



Présentation / Intervention

2015

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Munk Christiansen, Peter; Mach, André; Varone, Frédéric

How to cite

MUNK CHRISTIANSEN, Peter, MACH, André, VARONE, Frédéric. The Transformations of Neo-Corporatism: Comparing Denmark and Switzerland over time. In: Conceptualizing and Comparing Interest Groups and Interest Group Systems : ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops. Warsaw. 2015.

This publication URL: <https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:55384>

The Transformations of Neo-Corporatism: Comparing Denmark and Switzerland over Time

Work in progress – not to be quoted

Peter Munk Christiansen
Department of Political Science and Government
Aarhus University
pmc@ps.au.dk

André Mach
Institute of International and Political Studies
University of Lausanne
andre.mach@unil.ch

Frédéric Varone
Department of Political Science and International Relations
University of Geneva
Frederic.Varone@unige.ch

Paper presented for the workshop “Conceptualizing and Comparing Interest Groups and Interest Group Systems”, ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Warsaw, 29.3-2.4.2015.

Abstract: This paper investigates the evolution of the interest group system in Denmark and Switzerland. It focuses on the transformation of neo-corporatist arrangements and analyzes the presence of interest groups, especially business associations and trade unions, in the two major venues of the law-making process, namely the administrative and parliamentary venues. The key research question asks whether we observe a decline in the role of corporatist interest groups over time and, furthermore, a trend toward “parliamentary corporatism”, marked by the increasing involvement of corporatist actors in the parliamentary venue and a declining presence in the traditional corporatist administrative venue. To address this question, a longitudinal study compares which interest groups had a privileged access to the two institutional venues in the decade 1975-1985 versus in 2010. The combination of longitudinal and cross-country comparisons aims at systematically mapping and comparing two national interest group systems over time.

The Transformations of Neo-Corporatism: Comparing Denmark and Switzerland over Time¹

This paper investigates the evolution of the interest group system in Denmark and Switzerland in general, and the transformation of neo-corporatist arrangements in particular. Denmark is an emblematic example of *social* corporatism, while Switzerland is a paradigmatic case of *liberal* corporatism. However, neo-corporatist arrangements are put under strong and cumulative pressures in both countries, for instance through Europeanization of public policies, party polarization (i.e., the rise of radical-right parties), mediatization, revalorization of the parliament, "pluralization" of interest representation (i.e., the rise of citizen's groups), new political agendas (reforms with negative consequences for organized interests etc. As similar external factors have affected the two interest group systems during the last decades, one might wonder if the transformation of corporatism in Denmark and Switzerland leads to a convergence towards a *new and common form of interest intermediation system*. More precisely, the paper analyzes the presence of interest groups, especially corporatist actors (business associations and trade unions), in the two major (administrative and parliamentary) venues of the decision-making process, and asks whether the role of corporatist interest groups is declining. Building on these results, can we observe a trend toward "parliamentary corporatism", marked by increasing involvement of corporatist actors in the parliamentary venue and a declining presence in the traditional corporatist administrative venue?

A longitudinal study compares which interest groups had a privileged access to the two institutional venues in the decade 1975-1985 versus in 2010. In the *administrative* venue, an interest group may gain a seat in a public committee that is in charge of formulating political advice, preparing legislative decisions, advising decision makers, and/or implementing a policy program. Groups may also be mobilized as part of a specific decision to be prepared in the administration. In that case, they can choose to react to an administrative consultation to be held before the parliamentary phase. In the *parliamentary* venue, privileged access may be captured by the number of interest groups to which an MP is affiliated (as simple member, board member or paid official). Mobilization in relation to specific policy questions is measured by the number of contacts that groups make to parliamentary actors.

The combination of longitudinal and cross-country comparisons aims at systematically mapping and comparing two national interest group systems over time. This approach is innovative as there are only few comparative studies. Last but not least, it is situated in the intersection between the literature on national interest group systems and neo-corporatist theory.

1. A. Mach and F. Varone acknowledge the financial support of the Swiss National Science Foundation (funding of project No 100018_149689-1). They are also grateful to R. Gava, S. Eichenberger, J. Christe and C. Chao-Blanco for their help in coding the interest ties of Swiss MPs. P.M. Christiansen acknowledge the financial support of the Danish Council for Independent Research (Grant No. 0602-01212B).

