Chapitre de livre | 2026

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How to cite

GELLERA, Giovanni. *Sed istud non capio* : Scotistic answer to a Thomistic problem : Scotism and the Eucharist in the seventeenth century. In: L'humain, le réel et le divin : implications philosophiques et théologiques de l'eucharistie, 11e-18e siècle. Chukurian, A. & Zahnd, U. (Ed.). Turnhout : Brepols, 2026. (Textes et études du Moyen Âge)

This publication URL: https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:184839

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«Sed Istud non Capio»: A Scotistic Answer to a Thomistic Problem?
Scotism and the Eucharist in the Seventeenth Century

Introduction[1]

This paper investigates the contribution of Scotism to the seventeenth-century debates on the Eucharist from two distinct yet connected perspectives: one historical and one conceptual[2].

As regards the historical perspective, seventeenth-century Scotism developed in dialogue with, and as an alternative to, 'institutional' Thomism. The received opinion has long been that after the Council of Trent Catholic scholastic philosophy was predominantly Thomistic but in the past few decades the importance of early modern Scotism has been brought to light in both Catholic and Protestant studies. The elevation of transubstantiation to dogma at Trent determined new specific constraints for philosophers and, as this paper argues, especially for the Scotists. The paper focuses on two lesser known seventeenth-century Scotists: the Scottish one time Oratorian William Chalmers (1596–c.1678) and the French Franciscan Claude Méron (fl. 1672-1697). They are instructive for different reasons: Chalmers complained that ecclesiastical orders opposed his Scotism, while Méron produced a Scotistic response in a debate at that point influenced by René Descartes.

As regards the conceptual perspective, the paper frames the dialogue between Scotism and Thomism in terms of a 'realist' as opposed to a 'deflationary' metaphysics of the accidents[3]. The deflationary account gives priority to unity over separation. The challenge posed by transubstantiation to Thomism is that accidents are supposed to exist separately in the miracle although they are defined and individuated by inherence in their natural substance. When

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[2] Some arguments of this paper, especially in Section 3, are derived from G. GELLERA, «Calvinist Metaphysics and the Eucharist in the Early Seventeenth Century», *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 21.6 (2013) 1091-1110; G. GELLERA, «A "Calvinist" Theory of Matter? Burgersdijk and Descartes on res extensa», *Intellectual History Review*, 28.2 (2018) 255-270; GELLERA, G., «Reformed Scholasticism in 17c Scottish philosophy», in A. Broadie (ed.), *Scottish Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2020, pp. 94–110.
[3] For this terminology see for example R. PASNAU, *Metaphysical Themes, 1274–1671*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011, pp. 181-185.

discussing Thomas's view, Scotus objected «But I do not get this» («Sed istud non capio»). The realist account gives priority to separation over unity: transubstantiation thus fits in with the overall description of substances as a unitary order of different essences. This paper investigates a Scotistic solution to a Thomistic problem: how some scholastics argued that a realist metaphysics of Scotistic legacy was needed to 'save the miracle philosophically' against deflationary views, typically associated with Aristotelianism, which were regarded as compatible with the negation of the eucharistic miracle.

The paper is divided into three parts. The first part discusses the consequences of the decisions of the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) and the Council of Trent (1548–63) for a philosophy of the Eucharist. The second part introduces the differences between Thomas and Scotus as a blueprint for the analysis of the metaphysics of the Eucharist in William Chalmers and Claude Méron. The third part analyses the deflationary and realist metaphysics of the Eucharist and highlights the specific contributions of the Scotistic tradition.

1. From the Fourth Lateran Council to the Council of Trent

The Council of Trent (1548–63) was a decisive moment in the formulation of Catholic orthodoxy, and has been presented as a triumph for Thomism. The *Summa theologiae* was reportedly placed next to the Bible during the proceedings of the council. On many aspects, including the Eucharist, Trent set the Catholic orthodoxy for the following centuries, just as the Gregorian reform and the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), when the word 'transubstantiation' was first used, had set the medieval liturgical and doctrinal practices which the Reformers would later reject. For Francisco Suárez, René Descartes and the seventeenth-century Scotists the Eucharist was the transubstantiated Eucharist of Trent. Comparative remarks about the influence of the two councils are in order.

The Fourth Lateran Council stressed the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist. The council took place between early scholasticism and the thirteenth-century appropriation of Aristotle. Before 1215, the idea of a «substantial change» in the Eucharist was included in the oath that pope Gregory VII forced Berengar of Tours to sign (1079)[4]. Hugh of St Victor explained it as the substances of bread and wine changing into the substances of body and blood of Christ, and Robert Pullen was arguably the first to use the word «transubstantiation»[5]. After

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[4] On Berengar and substantial change, see the chapter of Christian Brouwer in the present volume.
[5] G. MACY, «The Medieval Inheritance», in L.P. WANDEL (ed.), *A Companion to the Eucharist in the Reformation*, Brill, Leiden – Boston 2014, pp. 15-37, 24-25.

1215, Alexander of Hales was the first to talk of quantity as a quasi-substance (or proxy-subject), a view later endorsed influentially by Thomas Aquinas. The variety of thirteenth-century scholasticism benefited from the fact that the Lateran Council did not set the eucharistic doctrine as an article of faith[6]. Theologians and philosophers could investigate different views of the Eucharist in keeping with orthodoxy, such as coexistence, substitution and transmutation[7]. There was no agreement on the concepts involved in the miracle, let alone on the use of Aristotle's philosophy in theology. The intense debate was guided, but not constrained, by the council's pronouncements. Thomas's position will later become orthodox among the Catholics but many could and, in fact, did object to it including Robert Kilwardby, Archbishop of Canterbury, Durand of St Pourçan, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham[8]. Scotus argued against transubstantiation as a 'conversion' but, like Ockham after him, accepted transubstantiation on account of the fact that it was the majority position in the church. So, the debate was fluid and the Roman Church lacked the centralised power to enforce a single orthodox view.

