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Perceiving Virtue: A Theory of Ethical Education in Plato's Republic

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Université de Genève
Département de philosophie

Thèse de doctorat ès lettres

**Perceiving Virtue:
A Theory of Ethical Education in Plato's *Republic***

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NOVEMBRE 2023

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Abbreviations of titles of Plato's works

<i>Cra.</i>	<i>Cratylus</i>
<i>Cri.</i>	<i>Crito</i>
<i>Euthd.</i>	<i>Euthydemus</i>
<i>Grg.</i>	<i>Gorgias</i>
<i>Lg.</i>	<i>Leges</i>
<i>Men.</i>	<i>Meno</i>
<i>Phd.</i>	<i>Phaedo</i>
<i>Phdr.</i>	<i>Phaedrus</i>
<i>Phlb.</i>	<i>Philebus</i>
<i>Plt.</i>	<i>Politicus</i>
<i>Prt.</i>	<i>Protagoras</i>
<i>R.</i>	<i>Respublica</i>
<i>Smp.</i>	<i>Symposium</i>
<i>Sph.</i>	<i>Sophista</i>
<i>Tht.</i>	<i>Theaetetus</i>
<i>Ti.</i>	<i>Timaeus</i>

Note on the text

References to pages, sections, and lines of Plato's *Republic* are based on Sling's edition whereas other texts of Plato are based on Burnet's edition except for vol. 1, for which I use the edition by E. A. Duke, W. F. Hicken, W. S. M. Nicoll, D. B. Robinson, and J. C. G. Strachan. Translations of the *Republic* are generally loosely based on the translation by G. M. A. Grube, as revised by C. D. C. Reeve, in Cooper (1997).

'Cf.' indicates that forthcoming references —whether texts or authors— express views close to those found in the corresponding main text or passage. 'Cf.' is not used to express a disagreement. I use the colon symbol ':' to introduce either a quotation or a list of items or an explanation (e.g. replacing 'for', 'because', and the like).

Introduction

The aim of this dissertation is to gain a better understanding —both historical and philosophical— of Plato’s views on early ethical education in the *Republic*. It argues for the original thesis that this education involves acquiring a rational account or understanding. This introduction first offers an overview of the interpretation defended. The second part looks to situate its findings within the context of another debate central to Platonic scholarship, namely Plato’s conception of the soul as divided into elements or parts in the *Republic*. The third section offers a summary of the dissertation’s chapters.

01. Ethical training in Plato’s *Republic*

Early ethical education in the *Republic* has two components, beginning with musical training —which includes poetry, stories, and music proper— followed by physical training; and it all takes place while students are still young (i.e. children and youths) before the age of twenty (*R.* 7 537 A 6–C 5). There are three standardly acknowledged achievements associated with this education: the acquisition of laws and law-inculcated judgements (cf. T5), basically law-abidingness; the acquisition of excellences such as courage, temperance, justice, etc. (cf. *R.* 4 441 E 3–444 E 5, respectively T3, T14, and 443 C 9–444 A 3); and the acquisition of a sound ethical discriminatory faculty, namely the ability to perceive or recognize instances of genuine excellences and vices (cf. T6 with T10).

There are two general ways to educate, either by force or by persuasion (cf. *R.* 8 548 B 4–C 2). At least one goal of early ethical education strongly indicates that well-trained students ought to be educated by persuasion. For, it is highly unlikely that education by force will produce truly law-abiding individuals: after all, imposed lessons hardly ever remain (cf. *R.* 8 548 B 4–C 2 with *R.* 7 536 D 4–537 A 3; cf. T5: note ‘being persuaded [πεισθέντες]’ (430 A 2–3)). (It is also a sign of little-to-no education to require having laws imposed upon us (cf. *R.* 3 405 A 6–B 4).)

Now it is noteworthy that being educated by persuasion need not mean being educated by reason, reasons, etc.. For, Plato has a generous conception of persuasion insofar as persuasive power is attributed to things such as: pleasure (cf. *R.* 3 413 C 1–4 with *R.* 7 538

C 6–D 5), sexual passion (cf. *R.* 5 458 D 5–7), prayers and sacrifices (cf. *R.* 2 365 E 2–366 A 5), and gifts (cf. *R.* 3 390 E 4). Plato could thus have in mind persuading students to be law-abiding by means other than rational calculation. In other words, Plato could have in mind achieving the goals of early ethical education by —call it— ‘non-rational’ persuasion and thus without a rational account or understanding. This is a tempting view. Consider —for instance— a passage (T6) articulating the motivations underlying a concern for a most proper education in musical training. The passage suggests two stages in ethical education, before and after ‘the account’s arrival [ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου]’ (402 A 3), and it also focuses on the good conduct in well-trained youths prior to the account’s arrival. The passage stresses that well-trained youths experience disgust correctly, enjoy fine things, and hate base things (cf. *R.* 3 387 E 10–388 A 4 with 388 D 6–8; cf. *R.* 3 395 B 9–D 4 with 396 C 6–E 5). The impression is basically that good conduct can be achieved by cultivating pleasure and distress at the right things, to be clear before the account’s arrival. Now if we assume that this good conduct is a result of acquiring laws and law-inculcated judgements, then it is tempting to conclude that being law-abiding can be achieved by training our —call them— ‘hedonic’ experiences without the need of a rational account or understanding.

It cannot be ruled out —however— that Plato does have in mind persuasion that appeals to reason, reasons, etc.. Consider that very same passage (T6) dividing ethical education into two parts, before and after ‘the account’s arrival [ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου]’ (402 A 3). The passage only indicates that its arrival would take place after acquiring certain character traits. The passage does not state that its arrival would take place after musical and physical training. Recall also the view that imposed laws fail to bring about truly law-abiding individuals. We may infer that being law-abiding requires not regarding laws as imposed. Early ethical education should aim —then— at producing students who agree to laws and law-inculcated judgements. If this is correct, then it is tempting to think that this agreement is preferably achieved by reason. For, it is plausible to suppose that students who agree to laws and law-inculcated judgements on the basis of their own reason will be more law-abiding than those who agree without a rational account or understanding —for instance, in virtue of being trained by habit. (We shall see that a compelling case can be made for the account’s arrival during early ethical education precisely because the best means to securing or fixing laws and law-inculcated judgements is by acquiring a rational account or understanding.)

These considerations show that we cannot outright rule out the possibility of Plato's having in mind an early ethical education that depends on the account's arrival, on rational persuasion.

This dissertation is shaped by the main debate to identify the primary target or beneficiary of this education. The phrase 'the primary target or beneficiary' is meant to pick out that element or part of the soul that explains the achievements of early ethical education. (It is noteworthy that the debate takes for granted a certain conception of the soul's elements, namely that they are psychological subjects or agents—more below in Section 0.2.) Two reasons give rise to this debate. First, Plato introduces soul elements in *Republic* 3 (410 B 10–412 A 3) writing that musical and physical training are designed for two elements of the soul, the philosophical and the spirited (T1). Plato later divides the soul into three elements in *Republic* 4 (436 A 8–441 C 7), namely the rational, the spirited, and the appetitive—the latter two deemed non-rational—by introducing the so-called 'principle of opposites' according to which numerically one and the same thing cannot do or suffer opposites in the same respect and in relation to the same thing all at the same time (cf. *R.* 4 436 B 9–C 2, 436 E 7–437 A 1, and 439 B 5–6). This division is swiftly followed by an agreement that a correct mixture of musical and physical training will make the rational and the spirited elements harmonious (T2). The second reason giving rise to the debate gravitates around two observations. The first is that musical training begins at an early age while the rational element is at best inchoate, but spirit is very much present (cf. T12). The second observation is that the stories told during musical training touch upon topics of characteristic concern for the spirited element. These two observations allude to an imbalance in early ethical education's impact upon the rational and the spirited elements and thus they have motivated commentators to single out a primary target or beneficiary, that soul element capable of explaining the achievements of this education in light of these observations.

The standard view in this debate contends that early ethical education's achievements are explained by the soul's spirited element, to be precise that this non-rational part is the proper or ultimate subject of true ethical judgements and the soul's ethical discriminatory faculty. The standard view deploys two arguments on the basis of the aforementioned observations pertaining to an imbalance in early ethical education's impact upon the rational and the spirited elements. The first—call it 'the argument from content'—focuses on the

fact that stories told during musical training acquaint students with the honorable and the shameful. Well-trained students are taught—for instance—to praise honorable things such as excellences and to censure shameful things such as vices (cf. T6 with T10). The argument from content then observes that the honorable and the shameful are special to the soul's spirited element, ('special') in the sense that each soul-element has its own characteristic concerns (T2) and the pleasure of honor is the single kind of pleasure belonging to the spirited element (T11); it is natural to assume that the shameful too is special to spirit: after all, the shameful ought to be at least avoided and arguably outright hated in the pursuit of honor. These two paths meet to suggest both that true ethical judgements of musical training focus on the honorable and the shameful plus that they are acquired by the spirited element given their appeal to its characteristic concerns. The second argument—call it 'the argument from psychic development'—invokes observations that have been universally understood to express the view that a young student's rational element is inchoate, in such a way that disqualifies it from being a plausible candidate to account for correctly praising the honorable and correctly censuring the shameful. One observation is that well-trained students will respond correctly to the honorable and the shameful while they are still young and unable to grasp an account or reason for this behavior (T6). Another observation is that there is an evident imbalance in the manifestations of reason and spirit in children, namely that spirit is fully present in children from birth whereas the same cannot be said of rational calculation (T12). These observations meet to support the standard view that spirit explains the achievements of early ethical education: musical and physical training take place while the soul is young and its rational element is inchoate, but its spirited element is not inchoate; the latter element is thus an attractive candidate to explain a young student's correctly praising the honorable and correctly censuring the shameful. The standard view could be said—in other words—to regard early ethical education as foregoing any rational persuasion and relying exclusively on non-rational persuasion.

A minority of scholars reject the standard view and contend that the primary target or beneficiary of early ethical education is the soul's rational or philosophical part. But—as far as I know—no scholar of the minority view further claims that this education involves acquiring a rational account or understanding. In other words, both the standard view and the alternative agree on construing early ethical education as foregoing any rational persuasion

and relying only on non-rational persuasion. This dissertation defends the minority view that the primary target or beneficiary of early ethical education is the soul's rational part. It arguably refutes the standard view by showing the latter's commitment to threatening the psychic integrity of the spirited part in multiple ways, especially since ethical training involves the task of weakening or eliminating non-rational non-necessary desires and pleasures. Now —however— this dissertation also takes a step further in favor of the rational part as the primary target of early ethical education: it argues for a novel achievement of this education, namely acquiring a rational account or understanding of laws and law-inculcated judgements. In other words, this dissertation rejects the unanimous view that early ethical education involves only non-rational persuasion and argues that it includes rational persuasion.

What does Plato have in mind? Which method of education would plausibly achieve the goals of early ethical education such as truly law-abiding individuals who preserve laws and law-inculcated judgements basically at all costs? Plato probably has in mind education by rational persuasion. For, this kind of education is arguably the best means to bring about truly law-abiding individuals. This can be appreciated by reflecting upon —first— a likely limitation of being trained by habit and —second— a likely advantage of relying on reason.

Plato repeatedly writes not only that desires or pleasures and aversions or distresses are formidable threats to preserving laws and law-inculcated judgements, but also that they can usurp our judgement and even change our psychic constitution for the worse (cf. threats at *R.* 3 412 E 4–413 E 5, *R.* 4 429 E 7–430 B 6, *R.* 8 548 A 5–C 4; cf. change at *R.* 8 553 B 7–E 1, *R.* 8 559 D 1–561 A 5, *R.* 9 572 B 9–573 C 11).¹ These threatening and corruptive experiences which basically are harmful to the soul's well-being Plato calls 'non-necessary' and some among these 'lawless' (cf. *R.* 8 558 D 8–599 C 7 with *R.* 9 571 A 7–572 B 8).²

¹ I write 'desires or pleasures' since there is evidence of treating these interchangeably in *Republic* 8 —for instance— 558 C 10–560 B 5; and I apply the same treatment to aversions and distresses.

² Plato explicitly applies 'necessary' and 'non-necessary' to desires and pleasures, but it is not unreasonable to extend this distinction to aversions and distresses: after all, Plato surely considers an intense distress to losing something valuable as non-necessary insofar as the concomitant desire to weep and lament excessively ought to be eliminated (cf. *R.* 10 603 E 4–604 D 10 with *R.* 3 387 D 11–E 9).

Being truly law-abiding —then— requires weakening or eliminating non-necessary pleasures and distresses (cf. *R.* 8 559 A 3–7 and 559 B 8–C 2 with *R.* 10 603 E 4–604 D 10).³ But how do we manage these for the sake of being law-abiding? Do we learn only by habit or do we need something more?

Habituation depends on the ability to repeat certain experiences or exercises sometimes even on a daily basis. But there are exceptional or extraordinary events beyond the domain of habituation, that is events that do not repeat themselves frequently and for which we cannot completely prepare ourselves. For instance, I cannot train myself to lose someone or something valuable such as a parent, home, etc.: the latter simply are not everyday events. The basic point is that there is a difference between —on the one hand— learning to do what is beneficial with respect to our diet and —on the other hand— learning to do what is beneficial after losing someone or something valuable such as a parent, home, etc.. It could be argued that we can train for exceptional or extraordinary situations to some extent: we could train to resist the desire to weep and lament excessively upon losing something valuable by being exposed to this loss and resistance at a distance —so to speak— for instance by witnessing the experience in stories. But it should be stressed that there is a gap between being prepared at a distance and experiencing the real thing, i.e. that the training cannot prepare us completely for the real thing; and Plato seems sensitive to this point: it is one thing to hear that death is not to be feared (cf. *R.* 386 A 6–388 E 3); it is another thing to be given a taste of it by witnessing war from afar and training for it (cf. *R.* 5 466 E 1–468 A 1 with *R.* 7 537 A 4–8); and —surely— it is yet another thing to be actively engaged in the battlefield (cf. *R.* 3 412 D 9–414 A 7). If we accept this gap, then it is not obvious that we shall be able to ford or bridge that space between preparation and the real thing with only the help of habituation. It is not obvious —then— that habituation is the best means to prepare us for —call them— ‘difficult’ cases. The basic point is that difficult or exceptional cases pose a veritable threat to our being law-abiding: after all, they present us with experiences such as intense distress and our training by habit may very well not suffice to withstand and preserve our laws and law-inculcated judgements.

³ Plato also writes about bringing measure or moderation to desires and these passages together suggest that bringing measure or moderation is not substantively different from weakening or eliminating desires, pleasures, etc..

Recognizing this limitation of habituation, we ask: ‘what should we do in difficult or exceptional cases in order not to be overtaken or dragged by intense desires, aversions, etc.?’ One promising alternative is to rely on reason, e.g. deliberation, inquiry, etc.. For, reason has the ability to give us a better perspective on things, a perspective that truly mitigates challenging desires, distresses, etc.. The basic idea is that reason gives us the tools with which —as it were— to treat the disease, namely the apparent magnitude of things, rather than to treat merely the symptoms, namely the concomitant desires, distresses, etc.. There are two ways for reason to give us a better perspective, namely deliberation and inquiry; and —to be clear— these can work together.

The first way for reason to give us a better perspective can be appreciated by reflecting upon the advantage of deliberating about what to do in the context of losing someone or something valuable such as a parent, home, etc.. This loss can be very destabilizing: not only can the loss itself be distressing, but also it can create great uncertainty and with it intense fear, anxiety, etc. —basically more distress. (The phrase ‘thrown into the deep end’ comes to mind along with the image of feet kicking about as there is no firm ground upon which to place them.) The magnitude of distress can be so great as to take over the mind, leaving little-to-no room for anything else. (The image of an overcast sky comes to mind with no definition or end in sight.) The loss, the uncertainty, the fear, etc. is all that is seen or experienced and we are thus left at their mercy. (The basic ideas here apply equally to desires and pleasures.) Now deliberating about what to do can truly mitigate difficult cases: the loss of someone or something valuable can introduce a change in our lives that elicits uncertainty, a change that makes us question our abilities and control of the situation; (the question ‘how am I going to [...]?’ comes to mind;) now deliberating about what to do will involve identifying problems and potential solutions; this activity will give us some knowledge about the situation and thus some sense of control, all of which —for the most part— introduces some calm to our minds and mitigates our distress. The basic idea is that deliberating about what to do can truly mitigate difficult cases because it provides some resolution to a part of the distress.

Now we may find ourselves unable to deliberate in difficult cases and this may lead us to question its value.⁴ Plato too seems to acknowledge the potential inability to deliberate:

⁴ I thank Paolo Crivelli for raising this concern.

we are encouraged ‘to habituate [ἑθίζειν]’ (*R.* 10 604 C 9) ourselves to rely on reason in exceptional or difficult cases. It does not come to us naturally —presumably— because deliberation requires rational calculation and we are not born exercising it (cf. *R.* 4 441 A 7–B 2 = T12). This explanation suggests an argument to show that our inability to deliberate in difficult cases does not tell against the value of deliberation. There are two kinds of alternatives to coping with distress, either rational or non-rational alternatives. We do not have by nature access to rational alternatives because we are not born exercising rational calculation (cf. *R.* 4 441 A 7–B 2 = T12). We do have by nature access to non-rational alternatives to relieve distress such as tears, anger, etc. (cf. *R.* 10 604 C 7–9 with *R.* 10 606 A 3–7 —and T12). Since we are not born exercising rational calculation, our first experiences of distress as children are relieved by tears, anger, etc.. (Now herein lies the crux of the problem.) Since relief from distress appears pleasant and pleasure strengthens desire (cf. *R.* 9 583 C 3–584 C 2 with *R.* 3 395 C 6–8, *R.* 8 560 A 9–B 5, *R.* 9 573 A 4–B 5, *R.* 10 606 A 3–7, and 606 D 1–8), then our first experiences of distress as children will strengthen non-rational coping mechanisms such as weeping and lamenting. If our education does not develop our rational calculation from an early age —if it comes ‘quite late [ὄψέ ποτε]’ (*R.* 4 441 B 1) to us— and so we are not shown rational alternatives to coping with distress, then our inability as adults to deliberate in difficult cases should be no mystery (cf. *R.* 9 584 D 1–585 A 7): not only would we lack the motivation to resist the desire to weep and lament, but also —persuaded by its pleasure— we are unlikely to calculate that weeping and lamenting threatens our psychological well-being (cf. *R.* 10 606 A 3–C 1 with 606 D 1–8). In other words, our inability to deliberate in difficult cases as adults is a consequence of poor education. That inability does not tell against the value of deliberation as a rational tool to mitigate challenging desires, distresses, etc..

There is another way —besides deliberating about what to do— for reason to provide us with a better perspective on things that would truly mitigate exceptional or extraordinary desires, distresses, etc.. This other way takes the form of inquiry or study into the very things that elicit these exceptional or extraordinary experiences, things such as death, wealth, etc.. Consider —for instance— the lure and hold that material wealth can have over us, potentially establishing itself as the goal toward which everything we do is aimed and even being the way to construe a blessedly happy life (cf. *R.* 8 553 B 7– E 1, *R.* 9 591 D 5–9, and —with

these in mind— *R.* 6 466 B 4–C 4). This lure and hold of acquiring material wealth can be effectively mitigated by rational inquiry (cf. *R.* 9 591 D 5–9 with *R.* 9 576 D 6–577 B 5: note the recurring theme of ‘being dazzled [ἐκπληττόμενος]’ (591 D 7; cf. 576 D 8, 577 A 3) and Socrates’ proposal to counter with thorough study). It could be argued that acquiring material wealth without limit or measure would result in being left with little-to-no moderation or self-control: the desire to acquire material wealth is insatiable, in the sense that it is strengthened and multiplied by being satisfied (i.e. by pleasure); and satisfied without limit or measure, the desire for acquiring material wealth becomes so pervasive and powerful that we come to be at its mercy and under its control—rather than its being under our control (cf. *R.* 4 430 E 4–431 B 3 with *R.* 4 442 A 4–B 4, *R.* 9 586 A 1–C 6, *R.* 9 573 C 11–575 A 8, *R.* 9 577 B 10–578 A 3, *R.* 9 588 E 4–589 A 5). It could be argued also that having little-to-no moderation or self-control is harmful to our well-being: at the very least, we come to be possessed and harassed by different kinds of distress—for instance—we are never truly satisfied, constantly experiencing some lack, and—being overwhelmingly attached—we are ever fearful of losing our acquisitions (cf. *R.* 9 586 A 1–C 6 and *R.* 9 578 A 4–580 A 8). Rational inquiry thus reveals a side to acquiring material wealth easily hidden from sight by desires or pleasures: it reveals acquiring material wealth as potentially dangerous—even catastrophic—to our well-being.

This insight—in turn—should influence our desires or pleasures for acquiring material wealth: realizing something as harmful generally elicits some kind of aversion from us, e.g. fear, disgust, etc.; but here it does not seem to set up merely an opposite experience to battle it out by force with the desire or pleasure for acquiring material wealth; the end result seems to be that the desire or pleasure for acquiring material wealth undergoes a genuine change: the splendor of acquiring material wealth dims and with it the intensity of desire or pleasure wanes or weakens; the desire or pleasure for acquiring material wealth neither remains the same nor is it merely suppressed for a while, lingering and incubating before coming back with a vengeance (cf. —for a helpful contrast— *R.* 8 559 D 1–560 C 1, especially 559 E 9–B 5). Acquiring material wealth no longer attracts us as it did before and we now approach it in a more thoughtful and careful or measured way (cf. *R.* 9 591 B 3–592 B 5, in particular 591 D 5–E 5; *R.* 6 485 D 6–E 6: the basic point applicable here is that a strong concern for something (e.g. psychic harmony) incompatible with something else (e.g.

acquiring material wealth without limit) automatically weakens any concern for the latter thing). Anyone sincerely concerned about their well-being would become wary of unquestioningly satisfying the desire to acquire material wealth. Reason in the form of inquiry —then— gives a more accurate perspective on challenging experiences with potential to overwhelm us and make us abandon —even if temporarily— our laws and law-inculcated judgements; and this more accurate perspective in turn weakens or eliminates those threatening factors such as non-necessary pleasures and distresses, thus assisting us to be truly law-abiding.

We have surveyed some reasons for believing that a rational education would best achieve the goal of early ethical education to bring about truly law-abiding individuals: at the very least, reason in the forms of deliberation and inquiry can truly mitigate the desires, aversions, etc. that are formidable threats to preserving laws and law-inculcated judgements. Readers —however— may be wondering whether this interpretation has any exegetical basis. We can appreciate an appeal to deliberation as a means for providing perspective that mitigates non-necessary desires, distresses, etc. in the *Republic* —for instance— in Book 10 603 E 4–604 D 10. Plato there endorses the combination of law and reason in the form of deliberation as the ideal response to intense grief. It is telling that Plato encourages us ‘to habituate [ἐθίζειν]’ (604 C 9) ourselves to rely on reason in exceptional or difficult cases such as the loss of someone or something valuable. (It is noteworthy that this discussion stressing the value of reason in the form of deliberation to moderate our emotional reactions follows immediately upon an argument (*R.* 10 602 C 4–603 B 6) highlighting the corrective role of reason in cases of perceptual illusions.) We can appreciate also the appeal to inquiry as a means for providing perspective that mitigates non-necessary desires, distresses, etc. in the *Republic* —for instance— across Books 9 and 10. First, Plato writes that ‘we ought not be dazzled [μὴ ἐκπληττώμεθα]’ (*R.* 9 576 D 8; cf. 577 A 3) by the figure of the tyrant in judging quality of life and proposes thorough study in order to get things right (*R.* 9 576 D 6–577 B 5). Second, it is plausible to think that Plato’s warning about being amazed by tyrants is intimately linked to our potentially ‘being dazzled [ἐκπληττώμενος]’ (*R.* 9 591 D 7) by an unlimited acquisition of material wealth (cf. *R.* 9 591 D 5–9 with *R.* 5 466 B 4–C 4). It is tempting to think —then— that Plato would propose here too the use of rational inquiry to counter the overwhelming attraction of acquiring unlimited wealth. (It is noteworthy that the

language of being ‘amazed’ or ‘dazzled’ brings to mind the discussion on being deceived out of one’s convictions or laws by pleasure, distress, etc. in *Republic* 3 412 E 4–414 A 7 with *Republic* 4 429 E 7–430 B 6.) It could be argued also that this view on reason’s power of inquiry to assist with being law-abiding can be appreciated in Plato’s study of imitative poetry in *Republic* 10 (cf. especially *R.* 10 607 E 4–608 B 3). We may even glean a way for rational inquiry to weaken or eliminate the fear of death from *Republic* 6 485 D 6–485 B 2 and *Republic* 10 608 B 4–D 1. These observations —then— are promising evidence that there is exegetical support for the alternative that Plato has in mind a rational education in early ethical training.

There is another line of thought to motivate the idea that reason is the best means to bring about truly law-abiding individuals. For, there are two features to acquiring laws and law-inculcated judgements with a rational account that strongly suggest it to be the superior means of becoming law-abiding. The first is that having a rational understanding very probably inspires a stronger desire to preserve laws and law-inculcated judgements than being trained by habit. The second is that having a rational understanding very probably elicits a stronger sense of shame at abandoning laws and law-inculcated judgements than being trained by habit. Now it should be uncontroversial not only that a strong desire to preserve laws and a strong sense of shame at abandoning them produce truly law-abiding individuals, but also that the desire to preserve laws as well as the shame at abandoning them come in degrees and the stronger these are the stronger likelihood of being law-abiding. If —then— having a rational account or understanding of laws brings about both a stronger desire to preserve laws and a stronger sense of shame at abandoning them than being trained by habit, it follows that being educated by reason brings about being law-abiding in the finest way possible. Let us consider the above-mentioned two features in turn.

There are two basic ways to be educated in laws and law-inculcated judgements relevant to our discussion, namely either by habituation or by acquiring a rational account. Both ways arguably instill in students an appreciation of laws and law-inculcated judgements as their own: those educated by habit internalize them, which would plausibly be said to make the laws their own; and those educated by reason either accept or formulate accounts of them based on their own reasoning, which would plausibly be said to make the laws their own. The basic idea is that both kinds of students would consider laws and law-inculcated

judgements as their own. This is important because we are by nature partial to that which belongs to us and inspired with a certain kind of attachment or concern for them—a special kind of love (cf. *R.* 1 330 B 8–C 9, *R.* 2 375 B 10–376 C 3). This special concern in turn elicits an extraordinary interest or desire to protect and preserve the object of love. These considerations together imply that students either trained by habit or by reason would have a special kind of concern for their laws and law-inculcated judgements and so they would have an extraordinary desire to preserve and not abandon them. But it is most likely that students educated by reason would have a stronger special concern than students trained by habit. Consider two ways for students to acquire an account of laws and law-inculcated judgements, either it comes from an external source—such as an educator—or the account comes from an internal source. Students who accept it from an external source presumably would go through an account agreeing to its premises, reasoning, and finally its conclusion (i.e. the law); and students to whom the account comes from an internal source, namely their reason, go through basically the same process. Now both kinds of students could be said to invest more parts of themselves, ‘parts’ such as assumptions, beliefs, reasoning, etc., than students trained by habit. The basic idea is that students educated by reason probably see more of themselves in (i.e. identify more strongly with) laws and law-inculcated judgements than students trained by habit who do not invest those so-called ‘parts’. (This idea may bring to mind Plato’s suggestion that we, as human beings, identify more strongly with the rational part of the soul than with the non-rational parts (cf. *R.* 9 588 B 1–E 3): the idea suggests that we identify more strongly with those assumptions, beliefs, etc. accepted by us upon reflection than with assumptions, beliefs, etc. that have no such anchor.) Since it is plausible to suppose that seeing more of ourselves in things strengthens the special kind of concern we enjoy toward them, then—if these considerations are correct—we may plausibly conclude that students educated by reason most likely would have a stronger special concern for laws and law-inculcated judgements than students trained by habit. If this special concern translates into a desire to preserve laws—and having a rational account or understanding brings about a stronger special concern than being trained by habit—it follows that being educated by reason would bring about being law-abiding in a superior way with respect to being trained by habit.

The second motivation to consider reason as the best means to being law-abiding is that a rational account or understanding very probably elicits a stronger sense of shame at abandoning laws than being trained by habit. It is arguably the case that students trained by habit and students trained by reason develop a disposition to experience shame at abandoning laws and law-inculcated judgements. Consider —again— the notion that both students are able to see or appreciate laws as their own or as part of themselves. This notion may be thought to capture a fundamental idea that recognizes a disposition to identify ourselves with desires, beliefs, etc.; for instance, if I identify with a certain belief and the latter is criticized, then I am very likely to take the criticism personally, that is as a criticism of me —to some extent. The qualification ‘to some extent’ is meant to account for the fact that there are degrees of identification, namely weak, strong, and anything in between. Some desires, beliefs, etc. we are weakly identified with and suffer little-to-no distress when frustrated or rejected whereas some desires, beliefs, etc. we are strongly identified with and suffer great distress when frustrated or rejected. Now consider applying this line of thought to abandoning laws and law-inculcated judgements. If we identify ourselves with laws to some extent, then it is likely that we experience abandoning them as an act of self-betrayal. For, abandoning them is tantamount to going against ourselves. Self-betrayal then introduces shame into the picture: consciously betraying ourselves —especially due to some weakness— is very likely to elicit an experience of shame (cf. *R.* 4 430 E 4–431 B 3 with *R.* 9 589 C 6–D 4; cf. *R.* 8 560 A 4–8: it could be argued that the young man is aware of betraying a part of himself from his upbringing). Now it seems certain that a sense of self-betrayal from abandoning laws is stronger insofar as the degree of identification with them is stronger; and it seems certain also that the sense of shame is stronger insofar as the degree of self-betrayal is stronger. If this is correct and we agree that students with a rational account or understanding enjoy a stronger identification with laws than students trained by habit, it follows that the former will have a stronger sense of shame at abandoning laws and law-inculcated judgements. Since a strong sense of shame protects us from abandoning laws (cf. *R.* 3 388 D 2–8, *R.* 5 465 A 8–B 5, *R.* 10 604 A 1–8), then there is a compelling case for the view that acquiring a rational account or understanding of laws is the finest way to bring about truly law-abiding individuals.

There is an additional layer or nuance to being educated by reason that reinforces or further strengthens the shame of abandoning laws and law-inculcated judgements. It is generally agreed that reason is the best thing and the best part or aspect of ourselves (cf. *R.* 10 607 A 3–B 1, *R.* 9 588 B 10–E 3, *R.* 8 549 A 9–B 8 with 560 B 6–C 1; cf. *R.* 9 590 C 7–D 7 and *R.* 10 604 B 1–D 6); and so laws and law-inculcated judgements made our own by rational thought are thus an expression of the best thing and the best part of ourselves. It is generally agreed also that submitting the better to the inferior is shameful—for instance—that submitting the better part of ourselves to the inferior is shameful (cf. *R.* 4 430 E 4–431 B 3, *R.* 9 589 C 6–D 4). These agreements suggest that acquiring a rational account or understanding of laws would add another perspective from which to be more ashamed of abandoning laws. For, abandoning a law due to some desire or distress would be tantamount to submitting our reason to that desire or distress; and since reason is the best part or aspect of ourselves, then abandoning a law due to some desire or distress would entail submitting the better to the inferior—which is shameful. In other words, it seems that acquiring a rational account or understanding of laws would make us more sensitive to shame at abandoning laws. Now if we assume—plausibly I believe—that being more sensitive to shame basically amounts to a stronger sense of shame, it would follow that acquiring a rational account of laws strengthens our sense of shame at abandoning laws and so students educated by reason would have a stronger sense of shame at abandoning laws than students trained by habit. If—once more—a stronger sense of shame at abandoning laws better secures or fixes them within us, then there is again a compelling case for the view that a rational education is the finest way to bring about truly law-abiding individuals.

This overview has sought to offer a philosophically inspired motivation for construing early ethical education in the *Republic* as primarily targeting the soul's rational part. We began by acknowledging two general ways to educate, either by force or by persuasion, and we supposed that Plato must have in mind education by persuasion since one goal of early ethical education, namely to produce truly law-abiding individuals, hardly seems compatible with education by force. But Plato—we noted—has a generous conception of persuasion, in the sense that persuasion could be either non-rational or rational. We then focused again on the goal to produce truly law-abiding individuals to determine which kind of persuasion Plato has

in mind. It is arguably the case that the kind of indelibility of laws and law-inculcated judgements at which Plato's early ethical education aims is best achieved by rational persuasion, that is by acquiring a rational account or understanding of laws and law-inculcated judgements. If this is correct, then early ethical education in the *Republic* must primarily target the soul's rational part.

Readers may be wondering whether there is any exegetical justification for the basic view that early ethical education must primarily target the soul's rational part. Let us briefly survey some passages. The first is *Republic* 3 401 D 4–402 A 6. This passage (T6) could be taken to divide ethical education into two parts, basically before and after 'the account's arrival [ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου]' (402 A 3). All commentators —as far as I know— take the arrival of 'the account [λόγος]' to be *after* the first stages of early ethical education, to be clear after musical and physical training. But it cannot be ruled out that the account arrives *during* these early stages: Plato only writes that its arrival would take place after acquiring certain character traits; Plato does not write that its arrival would take place after musical and physical training. We have seen —moreover— that there is a compelling case to be made for its arrival during early ethical education. We have seen that the latter's goal of bringing about truly law-abiding individuals is arguably best achieved by acquiring a rational account or understanding of laws and law-inculcated judgements.

Readers may be tempted to dismiss the arrival of the account during early ethical education because most human beings lack the ability to reason at an early age (cf. T12). Consequently, they would not be able to acquire a rational account of laws and law-inculcated judgements at that time during early ethical education. It should be argued —to anticipate (cf. Chapter 5 §4, the main text after n. 24)— that the general claim about reason's late arrival is not a psychological necessity: we ought to acknowledge that the exercise of rational calculation is something encouraged or facilitated by education. This acknowledgement together with the evidence that Callipolitan education will stimulate and develop —thus exercise— students' rational calculation from a young age should dispel the above-mentioned objection.

There is further evidence to support the view that well-trained students in Callipolis acquire a rational account or understanding during early ethical education. Let us examine —next— *Republic* 8 548 B 4–C 2. This passage observes that honor-loving timocrats are not

truly law-abiding because they have been educated by force rather than by persuasion. We may infer that being law-abiding requires being educated by persuasion. But —as we have seen— there is a generous concept of persuasion in the *Republic* including both rational and non-rational persuasion. We should then ask: ‘which kind of persuasion is required for being truly law-abiding?’ There is a passage shortly after *Republic* 8 548 B 4–C 2 and —read in this context— it suggests that Plato has in mind rational persuasion. *Republic* 8 549 A 9–B 8 intimates that education by persuasion for the sake of being truly law-abiding involves ‘reason mixed with musical training [λόγου μουσικῆ κεκραμένου]’ (549 B 6). These passages together propose that there is indeed a place for reason in educating students to be law-abiding. Since —moreover— being law-abiding is a goal of early ethical education (i.e. something to be achieved by it) and since there is compelling evidence that acquiring a rational account or understanding best fixes or secures laws within us, then we ought to take seriously the view that early ethical education primarily targets the rational part of the soul.

This —I believe— is confirmed in *Republic* 9 590 C 7–591 A 4. For, we may infer from the passage (T42) that students ought to acquire laws and law-inculcated judgements by virtue of their own reasoning. The passage advocates that we ought to be ruled by reason and articulates two ways, either we are ruled by our own reason or we are ruled by another person’s reason. The passage also states that early ethical education aims to have well-trained students ruled by their own reason. Now the two alternatives to being ruled by reason hint at two alternatives for well-trained students to regard the laws and law-inculcated judgements imparted throughout early ethical education, either as their own or as imposed upon them. The former alternative is arguably preferable: first, it is a sign of little-to-no education to require having laws imposed upon us (cf. *R.* 3 405 A 6–B 4); second, we are unlikely to be law-abiding insofar as laws are imposed upon us (cf. *R.* 7 536 D 4–537 A 3); third, it seems impossible to reconcile the goal of well-trained students ruled by their own reason with having laws and law-inculcated judgements imposed upon them. If this is correct, then it seems certain that Plato would prefer to educate students such as to appreciate laws and law-inculcated judgements as issued or accepted by their own reason rather than as issued and imposed by others. If this is correct, then early ethical education must surely primarily target the rational part of the soul.

0.2 Psychic complexity in Plato's *Republic*

This dissertation was motivated by the main debate on early ethical education in the *Republic* to address the question of which soul-element or soul-part is the primary target or beneficiary of education, meaning which soul-part absorbs or acquires laws, law-inculcated judgements, etc.. This debate unfolds under the tacit assumption that the soul's parts are psychological subjects or agents, i.e. an assumption that views a person's psychological acts, states, and attitudes (e.g. judgements, desires, etc.) as derived from soul-parts that are their non-derivative bearers, their proper or ultimate subjects. This interpretation is motivated by apparent attributions of psychological affections and activities to the soul's elements:

‘Plato characterizes each of these three parts in agent-like terms: each is treated as the ultimate subject of psychological affections, activities, and capacities that are normally attributed to the person as a whole. In particular, each part

- (1) has its own desires (ἐπιθυμία), and can wish and want (βούλεσθαι and ἐθέλειν),
- (2) has conceptual and cognitive capacities:
 - (i) each has beliefs,
 - (ii) each has practical goals,
 - (iii) each can engage in some forms of reasoning, including reasoning about what to do, and
 - (iv) each can communicate with the others: one part can persuade another and they can all agree.
- (3) has its own pleasures.’⁵

⁵ Bobonich (2002) 219–220. Lorenz (2006b) 25 n. 16 adds emotions to this list on the basis of *Republic* 10 604 D 7–9 and 606 A 3–7. As evidence of beliefs, scholars generally cite: *Republic* 4 442 B 5–D 4, *Republic* 9 571 C 3–D 6, 574 D 1–575 A 8, *R.* 10 603 A 1–3, 605 B 5–C 4. As evidence of means-end reasoning, scholars cite *Republic* 8 580 E 2–581 A 2, but they may be tempted to include *R.* 4 442 C 9–D 4 and *R.* 9 574 D 12–575 A 7. As evidence of persuasion and agreement, scholars point to *R.* 4 442 C 9–D 4 (cf. *R.* 9 586 D 4–E 3) and *R.* 8 554 C 11–D 4. Attributions of judgements, means-end reasoning, and persuasion to each soul-part are singled out here since they are challenged not only by this dissertation's findings, but also —we shall see— in this Section 0.2 of the Introduction.

In other words, the main debate on early ethical education in the *Republic* takes sides — without argument— in another debate central to Platonic scholarship, namely the nature of the soul’s parts. But these terms and assumptions seem to be put under serious pressure by the challenges and arguments against the standard view on early ethical education. Let us now explore this.

Scholars have long debated on at least two questions concerning Plato’s conception of the soul. The first is whether the soul is simple or complex: on the one hand, Plato’s *Phaedo* seems to present the soul as simple whereas other dialogues such as *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, and *Timaeus* seem to construe the soul as complex, mainly as tripartite; on the other hand, even the *Republic* itself seems to entertain both complex and simple souls (cf. *R.* 4 441 C 4–7, 441 E 7–442 D 4, 443 C 9–444 A 3, *R.* 9 580 C 10–581 C 8, 588 B 10–E 3, *R.* 10 611 B 5–612 A 7). The second question concerns the nature of those psychic elements distinguished in complex human (embodied) souls, mainly the appetitive (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν), the spirited (τὸ θυμοειδές) —both deemed non-rational— and the rational (τὸ λογιστικόν). These two questions are intimately related: certain characterizations may tempt us to construe those three soul-parts —for instance— as homunculi or as agent-like psychological subjects, in which case it is easier to suppose that the soul is essentially complex and divided into genuine parts; but if we are tempted to downplay these characterizations and to construe these three soul-parts —for instance— as no more than mere classes of certain desires or as properties of the soul, then it may be easier to deny that the soul is essentially complex. These have been the standard alternatives in the debate on the nature of Plato’s soul —call the former ‘realist’, the latter ‘deflationist’.⁶ There is an alternative that takes a —call it— ‘hybrid’ stance according to which a deflationist reading of well-ordered souls in *Republic* 2–4 is more or less correct whereas a realist reading of degenerate souls in *Republic* 8–9 is more or less correct.⁷ For, the number and nature of psychic elements in any individual embodied human soul is a contingent matter, in the sense that any individual embodied human soul may

⁶ These labels are borrowed from Whiting (2012) 178. Scholars who endorse some form of the realist alternative include —e.g.: Bobonich (2002) Chapter 3, Lorenz (2006b) Part One, Kamtekar (2018) Chapter 4. Scholars who endorse some form of the deflationist alternative include —e.g.: Price (2009), Shields (2010), Singpurwalla (2010), presumably Wilberding (2012).

⁷ Whiting (2012).

have soul-parts either as mere classes of certain desires or as something more agent-like with only the latter counting as a genuine part. (This hybrid alternative is basically meant to account for the possibility of both psychic unity in just individuals and psychic complexity in corrupt individuals.)

This dissertation may seem favorable to the hybrid view according to which a soul's simplicity or complexity basically depends on our ethical education. For, the arguments against the standard view of early ethical education show that correct ethical education does not require non-rational parts as psychological subjects or agents: on the one hand, those arguments reveal that the spirited part cannot explain our acquiring law-inculcated judgements lest it be involved in psychic conflict issuing an internal division; on the other hand, they indicate both that the spirited part cannot explain this education's goal to weaken or eliminate non-necessary desires lest —again— it be involved in psychic conflict and that this particular goal seems to be achieved by indirect or by direct opposition from the rational part without any sophisticated cognitive input for the non-rational parts. Yet this dissertation acknowledges that the non-rational parts in degenerate or corrupt souls do seem to be more like psychological subjects or agents. In other words, the apparent subjectivity or agency of soul-parts is not consistent across all persons or types of persons: correct ethical education does away with non-rational parts as psychological subjects or agents whereas lack of education and corruption generates parts to be taken seriously as if psychological subjects or agents; for instance, well-trained students seem to lack non-rational parts as psychological subjects or agents whereas the same cannot be said of degenerate persons such as oligarchs and democrats. A general consequence of this study is —then— that a well-trained soul does not have non-rational parts as psychological subjects or agents.

But it would be a mistake to conclude from these observations that the hybrid view is correct. For, it is fraught with difficulties. The first is that the hybrid view seems to assume that a soul is complex only if there appear to be psychological subjects or agents, but a soul's partition should not be contingent upon the appearance of agent-like elements: after all, it is possible to have genuine soul-parts and to construe them in another way —say— as faculties. (We shall explore this later.) In other words, the lack of apparent subjects or agents within the soul need not entail that the soul is devoid of genuine parts.

The second difficulty applies equally to the deflationist view. Both the deflationist and the hybrid interpretations agree that parthood is not essential to the human (embodied) soul. This agreement appeals to Plato's description of justice in *Republic* 4 443 C 9–444 A 3, in particular to the impression that the just soul is partless. The passage begins with a reflection on the interiority of justice, in the sense that it is primarily concerned with an internal activity and state. (Justice is secondarily external.) The internal activity amounts to regulating the dynamic relation between the soul's elements, in particular regulating each element to focus exclusively on its natural functions and not disturb the others. The internal state is orderly, an appropriate form of rule, and harmonious. Socrates continues describing the just person:

[...] πάντα ταῦτα συνδήσαντα καὶ παντάπασιν ἓνα γεγόμε-	443 E 1
νον ἐκ πολλῶν, σώφρονα καὶ ἡρμολογμένον[.]	443 E 2

[...] all these [*sc.* soul-elements] he binds together and he becomes entirely one from many, temperate and harmonious[.] (Pl. *R.* 4 443 E 1–2)

This description —however— does not conclusively deny that parthood is essential to the soul. For, it cannot be ruled out that the unity of the just soul is compatible with its having parts: first, a human body —although one— has different parts such as feet, hands, eyes, etc.; second, a human being —although one— has different parts such as body and soul (cf. *R.* 5 462 C 9–D 6 with *R.* 10 611 B 9–612 A 7); third, a single city —such as Callipolis— can have different groups or parts (cf. *R.* 5 462 A 2–464 D 5). It is noteworthy that *Republic* 9 580 C 10–583 A 11 recognizes the just soul as having the three canonical parts or elements.⁸ These observations suggest that —both philosophically and exegetically— it is preferable to allow for a unified soul to have different parts.

There is further reason to reject reading *Republic* 4 443 C 9–444 A 3, in particular 443 E 1–2, as denying or dissolving the parthood of the soul. For, this interpretation would be uncharitable. *Republic* 2 sees Plato's Socrates setting out to address Glaucon's challenge to

⁸ Cf. Pl. *Ti.* 69 C 7–D 6: first, the *Timaeus* conceives of the human (embodied) soul as tripartite; second, the introduction of the *Timaeus* recapitulates a discussion from the previous day that echoes *Republic* Books 2–5, thus suggesting some connection between the two dialogues.

identify justice in the soul first by constructing a city in which to find justice. Socrates is motivated partly by expecting that it will be an easier task to discern justice at a larger scale—insofar as cities are just—and partly by assuming that an account of justice in a city will be the same as an account of justice in a human being (*R.* 2 368 C 8–369 A 5; cf. *R.* 4 434 D 1–435 C 3). Socrates constructs a city, Callipolis, picks out three groups or classes, and identifies justice there as each group doing its own work (*R.* 4 432 B 3–434 C 11). Now if the position shared by the deflationist and hybrid interpretations were correct, namely that the just soul is partless, then the account of justice in a human being would not be the same as the account of justice in a city. It follows that Plato would be committed to rejecting the assumption of an isomorphic account of justice, an assumption on which the argument is based. This consequence is uncharitable since Plato would fail to see it: after all, Socrates does not revisit the account of justice in Callipolis as deemed necessary were there to be a discrepancy between accounts (cf. *R.* 4 434 E 4–435 A 5); and Socrates continues to insist on an isomorphic account of justice even immediately before the passage in question (cf. *R.* 443 B 1–C 8 and *R.* 4 441 D 4–E 2). There is no hint that Plato is aware of justice in a human soul being any different from justice in a city. In other words, the interpretation of *Republic* 4 443 C 9–444 A 3, in particular 443 E 1–2, according to which the human soul is not essentially partite—an interpretation endorsed by the deflationist and hybrid views—would both commit Plato to rejecting an assumption on which a central argument is based and make Plato oblivious to this. Since this is not a charitable interpretation, we should take seriously the view that the human (embodied) soul is partite.

The next question to address is: ‘what are those psychic elements distinguished in complex human (embodied) souls, mainly the appetitive (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν), the spirited (τὸ θυμοειδές) and the rational (τὸ λογιστικόν)?’. The main debate on early ethical education in the *Republic*—we have seen—tacitly construes these soul-parts as psychological subjects or agents, but this dissertation—as already noted—challenges this construal. For, the non-rational parts need not be psychological subjects or agents in order for the soul to receive a correct ethical education. What else—then—could the appetitive, the spirited, and the rational parts be?

One plausible alternative is to construe them as faculties. For, there are three important features of soul-parts that can be observed also in faculties. The three features of

soul-parts are: [i] they can be weak or strong, weakened or strengthened (cf. —e.g.— *R.* 3 410 C 8–412 A 8, *R.* 4 441 E 7–442 B 4, *R.* 9 588 E 4–589 B 7); [ii] they can interact with or influence one another (cf. —e.g.— *R.* 9 571 A 7–572 B 2, *R.* 4 439 C 3–D 9 with *R.* 4 440 A 9–B 8, *R.* 10 603 E 4–604 D 10); [iii] they play a role in shaping character, for instance in bringing about excellence or vice in the soul (cf. *R.* 2 374 E 7–376 C 7, *R.* 9 580 C 10–581 C 6, *R.* 4 442 B 10–443 B 6). Faculties too enjoy these features, for instance: [i] memory can be weak or strong, weakened by old age, concussions, etc. or strengthened by diet, exercise, etc.; [ii] memory can interact with perception (cf. *Pl. Phlb.* 33 C 5–34 C 3); [iii] the loss of memory normally amounts to the loss of one’s character. Readers —however— may hesitate to accept the last feature since it is not immediately obvious that faculties actually play a role in shaping character specifically with respect to bringing about excellence or vice in the soul.

Let us consider dreaming. (I am assuming that it is a faculty.) It is not uncommon for us to have dreams in which —for instance— without any measure we eat, drink, have sex, and are violent. Plato acknowledges these dreams and considers them to reveal the presence of non-necessary lawless desires and pleasures (cf. *R.* 9 571 A 7–D 6). Now bear in mind the context of this discussion, namely the generation and way of being of the tyrannical person (*R.* 9 571 A 1–576 B 3). This is noteworthy because Plato arguably attributes responsibility for psychic corruption to these non-necessary lawless desires and pleasures (cf. *R.* 9 572 D 9–C 11 with *R.* 9 572 B 9–D 5 and *R.* 8 559 D 1–561 A 5). But do these desires and pleasures in the dream state contribute anything to psychic corruption or are they harmless?

Plato never explicitly states that lawless dreams play a role in psychic corruption. Yet there is reason to attribute this view to Plato. First, the normative tone of the discussion suggests that non-necessary lawless desires and pleasures in the dream state are not harmless (cf. *R.* 9 571 D 7–572 B 1). Second, *Republic* 9 573 C 11–D 9 suggests that lawless dreams strengthen and increase lawless desires and pleasures which spill over into the waking state, in the sense that they motivate action in the waking state. Plato could have in mind nighttime activities in the waking state, but it cannot be ruled out that Plato has in mind also lawless dreams. Third, it is a plausible view (that lawless dreams play a role in psychic corruption) as evinced by the imagination’s ability to stimulate and strengthen desire:⁹ imagining one’s favorite food can stoke appetite to the point that we may even salivate and suddenly feel

⁹ Cf. *Pl. Ti.* 70 D 7–71 E 2.

hungry; the pleasure experienced in imagination can strengthen the appetite to the point that we may find ourselves involuntarily going back to the images again and again until we can resist no more (cf. *R.* 3 395 C 6–8 with *R.* 10 606 A 3–C 1: the basic principle is that pleasure strengthens desire; cf. *R.* 9 573 A 4–B 5); thus the desires stimulated and strengthened by the imagination can spill over into real life (cf. *R.* 10 606 B 5–C 1); since dreaming may be regarded as the faculty of imagination in sleep, it follows that desires and pleasures in the dream state can spill over into the waking state, into actions—for instance—that corrupt the soul. This is arguably illustrated in *Republic* 9 574 D 1–575 A 8 (cf. *R.* 9 573 A 4–B 5): after all, the young man’s lawless desires and pleasures in the dream state move into the waking state and expel childhood judgements. There is reason to believe—then—that Plato would regard lawless dreams as playing a role in psychic corruption.

Now the purpose of this discussion on dreaming has been to address a worry for the proposal to construe soul-parts as faculties. This proposal is motivated by the fact that faculties seem to partake of three salient characteristics of soul-parts: [i] they can be weak or strong, weakened or strengthened; [ii] they can interact with or influence one another; [iii] they play a role in shaping character, for instance in bringing about excellence or vice in the soul. Readers might have hesitated to attribute the third characteristic to faculties. But Plato has shown us a way to appreciate that dreaming can contribute to corrupting the soul; and if we agree both that dreaming is a faculty and that it can play a role in corrupting the soul, then our hesitation should be dispelled: we should agree that a faculty could corrupt the soul. It is not altogether implausible—then—to construe soul-parts as faculties.