1. Traditional neo-corporatist concertation under pressure: expectations

By corporatism we understand the “institutionalized and privileged integration of organized interests in the preparation and/or implementation of public policies” (Christiansen et al. 2010: 28). Institutionalization implies that organized interests are involved in policy-making and implementation on a regular and rule or norm basis. Some groups have a privileged access to the decision-making arenas won through consecutive exchange relations (Beyers and Kerremann 2007). Privileged groups have frequent and tight – sometimes structural – interaction with decision makers. Access is achieved in different venues and in different ways.

The administrative venue is the most important since this is where groups may come to hold the strongest positions through e.g. membership of public committees, close network relations to civil servants, and consultations and negotiations with civil servants on a regular basis. Strong integration implies access to agenda setting, policy formulation, and policy implementation. The parliamentary arena is also important, but much fewer parliamentarians and much fewer policy specialists make it more difficult for groups to win strong relations to parliamentarians. However, some groups establish strong relations for instance by having MPs on their board or payroll. Tight relations to MPs or political parties give groups access to agenda setting and policy formulation (Binderkrantz, Christiansen, and Pedersen 2015).

Katzenstein (1985; 2003) distinguishes between liberal and social (neo-)corporatism. Both are characterized by the inclusion of interest groups in the policy-making and policy implementing process, but they differ in other respects. The social corporatist model grows out of a somewhat symmetric relation between business and labor, i.e. a strong labor movement and a strong social democratic party that historically could match business and the center-right parties. In the liberal model unions are weaker and more fragmented, and they are facing strong business associations, representing internationalized companies.

Our two cases – Denmark and Switzerland – come close to these ideal types. Danish corporatism dates back to the early 1900s when the Danish labor unions had grown strong enough to enter an agreement with the main organization of the employers on the basic rules of the labor market (Swenson 1991). In the following years corporatist structures managed to advance workable solutions to class-related conflicts such as working conditions and sickness and unemployment benefits (Nørgaard 1997) and business related issues such as taxation, export, etc. (Christiansen & Nørgaard 2003: 41ff.). Throughout the century corporatist structures developed to cover many other policy areas such as education, judicial policy, and environmental policy (Johansen & Kristensen 1982). Until sometime in the 1970s corporatism played a major role in many policy sectors including the expanding welfare state sectors. In this period institutional groups such as Local Government Denmark or the Association of Danish High School Leaders grew strong. The Danish unemployment benefit scheme is organized after the Ghent system, which means that the unionization rate is among the very highest in the world (Scruggs 2002). All in all, classic Danish corporatism was characterized by strong business and labor organizations, strong institutional groups, and a close relation between these groups and the state. After 1975 corporatism declined in relation to decision-

making, while it stayed stronger in relation to policy implementation and policy advice (Öberg et al. 2011).

By contrast, in Switzerland, trade unions remained more fragmented (along confessional and professional cleavages) and never reached the Danish unionization level. In addition, unions had to face highly organized business associations, created very early during the second half of the 19th century. The major business associations could form a strong coalition (bourgeois block) with close connections to right-wing political parties since the beginning of the 20th century. It was only during the 1930s that trade unions were progressively integrated in the corporatist structures, but only on a minority basis (Eichenberger and Mach 2011).

During the last couple of decades these traditional liberal and social corporatist models have come under pressure. Similar and cumulative pressures potentially affect the presence of corporatist organizations in the decision-making process in Denmark and Switzerland.

First, **internationalization** in general, and **Europeanization** in particular, put pressure on corporatist groups – business as well as unions – for various reasons. For example, decision-making power has moved from the national to the EU level, the national bureaucracy and legislators are bypassed, diverging interests of import versus export or manufacturing versus service industries, diverging interests concerning lobbying at EU level by Euro-groups versus national groups, etc.

For Switzerland, Mach et al. (2003) and Sciarini et al. (2004) demonstrated that Europeanization reduces the importance of formal pre-parliamentary consultation procedures that are particularly important for neo-corporatist arrangements. Europeanization also results in a partial strengthening of export-oriented business over trade unions (competencies and channels of access to EU).

In Denmark too, the importance of the pre-parliamentary phase has been affected by Europeanization, but less than in Switzerland. Some previously national decisions have moved to Brussels, but when the Danish government makes its stand in EU policies, i.e. before an EU decision is made, there is an institutionalized consultative practice in which affected groups are involved. The integration of interest groups is less strong than traditional corporatist integration, but it is there (Christensen 2010). To some extent interest groups have come to function as fire-alarms (Blom-Hansen and Olsen 2014). Furthermore, when EU decisions are to be implemented, the normal Danish consultative system is used (Kallestrup 2005).