The Council of Trent exerted a normative force unknown to the thirteenth century. The post-Reformation confessional struggles determined that all sides increasingly treated dissent in terms of heterodoxy, if not outright heresy[9]. In a confessionally fragmented context, the eucharistic debates acquired a new political dimension. Another novelty was that, in order to ensure uniformity in the church and set the limits of orthodoxy, belief in the eucharistic miracle as transubstantiation was enshrined as an article of faith. On 11 October 1551, Trent «repudiating the Lutheran, Calvinist, and Zwinglian doctrines, affirmed the substantial real presence of the body and the blood of Christ in the Eucharist brought about by a change 'most aptly called transubstantiation'»[10]. The Latin text says that «in sanctissime Eucharistiae sacramento contineri vere, realiter et substantialiter una cum anima et divinitate Domini nostri Iesu Christi» and that «in sacrosanto Eucharistiae sacramento remanere substantiam panis et vini una cum corpore et sanguine Domini nostri Iesu Christi» by way of «conversionem totius substantiae panis in corpus et totius substantiae vini in sanguinem, manentibus dumtaxat

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[6] MACY, «The Medieval Inheritance», p. 28.
[7] See J.M. ARCADI, «Recent Philosophical Work on the Doctrine of the Eucharist», *Philosophy Compass*, 11.7 (2016) 402-412 for a classification of eucharistic views.
[8] On Ockham in particular, see the contribution of John Slotemaker in the present volume.
[9] S. MORTIMER – J. ROBERTSON (eds), *The Intellectual Consequences of Religious Heterodoxy 1600−1750*, Brill, Leiden – Boston 2012, pp. 9-12.
[10] R.J. DALY, S.J., «The Council of Trent», in L.P. WANDEL (ed.), *A Companion to the Eucharist in the Reformation*, Brill, Leiden – Boston 2014, pp. 159-182, 164-165

speciebus panis et vini»[11]. All the formulations end with the condemnation («anathema sit») of any opinion contrary to dogma.

Although Trent did not treat the Eucharist in a systematic way, its pronouncements were clear. The goal of countering heresy and the technical scholastic language of the pronouncements left much less room for interpretation than did the Fourth Lateran Council's decisions. Both councils directly influenced the philosophical debates of their times but in the aftermath of the Reformation and Trent the debates were more entrenched and polarised. The received opinion is that, as part of the enforcement of orthodoxy, the Catholic position was uniformed on a (broadly) Thomistic view and that the brunt of the polemics was between Catholic supporters and Protestant deniers of transubstantiation. The investigation of seventeenth century Scotism suggests that, within the limits imposed to philosophical liberty by the formulation of the dogma of transubstantiation, the Scotists animated a debate within Catholicism as an alternative to Thomism, just as Scotus had objected to Thomas. But, under the pressure of the new status of transubstantiation as dogma, seventeenth-century Scotism lost much of the originality, complexity and, one might want to say, moderation of Scotus's original position.

2. Thomas and Scotus, Chalmers and Méron

The differences between Scotus and Thomas on the Eucharist are of fundamental importance and include the very definition of transubstantiation. The Eucharist as 'substantial real presence' raises three fundamental issues: what type of change occurs, what the separation of the species means, and how real presence is possible[12]. Though not exhaustive, the following list serves as a helpful starting point for the discussion of seventeenth-century realist versus deflationary views.

> (1) Thomas understands real presence as «the *conversion* of one whole substance into another». Scotus objects that real presence cannot be explained by Thomas's transubstantiation (a doctrine about substances) but it can be by a movement of a substance[13]: a «transition of a total substance into a substance»[14].

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[11] DALY, «The Council of Trent», p. 165.

[12] Other important questions (e.g. what type of sacrifice the eucharist is) are not considered here as they do not bear directly on the meta-physics of the eucharist. See also the contribution of Laurent Cesalli in the present volume.

[13] R. CROSS, *Duns Scotus*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999, p. 140.

[14] D. BURR, «Scotus and Transubstantiation», *Mediaeval Studies*, 34.1 (1972) 336-360, 354.

(2) For Thomas, Christ's pre-existence helps explain how it can replace bread and wine whereas for Scotus it is problematic: if Christ pre-exists (and everyone agrees that he does), then Christ's substance undergoes accidental, and not substantial, change.

(3) For Thomas, no change occurs to the substance of Christ whereas for Scotus Christ acquires a new relation to place («respectus extrinsecus adveniens»): which is a change in the category of place.

(4) For Thomas, quantity acts as a quasi-substance or proxy-subject as the subject of the accidents,[15] whereas for Scotus quantity does not have this special role[16]. Hence:

(5) For Thomas, the accidents (including quantity) are not real entities. They are maintained into existence and individuated by their natural substance and their essence includes aptitudinal, not actual, inherence. For Scotus, the accidents (including quantity) are real entities, so they have essence and existence and individuation by themselves[17].

(6) For Thomas, Christ's body does not retain its physical extension, whereas for Scotus it does because extension is a necessary feature of a body, and loses only its proper spatial relation[18].

Thomas and Scotus also had different reasons for accepting transubstantiation. Scotus favoured remanence over transubstantiation and formulated several arguments against substantial conversion. Scotus believed that transubstantiation as conversion involved too many *inconvenientia* for natural reason and had weak scriptural evidence[19]. Scotus's eucharistic philosophy is at its most original in the *pars destruens* of existing views, especially Thomas's. Ultimately, Scotus's acceptance of transubstantiation was due to the fact that the councils and the majority of the church accepted it[20]. Scotus had a complex, nuanced, moderate view, respectful of the instances of natural reason and of ecclesiastical authority at once. He was unwilling to quarrel on the issue: «mirum videtur quare in uno articulo, qui non est principalis articulus fidei debeat talis intellectus asseri, propter quem fides pateat contemptui omnium sequentium rationem» [21]. This pronouncement shows little of the «strong sense» of

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[15] The expressions seek to capture the idea that quantity is made to act 'as if', 'almost as', 'in the stead of' a substance, as in Thomas Aquinas, *Contra Gentiles* 4, 65, n.2: «sola quantitas dimensiva sine subiecto subsistat, et ipsa aliis accidentibus *praebeat subiectum*», and Francisco Suárez, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, XL, Introduction: «quantitas est quodammodo prior et *quasi* fundamentum aliorum accidentium» (emphasis mine).

[16] S.E. LAHEY, «Late Medieval Eucharistic Theology», in I.C. LEVY – G. MACY – K. VAN AUSDALL (eds), *A Companion to the Eucharist in the Middle Ages*, Brill, Leiden – Boston 2012, pp. 499-540, 527. As a matter of fact, quantity does play this role, see Cross (1999): 142, but only once Scotus has accepted transubstantiation over remanence.

[17] P. KING, «Scotus on Metaphysics», in T. WILLIAMS (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002, pp. 15-68, 23 where King calls *realitas* «the diminutive of res» and 29-34 on Scotus's realism about accidents, as in *In Metaph.* VII, qq. 1 and 4.