Readers who construe soul-parts as psychological subjects or agents may protest. The remaining introductory remarks focus on the account of psychic temperance in *Republic* 4 (442 C 9–D 4) as it appears to presuppose non-rational parts as psychological subjects or agents. Addressing this passage will—as it were—feed two birds with one hand since it is generally taken to show also that soul-parts are capable of communicating with one another.

The view that well-educated souls do not have soul-parts as psychological subjects or agents may seem to be refuted by the account of psychic temperance in *Republic* 4 (442 C 9–D 4, i.e. passage T15 in Chapter 2 §2):

T15 Τί δέ; σόφρονα οὐ τῆ φιλία καὶ συμφωνία τῆ αὐτῶν

442 C 9

τούτων, ὅταν τό τε ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχομένω τὸ λογιστικὸν
 ὁμοδοξῶσι δεῖν ἄρχειν καὶ μὴ στασιάζωσιν αὐτῶ;
 Σωφροσύνη γοῦν, ἣ δ' ὅς, οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦτο,
 πόλεός τε καὶ ιδιώτου. D 1
 D 4

And isn't he temperate because of the friendly and harmonious relation between these same ones [*sc.* 'three beings [τριῶν ὄντων]' (442 C 7 in T14)]¹⁰, whenever the ruler and the two ruled agree perfectly that the rational one must rule and they don't form a faction against it?

Temperance —he said— is surely nothing other than that, both in a city and in an individual. (Pl. *R.* 4 442 C 9–D 4)

This account may seem to refute the view that well-trained souls do not have non-rational parts as psychological subjects or agents because well-trained souls are surely temperate and this excellence involves not only non-rational parts which hold judgements of their own — note 'agree in judgement [ὁμοδοξῶσι]' (442 D 2)— but also non-rational parts which are sensitive to rational calculation. In other words, Plato's account of psychic temperance acknowledges well-trained souls with non-rational parts able to think for themselves including on the basis of their own reasoning.

There is reason to doubt this central piece of evidence for the construal of non-rational parts as psychological subjects or agents. Two views will be defended. The first is that the non-rational parts' so-called 'judgement' that reason must rule need be nothing more than a characteristic desire demanding reason's rule. (This requires showing —first— that temperate non-rational parts do enjoy this characteristic desire and —second— that there is textual evidence for desires being construed as judgements.) The second view to be defended

¹⁰ Cf. Whiting (2012) 199 n. 28. Whiting (2012) 199–200 writes on *Republic* 4 442 B 11–D 1: 'And even if Socrates *is* talking about parts of the soul as such, there is no clear reference here to an *appetitive* part as such: when he speaks of the whole as a community of three things, he speaks not (as the Grube-Reeve translation would have it) of three *parts*, but only more generically of three *beings* (as I have revised their translation to say). But it would have been so natural given the first two occurrences of '*meros*' to use '*meros*' here as well that we should at least consider the possibility that Plato is reluctant to have Socrates speak of the *epithumêtikon* (at least in this context) as a *meros* of whatever it is he is talking about.'

is that non-rational desires led by reason do not involve non-rational parts capable of reasoning. These two views together downplay the cognitive aspect of the soul's non-rational parts and thus weaken the account of psychic temperance as a decisive piece of evidence for the construal of non-rational parts as psychological subjects or agents.

There are two kinds of characterization of psychic temperance in the *Republic*. There is a —call it— ‘judgemental’ construal according to which psychic temperance appears as a certain agreement in judgement (ὁμοδοξία) about the soul’s rulership (T15; cf. *R.* 4 433 C 6, 430 E 1–432 B 2 esp. 431 D 9–E 3 and 432 A 6–B 2). There is also a —call it— ‘non-judgemental’ construal in terms of the mastery of inferior desires by better desires. (This is passage T16 in Chapter 2 §2.)

T16	Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰς γε πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἡδονὰς τε καὶ λύπας ἐν παισὶ μάλιστα ἂν τις εὖροι καὶ γυναῖξι καὶ οἰκέταις, καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων λεγομένων ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ φαύλοις. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τὰς δὲ γε ἀπλᾶς τε καὶ μετρίας, αἱ δὴ μετὰ νοῦ τε καὶ δόξης ὀρθῆς λογισμῶ ἄγονται, ἐν ὀλίγοις τε ἐπιτεύξῃ καὶ τοῖς βέλτιστα μὲν φύσιν, βέλτιστα δὲ παιδευθεῖσιν. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ταῦτα ὀρᾶς ἐνόητα σοὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ κρατουμένας αὐτόθι τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ φαύλοις ὑπὸ τε τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῆς φρονήσεως τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἐλάττωσιν τε καὶ ἐπιεικεστέροις; Ἐγὼγ’, ἔφη.	431 B 9 C 1 C 5 C 10 D 1 D 3
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Moreover, one would find many and varied desires, pleasures, and distresses especially in children, women, and household slaves, plus in the inferior majority of those who are called ‘free’.

Certainly.

But you would chance upon the simple and moderate ones, which are led by calculation with the aid of understanding and correct judgement, in a few who have the best natures and the best education.

True —he said.

Do you not see these too in your city, namely the desires of the inferior majority mastered on the spot by the desires and by the wisdom of the excellent minority?

I do —he said. (Pl. *R.* 4 431 B 9–D 3; cf. *R.* 3 389 D 7–E 3, *R.* 4 430 E 1–431 B 3, *R.* 9 586 D 4–E 3)

The mastery of inferior desires by better desires results in temperance (*R.* 4 431 D 4–8). But what exactly does Plato have in mind? Passage T16 suggests that we all begin —note ‘ἐν παισὶ [in children]’ (431 C 1)— with some multifarious desires and pleasures (cf. T34 and T35 in Chapter 5 §2). It suggests also that we may be educated —note ‘βέλτιστα δὲ παιδευθεῖσιν [and receiving the best education]’ (431 C 7)— to acquire simple and moderate desires. It is noteworthy that the latter follow rational calculation, true judgement, etc.. The impression is that temperance involves weakening or eliminating inferior desires by following rational calculation, true judgement, etc. and thus acquiring simple and moderate desires.

This impression is supported by the discussion on weeping and lamenting in *Republic* 10 (603 E 4–604 D 10). For, it shows that weakening or eliminating a non-necessary desire by means of judgement and rational calculation amounts to mastering an inferior desire and acquiring in turn a moderate one. The discussion acknowledges that the loss of something valuable may urge us to weep and lament in a way harmful to our well-being (cf. *R.* 10 606 A 3–C 1). Desires harmful to our well-being are non-necessary and we ought to weaken or eliminate them (cf. T34 and T35). Consequently, the loss of something valuable may urge us to indulge in a non-necessary desire that we ought to weaken or eliminate —note ‘θρηνωδίαν ἀφανίζοντα [removing lamentation]’ (604 D 1). Now the best way to weaken or eliminate the non-necessary desire to weep and lament is by appealing to judgement and reasoning —note ‘λόγος καὶ νόμος [reason and law]’ (604 A 9), note also the account in support of the law (604 B 7–C 1), and ‘βουλεύεσθαι [to deliberate]’ (604 C 5). It seems that bringing to mind a law or judgement offers an initial resistance allowing for some respite from the urge to weep and

lament such that we are then able to reason or calculate about better and worse which in turn draws more of our attention away from and weakens the distress, thus weakening the desire to relieve it by weeping and lamenting (cf. T38 in Chapter 5 §3). The best way masters the inferior non-necessary desire resulting in a moderate desire to weep and lament —note ‘μετριάσει [he will be moderate]’ (603 E 9)— and since the best way appeals to law and reason, the moderate desire to weep and lament could be said to be ‘led by calculation with the aid of understanding and correct judgement [μετὰ νοῦ τε καὶ δόξης ὀρθῆς λογισμῶ ἄγονται]’ (431 C 5–6; cf. the non-rational desires ‘following knowledge and reason [τῆ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ λόγῳ ἐπόμεναι]’ (R. 9 586 D 6) in order to pursue the pleasures ‘prescribed by practical wisdom [τὸ φρόνιμον ἐξηγήται]’ (586 D 7)). In other words, opposing and weakening or eliminating our non-necessary (i.e. inferior) desires by turning to and following our principles and reasoning amounts to the acquisition of moderate desires and the mastery of inferior desires by better ones. It is worth emphasizing —to be clear— that this non-judgemental construal of temperance in terms of the mastery of inferior desires by better desires does not even hint at informing the non-rational parts with what we would call ‘judgements’; there is no evidence here of an inferior non-rational part being taught to judge —for instance— that human affairs are not worthy of serious concern. (There is no evidence also of an appetitive part being taught to judge —for instance— that sexual desire (ἔρωσ) ought to be moderate (cf. R. 3 402 E 2–403 C 3, R. 5 458 D 2–E 2), which is of primary concern in temperance.)

Passage T16 indicates that temperance is distinctively characterized by appetitive and spirited desires —these are the generally inferior desires— led by rational calculation, true judgement, etc., basically by reason (cf. R. 4 430 E 1–431 B 3 with R. 9 586 D 4–E 3). This is telling: the idea here is basically that temperance brings about non-rational parts intensely desiring or demanding reason’s rule. This idea may be appreciated by following a discussion on psychic elements in terms of their characteristic desires and pleasures in *Republic* 9 (580 C 10–581 B 12). The discussion argues that there are three kinds of pleasure peculiar to each soul-part in virtue of each having a characteristic desire and it also attributes appropriate names to the soul’s elements on the basis of their single kind of pleasure; for instance, the pleasure of honor and victory is identified as the single kind of pleasure belonging to the spirited part in virtue of its characteristic desire for mastery, victory, and high repute and so it

receives the names ‘victory-loving’ and ‘honor-loving’ (cf. T11 in Chapter 2 §2). The non-judgemental account of temperance invites a different construal of the non-rational parts: if temperance involves its being characteristic of appetitive and spirited desires to be led by rational calculation, true judgement, etc., basically by reason, then —speaking in soul-part terms— the appetitive and spirited parts’ characteristic desire would be to be led by reason, the pleasure and love peculiar to each would be for reason’s rule, and they would be appropriately called ‘reason-rule-loving’. If this is correct —basically that temperance makes the non-rational parts above all desire or pursue reason’s rule (cf. *R.* 9 586 D 4–587 A 7)— then it is plausible to construe the non-rational parts as requiring or demanding reason’s rule: the non-rational parts are always doing reason’s bidding (i.e. what reason wants to do) and thus it could be said that they just want to do reason’s bidding; since the non-rational parts above all desire to do reason’s bidding, then they above all desire for reason to rule; and since the non-rational parts are wholly keen about or striving for reason’s rule, then this desire could be plausibly described as requiring or demanding reason’s rule; in other words, temperance involves non-rational parts intensely desiring or demanding that reason rule. Temperance —then— brings about non-rational parts for which reason must rule.

The non-judgemental interpretation of temperance entails non-rational parts intensely desiring or demanding that reason rule. Could this intense desire be construed as a judgement (δόξα) that reason must rule? There is evidence suggesting that a distinction between desire and judgement (δόξα) is not so clear cut, in the sense that certain instances of ‘judgement [δόξα]’ could be plausibly substituted by ‘desire [ἐπιθυμία]’. Consider —first— a warning about any guardian who is attacked by a foolish and juvenile ‘judgement [δόξα]’ (466 B 8) about happiness and who is urged by it to use any power to appropriate everything in the city (*R.* 5 466 B 4–C 4). Consider —next— some remarks on the fate of a tyrannical son who is faced with depleted resources at home and who turns to violence and theft in society in order to satisfy the swarm ‘of pleasures [τῶν ἡδονῶν]’ (574 D 2) within him (*R.* 9 574 D 1–575 A 8). Socrates suggests that the tyrannical son undergoes a radical transformation on account of ‘pleasures newly released from slavery [αἱ νεωστὶ ἐκ δουλείας λελυμένοι]’ (574 D 6–7), namely the pleasures —and appetites— previously released in sleep as a dream (cf. *R.* 9 571 A 7–572 B 1), which together with Passion (Ἔρως) drive him to commit terrible deeds. This story of the tyrannical son may bring to mind the corrupt guardian who is urged by a foolish

judgement to appropriate everything in the city. It is tempting to think that the foolish judgement in question stands for an intense and lawless desire or pleasure: after all, we are not corrupted to do the unthinkable by some mere judgement, but in reality we are thus corrupted by intense and lawless desires or pleasures (cf. *R.* 8 559 D 1–561 A 5 with *R.* 9 572 B 9–575 E 2). If this is correct, it suggests a flexibility on Plato’s part to describe a psychological condition that is fundamentally about desire or aversion —pleasure or distress — in judgemental terms. This is the case —I suggest— in the judgemental construal of psychic temperance in T15: after all, the non-rational parts’ agreement that reason must rule can be explained solely in terms of appetitive and spirited desires characteristically led by rational calculation, true judgement, etc., basically by reason; put another way, the non-rational parts’ agreement can be understood without having to attribute intelligent thoughts to the non-rational parts.¹¹ If this is correct, then the judgemental construal of temperance can be explained in non-judgemental terms and thus the former seems not to provide a substantively different conception of temperance.

Readers who endorse the prevalent view may protest: ‘The non-rational parts must be psychological subjects or agents! You yourself acknowledge that temperance involves non-rational desires following rational calculation, true judgement, etc.. How could this be without their being capable of some reasoning? Indeed, in *Republic* 8 (554 C 11–D 4), it is presupposed that the appetitive part can be persuaded —note ‘πειθων [persuading]’ (554 D 1) — and so it surely must be capable of rational calculation. Since the non-rational parts enjoy some rationality, they must be psychological subjects or agents.’ These observations will not do.

¹¹ Wilberding (2012) 132–133 proposes to follow the non-cognitive ethical theory of emotivism as a model in order to understand the appetitive part’s judgement that reason should rule: first, there is a distinction between two kinds of cognition, namely conceptualization and reasoning; second, caution should be exercised in attributing a rational capacity to the appetitive part given that it is described as ‘ἀλόγιστον [*alogiston*]’ —citing *Republic* 4 439 D 7 and *Republic* 10 604 D 8; third, surely the appetitive part is capable of conceptualization and no more than this kind of cognition seems necessary in order for the appetitive part to function as the rest can be explained in non-cognitive terms. Wilberding (2012) 133 writes: ‘On this model [*sc.* of emotivism] we could say that the appetitive part does have beliefs, but this would simply be to say that it has certain representations and certain positive and negative attitudes towards those representations. [...] If this account is right, then the appetitive part’s belief that reason should rule would amount to saying that it has a conception of following reason and a positive disposition to achieve this.’

The non-judgemental construal of temperance as involving non-rational desires led by rational calculation, true judgement, etc. does not require non-rational parts capable of reasoning.¹² For, appetitive desires can be thus led without an appetitive part engaged in rational thought. Consider —again— the discussion on weeping and lamenting in *Republic* 10 (603 E 4–604 D 10). (Chapter 3 §2 argues for construing this desire to weep and lament as appetitive.) The discussion suggests that a moderate desire to weep and lament —note ‘μετριάζει [he will be moderate]’ (603 E 9)— can be achieved by appealing to correct judgement and reasoning. The loss of something valuable may urge us to weep and lament in a way harmful to our well-being. But if we bring to mind the law that we should keep quiet in misfortunes and not get irritated —perhaps even rehearse an argument in support of the law — we should be giving ourselves enough of a respite ‘to deliberate [βουλευέσθαι]’ (604 C 5) in order to understand the misfortune and to move forward in the best way possible according to reason. This is supposed to weaken or even eliminate the urge to weep and lament (cf. 604 C 9–D 1). Socrates and Glaucon conclude (604 D 4–10) that the best thing in us is willing to follow ‘this rational calculation [τούτω τῷ λογισμῷ]’ (604 D 4) whereas the thing urging us to weep and lament is ‘non-rational [ἄλόγιστον]’ (604 D 8). The concluding remarks stress a sharp distinction between —on the one hand— recalling law, deliberating, following rational calculation and —on the other hand— having an urge to weep and lament, so sharp as to discourage construing that which urges to weep and lament as something itself actively capable of lawful judgements and of engaging in reasoning. (Cf. *Republic* 9 587 A 8–B 3 insofar as that which urges us to weep and lament is arguably an appetitive desire.) That which urges us to weep and lament could be regarded as sensitive to lawful judgement and reasoning, but in a passive or automatic way in the sense that it suffers a loss of strength as an involuntary reaction to our conscious or deliberate effort to resist it with the help of lawful judgement and reasoning. The basic idea seems to be that the presence and strength of rational activities —for instance— rehearsing laws, deliberating, and following our principles based on reasoning automatically draws our attention away from and weakens our distress thus making the urge to relieve it moderate (cf. T38 in Chapter 5 §2). It seems plausible to regard this as an appetitive desire being led by correct judgement and rational calculation:

¹² Chapter 1 §2 n. 13 offers an answer to an objection against denying instrumental reasoning to the appetitive part.

after all, the desire goes from being potentially harmful to our psychic health to being moderate. But —to stress the concluding remarks (604 D 4–10)— that which truly follows correct judgement and rational calculation is not that which urges us to weep and lament. In other words, a moderate appetitive desire led by correct judgement and rational calculation does not require the urge itself or something that houses it to be actively capable of lawful judgement and rational calculation.

This interpretation of non-rational desires led by reason facilitates a reply to the second objection in the prevalent view's protest that soul-parts must be psychological subjects or agents. The second objection argues that the appetitive part must be capable of rational calculation since *Republic* 8 554 C 11–D 4 presupposes that the appetitive part can be persuaded —note 'πειθων [persuading]' (554 D 1). This argument assumes that being persuaded requires some rationality, but this is not necessary: the above interpretation of non-rational desires led by reason applied here encourages the suggestion that all Plato could have in mind (at *Republic* 8 554 C 11–D 4) is an oligarch who does not engage in rational activities such as rehearsing laws, deliberating, etc., activities which would 'persuade' by automatically drawing attention away from and weakening the oligarch's evil desires. Readers who are not convinced by this suggestion should still be cautious of attributing some rationality to the appetitive part on the basis of its ability to be persuaded. For, Plato does not share the assumption that being persuaded requires rationality. Plato is willing to attribute persuasive power to things such as pleasure (cf. *R.* 3 413 C 1–4 with *R.* 7 538 C 6–D 5), sexual passion (cf. *R.* 5 458 D 5–7), prayers and sacrifices (cf. *R.* 2 365 E 2–366 A 5), and gifts (cf. *R.* 3 390 E 4). This generous notion of persuasion allows Plato to think of persuading appetites by means other than rational calculation; and even a person who reasons a way to use —say— rewards in order to achieve a certain result on appetitive desires could be said to persuade them, but through no rational merit of their own —or of something that houses them— in the sense that the result is achieved without reasoning at the appetitive level. (Cf. *Republic* 5 468 A 2–E 4 with 458 D 5–8: it is tempting to argue that auxiliaries are trained to be exceptionally courageous in part by persuading their appetitive desires with erotic rewards.)

This study has shown that the judgemental account of temperance can be explained in non-judgemental terms: the non-rational parts' so-called 'judgement' that reason must rule

need be nothing more than a characteristic desire demanding reason's rule. (The judgemental account thus does not seem to offer a substantively different conception of temperance.) This study has shown also that the acquisition of this characteristic desire —basically the acquisition of non-rational moderate desires— does not require non-rational parts capable of reasoning. Consequently, temperance can be achieved without intelligent or reasoning non-rational parts. This brief study thus downplays the appearance of non-rational parts as psychological subjects or agents.

This study also alludes to a picture of the just or harmonious soul's integrity without dissolving the appearance of soul-parts as genuinely distinct entities —as the deflationist and hybrid views would have us believe. The non-judgemental construal of temperance suggests that temperate non-rational parts share a characteristic desire to be led by reason and so the pleasure and love peculiar to each would be for reason's rule —they would be appropriately called 'reason-rule-loving'. It is noteworthy that this view alludes to a sense of the unity of harmonious souls in *Republic* 4 (443 C 9–444 A 3): the appetitive, the spirited, and the rational parts share a desire and pleasure to be led by reason. But this unity does not dissolve them as genuine parts: first, the shared desire does not erase or eliminate the characteristic goals of each part described in *Republic* 9 (580 C 10–581 B 12); second, the shared desire does not preclude the possibility of conflicting desires between soul-parts: after all, the temperate surely experience psychic conflict —for instance— due to a tragic loss (cf. *R.* 10 603 E 4–604 D 10). Thus the non-judgemental construal of temperance shows that just or harmonious souls —although one— do have soul-parts.

0.3 Summary of chapters

Chapter 1 gives an overview of early ethical education and its achievements. It frames these in terms of the main debate concerned with identifying the primary target or beneficiary of this education. There is an apparent discrepancy between accounts in *Republic* 3 and *Republic* 4 specifying the soul-parts benefiting from early ethical education, and the chapter argues that Plato has not changed his mind: there is reason to believe that the philosophical and the rational elements are basically one and the same.

Chapter 2 presents the standard view according to which early ethical education's achievements are explained by the soul's spirited element. Some initial doubts are raised against this view, which the latter tries to resist. Nevertheless, the chapter seeds a serious worry, namely that the standard view is committed to partitioning the soul's spirited element. If this is correct, then spirit —on the standard view— would be a complex soul-element. (This is an unacceptable consequence insofar as the debate assumes the integrity of each soul-part.)

Chapter 3 turns to the discussion on imitative poetry in *Republic* 10 because it affords an insight into the non-rational parts' acquisition of judgements about what is excellent. The chapter defends the view that imitative poetry corrupts both non-rational parts, both appetite and spirit, against a problematic passage in *Republic* 10 that has been taken to introduce a novel psychic division in the rational part. This defense depends on arguing that 'appears [φαίνεται]' in this context enjoys a judgemental construal, which is noteworthy: imitative poetry is said to corrupt the soul by making images of excellence (εἰδῶλα ἀρετῆς) which are spoken of also as apparitions (φαντάσματα) and what appears (φαίνεται) to be excellent to the many. The chapter concludes suggesting that we should expect the non-rational parts to be the subjects of false judgements about —for instance— what is excellent.

Chapter 4 advances our understanding of the relation between the non-rational parts and judgements relevant to early ethical education, in order to ascertain whether the spirited element could indeed be the primary beneficiary of this education. The chapter argues that the soul's non-rational parts are the primary subjects of false judgements about —for instance— what is excellent. This result is shaped into a worry for the standard view on early ethical education, a worry that raises —again— the apparently unacceptable consequence of partitioning the spirited part.

Chapter 5 both delivers a final objection to the standard view and offers an explanation of the rational part as the primary target or beneficiary of early ethical education. The chapter argues that the soul most likely experiences psychic faction throughout early ethical education since the latter is tasked with weakening or eliminating the non-rational parts' natural non-necessary desires and pleasures. The chapter then seizes on this fact to argue —again— that the standard view is committed to partitioning the spirited element and thus endangering its psychic integrity. (This is —again— unacceptable insofar as the debate

assumes the integrity of each soul-part.) The chapter then defends the view that early ethical education must primarily target the soul's rational part by arguing for the novel thesis that this education involves acquiring a rational understanding of laws and law-inculcated judgements. The chapter concludes by articulating an advantage of this account.

Chapter 1

The achievements of ethical training

1.1 Introduction

Chapter 1 identifies both the psychological beneficiaries and the benefits of musical and physical training, that is of early ethical education. Chapter 1 §2 offers an initial defense of early ethical education as designed for both the rational and the spirited elements of the soul. Chapter 1 §3 argues that this education furnishes the soul with an accurate ethical discriminatory faculty, that is with the ability to perceive or recognize genuine instances of temperance, courage, etc.. Chapter 1 §4 notes that this achievement need not be accounted for by a non-rational element of the soul.

1.2 The identity of the soul's parts

In the *Republic*, Plato's Socrates sets out to identify the nature of justice—to answer the question 'what is justice?'—and to show that the just person is better off than the unjust (cf. *R.* 2 367 C 6–E 4). The task begins with the genesis of a city—culminating with an ideally good city, Callipolis—partly due to assuming tentatively an isomorphic account of justice in an individual and in a city, partly due to expecting an easier task to discern justice at a larger scale insofar as cities too are just (*R.* 2 368 C 8–369 A 5; cf. *R.* 4 434 D 1–435 C 3).¹ It is assumed also that an ideally good city will be just (*R.* 4 427 E 6–11, 434 D 7–E 2).

The genesis of Callipolis involves a long discussion (*R.* 2 376 C 8–*R.* 3 412 B 8) on the education of the city's future guardians, in particular an education concerned with

¹ The standardly called 'city-soul analogy' receives critical discussion in Williams (1997). See Ferrari (2003) for further reflection including replies to Williams. Whiting (2012) 178 observes that the analogy is officially introduced (*R.* 2 368 E 2) between a single man—not a soul—and a whole state. Chapter 2 §2 touches again on the city-soul analogy.

developing the best ethical character (e.g. courageous and temperate).² This education has two components, beginning with musical training—which includes poetry, stories, and music proper—³ followed by physical training; and it all takes place while students are still young (i.e. children and youths), before the age of twenty (*R.* 7 537 A 6–C 5).⁴ There is an initial impression that musical training is designed for educating the soul whereas physical training is meant for the body (*R.* 2 376 E 1–4), but—upon reflection—Socrates concludes that both

² It is not altogether evident that all inhabitants of Callipolis will receive the education outlined in *Republic* 2–3: certain passages seem to deny outright this education to some, including producers (*R.* 4 431 C 9–D 3; cf. *R.* 5 456 D 8–11, *R.* 9 590 C 1–6); yet their being left out of an education seems to be in tension with *Republic* 3 405 A 6–B 4. Wilberding (2012) 128–129 n. 2 offers a useful survey on commentators in the debate. Wilberding (2012) 130–131 construes the so-called ‘Noble Lie’ (*R.* 3 414 B 7–415 D 3) as part of early ethical education and observes that it is administered to all three classes in Callipolis (presumably on the basis of *R.* 3 414 C 2).

³ Cf. *Pl. Phd.* 60 D 8–61 C 1.

⁴ Cf. Kamtekar (2008) 347. In *Republic* Book 7 (521 C 1), Socrates returns to the subject of education with an eye mainly on the subjects that will lead people to knowledge of what is ($\tau\omicron\ \acute{\omicron}\nu$). There is an agreement that neither musical training nor physical training are among the subjects that lead to knowledge of what is (521 D 13–522 B2, e.g. T43). Since the discussion in Book 7 is concerned with developing the intellect, it is generally assumed that the rational part is not primarily benefited either by musical or by physical training. (This assumption stands to be corrected in this work.)

musical and physical training are designed for the soul, to be precise for two elements of the soul, the philosophical and the spirited (*R.* 3 410 B 10–412 A 3):⁵

T1	Ἐπ[ε]ἰ δὴ δὺ ὄντε τούτω, ὡς ἔοικε, δύο τέχνα θεὸν ἔγωγ’ ἄν τινα φαίην δεδωκέναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, μουσικὴν τε καὶ γυμναστικὴν ἐπὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς καὶ τὸ φιλόσοφον, οὐκ ἐπὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, εἰ μὴ εἰ πάρεργον, ἀλλ’ ἐπ’ ἐκείνω, ὅπως ἂν ἀλλήλοιν συναρμοσθῆτον ἐπιτεινομένω καὶ ἀνιεμένω μέχρι τοῦ προσήκοντος. Καὶ γὰρ ἔοικεν, ἔφη.	411 E 4 E 5 412 A 1 A 3
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So I would say that for these two things —as it seems— a god has given two crafts to human beings, musical training and physical training for the spirited and the philosophical elements, not for the soul and body —except incidentally— but for the other two: that they may be harmonized with one another by being stretched and relaxed to the appropriate degree.

It seems so —he said. (*Pl. R.* 3 411 E 4–412 A 3)

⁵ Socrates —to be clear— has not yet divided the soul into three elements or parts, namely reason, spirit, and appetite. This division happens in *Republic* 4 436 A 8–441 C 7. Thus —at this early stage of the dialogue— the identity of these elements (i.e. the philosophical and the spirited) in relation to the canonical three (i.e. reason, spirit, and appetite) is a moot point. It is noteworthy that they are spoken of as characteristics or ‘natures’ of the soul (*R.* 2 374 E 7–376 C 8) and that Socrates does not use the word ‘part [μέρος]’ in the arguments distinguishing the elements in the soul —although the word does appear later in reference to them (*R.* 4 442 B 10, C 4, 444 B 3; *R.* 9 581 A 6, 583 A 1, 586 E 5). See Whiting (2012) esp. 194–202 for reflections on the meaning behind introducing the word ‘μέρος [part]’. I shall follow convention in speaking also of ‘parts’ of the soul. Note that T1 makes no mention of a third element introduced in Book 4, namely the appetitive element. The division of the soul in Book 4 in conjunction with a clear back reference to the discussion on musical and physical training (*R.* 4 441 E 7–442A 3 in T2) prompts asking whether or not musical and physical training have any direct effect on the appetitive element. Wilberding (2012) argues that the appetitive part is educated during physical training. (Chapter 5 §2 argues that early ethical education involves weakening or eliminating both the appetitive and the spirited parts’ non-necessary desires and pleasures, in which case this education does involve training the appetitive element.)

In passage T1, Socrates and Glaucon agree that musical and physical training are meant to make two parts of the soul, the philosophical and the spirited, harmonious with one another.

What does their being ‘harmonized [συναρμολογητον]’ (412 A 1) with one another mean? This is the first instance of the verb ‘harmonize [συναρμολοζω]’ (cf. *R.* 4 443 D 5; *R.* 7 519 E 3), but the idea is not novel: it picks up the exchange at *Republic* 3 410 E 5–9 —note ‘ἡρμόσθαι [to be in harmony]’ at 410 E 8— which refers back to Book 2 374 E 7–376 C 7, in particular 375 C 6–7. The basic idea is that the philosophical and spirited elements oppose each other and too much attention to one element (e.g. the philosophical) comes at the expense of the other (e.g. the spirited) (411 A 5–E 3; cf. T39 in Chapter 5 §3). (If these elements are not harmonized with one another, the result would be someone not suited to rule Callipolis.)

This idea of harmonizing the soul’s elements reappears later in *Republic* 4. After the ideal city has been constructed and divided into three groups or classes, namely producers, auxiliaries (i.e. soldiers), and guardians, Socrates and Glaucon set out to identify justice in it —identifying also wisdom, courage, and temperance along the way (*R.* 4 427 C 6–434 C 11). They agree that justice in Callipolis amounts to each of the three classes doing its own work and not meddling in or trying to do the affairs belonging to another class, i.e. producers being producers (and nothing more), auxiliaries being auxiliaries (and nothing more), and guardians being guardians (and nothing more). Meddling and exchange of tasks amounts to injustice (*R.* 4 434 B 8–C 11; cf. 435 B 4–5). This is an important discovery: remember that the goal of identifying the nature of justice —and of proving that the just are better off than the unjust— would be first approached by trying to discern justice at a larger scale (e.g. in a city) and using this discovery to search for justice at a smaller scale (e.g. in a human being). With this account of Callipolis-justice in hand, Socrates turns to identifying justice in a human being or —to be precise— in a human soul.

The question now is whether the soul too has these three classes within it (*R.* 4 435 C 4–6). It is agreed —without difficulty— that these forms do exist within each of us, namely love-of-money, spiritedness, and love-of-learning: otherwise, they would not be present in cities (*R.* 4 435 D 9–436 A 7; cf. *R.* 8 544 D 5–E 3). But it is difficult to know whether or not the soul has three distinct elements within it: does the soul learn, become infuriated, and desire the pleasures of food, drink, and sex as a whole or does it do these with three distinct

Quite so —he said.

And these two having thus been nurtured and having truly learned and been educated in their roles will govern the appetitive part, which is the largest in each person’s soul and is by nature most insatiable for money. They’ll watch closely over it lest becoming big and strong by being filled with the so-called ‘pleasures’ of the body it does not do its own work, but attempts to enslave and rule over them [*sc.* the rational and spirited elements] even though it is not fitting for their kind to be ruled by it — thereby overturning everyone’s whole life.

Absolutely —he said. (Pl. *R.* 4 441 E 7–442 B 4)

In passage T2, Socrates and Glaucon agree that a correct mixture of musical and physical training will make the rational and the spirited elements ‘harmonious [σύμφωνα]’ (441 E 8). This passage contains a back reference to T1 —note ‘ὡπερ ἐλέγομεν [just as we were saying]’ (441 E 7). But there is an apparent difference: in the earlier passage (T1), the beneficiaries of musical and physical training are identified as the philosophical and the spirited parts whereas now (T2) the beneficiaries of musical and physical training are identified as the rational and the spirited parts.⁶

Has Socrates changed his mind? This is unlikely: there is reason to believe that the philosophical and the rational elements are one and the same. Later in *Republic* 9 (580 C 11–583 B 2), Socrates argues that the just person is better off than the unjust because the former’s life is more pleasant than the latter’s. The argument appeals to the three elements of an embodied human soul, namely an element by means of which we learn, another by means of which we are spirited, and an element by means of which we desire food, drink, sex, and other things (580 C 11–581 A 8). The latter two elements are clearly the spirited and the

⁶ C. Gill (1985) 13–14 enumerates apparent differences between T1 and T2, and outright objects that the rational element is educated during musical training: ‘All that the first phase of education [*sc.* musical and physical training] had developed was the passive capacity of the mind to absorb correct judgements [cf. *R.* 4, 428 B–430 C]; and this capacity is now [at 442 B10–C 4?] associated with τὸ θυμοειδές rather than τὸ λογιστικόν.’ The latter point is rejected below. Pelosi (2010) 20–21 with n. 18 too stresses the apparent passivity of the soul. Chapter 5 §4 argues that the first phase of education goes beyond a passive capacity to absorb true judgements: acquiring laws and law-inculcated judgements in the finest way possible involves some reasoning or calculation.

appetitive respectively (581 A 9–B 5). If we follow the nomenclature of soul-parts in *Republic* 4, we would expect the element by means of which we learn to be called ‘the rational [τὸ λογιστικόν]’ element (cf. *R.* 4 439 D 4–9): after all, it is the unique soul-part distinct from both appetite and spirit; yet the element by means of which we learn is now called ‘learning-loving [φιλομαθὲς]’ and ‘philosophical [φιλόσοφον]’ (581 B 6–12). It is noteworthy that the latter name was used in passage T1 (411 E 6). It is noteworthy also that the learning-loving or philosophical element rules in some souls (581 C 1–3) much like the rational element is said to rule in a well-educated soul (T2). This is no mistake or carelessness: the same view, namely that the philosophical element rules in some souls, is expressed later again in *Republic* 9 (586 D 4–587 A 7). Socrates speaks of the whole soul that follows the philosophical element, by which he means that it is ruling in the soul and each soul-part does its own task and is just (586 E 4–A 7). This view —and the language used— recalls passage T2, in particular that the rule of the rational element amounts to a just soul. This evidence suggests that there is no substantial difference between the philosophical element (τὸ φιλόσοφον) and the rational element (τὸ λογιστικόν):⁷ at the very least, Socrates treats the names ‘philosophical [φιλόσοφον]’ and ‘rational [λογιστικόν]’ as interchangeable with respect to denoting that unique soul-part distinct from both the appetitive part and the spirited part, the rulership of which amounts to justice in the soul.⁸ (Chapter 5 §4 argues that early ethical education’s goal to have laws and law-inculcated judgements acquired in the finest way possible —a goal introduced after T1— involves some reasoning or calculation, in which case there is an explanation to focus on the rational part in T2.)

It may be objected that the philosophical and rational elements are not identical, nor even associated with one another. For, the philosophical element is to be associated with the

⁷ I take this view to be assumed by Reeve (2013).

⁸ This should tell against the view that the philosophical element in passage T1 is a proto-reason, an earlier aspect or form of the rational element. This view is held by —e.g.: Kamtekar (1998), Moss (2005), Wilberding (2009), presumably Whiting (2012) 182, and Singpurwalla (2013). It is noteworthy both that psychic courage is an outcome of early ethical education (cf. *R.* 3 386 A 6 and the forthcoming n. 11) and —as many scholars believe— that it involves the *rational* part’s declarations on the fearful and the non-fearful (cf. T3 with n. 10). These two observations would imply that early ethical education trains the soul’s rational part —not some proto-reason.

spirited element as a capacity of it.⁹ Why should this be the case? (Addressing this objection will —so to speak— feed two birds with one hand: it will confirm the identity of the soul-parts benefited by early ethical training and it will begin to present the achievements of this training.)

The objection observes that the genesis of Callipolis explores the education of its future guardians to develop the best kind of ethical character, to be courageous, temperate, just, etc. —the best possible (cf. *R.* 3 386 A 6, 389 D 7, T9, *R.* 5 456 E 4–457 A 2). This education begins with musical training, in particular story-telling, followed by physical training (*R.* 2 376 E 1–377 A 10; cf. *R.* 7 537 A 6–C 5). The beginning of this education is deemed of the utmost importance: anything young and tender is most malleable and takes on the pattern anyone wishes to impress upon it (*R.* 2 377 A 11–B 3; cf. *R.* 2 378 D 6–E 2, *R.* 7 536 C 9–D 3). It is assumed that students will take judgements (δόξαι) into their souls and the concern or goal is for these young students to acquire the judgements they should hold as adults (377 B 4–9). The basic idea is that an ideal early ethical education instills correct judgements (cf. *R.* 2 378 D 6–E 2, *R.* 4 429 D 4–430 B 6, *R.* 7 521 D 4–522 B 2). This concern for acquiring correct judgements in the best way possible reappears in discussing political or civic courage (*R.* 4 429 D 4–430 B 6, part of which is T5). Some of the judgements to be acquired are for the sake of becoming courageous (*R.* 3 386 A 6–387 C 11). Later, individual or psychic courage is discussed and characterized as an excellence belonging to the spirited part of the soul:

T3	Καὶ ἀνδρεῖον δὴ, οἶμαι, τούτῳ τῷ μέρει καλοῦμεν ἓνα	442 B 10
	ἕκαστον, ὅταν αὐτοῦ τὸ θυμοειδὲς διασώζη διὰ τε λυπῶν καὶ	C 1
	ἡδονῶν τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων παραγγελθὲν δεινόν τε καὶ μή.	
	Ὅρθῶς γ', ἔφη.	C 3

⁹ C. Gill (1985) is —as far as I know— the only proponent of this view.

And because of this part [*sc.* the spirited] —I suppose— we call each one individual ‘courageous’, when his spirited element preserves through distresses and pleasures what our stories announce¹⁰ to be feared and what isn’t.

That’s right —he said. (Pl. *R.* 4 442 B 10–C 3)

Passage T3 characterizes courage as the spirited part’s preserving certain judgements through distresses and pleasures. This characterization may be understood to mean that spirit preserves judgements it itself has acquired, in which case the correct judgements that young

¹⁰ Cf. *Republic* 1 359 A 4 —following LSJ *s.v.* ‘ὑπό’ A II 1— for this construction ‘τὸ ὑπὸ [κτλ.]’ and *Republic* 2 376 E 1–11 for this use of ‘λόγος’. The Grube-Reeve translation —presumably following Adam (1902)— reads ‘τοῦ λόγου [of reason]’, i.e. ‘the declaration of reason about what is to be feared and what isn’t’. This reading arguably favors the view I shall defend, namely that Callipolitan ethical education imparts to the rational part true judgements about the fearful and the not fearful: after all, ethical education is designed to produce courageous individuals (cf. *R.* 3 386 A 6); this involves acquiring true judgements about the fearful and the not fearful; and if these are issued by the soul’s reason, then this reading seems to presuppose the rational part’s acquisition of the judgements in question. The rendering in T3 is preferable as it remains neutral on the matter.

souls are meant to acquire and hold as adults are impressed upon the spirited part of the soul.¹¹

Now —the objection continues— the ability to have judgements impressed upon the soul is not ascribed to the spirited part itself, but to the soul’s philosophical element: after all, learning is explained by a philosophical nature (cf. *R.* 2 375 E 8–376 C 3; *R.* 3 411 C 9–D 6).¹² This observation and T3 jointly suggest that correct judgements would be impressed upon the spirited part of the soul in virtue of its own philosophical nature. In other words, the spirited element’s ability to preserve judgements would be explained by associating it with the philosophical judgement-absorbing element.

The objection that the philosophical and rational elements are not identical because the philosophical element is a capacity of the spirited is not convincing. First, consider the evidence already adduced to identify the philosophical element with the rational (cf., above, the text to note 7 in this Section 2). Second, the suggestion that the philosophical element is a

¹¹ This is a fairly standard interpretation —e.g. Kamtekar (2006) 189: ‘it is not until Socrates defines philosophic courage that he says that the spirited part is the *holder* [my emphasis] of the beliefs about what is to be feared and what is not’. Kamtekar (2006) especially 188–189 distinguishes between civic excellence and philosophic excellence —for instance— believing that there is a contrast between the account of courage at *Republic* 4 429 C 5–430 C 4 (cf. T5) and the account of courage at *Republic* 4 442 B 10–C 3 (T3): the former account is based on law-inculcated true judgement whereas the latter account is based on spirit’s obedience to the declarations of the rational part —or to speeches or arguments according to Kamtekar (2006) 173. The impression is that Kamtekar does not consider the virtues discussed in *Republic* 4 442 B 10 ff. an outcome of early ethical education in *Republic* 2–3. If this impression is accurate, then this view is unpalatable: Plato clearly intends that the excellences discussed in *Republic* 4 are an outcome of early ethical education. For, students are meant to become — for instance— courageous and temperate (cf. *R.* 3 386 A 6–B 3 and 389 D 7–E 3). Note the proximity of the discussion to T2 —only four lines apart. Note also that two plausible alternative translations of ‘τῶν λόγων’ (442 C 2 in T3) would link the account of Kamtekar’s philosophic courage to early ethical education and thus to the earlier account of courage at *Republic* 4 429 C 5–430 C 4 (cf. T5). The first alternative is already given in T3, in which case Socrates has in mind the stories (τῶν λόγων) told throughout early ethical education. The second alternative would translate ‘λόγος’ by ‘principles’ or ‘rules’ or ‘laws’, in particular those resulting from reckoning or calculation —see Chapter 5 n. 15— in which case Socrates would have in mind the principles or laws (τῶν λόγων) about the fearful and the not fearful acquired throughout musical training.

¹² C. Gill (1985) 13 writes: ‘the “philosophical” element may signify nothing more than a “passive” rational capacity, the ability to absorb the moral norms presented to it in the educational programme.’

capacity of spirit raises a puzzle: musical and physical training are meant to harmonize the philosophical and spirited elements with one another (T1) because these elements oppose each other and too much attention to one element comes at the expense of the other; if the philosophical element is a capacity of spirit, why would its nurture be detrimental to spirit? Should it not be the contrary, namely that the nurture of a capacity of spirit be beneficial to it? Third, passage T3 need not mean that spirit preserves judgements it itself has acquired: suppose I rationally judge that it is better not to smoke cigarettes and I acquire a rational aversion to smoking; suppose also that I am desirous to smoke and the pleasures of smoking make me waver, e.g. I start to think about ways of procuring cigarettes; I have arguably abandoned my better judgement and rational aversion; now imagine that I yell at myself ‘Stop!’, that I oppose the happenings within me, namely giving in to the desire and pleasures of smoking; this opposition —if successful— may amount to my recovering my better rational judgement; put another way, this opposition preserves my better rational judgement. This picture presents spirit as responsible for the opposition which —if successful— preserves a rational judgement, not a judgement of its own. If this picture is correct, then there is a meaningful sense in which spirit can be said to preserve a judgement without

requiring that it be a judgement of its own.¹³ (This suggestion is elaborated and defended in Chapter 2 §4 after discussing the argument to distinguish spirit from appetite. If correct, the expanded suggestion will be a decisive reason to reject that fairly standard reading of passage T3.)

If the above is correct, early ethical education in Callipolis does work upon two distinct soul-elements, namely the philosophical or rational and the spirited elements. Passages T1 and T2 do not express different views and T2 does not make a mistake in introducing the rational part as a beneficiary of early ethical education. (The latter is confirmed in Chapter 5 §4.) Since this education is understood to impart correct judgements, then Callipolian ethical education will impart correct judgements upon either both or just one of the aforementioned soul-parts. To ascertain which soul-part or soul-parts acquires these judgements—which begins in Chapter 2—it is necessary to consider further the

¹³ I have here briefly sketched my answer to an objection raised by some scholars—e.g. Erginel (2013) 206–207 and Bobonich (2017) 8—against the view that denies instrumental reasoning to the appetitive part. Bobonich (2017) 8 writes: ‘Suppose I have rationally decided not to smoke and my Reasoning part believes that it is best overall not to smoke and desires not smoking as best overall. My Appetitive part nevertheless desires to smoke. I now find myself with a desire to go to the store and buy some cigarettes. This desire cannot be attributed to the Reasoning part because [...] this would result in its subdivision. But neither can it be attributed to the Appetitive part because it is a desire for a means to the end of smoking.’ My solution to the case of akratic smokers is [i] that reason abandons its better judgement and aversion due to the desire and the pleasures of smoking (cf. *R.* 3 412 E 4–413 C 4 on abandoning judgements due to pleasure—more in Chapter 2 §4); [ii] reason—without risking internal partitioning since it abandons its better judgement—is responsible for deliberating about ways to satisfy the appetitive part’s desire to smoke (cf. *R.* 9 590 C 1–6); and [iii] if an opposition arises to the instrumental reasoning or even to activity stemming from it (e.g. going somewhere to purchase cigarettes), then spirit is responsible for the opposition: after all, it is by nature an ally of reason (*R.* 4 440 A 9–B 8; cf. Chapter 2 §3) and—if courageous—it preserves judgements (T3). In other words, I deny the assumption that reason still holds its better judgement against and its aversion to smoking when akratic smokers are deliberating about or even acting on ways to procure cigarettes. I deny the further assumption that an aversion to deliberating about means or to acting on them must be an aversion of the rational part. Scholars who attribute instrumental reasoning to the appetitive part are—e.g.: Irwin (1995) 217–219, Bobonich (2002) 244 with n. 47 at 543–536, Price (2009) 11, Shields (2010) 161, and Bobonich (2017) 6–9. Scholars who deny this capacity to the appetitive part are—e.g.: Santas (2001) 122–123, Lorenz (2006b) 44 with n 8. and 47, Wilberding (2012) 182 n. 17, perhaps Kamtekar (2018) 146. Singpurwalla (2010) 885–886 views the appetitive part as susceptible to rational persuasion on the basis of *Republic* 8 554 C 11–D 4.

achievements of musical and physical training: simply put, we need to be clear about the expectations held over early ethical education in order to decide correctly whether these are compatible or not with the nature of the soul-parts in question.

1.3 Knowledge of excellences and vices

The basic expectation is that education in musical and physical training imparts a pattern or form upon young souls: they are most malleable, in the sense that they are most receptive to their environment (cf. *R.* 3 401 B 1–402 D 3); and early education begins with musical training, in particular with stories conveying views or judgements (about gods, heroes, etc.) that shape the soul (cf. *R.* 2 377 C 3–5). (Remember the concern for young students to acquire judgements they should hold as adults (*R.* 2 377 B 4–9).) These two observations may suggest that judgements alone give young souls a definite form or pattern, in the sense that young souls automatically endorse or acquire the views or judgements to which they are exposed. This suggestion seems to align well with the program of censorship throughout *Republic* 2–3 as its underlying motivation appears to be that merely being exposed to wrong views or judgements automatically amounts to their being acquired and forming a person’s (vicious) personality. (More on this interpretation below, from the text to note 15.)

The process of imparting a definite psychic pattern —however— is not that straightforward or simple. For, mere exposure to judgements need not amount to their being endorsed or acquired. Consider a worry expressed by Adeimantus in *Republic* 2. After presenting private and popular views that praise justice and disparage injustice in terms of their consequences (*R.* 2 362 E 6–365 A 3), Adeimantus says:

T4	Ταῦτα πάντα, ἔφη, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες, τοιαῦτα καὶ τοσαῦτα λεγόμενα ἀρετῆς πέρι καὶ κακίας, ὡς ἄνθρωποι καὶ θεοὶ περὶ αὐτὰ ἔχουσι τιμῆς, τί οἰόμεθα ἀκουούσας νέων ψυχὰς ποιεῖν, ὅσοι εὐφυεῖς καὶ ἱκανοὶ ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ὥσπερ ἐπιπτόμενοι συλλογίσασθαι ἐξ αὐτῶν ποῖός τις ἂν ὦν καὶ πῆ πορευθεῖς τὸν βίον ὡς ἄριστα διέλθοι;	365 A 4 A 5 B 1
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Dear Socrates —he said— when all these sorts of things are said about excellence and vice, about how humans and gods hold them in honor, what do we suppose to happen to young souls who are listening? I mean those who are naturally clever and are able —so to speak— to flit from one of these sayings to another and to reckon what sort of person he should be and of how best to travel the road of life. (Pl. *R.* 2 365 A 4–B 1)

Passage T4 observes that some young souls can reflect or calculate —note ‘συλλογίσασθαι [to reckon]’ (365 A 8)— upon the views or judgements to which they are exposed before making up their minds. It is noteworthy that acquiring or fixing a judgement in their souls seems to result from reasoning or calculation. (It is worth consulting the sequel to passage T4, namely *R.* 2 365 B 1–C 6.) Perhaps Adeimantus’ observation does not hold for those who are not clever, but the point remains that mere imparting or exposure to judgements does not explain their reception.

This point is later alluded to in the *Republic* 4 discussion to identify political or civic courage. To elucidate a conception of courage as a sort of preservation, it is compared to the process of dyeing wool purple (*R.* 4 429 D 4–E 6) and a crucial point is that naturally white wools undergo a significant preparation to ensure the reception of the color. The comparison is useful because:

T5	Τοιοῦτον τοίνυν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὑπόλαβε κατὰ δύναμιν ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ἡμᾶς, ὅτε ἐξελεγόμεθα τοὺς στρατιώτας καὶ ἐπαιδεύομεν μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ· μηδὲν οἴου ἄλλο μηχανᾶσθαι ἢ ὅπως ἡμῖν ὅτι κάλλιστα τοὺς νόμους πεισθέντες δέξοιντο ὥσπερ βαφήν, ἵνα δευσοποιὸς αὐτῶν ἡ δόξα γίγνοιτο καὶ περὶ δεινῶν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, διὰ τὸ τὴν τε φύσιν καὶ τὴν τροφήν ἐπιτηδείαν ἐσχηκέναι, καὶ μὴ αὐτῶν ἐκπλύναι τὴν βαφήν τὰ ρύμματα ταῦτα, δεινὰ ὄντα ἐκκλύζειν, ἢ τε ἡδονή, παντὸς χαλεστραίου δεινότερα οὔσα τοῦτο δρᾶν καὶ κονίας, λύπη τε καὶ φόβος καὶ ἐπιθυμία, παντὸς ἄλλου ρύμματος. τὴν δὲ τοιαύτην δύναμιν καὶ σωτηρίαν διὰ παντὸς	429 E 7
	430 A 1	
	A 5	
	B 1	

δόξης ὀρθῆς τε καὶ νομίμου δεινῶν περὶ καὶ μῆ, ἀνδρείαν

ἔγωγε καλῶ καὶ τίθεμαι, εἰ μὴ τι σὺ ἄλλο λέγεις.