Party polarization is a second big transformation to take into account. The radical right (i.e. the Danish People's Party, the Swiss People's Party) puts new policy issues on the political agenda (i.e. asylum, migration, law and order, foreign policy) and introduces a new dimension in party competition (i.e. openness versus closedness). In both countries, up until the 1960s and 1970s, the freezing hypothesis (Lipset and Rokkan 1967) provided a convincing explanation for the stability of both party systems (Lijphart 1979).

However, both religious and class cleavages have declined in since then in Switzerland, and a new conflict between the “losers” (i.e., the working class and the old middle class) and “win-

ners" (i.e., the new middle class and upper class) of globalization has emerged. This cleavage translates into a conflict over the country's desired level of openness to international cooperation, European integration, migrant workers, and asylum seekers—that is, a conflict over the openness/closedness or demarcation/integration dimension (Brunner and Sciarini 2002; Hug and Trechsel 2002; Kriesi et al. 2008; Lachat 2008). Since the late 1980s the Swiss People's Party has updated its ideology and transformed its issue profile, articulating the interests of globalization's losers. By combining a national-conservative stance on the cultural dimension and a liberal program on the economic dimension, it has successfully applied Kitschelt's (1995) famous winning formula. Its electoral rise owes much to its transformation from a moderate-right to a radical-right party, and more specifically to its clear cultural-protectionist profile. Thus, Swiss business no longer has privileged access to traditional center-right parties (i.e. Liberals) and unions and the Socialist Party loses many voters to the Swiss People's Party (see Oesch & Rennwald 2010). In a nutshell, party polarization and the rise of the radical-right reduce the power of neo-corporatist arrangements.

The Danish case shares some similarities with the Swiss case, but there are also differences. Like its Swiss namesake, the Danish People's Party has exploited internationalization and immigration to warn against economic and cultural threats to Denmark. It has been labelled as a radical right-wing party (Rydgren 2004), but it has a less pronounced anti-establishment attitude than its predecessor, the Progress Party. The party's quest for "equality" – a positive value word in the Danish public – has attracted many former Social Democratic blue collar votes. This has weakened the unions considering that their golden age strength was partially based on their ability to mobilize voters in favor of the Social Democratic Party. At close to 70%, the Danish unionization rate is still comparatively very high level (cf. Scruggs 2002). However, members of traditional strong blue-collar unions do vote as much for center-right parties, and in particular for the Danish People's Party, as for center-left parties, and the unions have lost some of their political power. The effect of the Swiss People's Party on the relation between business and the center-right is not found in Denmark.

Third, there is evidence that the **mediatization** of political processes affects interest groups and corporatist structures. Mediatized policy processes contrast closed and secret negotiations among neo-corporatist partners. Furthermore, neo-corporatist negotiations have a low "news/entertainment value" and are rarely compatible with the predominant media logic (cf. Wolfsfeld 2011). The reduced role of class voting reinforces the role of the media. As voters become increasingly unfaithful, political parties are forced to compete for voters and be more conspicuous. Time-consuming corporatist policy-making is abolished in favor of mediatized and "fast track" politics. In both countries, mediatization reinforces party polarization and new groups enter the scene and the minds of the public and decision-makers. In Denmark, interest groups appeared 47% more in the media in 2010 than in 1975. Economic groups had 81% of the appearances in 1975 compared to 67% in 2010, and appearances by citizen groups rose from 19 to 33% (Binderkrantz, Fisker and Pedersen 2014).

Fourth, the **government agenda** has changed during the period under scrutiny. In 1975, many programs related to the labor market, business policies and the public sector were developing and expanding. In 2010 the political agenda had changed so that a significant larger proportion of all policy proposals imply program retrenchment or other costs to be borne by groups, some of which are well organized. The politics of program expansion is different from the politics of program retrenchment (cf. Pierson 1996). Even if groups, in case of retrenchment, are better off when integrated in the government machinery than in an outsider position, groups themselves as well as government actors may prefer to carry through such decisions with interest groups at an arm's length (Öberg et al. 2011). We have evidence from Denmark (Christiansen and Klitgaard 2009) as well as from Switzerland (Häusermann et al. 2004) that retrenchment decisions have become more difficult to carry through within corporatist structures. With a retrenchment agenda it is difficult to establish the exchange relation that is the underlying logic of corporatist structures.