[18] CROSS, *Duns Scotus*, pp. 143-144. For a more general comparison of Thomism and Scotism, see R. ARIEW, *Descartes among the Scholastics*, Brill, Leiden – Boston 2011, pp. 83-84.

[19] LAHEY, «Late Medieval Eucharistic Theology», p. 521.

[20] BURR, «Scotus and Transubstantiation», pp. 347-348; CROSS, *Duns Scotus*, p. 142; LEVY – MACY – VAN AUSDALL (eds), «*A Companion to the Eucharist in the Middle Ages*», p. 625: Scotus and Ockham «believed [transubstantiation] to be more in keeping with canon law, most notably the canons *Firmiter* and *Cum Marthae* found within the *Decretales*, or *Liber extra*, issued by Pope Gregory IX in 1234».

[21] BURR, «Scotus and Transubstantiation», p. 349.

transubstantiation defended – theologically and philosophically – by Thomas and, later, at Trent[22].

Between Scotus and Thomas and the seventeenth-century Scotists and Thomists, Trent happened as well as the proclamation of Thomas as a Doctor of the Church in 1567. At Trent the eucharistic miracle became an article of faith. Much had changed from when Scotus could still refer to it as «non principalis articulus fidei». It was defined as substantial real presence brought about by transubstantiation, and the species were declared to remain without their natural substances following a total conversion of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ. Charles Lohr has suggested that, «disturbed by doctrinal confusion, post-Tridentine professors returned to the teaching of their orders' master»[23]. The possibility of a return *ad fontes* was different for the Thomists or the Scotists. The Thomists were part of an institutional philosophy, supported by the papacy[24], and reinvigorated by old and new orders such as the Dominicans and Jesuits. The Scotists were thought to be more numerous but did not constitute «a school in the normal sense of the word» and, as a result, Scotism was «much less clearly monolithic in character than Thomism»[25]. Scotism was not institutionally backed by a specific order and Scotus's eucharistic views were not even accepted by all the Franciscans[26]. Despite a Scotism-leaning majority among the delegates, Trent endorsed a 'Thomistic' Eucharist with two immediate consequences for the Scotists: 1) the eucharistic miracle could be understood only as a conversion of substances, against Scotus's favoured position; 2) a tendency prevailed towards Thomas's «strong sense» of transubstantiation and ancillarity of philosophy, arguably motivated by the intellectual dimension of the religious controversies and the rationalistic spirit of the time, rather than towards Scotus's nuanced dialectics between arguments from natural reason and from faith[27].

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[22] BURR, «Scotus and Transubstantiation», p. 357.

[23] C.H. LOHR, «Metaphysics», in C.B. SCHMITT – Q. SKINNER – E. KESSLER – J. KRAYE (eds), *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1988, pp. 537-638, 619.

[24] LOHR, «Metaphysics», p. 599.

[25] M.J.F.M. HOENEN, «Scotus and the Scotist School. The Tradition of Scotist Thought in the Medieval and Early Modern Period», in E.P. BOS (ed.), *John Duns Scotus (1265/6 – 1308): Renewal of Philosophy*, Rodopi, Amsterdam 1998, pp. 197-210, 198.

[26] J. SCHMUTZ, «L'Héritage des Subtils. Cartographie du Scotism de l'âge classique», *Les Études philosophiques. Duns Scot au XVIIe siècle: I. L'objet et sa métaphysique*, 1 (2002) 51-81, 55-59 on the fragmentation, syncretism, and purism of Renaissance and early modern Scotism. The resulting picture is that Scotism was a silent majority in early modern scholasticism.

[27] It is worth noting here that the notion of 'species', chosen in the pronouncements of Trent and broader than that of 'real accidents', will be important in Descartes's eucharistic views and the ensuing debates. See also J.-R. ARMOGATHE, *Theologia cartesiana. L'explication physique de l'Eucharistie chez Descartes et dom Desgabets,* La Haye, Martinus Nijhoff, 1977, and the contribution of Aurélien Chukurian in the present volume.

We now turn to William Chalmers and Claude Méron. The main features of their metaphysics of transubstantiation are based on Scotistic principles and suggest that, after Trent, it was complicated for the Scotists to fully follow Scotus on the Eucharist.

William Chalmers

William Chalmers (Gulielmus Camerarius Scotus) was born in Aberdeen, Scotland in 1596. A Catholic, Chalmers left the now Reformed Scotland at a young age to study at the Scots College in Rome, and joined the Oratorians in Paris in 1627[28]. Chalmers shows admiration for John Duns Scotus, whom he calls «noster» and «conterraneus» in the early *Selectae disputationes philosophicae, in tres partes distributae* (Paris: Chapelain, 1630), a work issued from his teaching with the Oratorians at Angers, France.

Chalmers seems to have a clear sense of the consequences of his allegiance to Scotus. In the discussion of the *ratio* of quantity he defends the Scotistic view that the formal reason of quantity is extension of *partes extra partes*, as opposed to the view that it is measurability and divisibility, attributed to Thomas (181). Chalmers remarks, quite tellingly, that «responsio haec nostra est contra receptam Theologorum sententiam, cui se opponere tutum non est» (185). In support of this, the opinion of cardinal William Allen (1532–1594) is cited that such a position is «heretical». Scotus's view is later qualified «in ordine ad locum» (184). The argument goes through the objections already moved by Scotus to Thomas. Whereas Thomas and the Thomists believe that in the host Christ retains intrinsic quantity (namely, the internal relation of the parts to one another) without extrinsic quantity (the relation of said parts to a place), for Scotus and Chalmers Christ retains the full quantity (because this is necessary for a body as such) and loses the relation to place (185). It is at this point that Chalmers makes the remark quoted above, and adds the potentially controversial distinction between *in theologicis* and *in philosophicis*:

> Respondeo, non esse hac in re confundenda Theologica cum Philosophicis, sed valde secernenda et distinguenda. In Theologicis convenimus cum Theologis, quatenus cum illis admittimus in Christo Domino sub speciebus extensionem intrinsecam et entitativam; in Philosophicis autem dissentimus a quibusdam, qua parte illi talem extensionem intrinsecam putant esse a quantitate, esseque quantitatis rationem formalem; nos autem minime (185).