B 5

Ἄλλ' οὐδέν, ἧ δ' ὅς, λέγω·

B 6

Then —I said— you should understand that we too were attempting within our means something similar when we selected our soldiers and educated them in music and physical training. You should think that it was contrived for nothing other than that they being persuaded by us would absorb the laws in the finest way possible — just like a dye— so that their judgement both about what is to be feared and about all the rest would become fast because they had the proper nature and upbringing; so fast that the dye would not be washed out by those extremely effective detergents: pleasure —which is much more effective at this than any washing soda or alkaline fluid— distress and fear and appetite —more effective than any detergent. This power, then, to preserve through everything the correct and law-inculcated judgement about what is to be feared and what isn't is what I call —and lay down as— ‘courage’ unless you say otherwise.

I —he said— have nothing different to say. (Pl. *R.* 4 429 E 7–B 6)

Passage T5 alludes to Adeimantus' point that mere imparting or exposure to judgements does not explain their reception. T5 presents two stages to acquiring or fixing true judgements relevant to ethical training, not just about courage —note ‘καὶ περὶ δεινῶν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων [both about what is to be feared and about all the rest]’ (430 A 4). The first stage is preparatory analogous to the preparatory treatment naturally white wools receive before being dipped in purple dye. The second stage is absorbing the laws and law-inculcated judgements in the finest way possible analogous to being dipped in purple dye.

The first preparatory stage to acquiring or fixing these true judgements remains obscure in passage T5 —understandably— given its focus on preservation. The obscurity can begin to be lifted by an earlier passage that articulates the motivations underlying a concern for a most proper education in musical training:

T6 Ἄρ' οὖν, ἧν δ' ἐγώ, ὃ Γλαύκων, τούτων ἔνεκα κυριωτάτη

401 D 4

ἐν μουσικῇ τροφῇ, ὅτι μάλιστα καταδύεται εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ὃ τε ῥυθμὸς καὶ ἁρμονία, καὶ ἐρρωμενέστατα ἄπτεται αὐτῆς φέροντα τὴν εὐσχημοσύνην, καὶ ποιεῖ εὐσχήμονα, ἐάν τις ὀρθῶς τραφῇ, εἰ δὲ μή, τοῦναντίον; καὶ ὅτι αὖ τῶν παραλειπομένων καὶ μὴ καλῶς δημιουργηθέντων ἢ μὴ καλῶς φύντων ὀξύτατ' ἂν αἰσθάνοιτο ὁ ἐκεῖ τραφεὶς ὡς ἔδει, καὶ ὀρθῶς δὴ δυσχεραίνων τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπαινοῖ καὶ χαίροι καὶ καταδεχόμενος εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν τρέφοιτ' ἂν ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ γίγνοιτο καλὸς τε κάγαθός, τὰ δ' αἰσχροὶ ψέγοι τ' ἂν ὀρθῶς καὶ μισοῖ ἔτι νέος ὢν, πρὶν λόγον δυνατὸς εἶναι λαβεῖν, ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἀσπάζοιτ' ἂν αὐτὸν γνωρίζων δι' οἰκειότητα μάλιστα ὁ οὕτω τραφεὶς;	D 5
Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, τῶν τοιούτων ἔνεκα ἐν μουσικῇ εἶναι ἡ τροφή.	E 1 E 5 402 A 1 A 5 A 6

So —I said— Glaucon, are these the reasons that musical training is most important? For, rhythm and harmony above all permeate the inner part of the soul, and affect it most strongly bringing it grace, and make someone graceful —if properly educated, but if not, the opposite. For, the properly educated man will most sharply perceive if things have been omitted or not been finely crafted or not been finely grown. And —being then correctly disgusted— fine things he will praise, enjoy, be nourished by them —receiving them into his soul— and he will become fine and good whereas base things he will rightly censure and hate while still young, before being able to understand an account. But he who is thus educated will kindly welcome the account's arrival recognizing it above all because of kinship.

Yes —he said— I agree that those are the reasons to provide education in music and poetry. (Pl. R. 3 401 D 4–402 A 6)¹⁴

Passage T6 can begin to lift the obscurity to the first preparatory stage in acquiring or fixing those true judgements from T5 insofar as these could be read as parallel passages. It is

¹⁴ Cf. Pl. Lg. 2 653 A 5–C 6 and 654 C 3–D 4.

noteworthy that also T6 (in addition to T5) suggests two stages in ethical education, in this case before and after ‘the account’s arrival [ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου]’ (402 A 3). It is noteworthy also that the good conduct in well-trained youths prior to the account’s arrival probably results from an initial acquisition of laws and law-inculcated judgements: for instance, students are to be disgusted at weeping and lamenting (cf. *R.* 3 387 E 10–388 A 4) —note ‘being then correctly disgusted [ὀρθῶς δὴ δυσχεραίνων]’ (401 E 4) in T6— and this seems to be a part of their training to be courageous which involves preserving laws and law-inculcated judgements about the fearful and the not fearful (cf. T5 and T3). (Passage T6 receives further attention in Chapter 5 §4 —for instance— arguing that the account’s arrival very likely takes place during early ethical education.)

If this is correct that T6 could be read parallel to T5, then what does T6 suggest to be the preparatory treatment? Consider the good conduct of well-trained youths expressed at lines 401 E 4–402 A 2, in particular their being correctly disgusted, their enjoying fine things, and their hating base things. These lines associate good conduct with pleasure and distress, in particular they associate praising and welcoming fine things with pleasure —note ‘χαίρου [enjoy]’ (401 E 5)— and they associate censuring and rejecting base things with distress —note ‘μισοῖ [hate]’ (402 A 2) and ‘δυσχεραίνων [disgusted]’ (401 E 4). (I am assuming that hatred and disgust are kinds of distress.) The impression is basically that well-trained youths are pleased by fine things whereas they are distressed by base things; put another way, well-trained youths experience fine things as pleasant whereas they experience base things as distressful. Since good conduct before the account’s arrival is arguably a result of an initial acquisition of laws and law-inculcated judgements and since this good conduct is associated with pleasure and distress, the impression is that the latter play a crucial role in absorbing laws before the account’s arrival. If this impression is correct, then T6 sheds light on the preparatory treatment to absorbing laws in the finest way possible and fixing true judgements relevant to ethical training. T6 suggests that youths are prepared first by cultivating experiencing pleasure with respect to fine things and experiencing distress by base things. (Chapter 5 §4 argues that absorbing laws and law-inculcated judgements in the finest way possible ultimately involves the account’s arrival, that is a rational account.)

Passage T6 is clear that the content and form of musical training is meant to furnish the soul with an accurate discriminatory faculty relevant to ethical matters: after all, the

ροῖς.

Καὶ μὲν δὴ, ἔφη, σφόδρα γε αὐτὸ πάσχουσι.

B 3

But a *judge* —my friend— does rule other souls with his own soul. And it isn't possible for a soul to be nurtured among vicious souls from childhood, to associate with them, to indulge in every kind of injustice, and come through it able to judge sharply other people's injustices from itself —as it can diseases of the body. But it itself must be inexperienced and uncontaminated by bad characters while it's young, if it's to be fine, good, plus a sound judge of just things. That's the reason indeed that decent young people appear naïve and are easily deceived by the unjust since they do not have within themselves models akin to the vicious.

Quite so —he said— they do indeed suffer it. (Pl. *R.* 3 409 A 1–B 3)

Passage T7 allegedly shows that those to be musically trained are precluded from having any cognitive access to (i.e. learning about) vice because there is no gap between having cognitive access to vice and becoming vicious. The phrase 'no gap' means basically that those who learn about vice become vicious themselves.¹⁶

It is plausible to suppose that what is true of future judges in Callipolis is true of those being musically trained, but the discussion about doctors and judges does not support the view that those being musically trained will not be allowed any cognitive access to vice and so they will not be taught to perceive or recognize it: after all, Socrates' injunction in T7 is not that young people ought not to have any awareness whatsoever of injustice or vice. The lines immediately after T7 clarify the injunction:

T8 Τῷ τοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὐ νέον ἀλλὰ γέροντα δεῖ τὸν ἀγαθὸν 409 B 4

δικαστὴν εἶναι, ὁψιμαθῆ γεγονότα τῆς ἀδικίας οἷόν ἐστιν, οὐκ B 5

οἰκείαν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ ψυχῇ ἐνοῦσαν ἠσθημένον, ἀλλ' ἀλλοτρίαν

¹⁶ Thaler (2015) 416 writes: 'It is easy to take away from this passage [*sc.* T7] merely the idea that judges ought not to be those who have engaged in various forms of vice during their childhood. But what such a reading fails to emphasize is that Socrates' restriction on the upbringing of judges leaves no gap whatsoever between the idea of having cognitive access to vice and becoming vicious oneself.' The contagiousness of vice —according to Thaler (2015) 417 n. 10— better explains passage T9 below.

ἐν ἀλλοτρίαις μεμελετηκότα ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ διαισθάνεσθαι
οἷον πέφυκε κακόν, ἐπιστήμη, οὐκ ἐμπειρία οἰκεῖα κεχρημέ-
νον.

Γενναιότατος γοῦν, ἔφη, ἔοικεν εἶναι ὁ τοιοῦτος δικαστής.

C 1

Therefore, mark my words —I said— it is necessary for a good judge to be not young, but old: who has been late to learn what injustice is like; who has become aware of it not as a familiar presence in his own soul, but as an alien presence in others; who has studied over a long time to perceive distinctly how naturally bad it is —by knowledge, not by enjoying an intimate experience.

Why yes —he said— it is fitting that such a judge be the noblest. (Pl. *R.* 3 409 B 4–C 1)

Good judges —in youth— are precluded from learning about ‘what injustice is like [τῆς ἀδικίας οἷόν ἐστιν]’ (409 B 5), that is about the nature of injustice from firsthand experience, what it is like to be unjust by being unjust themselves (cf. *R.* 2 358 E 2–359 B 7 —note ‘οἷόν τ’ ἐ<στί> [what [*sc.* justice] is like]’ at 358 E 3, ‘οὐσίαν [being]’ at 359 A 5, and ‘φύσις’ at 359 B 6). Good judges —in youth— are precluded from having firsthand experience about ‘how naturally bad [οἷον πέφυκε κακόν]’ (409 B 8) injustice is.

These lines clearly show that Socrates’ concern with respect to nurturing good judges is that they not come to learn or be aware of the nature of vice from firsthand experience. This is a narrower injunction than not having any awareness at all about vice which would preclude them from perceiving or recognizing vice. In other words, the discussion about doctors and judges in Callipolis does not support the claim that musical training in Callipolis precludes cognitive access to vice. The discussion considers two kinds of awareness about the nature of vice, namely firsthand experience and theoretical knowledge, and the discussion precludes the former from anyone who is to become a good judge of excellence. But the prohibition of having firsthand experience of the nature of vice (i.e. what it is like to be vicious) does not preclude learning to perceive or recognize vice: after all, ignorance about the nature of something (e.g. water) does not impede someone from learning to recognize it.

This reply is confirmed in the discussion pertaining to the style of the stories to be told in Callipolis (*R.* 3 392 C 7–398 B 9). Three styles of narration are distinguished, namely simple narration, narration through imitation, and a mix of both (392 D 1–6; cf. 394 B 9–C 6) and the issue now under discussion concerns the style of narration to be allowed, with an eye to the question whether Callipolitan guardians ought to be imitators or not (394 D 1–E 2). The answer loosely recalls the general principle that one nature (or group) ought to be dedicated to one job (394 E 2–7) and concludes that Callipolitan guardians ought not to do or to imitate anything except being guardians (395 B 9–C 3):

T9	[...]. ἐὰν δὲ	395 C 3
	μιμῶνται, μιμεῖσθαι τὰ τούτοις προσήκοντα εὐθὺς ἐκ	
	παίδων, ἀνδρείους, σώφρονας, ὀσίους, ἐλευθέρους, καὶ τὰ	C 5
	τοιαῦτα πάντα, τὰ δὲ ἀνελεύθερα μήτε ποιεῖν μήτε δεινοῦς	
	εἶναι μιμήσασθαι, μηδὲ ἄλλο μηδὲν τῶν αἰσχρῶν, ἵνα μὴ ἐκ	
	τῆς μιμήσεως τοῦ εἶναι ἀπολαύσωσιν. ἢ οὐκ ἤσθησαι ὅτι αἱ	
	μιμήσεις, ἐὰν ἐκ νέων πόρρω διατελέσωσιν, εἰς ἔθνη τε καὶ	D 1
	φύσιν καθίστανται καὶ κατὰ σῶμα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ κατὰ τὴν	
	διάνοιαν;	
	Καὶ μάλα, ἦ δ' ὅς.	D 4

But if they do imitate, they must imitate what is appropriate for them right from childhood, the courageous, temperate, pious, free, plus all things of that sort and they must not be clever at doing or imitating the slavish or the base, lest they ‘benefit’ from the imitation for the real thing. Or haven’t you noticed that imitations —if continued past youth— get settled in the habits and nature of body, voice, and mind?

I have indeed —he said. (*Pl. R.* 3 395 C 3–D 4)

Passage T9 clarifies the conclusion that guardians are not to do or to imitate anything except being guardians: Socrates probably expects some imitation to be inevitable (cf. *R.* 6 500 C 6–8). Socrates then issues a caveat about doing or imitating vice.

There is a warning against being good at doing or imitating vice because the adept are at risk of ‘benefiting’ from it, (‘benefiting’) in the sense that being good at doing or imitating vice will probably be pleasing (cf. ‘ἀπολαύειν [to enjoy]’ in *R.* 10 606 B 5–C 1). Socrates here expresses a concern about deriving pleasure from partaking of or imitating vice over time and then being hooked, that is becoming vicious. It is noteworthy that Socrates’ warning does not express the view that just any awareness of vice amounts to becoming vicious and immediately after passage T9 Socrates lists certain proscribed behaviors, and concludes — clearly: ‘for, although they must know about mad and vicious men and women, they must neither do nor imitate anything they do [γνωστέον μὲν γὰρ καὶ μαινομένους καὶ πονηροὺς ἄνδρας τε καὶ γυναῖκας, ποιητέον δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων οὐδὲ μιμητέον]’ (*R.* 3 396 A 4–6). Socrates here explicitly requires that future guardians learn about vice —if they must know about the vicious— and so they must have some cognitive access to vice. Consequently, Callipolitan early education as outlined in *Republic* 2–3 does not preclude developing an ethical discriminatory faculty in adults.

There is another reason to reject the view that an ethical discriminatory faculty cannot be an achievement of the early education outlined in *Republic* 2–3. The reason is an unattractive consequence of severing an account of musical training from its context. Consider the sequel to passage T6:

- T10 Ὡσπερ ἄρα, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, γραμμάτων πέρι τότε ικανῶς 402 A 7
εἶχομεν, ὅτε τὰ στοιχεῖα μὴ λανθάνοι ἡμᾶς ὀλίγα ὄντα ἐν
ἅπασιν οἷς ἐστὶν περιφερόμενα, καὶ οὐτ’ ἐν μικρῷ οὐτ’ ἐν
μεγάλῳ ἠτιμάζομεν αὐτά, ὡς οὐ δεοὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀλλὰ B 1
πανταχοῦ προθυμούμεθα διαγιγνώσκειν, ὡς οὐ πρότερον
ἐσόμενοι γραμματικοὶ πρὶν οὕτως ἔχομεν.
Ἀληθῆ.
Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰκόνας γραμμάτων, εἴ που ἢ ἐν ὕδασι ἢ ἐν B 5
κατόπτροις ἐμφαίνοντο, οὐ πρότερον γνωσόμεθα, πρὶν ἂν
αὐτὰ γνῶμεν, ἀλλ’ ἐστὶν τῆς αὐτῆς τέχνης τε καὶ μελέτης;
Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
Ἄρ’ οὖν, ὃ λέγω, πρὸς θεῶν, οὕτως οὐδὲ μουσικοὶ

πρότερον ἐσόμεθα, οὔτε αὐτοὶ οὔτε οὓς φαμεν ἡμῖν παιδευ- C 1
 τέον εἶναι τοὺς φύλακας, πρὶν ἂν τὰ τῆς σωφροσύνης εἶδη
 καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας καὶ
 ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφὰ καὶ τὰ τούτων αὖ ἐναντία πανταχοῦ
 περιφερόμενα γνωρίζωμεν, καὶ ἐνόητα ἐν οἷς ἔνεστιν αἰσθα- C5
 νόμεθα, καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ εἰκόνας αὐτῶν, καὶ μήτε ἐν μικροῖς
 μήτε ἐν μέγалоις ἀτιμάζωμεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς οἰώμεθα
 τέχνης εἶναι καὶ μελέτης;
 Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. 402 C 9

Then —I said— it is just as when we adequately understood our letters, when the letters —the few there are— did not escape our notice in all things in which they tumble about and neither in small nor in large things we lightly esteemed them as if there be no need to perceive them; but everywhere we were eager to distinguish them, since we would not yet be competent about letters until we understood them in this way.

True.

Is it not the case for images of letters too —if somehow either in bodies of water or in mirrors they were to be reflected— that we shall not yet know [*sc.* images of letters], until we knew them [*sc.* the letters], since it [*sc.* knowing images of letters] belongs to the same craft and discipline?

Absolutely.

Then —by the gods— am I right in saying that in this way and not before we shall be musically trained, whether ourselves or those we say that one must educate to be our guardians, until we know the forms of temperance, courage, liberality, magnificence, and those akin to them and moreover their opposites which are tumbling about everywhere, and we perceive their presence in the things in which they are, both them and their images, and we do not dismiss them either in small or in large things, but we think them to belong to the same craft and discipline?

It is very necessary —he said. (Pl. *R.* 3 402 A 7–C 9)

Passage T10 construes being musically trained as a skill that amounts to knowing the forms of ethical excellences and their opposites, which is explicated —taking the ‘καί [and]’ at 402 C 5 epexegetically— in perceptual terms.

On the view that an ethical discriminatory faculty cannot be an achievement of the early education outlined in *Republic* 2–3, passage T10 is taken to be forward-looking and pertaining to the later philosophical training of Callipolitan rulers; put another way, Socrates describes fully educated philosophers in passage T10.¹⁷ This forward-looking interpretation is allegedly supported by the analogy —note ‘ὡςπερ [just as]’ (402 A 7)— between being competent about letters and being musically trained:¹⁸ in Plato, the term ‘γραμματικός [competent about letters]’ always refers to someone who enjoys ‘a state of full literacy’, thus —analogously— the term ‘μουσικός [musically trained]’ refers to someone who enjoys ‘a similarly perfected epistemological state’.¹⁹ This forward-looking interpretation may appear to be bolstered by the introduction of ‘images of letters [εἰκόνας γραμμάτων]’ (402 B 5) insofar as the notion is taken to introduce an ontological or an epistemological distinction between images of letters and the letters themselves that anticipates the corresponding

¹⁷ Thaler (2015) 422 n. 15 writes: ‘Although the immediate context of this passage [*sc.* T10] is the discussion of the childhood education of the guardians, prior to the separation of the elite philosophical class and the introduction of their unique curriculum, it is clear that the analogy with grammatical expertise is forward-looking and refers to the later philosophical stage of civic education.’ Cf. also Thaler (2015) 423. Lee (1955/2007) tentatively treats T10 as forward-looking:

¹⁸ Plato often introduces a discussion on letters and syllables with different purposes in mind —e.g.: to expound logical or semantic views (Ryle (1960) and Gallop (1963)); to expound epistemological views, e.g. by using the model to illustrate the nature of knowledge (Gallop (1963) 369–371 on the use of the model in the *Theaetetus*); to illustrate a specific procedure and purpose, e.g. to cast light on or clarify the nature of examples or models (Gallop (1963) 367 and Ryle (1960) 440 on *Statesman* 277 C–278 D and 285 C–D; cf. Rosen (1995) 81, 84); to discuss classification as in the *Philebus* (Gallop (1963) 367–368); to discuss the elements of intelligibility as in the *Sophist* (Rosen (1995) 88). In other words —in a number of dialogues— Plato introduces the model of letters and syllables to serve some other purpose with one exception being the *Cratylus* as letters there are investigated in their own right (Gallop (1963) 368–369).

¹⁹ Thaler (2015) 422 n. 15 cites Pl. *Phlb.* 17 B and Pl. *Tht.* 198 E and 207 A–B as evidence for the sense of ‘γραμματικός’.

distinctions in *Republic* 5–7.²⁰ In other words, the ‘forms’ in T10 are Platonic Forms²¹ and being musically trained is a skill that amounts to knowing or perceiving both intelligible Platonic Forms and their images.

There are a number of objections to a forward-looking interpretation of T10 —more below. The view preferred here is that the forms of temperance, courage, etc. can by all means be Platonic Forms,²² but this need not make passage T10 forward-looking insofar as we understand the forms of temperance, courage, etc. to be simply Platonic Forms instantiated in the perceptible world. Note that Socrates is speaking about the forms of temperance, courage, etc. ‘which are tumbling about everywhere [πανταχοῦ περιφερόμενα]’ (402 C 4–5; cf. *R.* 5 476 A 1–9 —note ‘everywhere [πανταχοῦ]’ at 476 A 8). These are arguably ethical forms in the perceptible world: first, a palatable reading of the analogy introduced by T10 makes this account of musical training parallel to T6, where the musical trainees are engaged with their immediate physical environment (cf. *R.* 3 401 C 3–7); second, a plausible reading of ‘and [καί]’ as exegetic in the phrase ‘and we perceive their presence in the things in which they are [καὶ ἐνόντα ἐν οἷς ἔνεστιν αἰσθανώμεθα]’ (402 C 5–6) glosses the knowledge in question in perceptual terms. In other words, the forms in question are tumbling about in the perceptible world. By ‘Platonic Forms that are instantiated in the perceptible world’ is meant genuine instances or cases of the Forms in question, e.g. the Platonic Form of Temperance in the perceptible world just is a genuine case of temperance as opposed to some spurious case or an image of temperance —more below. If

²⁰ Jowett and Campbell (1894) III 138 understand there to be an ontological distinction: ‘Plato remembers that the highest forms of virtue to be found in human life are but shadows of the ideas, reflected on a fleeting stream.’ Bosanquet (1925) 107 understands there to be an epistemological distinction: “‘The images of letters’ or their reflections; this points forward to the classification of grades of knowledge at the end of Book VI., the allegory of the cave at the beginning of Book VII. and the argument of Book X.’ Adam (1902) I 167–168 disagrees with Bosanquet and —in general— with taking ‘images of letters’ as making T10 forward-looking.

²¹ Shorey (1937) 260 n. *a*.

²² *Pace* Adam (1902) I 168, Ferrari (1989) 121, Burnyeat (1999) 283 n. 51, Herrmann (2007) 209–211. Jowett and Campbell (1894) II 297 take the sense of ‘εἶδος’ here simply to be ‘an ethical notion regarded as an object of thought’. Objections to the view identifying the forms of temperance, courage, etc. with Platonic Forms are addressed from the main text to the forthcoming n. 30.

this is correct, then being musically trained amounts to knowing or perceiving instances of genuine excellences and vices as opposed to grasping only spurious instances (cf. *R.* 7 536 A 2–8). Being musically trained amounts to having a sound ethical discriminatory faculty.²³

There are two general objections to a forward-looking interpretation of T10, namely that it is not contextually sensitive and that it is committed to a conception of musical training explicitly rejected by later remarks. Why should the analogy be forward-looking rather than embedded in its context? The obvious context to T10 is a discussion beginning in *Republic* 2 (376 C 8) on the early education of future Callipolitan guardians. A forward-looking analogy would break off from this context in an unsettling manner after slightly over 20 Stephanus pages —abruptly— without any hint or warning. It is more palatable that the analogy follows from its immediate context, namely passage T6 (401 D 4–402 A 6), in which it is clear that mature fully-educated philosophers are not in question: those being musically trained are ‘young [νέος]’ (402 A 6). An audience of young musical trainees fits better with the analogy since —historically— those who studied to be competent about letters (γραμματικοί) were children.²⁴ Even Socrates’ opening allusion in T10 is indicative of an audience of young musical trainees: the shared experience at an earlier time is presumably their own childhood. It is noteworthy —moreover— that a forward-looking reading commits Socrates to construing musical training as endowing a skill to perceive both transcendent Forms and their images (i.e. instances). This construal —however— does not fit well with later remarks on musical training in *Republic* 7: this construal would seem to make of musical training one of the subjects able to lead the soul from becoming to being since the musically trained would be able to distinguish between transcendent Forms and their instances, between being and becoming; but musical training is explicitly excluded from these subjects capable of leading the soul from becoming to being at *Republic* 7 521 C 1–522 B B 6 (specifically T43).

²³ Bosanquet (1925) 108 writes: ‘We are to learn to read the world truly, and not as ill-trained minds do, all upside down, mistaking insolence for courage, or prodigality for liberality. The training in right feelings and right perception, through all forms of expressive art and disciplined life under due guidance, is to bring the young people up to a point at which they will readily recognise genuine goodness in the actual world.’ Cf. Ferrari (1989) 120–21.

²⁴ Cf. Adam (1902) I 167 *ad loc.*; Harvey (1966) 631–33; Pl. *Prt.* 325 C 5–326 A 4; Pl. *Tht.* 206 A 1–3 with 207 D 8–9 —Theaetetus is probably in late adolescence (cf. Nails (2002) 275); Pl. *Plt.* 277 E 2–C2 with 285 C 8–D 4; Pl. *Lg.* 7 809 E 2–810 B 4.

It is questionable —moreover— that the introduction of ‘images of letters [εἰκόνας γραμμμάτων]’ (402 B 5) bolsters a forward-looking interpretation of T10: it is doubtful that the notion introduces either an epistemological or an ontological distinction between images of letters and letters themselves. It is questionable that the notion introduces an epistemological distinction simply because both letters and their images can be known —note ‘γνωσόμεθα [we shall know]’ (402 B 6) for images of letters and ‘γνώμεν [we knew]’ (402 B 7) for letters. It is not the case —for instance— that there is knowledge of letters whereas there is judgement of images of letters. (Cf. an epistemological distinction of this sort at *Republic* 5 476 A 1–480 A 13.) In other words, it is not the case that there are different epistemic achievements with respect to letters and their images. The same observation holds in the controversial line ‘both them and their images [καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ εἰκόνας αὐτῶν]’ (402 C 6): the objects in question are to be perceived —note ‘αἰσθανώμεθα [we perceive]’ (402 C 5–6). (The meaning of this controversial line is elucidated in the next paragraph.) It is not the case that different epistemic achievements are here introduced in the ethical domain.

It is questionable also that the notion of images of letters introduces an ontological distinction: the picture at 402 B 5–8 evokes an exceptionally difficult situation to discern letters²⁵ —please try reading a text off a mirror— and Plato has very good reason to stress the difficulty of discerning ethical forms. The idea is that Plato’s concern here is the difficulty to distinguish instances of genuine excellences from vices merely appearing as excellences, a concern Plato sharply brings into focus by referring to vices as images of excellences. The phrase ‘both them and their images [καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ εἰκόνας αὐτῶν]’ (402 C 6) need not refer to the forms of excellences and their opposites (i.e. vices) and —in addition— to their images (i.e. images of excellences and vices).²⁶ There is an alternative to take the phrase ‘both them and their images [καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ εἰκόνας αὐτῶν]’ (402 C 6) in apposition to ‘the forms of temperance [...] and moreover their opposites [τὰ τῆς σωφροσύνης εἶδη [...] καὶ τὰ τούτων αὐτῶν ἐναντία]’ (402 C 2–4), in which case ‘them [αὐτὰ]’ —in the phrase ‘both them and their images [καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ εἰκόνας αὐτῶν]’ (402 C 6)— refers to the forms of temperance,

²⁵ I thank Paolo Crivelli for this suggestion.

²⁶ It is —as far as I know— universally thought that the ‘images [εἰκόνας]’ (402 C 6) in question are artistic representations of ethical forms. This thought is addressed in the main text to the forthcoming n. 30.

courage, etc. and ‘their images [εἰκόνας αὐτῶν]’ refers to the opposites of the forms of temperance, courage, etc., namely to the forms of intemperance, cowardice, etc. —basically, to vices. This alternative understands the ‘images [εἰκόνας]’ (402 C 6) in question to be images of excellences and this alternative attributes to T10 a construal of vices as images of excellences.

Plato has very good reason to stress the difficulty of discerning ethical forms and —already in *Republic* 1— Plato is arguably trying out a view of vice as an image of excellence although the phrase ‘image of excellence [εἶδωλον ἀρετῆς]’ appears only in *Republic* 10 at 600 E 5 (cf. *R.* 10 599 D 3–4).²⁷ *Republic* 1 and 2 show a pressing concern about the ease with which excellences and vices are confused. There are two ways to confuse excellences and vices. There can be —call it— ‘partial’ confusion as excellences and vices are mixed together, e.g. having a conception of justice that conceals a vice such as harming others (cf. *R.* 1 331 D 2–336 A 10, esp. 332 D 4–9, 334 A 10–B 9, 335 B 2–5, 335 E 2–7).²⁸ There can be —call it— ‘complete’ confusion as excellences and vices are exchanged, e.g. construing justice as a vice and injustice as an excellence (cf. *R.* 1 348 B 8–349 A 4, *R.* 2 367 A 6–B 1, T30). The confusion of excellences and vices —whether partial or complete— is no trifling matter: being confused about excellences and vices amounts to being at a loss about how to live well (cf. *R.* 1 354 B 9–C 3, *R.* 10 618 B 7–619 B 1); confusing excellences and vices facilitates deception, e.g. praising injustice privately while praising justice publicly, plus having the vicious appear excellent (cf. *R.* 2 360 C 6–D 7, 361 A 5–B 3, 365 A 4–C 6, 366 B 5); and not being able to discern vices may lead to living intimately with the worst things possible (cf. *R.* 2 366 E 7–367 A 5). Being able to distinguish excellences and vices —then— is of pressing concern (cf. *R.* 1 336 E 2–337 A 2, 344 D 5–E 7, 347 E 2–4, 348 E 1–349 A 4, 352 D 2–7, *R.* 2 368 B 7–C 4, *R.* 10 618 B 7–619 B 1).

This focus suggests that Plato —already in *Republic* 1 and 2— is trying out a view of vice as an image of excellence. For, *Republic* 1–2 show that vices can very well appear as excellences to many of us. These are —in other words— false or spurious excellences

²⁷ Cf. Pl. *Smp.* 212 A 4. These are —as far as I know— the only two uses of the phrase first attested in the Platonic corpus.

²⁸ Cf. Pl. *Men.* 71 E 1–5.

distinct from genuine excellences (cf. *R.* 7 536 A 2–8).²⁹ It may be tempting to reject the idea that the word ‘images [εἰκόνας]’ (402 C 6) is being used to refer to vices: after all, the Greek word for ‘image’ with connotations of falsehood is ‘εἶδωλον [image]’ and if Plato had in mind vices as images of excellences in T10, then the text at *Republic* 3 402 C 6 would have read ‘εἶδωλα [images]’ rather than ‘εἰκόνας [images]’. This objection is not convincing: it would work only if Plato uses ‘εἶδωλον’ for the sake of vice as ‘image’ of excellence, as an apparent excellence, but this is not the case. There are two other ways to characterize vices as apparent excellences: Plato uses also the word ‘spurious [νόθος]’ for apparent excellences (*R.* 7 536 A 2–8; cf. a use of ‘νόθος [nothos]’ to distinguish genuine and spurious pleasures at *Republic* 9 587 B 15–16); and Plato uses also the word ‘shadow [σκιά]’ in connection with an excellence term —‘shadow of justice’— to pick out an apparent excellence (*R.* 7 517 D 4–E 2). It is noteworthy that ‘shadow’ language is used in this way already in *Republic* 2 (365 C 1–6), namely in the idea of creating a ‘shadow-painting of excellence [σκιαγραφίαν ἀρετῆς]’ (365 C 4), that is an appearance or illusion of excellence. It is clear —then— that the notion of vice as an image of excellence encapsulates a concern present throughout the whole of the *Republic* (cf. *R.* 10 608 B 4–C 1 with 619 B 3–619 B 1).

There is a pressing concern in *Republic* 1–2 about the ease and danger of confusing excellences and vices, alternatively about the difficulty of distinguishing apparent or false excellences from genuine excellences. This —I find— is deftly evoked by referring to vices as ‘images’ of excellences: the notion of an image indicates resemblance and the danger of vices resembling —of passing off for— excellences is bluntly exposed by their being characterized as images of excellences. It is thus preferable to read T10 as embedded in this context making it clear that musical training is concerned with acquiring a sound ethical discriminatory faculty capable of distinguishing apparent or false instances of excellences from genuine excellences. (If the lesson that images of letters can be known only if the letters themselves are known is applied to the ethical domain, then Plato’s implicit point would be that knowledge of genuine excellences is necessary in order to discern images of excellences.) The interpretation preferred here attributes to Plato a construal of musical training as imparting a skill to know or perceive instances of genuine excellences and vices

²⁹ Cf. Plu. *Agis* Ch 1 §§1–3 at §2 lines 1–2.

without any commitment to introducing forward-looking epistemological or ontological distinctions.

The interpretation preferred here also urges readers to appreciate T10 in a wider context —already from *Republic* 1. Readers may object that the immediate context naturally suggests that the ‘images [εἰκόνας]’ (402 C 6) in question are artistic representations of ethical forms. This would be otiose or simply unnecessary: a plausible interpretation —as we have seen— views musical training as not being concerned with knowing or perceiving both intelligible Platonic Forms and their perceptible instances; musical training is concerned with knowing or perceiving perceptible instances of genuine excellences and vices; is it not the case —then— that this construal of musical training already covers knowing or perceiving artistic representations of ethical forms? (For, artistic representations of ethical forms are among the perceptible instances of genuine excellences and vice.) If readers are not convinced that the ‘images [εἰκόνας]’ (402 C 6) in question are images of excellences (i.e. vices) and they insist on them being artistic representations, then readers may raise another objection to identifying the forms in T10 with Platonic Forms. These readers may object that having artistic representations of Platonic Forms is committed to there being poets who directly imitate Forms, but this commitment is inconsistent with *Republic* 10 595 C 8–598 D 7³⁰ as the latter passage denies that poets insofar as imitators enjoy direct access to Forms.

There are two problems with this objection. First, it suffers from a false assumption that producing an image of something involves directly imitating that something: after all, I could paint a portrait of you based on a photograph of you and I would still count as producing an image of you, yet without directly imitating you. The second problem is that the objection succeeds only if ‘αὐτά [them]’ (402 C 6) refers to the forms themselves *simpliciter*, that is to ‘τὰ τῆς σωφροσύνης εἶδη [...] καὶ τὰ τούτων ἄν ἐναντία [the forms of temperance [...] and their opposites]’ (402 C 2–4) —full stop. The objection would succeed only if these forms were identical to Platonic Forms since ‘images of them [εἰκόνας αὐτῶν]’ (402 C 6) would indeed be images of Platonic Forms produced by poets and others. However, this narrow reference of ‘αὐτά [them]’ (402 C 6) is not required since Socrates is speaking about the forms of temperance, courage, etc. ‘which are tumbling about everywhere [πανταχοῦ

³⁰ Thus —e.g.: Adam (1902) I 168, Ferrari (1989) 121. Shorey (1937) I 260 expresses no reservation on this matter.

περιφερόμενα]’ (402 C 4–5), that is in the perceptible world as confirmed by the ensuing phrase ‘καὶ ἐνόητα ἐν οἷς ἔνεστιν αἰσθανώμεθα [and we perceive their presence in the things in which they are]’ (402 C 5–6). In other words, readers who insist on the ‘images [εἰκόνας]’ (402 C 6) being artistic representations need not object against identifying the forms in T10 with Platonic Forms. For, T10 acknowledges only access to perceptible forms of temperance, courage, etc. in which case there is no inconsistency with *Republic* 10 since artists would not be required to have direct cognitive access to Platonic Forms.

There are two advantages to the interpretation preferred here that the forms in T10 just are Platonic Forms instantiated in the perceptible world. The first is that the interpretation respects a principle of ontological economy by not incorporating other entities in order to explain the reference of ‘the forms of temperance [τὰ τῆς σωφροσύνης εἶδη]’ etc. There is — for instance— no need to view the forms in T10 as immanent:³¹ although they are described as being in certain things, only a strong locative reading of ‘in’ will support the view that these forms are immanent;³² but the text does not demand a strong locative reading: after all, there is a way of speaking about —say— courage in the soul by which we mean no more than that the soul is courageous or that the soul instantiates the excellence of courage; we are not hereby saying that courage is immanent in the soul.

The second advantage is that the interpretation respects also reading T10 in isolation from *Republic* Books 5–7. Commentators have rightly urged to read T10 in isolation from these books: after all, the doctrine of Platonic Forms is missing from *Republic* Books 1–4 and the study of Forms is explicitly reserved for the higher studies outlined in *Republic* 7, studies which are in sharp contrast to musical training.³³ The first point makes sound exegetical sense and the interpretation preferred here respects it: passage T10 is still read in isolation from *Republic* 5–7 insofar as the ontological and epistemological ideas pertaining to the theory of Platonic Forms are not being required to understand the account of musical training. In other words, identifying the forms in T10 with Platonic Forms does not require incorporating or relying on the doctrine to understand the account of musical training.

³¹ Pace Adam (1902) I 168.

³² I thank Paolo Crivelli for this point.

³³ Thus Adam (1902) I 168 who invites reading *Republic* 4 435 C 9–D 6 and *Republic* 6 504 B 1–8 with respect to the last point. Cf. *Republic* 7 521 C 1–522 B 2, e.g. T43.

The interpretation preferred here also does not require the study of Forms. Although musical training amounts to knowing Platonic Forms instantiated in the perceptible world, it is not necessary that ‘to know [γνωρίζειν]’ (402 C 5) means to know in a philosophical sense, to have the kind of knowledge that results from dialectical study along with its concomitant ontological doctrines. First, there is a sense of ‘to know [γνωρίζειν]’ that does not involve ontological doctrines such as the sense of (correctly) recognizing or identifying something; just as we can be said to know certain persons, in the sense of recognizing them, without making any ontological commitments about persons, so too it could be said that the musically trained know the Forms wherever they may be, in the sense of identifying them, without making any ontological commitments about Platonic Forms. Second, there are five instances of ‘γνωρίζειν [to know]’ in the *Republic*: Book 3 402 A 4, 402 C 5; Book 4 428 A 5,³⁴ 428 A 6; Book 7 525 D 2. The context to *Republic* 4 428 A 5 and 428 A 6, namely 427 E 6–428 A 11, hardly suggests that ‘γνωρίζειν [to know]’ means to have philosophical knowledge: its use here suggests the perceptual state of recognizing or picking out something, in particular by looking around for it with the mind. This seems to be the sense of the verbs expressing knowledge or a comparable cognitive achievement in T10, namely ‘to distinguish [διαγιγνώσκειν]’ (402 B 2) and ‘we shall know [γνωσόμεθα]’ (402 B 6; cf. 402 B 7). The letters-part of the analogy thus does not suggest a philosophical knowledge of letters, but rather a perceptual skill. If being competent about letters and being musically trained are analogous in this respect, then musical training does not involve knowledge in a philosophical sense.

1.4 Conclusion

Chapter 1 has clarified that two distinct soul-parts, namely the spirited and the philosophical or rational, are benefited by musical and physical training. The inclusion of the rational part as a beneficiary of early ethical education has been defended partly by noting an apparent identification between the philosophical and the rational elements. (This defense will be completed in Chapter 5 §4 according to which early ethical education’s achievement of acquiring laws and law-inculcated judgements in the finest way possible involves the rational

³⁴ Cf. ‘ιδεῖν’ at *Republic* 4 429 A 9 which here means ‘to search and see’ or ‘to pick out’.

part.) Chapter 1 has focused mainly on defending one benefit of early ethical education, namely that well-trained youths will be furnished with a sound or accurate ethical discriminatory faculty, in the sense that they will know or perceive —recognize— instances of genuine excellences and vices. Two other benefits have been acknowledged, namely the acquisition of excellences such as courage, temperance, justice, etc. and the acquisition of laws and law-inculcated judgements.

It is worth emphasizing that talk of perceiving instances of genuine excellences and vices need not be understood as perceiving by the senses. For, the term rendered by ‘perception [αἴσθησις]’ need not mean sense-perception in Plato.³⁵ Socrates speaks of the rational element’s ‘perceiving [αἰσθάνεσθαι]’ (*R.* 9 572 A 2) that which it does not know and he does not explicitly limit the perception to something sensible: for all we know, it could be the perception of something intelligible.³⁶ The point of this quick observation is that the notion of perception (αἴσθησις) in T10 does not commit Plato to construing musical training as operating at the level of mere sense-perception and so uses of the verb ‘αἰσθάνομαι [I perceive]’ (402 B 1, 402 C 5) in T10 do not require that the cognitive achievements of musical training be non-rational, in the sense that they are to be accounted for by a non-rational element of the soul.

Chapter 2 turns to the question of which soul-part primarily benefits from musical and physical training, in the sense that it is prepared to acquire or absorb the laws and true judgements of musical training. Chapter 2 presents —and casts doubts on— the standard view that the soul’s spirited element is the primary target. In other words —according to the standard view— a non-rational soul-part is prepared to acquire or absorb Callipolitan laws and true judgements from early ethical education.

³⁵ Cf. Frede (1987b) 3: ‘its ordinary use [*sc.* of the verb ‘*aisthanesthai*’] is quite general. It can be used in any case in which one perceives something by the senses and even more generally in any case in which one becomes aware of something, notices something, realizes or even comes to understand something, however this may come about.’

³⁶ There is also Plato’s use of the language of seeing (e.g. ‘βλέπω’) in the context of intelligible items —for instance— at *Republic* 10 596 B 5 (cf. *R.* 7 529 B 4).

Chapter 2

Does spirit learn to get things right?

2.1 Introduction

Chapter 1 §2 singles out the rational and spirited elements as soul-parts educated by musical and physical training. Chapter 2 further develops this picture by presenting the standard view according to which the soul's spirited element is the proper or ultimate subject of Callipolitan laws, true judgements, and the soul's ethical discriminatory faculty.¹ In other words, the standard view holds spirit to be the so-called 'primary target' of musical training —for instance— that soul-part which internalizes the norms of society.² Chapter 2 §2 rehearses — and calls into question— two arguments deployed by the standard view. Chapter 2 §3 sees the standard view drive back doubts by appealing to the case of Leontius in *Republic* 4, but this too is called into question. Chapter 2 §4 raises one final compelling worry against the standard view, namely that it seems committed to partitioning the soul's spirited element.

2.2 Spirit's discriminatory faculty

The standard view deploys two arguments for the claim that spirit is the primary target of early ethical education, in the sense that it explains the acquisition of laws, law-inculcated judgements, etc. imparted throughout this education. The basic idea of the first argument — call it 'the argument from content'— is that the stories of musical training appeal to spirit by touching upon topics with which the spirited element is by nature concerned. The basic idea of the second argument —call it 'the argument from psychic development'— is that musical training begins at an early age during which the rational element is at best inchoate whereas

¹ See —e.g.: Gosling (1973) 44–45, 76–79, C. Gill (1985) 8–12, Cairns (1993) 383–388, Kamtekar (1998) Section 4, Hobbs (2000) 11–14, 227–230, Moss (2005) 163–169, Richardson Lear (2006) 116–117, Klosko (2006) Ch. 8, Pelosi (2010) 23, Destrée (2011) 268–273.

² The view that spirit internalizes social norms is explicitly held by —e.g.: Gosling (1973) 44–47, 49–50, Kamtekar (1998) 326, Hobbs (2000) 12, 29–31, 59–67, Moss (2005) 163–168, Saadi Liebert (2013) 182, 190–191, 192. Wilberding (2009) 362–365 speaks against this internalization view.

spirit is very much present and this imbalance favors spirit as the primary target. Both arguments will be developed in turn.

The argument from content reminds us that the education of Callipolis' future guardians is designed to develop the best ethical character. In the discussion on the appropriate content of the stories to be told (*R.* 2 377 C 5–*R.* 3 392 C 7), courage (*R.* 3 386 A 6–389 D 6) and temperance (*R.* 3 389 D 7–392 C 7) are principally discussed whereas other ethical traits such as piety and liberality are included in the discussion on the style of these stories (cf. *R.* 3 395 C 3–5). Note that courage, temperance, and liberality —and their opposites— are to be known or perceived by the musically trained (T10). (I am assuming that piety is among the ethical traits ‘akin [ἀδελφὰ]’ (402 C 4) to the explicitly mentioned excellences in T10 whereas impiety is among their opposites.) The immediately preceding passage articulated the importance of a most proper education in musical training (T6). One important consideration —according to the standard view— is illustrated by the young man who praises honorable things (τὰ καλὰ) and censures shameful things (τὰ αἰσχρά).³ Since T10 is a consequence of T6 —note ‘ἄρα [then]’ (402 A 7)— these two passages suggest that excellences such as temperance, courage, liberality, etc. are among the honorable things praised by the musically trained whereas their opposites are among the shameful things censured. Musical training thus acquaints the soul with the honorable and the shameful.⁴

³ The Greek adjective ‘καλός [*kalos*]’ has been rendered for the standard view by ‘honorable’ and its opposite ‘αἰσχρόν [*aischron*]’ by ‘shameful’. These terms could have a wider meaning —for instance— the nominalized forms ‘τὸ καλόν [*to kalon*]’ and ‘τὸ αἰσχρόν [*to aischron*]’ may be rendered respectively by ‘moral beauty’ or ‘virtue’ and ‘baseness’ or ‘vice’ (cf. LSJ *s.v.* ‘καλός’ III 2 and ‘αἰσχρός’ II 2). A tentative point against the standard view is that we should be wary of taking these terms to signify matters of interest exclusive to the spirited element: after all, why exclude the rational element from taking an interest in excellence and vice?

⁴ For instance, mutual hatred amongst citizens ought to be regarded as shameful (*R.* 2 378 C 1–2) as well as weeping and lamenting the loss of something valuable (*R.* 3 387 D 11–388 A 4 with 388 D 6–7 and *R.* 10 603 E 4–604 A 8).

Now —the standard view continues— the honorable and the shameful are special to the soul’s spirited element.⁵ (Remember that each soul-part has its own characteristic tasks and concerns (T2).) In *Republic* 9, Plato concludes a discussion sketching the four main kinds of degenerate constitutions and the persons like them (*R.* 8 544 C 1–*R.* 9 576 B 9), the purpose of which is to assess these alongside Callipolis and who is like it in order to answer the question ‘is justice better than injustice?’. The assessment unfolds through three arguments to show that the just are better off than the unjust. The second argument concludes that the just are better off than the unjust because the former’s life is more pleasant than the latter’s (*R.* 9 580 C 11–583 B 2). This argument is inspired by the fact that the embodied human soul has three elements and evidently three kinds of pleasure, one belonging to each soul-part (*R.* 9 580 C 11–D 8). With respect to the spirited element, Plato writes:

T11	Τί δέ; τὸ θυμοειδὲς οὐ πρὸς τὸ κρατεῖν μέντοι φαμὲν καὶ νικᾶν καὶ εὐδοκιμεῖν ἀεὶ ὅλον ὠρμηῆσθαι; Καὶ μάλα. Εἰ οὖν φιλόνικον αὐτὸ καὶ φιλότιμον προσαγορεύοιμεν, ἧ ἐμμελῶς ἂν ἔχοι; Ἐμμελέστατα μὲν οὖν.	581 A 9 B 1 B 5
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What about the spirited element? Don’t we say that it is wholly aimed always at mastery, victory, and high repute?

Certainly.

Then wouldn’t it be appropriate for us to call it ‘victory-loving’ and ‘honor-loving’?

It would be most appropriate. (*Pl. R.* 9 581 A 9–B 5)

Passage T11 identifies the aims and appropriate names of the spirited part (cf. *R.* 8 550 B 6, B 7, 586 C 7–D 3). These aims and names pick out the pleasure of honor as the single kind of pleasure belonging to the spirited part (*R.* 9 581 D 5–8 with 581 A 3–8 on singling out a kind

⁵ The view that spirit is concerned with the honorable and the shameful is held by —e.g.: Annas (1981) 126–128, Cairns (1993) 381–392, Kamtekar (1998), Moss (2005) 155, Lorenz (2006a) 151–152, Richardson Lear (2006) 117–118. Irwin (1977) 330 n. 28 takes the philosophical part ‘[to] be attached to what is admirable, 403c4–7’.

of pleasure; cf. *R.* 5 475 A 9–B 3). This discussion indicates that the honorable and —presumably— the shameful are special to the spirited element: for instance, the shameful ought to be at least avoided and arguably outright hated in the pursuit of honor. (Note the nod to passage T6.)

It is not implausible to suggest —then— that the soul’s acquaintance with the honorable and the shameful during musical training appeals especially to the soul’s spirited element. The standard view’s proposal is —first— that true judgements imparted throughout musical training focus on the honorable and the shameful and —second— that they are acquired by the spirited part given their pertaining to its characteristic concerns.⁶ (The basic assumption is that judgements about some concern (e.g. what is good for the soul) are acquired by the soul-part sharing that very same concern (e.g. the rational part).⁷)

The argument from content appears to be complemented by an implicit account of psychic development. (Here is the argument from psychic development.) The standard view appeals to Socrates’ final observations in passage T6: after all, these final observations have been universally understood to express the view that the musically trained will respond correctly to the honorable and the shameful while they are still young and unable to grasp the ‘reason [λόγον]’ (402 A 2) —presumably of their behavior— but that later they will be able to

⁶ Kamtekar (1998) 334–335 writes: ‘[musical and physical training] will impart to the spirited part of their [*sc.* the auxiliaries] souls such true beliefs (δόξαι) as are relevant to “political” virtue: true beliefs about what things are to be feared, and what things are noble or honorable (καλά).’ Moss (2005) 166 with n. 60 writes that musical training ‘directly targets judgements about the shameful and the *kalon*.’

⁷ One may even think that not all judgements are available to each soul-part depending on the terms in which they are expressed. Kamtekar (1998) 328 writes: ‘These examples of the spirit’s activity attribute a striking degree of complexity to its judgements: that reason is authoritative, that the appetites are to be overridden, that it would be base to do such-and-such an action, that it is not fitting for a person like myself to be so treated, that it is right to be punished for injustice. These judgements of worth are made in terms not available to the appetitive part—whereas judgements of preference would seem to be available to the spirited part, since it can choose greater honors over lesser.’ Kamtekar (1998) 328 n. 23 entertains the idea that ‘judgments of overall goodness are similarly unavailable to both lower parts of the soul’. This is at least doubtful: a certain reading of the soul’s degeneration into a democratic character suggests that the appetitive part can have so-called ‘judgements of worth’ as the appetitive part there seems to be the primary subject of judgements confusing excellences for vices and vices for excellences, e.g. calling shamelessness ‘courage’ (cf. T30 in Chapter 4 §3).

welcome the arrival ‘of reason [τοῦ λόγου]’ (402 A 3). This rendering allows these remarks to suggest that a young soul’s rational element is inchoate in such a way that it is not a promising candidate to account for correctly praising the honorable and correctly censuring the shameful. (Chapter 5 §4 offers an original —and plausible— alternative to passage T6.)