Fifth, a **re-parliamentarization** process is at work and may have major impacts on interest groups' advocacy strategies. The famous Rokkan quote "votes count, resources decide" (1966: 105-6) hinted that the corporatist venue was more important than the parliamentary venue. This may have been true, but there are many indications of a relative shift in the balance between the two venues in favor of the parliamentary venue.

In Switzerland, several factors contributed to the re-valorization of the Parliament. First, the rising role of Parliament is partly due to the institutional reform of 1992, based on the replacement of ad hoc parliamentary committees by permanent, specialized committees. MPs have become increasingly specialized and competent in some policy fields and might thus be less dependent on the expertise and pressure of interest groups. Second, Parliament increased the remunerations of MPs. Thus, the "militia character" of the Swiss Parliament – i.e. "a parliament composed of amateurs who combine their professional activities with their parliamentary duties" (Kriesi 2001:60) – has diminished since the beginning of the 1990s. MPs have become more professional and less dependent on other revenues stemming from other professional activities. So if Parliament is a more important venue in the legislative process, interest groups could be expected to invest more intensively in this venue.

A parallel development has taken place in Denmark: Specialized parliamentary committees were introduced in the early 1970s, and consecutive reforms have equipped MPs with increasing staff support. In the mid-1970s Danish interest groups tended to see parliamentary actors as relatively unimportant, and they had few parliamentary contacts. This changed during the 1980s and 1990s when interest groups came to see MPs as much more important and therefore increased their contacts with MPs (Christiansen and Nørgaard 2003).

Last but not least, previous studies identified an historical trend towards the **pluralization of the interest group system**. The rising mobilization and political activities of public interest groups and identity groups are partially due to new societal cleavages and "new politics" issues such as immigration, the environment, law and order, morality issues etc. that are not related to labor market or macro-economic issues (i.e. typical neo-corporatist issues). This

has been demonstrated by many studies on the population of interest groups. In Denmark, we observe a sharp decrease in the proportion of economic groups from 71 to 58% of all nationwide interest groups between 1975 and 2010 and, as corollary, a rise of citizen groups from 29 to 42% of all groups. The drop in the share of economic groups particularly concerns the traditional neo-corporatist actors, unions and business groups. This means that the importance of neo-corporatism classic is probably declining as well: Many "new" policy sectors are occupied with values such as same sex marriage, nuclear power, immigration issues, etc. that do not fit well into traditional neo-corporatist negotiations on material distribution.

In sum, we expect that these six factors (which to some extent reinforce each other) will have a major impact on the traditional liberal (Swiss) and social (Danish) corporatist models of interest intermediation. They will directly affect the political strategies of traditional corporatist associations as well as other interest groups toward the different political venues. Our three working hypotheses read as follows:

Hypothesis 1: In the administrative venue, the presence and mobilization of corporatist actors is declining while the presence and mobilization of public interest groups is increasing.

Hypothesis 2: In the parliamentary venue, the presence and mobilization of corporatist actors and public interest groups is increasing.

Hypothesis 3: The Danish and Swiss corporatist models are converging in the sense that traditional corporatist actors play a relatively smaller role today compared to the role played by citizen groups.

2. Data and methods

We have gathered similar data concerning the administrative and parliamentary venues for both countries in order to document both the privileged access and the mobilization of interest groups in both venues.

Table 1. Overview of the data gathered

Institutional venue	Administration		Parliament	
Policy phase	Pre-parliamentary consultations (agenda setting/formulation)		Parliamentary committees and Plenum (adoption/decision)	
Denmark	Seats in public committees (1975 and 2010)	Answers during consultations (in 2009/2010)	MPs employed by interest groups and MPs with previous or present leading positions in interest organizations (1975 and 2010)	Letters to legislative committees (1975 and 2010)
Switzerland	Seats in extra-parliamentary committees (1980 and 2010)	Answers during consultations (in 2010)	MPs who are paid officials of interest groups or have leadership positions in interest groups (1985 and 2010)	MPs who are members of major legislative committees and affiliated with interest groups (1985 and 2010)

3. Corporatist actors in the legislative process over time

Interest groups can have access to the administrative and/or parliamentary venue during the processing of bills, the former being traditionally the most important venue in corporatist countries, and the latter being less central.