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[28] This was the start of a complicated relationship with the Catholic orders: see F. FERRIER, *William Chalmers (1596-1678). Études bio-bibliographique avec des textes inédits*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 1968, the main study on Chalmers, and A. BROADIE, «William Chalmers (Gulielmus Camerarius) (1596–c.1678): A Scottish Catholic Voice on the Best and the Worst», in A. BROADIE (ed.), *Scottish Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2020, pp. 191-207.

Chalmers suggests the opposition, of seemingly Scotistic legacy, between a conclusion based on theology and a conclusion based on natural reason. Further matter of contention is the role of quantity vis-à-vis the separated accidents. Chalmers quotes from Durandus (against Alexander of Hales) that «difficillimum esse sustinere quantitatem Christi esse in venerabile sacramento» (185) acting as a proxy substance for the accidents, a doctrine of Thomism. It is then false that the eucharistic accidents inhere in quantity (189).

Chalmers further reveals his Scotism in the analysis of the accidents and of what type of change transubstantiation is. Regarding the accidents, Chalmers discusses whether actual and aptitudinal inherence are from the essence of the accidents. Actual inherence is discarded right away «contra haereticos nostri temporis»[29]. Supposedly, the matter is so clear-cut that «qui de ea dubitet, non dubitet ipse sine intellectu esse» (384)[30]. Aptitudinal inherence is not from the essence of the accidents either, contra most authorities including Thomas and Scotus (385)[31]. The reason for both conclusions is the same: what is posterior cannot be predicated of what is (logically) prior. Hence, actual inherence denotes existence, and existence is not prior to essence; and aptitudinal existence denotes an aptitude which can only be posterior to the essence of the thing of which the aptitude is predicated. In parallel to Scotus's view that the potency to exist is the principle and not the essence of a substance, in the famous *accidentis esse est inesse* 'esse' denotes only existence, not essence. That is, the principle, and not the essence, of the accidents is to inhere. The Scotistic concept of *concomitantia* explains that, unless a divine intervention occurs, the inherence of the accidents is always concomitant with the existence of the accidents (386)[32]. A realist understanding of accidents is at work here: «accidens esse verum ens, et ens praedicari absolute de accidente […] accidentia habent propriam existentiam distinctam ab existentia subjecti seu substantiae» (386).

The question of the multiple ubication of bodies bore directly on the Eucharist: whether Christ's body can be in heaven and in different hosts at the same time. Additionally, a Scotist such as Chalmers could relate to Scotus's analysis of transubstantiation in terms of local motion rather than conversion. Chalmers believes that Scotus's view is much more probable («longe probabilior») than «substantial reproduction»: namely, the production of a new *ubi*, in terms of

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[29] Chalmers resented being accused of having «heretical» views but was keen to level the same accusation against the Calvinists. On Calvinist metaphysics and the Eucharist see G. GELLERA, «Calvinist Metaphysics and the Eucharist in the Early Seventeenth Century», *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 21.6 (2013) 1091-1110, and G. GELLERA, «A "Calvinist" Theory of Matter? Burgersdijk and Descartes on res extensa», *Intellectual History Review*, 28.2 (2018) 255-270.

[30] I will discuss the «heretical» modern deflationary view attacked by Chalmers in the third part of the paper.

[31] But cf. KING, «Scotus on Metaphysics», p. 29 who argues that for Scotus accidents do not essentially involve inherence.

[32] KING, «Scotus on Metaphysics», pp. 29-30 on the same view in Scotus.

actio additiva (231). For Chalmers, following Scotus, the issue is that «Christus in sanctissimo Sacramento non producitur nova substantiali actione, sed tantum incipit de novo illic esse, per acquisitionem novi ubi seu praesentiae localis.» Here is the problem raised by Christ's pre-existence: Scotus objected to Thomas that, since Christ already exists in heaven, transubstantiation can only mean the acquisition of a new local presence in the host – not a substantial change. Chalmers contends, against Francisco Suárez, that a substantial conversion in the Eucharist could only entail the annihilation of the species of bread and wine, a position rejected at Trent (231).

Arguably, there were both confessional and cultural reasons why Chalmers, a Scottish Catholic exile, took Scotus at heart against what he perceived as 'institutional' Thomism and authoritarian attitudes in the church orders[33]. With a frankness rarely encountered in academic treatises, Chalmers, motivated by his self-awareness as a Scotist, complains that it was not «safe» or «prudent» to disagree with the church's consensus. Ferrier found corroborating archival evidence that, in Armour's words, Chalmers' «break with the Jesuits seems to have been occasioned by their refusal to allow him to defend certain positions in Duns Scotus»[34]. And Broadie concurs that «his Scotistic leanings [...] suggest a possible explanation why he ceased to be a member of the Society of Jesus»[35].

Claude Méron

The French Franciscan Claude Méron (Claudius Meronius), theologian at the Sorbonne, published in Paris in 1675 a work entitled *Philosophia Scoto-Peripatetica*[36]. Less polemically Scotist than Chalmers, Méron set himself an additional task besides the defence of Scotism vis-à-vis Thomism: to counter the popularity of so-called modern philosophy, especially Cartesianism. I will discuss Méron's anti-Cartesian arguments below in Section 3. Now a look at Méron's Scotism.

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[33] This aspect of Chalmers' life should not be overlooked. Cf. R. Scott Spurlock, «Boundaries of Scottish Reformed Orthodoxy, 1560–1700», in D. Fergusson – M.W. Elliott (eds), *The History of Scottish Theology. Volume I: Celtic Origins to Reformed Orthodoxy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2019, pp. 359-376, 361-362: «to be fully Scottish was to be Protestant» because «by 1598, the Parliament even declared that all subjects of the Scottish crown 'should embrace the religion presently professed'».

[34] L. Armour, «Reason, Culture and Religion: Some Thoughts on the Foundations of the Calvinist "Heresies" of John Cameron and His Successors at Saumur», *Anglophonia/Caliban*, 17 (2005), 147-162, 157.

[35] Broadie, «William Chalmers», p. 191.

[36] Schmutz, «L'Héritage des Subtils», pp. 56 and ff. on Paris, and 61, where Méron is said to introduce Scotism at the Sorbonne with Claude Frassen.