This suggestion appears to be supported by a passage in *Republic* 4, in the discussion to distinguish reason and spirit as soul-parts (441 A 5–C 3):

T12	Ἄλλ’ οὐ χαλεπὸν, ἔφη, φανῆναι· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς παιδίοις τοῦτό γ’ ἂν τις ἴδοι, ὅτι θυμοῦ μὲν εὐθὺς γενόμενα μεστὰ ἐστὶ, λογισμοῦ δ’ ἔνιοι μὲν ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν οὐδέποτε μεταλαμβά- νειν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ὀψέ ποτε. Ναὶ μὰ Δί’, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, καλῶς γε εἶπες.	441 A 7 B 1 B 2
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But it isn’t difficult —he said— to show [*sc.* spirit to be different from the rational element]. For, even in children one can see this, that they are full of spirit right from birth whereas some seem to me never to get a share of rational calculation —and the many quite late.

Yes by Zeus —I said— you have spoken well. (Pl. *R.* 4 441 A 7–B 2; cf. *R.* 7 534 D 3–7)⁸

Passage T12 makes an observation about the manifestations of spirit and rational calculation in children. Glaucon takes an obvious imbalance to show that the spirited and rational elements are different from one another.

This implicit account of psychic development appears to support the standard view that spirit acquires true judgements during musical training: first, remember that musical and physical training take place while the soul is young; second, passage T12 confirms that a young soul’s rational element is inchoate and so musical and physical training could be said to happen ‘before the advent of reason’⁹; third, passage T12 suggests that spirit is not

⁸ Cf. Pl. *Lg.* 672 B 8–C 7.

⁹ Kamtekar (1998) 334. Ganson (2009) 186 n. 21 writes: ‘reason is lacking in animals and young children.’

πεινῆν καὶ διὰ τὸ ῥιγοῦν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα πάσχειν,
 ὑπομένων καὶ νικᾷ καὶ οὐ λήγει τῶν γενναίων, πρὶν ἂν ἦ D 1
 διαπράξῃται ἢ τελευτήσῃ ἢ ὥσπερ κύων ὑπὸ νομέως ὑπὸ τοῦ
 λόγου τοῦ παρ' αὐτῷ ἀνακληθεὶς πραῦνθῆι;
 Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, ἔοικε τούτῳ ᾧ λέγεις. καίτοι γ' ἐν τῇ
 ἡμετέρῃ πόλει τοὺς ἐπικούρους ὥσπερ κύνας ἐθέμεθα ὑπη- D 5
 κούς τῶν ἀρχόντων ὥσπερ ποιμένων πόλεως. D 6

But what happens when someone regards himself to be suffering injustice? Does the spirit in him not boil and become violent and is an ally of what seems just to him? And suffering through hunger, cold, and all such things, does it stand firm and conquer and does not give up from what is noble until it finishes or dies or —just as a dog under a shepherd— it becomes gentle by being called to heel by the reason alongside it?

Spirit —he said— certainly seems to be as you say it is. And indeed we put the auxiliaries in our city to be like obedient dogs to the rulers who are like shepherds of a city. (Pl. *R.* 4 440 C 6–D 6)

Passage T13 describes spirit as unreflectively reacting to the thought of one's being treated unjustly. It describes spirit also as being obedient to reason. If musical training involves a passive unreflective reception of laws and judgements —presumably, of what is rational— and it is characteristic of spirit to obey reason, then it is tempting to explain the passive unreflective reception of laws and judgements in terms of the spirited part.

It is noteworthy —the standard view may add— that Glaucon tacitly connects the soul's spirited part and Callipolitan auxiliaries since it promises the following line of thought. Both the argument from content and the argument from psychic development are purportedly confirmed by appealing to the city-soul analogy in the discussion to identify courage in Callipolis (*R.* 4 429 A 8–430 C 7; cf. the context to T5). The city is (called) courageous because of the part that engages in battle on its behalf, in particular because of that part's power to preserve through everything —distress, pleasure, appetite, etc.— the judgements learned throughout education (429 B 1–D 3; cf. *R.* 4 433 C 7–8). Now T5 observes both that

the auxiliary class is the part because of which Callipolis is (called) courageous and that education in musical and physical training plays a role in their becoming courageous. Both the identification of courage in Callipolis by reference to the auxiliaries and their courage being the result of musical and physical training appear to confirm that the soul's spirited element acquires true judgements from musical training. For, passage T5 lays great stress on the auxiliaries' acquisition of these true judgements and it is tempting to explain the achievements of Callipolitan auxiliaries in terms of the corresponding soul part in the sense that what is true of auxiliaries is true of the soul's spirited element. This tempting explanation recalls that the task to identify the nature of justice begins with the genesis of a city partly due to assuming tentatively an isomorphic account of justice in an individual soul and in a city. This tentative assumption then loses all reservation after wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice are identified in Callipolis and it is expected both that the human soul has the same three forms as in the city and that it receives the same names (e.g. 'wise', 'courageous', etc.) because of the same conditions as in the city (*R.* 4 435 A 6–C 3). The discussion next moves to ascertain whether the soul does in fact have the same three forms as in the city and the answer is affirmative: their presence in the city is due to their presence in private individuals (*R.* 4 435 D 9–436 A 7) —for instance— a city's 'spiritedness [*τὸ θυμοειδές*]' (435 E 3) is due to no other than the spiritedness of its private individuals. This analogy thus invites explaining the achievements of Callipolitan auxiliaries in terms of the corresponding soul-part in the sense that what is true of the auxiliaries is true of the soul's spirited element. Consequently, since *auxiliaries* acquire true judgements throughout early ethical education, it is expected that *spirit* acquires true judgements in this education. (Some

commentators believe that musical and physical training produces honor-loving auxiliaries, that is auxiliaries ruled by their spirited part.¹²)

There are a number of initial doubts to place on the standard view. (I ease in with a general doubt, followed by doubts on the argument from content, the argument from psychic development, etc..) The standard view presupposes that the spirited element *learns* what is taught in early ethical education such as laws and law-inculcated judgements about the fearful and the not fearful. Passage T2 indeed presupposes that the spirited part can learn: ‘And these two [*sc.* the rational and spirited parts] having thus been nurtured and having truly learned and been educated in their roles’ (*R.* 4 442 A 4–5). But what kind of learning does Plato have in mind with respect to the spirited part? Plato consistently associates *learning* with the philosophical or rational element of the soul from as early as Book 2 (375 E 8–376 C 3; cf. *R.* 3 411 C 9–D 6)¹³ to as late as Book 9 both identifying it as the part ‘by which a man

¹² Cooper (1984) 14 (‘θυμός governs them [*sc.* the warriors in Callipolis]’), Irwin (1995) 234 (‘since the auxiliaries are guided primarily by the spirited part of the soul, which is also the honour loving part’), Kamtekar (1998) 316 (‘honor-lovers in the ideal city—the musically trained auxiliaries’, ‘the psychology of honor-lovers in terms of [...] the spirited part of the soul which dominates them’), Bobonich (2002) 501 n. 96 (‘But insofar as the auxiliaries really are guided primarily by the Spirited part of the soul and so are lovers of honor’). There are difficulties with this position. First, it is puzzling: if musical and physical training produces honor-lovers who are ruled by the spirited part, why do some of them go on to higher, philosophical studies? It is not obvious that honor-lovers would be motivated to pursue higher studies (cf. *R.* 9 581 D 5–8). The second difficulty is lexical. Both ‘φιλότιμος [honor-loving]’ and ‘φιλόνικος [victory-loving]’ are used to denote a person or soul ruled by the spirited part (respectively *R.* 8 550 B 5–7 and *R.* 9 581 C 4–6). It is noteworthy both that there are seven instances of ‘φιλόνικος’ in addition to fifteen of ‘φιλότιμος’ in the *Republic* and that not one of these is ever used explicitly in connection to a Callipolian auxiliary. (Cf. Wilberding (2009) 357: ‘The *philotimos* is indeed someone who desires all kinds of honor from all kinds of people, and to this extent this disposition is properly contrasted with that of loving only the honor bestowed by good and praiseworthy human beings. This hardly looks like a description of the auxiliary.’) Indeed, *Republic* 8 548 E 4–549 B 11 contends that honor-lovers are not adequately educated, i.e. they are not brought up like Callipolian auxiliaries (cf. *R.* 8 550 A 5–B 8). Furthermore, it is noteworthy that an honor-lover corresponds to an honor-loving constitution (*R.* 8 548 D 6, 549 B 9–10)—not to an auxiliary. Wilberding (2009) 354–356 argues that auxiliaries are not spirit-ruled honor-lovers: auxiliaries receive the early ethical education resulting in the soul’s being ruled by reason (T2; cf. *R.* 3 410 C 5–412 A 3) and this is confirmed in *Republic* 9 (T42 in Chapter 5 §4).

¹³ Cf. Chapter 1 §2 the text to n. 7 and n. 12 with its main text.

learns [ᾧ μανθάνει ἄνθρωπος]’ (580 D 9; cf. *R.* 9 581 B 6) and calling it ‘learning-loving [φιλομαθές]’ (*R.* 9 581 B 10); and Plato does not limit the philosophical or rational element’s learning to sophisticated intellectual truths as it can learn—for instance—to procure cigarettes (cf. *R.* 9 590 C 1–6; note ‘deliberating [βουλευόμενοι]’ (458 A 4) in *R.* 5 457 E 7–458 B 1, an activity associated with reason: *R.* 4 442 B 5–9, *R.* 10 604 C 5–D 6).

‘But what about the judgements pertaining to courage?’—the standard view may protest— ‘Don’t forget the concern to have *auxiliaries* acquire these judgements in the best way possible [T5] and that psychic courage is characterized as the *spirited part’s* preserving them through distress and pleasure [T3]. Surely it preserves judgements it alone has acquired!’ There is reason to doubt this reading of passage T3 given its immediate sequel (the account of psychic wisdom):

T14	Σοφὸν δέ γε ἐκείνῳ τῷ μικρῷ μέρει, τῷ ὃ ἤρχεν τ’ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ταῦτα παρήγγελλεν, ἔχον αὖ κάκεῖνο ἐπιστήμην ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐκάστῳ τε καὶ ὅλῳ τῷ κοινῷ σφῶν αὐτῶν τριῶν ὄντων. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.	442 C 4 C 5 C 8
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But ‘*wise*’ [we call him] because of that small part which rules in him and makes these announcements [*sc.* about the fearful and the not fearful (cf. T3)], which has within it that knowledge of what is advantageous both for each part and for the whole—the community of all three beings. (Pl. *R.* 4 442 C 4–8)¹⁴

Passage T14 characterizes the psychic virtue of wisdom as the rule of the rational part and the latter is explicitly identified as issuing the announcements pertaining to the excellence of courage. This presupposes that reason acquires those true judgements about the fearful and the not fearful. T14 also suggests that reason is the proper or ultimate subject of these true judgements insofar as it is characterized as the part that ‘makes these announcements [ταῦτα παρήγγελλεν]’ (442 C 5); it is not the part that accepts those judgements from some other

¹⁴ Cf. Pl. *Ti.* 70 E 5–71 A 3.

soul-part. In other words, it is not the case that the spirited part preserves judgements about the fearful and the not fearful it alone has acquired.

It may be objected that passage T14 does not support construing the rational part as the proper or ultimate subject of true judgements pertaining to courage. For, passage T14 concerns wise souls with ‘knowledge [ἐπιστήμη] of what is advantageous both for each part and for the whole’ (442 C 5–6) in which case passage T14 concerns philosophers who receive a higher education.¹⁵ In other words, passage T14 need mean only that reason issues true judgements pertaining to courage in the case of (wise) philosophers who have knowledge due to further studies past musical and physical training. This reading leaves open the possibility that another soul-part is the proper or ultimate subject of these true judgements in the case of courageous individuals who lack philosophical knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) such as the auxiliaries.¹⁶

This is tempting, but unconvincing: there is reason to doubt that ‘ἐπιστήμη [knowledge]’ here in *Republic* 4 denotes philosophical knowledge. In the discussion identifying wisdom in Callipolis (*R.* 4 428 B 1–429 A 7), Socrates and Glaucon recognize in the city many kinds of knowledge (428 B 10–11 —note ‘ἐπιστήμαι [the Greek plural nominative of ‘knowledge’]’ at 428 B 10) such as knowledgeable carpenters.¹⁷ But the city ought not to be called ‘wise’ because of them, rather it should be called ‘skilled in carpentry’ (428 B 12–C 1). It is noteworthy that their knowledge is characterized as deliberating about how wooden objects can be best (428 C 2–3) whereas the knowledge that accounts for the city’s being called ‘wise’ —namely guardianship— deliberates about the whole city, about its best relations both internal and external (428 C 11–D 7; cf. the

¹⁵ Cooper (1977) 152 takes *Republic* 5–7 ‘to work out a theory of what this knowledge [sc. in T14] consists of’; see also Bobonich (2002) 43 with n. 46. Wilberding (2009) 360 accepts that the psychological definitions of courage, temperance, and justice apply to the auxiliaries whereas the definition of wisdom does not.

¹⁶ The objection may observe also that the cognitive state resulting from musical training cannot be or pass for knowledge (ἐπιστήμη): later in *Republic* 7 (521 D 4–522 B 2, in particular T43), musical training is said to fall short of conveying or imparting knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). A plausible reply is that the term ‘ἐπιστήμη [knowledge]’ acquires a more specific sense in the middle books of the *Republic*, namely as a term reserved for the cognitive grasp of Platonic Forms.

¹⁷ Cf. *Pl. Tht.* 146 C 7–D 3.

discussion on craft knowledge in *R.* 1 341 C 5–342 E 11). These remarks not only presuppose that carpenters have knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*), but also they suggest that carpenters can be called ‘wise’ about wooden objects: after all, guardians are presumably to be called ‘wise’ in virtue of their knowledge, yet guardianship and carpentry do not seem to differ in type (of knowledge), but only in the object over which they are set (cf. *R.* 4 438 C 6–D 8). In other words, being called ‘wise’ does not require having philosophical knowledge and passage T14 is probably not concerned with philosophers: after all, it is contextually related to passage T2 which begins with: ‘And —just as we were saying— is it not a mixture of musical training and physical training that will make them [*sc.* the rational and spirited parts] harmonious [...]’. Consequently, T14 probably speaks of wisdom in the context of musical and physical training. If the above is correct, then passage T14 casts doubt on the standard view’s interpretation of T3: T14 suggests that the rational part —not spirit— is the proper or ultimate subject of true judgements about the fearful and the not fearful. (Chapter 2 §4 returns to spirit’s role in judgement-preservation and confirms this suggestion.)

The initial doubt-inspiring observation —namely that we *learn* because of our rational part— casts a shadow too upon the argument from psychic development. Passage T12 denies only that children are *full* of rational calculation right from birth and to that extent —admittedly— the rational part is inchoate. But this cannot be taken to deny that the rational part can benefit from musical training. For, the lack of being full of rational calculation right from birth does not deter Socrates from later proposing that young students in early ethical education should receive simultaneously a mathematical education (*R.* 7 536 D 4–537 C 5).¹⁸ Socrates proposes that young students take up a paradigmatically rational education despite their not being full of rational calculation right from birth. It is noteworthy that no commentator who endorses the standard view —as far as I know— assumes that early ethical education requires rational calculation. Why should its not being fully present from birth matter? If not being full of rational calculation right from birth is compatible with receiving a mathematical education, why disqualify the rational element from an education that —according to the standard view— does not even require rational calculation?

¹⁸ Cf. Jenkins (2015). A longer discussion on passage T12 can be found in Chapter 5 §4, the main text after n. 24.

Suppose —for the sake of argument— that the standard view is correct. Passage T2 claims that a correct mixture of musical and physical training will make the rational and spirited elements harmonious, in particular they will have ‘truly learned their own roles [ὡς ἀληθῶς τὰ αὐτῶν μαθόντε]’ (442 A 4–5), i.e. they will be adept at their own affairs. Since early ethical education makes the rational part adept at its own affairs and this includes being the soul’s leader —for instance, caring for the soul as a whole and for each element (*R.* 4 442 B 5–9; cf. T14)— it follows that early ethical education brings about a rational part that has truly learned at least to care for the soul as a whole and for each element. This achievement seems to be obscure on the standard view: how on earth does the rational part become adept at its own roles? If the rulership of the rational part is a mysterious achievement on the standard view, then equally mysterious should be the spirited part’s becoming adept at its role of being an ally of the rational part (cf. 442 B 5–9): after all, the standard view does not clearly yield a ruling rational part. (Chapter 2 §3 returns to spirit’s role as an ally of reason.)

There is another doubt to cast upon the standard view. This doubt concerns the account of psychic temperance in *Republic* (442 C 9–D 4):¹⁹

T15	Τί δέ; σῶφρονα οὐ τῆ φιλία καὶ συμφωνία τῆ αὐτῶν τούτων, ὅταν τό τε ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχομένω τὸ λογιστικὸν ὁμοδοξῶσι δεῖν ἄρχειν καὶ μὴ στασιάζωσιν αὐτῶ; Σωφροσύνη γοῦν, ἣ δ’ ὅς, οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦτο, πόλεός τε καὶ ιδιώτου.	442 C 9 D 1 D 4
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And isn’t he temperate because of the friendly and harmonious relation between these same ones [*sc.* ‘three beings [τριῶν ὄντων]’ (442 C 7 in T14)]²⁰, whenever the ruler and the two ruled agree perfectly that the rational one must rule and they don’t form a faction against it?

Temperance —he said— is surely nothing other than that, both in a city and in an individual. (*Pl. R.* 4 442 C 9–D 4)

¹⁹ This account receives further discussion in the Introduction §0.2.

²⁰ Cf. Whiting (2012) 199 n. 28 and this study’s Introduction §0.2 n. 10.

Passage T15 describes temperance as a ‘friendly and harmonious relation’ between three soul-elements, presumably the rational, the spirited, and the appetitive elements. This achievement is a mystery on the standard view: how does primarily educating the spirited element bring about a friendly and harmonious relation between —for instance— the appetitive and the rational elements? The spirited part is characterized by a certain fierceness capable of being made useful, but being gentle is not characteristic of it (cf. *R.* 3 410 D 6–10 with *R.* 2 375 A 2–C 9) and even a well-educated spirited part that has been made gentle is still characterized by aggression (cf. *R.* 4 441 E 3–442 B 9 with 440 A 6–B 8). It is thus far from obvious that primarily educating a characteristically aggressive soul-part would bring about a friendly and harmonious relation between the appetitive and the rational elements. It is worth emphasizing both that the use of force does not result in genuine temperance and that it is a sign of inferior education (cf. *R.* 548 B 4–C 4 with 554 C 11–D 4).²¹

The mystery of achieving psychic temperance according to the standard view becomes more apparent upon careful consideration. There are two kinds of characterization of psychic temperance in the *Republic*. There is a —call it— ‘judgemental’ construal according to which psychic temperance appears as a certain agreement in judgement (ὁμοδοξία) about the soul’s rulership (T15; cf. *R.* 4 433 C 6, 430 E 1–432 B 2 esp. 431 D 9–E 3 and 432 A 6–B 2). There is also a —call it— ‘non-judgemental’ construal in terms of the mastery of inferior desires by better desires:

T16	Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰς γε πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἡδονὰς τε καὶ λύπας ἐν παισὶ μάλιστα ἂν τις εὖροι καὶ γυναιξὶ καὶ οἰκέταις, καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων λεγομένων ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ φαύλοις.	431 B 9 C 1
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²¹ *Republic* 7 536 A 2–8 introduces a distinction between spurious excellence and genuine excellence. I suggest that *Republic* 8 554 C 11–D 4 presents a case of spurious temperance as opposed to genuine temperance: it fits a general interpretation of temperance that acknowledges the presence of ‘something better and something worse in the soul of the same person [τι ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ μὲν βέλτιον ἐνι, τὸ δὲ χεῖρον]’ (*R.* 4 431 A 4–5) and regards it as ‘whenever the naturally better is a master of the worse [ὅταν μὲν τὸ βέλτιον φύσει τοῦ χείρονος ἐγκρατὲς ᾖ]’ (431 A 5–6); but the oligarch’s control is characterized by force rather than a friendly and harmonious relation (T15), which —I assume— holds of genuine temperance.

Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

Τὰς δὲ γε ἀπλᾶς τε καὶ μετρίας, αἱ δὲ μετὰ νοῦ τε καὶ
δόξης ὀρθῆς λογισμῶ ἄγονται, ἐν ὀλίγοις τε ἐπιτεύξει καὶ τοῖς
βέλτιστα μὲν φύσιν, βέλτιστα δὲ παιδευθεῖσιν. C 5

Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.

Οὐκοῦν καὶ ταῦτα ὀρᾶς ἐνόητα σοι ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ
κρατουμένας αὐτόθι τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τε C 10
καὶ φαύλοις ὑπὸ τε τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῆς φρονήσεως τῆς ἐν
τοῖς ἐλάττωσιν τε καὶ ἐπιεικεστέροις; D 1

Ἐγὼγ', ἔφη. D 3

Moreover, one would find many and varied desires, pleasures, and distresses especially in children, women, and household slaves, plus in the inferior majority of those who are called 'free'.

Certainly.

But you would chance upon the simple and moderate ones, which are led by calculation with the aid of understanding and correct judgement, in a few who have the best natures and the best education.

True—he said.

Do you not see these too in your city, namely the desires of the inferior majority mastered on the spot by the desires and by the wisdom of the excellent minority?

I do—he said. (Pl. *R.* 4 431 B 9–D 3; cf. *R.* 3 389 D 7–E 3, *R.* 4 430 E 1–431 B 3, *R.* 9 586 D 4–E 3)

Passage T16 suggests that we all begin—note 'ἐν παισὶ [in children]' (431 C 1)—with some multifarious desires and pleasures (cf. T35 and T36). It suggests also that we may be educated—note 'βέλτιστα δὲ παιδευθεῖσιν [and receiving the best education]' (431 C 7)—to acquire simple and moderate desires which follow rational calculation, true judgement, etc.. But how does primarily educating the spirited part bring about—for instance—appetitive desires 'led by calculation with the aid of understanding and correct judgement' (431 C 5–6)? How does primarily educating the spirited part bring about a rational part that leads non-

rational desires by rational calculation, true judgement, etc.? This is a mystery on the standard view according to which educating the spirited part explains the achievements of early ethical education.²²

2.3 The case of Leontius

The standard view may protest by appealing to the story of Leontius in *Republic* 4. After arguing for two elements in the soul, namely reason and appetite, it remains to determine whether there is a third:

T17	<p>Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δύο ἡμῖν ὠρίσθω εἶδη ἐν ψυχῇ ἐνόησα· τὸ δὲ δὴ τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ ὃ θυμούμεθα πότερον τρίτον, ἢ τούτων ποτέρῳ ἂν εἴη ὁμοφύες;</p> <p>Ἴσως, ἔφη, τῷ ἐτέρῳ, τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ.</p> <p>Ἄλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ποτὲ ἀκούσας τι πιστεύω τοῦτο, ὡς ἄρα Λεόντιος ὁ Ἀγλαΐωνος ἀνιῶν ἐκ Πειραιῶς ὑπὸ τὸ βόρειον τεῖχος ἐκτός, αἰσθόμενος νεκροὺς παρὰ τῷ δημίῳ κειμένους, ἅμα μὲν ἰδεῖν ἐπιθυμοῖ, ἅμα δὲ αὖ δυσχεραῖνοι καὶ ἀποτρέποι ἑαυτόν, καὶ τέως μὲν μάχοιτό τε καὶ παρακαλύπτοιο·</p> <p>κρατούμενος δ' οὖν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, διελκύσας τοὺς</p>	<p>439 E 1</p> <p>E 5</p> <p>440 A 1</p>
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²² The standard view may wish to counter by claiming either that the spirited part is not the primary target in the case of psychic temperance or that genuine temperance is not an achievement of early ethical education. These are unacceptable maneuvers. The first claim is *ad hoc*: why should the spirited part—all of a sudden—not be the primary target or beneficiary of early ethical education? The second claim is unpalatable since the excellences discussed in *Republic* 4 are an outcome of early ethical education (cf. Chapter 1 §2 n. 11). If—moreover—the auxiliaries are not genuinely temperate and thus enjoying simple and moderate desires, then they will be miserable in Callipolis and probably suffering internal faction: after all, auxiliaries are denied private possessions (cf. *R.* 3 416 D 4–417 B 9, *R.* 5 464 B 8–C 4, 464 D 6–E 3). But if the auxiliaries are miserable, how on earth will there be confidence in them—for instance—in their not turning against the other citizens? (Cf. *R.* 8 547 B 2–548 C 8 for the timocratic political constitution.) Note that the money-loving nature is basically non-existent in Callipolitan guardians and auxiliaries (cf. *R.* 8 549 A 9–B 8, 547 B 2–C 5 with 548 A 5–C 5), a fact that does not fit well with denying genuine temperance to auxiliaries.

ὀφθαλμούς, προσδραμῶν πρὸς τοὺς νεκρούς, “Ἴδου ὑμῖν,”
ἔφη, “ὧ κακοδαίμονες, ἐμπλήσθητε τοῦ καλοῦ θεάματος.”

Ἦκουσα, ἔφη, καὶ αὐτός.

A 5

Οὗτος μέντοι, ἔφην, ὁ λόγος σημαίνει τὴν ὀργὴν πολεμεῖν
ἐνίοτε ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὡς ἄλλο ὄν ἄλλῳ.

Σημαίνει γάρ, ἔφη.

A 8

Then —I said— let these two kinds be distinguished in the soul. Now is spirit, namely by which we get infuriated, a third or is it of the same nature as either of the other two?

Perhaps —he said— it’s like the appetitive.

But —I said— I once heard something that I believe, namely that Leontius, the son of Aglaion, was going up from the Piraeus along the outside of the North Wall when he saw some bodies lying at the executioner’s feet.²³ He had an appetite to look, but at the same time he was disgusted and turned away. For a time he struggled with himself and covered his face; but finally overpowered by the appetite, he pushed his eyes wide open, rushed towards the bodies, and said: “Look for yourselves, you evil wretches, take your fill of the beautiful sight!”

I too —he said— have heard that story.

It certainly proves —I said— that anger sometimes wages war against the appetites as something really different against another.

Indeed it proves this —he said. (Pl. *R.* 4 439 E 1–440 A 8)

²³ The standard interpretation is that the executioner is disposing of corpses of criminals. But Todd (2000) 49 writes: ‘it is tempting instead to read this as the final stage of *apotumpanismos* [*sc.* a method of execution]’. Todd (2000) 49 n. 64 cites Antiphon (*Orat.*) 2. 4. 5 to observe that the word ‘νεκρός’ can signify ‘a body in its death throes’ (cf. LSJ *s.v.* ‘νεκρός’ I 2). It is unclear —then— whether the executioner is disposing of corpses or is executing criminals. I leave it an open question and adjust by speaking of ‘the bodies’ (i.e. either corpses or bodies in death throes) or ‘the sight’ (i.e. either of executed criminals or of an execution). It is noteworthy that Leontius desires to look at either corpses or an execution because this amounts to his witnessing and coming in contact with death and this is relevant to explaining the rational part’s opposition to the appetitive part (cf. the text corresponding to n. 37 here in Chapter 2 §3.)

Passage T17 sees Socrates introduce a story in response to Glaucon’s suggestion that the spirited element is the same as the appetitive. Leontius’ behavior shows that spirit and appetite cannot be the same element. For, Leontius’ spirit is at war against his appetitive part.

The standard view may protest against the above-mentioned doubts by appealing to passage T17: first, the story is meant to distinguish the spirited part from the appetitive; second, the story introduces a conflict between spirit and appetite *without* the presence or intervention of reason;²⁴ third, note Leontius’s disgust —‘δυσχεραίνοι [he was disgusted]’ (439 E 8)— which is a response mentioned in passage T6 in the context of musically trained responses to what is honorable and what is shameful; plus, it is plausible that Leontius’ disgust is motivated by some evaluative judgement in terms associated with spirit (e.g. shamefulness) concerning his appetitive desire.²⁵ In other words, the story of Leontius should confirm that the spirited element is the proper or ultimate subject of judgements about what is honorable and what is shameful.

There are several reasons to doubt reading passage T17 as introducing a conflict between spirit and appetite *without* the intervention of reason.²⁶ One salient reason is the immediate sequel to T17 and its observation concerning the nature of spirit’s opposition to appetite:

T18	Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλοθι, ἔφη, πολλαχοῦ αἰσθανόμεθα, ὅταν βιάζονται τινα παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐπιθυμῖαι, λοιδοροῦντά τε αὐτὸν καὶ θυμούμενον τῷ βιαζομένῳ ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ ὥσπερ	440 A 9 B 1
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²⁴ I here reference commentators who are committed to this view either explicitly or clearly by implication —e.g.: Kraut (1973) 210, Reeve (1988) 130, Calabi (1998) 188–89, Vegetti (1998–2007) III 92 n. 98, Carone (2001) 137, Fortenbaugh (2002) 35, Moss (2005) 153, Burnyeat (2006) 10–11, Lorenz (2006a) 151–53, 159, Shields (2010) 153, 156, Reeve (2013) 159, Saadi Liebert (2013) 182, 185–86 with n. 33, 197 (but see also 194 n. 61).

²⁵ Moss (2005) 153 writes: ‘Why does spirit object to appetite’s desire? Clearly because it feels disgust: looking at corpses for pleasure is something *shameful*.’ Price (2010) takes Plato’s view of the emotions to construe them as involving some kind of cognition. But note Fortenbaugh (2002) 37: ‘[recognition of] the essential involvement of cognition in emotional response [...] did not arise in the Academy before the period of Plato’s *Philebus*’.

²⁶ These reasons are discussed thoroughly in Saldaña (2021).

δουῖν στασιαζόντων σύμμαχον τῷ λόγῳ γιγνόμενον τὸν
θυμὸν τοῦ τοιούτου;

B 4

Don't we often notice this elsewhere too —I said— when appetites force someone contrary to rational calculation, he reproaches himself and is infuriated with what is in himself doing the forcing, and —as if there were two factions— the spirit of such a person becomes an ally with his reason? (Pl. *R.* 4 440 A 9–B 4)

Passage T18 observes that self-rebuke and anger arise when appetites force us against rational calculation. If Leontius' case involves no opposition between reason and appetite, then passage T18 introduces a different, complex kind of opposition between the spirited and the appetitive elements: in T18, there is first a conflict between reason and appetite and second (a conflict) between spirit and appetite. Consequently, the standard view's appeal to the story of Leontius is committed to denying that T18 is a generalization of Leontius' case.²⁷

Denying that T18 is a generalization does not fit well with the text. For, the opening adverb, 'οὐκοῦν', when used in questions, invites assent either to an inference or to an addition to something that has already received assent.²⁸ In T18, 'οὐκοῦν' seems to invite assent to an addition rather than to an inference: after all, T17 ends simply with Glaucon's emphatic agreement to Socrates' concluding remark. Now T18 does not seem to introduce a

²⁷ Supporters of the view that only spirit opposes Leontius' appetite in passage T17 seem to overlook this implication. Some commentators take passage T18 to be a generalization and they do not involve spirit in the first opposition —e.g.: Penner (1971) 103–04 n. 6, Irwin (1995) 212, Kamtekar (1998) 326, Wilberding (2009) 365, Singpurwalla (2013) 44, 48–49, 57. Renaut (2014) 180 with 172–74 offers a hybrid interpretation, namely that spirit is present in the shame evinced by Leontius covering his face —before Leontius' anger— and that T18 is an explanation of Leontius' case, and so his reason and appetite are in opposition. This hybrid interpretation is not convincing: first, there is no mention of shame (αἰδώς) in T17 in contrast to T19 (discussed below at the end of Chapter 2 §4); second, 'παρακαλύπτοιτο [covered his face]' (440 A 1) need not even signal shame or any expression of the spirited element: it could simply be another attempt at not looking at the scene, an attempt going in hand with Leontius' being disgusted which —I suggest below— arises from the rational part. (I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing me here.) Consider that averting or covering one's face from a disgust-eliciting source is a typical reaction (cf. Lateiner and Spataras (2017) 8). In other words, it is not necessary that Leontius' covering his face is a sign of shame.

²⁸ LSJ s.v. 'οὐκοῦν' I.

substantive addition: ‘οὐκοῦν’ is followed by an adverbial ‘καί [and]’²⁹ which would not add anything new, but a stress on the familiarity of Leontius’ struggle; put another way, ‘οὐκοῦν’ followed by an adverbial ‘καί [and]’ suggests that Socrates means to elucidate the struggle within Leontius’ soul. If this is correct, then passage T18 means that elsewhere there are cases ‘just as [καί]’ Leontius’, namely cases of self-rebuke and anger at appetites when they force against rational calculation. In other words, T18 elucidates Leontius’ case and requires recognizing that Leontius’ rational part first opposes his appetitive part, i.e. it is not the case that only Leontius’ spirit opposes his appetitive part. (Further justification for taking T18 as elucidating Leontius’ case is offered below.)

This reading of T18 may appear to fail at taking proper account of a key word, ‘ἄλλοθι [elsewhere]’ (440 A 9).³⁰ For, ‘elsewhere [ἄλλοθι]’ signals a different sort of case from Leontius’ and thus T18 should not be read as an elucidation or even a generalization.³¹ In other words, T17 and T18 do not introduce cases of an identical type. The adverbial ‘καί [and]’ is explained by their having in common spirit’s conflict with appetite: while T17 shows spirit all on its own in conflict with the appetitive part, T18 shows spirit also (καί) in conflict with the appetitive part in other cases (ἄλλοθι), namely as the rational part’s ally. Consequently, since T18 introduces a different sort of conflict between spirit and appetite — whereby spirit operates in concert with reason— there is no difficulty with reading T17 as showing spirit all on its own in conflict with the appetitive part.

There are three points against this objection. First, ‘ἄλλοθι [elsewhere]’ need not mean a difference in kind as it can indicate only a difference in place or location.³² This use of ‘ἄλλοθι’ is present in the *Republic* without suggesting or implying a difference in kind (cf. *R.* 3 394 C 5, *R.* 5 460 B 1, *R.* 7 517 D 8, *R.* 9 584 D 8). Second, the expression ‘ἄλλοῖόν τι [of another kind]’ would better mark clearly a difference in kind and it is available to Plato (cf. *R.* 6 500 A 3, *R.* 8 559 B 8, *R.* 10 598 A 9).³³ Third, ‘ἄλλοθι’ (*R.* 2 368 D 5) is used in the

²⁹ LSJ *s.v.* ‘καί’ B 2. The weight of this ‘καί’ was brought to my attention by Paolo Crivelli.

³⁰ I owe this objection to Victor Caston.

³¹ Cf. LSJ *s.v.* ‘ἄλλοθι’ II.

³² LSJ *s.v.* ‘ἄλλοθι’ I.

³³ LSJ *s.v.* ‘ἄλλοῖος’ I.

sense proposed for T18, that is as finding the same thing elsewhere (ἄλλοθι). In *Republic* 2 (368 C 8–D 7), Socrates proposes a method of investigation to identify the nature of justice—as follows. Suppose that someone orders us to read small letters at a distance, yet we lack keen eyesight. Then someone considers ‘that the same letters are somewhere else [ὅτι τὰ αὐτὰ γράμματα ἔστι που καὶ ἄλλοθι]’ (368 D 4–5), bigger and on a bigger surface. The method would be to read first the larger letters in order to investigate the smaller ones and to verify their identity. The method shows that what is to be found elsewhere (ἄλλοθι) need not be something of a different kind—indeed— it could even be the same. Consequently, ‘ἄλλοθι’ in T18 need not introduce a different sort of case from Leontius’.

There is another motivation for taking T18 as elucidating Leontius’ case. The passage introduces a conception of spirit as by nature an ally of reason—if not corrupted by a bad education—and it is followed by an emphatic agreement that the spirited element would not side with appetites against reason’s command (440 B 4–8). Despite the emphatic agreement, the conception of spirit as an ally of reason is pressed with two further illustrations (440 B 9–C 5 and T13). Thereafter, Socrates and Glaucon reflect on the fact that spirit presents itself not as something like appetite and the point about spirit bearing arms alongside the rational part is repeated (440 E 1–4). The insistence on spirit’s alliance suggests that it plays a significant role both in identifying and in describing this part of the soul. If this is correct, then the conception (of spirit as an ally) ought to hold throughout the argument to distinguish the spirited part from appetite, including in the story about Leontius. Admittedly, it is not obvious that spirit’s alliance comes through the story on its own: after all, there is no explicit mention that reason first opposes appetite. But to read Leontius’ case without reason’s intervention is problematic as it creates an unwelcome discrepancy: if only spirit opposes Leontius’ appetite, then the story stands aloof to the lengthy description of the spirited part as an ally of reason, a characteristic that receives consistently plentiful attention despite its being obvious to Socrates and Glaucon. If only spirit opposes Leontius’ appetite, then the story sticks out like a sore thumb.

There is one final unwelcome discrepancy to reading Leontius’ case without reason’s intervention. If only spirit opposes Leontius’ appetite and passage T18 in conjunction with the other examples introduce another kind of opposition with an explanation of the conflict (i.e. spirit’s alliance to reason), then observe that an explicit explanation of spirit’s opposition

in T17 is lacking. This does not fit well with the fact that Plato provides an explanation of opposition when the soul's elements are distinguished. In the argument to distinguish the rational and the appetitive elements, Socrates explains the opposition to appetite as being due to reason. The explanation may be lacking in detail, but it is an explanation nonetheless. In T18 and the other examples concerning spirit, the explanation of spirit's behavior is attributed to its being an ally of reason. This suggests an interest not only in distinguishing different soul-elements, but also in identifying —however sketchily— an explanation of a soul-part's opposition. If this is correct, then we should expect some explanation in Leontius' case. On its own —however— there is no explicit indication (of an explanation) and if only spirit opposes the appetitive part, then we would have to embrace this silence; and Leontius' story would be the only place where two soul-parts are distinguished without also explaining the nature of the opposition. We need not embrace this silence: we could dispel it by accepting T18 as elucidating T17, in which case T18 explains the nature of spirit's opposition in T17, namely spirit's alliance to reason. In other words, T18 should be read in conjunction with T17 as elucidating Leontius' case as it provides a better interpretative fit to the whole: first, it includes T17 in the conception of spirit as by nature an ally of reason; second, it provides T17 with an explanation of the nature of the opposition in question by citing spirit's alliance to reason. (These advantages would be lost were T18 denied to elucidate Leontius' case.) Since T18 states that reason first opposes appetite, it follows that Leontius' reason first opposes his appetitive part and spirit's opposition arises when appetite forces Leontius.

‘Why on earth would Leontius' rational part oppose his appetite?’ —the standard view may protest. Remember that one concern of reason is the well-being of the soul and the body (*R.* 4 442 B 5–8). Now realize both that Leontius' appetite puts him in contact with the pollution (μιάσμα) of death³⁴ and that death-pollution is both contagious and dangerous,³⁵ and to be avoided,³⁶ i.e. death-pollution poses a threat to the well-being of a person. Consequently, Leontius' appetite would indeed be a concern for the rational part. In other

³⁴ Cf. Parker (1983) 39 for a conception of contact with pollution as a coming into the same social space.

³⁵ Parker (1983) 4.

³⁶ Parker (1983) 33 with n. 3 notes that Gods avoid the pollution of death and Parker (1983) 5, 45 with n. 47 observes that criminals are a source of pollution. Parker (1983) 46–47 doubts the idea that unburied corpses are not pollutants.

words, Leontius' appetite falls under the purview of the rational part as it impels him into contact with death-pollution, a threat to his well-being. The rational part thus has a clear motivation to draw back the soul.³⁷

This view construes Leontius' disgust as a rational response, in the sense that it arises from the rational part (specifically from its concern for the well-being of body and soul). Note that Leontius' response is identical in type to an important characteristic of the musically trained soul, namely its 'being correctly disgusted [ὀρθῶς δὴ δυσχεραίνων]' (*R.* 3 401 E 4 in T6). If this construal of disgust is correct, then it is at least possible to explain the musically trained soul's correct disgust by appealing to its rational part, e.g. to its characteristic concern for the the well-being of body and soul; put another way, the musically trained soul's correct response to what is shameful —and presumably what is honorable— could be explained by a characteristic activity of the rational part, namely its care of the body and the soul. In other words, the achievements listed in T6 and T10 could very well be due to the rational part's becoming adept at and truly learning its own job or role. (Note the nod to passage T2.)

2.4 Does the standard view risk partitioning spirit?

There is one final compelling doubt to raise against the standard view, namely that it seems committed to partitioning the spirited part of the soul. In *Republic* 3 (412 B 9–414 B 6), the discussion turns to selecting the city's rulers among those who have been properly trained. The discussion acknowledges the possibility that trainees abandon their judgements due to distress, pleasure, fear, etc. (412 E 4–413 C 4; cf. *R.* 7 538 C 6–D 5). The solution is to test trainees throughout their lives in order to identify who are the best guardians of their convictions (δόγματα) through distress, pleasure, fear, etc. and to establish them as rulers and guardians of Callipolis —above the auxiliaries (413 C 5–414 B 6). Now the concern about abandoning judgements due to distress, pleasure, fear, etc. should recall the characterizations of civic courage (T5, in particular 430 A 3–B 3) and psychic courage (T3): both acknowledge abandoning judgements due to distress and pleasure with the former passage including also fear and appetite. The proposed solution too should recall these characterizations: the best

³⁷ Saldaña (2021) Section 3.3 offers a fuller defense of this view.

guardians of their convictions —I suggest— just are those who preserve their judgements through distress, pleasure, etc.. If this is correct, then *Republic* 3 adds the important psychological detail that the courageous are pressured to abandon their judgements — whether compelled by distress, charmed by pleasure, etc.— yet they simultaneously preserve their judgements. In other words —as we shall see— the courageous experience psychic conflict of the sort that reveals the presence of distinct soul-parts.

This is shown in the young oligarch's degeneration into a democrat (in particular *R.* 8 559 D1–560 A 7). (The young oligarch may not be a paradigmatically courageous individual, but the discussion proves that being pressured to abandon judgements and preserving them involves psychic conflict.) The young man arguably enjoys —call them— 'oligarchic' judgements: he is brought up in oligarchic ways (*R.* 8 558 C 6–D 7) and being brought up in a certain way amounts to acquiring corresponding judgements (cf. *R.* 2 376 C 8–377 B 9, *R.* 4 429 E 7–430 B 6). Since oligarchs distinguish between necessary and non-necessary appetites (cf. *R.* 8 554 B 7–E 3, 559 C 8–12) —which is a true distinction (cf. *R.* 8 561 B 8–C 5)— the young man almost certainly endorses this distinction insofar as he adopts oligarchic ways (cf. 558 C 10–D 7). But the young man is surely pressured to abandon his oligarchic ways and judgements: he is said to change as he experiences non-necessary pleasures and his non-necessary appetites become many and strong (559 D 5–560 B 5); but indulging in non-necessary appetites and pleasures is incompatible with upholding the oligarchic view that distinguishes between necessary and non-necessary appetites plus calls for bringing the latter under control. This is arguably confirmed in explaining that the young man's acropolis is seized because it lacks fine studies, ways of living, and true claims (560 B 6–C 1; cf. 549 A 9–B 8): after the acropolis is seized, false and pretentious views and judgements occupy the young man's acropolis 'in place of the others [*ἀντ' ἐκεῖνων*]' (560 C 2–3); the preposition 'ἀντί [in place of]' (560 C 2) here could denote an exchange of views or judgements —note this use at *Republic* 2 371 C 8–D 3— in which case 'the others' (560 C 3) likely refers to views and judgements the young man has acquired throughout his upbringing, namely oligarchic views and judgements. In other words, the young oligarch comes to abandon even the true distinction between non-necessary appetites and his degeneration —then— should be regarded as a case of being charmed by pleasure to abandon judgements. (The young oligarch's degeneration receives further study in Chapter 4 §§3–4.)

Now observe that being charmed by pleasure to abandon judgements is in conflict with preserving (or striving to preserve) them, in the sense that they are opposites incapable of being experienced by one and the same soul-part according to the principle of opposites; put another way, one and the same thing cannot both be charmed to abandon judgements and preserve (or aim to preserve) them. If the soul evinces this behavior, then at least two soul-parts are to account for the experiences. Consider the young man who is charmed by pleasure to abandon his oligarchic character, yet also receives help from oligarchic allies:

T19	Καὶ ἐὰν μὲν γε, οἶμαι, ἀντιβοηθήσῃ τις τῷ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὀλιγαρχικῷ συμμαχία, ἣ ποθεν παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἰκείων νοουθετούντων τε καὶ κακιζόντων, στάσις δὴ καὶ ἀντίστασις καὶ μάχη ἐν αὐτῷ πρὸς αὐτὸν τότε γίγνεται. Τί μήν; Καὶ τοτὲ μὲν, οἶμαι, τὸ δημοκρατικὸν ὑπεχώρησε τῷ ὀλιγαρχικῷ, καὶ τινες τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν αἰ μὲν διεφθάρησαν, αἰ δὲ καὶ ἐξέπεσον, αἰδοῦς τινοῦ ἐγγενομένης ἐν τῇ τοῦ νέου ψυχῇ, καὶ κατεκοσμήθη πάλιν. Γίγνεται γὰρ ἐνίοτε, ἔφη.	559 E 9 E 10 560 A 1 A 5 A 8
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And —I suppose— if an alliance helps in turn the oligarchic party within him, whether from his father or from the rest of his household, who exhort and reproach him, then at that time there is a faction and counter-faction and a battle within him against himself.

That's right.

And sometimes —I suppose— the democratic party yields to the oligarchic, and some of the appetites are destroyed whereas others fall out, a kind of shame rises in the young man's soul, and order is restored.

That does sometimes happen —he said. (Pl. *R.* 8 559 E 9–560 A 8)

In passage T19, the young oligarch who is being charmed by pleasure to abandon his upbringing receives help from oligarchic allies. This help basically amounts to an attempt to

preserve the young man's oligarchic character. If successful, he experiences shame and his soul is once again ordered.

It is explicit that an attempt to preserve the young man's oligarchic character conflicts with its being abandoned (in the pursuit of non-necessary appetites and pleasures), in the sense that two soul-parts come to be in opposition to one another (cf. *R.* 9 572 B 9–D 5; note the language of faction and alliance in T18).³⁸ In other words, an attempt to preserve the young man's oligarchic character from being abandoned reveals a division in his soul. Now—I assume—character preservation or abandonment involves preserving or abandoning judgements because characters are partly constituted by them. (How could there be an oligarchic character without oligarchic judgements?) If this is correct, then the above case can be seen to entail that being charmed by pleasure to abandon judgements conflicts with preserving (or striving to preserve) them, in the sense that distinct soul-parts account for the experiences: one soul-part is charmed to abandon certain judgements whereas another soul-part preserves (or aims to preserve) them. In other words, numerically one and the same soul-part cannot both be charmed to abandon judgements and preserve (or aim to preserve) them.³⁹

But which soul-part preserves the young man's oligarchic character? There is evidence to believe that the young man's spirit is to be held responsible. It is worth underlining both that the young man's non-necessary appetites make him act contrary to reason by abandoning the true distinction between appetites and that his oligarchic allies treat

³⁸ The use of 'στάσις [faction]' almost always entails a conflict between soul-parts (cf. *R.* 4 440 E 1–5, *R.* 8 547 B 2–8). I write 'almost always' because there is just one more use of the term, namely to characterize injustice as a kind of faction among the soul's three parts (*R.* 4 444 A 10–C 1), and it does not explicitly signal an instance of psychic conflict. The discussion on degenerate (i.e. unjust) souls in *Republic* 8 nevertheless shows them to be victims of psychic conflict.

³⁹ This interpretation is inspired by a suggestion made by Paolo Crivelli with respect to my interpretation of Leontius' case. The view I defend there acknowledges an opposition between the appetitive and the rational elements in T17 as appetite is impelled to look and reason draws back the soul. The appetitive element can be said to ignore the commands of reason. Now the spirited element gets angry at the appetitive because—as an ally of reason—it aims to preserve the commands of reason (cf. *R.* 442 B 10–C 2). This shows that the appetitive element cannot be identical to the spirited: if it were, it would follow that one and numerically the same thing would ignore the commands of reason while simultaneously aiming to preserve those commands; but these are opposite properties and applying the principle of opposites yields that the appetitive and the spirited elements are distinct.

him in ways reminiscent of the behavior illustrated in passage T18, that is behavior attributed to the spirited part. The suggestion is that passage T19 reflects an interpersonal form of spirit's opposition to appetite in T18. It is worth emphasizing the mention of shame (*αἰδώς*) in restoring order to the soul (560 A 6–7) as it is generally considered an experience characteristic of spirit. Now keep in mind both that the conflict arises upon attempting to preserve the young man's oligarchic character—including his judgements—and that spirit is characterized as the soul-element in charge of preserving judgements in the face of fear, pleasure, etc. (cf. T3 and *R.* 4 429 C 7–D 1 with T5).

If the above is correct, then the standard view is committed to partitioning the soul's spirited element. For, the standard view holds that spirit is the proper or ultimate subject of Callipolitan laws and true judgements from early ethical education. There is—however—a concern that the soul-part acquiring or absorbing Callipolitan laws etc. can also abandon them due to distress, pleasure, fear, etc. whereas spirit is unanimously responsible for preserving laws and judgements through these deterrents. The above case shows that abandoning judgements conflicts with preserving them in the sense that numerically one and the same soul-part cannot both abandon and preserve laws or judgements at pains of violating the principle of opposites. Consequently, the phenomenon of a soul's abandoning its judgements and preserving them must be explained by two distinct soul-parts. In other words, the part that acquires or absorbs judgements and the part that preserves them from being abandoned must be distinct soul-parts. The standard view is committed to spirit's being both the part that acquires and the part that preserves, in which case the standard view is committed to spirit being a complex soul-part. The standard view—then—is committed to partitioning the soul's spirited element. (Chapter 5 §3 offers a final decisive objection along these lines.)

2.5 Conclusion

Chapter 2 presents the standard view's interpretation of early ethical education, namely that the soul's spirited part learns to get things right about excellences and vices—for instance—by absorbing Callipolitan laws and law-inculcated judgements. The two arguments it deploys, namely the argument from content and the argument from psychic development, plus its appeal to both the city-soul analogy and the case of Leontius, all are called into question. The

Chapter concludes with a compelling doubt about the standard view, namely that it seems committed to partitioning the soul's spirited part.