3.1. Administrative venue

The administrative venue is important for interest groups for a number of reasons. In both countries the administration holds a de facto monopoly on or a dominant position in the preparation of bills. This means that the expertise on the government machinery and on putting legislation together rests with the administration. This is where the specialists employed in interest organizations find people with whom they can discuss all the small and big problems related to legislative issues. These technical aspects are also one reason why civil servants enter into a mutually beneficial exchange with interest group representatives. Interest groups also supply politically relevant information and support/resistance that is valuable/important to avoid for administrators because of the pending political process in and around parliament (Binderkrantz, Christiansen, and Pedersen 2015: 98ff.).

We distinguish between privileged (i.e. permanent and institutionalized) access and open/competitive (i.e. ad hoc, punctual, policy-based) mobilization. We measure privileged access by the presence of interest groups in extra-parliamentary committees and we measure competitive access by the role of groups during administrative consultation procedures.

3.1.1 Denmark

Our first indicator for the development of privileged access to the Danish administration is seats in public committees. In Denmark, committees have been an important venue for corporatist policy making and implementation throughout the 20th century, and it has been seen as the strongest indicator of the strength of corporatism. To the extent that numbers count, the 1970s may be said to be the strongest hour of the Danish committee system. The committee system has been registered for 1946, 1955, 1965, 1975 and subsequently every fifth year. The highest number of committees was registered in 1980 (Christiansen et al. 2010). The committee system did not cover all policy issues and many decisions even in corporatist sectors were taken without the involvement of interest groups. Nevertheless, committees with interest group members were an important part of policy making and implementation in Denmark in the 1970s (Damgaard and Eliassen 1978).

Privileged access to extra-parliamentary committees

Two major changes have occurred in the committee system since the 1970s. The first is a substantive drop in the number of committees. In 1975 there were 667 committees altogether, in 1980 715 committees. It dropped to 388 committees in 1990, went up to 513 in 2000 and dropped again to 443 in 2010.

Alongside with this quantitative development the function of the committees has changed. In 1975, 46% of the committees were somehow occupied with preparation of public policies,

either with the function to recommend or even draft policies to deal with a specific problem or with the somewhat broader assignment to discuss how to understand and possibly solve a given problem. Today only 10% of the committees are occupied with policy preparation. In absolute numbers this is a drop from 307 to 44 committees (Christiansen et al. 2010). These 44 committees include the so-called EU Special Committees, which discuss the Danish stance in EU matters. They also include interest groups, but they have a looser and less institutionalized structure compared to the traditional policy preparing committees. They did not exist in 1975. If we exclude them, the proportion of policy preparing committees drops to 5%. This means that today policies are only rarely prepared in committees or commissions, but rather within the ministerial hierarchies under full control of ministers and civil servants. Interest groups are consulted, they are sometimes involved in negotiations, but the close, institutionalized integration of interest groups in policymaking through committees is an almost closed chapter.

The Danish committee system has two other functions left: The first is administrative tasks, such as semi judicial bodies that take care of complaints or committees that make decisions on applications for industrial or other grants. The second is advisory bodies that are related to sectoral or sub-sectoral policy issues. In both cases they are permanent committees compared to the temporary committees that used to be involved in policy preparation.

Table 2. Distribution of the population of groups and of committee seats, Denmark 1975 and 2010

	Population (Groups)			Administration (Committee seats)			Parliament (Contacts)		
	1975	2010	Change	1975	2010	Change	1975	2010	Change
Economic groups	71.1	58.3	-12.8	88.8	84.1	-4.7	73.8	50.4	-23.4
Unions	15.9	10.3	-5.6	30.3	25.2	-5.1	27.0	15.8	-11.2
Business	34.3	27.5	-6.8	39.1	40.9	+1.8	31.5	24.1	-7.4
Institutions	4.6	4.4	-0.2	16.5	13.7	-2.8	10.3	8.4	-1.9
Professional	16.3	16.0	-0.3	2.9	4.2	+1.3	5.0	2.1	-2.9
Citizen groups	28.8	41.7	+12.8	11.2	15.9	+4.7	26.2	49.6	+23.4
Civil society	23.6	28.7	+5.1	8.5	7.3	-1.2	19.8	26.2	+6.4
Public interest	5.2	13.0	+7.8	2.7	8.6	+5.9	6.4	23.3	+16.9
Total	2,127	2,543		1,748	1,964		359	1,071	
	99.9	100.0		100.0	100.0		100.0	100.0	