Méron defines the accident as «quod per se subsistere nequit», that which «non tam est, quam inest», that which by its nature is prone to inhere (79). Regarding the crucial question of the inherence of the accidents in their subject, Méron investigates three possibilities: actual, aptitudinal and, as he calls it, essential or radical inherence. Actual inherence is the union with the substance; aptitudinal inherence is the accident's «towardness» or «leaning towards» their substance («pronitas»); finally, radical inherence is the nature of the accident proper «e qua veluti e radice pullulat tanquam proprietas» (80). Like Chalmers, Méron does not want to define the accident in terms of inherence, actual or aptitudinal; rather, inherence is a property of the accident. Méron rejects the Thomists's view that «accidens a subjecto separatum non existere per propriam existentiam, sed per modum sibi supervenientem quem vocant substantiae proprietatem» (89). For the Scotists, an accident can exist by its own existence (once the *concomitantia* with the subject is removed by God) because it is a being in the proper sense: it has a *realitas* and an essence independent from the subject.

Méron holds that «Fides [...] secundum definitionem Conciliorum nos *obligat*, ut admittamus species panis et vini remanere post transubstantiationem: porro inter species panis et vini recensenda venit quantitas secundum vulgatiorem Theologorum sententiam» (201, emphasis mine)[37]. So Méron seems unwilling, unlike Chalmers, to argue against the prevailing philosophical explanations of the Eucharist which understood quantity as a proxy-substance for the eucharistic accidents – the very disagreement which Chalmers deemed «not safe (or prudent)» to have («non tutum»). This was a central issue in post-Tridentine Catholic scholasticism. Scotists and Thomists alike agreed, against the *Nominales*, that quantity is really different from matter. For the Scotists, the Thomistic version of this doctrine raised an important difficulty. This is, at least, what Bartolomeus Mastri and Bonaventura Belluto believed. Against the Thomist Thomas de Vio Cajetan, Mastri and Belluto argue that the accidents are conserved separate «secundum suam entitatem», and that no «novus perseitatis modus positivus» is required for that. On a realist view of accidents, the essence of the accidents and God's power are jointly sufficient for the separate existence of the accidents. Positing such a new mode and using quantity as a proxy-substance «non est defendere accidens sine subjecto, sed potius esset tribuere illi aliud subiectum loco prioris»[38].

What unifies the Scotistic position is realism about the accidents, which calls into question the need of a separate quantity acting as a proxy-subject. We now turn to a comparison

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[37] The same view is in B. Mastrius – B. Bellutus, *Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti cursus integer*, N. Pezzana, Venice 1727 (1678), p. 89, and J. Punch, *Integer philosophiae cursus ad mentem Scoti*, L. Anisson, Lyon 1672, p. 204.
[38] Mastrius – Bellutus, *Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti*, p. 94.

of realist and deflationary metaphysics and to how well equipped they were to give a philosophical account of the Eucharist.

3. Deflationary and realist theories of the accidents

Although, in principle, the Council of Trent left the question open, the scholastics understood the eucharistic species as Aristotelian accidents [39]. Their metaphysical differences aside, Scotists and Thomists alike accepted some version of what one might call the 'separability claim': under certain conditions, it is the case that a feature X can exist without its natural subject Y. This principle is required for the philosophical explanation of the separate existence of the species, as generally agreed by the Catholic scholastics. Whether it is in a deflationary metaphysics of the accidents and only applies to quantity (Thomism), or in a realist metaphysics and applies to all the accidents (Scotism), the separability claim appears to be a necessary conceptual tool for a Catholic-orthodox view of the Eucharist. But, clearly, the separability claim resonates differently in Thomism and Scotism.

Until the seventeenth century, the scholastics generally regarded Aristotle's philosophy as the best possible ever produced without the assistance of revelation. The question of the separability of the accidents was also a question of the interpretation of Aristotle, for example *Physics* I, 4. Robert Pasnau has argued that this question unfolded in two fundamental moments in the history of scholastic philosophy[40]. The first moment is Thomas Aquinas. Thomas has a deflationary account of substance: properly speaking, only substances exist, accidents exist only as modifications of substances, and their esse, individuation and operations are from the substances. *Accidentis esse est inesse*, as the medieval dictum goes. Thomas believed that he was following Aristotle on this point. The subsequent logical step for Thomas was to prove the compatibility of this deflationary metaphysics and transubstantiation, as a case of the broader compatibility of Aristotle and Christianity. With an influential and non-controversial move, already anticipated by Alexander of Hales, Thomas argues that quantity is made to act as a 'proxy-subject' or 'quasi-substance' as the material cause of the inherence of the accidents by virtue of God's powers, who intervenes as a *causa conservans*[41]. Quite problematically though, Thomas's solution does not explain how the accident of quantity can be without its subject. Even though quantity is an absolute accident, it still needs a substance of inherence, and God is

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[39] See Méron's objection to Descartes below.
[40] See R. PASNAU, *Metaphysical Themes, 1274–1671*, chapter IX, for the following paragraphs.
[41] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, 4, 65, n.3.

obviously ruled out as the material cause or the subject of quantity. Thomas's solution seems to manifest a tension between Aristotelian accidents and transubstantiation.

The second moment identified by Pasnau is John Duns Scotus's realist metaphysics of accidents, which will exert much influence on later scholasticism [42]. Scotus has a non-deflationary account of the accidents: the accidents are not just attributes of a substance but they are also actual and metaphysical entities in their own right, on account of the fact that they are accidental forms. For Scotus the Eucharist is the key evidence that substances and accidents are really different and can exist separately. In the discussion of Thomas's view of accidents, Scotus wrote:

> sed istud non capio. Sicut enim unumquodque habet essentiam, ita et esse, quia omnis essentia est actus, sicut probatum est; sed accidens habet essentiam, et per se unam, et est alterius generis a subjecto suo, igitur, habet esse distinctum aliud ab esse subjecti[43].

Scotus declares that he does not understand how an accident, endowed with its own essence and, therefore, with its own being («ita et esse»), could be said not to have an existence independent from that of the substance[44]. Unlike other objections, this move against Thomas seems to rely on Scotus's metaphysics of essence. Thomas would generally reject the talk of the «essence of an accident» and he accepted a separate existence of the accidents – as in transubstantiation – only if accidents are made inhere in quantity as a proxy-subject. This onto-logical step is required because, for Thomas, accidents are maintained into existence and individuated by their subject. For Scotus, «the idea of quantity as present *sub modo substantiae* makes little sense» because quantity is itself an accident[45]. With(in) the resources of a deflationary view, the problem of the separate existence of the accidents seems to be kicked down the eucharistic road without being solved[46].