Chapter 3 next turns to the psychic impact of imitative poetry in *Republic* 10: although this kind of poetry is banned from Callipolis, the discussion on the relation between imitative poetry and the soul indicates a path to understand better the goals of early ethical education. For, imitative poetry appeals to (i.e. gratifies and strengthens) the soul's non-rational parts by making images or apparitions of excellence (i.e. what appears to be excellent) and there is evidence to suggest that the non-rational parts would be the proper or ultimate subjects of false judgements relevant to ethical training.

Chapter 3

Poetry's impact on the soul

3.1 Introduction

Chapter 2 casts a doubtful shadow upon the view that the soul's spirited element is the primary target of early ethical education—for instance—as the proper or ultimate subject that learns or acquires Callipolitan laws, law-inculcated judgements, etc.. Chapters 3 through 5 will explore the relation between non-rational parts, excellence, and vice: if the views and arguments developed there are sound, then no non-rational part could be the primary target of early ethical education.

Chapter 3 initiates the exploration with the discussion on imitative poetry in *Republic* 10. Although early ethical education in Callipolis does not welcome imitative poetry—after all, it is banned—the discussion affords a path to understanding the non-rational parts' acquisition of evaluative and normative judgements, that is judgements relevant to ethical training. Chapter 3 §2 argues that imitative poetry's corruptive power affects both non-rational parts, both appetite and spirit. Chapter 3 §3 defends this interpretation by arguing that imitation as a whole appeals to an inferior non-rational part rather than—as a problematic passage appears to show—an inferior sub-part of the rational element. This defense observes that appearance-language (e.g. 'appears [φαίνεται]') is here employed in its judgemental construal; for instance, what appears (φαίνεται) to be F is judged to be F by a non-rational part. This is relevant because imitative poetry is said to corrupt the soul by making images of excellence (εἰδωλα ἀρετῆς) which are spoken of also as apparitions (φαντάσματα) and what appears (φαίνεται) to be excellent to the many. The expected implication—further explored in Chapter 4—would be that non-rational parts are the subjects of false judgements about what is excellent.

3.2 Imitative poetry and non-rational parts

Republic 10 595 A 1–608 C 1 returns to the topic of imitative poetry and it is dedicated to defending the decision not to welcome or accept imitative poetry in Callipolis (cf. *R.* 3 398 A

1–B 5) by showing that it is harmful to the soul.¹ The discussion is divided into five sections: a brief introduction on returning to the topic (595 A 1–C 7), an investigation on the nature of imitation in general and whether poets count as imitators (595 C 8–602 C 3), an argument to identify the soul-element upon which imitation effects its power (602 C 4–605 C 4), the greatest accusation against imitative poetry (605 C 5–607 B 1), and some final reflections (607 B 2–608 C 1). This Chapter focuses mainly on the third section that identifies the soul-element upon which imitation effects its power.

It has been debated whether the psychology in Book 10 is the same as or different to the psychology in Book 4.² The debate is partly due to a passage (602 C 4–603 A 8; cf. T23) that appears to introduce a novel psychic division, namely in the soul’s rational part. It is noteworthy that some introductory remarks to Book 10 see Socrates claim that the decision to banish imitative poetry from Callipolis was correct and is clearer now that the elements of the soul have been distinguished (595 A 1–B 1). This is presumably a back reference to the elements distinguished in Book 4, namely the appetitive, spirited, and rational elements. Socrates’ opening remarks suggest that the forthcoming apology will rely on the psychology in Book 4 and the question now is upon which of these soul-elements imitation exerts its power.

Having defined imitation and imitators (e.g. painters and poets) as being far from the truth and producers of images (cf. *R.* 10 597 D 10–598 A 1, 598 B 6–D 7, 599 D 3–4, 602 B 5–C 3),³ Socrates and Glaucon turn to identify the soul-element upon which imitation exerts its

¹ This part of *Republic* 10 is standardly read as Plato’s treatment of art, visual and auditory, and its relation to the context or even the major theme of the *Republic* (i.e. the nature and value of justice) has been a source of puzzlement: it appears divorced from its context —e.g. Else (1972) 7–8 sees no direct connection either with Book 9 or with the rest of Book 10— or from the dialogue’s central argument spanning Books 2–9 —e.g. Irwin (2017). Against the view that *Republic* 10 is an afterthought, see —e.g.: Halliwell (1988) 2 and 24 n. 1, Nehamas (1988) 215, Ferrari (1989) 120, and Schofield (2010) 239–240 (who —along with Ferrari— takes Plato’s attack on poetry in Book 10 to rely on psychological and ontological views established earlier in the *Republic*).

² On the view that it is different, see references in Adam (1902) II 406 n. to 602 C ff.. On the view that it is the same, see Adam (1902) II 406. The argument in this Chapter supports the latter view —cf. the forthcoming n. 6 with its main text.

³ Cf. Pl. *Sph.* 233 D 9–234 D 1 and Chapter 4 §2 n. 2.

power (602 C 4–605 C 4). The argument addressing the latter question is divided into two parts, the first focusing on visible imitations such as painting (602 C 4–603 B 6), the second part focusing on audible imitations such as poetry (603 B 7–605 C 4). The first part concludes that painting and imitation in general consort with or exert their power upon an inferior element of the soul (603 A 9–B 6).

Socrates and Glaucon then turn their sights to imitative poetry in order to identify the soul-element upon which imitative poetry exerts its power, especially whether it is an inferior or excellent soul-element (603 B 7–603 C 4). Imitative poetry is characterized as imitating the affairs of human beings, in particular their actions, the distresses and pleasures resulting from these, and their thinking to be doing badly or well (passage T34 in Chapter 4 §4; cf. 606 D 1–3 on distress, pleasure, and action). Socrates then wonders whether human beings suffer psychic conflict in this context —just as psychic conflict was shown earlier in discussing visible imitations (cf. T23)— but he quickly recalls an earlier agreement to this effect, presumably the earlier arguments showing the soul to suffer opposites in matters of action (603 C 11–D 7 recalling —presumably— *R.* 4 439 C 3–441 C 7).

These earlier arguments —however— omitted something to be now discussed (603 E 1–3). (Socrates probably has in mind the omission to explicate the case under scrutiny in terms of the soul’s parts: after all, the case in question was introduced in Book 3 before the arguments showing the soul to have three parts appeared in Book 4. This is suggested by the discussion’s development.) Socrates recalls a possible reaction from a good man who suffers the loss of something valuable, namely the reaction of being moderate toward distress, to be precise being moderate in grieving (603 E 4–10; cf. *R.* 3 387 D 1–E 9). He asks whether the good man’s resistance to this distress will be more likely in public or in private to which Glaucon replies that it is more likely in public; and Socrates suggests that the good man will basically not resist in private the urge to grieve caused by the distress of losing something valuable (604 A 1–8). They agree that reason and law order him to resist whereas the incident drags him to feel his distress (604 A 9–11). The case under scrutiny shows there to be opposite impulses about the same thing at the same time, in which case there are two soul-elements in play (604 B 1–3). Socrates appeals to the principle of opposites from *Republic* 4 (436 B 9–C 2; cf. 436 E 7–437 A 1, 439 B 5–6) and analyzes the good man’s measured response to his loss in terms of two soul-elements. Which elements though?

One of these soul-elements, namely the one ordering the good man to resist, is prepared to be persuaded by the law (604 B 4–5) which gives reasons —note ‘because [ὡς]’ (604 B 8)— for resisting the urge to grieve. This soul-element is arguably the rational one: only the rational part is presumably capable of following rational calculation (λογισμός) by means of reasoning;⁴ the law also insists that grieving hinders that which we need in these circumstances, namely to deliberate (604 C 1–8), which gives the impression that the soul-element prepared to be persuaded by the law is responsible for deliberation; if this is correct, then the soul-element in question is the rational part: after all, the latter is described as the part ‘that deliberates [τὸ βουλευόμενον]’ (R. 4 442 B 7) whereas spirit is described as the battling part which follows the rational (442 B 5–9). It is noteworthy —moreover— that the soul-element prepared to be persuaded is responsible also for curing or treating the part ‘that is sick [νοσῆσαν]’ (604 D 1). The language of disease (νόσημα) and its treatment recalls some of the first remarks distinguishing the appetitive and rational parts of the soul, in particular the appetitive part’s ‘leading and dragging [ἄγοντα καὶ ἔλκοντα]’ (R. 4 439 D 1 — note ‘τὸ ἔλκον [that which drags]’ (604 A 10) the soul on account of affections and ‘diseases [νοσημάτων]’ (439 D 2)— whereas opposition arises ‘from rational calculation [ἐκ λογισμοῦ]’ (439 D 1). The impression is —again— that the soul-element ordering the good man to resist is the rational one; and a discussion on comedy in *Republic* 10 (606 C 2–10), parallel to the discussion on tragedy, explicitly states that reason — ‘τῷ λόγῳ [by reason]’ (606 C 5)— is responsible for holding back an element’s appetite for certain jokes. There is also passage T18 to consider: it acknowledges an initial resistance to appetite from reason in the general account of the spirited part’s opposition to appetite. The evidence —

⁴ *Republic* 8 554 C 11–D 4 presupposes that the appetitive part can be persuaded: the passage presupposes that certain —call them— ‘bad’ appetites can be persuaded and the appetites in question belong the appetitive part. If this soul-part can be persuaded, it is tempting to construe the appetitive part as capable of following rational calculation (λογισμός). This is not necessary (cf. Introduction §0.2, the paragraph after the main text to n. 7): the *Republic* enjoys a generous notion of persuasion in the sense that persuasion is not confined exclusively to rational calculation, e.g. pleasure is spoken of as persuasive (cf. R. 3 413 C 1–4 with R. 7 538 C 6–D 5), so too sexual passion (cf. R. 5 458 D 5–7), so too prayers and sacrifices (cf. R. 2 365 E 2–366 A 5), so too gifts (cf. R. 3 390 E 4). It could very well be — then— that Plato has in mind persuading the appetitive part by means other than rational calculation in *Republic* 8 554 C 11–D 4. (There are cases of rational calculation appearing together with pleasure or love —e.g. R. 4 422 D 2–8, R. 5 468 B 13–C 4— but it is not obvious that both calculation and its partner appeal to the appetitive part.)

Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

605 A 1

Ὁ δὴ μιμητικὸς ποιητὴς δῆλον ὅτι οὐ πρὸς τὸ τοιοῦτον τῆς
ψυχῆς πέφυκέ τε καὶ ἡ σοφία αὐτοῦ τούτῳ ἀρέσκειν πέπηγεν,
εἰ μέλλει εὐδοκιμήσειν ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ
ἀγανακτικὸν τε καὶ ποικίλον ἦθος διὰ τὸ εὐμίμητον εἶναι.
Δῆλον.

A 5

A 6

But the element that leads to recollections of our suffering and to lamentations — which insatiably has them— shall we not say it to be non-rational, idle, and a friend of cowardice?

We certainly shall.

Does this element, the irritable one, admit of many and diverse imitations whereas the wise and quiet character —being nearly always close to itself— is neither easy to imitate nor easy to understand when imitated, especially at a festival where all kinds of people are gathered together in theaters? For —I suppose— the imitation is of an experience alien to them.

Absolutely.

It is clear that the imitative poet of all persons is not naturally relating to such an element [*sc.* wise and quiet] of the soul nor is his wisdom bent upon pleasing it —if he expects to be popular among the many— but he is naturally relating to the irritable and variegated character because it is easily imitated.

Clearly. (Pl. *R.* 10 604 D 7–605 A 6)

Passage T20 describes the soul-element responsible for the good man's distress as 'non-rational, idle, and a friend of cowardice' (604 D 8–9), 'irritable' (604 E 2, 605 A 5), and 'variegated' (605 A 5). It is also the soul-element to which imitative poets appeal. Which soul-element is in question?

I suggest that it is the appetitive.⁶ (The spirited element too is affected by imitative poetry as to be seen in passage T21.⁷) Consider the descriptions ‘non-rational [ἀλόγιστον]’ (604 D 8), ‘a friend of cowardice’ (604 D 9), and ‘variegated’ (605 A 5). (The description ‘irritable’ is discussed below in the text to n. 10.) The appetitive part is described as non-rational (ἀλόγιστον) when first introduced in Book 4 at 439 D 7. (Yes, so too spirit in *Republic* 4 441 B 2–C 3; cf. T22.) The description ‘a friend of cowardice’ fits better with the appetitive part: at the very least, it would be a puzzling characterization of the spirited element given its association with the virtue of courage (T3); and it is noteworthy that fear experienced by a timocratic youth leads him to become an oligarchic person, a person ruled by the appetitive element (*R.* 8 553 A 6–C 8, in particular 553 B 7–C 1, and 559 C 8–12). ‘Variegated’ is used on multiple occasions in discussions concerning the appetitive part: it is likened to a variegated beast (*R.* 9 588 C 7–10); the democrat, who is ruled by the appetitive part, is described as variegated (*R.* 8 561 E 3–8);⁸ and democracy, analogous to the democrat, is a variegated constitution (*R.* 8 558 C 1–5; cf. 557 C 4–10). The second reason for suggesting that the irritable soul-element in T20 is the appetitive pertains to the context. The soul-element in question gets irritated by misfortunes, such as the loss of a son or something

⁶ Cf. Annas (1981) 338, Nehamas (1988) 217, Reeve (1988) 230, Ferrari (1989) 138, Burnyeat (2006) 18, Moss (2006) Sect. III, in particular 519–520, Price (2011) 173, Wilberding (2012) 132 n. 17 with its text. If *Republic* 10 606 B 9 refers to a soul-part — rendering ‘τὸ ἐλεινὸν’ by ‘the pitying part’ rather than by ‘pity’ — then this is surely the irritable element from T20: note the parallels between 604 D 7–10 and 606 A 3–7. In other words, ‘τὸ ἐλεινὸν’ would not introduce a novel part of the soul.

⁷ This may suggest the thought that the inferior element in question includes both appetite and spirit — e.g. Singpurwalla (2010) 887: ‘Of course one immediate question is whether the inferior element discussed in *Republic* X is the same as the appetitive element, the spirited element, both, or neither. Although this issue is disputed, it is likely that the inferior element includes both the appetitive and spirited elements, since Socrates says that poetry strengthens the non-rational element by nurturing appetites such as sexual desire and anger (606c), which are clear examples of attitudes stemming from the appetitive and spirited parts, respectively.’ See also the forthcoming n. 10 in this Section 2.

⁸ The prevalent interpretation is that the democratic soul is ruled by the appetitive part, or a sub-part of it, or a distinctive class of appetites (i.e. not lawless, non-necessary appetites) — e.g.: Irwin (1995) 283 (‘the oligarchic, democratic, and tyrannical people are dominated in different ways by different aspects of the appetitive part’); Arruzza (2019) 139 (‘by the appetitive part’) with n. 1, 169 (‘ruled by unnecessary appetites and pleasures’) with n. 54. Some commentators deny the prevalent view — e.g.: Scott (2000), Johnstone (2013) e.g. 140 with n. 3 (no stable rule by any element or part).

of value. Passage T20 began by explicitly drawing our attention to another discussion about the same kind of misfortune in *Republic* 3 (387 D 1–388 A 4; cf. 399 A 5–B 3). There too Socrates speaks about losing a son and in the same breath he adds a brother or money (χρήματα) (387 E 4–5). The mention of money suggests that the soul-element irritated by the loss of something valuable (e.g. son, brother, money, etc.) is the appetitive: this soul-part is described as ‘money-loving [φιλοχρημάτων]’ on three occasions (*R.* 8 553 C 5, *R.* 9 580 E 5, 581 A 6) and note especially the rise of the appetitive part to the throne of the soul when a timocratic youth loses all possessions (*R.* 8 553 A 6–8). In other words, the irritable element in passage T20 —irritated by the loss of something valuable (e.g. son, brother, money, etc.)— is the appetitive part (cf. *R.* 1 329 A 2–8).⁹

It may be objected that the irritable soul-element in passage T20 is the spirited: first, the description ‘irritable [ἀγανακτητικόν]’ (604 E 2, 605 A 5) strongly suggests spirit insofar as it is the source of anger;¹⁰ second, the description ‘a friend of cowardice’ is not impossibly ascribable to the spirited part: in *Republic* 9 (590 B 3–5), luxury and softness are charged with producing cowardice in this very same soul-part; third, the fact that the appetitive part is affected by the loss of money does not confirm its being the part affected by the loss of a child: losing a child is of a different order than losing money, plus a child could be an object of status and honor —characteristic concerns of spirit.¹¹ In other words, we are witnessing

⁹ Cf. Pl. *Ion* 535 D 2–4 (on weeping the loss of possessions). Penner (1971) 112 also ascribes grief to the appetitive part.

¹⁰ Moss (2008) 43 believes that T20 is evidence that imitative poetry consorts not only with the appetitive element, but also with the spirited. Halliwell (1988) 151 —see also 138— observes that the irritable element is only akin to the spirited. Some commentators take passage T20 to be exclusively focused on spirit —e.g.: Adam (1902) II 406 with 411, Destrée (2011) 277 with n. 14.

¹¹ I thank Paolo Crivelli for pressing this third objection.

degenerate or corrupt behavior (e.g. being a friend of cowardice) from the spirited part in passage T20.¹²

The first objection is not decisive: in the *Republic*, the term ‘ἀγανακτητικόν [irritable]’ is used also in relation to the appetitive part (*R.* 1 329 A 7), in which case this use shows that it is an experience not exclusive to the spirited element; and the experience that the term is meant to capture is better understood as the manifestation of dislike or displeasure—not spirited anger or indignation (cf. *R.* 4 440 C 6–D 4)—meaning that being irritated is not on the same footing as characteristic spirited responses to ill-treatment (e.g. undeserved misfortune).¹³ The second objection fails to appreciate that talk of cowardice in the spirited part figures in discussing the part’s corruption, but passage T20 portrays a good man who presumably does not have a corrupt spirit. This point tells against the impression that we are witnessing degenerate or corrupt behavior from spirit. The third objection can be explained by the same soul-part’s having different degrees of attachment (rather than by different soul-parts). *Republic* 1 (330 B 8–C 9) suggests that different attitudes to money can be explained by different means of acquisition—to wit—those who inherit their wealth rather than work for it are for the most part not exceedingly attached to it (e.g. Cephalus) whereas those who work for it ‘love it twice as much as the others [διπλῆ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσπάζονται αὐτά]’ (330 C 2–3). Socrates even compares the love of those wealth-acquirers to the love of fathers toward their children and he implicitly suggests that these wealth-acquirers may even esteem money more than their own children (cf. 330 C 6–8). Now imagine the reaction of these wealth-

¹² One may ask: ‘why this particular—and tragic— example of losing a son?’ (I thank Paolo Crivelli for this question.) I suggest that it is part of Plato’s general criticism of Homer’s lack of knowledge (*R.* 10 598 D 8–601 C 3): first, weeping and lamenting the loss of a child or something valuable does not follow reason (*R.* 10 603 E 4–604 D 3); second, Golden (1988) 152 writes: ‘The death of children is a constant theme in the *Iliad* [...] Of course, the victims are mainly adults, not young children’; and Griffin (1980) 108 observes that ‘short life’ and ‘bereaved parents’ are two of Homer’s ‘most pathetic motifs [...] These two, in their fully expanded form, dominate the architecture of the whole poem, from the Achilles and Chryses scene in *Iliad* I to the encounter of Achilles and Priam in 24.’ In other words—I suggest—the prevalence of weeping and lamenting the loss of a child in Homer motivates Plato to focus on criticizing this behavior.

¹³ Pace Halliwell (1988) 138: ‘*aganaktein* [...] entails a sense of injustice at undeserved misfortune. [...] [*Republic*] 7.536c3–4 links indignation with the ‘spirited’ (*thumoeides*) part of the soul, which according to 3.411a is softened by an excess of mournful music (corresponding to tragedy).’

acquirers to losing their wealth; now imagine their reaction to losing a sexual partner. These —I suggest— would be radically different reactions pertaining to characteristic objects of the soul's appetitive part. If this is correct, then the same soul-part (e.g. appetite) can have radically different reactions to losing different objects belonging to it and the difference among reactions is to be explained by the degree of attachment the soul-part enjoys with respect to the different objects in question —the stronger the attachment or love, the stronger the distress from loss (cf. *R.* 3 387 D 11–E 9). In other words —in reply to the third objection — reactions of a different order are not necessarily explained by different soul-parts. Weeping and lamenting the loss of children could very well be an expression or reaction of the appetitive part even if it be of a different order to losing food, money, sexual partners, etc. (I am not denying the possibility of spirited reactions to losing a child —for instance— there could be shame from losing a child due to neglect. I am insisting only that weeping and lamenting are appetitive reactions.)

There is one final —if correct, decisive— reason to reject the view that the irritable element is spirit, namely that the identification would threaten the unity of this soul-part. Remember that the good man who is measured in his grief —who resists his irritable element — first appeared in a discussion on removing lamentations from the stories to be told in Callipolis (*R.* 3 387 D 1–388 E 3). The context there is a discussion about the stories to be told and not told with respect to the future guardians being courageous (386 A 6 ff.). Note that lamenting is cowardly behavior (387 E 10–388 A 4). It is thus plausible to suppose that the good man measured in grief is courageous or models courageous behavior. Now remember that courage is characterized as an excellence of the spirited part insofar as it preserves certain judgements through distresses and pleasures (T3). If the good man is courageous or models courageous behavior, then his spirited part preserves certain judgements through the distress of losing his son. (The judgements in question could be those expressed at *Republic* 10 604 B 7–C 1.) If this is correct, then spirit plays a role in resisting the irritable element's desire to lament (cf. *R.* 10 606 A 3–7 and *R.* 3 388 D 6–7).¹⁴ Consequently, the irritable element cannot be identical to spirit: otherwise, the same soul-part simultaneously desires to lament and resists, i.e. the same soul-part suffers opposites about

¹⁴ Burnyeat (2006) 18 takes the mention of shame in 604 A 1–11 as suggesting spirit's involvement (cf. Chapter 2 §4). Note that the absence of shame would basically amount to weeping and lamenting any loss (cf. *R.* 3 388 D 6–7).

αὐτά, ἵνα βελτίους τε καὶ εὐδαιμονέστεροι ἀντὶ χειρόνων καὶ
ἀθλιωτέρων γινώμεθα.

Οὐκ ἔχω ἄλλως φάναι, ἢ δ' ὅς.

D 8

And with respect to sexual appetites —and of course¹⁵ anger— indeed everything belonging to the appetitive element, as well as distresses and pleasures in the soul — those we now say to follow all our actions—¹⁶ imitative poetry produces the very same effect upon us. For, it causes them to grow by fostering them —when it is necessary to parch them— and it sets them up as rulers in us when it is necessary that they be ruled so that we become better and happier instead of being worse off and wretched.

I have nothing else to say —he said. (Pl. *R.* 10 606 D 1–8)

Passage T21 explicitly confirms that imitative poetry exerts its power on ‘the appetitive element [τῶν ἐπιθυμητικῶν]’ (606 D 1–2); it is noteworthy also that sexual appetites have been consistently associated with the appetitive part (*R.* 4 439 D 4–9, *R.* 9 580 D 9–581 A 2). Passage T21 confirms moreover that imitative poetry exerts its power on the spirited element: anger (θυμός) is included among the set of passions affected by imitative poetry and anger has been consistently associated with the spirited element (*R.* 4 439 E 2–3, 440 A 9–B 4, 441 B 6–C 3, *R.* 9 580 D 9–581 A 2, and forthcoming passage T22).

The inclusion of the spirited element in T21 may be puzzling. For, both the argument to identify the soul-element upon which imitative poetry exerts its power (602 C 4–605 C 4) and Socrates’ greatest accusation up to T21 have focused on imitative poetry’s power over the appetitive part —or so I have argued. There has been neither an inkling nor any apparent evidence that imitative poetry gratifies and strengthens the spirited element. What justifies this casual inclusion of spirit in T21? Why should the spirited element too be affected by imitative poetry?

This is not the first instance to witness conclusions about the appetitive part being casually extended to the spirited. In *Republic* 9, there is a third proof to show that the just are

¹⁵ Cf. LSJ *s.v.* ‘δῆ’ IV 4.

¹⁶ Cf. *R.* 10 603 C 5–10 (passage T34).

better off than the unjust (583 B 2–588 B 1). The first part of the proof (583 C 3–586 D 3) is meant to show ‘that the pleasure of the others —except of the wise— is neither absolutely true nor pure, but a deceptive one [ὅτι οὐδὲ παναληθῆς ἐστὶν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονὴ πλὴν τῆς τοῦ φρονίμου οὐδὲ καθαρὰ, ἀλλ’ ἐσκιαγραφημένη τις]’ (583 B 3–5; cf. 586 B 7–8). The phrase ‘the others’ here concerns the two other types of persons under discussion in the immediately preceding argument (580 C 11–583 B 2), namely the type who is victory-loving and the type who is profit-loving (581 C 4–6), respectively the one ruled by spirit and the one ruled by appetite.

The first part of the proof can be divided in three steps: an introduction to pure and to non-pure pleasure (583 C 3–584 C 10), an analogy to elucidate non-pure pleasure in terms of truth (584 D 1–585 A 7), and a development of true pleasure to conclude that the pleasure of the soul’s non-rational parts not under the rule of reason is neither absolutely true nor pure, but mixed with distress (585 A 8–586 D 3) —later called ‘spurious [νόθαιν]’ (587 B 16). The first step distinguishes two conditions, namely distress (λύπη) and pleasure (ἡδονή), and a third sort which is neither to feel distress (λυπεῖσθαι) nor to feel pleasure (χαίρειν) —‘a certain quiet [ἡσυχίαν τινά]’ (583 C 7). Pure pleasure is characterized as not following distress nor ending with lingering distress (584 A 12–B 8), nor being a relief from distress (584 B 9–C 3). Non-pure pleasure —on the other hand— is characterized as a sort of relief from distress, whether actual or anticipatory (584 C 3–10). The second step elucidates the nature of non-pure pleasure in terms of true pleasure with a topographic analogy that identifies three levels, namely what is below, what is in-the-middle, and what is above.¹⁷ The levels are analogous to distress (: what is below), the quiet (: what is in-the-middle), and true pleasure (: what is above). The analogy shows not only that non-pure pleasure happens in between distress and the quiet, but also that non-pure pleasure affords not even a sight of true pleasure —let alone an experience (of true pleasure). The third step develops the notion of true pleasure by construing pleasure as a replenishment of an emptiness and by distinguishing two kinds of replenishment, on the one hand bodily replenishment, on the other hand psychic replenishment. Bodily replenishment turns out to be less true than psychic nourishment, and so a less true pleasure. Consequently, those who are dedicated to bodily replenishments —to

¹⁷ Commentators —e.g. Adam (1902) II 352 and Cornford (1941) 304 n. 1; cf. Jowett and Campbell (1894) 428— observe that the topography expressed here is a popular view and that it is corrected in Plato’s *Timaeus* 62 C 3–63 E 8.

the satisfaction of appetitive desires— simply travel between distress and the quiet with neither a sight of nor an experience of true pleasure, i.e. those dedicated to the satisfaction of appetitive desires are limited to non-pure pleasure. They are finally characterized as ‘living with pleasures mixed with distress, images of true pleasure and deceptive [ἡδοναῖς συνεῖναι μεμειγμέναις λύπαις, εἰδώλοις τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἡδονῆς καὶ ἐσκιαγραφημέναις]’ (586 B 7–8).

Socrates then casually extends the conclusions about the pleasures of the appetitive part to the spirited:

T22	<p>Τί δέ; περὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς οὐχ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι, ὅς ἂν αὐτὸ τοῦτο διαπράττηται ἢ φθόνῳ διὰ φιλοτιμίαν ἢ βία διὰ φιλονικίαν ἢ θυμῷ διὰ δυσκολίαν, πλησμονὴν τιμῆς τε καὶ νίκης καὶ θυμοῦ διώκων ἄνευ λογισμοῦ τε καὶ νοῦ;</p> <p>Τοιαῦτα, ἧ δ’ ὅς, ἀνάγκη καὶ περὶ τοῦτο εἶναι.</p>	<p>586 C 7</p> <p>D 1</p> <p>D 3</p>
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What next? Mustn’t similar things happen with respect to the spirited element for whoever satisfies it —either by envy because of its love of honor or by force because of its love of victory or by anger because of its peevishness— pursuing his fill of honor, victory, and anger without calculation or understanding?

Similar things —he said— must happen also with respect to this [*sc.* element]. (Pl. *R.* 9 586 C 7–D 3)

Passage T22 construes the satisfaction of spirited desires without calculation or understanding along the lines of the satisfaction of appetitive desires, to be clear as resulting in a less true pleasure. To be precise —since the first part of the third proof concerns the pleasure of the appetite-ruled and spirit-ruled souls— passage T22 holds that spirit-ruled souls too simply travel between distress and the quiet with neither a sight of nor an experience of true pleasure, i.e. they are limited to non-pure pleasure.

Why are the conclusions about appetitive pleasure casually extended to the spirited part? Remember that pleasure is construed as a replenishment of an emptiness and that two kinds are distinguished, namely bodily replenishment and psychic replenishment. It is far

from obvious that spirited pleasure falls under the kind bodily replenishment —as obviously as appetitive pleasure does— but it is tempting to suspect the assumption that satisfying the spirited element without rational intervention amounts only to a relief from distress,¹⁸ in particular that love of honor, love of victory, and peevishness are each a sort of emptiness and distressful.¹⁹ This plausible temptation is not entirely satisfactory: if merely satisfying an emptiness amounts to a mixed pleasure, then even satisfying the empty states of ignorance and of foolishness should be mixed to some extent (cf. 585 A 8–B 5). Why —then— should non-rational spirited satisfaction result in a less true pleasure?

The context suggests the probable answer that the objects of spirited replenishment, namely honor, victory, etc. are assumed to partake of less being and less truth just as the objects of bodily replenishment, namely bread, drink, etc. (cf. 585 B 11–E 6). Passage T22 and its context —then— present appetite and spirit as enjoying the same kind of hedonic experience insofar as these soul-elements do not follow calculation or understanding. This does help to clarify the inclusion of spirit in passage T21. First, it is plausible to say that imitative poetry itself is ‘without calculation or understanding [ἄνευ λογισμοῦ τε καὶ νοῦ]’: earlier in *Republic* 10 (T27 in Chapter 4 §2), imitative poets are denied knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) and correct judgement (ὀρθὴ δόξα) about what is excellent in their subject matters, in which case it is not implausible to characterize imitative poetry as not following calculation or understanding. Consequently, imitative poetry does not offer to appetite and spirit an opportunity to follow calculation or understanding, in which case —given T22 and its context— appetite and spirit will enjoy the same kind of hedonic experience (i.e. mere relief from distress). Second, it is noteworthy that the greatest accusation against imitative poetry (i.e. the context to T21) is meant to show its comprehensive corruptive power, including over us who relax the best element’s guard over the soul-part affected by the poetic content (cf. *R.* 10 606 A 3–C 1). If the best element is the rational part —as Chapter 3 §3 will conclude— and it relaxes its guard in the sense that it does not intervene in the satisfaction of the affected soul-part’s desires, then the greatest accusation presents imitative poetry as a context that allows for the non-rational parts to pursue their desires without calculation or

¹⁸ Cf. Jowett and Campbell (1894) III 431 (who focus on satisfying anger); Adam (1902) II 356 (who focuses on satisfying the spirited element).

¹⁹ Adam (1902) II 357.

understanding, in which case —given T22 and its context— the results will be basically the same whether the soul-part in question is appetite or spirit. In other words, passages T20 and T21 identify both non-rational elements, both appetite and spirit, as the soul-elements upon which imitative poetry exerts its corruptive power.

3.3 A Problematic Passage

Although it is generally agreed that poetic imitations negatively affect our non-rational elements, there is a problematic passage in our midst. This agreement appears to be challenged by the first attempt to identify the soul-element upon which imitation as a whole exerts its power (602 C 4–603 B 6): the attempt has been taken to identify an inferior part of the rational element as the soul-element upon which imitation exerts its power; and the argument to identify the soul-element affected by imitative poetry concludes with two observations linking it to the soul-element affected by imitation as a whole. This challenging alternative would imply that an inferior part of the rational element is the soul-element affected by imitative poetry rather than the soul's non-rational parts.

The first observation is that the imitative poet resembles a painter in two ways, namely in making inferior things with respect to truth and in consorting not with the best soul-element (τὸ βέλτιστον) but with another sort of element (605 A 7–B 1). Which other sort? First, in the earlier argument (to identify the soul-element upon which imitation as a whole exerts its power), it is agreed that both painting and imitation as whole associate with an inferior element (603 A 9–B 6), namely an inferior part that opposes the best element in the soul (603 A 4–8). Second, the contrast between the best soul-element and another sort of element (605 A 9–10) parallels the earlier contrast between the best element and an inferior one (603 A 4–8; cf. 603 B 7–C 4). The first observation —then— supports the view that the other sort of element with which imitative poetry consorts is of an inferior sort, akin to the inferior element mentioned at 603 A 4–8. The second observation linking these soul-elements is that the poet gratifies the silly (ἄνόητον) element which does not distinguish the big and the small, but regards the same things sometimes as big, sometimes as small (605 B 7–C 4). This characterization probably alludes to the earlier argument (602 C 4–603 B 6) as the language readily brings to mind the opening example of the same magnitude appearing to be

not equal. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the argument to identify the soul-element affected by imitative poetry (603 B 7–605 C 4) lacks any evidence that would warrant ascribing this mistake (of not distinguishing the big and the small) to the silly element, in which case —unless Plato has been careless— it refers back to something already stated. If this is correct that the soul-element affected by imitative poetry is an inferior sort of element and the latter appears to be a sub-part of the rational element —on a certain reading of T23— then the general agreement that poetic imitations negatively affect our non-rational elements could be in peril. Socrates’ first attempt to identify the soul-element upon which imitation as a whole exerts its power calls for closer scrutiny.

The argument begins with the question ‘upon which of a human being’s elements does it [*sc.* imitation] have the power it has?’ (602 C 4–5). It is agreed that the same magnitude appears not equal when seen both from nearby and from afar (602 C 7–9); for instance, the same tree appears to be big and small after being seen close up and at a distance. A similar observation is made with respect to shape, namely that the same things appear to have different shapes depending on the location or way in which they are seen (602 C 10–D 1); for instance, the same stick appears to be bent and straight when seen both in water and outside it.²⁰ These examples are relevant to the question at hand because they allude to a weakness of our nature —at the very least, to have what appears conflict with our better judgement— a weakness exploited by a paradigmatic imitative art, shadow-painting (602 D 2–5).

Socrates and Glaucon then agree on two points (602 D 6–E 3), namely that certain skills such as measuring and calculating are helpful in these cases because they allow the truth to rule in us rather than what appears to be bigger than it is or smaller than it is etc. (Cf. *R.* 7 523 A 10 ff. (e.g. T24) for another kind of contrast between sense-perception and reason.) The discussion continues onto the problematic passage:

T23	Τούτω δὲ πολλάκις μετρήσαντι καὶ σημαίνοντι μείζω ἅττα εἶναι ἢ ἐλάττω ἕτερα ἐτέρων ἢ ἴσα τὰναντία φαίνεται ἅμα περὶ ταῦτά. Ναί.	602 E 4 E 5
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²⁰ Cf. *R.* 10 598 A 7–10: the couch appears different when seen from different angles.

Οὐκοῦν ἔφαμεν τῷ αὐτῷ ἅμα περὶ ταῦτα ἐναντία δοξάζειν
ἀδύνατον εἶναι;

Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ' ἔφαμεν.

E 10

Τὸ παρὰ τὰ μέτρα ἄρα δοξάζον τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ κατὰ τὰ
μέτρα οὐκ ἂν εἴη ταῦτόν.

603 A 1

Οὐ γὰρ οὖν.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ μέτρῳ γε καὶ λογισμῷ πιστεῦον βέλτιστον ἂν
εἴη τῆς ψυχῆς.

A 5

Τί μὴν;

Τὸ ἄρα τούτῳ ἐναντιούμενον τῶν φαύλων ἂν τι εἴη ἐν ἡμῖν.

Ἀνάγκη.

A 8

But often the opposites to this that has measured and indicates certain things to be larger or smaller than others, or equal, appear at the same time about the same things.

Yes.

Did we not say that it is impossible for the same thing to judge opposites at the same time about the same things?

And rightly so we said it.

The soul's element judging what is contrary to the measurements —therefore— could not be the same as the element judging what is according to the measurements.

Certainly not.

But surely the element putting its trust in measurement and calculation would be the soul's best element.

Well, what of it?

The element —then— opposing this would be some one of the inferior elements in us.

Necessarily. (Pl. *R.* 10 602 E 4–603 A 8)

Passage T23 acknowledges the frequent possibility of a conflict between the rational part's indications and what appears. This is understood as a conflict between simultaneously held opposite judgements (δόξα). By appealing to the principle of opposites, it follows that the

part judging against measurement and the part judging in accordance with it cannot be numerically one and the same. Since the part judging in accordance with measurement is the soul's best element, it follows that the opposing element is one of the inferior parts.

This passage has been problematic because it has appeared to introduce a new division in the soul, namely a partition of the rational element into superior and inferior parts.²¹ This is problematic because the inferior soul-part with which imitation consorts would not be a non-rational soul-part, in which case there would be a tension between this view (i.e. that imitation consorts with an inferior part of reason) and the view that imitative poetry consorts with the non-rational parts (as argued in Chapter 3 §2). The appearance to divide the rational part arises on account of two assumptions, namely

[A1] that the noun phrase in the dative 'to this that has measured and indicates [τούτω [...] μετρήσαντι καὶ σημαίνοντι]' (602 E 4) is governed by 'appear [φαίνεται]' (602 E 5), and [A2] that 'appear [φαίνεται]' (602 E 5) is equivalent to 'judges [δοξάζει]'.²²

It is noteworthy that reading lines 602 E 4–6 with [A1] would yield a different, yet fairly standard translation:

Τούτω δὲ πολλάκις μετρήσαντι καὶ σημαίνοντι μείζω ἅττα εἶναι ἢ ἐλάττω ἕτερα ἐτέρων ἢ ἴσα τὰναντία φαίνεται ἅμα περὶ ταῦτά.

But often the opposites appear at the same time about the same things to this that has measured and indicates certain things to be larger or smaller than others, or equal.

²¹ This view is shared by —e.g.: Murphy (1951) 239–243, Kenny (1969) 248–249, Nehamas (1999a) 264–269, Burnyeat (1999) 223–228, Sedley (2004) 113 n. 4, Kamtekar (2006) 173 n. 11. This view is rejected by —e.g.: Penner (1971) Section II, Burnyeat (1976) 34–35 with n. 21, Lorenz (2006b) Chapter 5, Ganson (2009) 180 nn. 4 and 6 (with their main texts), Moss (2008) Section 1, Shields (2010) 170 n. 24, Singpurwalla (2010) 886, Storey (2014) Section 2. Cf. the forthcoming n. 23 with its main text.

²² Assumption [A2] is shared by —e.g.: Barney (1992), Burnyeat (1999) 223 n. 12, Nehamas (1999a) 265, Sedley (2004) 113 n. 40, Kamtekar (2006) 173 n. 11.

Assuming [A1] would seem to present the rational part alone as the subject of a conflict between its own indications and the opposites that appear about the same things at the same time. Assuming also [A2] would seem to present the rational part alone as the subject of conflicting judgements (δόξα): after all, lines 602 E 8–10 show that the rational part’s own indications are construed as a judgement (δόξα). In other words, assumptions [A1] and [A2] would seem to imply that the rational part both judges (δοξάζει) that certain things are larger or smaller than others, or equal, at the same time that it judges (δοξάζει) the contrary. By appealing to the principle of opposites, it follows that the rational part is a complex soul-part, with one part later described as ‘one of the inferior elements in us’ (603 A 7).

Two main kinds of attempts have been made to avoid partitioning the rational part, with one kind accepting both assumptions [A1] and [A2], with the other kind denying one of the two assumptions. The first kind of attempt accepts both [A1] and [A2], but it proposes alternative referents either for ‘this [τούτω]’ (602 E 4) or for ‘the opposites [τάναντία]’ (602 E 5). Some commentators propose that ‘this [τούτω]’ (602 E 4) refers to the person or the whole soul,²³ but this is not satisfactory: it is generally agreed that ‘this [τούτω]’ has the same referent as the immediately preceding demonstrative ‘it [τούτου]’ (602 E 3), namely the referent ‘the rational part [τοῦ λογιστικοῦ]’ (602 E 1). Some commentators propose alternatively that ‘the opposites [τάναντία]’ (602 E 5) refers to the rational part’s own indications —the opposites to ‘the thing appearing [τὸ φαινόμενον]’ (602 D 7–8) larger or smaller etc.— and these conclusions appear (φαίνεται) to it,²⁴ but this seems awkward:²⁵ it probably involves an unexpected shift in the use of the verb ‘appear [φαίνομαι]’. The Greek verb ‘φαίνομαι [*phainomai*]’ has a neutral and a factive use.²⁶ The verb in its neutral use indicates that something presents itself —for instance— in a certain way, but it is not understood either that it really is so-and-so or that it really is not so-and-so. (You may consider the statement ‘the submerged stick appears to be bent’ an example of the neutral use: it cannot be understood from this statement either that the submerged stick really is bent or

²³ Respectively Bosanquet (1925) 393 and Halliwell (1988) 134.

²⁴ Adam (1902) II 408, Lorenz (2006b) 67–68, Kamtekar (2018) 142, 161 n. 19.

²⁵ For another problem with this alternative, see Barney (1992) 286–287 n. 5 and Storey (2014) 97.

²⁶ LSJ s.v. ‘φαίνω’ B II 1. Cf. Crivelli (ms²) 26–27.

that it really is not bent.) The verb ‘φαίνομαι’ in its factive use indicates that something really so-and-so presents itself as so-and-so, and it is understood to be so-and-so. (You may consider the statement ‘the stars appear to be very far away’ an example of the factive use: it can be understood from this statement that the stars really are very far away.) Now the context to T23 seems to be employing the verb ‘φαίνομαι [*phainomai*]’ in its neutral use because—at the very least— what appears is problematic or confusing and incites rational investigation. The alternative according to which the rational part’s own conclusions appear (φαίνεται) to it seems to require employing the verb ‘φαίνομαι [*phainomai*]’ in its factive use with an implication of truth, in which case the rational part’s conclusions ‘appear [φαίνεται]’ in the sense that they are clearly shown to be the case (cf. *R.* 7 524 B 7–9). This shift in use seems necessary for the alternative view: otherwise, why would the results of reason’s measurements and indications merely appear to it—as if they were on a par with the apparently large or small etc.— before ‘putting its trust [πιστεῦον]’ (603 A 4) in them?²⁷ Without the shift in use, it seems odd that the rational element would first have the same attitude (i.e. being-appeared-to) to the results of its own works as the attitude it presumably takes toward the appearances that cause a disturbance (ταραχή) in the soul and rouse it to investigation. The alternative according to which the rational part’s own conclusions appear (φαίνεται) to it thus probably involves an unexpected shift in the use of the verb ‘φαίνομαι [*phainomai*]’ which—although possible— seems awkward.

The second kind of attempt denies either [A1] or [A2]. One attempt accepts [A1], but denies [A2]²⁸ in which case the opposites appear to the rational part without its being the subject of a judgement (δόξα) that would conflict with its own conclusions. This attempt is doubtful though:²⁹ it attributes to Plato an Aristotelian view of appearance according to which—for instance—the sun appears (φαίνεται) a foot across, but we do not judge it to be so (cf. *de An.* III 3 428a18–b9 and *Insomn.* 2 460b16–22); yet it is generally agreed that Aristotle has Plato in mind in denying that being-appeared-to involves judgement.³⁰ In other words, an

²⁷ Kamtekar (2018) 142 writes that the rational part becomes ‘the subject of new appearances, rational ones on the basis of which it forms beliefs’.

²⁸ Halliwell (1988) 134 and Storey (2014).

²⁹ I thank Paolo Crivelli for this objection.

³⁰ Cf. Lycos (1964) 497–500 (discussing *R.* 10 at 499–500) and Barney (1992) Section II.

interpretation of lines 602 E 4–6 accepting [A1] although denying [A2] amounts to a view that is unlikely to be Plato’s since Aristotle —presumably— would have accepted it.

The attempt adopted here denies [A1] and accepts [A2].³¹ This attempt takes the noun phrase in the dative ‘to this that has measured and indicates [τούτω [...] μετρήσαντι καὶ σημαίνοντι]’ (602 E 4) as governed by ‘the opposites [τάναντία]’.³² This alternative should not be problematic: in particular, the demonstrative ‘this [τούτω]’ refers to the rational part and it is comparable to saying —for instance— ‘the data tell against the defendant’, in which case data ‘tell against’ or are opposite (έναντία) to a subject.³³ With respect to [A2], there are two reasons supporting the assumption that ‘appear [φαίνεται]’ (602 E 5) is equivalent to ‘judges [δοξάζει]’. The first is that the appearance-side of the conflict concerns a perceptual report and there is textual evidence to construe perceptual reports as judgements (δόξαι). The second reason is that *Republic* 9 too evinces a use of ‘appears [φαίνεται]’ in its judgemental

³¹ Jowett and Campbell (1894) III 451–452 deny [A1] by taking the noun phrase in the dative ‘to this that has measured and indicates [τούτω [...] μετρήσαντι καὶ σημαίνοντι]’ (602 E 4) as loosely connected to the main clause and behaving like a genitive absolute. Adam (1902) II 466 finds this construction suspect.

³² Cf. Barney (1992) 286–287 n. 5.

³³ I thank Paolo Crivelli for this example. The conflict at lines 602 E 4–6 is irregular in comparison to other conflicts falling under the principle of opposites —for instance— conflicts between desires or between soul-parts. For, the opposition at lines 602 E 4–6 holds between different kinds of things, namely between what appears and a soul-part rather than —for instance— between appearances or between soul-parts. Barney (1992) 286–287 n. 5 seems sensitive to this irregularity and writes: ‘There is no problem with using the *logistikon* to stand in for what asserts in the *enantia* + dative construction: cf. *Republic* 453c3-4 [453 C 1–2 in Slings (2003)], *Euthyphro* 6a4-5 [6 A 4–6 in Duke et al. (1995)], *Protagoras* 339b9-10 and *Laws* 810d3-4.’

construal, in particular something is said to appear so-and-so precisely because it is judged to be so-and-so. Let us take up each reason in turn.³⁴

It should be uncontroversial that what conflicts with the rational part's indication is a perceptual report; for instance, the rational part indicates that some object is straight whereas sight reports that it is bent. Plato reflects on the nature of sense-perception in *Republic* 7 paying attention to the question about the subjects in which prospective rulers of Callipolis ought to be educated (521 C 1–535 A 2). Two requirements are set down for the subjects in question —first— they must be able to draw the soul from the realm of becoming to the realm of what is or of being (521 D 4–5) and —second— the subjects must not be useless to warlike individuals because prospective rulers must be athletes in war when young (521 D 5–12). The studies that come to mind are *arithmētikē* and *logistikē* (522 B 7–523 A 4) partly because they are useful to warlike individuals since every craft and science is compelled to have a share in them.³⁵ Socrates also notices that *arithmētikē* and *logistikē* lead to understanding, but Glaucon does not comprehend the observation and asks for an explanation. Socrates then goes on to argue that the study of *arithmētikē* and *logistikē* is by nature one which draws the soul in all ways toward being (523 A 5–526 C 7).

The argument relies on a distinction (523 A 10–C 3) between those things in our sense-perceptions that do not compel the soul to rouse the understanding into investigation —call these ‘non-summoners’— and those that do compel the soul in this way —call these

³⁴ Readers sympathetic to assumption [A2] may be tempted to defend it by appealing to Plato's *Sophist* (264 A 4–7, 264 B 1–2). For, Plato there defines appearance (φαντασία) as judgement (δόξα) that arises through perception (i.e. a perceptual judgement) and it is explicitly connected to the verb ‘appears [φαίνεται]’. In other words, the *Sophist* is in agreement with assumption [A2]. It is noteworthy that the definition is presupposed earlier (233 B 1–2 with 233 C 6) as the Visitor first mentions the judgement (δόξα) that sophists are the wisest about all things and then remarks that sophists appear (φαίνονται) to be wise about all subject matters (cf. Crivelli (ms¹) 140). This is noteworthy because the Visitor's observations partially resemble T23 in the sense that they move from judging to appearing whereas T23 shows a move in the opposite direction.

³⁵ The distinction between *arithmētikē* and *logistikē* has been taken to be between a theoretical study (e.g. the theory or science of numbers) and a practical study (e.g. the art of calculation) —e.g.: Adam (1902) II 112, 113; Heath (1921/1981) 13–16. This interpretation was challenged by Klein (1968/1992) 17–25 who argues that the distinction is between the art of counting and the art of calculating; see also Annas (1976) 5–6.

‘summoners’.³⁶ Non-summoners are adequately ‘distinguished [κρινόμενα]’ (523 B 2) by the senses, e.g. sight ‘indicates [ἐσήμηνεν]’ (523 D 5) a finger to be a finger and not also some opposite. But summoners are not adequately distinguished by the senses, meaning that some sense ‘reveals [δηλοῖ]’ (523 C 3) no more this than the opposite or contrary, e.g. the sense of touch ‘announces [παραγγέλλει]’ (524 A 2) that the same thing is both hard and soft. At this point, the soul is puzzled:

T24	<p>Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις αὖ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπορεῖν τί ποτε σημαίνει αὕτη ἢ αἴσθησις τὸ σκληρόν, εἴπερ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ μαλακὸν λέγει, καὶ ἢ τοῦ κούφου καὶ ἢ τοῦ βαρέος, τί τὸ κοῦφον καὶ βαρὺ, εἰ τό τε βαρὺ κοῦφον καὶ τὸ κοῦφον βαρὺ σημαίνει;</p> <p>Καὶ γάρ, ἔφη, αὗται γε ἄτοποι τῇ ψυχῇ αἱ ἐρμηνεῖαι καὶ ἐπισκέψεως δεόμεναι.</p> <p>Εἰκότως ἄρα, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις πρῶτον μὲν πειρᾶται λογισμὸν τε καὶ νόησιν ψυχὴ παρακαλοῦσα ἐπισκο- πεῖν εἴτε ἐν εἴτε δύο ἐστὶν ἕκαστα τῶν εἰσαγγελλομένων.</p> <p>Πῶς δ’ οὐ;</p>	<p>524 A 5</p> <p>B 1</p> <p>B 5</p> <p>B 6</p>
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Is it not necessary —I said— in cases of this sort —on the other hand³⁷— for the soul to puzzle over what on earth this sense indicates by the hard, if truly it declares the same thing³⁸ also soft, as well with the sense which is set over the light and the heavy, what <does it indicate by> the light and heavy, if it indicates both the light thing to be heavy and the heavy thing light?

³⁶ According to some commentators —e.g. Irwin (1977) 144–148 with 318 n. 26 and Fine (1980) 227–235— the problem pertaining to summoners is that the senses announce the property of being F (F-ness) to be also the property of being G (G-ness): the senses —these commentators claim— identify F-ness with some perceptible property with which they identify also G-ness.

³⁷ Cf. Jowett and Campbell (1894) III 331 who take ‘αὖ’ (524 A 5) as ‘[i]n contradiction to the former case [i.e. 523 C ff.] in which the soul was not perplexed’.