Although the policy preparing committees have withered away, the committee system is still going strong. There are, as mentioned, still 443 committees in 2010 and as Table 2 shows, interest groups have more seats in 2010 than in 1975 despite the drop in the number of committees. We also see that even if citizen groups have more seats in 2010 than in 1975, economic groups are more overrepresented in the present committee system than they were in 1975. Economic groups dropped from 71% to 58% of the population of groups from 1975 to 2010, but their share of committee seats only dropped from 89 to 84%. Unions are

still the most overrepresented group compared to their share of the group population, but they have lost ground to business groups during the 35 year period. All the seats won by citizen groups have gone to public interest groups. Altogether, citizen groups make up 42% of all groups, but they only occupy 16% of all committee seats.

In sum, the Danish committee system is still viable as a venue for the integration of interest groups into administrative and advisory tasks related to the Danish central administration. Interest groups even have more seats today than in 1975. The changes in the composition of the interest group population have not been transposed into an equivalent change in the composition of committee seats. The Danish committee system is still primarily a business for economic interest groups.

Ad hoc participation to administrative consultations

A second indicator of the relation between interest groups and bureaucracy is how interest groups react to administrative consultations. Danish bills are, as mentioned, sent out for comments before they are presented to parliament. Invitations are sent out broadly, mostly to public authorities and interest groups and it is also possible for non-invited groups to respond – given that they know that there is something to respond to. Although the administrative consultation is conducted when the administrative preparation is almost finished and often within a very narrow time limit, interest groups actually do manage to influence government proposals (Binderkrantz, Christiansen, and Pedersen 2014: 889ff.). Unfortunately we do not have the figures for 1975. Table 3 shows that in 2009/2010 altogether 1,692 substantial responses were submitted by 416 different groups. The distribution of answers is not very different from the distribution of interest group seats in committees, cf. Table 2 above. Almost 80% of the answers are produced by economic groups and a little more than half of these are produced by business groups. Responding to administrative consultations is primarily an insider business – just as committee membership.

Table 3. Answers to administrative consultations and group type. Denmark, 2009/2010

Group type	% of answers to administrative consultations 2009/10
<i>Economic groups</i>	<i>78.8</i>
Unions	20.0
Business	41.1
Institutions	14.9
Professional	2.8
<i>Citizen groups</i>	<i>21.2</i>
Civil society	13.5
Public interest	7.7
<i>Total</i>	<i>100.0 (n=1,692)</i>

Altogether the Danish administrative venue is dominated by economic groups, even if they have lost a little foothold since 1975. Among the economic groups, business groups have become more privileged and unions and institutional groups less. The distribution of re-

sponses to administrative consultations hints that not only the distribution of committee seats but also other types of contacts between administrators and interest groups are mainly insider phenomena.

3.1.2 Switzerland: the changing importance of the administrative venue

In the literature, interest groups, especially economic peak associations, have traditionally been considered as crucial and very influential political actors in Switzerland. In the context of an underdeveloped central state, weak national political parties and a weakly professionalized parliament, major Swiss interest groups, because of their various resources (in terms of finance, membership, expertise and institutional recognition by public authorities) and their early organization at the national level, have been major and central political actors since the end of the 19th century. More precisely, interest groups were the dominant actors in the pre-parliamentary phase of the decision-making process (extra-parliamentary committees, consultation procedures), identified as the most important phase, whereas the Parliament, with its militia character, only marginally modified the proposals of the Federal Council (= Government) (Neidhart 1970; Kriesi 1980; Mach 2007).

In this context, major interest groups, which had access to the pre-parliamentary phase (either in extra-parliamentary committees or active in the consultation procedure), had good informal contacts with the federal administration and were involved in the implementation of public policies, were clearly the dominant actors. These were the large peak level economic associations, business associations (USCI/Vorort – Economiesuisse since 2000, USAM and UPS), linked to right-wing parties, and, to a lesser extent, trade unions, (USS and CSCS) connected to the social democratic party and social wing of the Christian democratic party.² However, there was a clear asymmetry in this corporatist structure, where the trade unions remained in a minority position, and business associations remained the dominant actors (Kriesi 1980 and Katzenstein 1985). This configuration of power remained largely stable during most of the 20th century. However, since the 1970s, because of the changes underlined above in section 1, the pre-parliamentary phase of the legislative process seems to have lost its decisive character, whereas the parliamentary venue has gained in importance (Häusermann et al. 2004; Sciarini 2014).

