition.

As for Marty's choice of simple supposition to play the role of the medieval personal supposition, besides being the consequence of a possible lack of knowledge, its motivations are trickier to guess. They may lie with the specificity of a Sherwoodian definition which seems to distinguish the 'meant' from the meaning – *supponere pro significato*. If, for Marty, the meaning is the 'triggering' process, the meant has to be, ultimately, on the side of what terminates the process, namely, things. This is actually the way William of Ockham, another medieval logician, understands the idea of 'supposing for the significate'. From Ockham's nominalist point of view, standing for the meaning – *supponere pro significato* – cannot correspond to naming a common form, for there is no such a thing.⁴⁹ Marty's 'standing for the meaning' and Ockham's '*supponere pro significato*' amount to naming things, that is, to supposing personally (*supponere personaliter*) – in medieval terms. Thus, a nominalist reading of the (possibly) sherwoodian definition of simple supposition was likely to lead Marty to shift it towards what mediaevals called personal supposition.

⁴⁸ This medieval use of 'form' in semantic issues is the exact contrary of Marty's use of 'form': according to him, the meaning is not the form, but the matter (*Stoff*) and the expression itself is what gives this matter its (sensible) form. Cf. A. MARTY, "Grundfragen der Sprachphilosophie", in Ders. *Psyche und Sprachstruktur*, O. FUNKE ed., Bern 1940, p. 79-117 (esp. 89).

⁴⁹ See above, note 21. As for Ockham, see above, note 46.

The fact that some of the mediaevals' ideas had to be twisted quite a bit in order for Marty to use them as illustrations of his own ideas should irremediably torpedo the assumption of commensurability which goes with Marty's recourse to medieval semantics. Yet, a case for some commensurability may be made, as shown by the fact that Sherwood, our medieval spokesman, did acknowledge, quite in advance, Marty's point. He considered the possibility that one could be led to believe that the opposition between simple and personal suppositions (naming meanings vs. naming things) implies distinguishing two different meanings (and therefore two different presentations): "It indeed seems that this diversity [between simple and personal suppositions] leads to equivocation, for when a name supposes *simpliciter*, it presents to the intellect the form it signifies, but when it does it *personaliter*, it presents the thing bearing the form".⁵⁰ Sherwood recognises that, depending on whether we name things or presentations, something has to change at the conceptual level; he nevertheless insists that what changes is not the presentation itself, but how we consider it: in one case 'for the significate' and in the other 'for the thing signified'. As we have seen, meaning is for Sherwood less a process than the activation of 'common form' able to lock the semantic relations, it is the static part of the system. Every time you use the word 'man' in relation to men (whether the rational animal or their common nature), you have to present to the mind the 'humanity' form.⁵¹ Which does not prevent you, of course, from building different perspectives about it: you can consider manhood in at least two different ways – but you are considering it, and that is what matters.

4.3. *Shift, semantics and late medieval ontology*

Marty and the mediaevals offer two distinct approaches of the statute of the relation between meaning and naming within semantics: a dynamic one, which needs a systematic difference of level between the two notions, and a static one, which requires the stability of the first. We have seen how Marty's dynamic semantics is echoed in his ontology, especially with respect to non-reality and existence. How does the mediaevals' need for semantic stability echo in their ontology? The last section of our comparison will be devoted to giving a short summary of Sherwood's approach.

William of Sherwood, just like most of his colleagues, considers that what exists, exists now. What does not exist now, like past, future or possible things, does not properly exist – which of course should not prevent us from thinking and naming such things. Thirteenth-century authors like Sherwood usually have

⁵⁰ *IL*, p. 140: 110-113: "(...) Videtur enim, quod haec diversitas facit aequivocationem, quia cum supponit simpliciter, praesentat ad intellectum formam significatam per nomen; cum autem personaliter, praesentat rem deferentem formam."

⁵¹ Cf. *IL*, p. 144: 154sq.

recourse to the notion of *appellatio* to take care of the existing things, the things which actually carry the name at stake.⁵² But with or without *appellatio* the principle is the same: some things have to exist – whether concretely or not – for an affirmative proposition in the present tense to be true about them. One of the most popular rules of supposition theory (sometimes called *regula appellationum*) is stating that, unless otherwise specified, the supposition of the subject (and of the predicate) of a present-tensed proposition is limited to present things. And if the proposition is affirmative, it shall not be empty; in other words, the rule states that, unless otherwise specified, by affirming at the present-tense, we are committed to the actual existence of a minimum of bearers of the name.⁵³

The ‘unless otherwise specified’ clause covers all the cases where something in the proposition allows us not to be committed – we cannot be always committed, we have to be able to think and talk about Caesar or the possible first female pope.⁵⁴ We then rely on the full power of supposition. It is designed to be modified so that, in the appropriate context, it includes non-existent things: depending on the linguistic environment – verbal tenses, modalities etc. – they can be past, future and/or possible things. In short, provided that we are in a situation where the ‘rule of appellations’ does not apply, the things we think or talk about do not have to exist now, when we talk about them. In the case of *possibilia*, they do not even have to exist at all: there is usually no requirement of actualisation. We can do that because do not *name* them in the *appellatio* way, we do not even strictly speaking *refer* to them, we *suppose* them – now. After all, that is what the supposition theory is about: supposing.⁵⁵ It is striking that medieval philosophers,

⁵² See above, note 15. Sherwood’s *appellatio* is not everybody’s *appellatio*: the notion takes on different shapes in late medieval logic, shapes we could resume with the idea that it somehow is in charge of the synchronous relation between a moment of existence of a thing and the moment it carries a certain form. It will play a role in 14th-century under the terminology of *appellatio formae*.