³⁸ I take this to mean the same perceptible particular to which the sense attributes ‘hard’ —as opposed to mean ‘the hard’ (i.e. hardness).

Certainly —he said— these are strange expressions which need to be investigated.

It is then likely —I said— in cases of this sort that the soul first tries rousing reasoning and understanding to investigate, with respect to each set of things announced,³⁹ whether they are one or two.

How could it not? (Pl. *R.* 7 524 A 5–B 6)

In passage T24, it is agreed that the soul is necessarily puzzled by the senses' perception of attributes at opposite ends of a range (e.g. soft and hard, big and small, etc.; cf. 524 A 1–2);⁴⁰ for instance, it puzzles over what the sense of touch indicates by the hard and the soft — 'what is the hard?', 'what is the soft?'.⁴¹ The soul may then rely on certain intellectual abilities to investigate whether the attributes at opposite ends of a range (e.g. soft and hard) are one or two things.

The language used to describe the activities of sense-perception in T24 is worth emphasizing: touch 'indicates [σημαίνει]' (524 A 6) something about the hard and the soft; it

³⁹ I render 'ἕκαστα τῶν εἰσαγγελλομένων' as 'each *set* of things announced' to capture the plural 'ἕκαστα'. I take it that by 'ἕκαστα τῶν εἰσαγγελλομένων' Socrates means —for instance— 'hard and soft' (524 A 3), 'light and heavy' (524 A 7–9), as well as 'big and small', 'thick and thin' (cf. 524 C 3–4). In other words, the translation is meant to capture each *pair* of things announced.

⁴⁰ I take the phrase 'the sense set over the hard is compelled to be set over also the soft' (524 1–2) to identify the range of attributes over which the sense of touch governs. The phrase does not mean that the sense feels both hard and soft in all cases. Cf. Adam (1902) II 111 (on *R.* 7 524 A 2).

⁴¹ The 'what is it?' question is vague (cf. Robinson (1953/1980) 59–60). The soul could be asking for a verbal definition of the terms 'hard' and 'soft'. (This is denied by —e.g.: Robinson (1953/1980) 53, plus Cross and Woosley (1964) 7.) It could be asking for an extensional definition, for the feature or features which distinguish the hard and the soft, that is for the feature or features that all and only hard things share and for the feature or features that all and only soft things share. Alternatively, the soul could be asking for a real definition, for the real nature, of the hard and the soft (Cross and Woosley (1964) 6–8). This too is ambiguous: either the soul is asking for a real definition of the hard without positing an entity corresponding to 'the hard' or it is asking for a real definition of the hard while positing a corresponding entity, namely the Form of the Hard. Nothing here hangs on which question is being asked although I would suggest that a real definition without positing an entity (i.e. a Form) is at hand: after all, the context suggests that something more than verbal or extensional definitions are at hand; and the question is *necessarily* raised, yet there is no good reason to believe that all souls would ask the 'what is it?' question while positing an entity (i.e. a Form).

‘declares [λέγει]’ (524 A 7) the same thing to be hard and soft; it ‘indicates [σημαίνει]’ (525 A 9) light things to be heavy (and vice versa). It is worth emphasizing also that the language of indicating appeared prior to T24 (523 D 5; cf. the language of announcements in T24 (524 B 5) and previously at 524 A 2). Now return to passage T23 and observe that the rational part too engages in the activity of ‘making indications [σημαίνουντι]’ (602 E 4) about the perceptible world. Observe moreover that the immediately following exchange is phrased in terms of judgements (δόξαι) (602 E 8–603 A 3). This implies that the activity of making indications is construed as making or having a judgement (δοξάζειν). Consequently, the senses’ indications can be construed as judgements about the perceptible world.⁴² This would explain Socrates’ assumption of —and Glaucon’s unhesitating agreement to— the presence of a judgement opposite to the rational part in T23; put another way, Plato’s use of ‘appears [φαίνεται]’ can be explained by a shared assumption that sensory indications are judgements (δόξαι). The conflict in T23 shows the rational part indicating (i.e. judging) some object to be straight whereas sight indicates (i.e. judges) it to be bent. In other words, reading *Republic* Books 7 and 10 together support assumption [A2] and a judgmental reading of ‘appear [φαίνεται]’ in T23.

There is a second reason supporting assumption [A2] that ‘appear [φαίνεται]’ (602 E 5) is equivalent to ‘judges [δοξάζει]’, namely that a passage in *Republic* 9 too reveals a judgmental use of ‘appears [φαίνεται]’. The third argument to show that the just are better off than the unjust (*R.* 9 583 B 2–588 B 1) —as we have seen— distinguishes distress (λύπη) and pleasure (ἡδονή) as opposite conditions plus a third sort which is neither to feel distress (λυπεῖσθαι) nor to feel pleasure (χαίρειν) (583 C 3–9), ‘a certain quiet [ἡσυχίαν τινά]’ of the soul with respect to the opposites (583 C 7–9). Socrates subsequently invites Glaucon to consider some claims to the effect that conditions devoid of distress are in fact most pleasant:

T25	Ἄρ’ οὖν μνημονεύεις, ἣν δ’ ἐγώ, τοὺς τῶν καμνόντων λόγους, οὓς λέγουσιν ὅταν κάμνωσιν; Ποίους; Ὡς οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡδιον τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν, ἀλλὰ σφᾶς ἐλελήθει, πρὶν κάμνειν, ἡδιστον ὄν.	583 C 10 D 1
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⁴² Cf. Moss (2008), Ganson (2009), Storey (2014).

Μέμνημαι, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τῶν περιωδυνία τινὶ ἐχομένων ἀκούεις λεγόντων ὡς οὐδὲν ἥδιον τοῦ παύσασθαι ὀδυνώμενον; Ἀκούω.	D 5
Καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις γε, οἶμαι, πολλοῖς τοιούτοις αἰσθάνη γίγνομένους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἐν οἷς, ὅταν λυπῶνται, τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν ἡσυχίαν τοῦ τοιούτου ἐγκωμιάζουσιν ὡς ἥδιστον, οὐ τὸ χαίρειν. Τοῦτο γάρ, ἔφη, τότε ἡδὺ ἴσως καὶ ἀγαπητὸν γίγνεται, ἡσυχία. Καὶ ὅταν παύσηται ἄρα, εἶπον, χαίρων τις, ἢ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἡσυχία λυπηρὸν ἔσται. Ἴσως, ἔφη.	D 10 583 E 1 E 3

So —I said— do you remember the claims of the sick, the things they claim whenever they are sick?

Of which sort?

Namely that nothing is more pleasant than being healthy, but it had escaped their notice — before being sick— its being most pleasant.

I am reminded —he said.

Do you not hear too those who are in some excessive pain saying that nothing is more pleasant than to end suffering pain?

I do hear them.

Yes —I suppose— and in many other cases of this sort you perceive human beings finding themselves, cases in which, whenever distressed, they praise not being distressed and the quiet from this sort of thing as most pleasant —<they do> not <praise> being pleased.

For —he said— this [*sc.* not being distressed] at the time [*sc.* of being distressed] becomes equally pleasant and desirable⁴³ —a quiet.

⁴³ LSJ *s.v.* ‘ἀγαπητός’ II 1.

Then —I said— the quiet from pleasure will be distressful also for someone enjoying pleasure whenever it comes to an end.

Probably. (Pl. *R.* 9 583 C 10–E 3)

In passage T25, Socrates invites Glaucon to consider claims about the quiet (or quiet conditions) from the perspective of either distress or pleasure, that is judgements about the quiet (or quiet conditions) at the time of feeling distress or feeling pleasure.⁴⁴ Consider the ill who express the judgement that being healthy is most pleasant insofar as they are ill and thus in distress (583 C 10–D 2). (Since their condition is on a par with those in excessive pain (583 D 3) and with normal people in distress (583 D 7), it is safe to assume that the illness in question here is distressful.) The ill compare their currently distressful condition to a different condition, namely being healthy. The comparison is accentuated by their confessing that being healthy is now seen in a new light given the context of their illness (cf. T26). In comparison to being ill, being healthy is understood to lack the property of being ill, namely distressfulness; for instance, being healthy once again will be the end of being ill —note ‘παύσασθαι [to end]’ in 583 D 3–4— the end of being in distress (cf. ‘τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι [not to feel distress]’ in 583 D 6–9). In other words, being healthy does not have the property of distressfulness, i.e. being healthy is not distressful.

The ill —however— do not claim that being healthy is not distressful insofar as they claim instead that being healthy is most pleasant. Although they (correctly) understand that being healthy is not distressful, they make the further claim that being healthy has the property contrary or most opposed to the property of their current distressful condition —a claim which is false: a condition which is merely not distressful need not be pleasant. The same pattern is observed in the case of those experiencing pleasure, e.g. someone currently experiencing pleasure anticipates the end of the current experience (i.e. the end of pleasure) to be distressful (583 E 1–3). Since the end of distress is on a par with not feeling pain (cf. 583 C 10–D 11), it is safe to assume that the end of pleasure is on a par with not feeling

⁴⁴ Call these ‘non-concurrent’ judgements, in the sense that they are not expressed concurrently with an experience of the quiet. There are also —call them— ‘concurrent’ judgements, namely judgements about the quiet from the perspective of the quiet, that is judgements expressed concurrently with experiencing the quiet. I take Plato to recognize mistakes pertaining to concurrent judgements in the second step of the argument in the topographic analogy (584 D 1–585 A 7).

pleasure (τὸ μὴ χαίρειν), in which case —according to 583 E 1–3— those currently experiencing pleasure anticipate the end of or not (μὴ) feeling pleasure to be distressful —a judgement which is false: a condition which is merely not pleasant need not be distressful.

The claims under discussion —then— are false judgements about quiet conditions (e.g. being healthy), to be clear conditions devoid of distress and of pleasure. Now consider Socrates' assessment:

T26	Πῶς οὖν ὀρθῶς ἔστι τὸ μὴ ἀλγεῖν ἢ δὴ ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ μὴ χαίρειν ἀνιαρόν; Οὐδαμῶς. Οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ φαίνεται, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, παρὰ τὸ ἀλγεινὸν ἢ δὴ καὶ παρὰ τὸ ἡδὴ ἀλγεινὸν τότε ἢ ἡσυχία, καὶ οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς τούτων τῶν φαντασμάτων πρὸς ἡδονῆς ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ γοητεία τις.	584 A 4 A 5 A 10 A 11
	Ὡς γοῦν ὁ λόγος, ἔφη, σημαίνει.	

So, how is it correct to regard that not feeling pain is pleasant or that not feeling pleasure is painful?

Not at all.

Therefore this is not correct —I said— but the quiet then appears pleasant compared⁴⁵ with what is painful and painful compared with what is pleasant; and there is nothing sound from these apparitions with respect to the truth about pleasure, but a certain sorcery.

As at any rate the argument shows —he said. (Pl. R. 9 584 A 4–11)

Glaucon here agrees with Socrates that regarding what is not painful to be pleasant or what is not pleasant to be painful is wrong. Socrates then clarifies that what is neither painful nor pleasant ‘appears [φαίνεται]’ (584 A 7) to have the contrary property in comparison to what is painful or what is pleasant. The assessment in T26 invites the suggestion that ‘appears [φαίνεται]’ here enjoys a judgemental construal. For, Plato writes that the quiet appears to

⁴⁵ LSJ s.v. ‘παρά’ C I 7.

have some property insofar as it is compared to either a painful or a pleasant condition and the comparative context suggests that Plato has in mind the judgements leading up to T26 — for instance— the claims of the ill.⁴⁶ The impression is that the quiet’s appearing so-and-so is explained by the fact that it is judged to be so-and-so. There is a further impression that the ‘apparitions [φαντασμάτων]’ (584 A 9) here are those false judgements about the quiet. This impression is emphasized by the reappearance of the phrase ‘nothing sound [οὐδὲν ὑγιές]’ (584 A 9) later in *Republic* 9 (589 C 3) in a context pertaining to false judgement — note ‘ψεύδοιτο [speaks falsely]’ (589 C 1).⁴⁷ In other words, *Republic* 9 also supports assumption [A2] and a judgemental reading of ‘appears [φαίνεται]’ in T23.⁴⁸

The aforementioned observations should tell against the view both that the sense of ‘appears [φαίνεται]’ in this part of *Republic* 10 is purely phenomenal or sensory (i.e. non-judgemental) and that terms such as ‘appearances [φαινόμενα]’, ‘images [εἶδωλα]’, and ‘apparitions [φαντάσματα]’ are terms ‘not so easily construed judgementally’⁴⁹. Two arguments were given in favor of assumption [A2] that ‘appear [φαίνεται]’ (602 E 5) in T23 is equivalent to ‘judges [δοξάζει]’. The first argues that perceptual reports are construed as judgements (δόξαι) about the perceptible world, in which case T23 involves an episode of

⁴⁶ It may be objected that ‘judges [δοξάζει]’ or ‘judgement [δόξα]’ are not used in this context. It is noteworthy —however— that Socrates introduces the views under scrutiny with ‘So, do you remember the claims [λόγους] of the sick, the things they claim [λέγουσιν] whenever they are sick?’ (583 C 10–11). This is noteworthy because —first— ‘λόγοι [logoi]’ and ‘δόξαι [doxai]’ seem to be treated interchangeably in *Republic* 8 (560 B 6–561 B 3; cf. T30 in Chapter 4 §3) and —second— a parallel passage in *Republic* 9 (573 A 4–B 5) mentions only judgements (δόξαι) suggesting that no substantive difference between ‘λόγοι’ and ‘δόξαι’ need be registered.

⁴⁷ *Republic* 7 (523 A 10–B 6) presents for another connection between perceptual judgements with ‘nothing sound [οὐδὲν ὑγιές]’ (523 B 3) and what is ‘appearing [φαινόμενα]’ (523 B 5). Cf. Pl. *Sph.* 232 A 1–7 with 233 B 1–D 2.

⁴⁸ Cf. *Republic* 8 (557 C 4–10) connecting ‘φαίνω [appear]’ and ‘κρίνω [judge]’.

⁴⁹ Storey (2014) 103 writes: ‘Book 10 furnishes us with plenty of evidence to allay any doubt about the sense of “appears” Plato is using. First, of course, what Socrates calls “appearances” seem to be sensory appearances: paintings, reflections in mirrors, and visual illusions. It should also be noted that these are not only called *phenomena* but also, synonymously, *eidōla* and *phanstasmata*, images and semblances, and these words are not so easily construed judgementally. But most importantly, since Plato is using appearance language to make a distinction, and he does so carefully and deliberately (596 A–598 C), our understanding of what he means should follow this distinction.’

judgement since what ‘appears [φαίνεται]’ is a perceptual report. The second argument relies on *Republic* 9 (T26) as it not only presents a judgmental use of ‘appears [φαίνεται]’, but also suggests that the (false) judgements in question are referred to by the term ‘apparitions [φαντασμάτων]’ in which case ‘φάντασμα [apparition]’ can have a judgemental construal.⁵⁰ There is evidence to suggest a judgemental construal also of images: a verbal lie is described as an image (εἶδωλον) of a true lie in *Republic* 2 (382 B 6–C 3) and the principle requiring each person to perform one task is described as a sort of image (εἶδωλον) of justice in *Republic* 4 (443 C 4–8). It is also tempting to understand a ‘shadow-painting of excellence [σκιαγραφίαν ἀρετῆς]’ (365 C 4) in judgmental terms as a reputation for excellence (cf. *R.* 2 365A 4–C 6 with *R.* 8 554 C 11–D 4).⁵¹ (Chapter 4 §2 defends a connection between imitative poetry’s so-called ‘images [εἶδωλα]’ of excellence and judgements.)

3.4 An outstanding question

There remains an outstanding question with respect to T23: ‘why is it assumed that a soul-*part* makes or has these perceptual judgements?’. This is a question difficult to answer with conviction, but not because of the view defended here: Plato simply does not state a precise relation between sense-perception and the soul’s parts;⁵² yet he clearly assumes that sense-perception and the inferior element in T23 are related in some way. The view defended here takes the inferior element in T23 to be the appetitive part and if Plato held this view, then he clearly assumes that sense-perception and the appetitive part are related in some way. Perhaps sense-perception belongs to the appetitive part, in the sense that sense-perception is an

⁵⁰ Cf. *Republic* 2 (382 A 1–3) for its notion of a verbal apparition (φάντασμα λόγῳ) associated with falsehood.

⁵¹ *Republic* 10 (598 B 6–C 5 with 600 E 4–601 A 3) makes a connection between imitation and false judgement in the case of a painter who makes what appears to be a carpenter to those who falsely think it to be a carpenter (cf. *Pl. Sph.* 234 B 5–C 1). *Republic* 10 (601 B 9–602 C 3) —immediately before T23— suggests a connection between appearance-language and false judgement: imitators are said to lack knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) and correct judgement (δόξα ὀρθή) suggesting that they may just have false judgement; but poetic imitators will nevertheless make what ‘appears [φαίνεται]’ (602 B 2) to be fine to the ignorant many (cf. T27 in Chapter 4 §2).

⁵² Cf. Bobonich (2002) 322.

element or feature of it:⁵³ remember that the appetitive part is responsible for desires pertaining to food, drink, etc. (*R.* 4 436 A 10–B 2, 439 D 6–8), in which case it is responsible for our bodily survival; remember also that the senses can adequately discern objects such as fingers, in which case they presumably can discern objects of concern to the appetitive part (e.g. food, drink, etc.); there is —then— a functional benefit to the appetitive part and sense-perception having an intimate relation,⁵⁴ even more so than other soul-parts. (The intuition is that the body brings together appetite and sense-perception.⁵⁵)

3.5 Conclusion

Chapter 3 has taken two steps on the path to discover the relation between the non-rational parts, excellence, and vice in order to ascertain whether the spirited element could indeed be the primary beneficiary of early ethical education. The first step shows that imitative poetry appeals to the soul's non-rational elements, appetite and spirit. The second step both identifies an inferior non-rational element as the soul-element upon which imitation as a whole exerts its power, as the subject of what appears to be F, and recognizes a judgemental use of appearance-language such as 'appears [φαίνεται]'. These two steps are relevant to our study: the general discussion on imitation characterizes the non-rational element under its sway as an element sensitive or susceptible to perceptual illusions and which holds false judgements contrary to reason in these cases; the particular discussion on imitative poetry clearly identifies the soul-element under its power to that soul-part affected by imitation as a whole; this identification tacitly implies that the non-rational parts are vulnerable to imitative poetry, most likely that —just as the inferior element in the general discussion on imitation is easily deceived by perceptual illusions and holds false judgements contrary to reason in these cases— the non-rational parts are easily deceived by imitative poetry and hold false judgements contrary to reason in this context. Imitative poetry is basically concerned with excellence and vice, in particular with presenting what appears to be excellent to the many. If

⁵³ Both Moss (2008) 46–49 and Storey (2014) 115–116 attribute sense-perception to the non-rational parts due to Plato's *Timaeus* (69 C–D, 70 D–71 B, 77 B 4–6).

⁵⁴ Cf. Lorenz (2006b) 68.

⁵⁵ Cf. *Pl. Phd.* 82 D 9–83 E 3.

the above is correct, then it seems very likely that the non-rational parts would be sensitive or susceptible to what appears to be excellent and would be the bearers of false judgements about what is excellent.

Chapter 4 continues on this path. It argues that the poets' images or apparitions of excellence just are false judgements about excellence since poets copy what the many falsely judge to be excellent. Chapter 4 then advances the view that the soul's non-rational parts are the primary subjects of these false judgements, ('primary') in the sense that these false judgements are acquired first by some non-rational part. This foreshadows a problem for the standard view of early ethical education: the non-rational parts thus seem to be especially susceptible to acquiring false judgements relevant to ethical training, but early ethical education is meant to instill true judgements; if the spirited part is the primary target of education, does this not potentially put spirit at risk of simultaneously holding false and true judgements thus compromising its psychic integrity?

Chapter 4

Images of excellence and non-rational parts

4.1 Introduction

Chapter 3 argues that imitative poetry exerts its power upon both non-rational parts of the soul, appetite and spirit. It also both identifies a non-rational element as the subject of what appears (φαίνεται) to be F and defends a judgemental use of appearance-language such as ‘appears [φαίνεται]’. Chapter 3 concludes observing a tacit implication of the discussions on imitation as a whole and imitative poetry in *Republic* 10, namely that the non-rational parts would be sensitive or susceptible to what appears to be excellent and would be the bearers of false judgements about what is excellent.

Chapter 4 takes two more steps on the path to discover the nature of the relation between the non-rational parts, excellence, and vice in order to ascertain whether the spirited element could indeed be the primary beneficiary of early ethical education. Chapter 4 §2 further defends the judgemental construal of appearance-language specifically in the context of imitative poetry. Chapter 4 §3 argues both that the many hold false judgements about excellence and vice plus that the soul’s non-rational parts are the primary subjects of these false judgements. Chapter 4 §4 then shapes these results into a worry for the standard view on early ethical education.

4.2 What appears excellent and judgement

Chapter 3 alludes to an expectation that an imitative poet’s image of excellence —what *appears* to be excellent— amounts to a false judgement about excellence (and vice). Does this expectation hold true? First, does Plato employ a judgemental use of appearance-language specifically in the context of imitative poetry? This Section 2 will acknowledge this judgemental use in the context of imitative poetry since poets imitate the many’s convictions or judgements about excellence and vice. (Section 3 will argue that these judgements are indeed false.)

There is an initial impression that Plato is employing a judgemental use of appearance-language in the context of imitative poetry. The opening discussion of *Republic* 10 focuses on imitation and imitators, via the painter, characterizing them all (i.e. imitation and imitators, in particular painters) as being far from the truth and producers of ‘images [εἰδῶλα]’ (cf. 597 D 10–598 A 1 and 598 B 6–D 7 —‘image [εἰδῶλον]’ at 598 B 8).¹ The discussion then focuses on imitative poets (598 D 8–599 A 6) —exemplified by Homer— asking whether or not they too are imitators and the question is phrased in terms of whether they make ‘apparitions [φαντάσματα]’ (599 A 3). The terms ‘images [εἰδῶλα]’ and ‘apparitions [φαντάσματα]’ seem to be used interchangeably: the opening discussion on imitators uses the term ‘image [εἰδῶλον]’ and the question on the status of poets as imitators uses the term ‘apparition [φάντασμα]’, but shortly later the term ‘image [εἰδῶλον]’ (599 D 4) is used in relation to a poet —Homer— and the conclusion to the question on the status of poets as imitators uses the term ‘images [εἰδῶλων]’ (600 E 5; cf. 605 B 5–C 4).² After concluding that poets imitate images of excellence without any grasp of the truth (600 E 4–6), they are compared to painters who ‘make what seems to be a shoemaker [σκυτοτόμον ποιήσει δοκοῦντα εἶναι]’ (600 E 7–601 A 1) both without knowing about shoemaking and for an audience also devoid of knowledge (600 E 6–601 A 3). The comparison suggests that imitative poets will make what ‘seems [δοκεῖ]’ to be excellence —note the judgmental term ‘seems [δοκεῖ]’— both without knowing about excellence and for an audience also devoid of knowledge.

Attention is now turned to specifying the degree to which imitative poets do not have knowledge of truth (601 C 7–602 C 3). Socrates again focuses on —and illustrates his point

¹ Cf. Chapter 3 §2 n. 3 and the forthcoming n. 2.

² In the *Sophist* (235 B 8–236 D 4), Plato distinguishes between two kinds of images (εἰδῶλα), a likeness (εἰκών) and an apparition (φάντασμα). Likenesses are associated with faithful representation whereas apparitions are associated with deceptive representation (cf. Crivelli (2012) 24–25). The *Republic* lacks these precise distinctions, but some commentators —Halliwell (1988) 118 and Moss (2007) 419 n. 7— find that ‘likeness [εἰκών]’ is a neutral non-prejudiced term whereas ‘image [εἰδῶλον]’ is often associated with deception and that Plato abandons ‘likeness [εἰκών]’ for ‘image [εἰδῶλον]’ in *Republic* 10. (There is no use of ‘likeness [εἰκών]’ in Book 10.) Note that the term ‘εἰκόνας [images]’ in T10 (402 C 6) —on the interpretation offered there— could be associated with deception: after all, the images in question are vices and describing vices as ‘images’ of excellences suggests that vices —as it were— try to pass off as excellences (cf. *R.* 7 536 A 2–8).

via— painters who are already known to be third from truth. Socrates now introduces an epistemic tripartite hierarchy: users have most experience and knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) (cf. *R.* 2 374 C 8–D 7); makers have correct judgement (ὀρθὴ δόξα) by associating with users;³ and imitators —here painters— have neither knowledge nor correct judgement (602 A 3–7): after all, (imitative) painters do not use what they paint —hence no knowledge— nor do they associate with users —hence no correct judgement. These findings are then applied to imitative poets specifying the degree to which they lack knowledge of truth:

T27	<p>Οὔτε ἄρα εἴσεται οὔτε ὀρθὰ δοξάσει ὁ μιμητῆς περὶ ὧν ἂν μιμῆται πρὸς κάλλος ἢ πονηρίαν.</p> <p>Οὐκ ἔοικεν.</p> <p>Χαρίεις ἂν εἴη ὁ ἐν τῇ ποιήσει μιμητικὸς πρὸς σοφίαν περὶ ὧν ἂν ποιῆ.</p> <p>Οὐ πάνυ.</p> <p>Ἄλλ’ οὖν δὴ ὅμως γε μιμήσεται, οὐκ εἰδὼς περὶ ἐκάστου ὅπῃ πονηρὸν ἢ χρηστόν· ἀλλ’, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἷον φαίνεται καλὸν εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ μηδὲν εἰδόσιν, τοῦτο μιμήσεται.</p> <p>Τί γὰρ ἄλλο;</p>	<p>602 A 8</p> <p>A 10</p> <p>B 1</p> <p>B 4</p>
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The imitator —then— neither will know nor will judge correctly about the things he imitates whether they are fine or poor.

Apparently not.

How accomplished the poetic imitator is in relation to wisdom about the things he makes!

He isn’t really.

Yet he will nevertheless go on imitating no matter what, not knowing in which way each thing is poor or useful. But —as it seems— what appears to be fine to the many who know nothing, this he will imitate.

What else? (*Pl. R.* 10 602 A 8–B 4)

³ Cf. *Pl. Cra.* 390 B 1–D 8; *Pl. Euthd.* 289 A 4–D 7; *Pl. Grg.* 517 C 7–518 A 5.

Passage T27 denies knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) and correct judgement (ὀρθὴ δόξα) about excellence and vice to imitative poets. But they continue to imitate ‘what appears to be fine [οἷον φαίνεται καλὸν εἶναι] to the many’ (602 B 2–3).

Passage T27 precedes the argument identifying the soul-element upon which imitation as a whole exerts its power (602 C 4–603 B 6), namely the argument in which ‘appears [φαίνεται]’ is employed in its judgemental use (cf. Chapter 3 §3, especially T23). Given the proximity of these passages, does appearance-language in T27 follow this pattern? Poets are said to make apparitions (φαντάσματα) of excellence and to imitate what appears (φαίνεται) to be excellent. Is appearance-language here employed in its judgemental use? It is noteworthy —to begin— that there is indeed a connection between judgement and the poets’ imitations of what appears to be fine to the many. For, a comparison between sophists and poets in *Republic* 6 reveals that they express no more than the views and convictions of the many.

Republic 6 (490 E 1–495 B 7) investigates the corruption of a truly philosophical nature. Socrates observes that the masses find sophists to be corruptive forces (492 A 5–B 1), but he challenges this view claiming that the many —those who charge the sophists— are really the greatest ‘educators’, that is corrupters: the many make anyone be just as they wish (492 B 1–5). Socrates also identifies the many’s mechanisms of ‘education’ or manipulation. First, they corrupt in mass gatherings with loud and excessive censure to speech or deeds as well as with loud and excessive praise. These circumstances are corruptive because the views or judgements acquired in private education will be swept away or abandoned by this sort of blame or praise (cf. *R.* 3 412 E 4–413 C 4: I assume the idea to be that mass blame and praise work upon our pains, pleasures, fears, etc.). Once swept away, the young person calls the same things ‘honorable [καλά]’ and ‘shameful [αἰσχρά]’ as the many, practices the very same things as the many, and becomes that sort of person (492 B 6–D 1). The second mechanism by which the many ‘educate’ or manipulate is punishment. If mass blame and praise do not work, then the many punish in a variety of ways (492 D 2–8). (I take the second mechanism to support the idea that mass blame and praise work upon our pains, pleasures, fears, etc.: I assume that punishment is meant to induce some kind of distress.) Short of having a divine character or receiving the grace of divine intervention, no human character can escape current

political systems (492 D 9–493 A 3). In other words, the many set the agenda or discourse about excellence and there is basically no escape to endorsing it.

Socrates and Glaucon then agree on the relationship between the sophists’ teachings and the views of the many:

T28	<p>Ἐκαστος τῶν μισθαρνούντων ιδιωτῶν, οὓς δὴ οὗτοι σοφιστὰς καλοῦσι καὶ ἀντιτέχνους ἡγοῦνται, μὴ ἄλλα παιδεύειν ἢ ταῦτα τὰ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματα, ἃ δοξάζουσιν ὅταν ἄθροισθῶσιν, καὶ σοφίαν ταύτην καλεῖν. οἷόνπερ ἂν εἰ θρέμματος μεγάλου καὶ ἰσχυροῦ τρεφομένου τὰς ὀργὰς τις καὶ ἐπιθυμίας κατεμάνθανεν, ὅπη τε προσελθεῖν χρὴ καὶ ὅπη ἄψασθαι αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὅποτε χαλεπώτατον, ἢ πραότατον, καὶ ἐκ τίνων γίγνεται, καὶ φωνὰς δὴ ἐφ’ οἷς ἐκάστας εἴωθεν φθέγγεσθαι, καὶ οἷας αὖ ἄλλου φθεγγομένου ἡμεροῦταί τε καὶ ἀγριαίνει, καταμαθῶν δὲ ταῦτα πάντα συνουσία τε καὶ χρόνου τριβῆ σοφίαν τε καλέσειεν καὶ ὡς τέχνην συστησάμενος ἐπὶ διδασκαλίαν τρέποιτο, μηδὲν εἰδὼς τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τούτων τῶν δογμάτων τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ὅτι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχροὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἀδίκον, ὀνομάζοι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα ἐπὶ ταῖς τοῦ μεγάλου ζώου δόξαις, οἷς μὲν χαίροι ἐκεῖνο ἀγαθὰ καλῶν, οἷς δὲ ἄχθοιτο κακά, ἄλλον δὲ μηδένα ἔχοι λόγον περὶ αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰναγκαῖα δίκαια καλοῖ καὶ καλά, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, ὅσον διαφέρει τῷ ὄντι, μήτε ἑωρακῶς εἶη μήτε ἄλλῳ δυνατὸς δεῖξαι, τοιοῦτος δὴ ὢν πρὸς Διὸς οὐκ ἄτοπος ἂν σοὶ δοκεῖ εἶναι παιδευτής;</p> <p>Ἐμοιγ’, ἔφη.</p>	<p>493 A 6</p> <p>A 10</p> <p>B 1</p> <p>B 5</p> <p>C 1</p> <p>C 5</p> <p>C 9</p>
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Each of the private wage-earners —whom these [*sc.* people] call ‘sophists’ and regard as rivals in craft— teaches nothing but the very convictions of the many, that is their judgements whenever they are assembled together and this he calls ‘wisdom’. It

is just as if someone were learning the passions and appetites of a huge and strong beast he is rearing: how to approach and handle it; when it is most difficult to deal with or most docile, plus what makes it so; what sounds it utters in either condition; and what tones of voice soothe or anger it. And having learned all this by associating and spending time together, he calls this ‘wisdom’ and gathering it together as if a craft he starts to teach it. Knowing nothing in reality about these convictions and appetites which is honorable or shameful, good or bad, just or unjust, he uses all these [*sc.* terms] in conformity with the great beast’s judgements, calling the things it enjoys ‘good’ and the things that vex it ‘bad’ —he has no other account to give of them— but he calls what he is compelled to do ‘just’ and ‘honorable’, neither having seen nor being able to explain to another how much the natures of necessity and goodness really differ. Don’t you think —by Zeus— that such a man would make a strange educator?

I do indeed —he said. (Pl. *R.* 6 493 A 6–C 9)

Passage T28 claims that sophists teach the very same convictions (*δόγματα*) or judgements (*δόξαι*) of the many when gathered together (493 A 6–9); put another way, sophists are not original thinkers, but basically regurgitate the views of the times and the environment. This activity is compared to learning the appetites and passions of a beast without knowing which of these are in fact excellent or vicious (493 B 7–C 1). The comparison views sophists as using evaluative terms in the same way as the many (cf. 492 B 6–D 1) and using them merely in relation to their pleasures and distresses —note ‘χαίροι [enjoys]’ (492 C 2) and ‘ἄχθοιτο [vexed]’ (492 C 3)— or their demands (493 C 1–6). (This observation may be alluding to the many’s acquisition of evaluative judgements, namely that they are acquired merely in relation to pleasure and distress.)

The passage immediately following T28 (493 C 10–E 1) finds these sophists to be no different from poets:

T29	ἼΗ οὖν τι τούτου δοκεῖ διαφέρειν ὁ τὴν τῶν πολλῶν καὶ παντοδαπῶν συνιόντων ὀργὴν καὶ ἡδονὰς κατανενοηκέναι σοφίαν ἡγούμενος, εἴτ’ ἐν γραφικῇ εἴτ’ ἐν μουσικῇ εἴτε δὴ	493 C 10 D 1
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ἐν πολιτικῇ; ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἐάν τις τούτοις ὁμιλῇ ἐπιδεικνύμε-
 νος, ἢ ποιήσιν ἢ τινα ἄλλην δημιουργίαν ἢ πόλει διακονίαν,
 κυρίους αὐτοῦ ποιῶν τοὺς πολλούς, πέρα τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἢ
 Διομήδεια λεγομένη ἀνάγκη ποιεῖν αὐτῷ ταῦτα ἃ ἂν οὔτοι
 ἐπαινῶσιν· ὡς δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ ταῦτα τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, ἤδη
 πώποτε του ἤκουσας αὐτῶν λόγον διδόντος οὐ καταγέλαστον;
 Οἶμαι δέ γε, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὐδ' ἀκούσομαι.

D 5

E 1

Is there any difference between this person and the one who regards as wisdom to understand the disposition and pleasures of the multifarious many gathered together, whether in painting or in music or —of course— in politics? For, whenever someone busies himself with them by putting on a show —be it poetry or some other creative endeavor or service to the city— and makes the many sovereign over him beyond what is called for, the so-called ‘Diomedean’ necessity is upon him to make the things which they praise. But that these are truly good and fine, have you ever heard from him an account about them that was not ridiculous?

I have not —he said— nor will I hear it. (Pl. *R.* 6 493 C 10–E 1)

Passage T29 finds that —just as the sophists— poets too aim to please the many (cf. *R.* 10 605 A 2–6). The analogy between sophists and poets reveals the relationship between poets and the convictions or judgements of the many. Poets too —then— express nothing more than the convictions or judgements of the many (cf. *R.* 4 426 C 2–6 with *R.* 10 598 D 8–599 A 6 (cf. 599 C 6–D 2)). It is noteworthy that this view is articulated early in the *Republic* as poets and private individuals are alleged to share the same views about excellence and vice (*R.* 2 363 E 4–364 B 2), to be precise poets are echoing the many (cf. *R.* 2 358 E 2–6, 359 A 4–7, 360 D 1–3, and 365 B 4–C 1). This evidence acknowledges a connection between the poets’ imitations of what appears to be fine or excellent to the many (in T27) and judgements about what is fine or excellent. It seems certainly the case that ‘appears’ in the phrase ‘what appears to be fine [or excellent] to the many’ (602 B 2–3) is employed in its judgemental sense and thus what *appears* to be excellent to the many just is what is *judged* to be excellent by the many.

But are these judgements false? The above considerations do not show that the many's evaluative judgements are false. Reflect —however— on the earliest remarks on poetry in *Republic 2*: there are two kinds of stories included in musical training, true and false stories (376 E 8–377 A 7); Homer, Hesiod, and other poets composed false tales (377 D 3–5); a great fault in uttering a falsehood (ψεύδεσθαι) is found to be ‘whenever someone using words creates a bad image about what the gods and heroes are like [Ὅταν εικάζη τις κακῶς τῷ λόγῳ, περὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἡρώων οἷοί εἰσιν]’ (377 E 1–2; cf. 377 E 6–378 A 1). In *Republic 3*, after discussing stories about gods, heroes, etc., Socrates refrains from discussing stories pertaining to humans ‘because —I suppose— we are to say that poets and prose writers speak badly about the greatest things pertaining to humans [Ὅτι οἶμαι ἡμᾶς ἐρεῖν ὡς ἄρα καὶ ποιηταὶ καὶ λογοποιοὶ κακῶς λέγουσιν περὶ ἀνθρώπων τὰ μέγιστα]’ (392 A 12–B 1). Note the adverb ‘κακῶς [badly]’ both here and in the gloss to a great fault in uttering a falsehood. The impression is that to speak badly (κακῶς) about the greatest things pertaining to humans is to utter falsehoods (ψεύδεσθαι): indeed, consider the claims about humans ascribed to poets and prose writers (*R.* 3 392 B 1–7; cf. *R.* 8 568 A 8–C 2). These early remarks on poetry stress the presence of false views. For, poets echo the views held by the many (*R.* 6 493 C 10–E 1 with T28) and it is thus not implausible to expect false views in the many's evaluative judgements —the purview of poetry upon which Plato focuses. (Section 3 next will argue both that the many's judgements about excellence and vice are false plus that an inferior non-rational part is the subject of these false judgements.)

4.3 The many's false judgements about excellence

Republic 8–9 (from 544 C 1) picks up a previously interrupted discussion (*R.* 5 449 A 1–B 1) to sketch the four main kinds of degenerate constitutions and the men like them, in particular their coming-to-be as well as their nature. The purpose of the discussion is to assess these constitutions alongside Callipolis and the man like it in order to answer the question: ‘is the just soul better off than the others?’ (cf. *R.* 1 354 A 12–C 3). The four degenerate constitutions are timocracy (*R.* 8 545 C 7–548 D 5), oligarchy (*R.* 8 550 C 8–553 A 2), democracy (*R.* 8 555 B 4–558 C 5), and tyranny (*R.* 8 562 A 4–569 C 9). It is agreed that there is a form of human character corresponding to each constitution and so there are four

main kinds of degenerate psychic constitutions (*R.* 8 544 D 5–E 6; cf. *R.* 4 435 A 6–436 A 7, in particular 435 D 9–436 A 7): the timocrat (*R.* 8 548 D 6–550 B 8), the oligarch (*R.* 8 553 A 3–555 B 3), the democrat (*R.* 8 558 C 6–562 A 3), and the tyrant (*R.* 9 571 A 1–4, 572 D 6–576 B 9).

The sketch of the democrat in Book 8 includes his coming-to-be (558 C 6–D 7, 559 D 1–561 B 3;⁴ cf. *R.* 9 572 B 9–C 8, 572 D 9–E 2) and his nature or what he is like (561 B 3–562 A 3; cf. *R.* 9 572 C 8–D 5).⁵ Socrates and Adeimantus agree both that he could be the son of an oligarchic man, raised in his father’s ways, and that he too —the son— then rules by force the non-necessary pleasures within him. In other words, Socrates and Adeimantus agree that the son has an oligarchic soul (558 C 10–D 7; cf. 559 D 1–6). It is suggested that the change from having an oligarchic constitution to a democratic soul begins with experiencing pleasures ‘of all sorts [παντοδαπὰς]’ (559 D 7), especially when certain appetites in the oligarchic soul —namely those conducive to pleasures of all sorts— receive help from other persons with similar appetites, presumably in the sense that like-minded others provide for the satisfaction of the appetites in question (559 D 5–E 8). The appetites in question are the non-necessary ones (559 E 9–560 A 8; cf. *R.* 9 572 B 9–E 2), in which case the suggestion is that the change from having an oligarchic constitution to a democratic constitution begins with experiencing non-necessary pleasures. With the experience of non-necessary pleasures, the young oligarch’s non-necessary appetites are nourished, becoming many and strong —a multitude (560 A 9–B 5). Socrates continues:

T30	<p>Τελευτῶσαι δὴ, οἶμαι, κατέλαβον τὴν τοῦ νέου τῆς ψυχῆς ἀκρόπολιν, αἰσθόμεναι κενὴν μαθημάτων τε καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματων καλῶν καὶ λόγων ἀληθῶν, οἱ δὴ ἄριστοι φρουροὶ τε καὶ φύλακες ἐν ἀνδρῶν θεοφιλῶν εἰσι διανοίαις.</p> <p>Καὶ πολὺ γ’, ἔφη.</p> <p>Ψευδεῖς δὴ καὶ ἀλαζόνες, οἶμαι, λόγοι τε καὶ δόξαι ἀντ’</p>	560 B 6
		C 1

⁴ The discussion on the democrat is interrupted to distinguish between necessary and non-necessary appetites (*R.* 8 558 D 8–559 C 12).

⁵ Scholars generally identify two phases in the democrat’s coming to be, phase one (*R.* 8 558 C 8–561 A 8) and phase two (*R.* 8 561 A 8–562 A 3) —e.g.: Scott (2000) 22 (a ‘junior’ and a ‘senior’ democrat), Parry (2007) 390, Johnstone (2013) 154.

ἐκείνων ἀναδραμόντες κατέσχον τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον τοῦ τοι-
ούτου.

Σφόδρα γ', ἔφη.

C 5

Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ πάλιν τε εἰς ἐκείνους τοὺς Λωτοφάγους ἐλθὼν
φανερῶς κατοικεῖ, καὶ ἐὰν παρ' οἰκείων τις βοήθεια τῷ
φειδωλῷ αὐτοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀφικνῆται, κλήσαντες οἱ ἀλαζόνες
λόγοι ἐκείνοι τὰς τοῦ βασιλικοῦ τείχους ἐν αὐτῷ πύλας οὔτε
αὐτὴν τὴν συμμαχίαν παριᾶσιν, οὔτε πρέσβεις πρεσβυτέρων
λόγους ἰδιωτῶν εἰσδέχονται, αὐτοὶ τε κρατοῦσι μαχόμενοι,
καὶ τὴν μὲν αἰδῶ ἠλιθιότητα ὀνομάζοντες ὠθοῦσιν ἔξω
ἀτίμως φυγάδα, σωφροσύνην δὲ ἀνανδρίαν καλοῦντές τε καὶ
προπηλακίζοντες ἐκβάλλουσι, μετριότητα δὲ καὶ κοσμίαν
δαπάνην ὡς ἀγροικίαν καὶ ἀνελευθερίαν οὔσαν πείθοντες
ὑπερορίζουσι μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἀνωφελῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν;

D 1

Σφόδρα γε.

Τούτων δὲ γέ που κενώσαντες καὶ καθήραντες τὴν τοῦ
κατεχομένου τε ὑπ' αὐτῶν καὶ τελουμένου ψυχὴν μεγάλοισι
τέλεσι, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἤδη ὕβριν καὶ ἀναρχίαν καὶ ἀσωτίαν
καὶ ἀναίδειαν λαμπρὰς μετὰ πολλοῦ χοροῦ κατάγουσιν
ἐστεφανωμένας, ἐγκωμιάζοντες καὶ ὑποκοριζόμενοι, ὕβριν
μὲν εὐπαιδευσίαν καλοῦντες, ἀναρχίαν δὲ ἐλευθερίαν, ἀσω-
τίαν δὲ μεγαλοπρέπειαν, ἀναίδειαν δὲ ἀνδρείαν. Ἄρ' οὐχ οὔτω
πως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, νέος ὢν μεταβάλλει ἐκ τοῦ ἐν ἀναγκαίοις
ἐπιθυμίαις τρεφομένου εἰς τὴν τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων καὶ
ἀνωφελῶν ἡδονῶν ἐλευθέρωσίν τε καὶ ἄνεσιν;

D 5

E 1

E 5

561 A 1

Καὶ μάλα γ', ἦ δ' ὅς, ἐναργῶς.

A 5

Finally —I suppose— they [*sc.* the non-necessary appetites⁶] seize the acropolis of the young man's soul, perceiving that it is devoid of fine notions, ways of living, and

⁶ Cf. Jowett and Campbell (1894) III 393, Scott (2000) 34, Hitz (2010) 118, Johnstone (2011) 161, Johnstone (2013) 154, Arruzza (2019) 171. Cf. the forthcoming n. 14 with its main text.

true views, those which are the best watchmen and guards in the minds of men loved by the gods.

By far the best —he said.

Then —I suppose— false and boastful views and judgements, rising quickly, occupy this same part of him in place of the others.⁷

They do indeed —he said.

Won't he then return to those Lotus-eaters and live with them openly? And if any help should come to the thrifty part of his soul from his relatives, don't those boastful words —having barred the gates of the royal wall within him— prevent the allied force itself from entering and even refuse to admit words of older private individuals as ambassadors? Proving stronger in the battle, won't they call shame 'foolishness' and drive it out as a dishonored fugitive? And calling temperance 'cowardliness', won't they shower it with abuse and banish it? As for moderate and orderly expenditure, won't they persuade him that it is boorish and illiberal, and join with a multitude of useless appetites to drive it over the border?

They will indeed.

And when they have somehow emptied and purged these from the soul of the one they are seizing hold of and initiating with solemn rites, they then immediately proceed to lead in arrogance, anarchy, extravagance, and shamelessness in a blaze of torchlight, accompanied with a vast chorus of followers and crowned with garlands. They praise them and give them fine names, calling arrogance 'good breeding', anarchy 'freedom', extravagance 'magnificence', and shamelessness 'courage'. Isn't it in some such way as this —I said— that a young person exchanges an upbringing among necessary appetites for the freeing and release of useless and non-necessary pleasures?

Yes —he said— that's clearly the way it happens. (Pl. *R.* 8 560 B 6–561 A 5)

In passage T30, the young oligarch is finally corrupted and comes to be ruled by false judgements about excellences and vices. Passage T30 sheds some light on the views and

⁷ Views and judgements are characterized as boastful probably because they make excessive claims about democratic desires and values, e.g. freedom (cf. *R.* 9 562 B 7–C 3).

judgements of democrats. I write ‘some’ light because a young democrat and an older democrat may not share the same views (cf. *R.* 8 561 A 6–B 7).⁸ But even if older democrats mollify their attitude, they nevertheless enjoy a central false judgement about the equality of desires and pleasures and it probably informs other false judgements (cf. *R.* 8 561 B 8–C 5 with 562 B 7–C 3). Democrats —then— surely hold false judgements about excellence and vice.

Now it is arguably the case that the many are democrats or even worse (e.g. drones). For, the many’s desires are ‘of all sorts [παντοδαπάς]’ (*R.* 4 431 B 9 in T16) and persons who enjoy desires of all sorts deny true views both distinguishing between necessary and non-necessary appetites plus calling to restrain the latter: this is explicitly true of democrats (*R.* 8 561 B 8–C 4) and it is surely true of those drones who expose young oligarchs to pleasures ‘of all sorts [παντοδαπάς]’ (*R.* 8 559 D 7) before they become democrats. Note —moreover— that both the many and the democrat are characterized as ‘manifold’, respectively ‘παντοδαπῶν [*pantodapōn*]’ (*R.* 6 493 D 1) and ‘παντοδαπὸν [*pantodapōn*]’ (*R.* 8 561 E 3). Since the many are democrats —or worse— and the latter hold false judgements about excellence and vice, it follows that the many hold false judgements about these.

This is consequential: since poets imitate what appears to be excellent to the many, to be precise what the many judge to be excellent, and the many hold false judgements about excellence (and vice), it follows that poets imitate false judgements about excellence (and vice). In other words, imitative poetry’s images or apparitions of excellence just are the many’s false judgements about excellence. Now Chapter 3 showed that what appears consorts with an inferior non-rational part of the soul, (‘consorts’) in the sense that what appears —or the judgement in question— is attributed to an inferior non-rational part as its subject. This result from Chapter 3 applied to the context of imitative poetry would imply that an inferior non-rational part is the subject of false judgements about excellence and vice. Do poetic images or apparitions of excellence —what appears excellent to the many— consort with an inferior non-rational part of the soul?

Passage T30 strongly suggests that a non-rational part is the primary subject of these false judgements about excellence and vice acquired as a consequence of desires, aversions, etc. (I write ‘primary’ because —if the following is correct— a non-rational part first acquires

⁸ Cf. the previous n. 5 in this Section 3.

the false judgements in question and it is then joined by the rational part.) Recall the picture in which ‘false and boastful views and judgements, rising quickly, occupy this same part of him [*sc.* the acropolis] in place of the others’ (560 C 2–4 in T30). This picture suggests that an inferior non-rational element is the primary subject of the false judgements in question before they occupy or are acquired by the rational part.⁹ This suggestion can be traced to describing the judgements as ‘rising quickly [ἀναδραμόντες]’ (560 C 3). There are two alternative interpretations depending on whether ‘ἀναδραμόντες [*anadramontes*]’ is meant to be taken literally or not. If ‘ἀναδραμόντες’ is meant literally, then the term would indicate that judgements move from one place to another, to be precise from an undisclosed place upwards to the acropolis: ‘ἀναδραμόντες’ is composed with the preposition ‘ἀνά’ which could mean upwards movement.¹⁰ Since the young man in question develops from an oligarchic soul —a soul ruled by the appetitive part— the literal interpretation of ‘ἀναδραμόντες’ would suggest that the false judgements move from the appetitive part (i.e. an inferior element) upwards to the acropolis (i.e. the rational part), in which case the appetitive part is a subject of the judgements in question before the rational part. If the alternative according to which ‘ἀναδραμόντες’ is not meant literally —nothing requires taking it so— then judgements do not literally move from one soul-part (e.g. appetite) to the acropolis (i.e. reason). The non-literal ‘ἀναδραμόντες’ could mean only that judgements come to be swiftly in the young man’s acropolis —they sprout up¹¹— in which case no other soul-part would have already been a subject of the judgements in question. (This is the only instance of ‘ἀνατρέχω [rise quickly]’ in the Platonic corpus, so relying on other instances to favor one alternative over another is not an option.)

⁹ There is good reason to believe that the acropolis is the rational part of the soul: a properly trained acropolis —full of fine notions, etc.— would be our best guard (*R.* 8 560 B 8–9); the best guard is reason mixed with musical training, in particular the best guard keeps us from indulging (i.e. it controls, opposes, etc.) our money-loving nature, that is our appetitive part (*R.* 8 549 A 9–B 8; cf. *R.* 4 442 A 5–7 in T2); now, a proper musical and physical training results in two soul-parts, reason and spirit, being put in charge of the appetitive part (*R.* 4 441 E 7–442 B 9 = partially T2); but the best guard (of the two) would rule (*R.* 3 412 B 9–414 B 6) and reason would be the best guard: after all, ruling belongs to the rational part whereas spirit is to be obedient to and an ally of it (*R.* 4 441 E 3–6).

¹⁰ LSJ *s.v.* ‘ἀνά’ F 1.