Scotus's doctrine of the real accidents shifts the attention from what we call a 'Thomistic problem' (of Aristotelian legacy) of how to conceive a separation within a substantial unity to the opposite and equally thorny ('Scotistic') problem of how to conceive a substantial unity between beings (substance and accidents) with different essences and, in turn, of how to conceive of the independent essence and existence of an accident. For Amerini, «according to

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[42] See also SCHMUTZ, «L'Héritage des Subtils», p. 53: «le régime de ce que l'on pourrait dès lors appeler la «théologie normale» postscotiste obéissant à des structures largement différentes de celle des premières décennies de l'aristotélisme du XIIIᵉ».

[43] John Duns Scotus, *Reportata Parisiensia*, IV, d. 12, q. 1, n. 4.

[44] KING, «Scotus on Metaphysics», p. 55. For Scotus existence really is essence, there is no real distinction. Something can have an essence and so exist only if its components are properly aligned.

[45] BURR, «Scotus and Transubstantiation», p. 342.

[46] See fn. 38: Mastrius – Bellutus, *Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti*, p. 94.

Scotus the Eucharist is a case that *reveals* what the real metaphysical order of the actual world is rather than a case that *violates* it»[47]. Similarly, David Burr: «Christ might be present in the Eucharist 'only' by a *respectus extrinsecus adveniens*, but it is also 'only' by such a *respectus* that the statue of liberty is present in New York harbor»[48]. The question is, therefore, what the eucharistic miracle entails for a general metaphysics of the natural substances. On the point at issue here, Scotus seems to postulate a closer connection between revelation and metaphysics than Thomas[49]. For Scotus, a metaphysics of accidents is compatible from the outset with the requirements of transubstantiation, whereas for Thomas an additional philosophical argument is needed in order to demonstrate the compatibility of his (Aristotelian) deflationary view of accidents and transubstantiation. The remainder of this paper will discuss the ways in which Scotus's real accidents proved to be an important resource for seventeenth century scholastic formulations of the metaphysics of the Eucharist, in a constant dialogue with the deflationary tendencies of the Thomists but also of those who argued against transubstantiation within Aristotelo-scholasticism, such as the Calvinist scholastics, and those who argued for transubstantiation without scholasticism, such as René Descartes.

Francisco Suárez

The metaphysics of the Eucharist of Francisco Suárez represents an important moment in this narrative. Three intertwined aspects of Thomism, Scotism and Ockhamism (or nominalism) are present. Suárez is a Thomist when he argues that quantity acts as the subject of inherence of the accidents during the miracle (*Disputationes metaphysicae* 40, II), is a Scotist when he accepts the real accidents (*Disputationes* 16, I, 2–3) and adopts an 'Ockhamist' strategy concerning what type of evidence supports the separate existence of the accidents[50]. Suárez believed that the view that quantity is really distinct from the substance must be affirmed on theological principles, but that «it cannot be sufficiently demonstrated by natural reason». Thus, the Eucharist of Trent is the best but, also, the only example which Suárez is able to produce for the separate existence of accidents: «Haec sententia est omnino tenenda; quanquam enim non

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[47] F. AMERINI, «Utrum inhaerentia sit de essentia accidentis. Francis of Marchia and the Debate on the Nature of Accidents», *Vivarium*, 44.1 (2006) 96-150, 139. Amerini argues that in the Scotistic tradition the eucharist, and not the Aristotelian text, is the metaphysical starting point, although the attempt to show the compatibility with Aristotle is explicitly pursued.

[48] BURR, «Scotus and Transubstantiation», p. 347.

[49] LOHR, «Metaphysics», p. 588.

[50] See M.G. HENNINGER, *Relations: Medieval Theories 1250–1325*, Oxford University press, Oxford 1989, p. 77: William of Ockham denies the formal distinction between substance and accidents and holds that it is only because of transubstantiation that he admits of separable accidents. And GELLERA, «A "Calvinist" Theory of Matter?», pp. 257-258.

possit ratione naturali sufficienter demonstrari, tamen ex principiis Theologiae convincitur esse vera, maxime proprie mysterium eucharistiae» (*Disputationes* 40, II, 8). Notice the different emphasis between Suárez's «convincitur» and Méron's «nos obligat». For Suárez and Thomas, the Eucharist is the crucial instance which argues for a metaphysics of the accidents which makes room for the separate accidents. But, by the same reason, the Eucharist is also the only counterexample to the conclusion of unassisted natural reason that an accident cannot exist separately from its natural substances. For Scotus, instead, the Eucharist is the most representative case of a whole metaphysics already essentially structured on the separability of the accidents.

A second crucial insight is given by Suárez in *Disputationes* 16, I, 2. Suárez argues that the Thomistic view that an accident is not really distinct from its substance (which prompted Scotus to retort: «sed istud non capio») is dangerous for the Catholic faith. The danger lies in the fact that the view is deflationary about accidents, hence at odds with the transubstantiation of Trent – pace the Thomists, especially Capreolus, Suárez's direct target here. In *Disputationes* 37, II, 2, Suárez labels this view as Aristotelian, at once corroborating the Thomists's pretensions to Aristotelian orthodoxy and denouncing the same Aristotelian orthodoxy as at odds with the Catholic faith[51]. The Suárezian insight is that it is only with the resources of Scotism (a theory of real accidents grounded in a metaphysics of essence) that what he regards as unorthodox deflationary tendencies – present even within Catholic scholasticism – can be countered and the truth of Trent preserved. Therefore, according to Suárez, it is a Scotistic concept which lies right at the core of the Catholic Eucharist.

Calvinist and Cartesian Deflationism

Seventeenth-century philosophy displays a general deflationary tendency and, famously, a negative opinion of the real accidents. Almost all non-Catholic philosophers were quick at mocking them as 'free-floating entities', as figments of papal imagination, or as remnants of the old way of doing philosophy. There were two principal reasons against real accidents: either one did not believe in transubstantiation and, therefore, needed not to postulate such problematic accidents; or, whether one believed in transubstantiation or not, one rejected Aristotelian scholasticism, the philosophy which gave sense to the very expression 'real accidents'. To the first group belong the Calvinist scholastics, to the second René Descartes.

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[51] See GELLERA, «Calvinist Metaphysics», pp. 1107-1108.