⁵³ Sherwood states it in terms of *appellatio*: *IL*, p. 156: 319-324: “And thus a *suppositum* and an *appellatum* are sometimes the same thing, sometimes not. In order to determine when they are the same and when they are not, a rule can be given: a non-restricted common term which has enough *appellata* put under a present tense verb devoided of ampliative power, supposits only for the things which are (i.e. exist).” “Et sic suppositum et appellatum quandoque sunt idem, quandoque non. Et ad hoc sciendum, quando sunt idem et quando non, datur haec regula: terminus communis non-restrictus habens sufficientiam appellatorum supponens verbo de praesenti non habenti vim ampliandi supponit tantum pro his, quae sunt”.

⁵⁴ Among the subtleties we have to leave aside are William of Sherwood’s two positions about what is the default situation, which reflect the two competing positions we find defended in the first supposition theory. We assume that this distinction is not relevant for the understanding of the respective roles of *appellatio* and *suppositio* we need here. For details about William of Sherwood’s dual position, cf. H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS, “The Views of William of Sherwood on Some Semantical Topics and Their Relation to Those of Roger Bacon”, in: *Vivarium* 15 (1977), p. 111-142. For a more general picture, cf. A. DE LIBERA, “The Oxford and Paris Traditions in Logic”, in N. KRETZMANN *et al.*, (eds.), *The Cambridge History...*, op. cit., p. 174-187.

⁵⁵ An author like John Pagus would go as far as considering past and future, in this perspective, as *secundum quid* forms of actual being: JOHANNES PAGUS, *Appellationes*, A. DE LIBERA (ed.), “Les

who were in many respects fascinated by ontological issues, do not even consider the existential deficiencies of many of the things we think and talk about as the beginning of a problem. It is plain obvious to them that we can suppose things at a moment they do not exist, that we can suppose things whether or not they exist one day. Which does not mean that there is no ontological constraints of course: *supposita* have to be things, to be what we call them.⁵⁶ This approach offers interesting affinities with the idea of counterfactuality we met in Marty: supposing non-existing things is committing ourselves to things that, when they existed, once they exist, or would they be to exist, did / will / could be what it takes to be meant by the term with which we suppose them. In clear, supposing past, future or possible men is assuming that there was, will be, could be things of which it was, will be or could be true to say that they are men.

5. Conclusion

In spite of the differences between their respective conceptions of the statute of meaning-naming couple, Sherwood and Marty offer puzzling affinities with respect to the way of treating the non-actually existing objects. An explication for that may lie in the idea that they use a similar set of intuitions for two different and nevertheless complementary purposes. Sherwood and his medieval colleagues are – when dealing with supposition theory – first and foremost logicians: they want to understand the way language works insofar as it is a condition to provide a formal descriptions of propositions' truth-conditions. They do it in accordance to some convictions about concepts, meanings and existence. Marty positions himself upstream: it is the phenomenon of human communication he is interested in.⁵⁷ Rather than a mere logician, he is a linguist and a psychologist. The dynamics of the language processes are what he is into, while Sherwood contents himself with presupposing this level.

Appellationes de Jean le Page”, in: *Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age* 51 (1984), III, § 6: “preteritum et futurum sunt ens secundum quid respectu praesentis”.

⁵⁶ The point is important, for there is another, complementary rather than concurrent, strategy with respect to non-existence, which consists in deleting the border between existence and non-existence with a special, relational kind of being (*esse habituale*), in order to have omnitemporal truth. But, contrary to the ampliative semantics, the approach in terms of relational being tends to imply a modification of the status of the *supposita*: they are not any more full-fledged things, but funny objects of – for instance – reduplicative nature (*qua*-things, things ‘insofar as’). Which is mainly why this strategy was vehemently contested. For an analyse of the positions of William of Sherwood and Roger Bacon (a fierce opponent of the *esse habituale*), cf. H.A.G. BRAAKHUIS, “The Views of William of Sherwood...”, op. cit. For a broader perspective, cf. A. DE LIBERA, *La référence vide. Théories de la proposition*, Paris 2002, as well as G. KLIMA, “Existence and Reference in Medieval Logic”, in A. HIEKE & E. MORSCHER (eds.), *News Essays in Free Logic*, Dordrecht 2001, p. 197-226.

⁵⁷ For an extensive account of medieval considerations of this kind, see IRÈNE ROSIER-CATACH, *La parole efficace: Signe, rituel, sacré*, Paris 2004.