¹¹ LSJ *s.v.* ‘ἀνατρέχω’ II 3.

The literalist reading according to which the false judgements in question rise up from the appetitive part is preferable. For, it is very likely that the young oligarch secretly held at least some false and boastful judgements before being fully corrupted and these must be attributed to the appetitive part. Consider —first— the young oligarch’s association with the drones as there is reason to believe that the drones hold ‘false and boastful views and judgements’ (560 C 2): these judgements play a role in the release of non-necessary appetites and pleasures which are conducive to lawlessness —if unchecked— and the drones are preoccupied with lawlessness (cf. *R.* 8 560 C 2–561 B 7 with *R.* 9 572 B 9–573 A 3 and 571 A 7–D 6); in other words, these judgements would be very favorable to the drones. There is reason to believe also that the young oligarch is exposed to the drones’ views (cf. *R.* 8 549 C 1–550 B 8). Now —second— it is reasonable to assume that close or intimate association with certain individuals and indulging in their practices results in adopting certain views or judgements (cf. *R.* 2 376 C 8–377 B 9, *R.* 3 395 C 3–D 4, 408 C 5–409 E 3, *R.* 4 429 E 7–430 B 6). The young oligarch’s association with the drones is probably intimate enough to result in acquiring some of their views: after all, the young oligarch adopts their behavior (cf. *R.* 9 572 C 6–D 5). In other words, it is very likely that the young oligarch acquires some false views before being fully corrupted and having his rational part be occupied by them. This idea (that the young oligarch already holds some false judgements before being fully corrupted) is supported by a general phenomenon of degeneration. Corruption brings to the surface —out in the open— something previously secret. Consider timocrats who have a secret love for money which is made manifest as the city degenerates into an oligarchy (cf. *R.* 8 548 A 5–C 4, 549 A 9–B 11, and 550 D 2–551 B 8). Consider also democrats who enjoy lawless desires in dreams —secretly— which are awakened as they degenerate into tyrannical beings (cf. *R.* 9 574 D 1–575 A 8 and 576 B 3–5 with 571 C 3–D 6). Now observe that the young oligarch’s corruption brings to the surface false and boastful views and judgements (cf. 560 C 2–5 in T30). If these observations are correct, then there is reason to believe that that young oligarch secretly held at least some false and boastful judgements before being fully corrupted. There is reason to believe —moreover— that these false judgements should be attributed to the appetitive part: first —as we have seen— these false and boastful judgements conflict with oligarchic views in the sense that they cannot be simultaneously held by numerically one and the same soul-part; second, the psychic conflict

experienced by the young oligarch strongly suggests that oligarchic views are held by the rational part with the support of the spirited (cf. Chapter 2 §4 on T19 with *R.* 4 440 A 9–440 B 8); if the above is correct and the young oligarch secretly holds at least some false and boastful judgements before being fully corrupted, then these must be attributed to the appetitive part. In other words, the young oligarch’s appetitive part is the primary subject of the false and boastful judgements which rise quickly and occupy the rational part.¹² In other words, T30 strongly suggests that the many’s false judgements about excellence and vice are acquired first by the appetitive part, an inferior non-rational part of the soul.

This Section 3 has argued that the soul’s appetitive part can be the primary subject of false judgements about excellence and vice. It is now important to remember that conclusions about the appetitive part have been casually extended to the spirited in the context of imitative poetry and elsewhere (cf. Chapter 3 §2, the discussion pertaining to passages T21 and T22; cf. *R.* 9 586 B 7–D 3). It is plausible —then— to extend these results to the spirited part, i.e. to extend insights about the appetitive part and these judgements to spirit. The spirited part too can be the primary subject of false judgements about excellence and vice: after all, there are judgements that praise timocratic desires and values, namely spirited desires and values not ruled by or following the rational part; and —following the precedent set by T30— their proper subject would surely be the spirited part. (It is tempting to construe some judgements in *Republic* 8 549 C 1–550 B 8 in this way.) In other words, it is plausible to construe both non-rational parts of the soul as the primary subjects of false judgements about excellence and vice.

4.4 An old worry for the standard view?

¹² The above interpretation casts a plausible light on Socrates’ greatest accusation against imitative poetry (i.e. its ability to corrupt even good people). Good persons who follow law and reason in cases of private misfortune (e.g. losing something valuable) have correct judgements. In the theater —however— they temporarily abandon these judgements and they allow their irritable element to be pleased. If the above is correct, then Socrates’ concern could be that sustained gratification (i.e. strengthening) of their irritable element will make them —like the young oligarch— altogether abandon their correct judgements and then come to be ruled by false ones, by what appears to be excellent.

This ought to be concerning for the standard view according to which the spirited part —a non-rational element— is the primary target or beneficiary of early ethical education. If —as we have seen— there is a strong impression that non-rational parts are especially sensitive or susceptible to be subjects of false judgements relevant to ethical training and the spirited part is meant to explain the acquisition of true judgements, is it not in danger of experiencing conflict that threatens its psychic integrity by holding opposite judgements at the same time? Supporters of the standard view may wish to dismiss this worry about partitioning the spirited part. For, there will be no false judgements —for instance— about what is excellent for the non-rational parts to pick up or acquire during early ethical education in Callipolis. It may be tempting to suppose that the non-rational parts are subjects of false judgements relevant to ethical training only insofar as they are exposed to imitative poetry. But imitative poetry is banned from Callipolis and so there should be no worry about the spirited part's being potentially subject to conflicting judgements at the same time.

The worry —however— cannot be so easily dismissed. It is uncontroversial that imitative poetry does play a role in corrupting our judgement and that this specific risk (of being corrupted by poetry) would be eliminated in Callipolis. But passage T28 —I parenthetically noted— seems to allude to a view according to which the many acquire evaluative judgements in relation to their desires, pleasures, etc.; and passage T30 —I shall argue next— strongly suggests that the many acquire judgements about excellence and vice as a consequence of non-necessary desires and pleasures. These observations hint at a problem that runs deeper than merely the style and content of the stories to which we are exposed as children: these observations suggest that the problem of acquiring false judgements here is more proper to the soul itself rather than something merely picked up by the soul.

Passage T30 strongly suggests that judgements about excellence and vice are acquired as a consequence of desires, pleasures, etc.: the young man —we shall see— is corrupted only by non-necessary desires and pleasures and these cause a confusion of excellences for vices and vices for excellences. There is a scholarly debate concerning the role —if any— of reason in the degeneration of psychic constitutions and in the established degenerate characters. By 'reason' it seems to be meant an autonomous soul-part that deliberates about the ends of degenerate constitutions and gives shape or order to the life of the person in

Then —I suppose— he sits on either side the rational and spirited elements on the ground under it and enslaves them: the first he will forbid to calculate or examine anything but how a little money will be worth much more; the second he will forbid to admire and honor anything but wealth and the wealthy, and to love being honored for anything but the possession of wealth and whatever may contribute to it.

There is —he said— no other change as swift and forcible from an honor-loving youth into a money-lover. (Pl. *R.* 8 553 D 1–E 1)

T31 observes that the transition from a timocratic youth to an oligarch finds the rational part enslaved to the appetitive, ('enslaved') in the sense that reason is now forced to satisfy the appetitive part's money-making desires. If we accept the assumption that there may be no substantial difference between seizing and enslaving in this context, then it is likely that the young man's acropolis or rational part is 'seized' by non-necessary appetites in the sense that it is enslaved to oblige and promote them; in other words, the young man's non-necessary appetites now forcibly task the acropolis or rational part with obliging and promoting them—not just necessary appetites.¹⁵ This new task (of obliging and promoting non-necessary appetites and pleasures) seems to be an inevitable outcome of the growing number and strength of non-necessary appetites and pleasures, ('inevitable') in the sense that there is no reflection or deliberation to acquire the new task and the acropolis or rational part is forced by the torrent of multitudinous non-necessary appetites and pleasures (cf. T39). It is worth emphasizing that oligarchs raise their children to be weak at enduring pleasures and pains (*R.* 8 556 B 7–C 2): this suggests that oligarchic children merely give in to these pressures rather than deliberate. In other words, there is a strong impression that an increase and

¹⁵ The young man's soul now seems to be ruled by the appetitive part as a whole rather than by just one kind of appetite (e.g. the necessary appetites in the case of oligarchs): after all, exclusively catering to non-necessary appetites is impossible as some appetites are indispensable for survival (cf. *R.* 8 558 D 11–559 A 2); and the idea of catering exclusively to non-necessary appetites does not fit well with lines 561 A 6–8. This seems to hold in the case of the established democratic soul (from 561 A 8). (*R.* 9 572 B 9–D 5 confirms that the democratic soul begins to be established from 561 A 8.) See Chapter 3 §2 n. 8 for the prevalent interpretation concerning the established democratic soul.

strengthening of non-necessary appetites and pleasures is the sole cause of corrupting the young man's oligarchic soul.

There is a strong impression also that only these non-necessary desires and pleasures —without an intervention from the rational part— cause the young man to have a change of mind about excellences and vices, to be precise a change of mind resulting in confusing excellences for vices and vices for excellences. For, the new task of obliging and promoting non-necessary appetites and pleasures presupposes having oligarchic ways of living, views (λόγοι), etc. —by which the young man would forcefully rule his non-necessary appetites— be expelled. This must be the case since the new task is incompatible with an oligarchic soul: seriously indulging non-necessary appetites leads one away from oligarchic ways (cf. *R.* 9 572 B 9–2). Oligarchic views (λόγοι) and judgements (δόξαι) —moreover— must be expelled before the arrival of other views and judgements (cf. *R.* 8 560 C 2–5) lest the acropolis (i.e. the rational part) suffer self-partitioning.¹⁶ For, oligarchic judgements arguably are held by the rational part: the psychic conflict experienced by the young oligarch strongly suggests that oligarchic views are held by the rational part with the support of the spirited (cf. Chapter 2 §4 on T19 with *R.* 4 440 A 9–440 B 8); and the rational part's being occupied by false and boastful judgements in T30 supports the idea that oligarchs have their rational part occupied by oligarchic views (cf. *R.* 8 553 D 1–E 1). Now the co-existence of oligarchic judgements in the acropolis at the same time as the false and boastful judgements would fall under the so-called 'principle of opposites':¹⁷ the boastful judgements do not admit or welcome oligarchic views in the sense that they deny (ἀνανεύουσι) their claims (cf. *R.* 8 561 B 8–C 5 paying attention to the parallel language of non-admittance, explicated by the democrat's denial —note 'ἀνανεύει [denies]' at 561 C 3); but surely the oligarchic judgements assent (ἐπινεύουσι) to these claims; consequently, the boastful views and the oligarchic views are opposites forbidden to coexist in the acropolis at the same time at pains of violating the principle of opposites (cf. *R.* 4 437 B 1–5 with 436 B 9–C 3). Since they

¹⁶ It is curious that certain oligarchic excellences seem to linger in the young man's soul (cf. *R.* 8 560 C 6–D 8).

¹⁷ For the sake of brevity, I shall mainly use alone either 'judgements [δόξαι]' or 'views [λόγοι]' barring evidence that they are not treated interchangeably in T30. The mention of only judgements —not judgements (δόξαι) and views (λόγοι)— at risk of expulsion from the soul in a parallel passage (*R.* 9 573 A 4–B 5) supports treating them interchangeably.

cannot coexist in the acropolis at the same time, then the rise of false views presupposes the expulsion of oligarchic judgements from the acropolis.

The young man's oligarchic judgements are very likely expelled by his non-necessary pleasures (cf. Chapter 2 §4): first, a young oligarchic man distinguishes between necessary and non-necessary appetites (cf. *R.* 8 554 B 7–E 3), which is a true distinction (cf. *R.* 8 558 D 8–559 C 7, 561 B 8–C 5); second, he would need to abandon this true distinction in order to oblige and promote non-necessary appetites since the distinction is meant to keep non-necessary appetites in check (cf. *R.* 8 561 B 8–C 5); third, the young man would be depriving himself of something good in banishing a true distinction, yet no person voluntarily deprives herself or himself of good things (cf. *R.* 3 412 E 9–413 A 10; *R.* 2 381 C 2–5 (and *R.* 3 396 C 6–E 2, in particular 396 D 3–E 1)); fourth, there are three ways to be involuntarily deprived of true judgements, namely theft, compulsion, plus beguilement, and the evidence here points in favor of the young oligarch being a victim of beguilement, to be precise of being charmed by pleasure (cf. *R.* 3 413 B 1–C 4; for compulsion and beguilement, *R.* 4 429 E 7–430 B 6, in particular 430 A 3–B 3). (He likely gives up the distinction willingly (i.e. with desire): after all, he wants to experience non-necessary pleasures and giving up the distinction makes room for this. However, he is likely ignorant of giving up a true distinction —something good for him— in which case he acts unintentionally.¹⁸) If this is correct that the young oligarch banishes his judgements in virtue of being charmed (i.e. beguiled or tricked) by pleasure, then it is hard to appreciate in which way his rational part would play an autonomous role in his degeneration, in particular that the rational part would deliberate and choose to oblige and promote non-necessary appetites and pleasures.¹⁹ If this is correct, then non-necessary appetites and pleasures by themselves cause the young man's judgement about excellences and vices to be corrupted. He comes to be ruled by false judgements: he confuses excellences for vices, e.g. he condemns shame calling it 'foolishness' and he condemns temperance calling it 'cowardliness', etc.; he confuses vices for excellences, e.g. he praises shamelessness

¹⁸ I thank Paolo Crivelli for pressing this clarification.

¹⁹ The young oligarch's case seems to be an example of pleasure persuading and drawing people to adopt certain ways of life (cf. *R.* 7 538 C 6–D 5). Note that pleasure can also fix people's attention (cf. *R.* 7 519 A 7–B 6 and *R.* 9 586 A 1–C 6).

calling it ‘courage’ and he praises anarchy calling it ‘freedom’, etc.; and these false judgements occupy the acropolis or rational part of his soul.²⁰

Passage T30 is not the only place in the *Republic* to appreciate evaluative judgements as consequences of pleasure and distress. (To be clear, I shall speak of these as ‘hedonic experiences’ and I expect that our findings could be extended to desire and aversion since there is precedent on treating desires and pleasures interchangeably in *Republic* 8—for instance— 558 C 10–560 B 5.) Plato writes in *Republic* 10:

T32	[...] οἶσθ’ ὅτι	605 D 2
	χαίρομέν τε καὶ ἐνδόντες ἡμᾶς αὐτοῦς ἐπόμεθα συμπάσχον- τες, καὶ σπουδάζοντες ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἀγαθὸν ποιητὴν ὃς ἂν ἡμᾶς ὅτι μάλιστα οὕτω διαθῆ.	D 5
	Οἶδα· πῶς δ’ οὐ;	D 6

²⁰ It may be objected that there is nothing to expel in the young man’s acropolis since it is devoid of fine notions, ways of living, etc. (*R.* 8 560 B 6–C 1). The next event in the young man’s degeneration (560 C 2–5)—however— supports the claim that oligarchic judgements have been expelled from the young man’s acropolis (i.e. the rational part). After being seized, false and boastful views and judgements occupy the young man’s acropolis ‘in place of the others [ἀντ’ ἐκείνων]’ (560 C 2–3). Which other views and judgements? There are two alternatives depending on the use of ‘ἀντί [*anti*]’, either it denotes no exchange of views and judgements (cf. *R.* 3 411 C 1–2) or it denotes an exchange (cf. *R.* 2 371 C 8–D 3). The second (i.e. latter) alternative is intuitively preferable: note that being brought up in a certain way amounts to acquiring corresponding judgements (cf. *R.* 2 376 C 8–377 B 9 and *R.* 4 429 E 7–430 B 6; cf. *R.* 3 408 C 5–409 E 3 for the acquisition of models based on upbringing); the young man is brought up in oligarchic ways (558 C 6–D 7); and oligarchs are not utterly devoid of views or judgements (cf. 559 E 9–560 A 3, 560 C 6–D 2, 561 B 8–C 5); and so the young man’s acropolis almost certainly acquires oligarchic judgements. This alternative may seem to conflict with the observation that the young man’s acropolis is empty of true views (560 B 6–8) since oligarchs hold a true distinction between necessary and non-necessary appetites, in which case a young oligarchic soul probably endorses this true distinction and consequently is not altogether devoid of true views. But it is not unfathomable to consider the young man empty of true views if this distinction is the only true view held. The second alternative—then— supports the claim that oligarchic judgements have been expelled from the young man’s acropolis (i.e. rational part): oligarchic judgements are replaced by false and boastful judgements.

[...] you know that we both enjoy and, giving up ourselves, follow them feeling sympathy; and in earnest we praise as good a poet who puts us most of all in this way.

I know. It must be so. (Pl. *R.* 10 605 D 2–6)

T32 observes that poets are praised or judged to be good to the extent to which they please their audience —similarly for politicians (*R.* 4 426 C 2–6). *Republic* 5 (462 A 2–464 D 5) invites considering evaluative judgements also as consequences of hedonic experiences. Following a discussion on the arrangement of sharing women and children among Callipolis’ rulers (*R.* 5 449 A 7–462 A 1; cf. *R.* 4 423 E 5–424 A 4), there is an argument to confirm that sharing women and children is the best arrangement for Callipolis —or any city— as it furnishes the greatest good for a city, namely unity (cf. 461 E 5–462 A 1).²¹ This unity results from two elements —on the one hand— the application of possessives such as ‘mine’ in unison (in virtue of sharing women and children) and —on the other hand— the sharing of pleasure and distress (which bind together the city).

T33	Πασῶν ἄρα πόλεων μάλιστα ἐν αὐτῇ συμφωνήσουσιν ἑνός τινος ἢ εὖ ἢ κακῶς πράττοντος ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν τὸ ῥῆμα, τὸ ὅτι τὸ ἐμὸν εὖ πράττει ἢ ὅτι τὸ ἐμὸν κακῶς. Ἀληθέστατα, ἦ δ’ ὅς. Οὐκοῦν μετὰ τούτου τοῦ δόγματός τε καὶ ῥήματος ἔφαμεν συνακολουθεῖν τὰς τε ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς λύπας κοινῇ; Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε ἔφαμεν. Οὐκοῦν μάλιστα τοῦ αὐτοῦ κοινωνήσουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ πολῖται, ὃ δὴ ἐμὸν ὀνομάσουσιν; τούτου δὲ κοινωνοῦντες οὕτω δὴ	463 E 4 E 5 464 A 1 A 5
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²¹ The law to share women and children applies to Callipolis’ rulers —to be clear— both to guardians and to auxiliaries. The first mention of the law appears to be addressed to Callipolis’ top rulers, namely guardians: note ‘ἄρχουσιν [rulers]’ (*R.* 4 423 B 6) and ‘φύλαξι [guardians]’ (423 C 2; cf. 423 C 6–D 2). But the concluding remarks (*R.* 5 464 A 7–D 5) mention not only ‘guardians [φύλαξιν]’ (464 A 9), but also ‘auxiliaries [ἐπικούροις]’ (464 B 6). The ruling class includes both guardians and auxiliaries (cf. *R.* 8 545 C 7–D 7). Note that Plato has used ‘guardians [φύλακας]’ (*R.* 3 416 C 7) to cover both guardians and auxiliaries shortly after distinguishing the two (*R.* 3 414 B 1–6 cf. 415 A 1–7).

λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς μάλιστα κοινωνίαν ἔξουσιν;

Πολύ γε.

A 7

Therefore—in this above all other cities— when someone is doing either well or badly, they will sound together the phrase which we said just now, saying ‘that “my” so-and-so is doing well’ or ‘that “my” so-and-so is doing badly’.

Quite true—he said.

Did we not say that shared pleasures and distresses follow closely in conjunction this conviction and phrase?

And we spoke correctly.

Is it not the case that—most of all— our citizens will share of the same thing, which they will call ‘mine’? And thus sharing this, will they then have most of all shared distress and pleasure?

By far. (Pl. *R.* 5 463 E 4–464 A 7)²²

It is tempting to read T33 as suggesting the connection according to which our hedonic experiences are consequences of evaluative judgements: ‘this conviction and phrase’ (464 A 1) in the agreement ‘that shared pleasures and distresses follow closely in conjunction this conviction and phrase’ (464 A 1–3) may appear as referring to the evaluative judgements in the preceding lines (e.g. ‘my so-and-so is doing well’).

But this is probably not the case. The agreement likely refers back to the argument according to which a city is bound together insofar as citizens apply the same possessives such as ‘mine’ to the same things and thus come to share their hedonic experiences (*R.* 5 462 A 9–C 8). This kind of city is then compared to a human being’s experiences of physical pain and pleasure in order to elucidate the part-whole relation between a citizen’s doing well or poorly and the city’s own pleasure and distress (462 C 9–E 3). The stress on agreeing to use possessives in unison and the consequent shared hedonic experiences strongly suggests that ‘this conviction and phrase’ (464 A 1) in T33 refers to the use of the possessive ‘my [ἐμόν]’ at 463 E 6 (cf. ‘mine [ἐμόν]’ at 464 A 5). Note that an elaboration on T33 at *Republic* 5 (464 C 5–D 5) speaks of Callipolitan guardians who share ‘a single conviction [ἐνὶ δόγματι] about

²² Aristotle criticizes this view in *Pol.* II 3.

[πράξεις]’ (603 C 6) or referring to both our actions and our evaluative judgements. (Plato probably has in mind the more inclusive reading according to which there is some connection between our hedonic experiences and both our actions and our evaluative judgements.) What connection does Plato have in mind? The connection between experiencing distress or pleasure and our evaluative judgements itself is vague. For, Plato could have in mind either a view according to which our hedonic experiences are consequences of evaluative judgements—just as thinking to have done well in an exam may give us pleasure— or a view according to which our evaluative judgements are consequences of hedonic experiences—just as enjoying a meal makes us deem it good. It is tempting to read T34 as suggesting the former view, but it cannot be ruled out that T34 includes the connection according to which our evaluative judgements are consequences of hedonic experiences. (The same ambiguity holds with respect to the connection between experiencing distress or pleasure and our actions. For, Plato could have in mind either hedonic experiences causing our actions—just as overwhelming distress compels a tyrannical person to do the unthinkable (cf. *R.* 9 573 C 11–575 A 8)— or hedonic experiences as consequences of our actions—just as great joy may be felt upon embracing an old friend.)

It is plausible—then—to suppose that some judgements about excellence and vice are acquired as a consequence of desires, pleasures, etc. and the evidence (T30) strongly suggests that false judgements in this domain are indeed acquired as a consequence of non-necessary desires and pleasures. We should thus exercise caution before dismissing the worry raised against the standard view on early ethical education: the problem of acquiring false judgements about excellence and vice runs deeper than merely the style and content of the stories to which we are exposed as children; and the acquisition of these false judgements as a consequence of desires, pleasures, etc. suggests that the problem is more proper to the soul itself rather than something merely picked up by the soul. (Chapter 5 §§2–3 further explore this problem and re-articulate the worry in a decisive challenge to the standard view.)

4.5 Conclusion

Chapter 4 advances our understanding of the nature of the relation between the non-rational parts, excellence, and vice in order to ascertain whether the spirited element could indeed be

the primary beneficiary of early ethical education. Chapter 4 §2 further defends the judgemental construal of appearance-language in the context of imitative poetry; for instance, what appears (φαίνεται) to be excellent to the many just is what the many judge to be excellent. Chapter 4 §3 argues that the many hold false judgements about excellence and vice. Since imitative poets represent what appears excellent to the many, it follows that imitative poets represent what the many falsely judge to be excellent. This is consequential: Chapter 4 §§2–3 show appearance-language behaving in the same way as in Chapter 3 and the latter argues that an inferior non-rational part is the subject of what appears to be F, of what is judged to be F; Chapter 4's findings together with Chapter 3 would imply that an inferior non-rational part is the subject of what appears excellent to the many. Chapter 4 §3 shows that —indeed— the appetitive part (i.e. a non-rational part) is the primary subject of the many's false judgements about excellence and vice. Now since conclusions about the appetitive part have been casually extended to the spirited in the context of imitative poetry —and elsewhere— it is plausible to extend these results to the spirited part. In other words, the spirited part too can be the primary subject of false judgements about excellence and vice.

Chapter 4 §4 raises a worry for the standard view on early ethical education insofar as the spirited could be the primary subject of false judgements about excellence and vice. The worry raises —again (cf. Chapter 2 §4)— the specter of partitioning the spirited part on the standard view: if the non-rational parts are especially susceptible to false judgements about excellence and vice and the spirited part is meant to explain the acquisition of true judgements in this domain, could it be in danger of holding opposite judgements at the same time? It is not obvious that the spirited part would be exempt from experiencing this kind of conflict that threatens its psychic integrity. Chapter 4 §4 then argues that this worry cannot be easily dismissed by claiming that there will be no false judgements for the non-rational parts to pick up or acquire during early ethical education in Callipolis: there is reason to believe that false judgements about excellence and vice are acquired as a consequence of desires, pleasures, etc., in particular non-necessary desires and pleasures; and this suggests that the problem of acquiring these false judgements is more proper to the soul itself rather than something merely picked up by the soul due to the style and content of the stories to which we are exposed as children.

Chapter 5

Early ethical education

5.1 Introduction

Chapter 4 argued that the notion of what appears to be excellent to the many ought to be understood as what is falsely judged to be excellent by the many. It argued also that the soul's non-rational parts are the primary subjects of these false judgements, in the sense that they are the first to acquire these false judgements. Moreover, the non-rational parts acquire these false judgements as a consequence of non-necessary desires and pleasures. These findings hint that the problem of acquiring these false judgements is more proper to the soul itself and that addressing the problem must go beyond merely controlling the style and content of the stories to which we are exposed as children.

Chapter 5 shall conclude the objection against the standard view of early ethical education, namely the view that the soul's spirited element is the primary target of early ethical education in the sense that it is the proper or ultimate subject of Callipolitan laws, true ethical judgements, and a sound ethical discriminatory faculty. Chapter 5 §2 begins by arguing both that the non-rational parts by nature have non-necessary desires and pleasures and that early ethical education involves correcting this natural disposition in a way that creates a real possibility of psychic faction. Chapter 5 §3 seizes on the fact that early ethical education may cause the soul to experience psychic faction to argue that the standard view is committed to the possibility of partitioning the soul's spirited element. Chapter 5 §4 offers an explanation for construing the rational part as the primary target of early ethical education, an explanation that involves identifying the acquisition of a rational understanding of laws and law-inculcated judgements as an achievement of early ethical education. Chapter 5 §5 articulates an advantage of the account defended in Chapter 5 §4.

5.2 The non-rational parts' natural desires

The picture emerging from Chapter 4 is that our judgement about values and norms is especially vulnerable to non-necessary desires and pleasures, in the sense that the latter seem

certainly bound to corrupt and give rise to false judgements. These false judgements — moreover— have first an inferior non-rational part as their subject. This emerging picture deserves further attention: it has consequences for understanding the tasks of early ethical education and this understanding raises a suspicion about the standard view’s construal of the soul’s spirited part as the primary target or beneficiary of early ethical education. Since non-necessary desires and pleasures mislead us to acquire false judgements and musical trainees are meant to acquire true judgements, it seems very likely that early ethical education must do something about our non-necessary desires and pleasures —more below. This rough understanding of early ethical education already raises a suspicion about the standard view: if spirit is the primary target of early ethical education and thus it learns to do something about non-necessary desires and pleasures, but spirit has its own non-necessary desires and pleasures with which to deal, would this not risk partitioning the spirited part? Does it not seem that spirit could thus suffer psychic conflict —for instance— by experiencing both a non-necessary desire and an opposition to it? (This suspicion is pursued in Chapter 5 §3 after hearing from the standard view.)

The standard view may speak up: ‘There is reason to protest against the application of the emerging picture in Callipolis. Applying the emerging picture to young Callipolian students is a specious move! For, the danger of non-necessary desires and pleasures is practically non-existent in Callipolian education. First, Callipolian students initially receive an upbringing appropriate to the auxiliary class (cf. *R.* 3 404 A 9–B 4, 414 A 7–B 6), a lifestyle in stark contrast to a life characterized by non-necessary desires and pleasures (cf. *R.* 3 416 C 5–*R.* 4 420 A 9 and *R.* 8 543 B 1–C 3 in contrast to *R.* 9 586 A 1–D 3). This kind of —call it— ‘auxiliary’ upbringing is arguably devoid of these pleasures harmful to psychic excellence: after all, Callipolian students are being trained to become temperate (*R.* 3 389 D 7–8) and the temperate are devoid of excessive pleasure (cf. *R.* 3 402 E 2–4). In other words, early ethical education in Callipolis is not an environment suitable for the temptations, deceptions, etc. of non-necessary pleasure —there are no drones in Callipolis (cf. *R.* 3 414 B 1–6)!

We may support our protest by looking at the discussion on temperance in Callipolis (*R.* 4 430 E 4–432 B 2), in particular:

T16	<p>Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰς γε πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἡδονὰς τε καὶ λύπας ἐν παισὶ μάλιστα ἂν τις εὖροι καὶ γυναῖξιν καὶ οἰκέταις, καὶ τῶν ἐλευθέρων λεγομένων ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ φαύλοις.</p> <p>Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.</p> <p>Τὰς δὲ γε ἀπλᾶς τε καὶ μετρίας, αἱ δὴ μετὰ νοῦ τε καὶ δόξης ὀρθῆς λογισμῶ ἄγονται, ἐν ὀλίγοις τε ἐπιτεύξῃ καὶ τοῖς βέλτιστα μὲν φύσιν, βέλτιστα δὲ παιδευθεῖσιν.</p> <p>Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη.</p> <p>Οὐκοῦν καὶ ταῦτα ὀρθᾶς ἐνόητα σοὶ ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ κρατουμένας αὐτόθι τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ φαύλοις ὑπὸ τε τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν καὶ τῆς φρονήσεως τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἐλάττωσιν τε καὶ ἐπιεικεστέροις;</p> <p>Ἐγὼγ', ἔφη.</p>	<p>431 B 9</p> <p>C 1</p> <p>C 5</p> <p>C 10</p> <p>D 1</p> <p>D 3</p>
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Moreover, one would find many and varied desires, pleasures, and distresses especially in children, women, and household slaves, plus in the inferior majority of those who are called 'free'.

Certainly.

But you would chance upon the simple and moderate ones, which are led by calculation with the aid of understanding and correct judgement, in a few who have the best natures and the best education.

True—he said.

Do you not see these too in your city, namely the desires of the inferior majority mastered on the spot by the desires and by the wisdom of the excellent minority?

I do—he said. (Pl. *R.* 4 431 B 9–D 3)¹

¹ I deliberately do not include *Republic* 9 590 C 7–591 A 4 in the protest to reflect—as far as I know—its being overlooked by proponents of the standard view: after all, this passage in *Republic* 9 strikes me as compelling evidence against the standard view. Cf. *Republic* 8 550 A 5–B 3.

Passage T16 suggests that Callipolitan students are ruled by someone else's rational part: children are ruled by the superior few who are regarded as wise and as having desires, pleasures, etc. led 'by calculation with the aid of understanding and correct judgement [μετὰ νοῦ τε καὶ δόξης ὀρθῆς λογισμῶ]' (431 C 5–6); at least wisdom, calculation, and understanding are plausibly construed as belonging to reason and the rational part —note the proximity between the Greek words 'λογισμός [calculation]', 'λόγος [reason]', and 'τὸ λογιστικόν [rational part]' (cf. *R.* 10 602 D 6–E 3); consequently, it is likely that having these intelligent desires is an outcome of the rational part's rulership, i.e. the souls of the superior few are ruled by the rational part.² But if Callipolitan students are ruled by someone else's rational part, it is preferable to hold the view that these students experience the truest pleasure possible for them rather than non-necessary pleasures (cf. 431 C 5–8 in T16 with *R.* 9 586 D 4–587 A 3; *R.* 6 500 D 5–501 C 4). This is confirmed by passage T6: the best education imparts correct or true hedonic experiences. Consequently' —so continues the standard view's protest— 'the threat of non-necessary desires and pleasures at least for young Callipolitan students is at best questionable as these observations suggest that young Callipolitan students —despite not being ruled by their own rational part— may very well be unlikely to suffer at the hands of non-necessary pleasures and their concomitant false judgements; and the conditions pertaining to their upbringing and education do not make them —or their non-rational parts— more receptive or friendly to the acquisition of false judgements about values and norms (cf. *R.* 4 425 A 3–7).' Thus ends the standard view's protest.

This protest rightly points out the ideal and favorable conditions in which young Callipolitan students are educated (cf. *R.* 3 401 B 1–D 3), conditions averse to non-necessary desires and pleasures. But appealing to the external environment does not ultimately succeed to dismiss the emerging picture's application here: the standard view's protest does not address the dangers posed by the very nature of the soul. Consider the distinction between necessary and non-necessary appetites in *Republic* 8 (558 D 8–559 C 7), in particular the two characterizations of non-necessary appetites:

² The suggestion in passage T16 is confirmed later both in the description of the wise in *Republic* 4 (442 C 4–8) and in the description of true pleasure for non-rational parts in *Republic* 9 (586 D 4–587 A 3): the souls of the wise are ruled by the rational part and their intelligent desires are an outcome of the rational part's rulership.

T35	<p>Τί δέ; ἄς τέ τις ἀπαλλάξειεν ἄν, εἰ μελετῶ ἐκ νέου, καὶ πρὸς οὐδέν ἀγαθὸν ἐνοῦσαι δρῶσιν, αἱ δὲ καὶ τούναντίον, πάσας ταύτας εἰ μὴ ἀναγκαίους φαῖμεν εἶναι, ἄρ' οὐ καλῶς ἂν λέγοιμεν; Καλῶς μὲν οὖν. [...]</p> <p>Τί δὲ ἡ πέρα τούτων καὶ ἀλλοίων ἐδεσμάτων ἢ τοιούτων ἐπιθυμία, δυνατὴ δὲ κολαζομένη ἐκ νέων καὶ παιδευομένη ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν ἀπαλλάττεσθαι, καὶ βλαβερὰ μὲν σώματι, βλαβερὰ δὲ ψυχῇ πρὸς τε φρόνησιν καὶ τὸ σωφρονεῖν; ἄρα γε ὀρθῶς οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα ἂν καλοῖτο; Ὅρθότατα μὲν οὖν.</p>	<p>559 A 3</p> <p>A 5</p> <p>A 7</p> <p>559 B 8</p> <p>B 10</p> <p>C 1</p> <p>C 2</p>
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What next? And those [*sc.* appetites] that someone could remove —if he tried from youth upwards— and whose presence does no good, but even the opposite, would we be speaking wrongly if we said that all of them are not necessary?

We would be speaking correctly.

[...]

And what about the appetite going beyond these and seeking other sorts of foods, which being checked and educated from youth upwards it is possible to remove from the many, which is harmful to the body, and harmful to the soul's practical wisdom and temperance? Would it be correctly called 'not necessary'?

Most correctly. (Pl. *R.* 8 559 A 3–7, 559 B 8–C 2)

Passage T35 does not give the impression that non-necessary appetites are foreign to the soul in the sense that it is born without non-necessary appetites and later acquires them from the surrounding environment. The impression in T35 is that non-necessary appetites are presupposed, present from childhood and innate to the soul regardless of the environment. This impression is confirmed by a later passage elaborating on non-necessary appetites and pleasures:

T36	[...]. τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν δοκοῦσι τινές μοι εἶναι παράνομοι, αἱ κινδυνεύουσι μὲν ἐγγίγνεσθαι παντί, κολαζόμεναι δὲ ὑπὸ τε τῶν νόμων καὶ τῶν βελτιόνων ἐπιθυμιῶν μετὰ λόγου ἐνίων μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἢ παντάπασιν ἀπαλλάττεσθαι ἢ ὀλίγοι λείπεσθαι καὶ ἀσθενεῖς, τῶν δὲ ἰσχυρότεροι καὶ πλείους.	571 B 3 B 5 C 1
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[...]. Some of the non-necessary pleasures and appetites seem to me to be lawless. They may be present in everyone, but they are checked by the laws and by the better appetites with reason. In a few persons, they have been eliminated entirely or a few weak ones remain, while in others they are stronger and more numerous. (Pl. *R.* 9 571 B 3–C 1)

Passage T36 confirms the impression in T35 that non-necessary appetites and pleasures are innate or natural to the soul regardless of the environment of upbringing. For, T36 puts forward the idea that lawless non-necessary appetites and pleasures may be present ‘in everyone [παντί]’ (571 B 5) except the few who manage ‘to eliminate [ἀπαλλάττεσθαι]’ (571 B 7) them. Since it is not the case that everyone lives in the same natural and cultural environment, T36 suggests that non-necessary appetites and pleasures are not a consequence of the environment in which the soul is incarnated. It is noteworthy —moreover— that their absence is due to being extirpated from the soul rather than merely to avoiding catching them as if a contagious disease.

The discussion on weeping and lamenting in *Republic* 10 is helpful in case there is resistance to the suggestion that all human souls are born with lawless appetites and pleasures. Weeping and lamenting the loss of something valuable is arguably a lawless appetite:

T37	Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἀντιτείνειν διακελευόμενον λόγος καὶ νόμος ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ ἔλκον ἐπὶ τὰς λύπας αὐτὸ τὸ πάθος; Ἀληθῆ.	604 A 9 A 10
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Ἐναντίας δὲ ἀγωγῆς γιγνομένης ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα, δύο φαμὲν αὐτῷ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι.	B 1
Πῶς δ' οὐ;	
Οὐκοῦν τὸ μὲν ἕτερον τῷ νόμῳ ἔτοιμον πείθεσθαι, ἢ ὁ νόμος ἐξηγεῖται;	B 5
Πῶς;	B 6

Is it not the case that reason and law exhort him to resist whereas the experience itself drags him to sorrows?

True.

And when opposite movements come to be in this man about the same thing at the same time, we say that it is necessary for there to be two things within him.

It must be so.

Is it not the case that one of the two is ready to be persuaded by the law, wherever the law leads?

How? (Pl. R. 10 604 A 9–B 6)

Passage T37 considers that there are cases in which grieving can be lawless, in the sense that it goes against reason and law (cf. 603 E 4–604 D 6, especially 604 A 9–B 6). Moreover, the greatest accusation against imitative poetry describes the desire to grieve excessively as something natural:

T38	Εἰ ἐνθυμοῖο ὅτι τὸ βία κατεχόμενον τότε ἐν ταῖς οἰκείαις συμφοραῖς καὶ πεπεινηκὸς τοῦ δακρῦσαί τε καὶ ἀποδύρασθαι ἰκανῶς καὶ ἀποπλησθῆναι, φύσει ὄν τοιοῦτον οἶον τούτων ἐπιθυμεῖν, τότε ἔστιν τοῦτο τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν πιμπλάμενον καὶ χαῖρον·	606 A 3 A 5 A 7
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If you consider that what is held back by force in cases of personal misfortunes and which craves to weep and to lament excessively to its satisfaction —being by nature

desirous of things such as this— is that which is satisfied by the poets and enjoys them. (Pl. *R.* 10 606 A 3–7)

Passage T38 describes the irritable element’s basically insatiable craving to weep and to lament as something it desires ‘by nature [φύσει]’ (606 A 5). It follows that there is at least one natural lawless desire (cf. *R.* 1 329 B 6–D 2, *R.* 2 359 C 3–6).³ The charges against imitative poetry insist that surrounding environments indeed are not inconsequential, but the picture reveals that non-necessary appetites and pleasures in the environment are able to work their magic—or wreak havoc—precisely because some soul-part already enjoys them (cf. *R.* 8 559 E 4–8; *R.* 9 574 E 4–575 A 8 acknowledges both external and internal lawlessness).

Both T35 and T36 reveal that the soul has natural or innate non-necessary appetites and pleasures. These passages thus advance the emerging picture’s impression: since these desires and pleasures mislead us to acquire false judgements about values and norms whereas musical training is meant to instill true judgements, it is now certainly the case that early ethical education must do something about our non-necessary desires and pleasures. Consequently, the standard view’s protest—namely that the dangers of non-necessary pleasures are practically non-existent in Callipolitan education—does not succeed: the existence of non-necessary appetites and pleasures is not merely sensitive to the environment in which the soul incarnates, in the sense that being born in an ideal environment such as Callipolis does not magically yield a soul clean of harmful appetites and pleasures; put another way, no human soul is born as if an unproblematic clean slate (cf. *R.* 6 501 A 2–8, *R.* 10 611 B 9–D 7, 618 B 3–7). The basic point to acknowledge is that the emerging picture does indeed apply even to young Callipolitan students because—simply put—the human soul by nature possesses harmful appetites and pleasures. Passages T35 and T36 also clarify the vague suggestion that early ethical education must do ‘something’ about non-necessary desires and pleasures. For, these passages clarify that non-necessary desires and pleasures must be corrected by weakening or eliminating them (cf. Chapter 5 §3, from the main text to n. 7). In other words, early ethical education is tasked with weakening or eliminating certain

³ Cf. Pelosi (2010) 15 n. 3 (who agrees on construing weeping and lamenting as innate).

harmful appetites and pleasures⁴ (cf. *R.* 7 519 A 7–B 6 with *R.* 9 586 A 1–C 6: non-necessary desires and pleasures appear as ‘leaden weights [μολυβδίδας]’ (519 B 1)).

Now it may be tempting to regard the natural presence of non-necessary desires exclusively for the soul’s appetitive part thus exempting the spirited part from naturally having non-necessary desires: first, the distinction between necessary and non-necessary appetites arises in the context of sketching the degeneration of the soul from an oligarchic constitution to a democratic, two constitutions arguably ruled by the appetitive part (cf. *R.* 8 553 B 7–E 1 and 559 C 8–12 for the oligarch and Chapter 4 §4 n. 15 for the democrat); second, the elaboration on non-necessary appetites and pleasures in T36 arises in the context of investigating the tyrannical soul, again a soul ruled by the appetitive part; third, the irritable element examined in *Republic* 10 —the element with a natural desire to weep and lament— is arguably the appetitive (cf. Chapter 3 §2, the interpretation of T20). In other words, it may be tempting to suppose that non-necessary desires and pleasures belong only the appetitive part, in which case the spirited part escapes having innate non-necessary desires.

This temptation should be rejected. Passage T22 in context reveals that the spirited part too has non-necessary desires and pleasures just as the appetitive part (cf. *R.* 8 586 B 7–8; 583 B 3–5 with 587 B 15–17: appetitive and spirited souls enjoy the inferior pleasures). Since T35 and T36 indicate that the appetitive part has them by nature, what good reason is there to deny this for the spirited part? Why think that the spirited part —unlike the appetitive — gains its non-necessary desires and pleasures rather than having them by nature? Indeed, remember that conclusions about the appetitive part are casually extended to the spirited part on at least two occasions (cf. Chapter 3 §2, in particular passages T21 and T22). There is a precedent that favors applying insights about the appetitive part to the spirited in a certain context, namely the very context in question of non-rational desire and pleasure. In other words —barring explicit evidence to the contrary— it is preferable to construe the spirited

⁴ Cf. Wilberding (2012) esp. 137 with n. 30. Passage T16 —to be clear— need not mean nor entail that young Callipolitan students are in fact lacking non-necessary desires and pleasures. For, T16 is compatible with T35 and T36: lines 431 C 5–8 arguably express the outcome of receiving the best education and practicing the general instructions laid down in T35 and T36 to restrain and to eliminate the non-necessary desires and pleasures.

part too as having by nature non-necessary desires and pleasures (cf., below, the discussion on *Republic* 9 588 B 1–592 B 5).

5.3 The standard view's final challenge

Chapter 5 §2 offers a better understanding of Plato's views about early ethical education, namely the understanding that musical and physical training involves weakening or eliminating the non-rational parts' innate non-necessary desires and pleasures. Some are explicitly characterized as harmful to the soul's temperance —'harmful' probably in a sense that recognizes an incompatibility between them and psychic temperance— yet temperance is a goal of early ethical education (*R.* 3 389 D 7–8; cf. T9, T16). Non-necessary desires and pleasures are explicitly characterized also as being harmful to the soul's practical wisdom (*φρόνησις*), in which case they are harmful to the rule of reason since wisdom (*σοφία*) involves the rational part's rule (*R.* 4 442 C 4–8). If non-necessary desires and pleasures are harmful to the rule of reason, then they are harmful to the soul's justice and harmony (*R.* 4 443 B 1–6, 443 C 9–444 A 3) yet psychic justice and harmony are goals of early ethical education (T1 with *R.* 3 412 A 4–8 and T2). In other words, non-necessary desires and pleasures are harmful to the soul's excellences and harmony. Since they are an obstacle to the goals of early ethical education, it is natural to connect these observations and construe early ethical education with the task of weakening or eliminating the non-rational parts' innate non-necessary desires and pleasures.

This Section 3 will identify two ways to weaken or eliminate non-necessary desires and pleasures, either indirectly by cultivating desires of another kind or directly by opposing them. It is important that the latter (i.e. direct opposition) involves psychic conflict: if Callipolitan students learn to weaken or eliminate their own non-necessary desires and pleasures by directly opposing them and spirit too —in addition to the appetitive part— enjoys non-necessary desires and pleasures, then Callipolitan students will experience psychic conflict in learning to weaken or eliminate their own spirited non-necessary desires and pleasures. If this is correct, then this presents a decisive challenge to the standard view: if spirit is the primary target or beneficiary of early ethical education and thus explains the soul's learning to oppose directly its non-necessary desires and pleasures, then spirit would

suffer psychic conflict within itself; consequently, the standard view of early ethical education is committed to the possibility of endangering the integrity of the soul's spirited element.

The construal of early ethical education as involving weakening or eliminating the non-rational parts' non-necessary desires and pleasures can be gleaned from the final evaluation of injustice and justice through an image of the soul in *Republic* 9 (588 B 1–592 B 5). After the three proofs to show that the just are better off than the unjust (576 D 6–588 A 10), Plato's interlocutors turn to assessing the claim that injustice profits a totally unjust person. The assessment is pursued by forming an image of the soul to elucidate the meaning of the claim. The image is composed of three elements: a multi-headed beast with tame and savage heads, then a lion, and finally a human being; the first element is greatest in size whereas the third is smallest; all three are joined together and covered by the image of a human body. These elements correspond respectively to the soul's appetitive, spirited, and rational parts:⁵ for instance, the appetitive part is regarded as the largest of the three (*R.* 4 442 A 6 in T2). The claim that injustice profits the unjust amounts to regarding as profitable the 'feeding well [εὐωχοῦντι]' (588 E 6) of both the appetitive part and the spirited part and thus their being made strong while the rational part is made 'to starve [λιμοκτονεῖν]' (589 A 1) and made 'weak [ἀσθενῆ]' (589 A 1). The result is that the rational part is dragged by either of the two and these in turn are not friendly to one another. Now the claim that justice is profitable amounts to regarding as advantageous the encouragement of the rational part's being in control of the entire human being, namely by making an ally out of the spirited part and by taking care of the appetitive part, e.g. by 'hindering the growth [ἀποκωλύων φύεσθαι]' (599 B 3) of the wild appetites. The result is a friendly relation among all soul-parts (cf. *R.* 4 442 C 9–D 4).

These psychic images of injustice and justice shed light on the work of early ethical education: after all, psychic justice is a result of receiving an ideal musical and physical training (T2 with *R.* 4 443 B 1–6 and 443 C 9–444 A 3). Both images draw attention to wild or savage elements in the non-rational parts. The image of injustice presents them as being

⁵ Cf. Jowett and Campbell (1894) III 435, Adam (1902) II 363 note to 588 D 24 and 364 note to 589 B 9, Kamtekar (2006) 174.

harmful to the soul's excellences and harmony, in which case they could be equated with the soul's non-necessary desires and pleasures (cf. T35).⁶ The fact that the lion is not depicted with wild or savage heads does not tell against its having savage or non-necessary desires: spiritedness and savageness are intimately related in the concern about spirited guardians being 'savages [ἄγριοι]' (375 B 10) to one another and to other citizens (cf. *R.* 2 375 B 8–C 5); moreover non-necessary pleasures are attributed to spirit (*R.* 9 586 C 7–D 3). The point is that both appetite and spirit have wild or savage elements to them. The image of justice explicitly calls for 'hindering the growth [ἀποκωλύων φύεσθαι]' (599 B 3) of the appetitive part's wild appetites, namely its non-necessary desires. Since the spirited part too has wild desires, the image of justice should be understood as implicitly calling for hindering the growth of also the spirited part's wild or non-necessary desires. By 'hindering the growth' of both appetite's and spirit's non-necessary desires, Socrates probably has in mind at the very least weakening them, at the very best eliminating them (cf. next paragraph): note that a soul-part grows upon being fed —especially upon being fed well (cf. 588 E 6–7)— in which case it should not be fed if the goal is to hinder its growth; but not feeding a soul-part is basically to starve it, the result of which is its being weakened (cf. 588 E7–589 A 1; *R.* 10 606 D 1–8 —note 'to dry up [αὐχμεῖν]' (606 D 5), i.e. not water or feed). If this is correct —namely that achieving psychic justice involves at the very least weakening the non-rational parts' non-necessary desires— and psychic justice is a result of receiving an ideal musical and physical training, then a task of early ethical education is to weaken the non-rational parts' non-necessary desires. (Remember that non-necessary desires are innate to embodied human souls.)

But how are the non-rational parts' non-necessary desires to be weakened? The opening question in passage T35 presupposes that non-necessary desires can be eliminated with appropriate training from a young age (*R.* 8 559 A 3–4; cf. T36 and *R.* 7 519 A 7–B 6). The ensuing question identifies one practice for eliminating them, namely the practice of 'checking [κολαζομένη]' (559 B 9) non-necessary desires. This is helpful because —I assume — if checking does not eliminate non-necessary desires, then presumably they are at least

⁶ Cf. Wilberding (2012) 137.

᾿Ωι δὴ πρὸς τὰ μαθήματα καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐρρυήκασιν,	D 10
περὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς, οἶμαι, ἡδονὴν αὐτῆς καθ' αὐτὴν εἶεν ἄν,	
τὰς δὲ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐκλείπειεν, εἰ μὴ πεπλασμένως ἄλλ'	
ἀληθῶς φιλόσοφος τις εἴη.	E 1
Μεγάλη ἀνάγκη.	E 2

But for anyone whose desires are exceedingly directed towards some one thing, we know—I suppose—that they are in that case weaker for other things just as a stream partly diverted elsewhere.

Certainly.

Then, for whom they [*sc.* the desires] flow towards learning and everything of that sort—I think—they would be concerned with the pleasure of the soul itself by itself while they would abandon the [*sc.* pleasures] that come through the body—if someone is not feigning, but is truly philosophical.

Quite necessary. (Pl. *R.* 6 485 D 6–E 2; cf. *R.* 7 517 C 6–D 3 and *R.* 1 328 D 3–5)¹⁰

Passage T39 introduces a view similar to the one expressed in the discussion on balancing soul-parts in *Republic* 3 (cf. the previous paragraph). Both focus on a dynamic relation between psychic entities in terms of their relative strengths—call it ‘power dynamics’. *Republic* 3 focuses on the power dynamics between opposite characters whereas T39 focuses on the power dynamics between desires. Socrates probably has in mind desires of a certain kind—rather than particular desires—as suggested by the example given (485 D 10–E 2): it alludes to desires in relation to the appetitive, spirited, and rational parts of the soul (cf., for an explicit distinction between three kinds of desires and pleasures on the basis of the soul’s parts, *R.* 9 580 C 10–582 B 2, in particular 580 D 2–9, 581 C 4–8, 583 A 1–11). Consequently, T39 focuses on the power dynamics between desires of certain specific kinds. The basic idea is that the strength of desires of certain kinds affects the strength of desires of other kinds.