The standard view among the Calvinists is that potential inherence is the same as actual inherence, hence that it is essential to the accidents:

> We [...] claim that the essence of an accident is not only 'to be able to inhere' in a substance, but 'to actually inhere in a substance', as it is absolutely and simply impossible that any accident can exist by itself without a substance[52].
>
> If an accident is in act, then it inheres in act: if it is in potency, then it is apt to inhere. hence, it is contradictory to say that the accidents of bread in the Eucharist retain their aptitudinal inherence; in fact, they are in act. Therefore they inhere in act[53].
>
> The essential property of an accident is to exist in act in the subject of inherence[54].

These passages defend a strong deflationary metaphysics reminiscent of Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham. While the Catholics endorse the 'separability claim': for every X and Y, such that X is an accident and Y is a substance, X can exist without (inhering in) Y; the Calvinist scholastics seem to endorse the 'inseparability claim': for every X and Y, such that X is an accident and Y is a substance, X *cannot* exist without (inhering in) Y[55]. Robert Pasnau has argued that on the substance-accident relation scholastic philosophy:

> travel[ed] full circle, from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century. The first scholastic efforts to make sense of Aristotle's metaphysics, in the thirteenth century, tend towards an understanding of accidental form that is deflationary. [...] From the start of the fourteenth century, under the influence of Duns Scotus, this deflationary reading is generally rejected, in favor of a conception of accidents as real entities in their own right. When seventeenth-century authors in turn reject the doctrine of "real accidents," they are in many cases returning to the sort of view that was first in favor among scholastic authors[56].

Hence, the (Scotistic) doctrine of the real accidents is not «an essential feature of scholastic Aristotelianism»[57], but it is only one among several views available. When seventeenth-century authors criticized the real accidents they agreed, arguably unknowingly, with medieval scholastics such as Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham – once transubstantiation is not

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[52] F. Burgersdijk, *Institutionum metaphysicarum Libri II*, H. de Vogel, Leiden 1640, II, XVII, XVII: «Essentiam accidens esse non solum posse inhaerere, sed actu inhaerere substantiae, ideoque absolute simpliciterque impossibile esse, ut accidens aliquod per se sine substantia existat».

[53] I.H. Alsted, *De Manducatione Spirituali, transubstantiatione, sacrificio missae dissertatio*, M. Berjon, Geneva 1630, VIII, XXII: «si accidens actu est actu inhaeret: si potentia est, aptum est inhaerere. Unde porro patet contradictorium esse, si quis dicat accidentia panis in Eucharistia retinere aptitudinalem inhaerentiam. Sunt enim actu. Ergo actu inhaerent».

[54] C. Timpler, *Metaphysicae systema methodicum*, T. Caesar, Steinfurt 1604, V.III: «Proprietas essentialis accidentis est, actu inesse subiecto inhaerentia».

[55] For these arguments and passages, see GELLERA, «Calvinist Metaphysics» and GELLERA, «A "Calvinist" Theory of Matter?».

[56] PASNAU, *Metaphysical Themes*, p. 180.

[57] PASNAU, *Metaphysical Themes*, p. 180.

considered. Non-scholastic philosophers were generally doubtful of real accidents but so were those scholastic authors who objected to them for confessional reasons. On the Eucharist, one crucial difference between Thomas and Ockham, and the Reformed scholastics is that, for the latter, eucharistic faith did not require an additional argument for the compatibility of theological and philosophical beliefs, nor an exception to their deflationary reading of Aristotle. The Reformed scholastics were not motivated to question the view that the accidents essentially inhere in their substances because their understanding of the Eucharist did not provide any counterexample, defeater or exception to it. So, between the beginning and the end of Pasnau's philosophical «full circle» on real accidents from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century lay also two different confessional horizons.

An important moment of this «full circle» is the Catholic and non-scholastic philosophy of René Descartes[58]. Descartes' published position is well known. In the Fourth Replies to the *Meditations* addressed to Antoine Arnauld (AT VII, 248-256), Descartes, as a Catholic, endeavoured to demonstrate the agreement between his deflationary philosophy and transubstantiation as a truth of faith. Descartes rejected the real accidents as an unintelligible scholastic theory («a ratione aliena»), and claimed that he can do without them because his non-scholastic argument can explain the miracle even more effectively than traditional philosophy. Descartes seemingly approached transubstantiation from Thomistic assumptions. First, within the dialectics of deflationary versus realist metaphysics, Descartes faced a version of the 'Thomistic problem' (transubstantiation is prima facie in contradiction with a deflationary view of the accidents) minus the conceptual resources developed by scholasticism. Secondly, transubstantiation is a conversion which raises a fundamental problem of *perceptual experience*: we perceive that the species of bread and wine remain throughout the substantial conversion[59]. Descartes replaced the real accidents with the dispositions or modes of the underlying matter in a deflationary and mechanical view of natural bodies. He then suggested that real accidents are «parum tuta in fide», and interpreted the 'species' referred to by Trent as the outer surface of the bread and the wine «praecise id quod requiritur ad sensus afficiendos» (AT VII, 252). The species/outer surface remain the same during conversion and, therefore, are perceived by us in the same way – as bread and wine. The outer surface can be preserved without the underlying matter because it is a «mode» of it: how we perceive the substance, not

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[58] See GELLERA, «A "Calvinist" Theory of Matter?», especially pp. 262-264, for the following analysis of Descartes.
[59] Cf. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles*, 4, 65, n. 1: «Non enim negari potest accidentia panis et vini remanere: cum sensus hoc infallibiliter demonstret».

the way the substance is. As Descartes concludes, although the accidents and modes cannot be comprehended without the substance, nothing prevents God from doing something one cannot comprehend.

Let us now return to the Scotist Franciscan Claude Méron. The formulation of Trent about the 'species' was, arguably, sufficiently vague as to make Descartes's argument compatible with orthodoxy but Descartes's philosophy did not garner much praise among the Catholic on this point. The Roman Church condemned Descartes' works officially in 1663 *donec corrigantur* and his eucharistic views, among others, likely bore on the decision. In the confessionalized debates which ensued around Descartes' eucharistic theory, Méron formulates a rejection from a Catholic and Scotistic perspective, which brings him to explicitly associate Cartesianism and Protestantism in two respects[60]. In *Philosophia Scoto-Peripatetica* (1675) Méron's argument against Descartes's deflationary views of matter and accident with respect to transubstantiation hinges on how Descartes's position on matter and accidents is framed:

> Alij, ut Cartesius […] nedum ullam admittunt quantitatem distinctam a substantia, sed nec formam ullam sive substantialem et corpoream, sive accidentalem, dicuntque *omnia quae sunt* […] *esse corpora completa et perfecta* ad triplex genus redacta secundum densitatem et raritatem, figuram, motum… (190, emphasis mine).