¹⁰ Cf. Pl. *Phd.* 64 C 10–67 E 3. Johansen (2004) Chapters 7 and 8 argues that Plato’s *Timaeus* presents a more favorable view of the body.

It is worth emphasizing that the opening lines of T39 suggest a general principle, in the sense that the basic idea is not confined to power dynamics between opposites like the aforementioned remarks on balancing opposite soul-parts in *Republic* 3. Appetite and reason may be loosely construed as opposites —for instance, being furthest from one another (cf. *R.* 9 587 A 8–B 3)— but the basic idea in T39 is probably not limited to desires of opposite kinds: it is plausible to hold the view in T39 also between appetitive and spirited desires, plus between rational and spirited desires. This is confirmed in *Republic* 9:

T40	<p>Τί δὲ ὁ φιλότιμος; ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐ τὴν μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν χρημάτων ἡδονὴν φορτικὴν τινα ἡγεῖται, καὶ αὖ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ μανθάνειν, ὅτι μὴ μάθημα τιμὴν φέρει, καπνὸν καὶ φλυαρίαν; Οὕτως, ἔφη, ἔχει. Τὸν δὲ φιλόσοφον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τί οἰώμεθα τὰς ἄλλας ἡδονὰς νομίζειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ εἰδέσθαι τάληθες ὅπῃ ἔχει καὶ ἐν τοιοῦτῳ τινὶ ἀεὶ εἶναι μανθάνοντα; οὐ πάνυ πόρρω; καὶ καλεῖν τῷ ὄντι ἀναγκαίως, ὡς οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων δεόμενον, εἰ μὴ ἀνάγκη ἦν; Εὖ, ἔφη, δεῖ εἰδέσθαι.</p>	<p>581 D 5</p> <p>D 10</p> <p>E 1</p> <p>E 4</p>
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But what about the honor-lover? —I said— Does he not regard the pleasure of money somewhat vulgar and the pleasure of learning —except learning that brings honor— smoke and nonsense?

So it is —he said.

And with respect to the philosopher —I said— what do we suppose he believes about the other pleasures in comparison to the pleasure of knowing the truth wherever it lies and always being in some such condition while learning? Will he not believe them to be far behind? And will he call them ‘really’ necessary, since he is in need of not one of them unless it is necessary?

Rest assured —he said— it must be so. (Pl. *R.* 9 581 D 5–E 4; cf. *R.* 7 540 D 3–E 1 and 516 C 8–E 2)¹¹

¹¹ Cf. Pl. *Ti.* 89 D 2–90 D 7 for echoes.

Passage T40 confirms that the basic idea in T39 is not confined to power dynamics between opposites. For, it claims that a person with spirited desires as strongest (i.e. the honor-lover) will have little-to-no interest in appetitive desires as well as rational desires; put another way, strong spirited desires weaken the strength of desires of the other kinds. The same is to be said about the philosopher —for instance— that a person whose rational part flows strongly —whose rational part is fed appropriately— will have weakly flowing non-rational parts. The aforementioned reflections from *Republic* 3 and passages T39 and T40 together suggest a strategy of desire management with an eye to weakening certain desires without directly opposing them —call it ‘indirect’ opposition. The strategy is basically to encourage the development of desires of a certain kind (e.g. the rational) in a way that results in waning or weakening desires of other kinds (e.g. the appetitive and the spirited).

The second way to check or hinder the growth of non-necessary desires and pleasures is suggested by the verb ‘to check [κολάζειν]’. Unlike the first method (i.e. indirect opposition), the verb ‘to check’ suggests a direct opposition to non-necessary desires and pleasures of the kind that creates psychic conflict. This suggestion is supported by examining the context to passage T35 in which talk of checking non-necessary desires from a young age appears, namely the context of sketching a young oligarch’s corruption into a democrat. There is here an imaginary scene of the young oligarch receiving help from his family (T19). This help can be plausibly taken to stand for a case of checking desires: after all, checking may lead to expelling desires (T35) and the help results in some non-necessary desires ‘being destroyed [διεφθάρησαν]’ (560 A 5) while some ‘fall out [ἐξέπεσον]’ (560 A 6). It is noteworthy that this help amounts to an opposition between soul-parts (cf. Chapter 2 §4 and the interpretation to T19, in particular the main text to n. 38). There is thus a second way to check or hinder the growth of non-necessary desires and pleasures and —to be clear— this second way involves psychic conflict or an opposition between soul-elements.¹² (Cf. T36 — note ‘κολαζόμεναι [checking]’ at 571 B 5— with *R.* 10 604 C 5–D 3: reason and law are meant to check the desire to weep and lament, in a way that shows psychic conflict.)

¹² The description of the democrat’s refusal to distinguish between two kinds of desires (*R.* 8 560 B 8–C 5) also suggests a construal of checking desires in the form of direct opposition rather than indirect opposition: ‘to check [κολάζειν]’ (561 C 2) is here coupled with enslavement of desires, an activity suggestive of engagement rather than neglect.

There are —then— two ways to weaken or eliminate the non-rational parts’ non-necessary desires and pleasures, either indirectly by cultivating desires of another kind or directly by opposing them. Direct opposition —to be clear— involves psychic conflict. Since early ethical education is tasked with weakening or eliminating non-rational non-necessary desires and pleasures (cf. T35), it is surely the case that Callipolitan students themselves learn to do this. Observe that the opening question to passage T35 indicates self-effort in early ethical education. Observe also that Callipolitan training to become courageous, temperate, etc. requires practice (cf. *R.* 4 444 E 3–5), e.g. to learn about and acquire temperance requires practicing temperance.¹³ (This seems to be a point in having students be tested (cf. *R.* 3 412 B 9–414 B 6).) The basic idea is that early ethical education is not entirely passive, in which case students will learn to weaken or eliminate their own non-rational non-necessary desires and pleasures. Since the spirited element possesses non-necessary desires and pleasures, it follows that Callipolitan students will learn to weaken or eliminate their own non-necessary spirited desires and pleasures. It is probably certain —moreover— that Callipolitan students will learn to weaken or eliminate their own non-necessary spirited desires and pleasures by directly opposing them: after all, there is no obvious reason to suppose that weakening or eliminating non-necessary spirited desires must be only indirect. It is very plausible to suppose —then— that Callipolitan students will experience psychic conflict in learning to weaken or eliminate their own non-necessary spirited desires and pleasures. But if spirit is the primary target or beneficiary of early ethical education —if spirit explains the soul’s learning to restrain or oppose its non-necessary desires and pleasures— then spirit could suffer psychic conflict with itself, e.g. by experiencing both a non-necessary desire and an opposition to it. If this is correct, then the standard view of early ethical education is

¹³ Wilberding (2012) 141 writes: ‘The appetitive part’s “opinion” that reason should rule results from the elimination of its teleologically unnecessary appetites and the moderation of its materially necessary appetites. It remains to examine *how* and *when* this is accomplished. The answer to the “how” question is fairly straightforward. It is by performing moderate actions that we become moderate: “by over-feeding (*euôkhounti*) the multiform beast one makes it strong” (588e6–7) and it is likewise by “feeding it in a nourishing manner (*trephôn*)” that it is domesticated (589b2–3). But if this is so, then it would seem that the domestication of the appetites does indeed take place in the moral education described in Books II-III, and in particular through the regimen of physical training, broadly construed (*gumnastikê*).’

committed to the possibility of partitioning the spirited element. In other words, the standard view endangers the integrity of the soul's spirited element and this is generally unacceptable.

5.4 Early ethical education and reason

Since the primary target or beneficiary of early ethical education cannot be the spirited part lest its integrity be threatened, an exegetically preferable account of early ethical education identifies the rational element as the primary target or beneficiary.¹⁴ What could explain this special status of the rational part? It will prove helpful to focus on an explicit achievement of early ethical education, namely the acquisition of laws and law-inculcated judgements in the finest way possible (cf. T5 with T3). For —we shall see— acquiring laws and law-inculcated judgements in the finest way possible involves a rational understanding of them.

In *Republic* 9 (587 A 8–C 4) and *Republic* 10 (604 A 9–D 6 and 607 A 5–B 1), Socrates casually couples law and reason suggesting that he assumes a link or relation between the two (cf. *R.* 9 571 B 2–C 2). What might this link be? It is noteworthy that laws articulated for Callipolis are explicitly results of reasoning, e.g. laws concerning stories about gods, laws concerning erotic relations, laws concerning physical training, etc. (cf. *R.* 2 378 E 5–383 C 7, *R.* 3 402 E 2–403 C 3, *R.* 3 403 C 8–405 A 5, *R.* 5 470 A 5–471 C 3, *R.* 10 604 B 7–D 6). It is worth emphasizing that the Greek word ‘λόγος [*logos*]’ —typically translated by ‘reason’— can mean ‘principle’, ‘rule’, or ‘law’, in particular one resulting from reckoning or

¹⁴ Cf. Schofield (2010) Section 2, Singpurwalla (2013) 49–50 and 61–62, Thaler (2015). For a qualified alternative, Wilberding (2009) 363–364: ‘The education has two parts, each of which contains two subparts. *Mouiskê* has one part concerned with content (*logoi*) and another concerned with rhythm and melody, while *gymnastikê* has both athletics and what we might call lifestyle-training. Of these four components, it is reasonable to assume that the entire discussion of content (*logoi*) is directed at forming not the spirited part but the proportional part, which is the other explicitly mentioned aspect of the soul that profits from the education, while lifestyle-training is aimed at training the appetitive part of the soul.’

calculation.¹⁵ A first impression is that conscious effort to articulate laws comes to be in virtue of some reasoning or calculation in contrast to being declared at a whim. What about the other side of this coin, namely conscious effort to follow laws?

The discussion in *Republic* 10 (603 E 4–604 D 10) intimates that conscious or deliberate effort to act in the best way possible involves some reasoning or calculation. This view can be appreciated in the first and second arguments to distinguish soul-parts in *Republic* 4 insofar as these arguments seem to describe cases of conscious or deliberate effort to act correctly: the first argument acknowledging an opposition to appetitive desires states that the opposition arises ‘from reasoning [ἐκ λογισμοῦ]’ (439 C 3–D 3 at 439 D 1); and the second argument acknowledging an opposition to appetitive desires makes the observation that the spirited part’s opposition arises ‘when appetites force someone contrary to rational calculation [ὅταν βιάζονται τινα παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐπιθυμῖαι]’ (440 A 9–10 in T18). Sometimes —as the discussion in *Republic* 10 intimates— conscious or deliberate effort to act in the best way possible entails following laws, yet this need not be a blind or passive endeavor as some reasoning or calculation can be involved. In fact, Socrates seems to endorse the plausible view that the ideal case finds reason and law working together for the sake of acting in the best way possible.

If the cooperation of reason and law is ideal in the domain of action, then it is tempting to suppose that this cooperation should come to be in early ethical education. For, it is concerned with providing the best education and it is natural to assume that the best education would deliver an ideal condition such as the cooperation of reason and law. It is worth emphasizing —first— that early ethical education is meant to bring about the best men

¹⁵ LSJ s.v. ‘λόγος’ III 2 d. Cf. Pl. *Cri.* 46 B 3–6: ‘We must therefore investigate whether we should act in this way or not: as I am —not only now but always— the sort who in my affairs is persuaded by nothing other than the principle which appears best by my reckoning [σκοπεῖσθαι οὐδὲν χρὴ ἡμᾶς εἶτε ταῦτα πρακτέον εἶτε μή· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐ νῦν πρῶτον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀεὶ τοιοῦτος οἷος τῶν ἐμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλω πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ ὃς ἂν μοι λογιζομένῳ βέλτιστος φαίνεται].’ In this passage, the ‘λόγος’ in question —‘τῷ λόγῳ’ (46 B 5)— appears in the context of making a practical decision. It appears also to be construed as the result of reckoning or deliberating about a course of action. The word almost certainly picks out that which ought to be done, that is a rule or principle. It is important that T4 may come to mind: here we have ‘young souls [νέων ψυχὰς]’ (365 A7) reasoning or calculating —note ‘συλλογίσασθαι [to reckon]’ (365 A 8)— about the kind of person they ought to be, in particular whether excellent or vicious; and so they are engaged in an activity at the very least overlooked —at most denied— in standard accounts of early ethical education.

and women possible (cf. *R.* 5 456 E 4–457 A 2) and —second— that excellent individuals make a conscious or deliberate effort to act in the best way possible (cf. *R.* 4 443 C 9–444 A 3 with *R.* 9 591 B 3–592 B 5). Now remember —third— that musical and physical training are designed to have well-trained youths absorb laws and law-inculcated judgements in the finest way possible (cf. T5). These three observations plus the above view that conscious or deliberate effort to act in the best way possible involves some reasoning or calculation suggest that early ethical education would indeed support the cooperation of reason and law. If this suggestion is correct, then early ethical education will involve some reasoning or calculation.

The view that early ethical education would aim to bring about the cooperation of reason and law can be motivated by reflecting on both passage T6 (reprinted below for ease of reference) and the goal of having Callipolitan students absorb laws and law-inculcated judgements in the finest way possible.¹⁶ Passage T6 —to anticipate— alludes first to the acquisition of laws and law-inculcated judgements and the passage acknowledges that this takes place before well-trained youths have a rational understanding of them. But T6 acknowledges also the arrival of rational understanding in which case well-trained youths will ultimately have a rational understanding of laws and law-inculcated judgements. The passage —however— is vague about the timing of reason’s arrival. Does it arrive during or after early ethical education? The plausible view is that well-trained students acquire a rational understanding of the laws and law-inculcated judgements during early ethical education: a goal of this education is to have the laws etc. absorbed in the finest way possible (cf. T5); and it is arguably the case —we shall see— that the finest way possible involves rational understanding rather than not. In other words, passage T6 and the goal of having Callipolitan students absorb laws and law-inculcated judgements in the finest way possible jointly indicate that well-trained students will acquire a rational understanding of them during early ethical education.

¹⁶ Whiting (2012) 181 floats the idea that T6 suggests the advent of reason itself from musical training: ‘[...] Socrates takes the proper combination of the spirited and philosophic natures to begin with musical training (which includes what we now call “literature”) and he may even take reason itself to emerge from such training’. Kamtekar (2008) 344 n. 22 refers to T6 in describing music and physical training as ‘prerational’.

In *Republic* 3 (401 D 4–402 A 6), Socrates articulates —with Glaucon’s agreement— the motivations behind providing a most proper education in musical training:

T6	<p>Ἄρ’ οὖν, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ὃ Γλαύκων, τούτων ἕνεκα κυριωτάτη ἐν μουσικῇ τροφή, ὅτι μάλιστα καταδύεται εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ὃ τε ῥυθμὸς καὶ ἄρμονία, καὶ ἐρρωμενέστατα ἄπτεται αὐτῆς φέροντα τὴν εὐσχημοσύνην, καὶ ποιεῖ εὐσχήμονα, ἐάν τις ὀρθῶς τραφεῖ, εἰ δὲ μὴ, τοῦναντίον; καὶ ὅτι αὖ τῶν παραλειπομένων καὶ μὴ καλῶς δημιουργηθέντων ἢ μὴ καλῶς φύντων ὀξύτατ’ ἂν αἰσθάνοιτο ὁ ἐκεῖ τραφεὶς ὡς ἔδει, καὶ ὀρθῶς δὴ δυσχεραίνων τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἐπαινοῖ καὶ χαίροι καὶ καταδεχόμενος εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν τρέφοιτ’ ἂν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν καὶ γίγνοιτο καλὸς τε κάγαθός, τὰ δ’ αἰσχροῦ ψέγοι τ’ ἂν ὀρθῶς καὶ μισοῖ ἔτι νέος ὢν, πρὶν λόγον δυνατὸς εἶναι λαβεῖν, ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἀσπάζοιτ’ ἂν αὐτὸν γνωρίζων δι’ οἰκειότητα μάλιστα ὁ οὕτω τραφεὶς;</p> <p>Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, τῶν τοιούτων ἕνεκα ἐν μουσικῇ εἶναι ἡ τροφή.</p>	<p>401 D 4 D 5 E 1 E 5 402 A 1 A 5 A 6</p>
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So —I said— Glaucon, are these the reasons that musical training is most important? For, rhythm and harmony above all permeate the inner part of the soul, and affect it most strongly bringing it grace, and make someone graceful —if properly educated, but if not, the opposite. For, the properly educated man will most sharply perceive if things have been omitted or not been finely crafted or not been finely grown. And —being then correctly disgusted— fine things he will praise, enjoy, be nourished by them —receiving them into his soul— and he will become fine and good whereas base things he will rightly censure and hate while still young, before being able to understand an account. But he who is thus educated will kindly welcome the account’s arrival recognizing it above all because of kinship.

Yes —he said— I agree that those are the reasons to provide education in music and poetry. (Pl. *R.* 3 401 D 4–402 A 6)¹⁷

Passage T6 alludes first to the acquisition of laws and law-inculcated judgements without a rational understanding: a well-trained youth's good conduct such as welcoming the fine and rejecting the base is plausibly seen as a consequence of acquiring laws and law-inculcated judgements. First, Socrates observes that well-trained youths will praise the fine and censure the base 'before being able to understand an account [*πρὶν λόγον δυνατὸς εἶναι λαβεῖν*]' (402 A 2–3). Socrates probably has in mind that well-trained youths will enjoy good conduct before being able to grasp the reason or explanation of their behavior:¹⁸ after all, it is later agreed that youths are for the most part devoid of reasoning (cf. *R.* 4 441 A 7–B 3). But Socrates observes also that well-trained youths 'will kindly welcome the account's arrival [*ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἀσπάζοιτ' ἄν*]' (402 A 3). Socrates here seems to acknowledge that well-trained youths will later come to have a rational understanding of their good conduct.¹⁹ (This much seems uncontroversial. The explanation 'above all because of kinship [*δι' οἰκειότητα μάλιστα*]' (402 A 4) will be discussed later.) In other words, Socrates praises the good conduct of well-trained youths before they acquire a rational understanding of it. Now consider —for instance— that well-trained youths are to be disgusted at weeping and lamenting (cf. *R.* 3 387 E 10–388 A 4; note 'being then correctly disgusted [*ὀρθῶς δὴ δυσχεραίνων*]' (401 E 4) in T6). The goal of being disgusted at weeping and lamenting arises in the context of training youths to be courageous (*R.* 3 386 A 6–389 D 6). This suggests that being disgusted at weeping and lamenting is a part of being courageous. It is worth remembering that being courageous is characterized as preserving laws and law-inculcated

¹⁷ Cf. Pl. *Lg.* 2 653 A 5–C 6 and 654 C 3–D 4.

¹⁸ Cf. Jowett (1881), Lee (1955/2007).

¹⁹ Cf. Jowett and Campbell (1894) 137: 'Education may be truly regarded as a process in which instincts, feelings, impressions, words, rules, are gradually ennobled and lighted up by reasoning and reflection. The results of reasoning and reflection may again become instincts and feelings; no conscious effort of thought is required to recall the first principles of morality. But this practical intuition of morals which is gained by use must not be confounded with that narrower and feebler perception of right and wrong which is given in childhood; or with the simple abstractions of right and wrong which are gained by later reflection.'

judgements about the fearful and the not fearful given throughout early ethical education (cf. *R.* 4 429 B 8–430 C 1, in particular 429 C 1–2 (the lawgiver’s declarations in education), 429 C 7 (the law-inculcated judgement through education), 430 A 2–3 (absorbing laws in the finest way possible), and 430 B 4 (the correct and law-inculcated judgement about the fearful and not fearful)). (There may be more than one law relevant to weeping and lamenting, but *Republic* 10 604 B 7–8 discloses the law to keep quiet in misfortunes in a discussion on weeping and lamenting.) It is plausible to suppose —then— that good conduct here is initially the result of acquiring laws and law-inculcated judgements without rational understanding.

But Socrates observes that well-trained youths ‘will kindly welcome the account’s arrival [ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου ἀσπάζοιτ’ ἄν]’ (402 A 3). Socrates seems to have in mind that well-trained youths will later come to have a rational understanding of their good conduct and its underlying laws and law-inculcated judgements. Now *Republic* 4 describes early ethical education as designed to have well-trained students absorb laws and law-inculcated judgements in the finest way possible, in such a way that they preserve and not abandon these laws and judgements at all costs (cf. T5 with *R.* 3 412 D 9–E 7). Considering jointly these two observations —first— about the arrival of reason in the context of good conduct motivated by laws and law-inculcated judgements and —second— about acquiring laws and law-inculcated judgements in the finest way possible, it is tempting to suppose that acquiring laws and law-inculcated judgements in the finest way possible involves rational understanding. This is a plausible view. For —we shall see— a rational understanding of laws and law-inculcated judgements makes them truly our own, indeed an expression of the best part of ourselves, and we are least likely to abandon that which we consider our own and an expression of the best part of ourselves.

The idea here is encouraged by Socrates’ final words in T6, namely that well-trained youths recognize the account in question ‘above all because of kinship [δι’ οἰκειότητα μάλιστα]’ (402 A 4). For, Socrates probably has in mind that well-trained youths recognize the account above all because they appreciate it as their own due to their own rational thought. (Note that the primary meaning of the noun ‘οἰκειότητα [*oikeiotēta*]’ is connected to the adjective ‘οἰκεῖος [*oikeios*]’ which has proprietary senses.) There are two ways to understand this suggestion as there are two alternatives to interpreting ‘the account’s arrival

[ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου]’ (402 A 3). Either the account comes from an external source —such as an educator— or the account comes from an internal source. These alternatives can be illustrated by the task of founding Callipolis and establishing its laws. Observe that Socrates reflects and reasons about these laws rather than declaring them at a whim (cf. *R.* 2 378 E 5–383 C 7, *R.* 3 402 E 2–403 C 3, *R.* 5 470 A 5–471 C 3, *R.* 10 604 B 7–C 1). Now imagine that these arguments for the laws are shared with well-trained youths who accept them —note ‘will kindly welcome [ἀσπάζοιτ’ ἄν]’ (402 A 3)— much like Adeimantus and Glaucon. It seems trivially true that well-trained youths would rely on their own reasoning insofar as they accept the account: they would presumably go through the account accepting its premises and conclusion (i.e. the law). If this is correct, it would be plausible to say both that well-trained youths have a rational understanding of these laws and that they would likely regard or recognize them as their own precisely because they are accepted on the basis of their rational thought. The basic idea is that acquiring a rational understanding of laws (and law-inculcated judgements) in this fashion, namely by accepting an argument based on one’s own reasoning, would plausibly be said to make them one’s own. (This alternative allows us to imagine speaking of ‘your laws’ in addressing Callipolitan students much like Socrates describes Callipolis or its children as ‘yours’ in addressing either Adeimantus or Glaucon (cf. *R.* 3 409 E 5, *R.* 4 427 C 6–D 1, 427 C 9, *R.* 5 461 E 6, *R.* 7 534 D 3, *R.* 10 607 A 6).)

The second alternative to interpreting ‘the account’s arrival [ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου]’ (402 A 3) views the account as coming from an internal source. Although the talk of ‘arrival’ readily suggests its coming from an external source (cf. *R.* 8 559 E 9–560 A 3 with 560 C 6–D 2), this is not necessary: we are not required to have in mind an external source in the phrase ‘the reason came to me’ since the phrase can —and usually does— mean that the reason was issued by one’s own mind. This second alternative corresponds to Socrates’ reflecting and reasoning about Callipolitan laws, in the sense that the laws’ accounts come from an internal source, namely Socrates’ reason. Since Socrates argues for these laws on the basis of his reasoning, it would be plausible to say both that he has a rational understanding of them and that he would likely regard these laws as his own precisely because they result from his rational thought. If this is correct and the account in T6 comes from an internal source, then it would come from the well-trained youths’ own reason. It would thus be plausible to say both that they have a rational understanding and that they would likely regard

the account as their own precisely because it results from their rational thought. The basic idea is that acquiring a rational understanding in this fashion, namely by formulating an account based on one's own reasoning, too makes the account our own. In other words, both alternatives to interpreting 'the account's arrival [ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου]' (402 A 3) point to the view that well-trained youths acquire a rational understanding of their behavior and the underlying laws and law-inculcated judgements, in the sense that their understanding arises by virtue of their own reasoning.

The next basic idea is that laws and law-inculcated judgements made our own by rational thought are least likely to be abandoned—for two complementary reasons. The first is that we are least likely to abandon that which we consider our own. We have a special concern or attitude—a certain love—for ourselves and our closest relations such as romantic partners, children, even animals. We can have this kind of love even for things beyond humans and non-human animals:

T41	<p>Οὗτοι τοι ἔνεκα ἠρόμην, ἧν δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι μοι ἔδοξας οὐ σφόδρα ἀγαπᾶν τὰ χρήματα, τοῦτο δὲ ποιῶσιν ὡς τὸ πολὺ οἱ ἂν μὴ αὐτοὶ κτήσωνται· οἱ δὲ κτησάμενοι διπλῆ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀσπάζονται αὐτά. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ποιήματα καὶ οἱ πατέρες τοὺς παῖδας ἀγαπῶσιν, ταύτη τε δὴ καὶ οἱ χρηματισάμενοι τὰ χρήματα σπουδάζουσιν ὡς ἔργον ἑαυτῶν, καὶ κατὰ τὴν χρείαν ἥπερ οἱ ἄλλοι. χαλεποὶ οὖν καὶ συγγενέσθαι εἰσίν, οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἐπαινεῖν ἄλλ' ἢ τὸν πλοῦτον.</p> <p>Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, λέγεις.</p>	<p>330 B 8 C 1 C 5 C 9</p>
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Let me tell you the reason for asking—I said—because you seem to me not to love money very much, and those who have not procured it themselves are for the most part like this. But those who have made it themselves are twice as attached to it than the others. For—just as poets love their poems and fathers their children—those who have made money take their money seriously both in this way as something they have

made themselves and for its use in the same way as the others. So, it is difficult even to associate with them: being willing to praise nothing other than wealth.

This is true —he said. (Pl. *R.* 1 330 B 8–C 9)

T41 recognizes that we can have a special concern or attitude —a certain love— even for things we produce such as artworks, money, etc.. Socrates takes this seriously and uses the so-called ‘Noble Lie’ for the welfare of Callipolis by expanding the reach of this love to include not only all members of Callipolis, but also the land itself.²⁰ This love motivates us to care for ourselves and our own, most basically in the form of preserving ourselves and them (cf. *R.* 3 412 D 2–E 3); put another way, this love engages us in such a way that we are least likely to abandon the object of love. Now it is plausible to suppose that laws and law-inculcated judgements made our own by rational thought would be included within this circle of special concern or love. Consider the above-mentioned examples of artworks and money. These suggest two alternatives for explaining our special concern for them, respectively either because we appreciate them as expressions of ourselves or because we appreciate them as instrumental to our well-being. It is almost certain that laws and law-inculcated judgements made our own by rational thought would fall under one of the two considerations (either as expressions of ourselves or as instrumental to our well-being) or even both. Since the special concern or love we have toward things we consider either as expressions of ourselves or as instrumental to our well-being engages us in such a way that precludes abandoning them, it is plausible to suppose that laws and law-inculcated judgements made our own by rational thought are least likely to be abandoned.²¹ It is striking that this idea finds a parallel in Socrates’ observation that compulsory learning does not stick or remain (cf. *R.* 7 536 D 4–537 A 3, *R.* 8 548 B 4–C 4) and that Socrates invites Glaucon to abide by —and

²⁰ Cf. Wilberding (2012) 131: ‘The different features of the Noble Lie are meant to address the various ways in which these cares and concerns [*sc.* for ourselves and our kin] might jeopardize the city. For example, when one’s city is under siege and things are at their bleakest, this concern for one’s own well-being encourages one to take one’s family and flee the city. Hence, the myth of *autochthony*, which by suggesting that the very earth under foot is one’s kin turns this desire on its heels and persuades one to remain and fight.’

²¹ Cf. Pl. *Men.* 97 E 6–98 A 4.

so preserve— the law not to welcome imitative poetry by rehearsing the argument against it in *Republic* 10 (607 E 4–608 B3).²²

The second —and complementary— reason for thinking that laws and law-inculcated judgements made our own by rational thought are least likely to be abandoned is that we are least likely to abandon that which we consider an expression of our reason. First, it is generally agreed that reason is the best thing and the best feature or part of ourselves (cf. *R.* 10 607 A 3–B 1, *R.* 9 588 B 10–E 3, *R.* 8 549 A 9–B 8 with 560 B 6–C 1; cf. *R.* 9 590 C 7–D 7 and *R.* 10 604 B 1–D 6). Second, it is generally agreed also that it is shameful to submit the better to the inferior, e.g. the better part of ourselves to the inferior part of ourselves (cf. *R.* 4 430 E 4–431 B 3, *R.* 9 589 C 6–D 4). Third, shame acts as a guardian in the sense that it keeps us from engaging in shameful actions, words, etc. (cf. *R.* 3 388 D 2–8, *R.* 5 465 A 8–B 5, *R.* 8 560 A 4–8 —note that shame restores or preserves the young man’s oligarchic constitution— and *R.* 10 604 A 1–8). Laws and law-inculcated judgements made our own by rational thought are thus an expression of the best thing and the best part of ourselves. Since it is shameful to submit the better part of ourselves to the inferior, abandoning our rationally understood laws and law-inculcated judgements would be shameful. (I am assuming that abandoning them is a form of submitting the better to the inferior.) Since well-trained youths have been brought up to have the right dispositions to the fine (τὰ καλὰ) and the base (τὰ αἰσχρὰ) —alternatively, the honorable and the shameful— even before any rational understanding, it is probable that well-trained youths will be especially sensitive to shame associated with abandoning laws and law-inculcated judgements made their own by rational thought. Well-trained youths would thus be especially averse to abandoning their own laws and law-inculcated judgements, those made an expression of their best part, namely reason.

The idea that early ethical education aims at the acquisition of laws and law-inculcated judgements by virtue of a student’s own reasoning can be gleaned from *Republic* 9 (590 C 7–591 A 4). For, the passage expresses views that applied to early ethical education imply the acquisition of laws and law-inculcated judgements by virtue of a student’s own reasoning.

T42 Οὐκοῦν ἵνα καὶ ὁ τοιοῦτος ὑπὸ ὁμοίου ἄρχηται οἷουπερ ὁ

590 C 7

²² Cf. *Pl. Phd.* 77 C 6–78 A 10; *Grg.* 513 C 4–D 1.

βέλτιστος, δοῦλον αὐτόν φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι ἐκείνου τοῦ
βελτίστου, ἔχοντος ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ θεῖον ἄρχον, οὐκ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ
τῆ τοῦ δούλου οἰόμενοι δεῖν ἄρχεσθαι αὐτόν, ὥσπερ Θρασύ-
μαχος ᾤετο τοὺς ἀρχομένους, ἀλλ' ὡς ἄμεινον ὄν παντὶ ὑπὸ
θείου καὶ φρονίμου ἄρχεσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν οἰκεῖον ἔχοντος ἐν
αὐτῷ, εἰ δὲ μή, ἔξωθεν ἐφεστῶτος, ἵνα εἰς δύναμιν πάντες
ὅμοιοι ᾤμεν καὶ φίλοι, τῷ αὐτῷ κυβερνώμενοι;
Καὶ ὀρθῶς γ', ἔφη.
Δηλοῖ δέ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ὁ νόμος ὅτι τοιοῦτον βούλεται,
πᾶσι τοῖς ἐν τῇ πόλει σύμμαχος ὢν, καὶ ἡ τῶν παιδῶν ἀρχή,
τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἐλευθέρους εἶναι, ἕως ἂν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὥσπερ ἐν πόλει
πολιτείαν καταστήσωμεν, καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον θεραπεύσαντες
τῷ παρ' ἡμῖν τοιούτῳ ἀντικαταστήσωμεν φύλακα ὅμοιον καὶ
ἄρχοντα ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ τότε δὴ ἐλεύθερον ἀφίεμεν.
Δηλοῖ γάρ, ἦ δ' ὅς.

D 1

D 5

E 1

591 A 1

A 4

Is it not for the sake of having even this kind of man [*sc.* the artisan] be ruled by something similar to what rules the best man that we say it behooves him to be a slave of that best man, who has the divine ruler within himself? It is not for harming the slave that we think it behooves him to be ruled —just as Thrasymachus thinks of the ruled— but because it is better for all to be ruled by a divine and wise ruler, above all that he has in himself as his own, alternatively one placed upon from outside, so that —so far as possible— we all be similar and friendly to one another, being steered by the same thing.

And rightly so —he said.

And it is clear —I said— that the law too has in view this much —being an ally to all in the city— as well as the rule of our children: they are not to be free until we establish a constitution in them —just as in a city— and taking care of their best [*sc.* soul-part] with our own we establish as counterpart a similar guard and ruler in it; and just then we set it free.

Yes it is clear —he said. (Pl. *R.* 9 590 C 7–591 A 4)

Passage T42 speaks about being ruled by ‘a divine and wise ruler’ (590 D 4). The ‘divine and wise ruler’ in question is almost certainly reason: note that divinity and wisdom are often associated with reason (cf. *R.* 4 441E 3–6, 442 C 4–8, *R.* 7 518 D 9–519 B 6 with 532 B 6–D 1, *R.* 9 586 D 4–587 A 13, 589 C 6–D 4, *R.* 10 611 B 9–612 A 7). The first part of T42 (590 C 7–D 7) presents two ways for a person to be ruled by reason. Either we are ruled by our own reason or we are ruled by another person’s reason. The second part of T42 (590 E 1–591 A 4) states that early ethical education —note ‘the rule of our children’ (590 B 2) and the goal of ‘establish[ing] a constitution in them’ (590 E 3–591 A 1); cf. *R.* 4 441 E 7–442 B 9 with 445 C 4–E 3— aims to have well-trained students be ruled by their own reason.

The two alternatives for a person to be ruled by reason suggest two alternatives for a person to regard the laws and law-inculcated judgements imparted throughout early ethical education, either well-trained students regard them as their own or they regard the laws etc. as imposed upon them. The former alternative seems to be likely: first, imposing laws and law-inculcated judgements upon a person indicates a lack of education (cf. *R.* 3 405 A 6–B 4); second, laws and law-inculcated judgements imposed upon a person are not likely to stick or remain (cf. *R.* 7 536 D 4–537 A 3); third, the goal of having well-trained students be ruled by their own reason simply seems incompatible with the result that well-trained students regard laws and law-inculcated judgements as imposed upon them. The impression is that laws and law-inculcated judgements issued or accepted by one’s own reason are always preferable to those issued and imposed by others.²³ In other words, the views expressed in T42 applied to early ethical education imply that well-trained students will acquire laws and law-inculcated judgements by virtue of their own reasoning.

It may be objected that well-trained youths do not come to have a rational understanding of their good conduct, laws, etc. during early ethical education. For, it is tempting to claim that well-trained youths would acquire this understanding (by virtue of their own reasoning) only after early ethical education. Two observations may be made.

The first observation (against the view defended here) arises from an agreement in *Republic* 4:

²³ Cf. *Ti.* 89 A 1–B 3 for an analogue with respect to bodily health.

T12	<p>Ἄλλ' οὐ χαλεπὸν, ἔφη, φανῆναι· καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς παιδίοις τοῦτό γ' ἂν τις ἴδοι, ὅτι θυμοῦ μὲν εὐθὺς γενόμενα μεστὰ ἐστὶ, λογισμοῦ δ' ἔνιοι μὲν ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν οὐδέποτε μεταλαμβάνειν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ὀψέ ποτε.</p> <p>Ναὶ μὰ Δί', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καλῶς γε εἶπες.</p>	<p>441 A 7</p> <p>B 1</p> <p>B 2</p>
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But it isn't difficult —he said— to show [*sc.* spirit to be different from the rational element]. For, even in children one can see this, that they are full of spirit right from birth whereas some seem to me never to get a share of rational calculation —and the many quite late.

Yes by Zeus —I said— you have spoken well. (Pl. *R.* 4 441 A 7–B 2; cf. *R.* 7 534 D 3–7)²⁴

This passage could be taken to express the view that most human beings lack the ability to reason during the years of early ethical education. If this view is endorsed in T12, then most human beings would not be able to acquire a rational account of laws and law-inculcated judgements during early ethical education. How —then— does T12 fit with the view defended here?

The worry seems to arise especially were we to take the phrase ‘quite late’ to entail that most human beings get their share of rational calculation *after* early ethical education, which —in the Callipolitan scheme of education— would be after the age of 20. But why suppose this interpretation? There is no obvious motivation to understand the phrase ‘quite late’ in this way and it is hardly credible. Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that ‘quite late’ applies either to the period of childhood or to the period immediately after childhood, in which case Glaucon would be claiming that most human beings get their share of rational

²⁴ Cf. Pl. *Lg.* 672 B 8–C 7.

calculation either late in childhood or in adolescence; but this would still be during the years of early ethical education.²⁵ At any rate, let us dispel the worry in the best way possible.

Exactly what does Glaucon have in mind? By the phrase ‘get a share of’, Glaucon probably means ‘to have’ rational calculation in the sense of ‘to exercise’ it: Glaucon contrasts getting a share of rational calculation with being ‘full of spirit right from birth’; the latter observation readily elicits the fact that children show or manifest their spirit right from birth; and to show or manifest one’s spirit amounts to its being exercised; if this is correct, then Glaucon is making the observation that children do not show or manifest —exercise— rational calculation as early as spirit. Now what is meant by ‘rational calculation’? Glaucon probably has in mind the kind of rational calculation concerned with action, namely practical reasoning. This is suggested by the context: the first argument to reveal a partite soul focuses on a conflict between a desire to drink and an opposition to it that arises ‘from rational calculation [ἐκ λογισμοῦ]’ (*R.* 4 439 C 3–D 9 at 439 D 1); the next argument to reveal another psychic division returns to the case of appetitive desire forcing someone to act ‘contrary to rational calculation [παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν]’ (*R.* 4 439 D 10–440 E 5 at 440 B 1). This opposition or conflict between rational calculation and appetitive desire restricted to the context of children in T12 may bring to mind an earlier discussion on temperance: after all, it is not uncommon to find many and varied desires in children, that is desires not led by rational calculation (cf. *R.* 4 430 E 1–432 B 2, especially 431 B 9–C 8); and it may be no coincidence that Plato complements Glaucon’s observation in T12 with the example of Odysseus acting temperately (cf. *R.* 4 441 B 2–C 3 with *R.* 3 398 D 7 ff. at 390 D 1–6). Glaucon may be simply commenting on the fact that children are rarely seen exercising rational calculation in their actions. At any rate, it seems to be the case that Glaucon has in mind the kind of rational calculation concerned with action.

If this is correct, then it is arguably the case that Glaucon’s observation proves no challenge to the view defended here (according to which Callipolitan students acquire a rational account of laws and law-inculcated judgements). For, Glaucon’s observation does not

²⁵ We have seen (cf. Chapter 2 §2, the main text to n. 18) that T12 neither means nor entails that the rational part cannot be exercised: Callipolitan students receive a mathematical education at the same time as their musical training (*R.* 7 536 D 4–547 C 5); in other words —despite T12— young Callipolitan students are not disqualified from an education that paradigmatically depends on and develops rational calculation (cf. Jenkins (2015)).

fit well with Plato’s expectations of Callipolitan early ethical education. There is evidence to argue that Callipolitan students would find their rational calculation stimulated and developed —thus exercised— during early ethical education. Consider the goal to make Callipolitan students acquire temperance: first —as we have seen— acting temperately can involve exercising rational calculation, for instance to mitigate the strength of a non-rational desire (cf. *R.* 4 431 B 9–D 8 with *R.* 10 603 E 4–604 D 10, especially 604 B 7–D4, and 606 B 5–C 1 with 607 E 4–608 B 3, especially 608 A 1–5); second, Callipolitan students are expected eventually to be independently temperate and not always dependent on a teacher (cf. *R.* 9 590 E 1–591 A 4 with *R.* 4 429 E 7–430 B 6, especially if Plato has in mind rational persuasion); it is plausible to conclude —then— that Callipolitan students will exercise their own rational calculation in the course of early ethical education. The basic point to stress against taking T12 as an objection to the view defended here is that Glaucon’s observation is not a psychological necessity since the exercise of rational calculation is something encouraged or facilitated by education.²⁶ The evidence suggests that Callipolitan education will stimulate and develop —thus exercise— students’ rational calculation from a young age, to be clear during early ethical education.

The second observation (against the view defended here according to which early ethical education involves acquiring a rational account (λόγος) of laws and law-inculcated judgements) arises from an agreement in *Republic* 7. It is tempting to think that acquiring a rational understanding falls outside the scope of early ethical education —for two reasons. In *Republic* 7 (521 C 1–535 A 2), Plato pays attention to the subjects in which to educate prospective rulers of Callipolis and Socrates requires that they must be able to draw the soul from the realm of becoming to the realm of what is or of being (521 D 4–5). After showing that physical training does not satisfy this requirement, Socrates asks:

T43 Ἄλλ’ ἄρα μουσικὴ ὅσῃν τὸ πρότερον διήλθομεν; 522 A 2
 Ἄλλ’ ἦν ἐκείνη γ’, ἔφη, ἀντίστροφος τῆς γυμναστικῆς, εἰ
 μέμνησαι, ἔθεσι παιδεύουσα τοὺς φύλακας, κατὰ τε ἁρμονίαν
 εὐαρμοσίαν τινά, οὐκ ἐπιστήμην, παραδιδούσα, καὶ κατὰ A 5

²⁶ Cf. *R.* 7 521 C 1–532 D 1 with 536 D 4–547 C 5: mathematical studies that rouse up rational calculation —note ‘calculation and understanding [λογισμὸν τε καὶ νόησιν]’ (524 B 4) in its context— are to be pursued alongside early ethical education.

ῥυθμὸν εὐρυθμίαν, ἔν τε τοῖς λόγοις ἕτερα τούτων ἀδελφὰ ἔθη
 ἄττα ἔχουσα, καὶ ὅσοι μυθώδεις τῶν λόγων καὶ ὅσοι
 ἀληθινώτεροι ἦσαν· μάθημα δὲ πρὸς τοιοῦτόν τι ἄγον, οἷον
 σὺ νῦν ζητεῖς, οὐδὲν ἦν ἐν αὐτῇ.

Ἀκριβέστατα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἀναμιμνήσκεις με· τῷ γὰρ ὄντι B 1
 τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν εἶχεν. B 2

But could it be the musical training we thoroughly discussed earlier?

But that —he said— is just the counter part of physical training. If you remember, it educated the guardians in customs: imparting by harmony a certain harmonious temper —not knowledge— and by rhythm a certain gracefulness; and cultivating certain other habits akin to these in the stories, whether fabulous or closer to the truth. But as a subject leading to something such as that, of the kind you now seek, there is nothing in it.

You —I said— remind me with the greatest precision: for, it really has nothing like that. (Pl. *R.* 7 522 A 2–B 2)

Passage T43 shows Socrates and Glaucon agreeing that the cognitive state resulting from musical training cannot be or pass for knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). Since it can be supposed that a rational understanding —say— of laws amounts to knowledge and since musical training does not yield knowledge, then we should deny that well-trained youths acquire their rational understanding during early ethical education. The second reason is due to another passage in *Republic* 7:

T44 Ἡ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἐκάστου λαμβάνοντα 534 B 3
 τῆς οὐσίας; καὶ τὸν μὴ ἔχοντα, καθ' ὅσον ἂν μὴ ἔχη λόγον
 αὐτῷ τε καὶ ἄλλω διδόναι, κατὰ τοσοῦτον νοῦν περὶ τούτου B 5
 οὐ φήσεις ἔχειν;
 Πῶς γὰρ ἂν, ἦ δ' ὅς, φαίην; B 7

Do you too call a ‘dialectician’ who understands the account of the being of each thing? And who does not, will you say that so far as he does not have an account to give either to himself or to another to that extent he does not have an understanding of it?

How —he said— could I not say this? (Pl. *R.* 7 534 B 3–7)

Passage T44 may tempt us with the view that a rational understanding of good conduct, laws, etc. falls under the purview of dialectic. For, the phrase ‘τὸν λόγον [...] λαμβάνοντα [who understands the account]’ (534 B 3) may bring to mind that phrase ‘πρὶν λόγον δυνατὸς εἶναι λαβεῖν [before being able to understand an account]’ (402 A 2–3) in T6 and the parallelism may tempt us to suppose that the understanding mentioned in T6 is an achievement of dialectic (cf. *R.* 7 538 C 6–539 A 4). If this is correct, then the understanding mentioned in T6 falls under the purview of dialectic beyond the scope of early ethical education. In other words, these passages in *Republic 7* suggest that a rational understanding of good conduct, laws, etc. falls outside the scope of early ethical education.

The agreement in *Republic 7* (T44) —however— does not support the objection that a well-trained youth’s rational understanding arrives after early ethical education. This agreement denying knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) as a cognitive state resulting from musical training is tenuous: it is possible that the term ‘ἐπιστήμη [knowledge]’ acquires a more specific sense in the middle books of the *Republic*, namely as a term reserved for the cognitive grasp of Platonic Forms (cf. Chapter 2 §2 n. 16 with the main text to n. 17). If this is correct, then it is dubious to rely on the agreement [i] that musical training does not yield knowledge and the premise [ii] that a rational understanding —say— of laws amounts to knowledge to argue for the conclusion [iii] that well-trained youths do not acquire their rational understanding during early ethical education: it is not obvious that premise [ii] is true in the stricter sense of ‘knowledge [ἐπιστήμη]’. Passage T44 —moreover— does not decisively support the objection that a well-trained youth’s rational understanding arrives after early ethical education: acquiring a rational understanding of the being of each thing —presumably answering the ‘what is F?’ question (cf. *R.* 7 538 D 6–E 5)— is not the same thing as acquiring a rational understanding of laws and law-inculcated judgements; the difference

between answering the ‘what is F?’ question and acquiring an account of laws is manifest (cf. R. 2 378 E 5–383 C 7, R. 3 402 E 2–403 C 3, R. 5 470 A 5–471 C 3, R. 10 604 B 7–C 1).

5.5 Conclusion

Chapter 5 §§2–3 concluded the objection against the standard view of early ethical education according to which the soul’s spirited element is the primary target of early ethical education, in the sense that it is the proper or ultimate subject of Callipolitan laws, true (law-inculcated) judgements, and a sound ethical discriminatory faculty. Chapter 5 §2 argued first that both non-rational parts, the appetitive and the spirited, by nature have non-necessary desires and pleasures. This is problematic because non-necessary desires and pleasures are obstacles to acquiring psychic excellences such as temperance, justice, etc.. Since early ethical education is meant to bring about psychic excellences, it must work on weakening or eliminating the non-rational parts’ innate non-necessary desires and pleasures. Chapter 5 §3 identified two ways to weaken or eliminate these desires and pleasures, either indirectly by cultivating desires of another kind or directly by opposing them. The latter strategy of direct opposition involves psychic conflict. Now early ethical education is not an entirely passive training in the sense that students learn to weaken or eliminate their own non-rational non-necessary desires. These observations are decisively troubling for the standard view that the soul’s spirited element is the primary target of early ethical education. For, the spirited element possesses non-necessary desires and pleasures which Callipolitan students will learn to weaken or eliminate and it is very likely that Callipolitan students will learn to weaken or eliminate them by directly opposing them: after all, there is no obvious reason to suppose that weakening or eliminating non-necessary spirited desires must be only indirect. It is possible—then—that Callipolitan students will experience psychic conflict in learning to weaken or eliminate their own non-necessary spirited desires and pleasures. But if spirit is the primary target or beneficiary of early ethical education and it explains the soul’s learning to restrain or oppose its non-necessary desires and pleasures, then spirit could suffer psychic conflict within itself. If this is correct, then the standard view of early ethical education is committed to the generally unacceptable possibility of partitioning the spirited element.

Chapter 5 §4 defended the view that early ethical education must primarily target the soul's rational part. Early ethical education is concerned with training students to act in the best way possible—for instance—to welcome excellences such as courage and to reject vices such as cowardice. This training begins with acquiring laws and law-inculcated judgements without a rational account. It is acknowledged that well-trained students will later acquire that rational understanding, but the timing is unclear. Does it arrive during or after early ethical education? There is reason to believe that acting in the best way possible is the result of a cooperation between reason and law. This plausible view suggests that early ethical education will culminate with a cooperation between reason and law, with the arrival of that rational account of laws and law-inculcated judgements, in which case this education will involve some reasoning or calculation. This suggestion is supported by reflecting on early ethical education's design to have well-trained youths absorb laws and law-inculcated judgements in the finest way possible. Students who have absorbed laws etc. in the finest way possible preserve them—do not abandon them—basically at all costs. This kind of preservation is best explained by acquiring a rational account of laws and law-inculcated judgements—for two complementary reasons: first, a rational account would make laws etc. our own and we are least likely to abandon that which we consider our own; second, a rational account would make laws etc. an expression of the best part of ourselves, namely reason, and shame would deter us from the shameful act of abandoning our laws and law-inculcated judgements. Since early ethical education is designed to have well-trained youths absorb laws and law-inculcated judgements in the finest way possible and this involves a cooperation between reason and law, namely the acquisition of a rational understanding of laws etc., then early ethical education must primarily target the soul's rational part. (This view thus identifies a novel achievement of early ethical education, namely acquiring a rational understanding of laws and law-inculcated judgements.)

There is an advantage to the view that early ethical education involves acquiring a rational understanding of laws and law-inculcated judgements. Remember that well-trained youths adopt true judgements about values and norms in such a way that these are preserved basically at all costs. This kind of commitment may be found puzzling insofar as early ethical education seems to forgo providing any sort of justification to these true judgements:

‘A defining feature of the correct opinions which musical education leads guardians to adopt is that they are held with a kind of commitment and tenacity that seems to go well beyond what is warranted merely by their epistemic value. There is nothing provisional, superficial, or tentative about these opinions; and Socrates’ description of them as penetrating to the very fabric of the guardians’ souls—a feature clearly brought out in his likening of musical education to the dyeing of wool (429c-430b)—is more reminiscent of knowledge than ‘mere’ opining. A basic task which faces any interpretation of musical education in the *Republic* is then to provide some account of the sort of psychological condition which is manifested in an intense commitment to what are, ultimately, mere true opinions.’²⁷

The view defended in Chapter 5 §4 is advantageous insofar as it dispels this puzzle. The kind of commitment shown by well-trained students is explained by their acquiring a rational understanding of the true judgements imparted throughout early ethical education. This rational understanding makes these judgements truly their own and an expression of the best part of themselves. Since we are unlikely to abandon that which we consider our own and an expression of the best part of ourselves, it is no longer puzzling that well-trained students will preserve those true judgements at all costs.

²⁷ Thaler (2015) 413.

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