The difficulty lies in the fact that the (Catholic) Cartesians «mysterium Eucharistiae catholice credunt et adorant» while «in illorum mente nulla sint omnino accidentia» (198) because all that exist are full-fledged corporeal substances. As a result, for Méron, the answer to whether it is possible to be a Cartesian and Catholic is patently negative. Although Trent speaks of species and not of accidents – as the Cartesians were ready to contend – the species can only be conceived as the accidents of bread and wine («species eucharisticas, sive accidentia panis et vini» 194–195); that is, only within Aristotelo-scholasticism. So, Méron is not surprised that Descartes's deflationary (hence unorthodox) views «amplectantur in regionibus praedictis [namely France, Sweden and Denmark], cum haeretici sint et Protestantes, nihil curant de ejusmodi specierum Eucharisticarum conservatione, cum transubstantiationem panis et vini in Corpus Domini irrideant» (190) – Descartes the deflationary metaphysician and, therefore, Descartes the Reformed[61].

According to Méron, Descartes's deflationary and non-scholastic view incurs problematic consequences. The first consequence is a logical fault. If the Cartesian principle states that only

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[60] On Scotism and Descartes see, among others, ARIEW, *Descartes among the Scholastics*, chapter 2.
[61] Cf. the positions of, for example, Timpler, Alsted, and Burgersdijk mentioned above.

substances exist, and if the *corpuscula* which affect our senses (as in AT VII, 248–256) exist after consecration, then they are substances in their own right. Méron might have AT VII, 251 in mind, where Descartes says that the outer surface «nullam plane habet entitatem nisi modalem». Méron purports not to grasp how a *Cartesian* mode of a substance affects our senses in the same way when said substance exists and when it does not anymore. The second consequence is a doctrinal fault. If these *corpuscula* are of the same nature as bread and wine, then they remain after consecration. So, Méron provocatively asks what the difference is between the Cartesian and the Lutheran views (198–199). So, in addition to the association of Descartes and the Calvinists on account of their deflationary metaphysics (190), Méron associates Descartes and the Lutherans on account of the permanence of the substances of bread and wine which would supposedly follow from understanding the species as the outer surface[62].

The third consequence is an epistemological one. If the *corpuscula* are of a different nature from bread and wine, then they cannot signify bread and wine. Méron writes that:

> quia cum nulla sint accidentia distincta a substantia in eorum [of the Cartesians] principiis, ubi absens erit substantia panis et vini, ibi existere non poterunt ea quae ejusmodi substantias repraesentant, et praesertim ita perfecte sicuti eas repraesentant species eucharisticae (199).

If one perceives the same substance during consecration, then the species remain the same; but the species can be the same only if they are separable, which Méron deems incompatible with Descartes' philosophy[63]. If one follows Descartes, the new species would be made to signify bread and wine in the place of the old ones: arguably, they would «represent» or be similar with the older species. The conclusion is that the appearance of bread and wine after consecration would amount to a deception, manifestly against Descartes's guiding belief that God cannot deceive. Méron's remark has a final Scotistic slant too. Scotus had objected to Thomas that his view of transubstantiation bore some grave *inconvenientia* including that, in the case of the conversion of one substance into another, the natural signification of the accidents by which substances are known to humans would fail them[64].

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[62] On the Cartesian views and their reception, see A. CHUKURIAN, «Le cartésianisme au miroir de l'eucharistie», *Seiscentos*, 2.1 (2023), 1-27. See also the contribution of Sigrid Agostini in the present volume.
[63] As we have seen above, Descartes interprets the separable species of Trent as the outer surface which remains after the underlying body has changed.
[64] BURR, «Scotus and Transubstantiation», p. 349.

Conclusion

At the Council of Trent, the eucharistic miracle was declared to be Catholic orthodoxy in terms of a substantial real presence and conversion brought about by transubstantiation. Scotus preferred, *in philosophicis*, to explain real presence in terms of local motion rather than conversion, and accepted transubstantiation, with an argument from authority, because of the general consensus of the church. Scotus's eucharistic views were never condemned by the Roman Church but the cultural impact of Trent is visible in the fact that seventeenth-century Scotists could not expect to revive their master's position and arguments in full. So, they sought to adapt a Scotistic metaphysics of the Eucharist in accordance with Trent. Chalmers's and Méron's metaphysics of the Eucharist are construed around the concept of real accidents as separable because they are endowed with a *realitas*. They suggest that this view makes a Scotistic metaphysics of essence best equipped to explain the Eucharist philosophically on account of the fact that on Thomas's deflationary view an additional argument is needed for the separate existence of the accidents, while Scotus and our Scotists placed separate accidents already at the core of their metaphysics.

Real accidents were famously controversial in the seventeenth century. On the one hand, the Catholics pulled their ranks behind the Eucharist of Trent and real accidents proved to be an important resource. On the other hand, for the many detractors of (Catholic) scholasticism, real accidents became the byword for all that had gone wrong with scholasticism. Furthermore, the predominant tendency in seventeenth-century metaphysics was deflationary: Aristotelians, Calvinist scholastics, Cartesians, mechanical philosophers and even some Thomists had their respective reasons to reject some versions of the real accidents. Francisco Suárez believed that a deflationary view of accidents followed the letter and spirit of Aristotle but that it also represented a danger for the Catholic Eucharist, a position which adds a further layer of complexity to the notion of 'Aristotelo-scholasticism'.

The discussions of Scotism examined here have showed an interplay of historical and conceptual dimensions. It was not inevitable that the 'species' of Trent were understood almost exclusively as 'real accidents', apart from the notable exception of Descartes. Nor that the 'real accidents' were generally understood in a strong sense as implying a separate or separable existence, and not just a *realitas* different from that of their subject. Nor that deflationism was generally considered as incompatible with transubstantiation[65]. But, whether it was seen in a

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[65] See Pasnau, *Metaphysical Themes*, 189 and 191.

positive or negative light, Scotism was central to all of these important developments and laid at the heart of the seventeenth-century Catholic scholastic metaphysics of the Eucharist.[66]

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[66] SCHMUTZ, «L'Héritage des Subtils», p. 73: «ce sont assurément les héritiers de Duns Scot qui ont les plus contribué à forger le discours de la «théologie normale».»

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