Privileged access to extra-parliamentary committees

Many authors have defined extra-parliamentary committees (EPC) as a kind of “militia administration” (playing a role in the implementation of some public policies) and as an unofficial system of representation parallel to the Parliament (Germann 1996). According to the official definition, extra-parliamentary committees are organs which assume tasks on behalf of executive authorities, but which are essentially composed of persons who are not civil

² We use the French abbreviations : USCI : Unions suisse du commerce et de l’industrie (becoming Economiesuisse in 2000); USAM : Union suisse des arts et métiers ; UPS : Union patronale suisse ; USP : Union suisse des paysans ; USS : Union syndicale suisse and CSCS : Confédération des syndicats chrétiens suisses (becoming Travail.suisse in 2002).

servants. They serve as a complement to the administration with regard to subjects about which the latter may not have enough knowledge and are thus considered as the best means to keep administrative costs down. In the legislative process, they often help find compromises between the major economic and political actors during the initial phase of the political decision-making process (Kriesi 1980; Germann et al. 1985).

These corporatist bodies are numerous and increased considerably in numbers after WWII. Their domain of competence is very specialized. Despite their central importance for the preparation of new legislation and the implementation of public policies, these committees remained completely unregulated and very opaque until the 1970s. In the 1970s, the first regulation on EPCs was adopted by the Federal Council. The Parliament regularly criticized the composition of EPCs during the renewal of their composition, and the regulation was reformed in 1996 and in 2008 included in the new law on the administrative organization (for more details, Rebmann and Mach 2013). During this process, which aimed to introduce more transparency in the functioning of EPCs, the number of EPCs was considerably reduced from around 300 in 1980 to less than 200 in 2000 (Table 4). We only took into account permanent extra-parliamentary committees, and not “ad hoc committees”, which are created for a specific task and for which it is very difficult to gather systematic information.

If we look at the overall composition of EPCs, we observe a decline in the total number of interest group representatives from 21.4% in 1980 to 17.4% in 2010. This decline is stronger for business associations and trade unions (from 15.7% to 11.4%), whereas there is a slight increase in the number of representatives of public interest groups (4.1% to 4.9%). It should be underlined that the presence of corporatist actors is mainly concentrated among some central EPCs dealing with social and economic issues affiliated with the Department of the Economy and the Department of Home Affairs, dealing with social policies.

If we only take into account interest group representatives, business associations and trade unions clearly appear as the dominant actors in the 1980s with a share of around 75% of all affiliations to interest groups (Table 5). But there is a clear decline between 1980 and 2010 (from 75 to 65%), concentrated among business associations (from 51 to 42.4%). The position of trade unions remains stable (around 23%), whereas the proportion of public interest groups increases from 18.9 to 27.9%.

*Table 4. Affiliations of members of extra-parliamentary committees, Switzerland 1980 and 2010**

	1980		2000		2010	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Science/Universities	403	9.7	291	13.3	313	13.3
Administration**	1285	30.8	508	23.2	771	32.8
Politics**	362	8.7	140	6.4	120	5.1
Companies + Independents	1050	25.2	577	26.4	644	27.4
Business associations	455	10.9	215	9.8	173	7.4
Trade unions	199	4.8	119	5.4	94	4.0
Occupational associations	70	1.7	31	1.4	27	1.1
Public interest groups***	169	4.1	128	5.8	114	4.9
Total Interest groups	893	21.4	493	22.5	408	17.4
Not defined + various	175	4.2	180	8.2	92	4.0
Total	4168	100.0	2189	100.0	2348	100.0
Number of committees	298		192		217	

Table 5. Interest groups representatives in extra-parliamentary committees, Switzerland 1980 and 2010

	1980		2000		2010	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Business associations	455	51.0	215	43.6	173	42.4
Trade unions	199	22.3	119	24.1	94	23.0
Occupational associations	70	7.8	31	6.3	27	6.6
Public interest groups***	169	18.9	128	26.0	114	27.9
Total	893	100.0	493	100.0	408	100.0

Sources: Database on Swiss elites during the 20th century:

* For the three years, the total numbers of committees included number of members, number of seats and number of affiliations. Each member can have several seats and have several affiliations, as indicated in the original sources. The sources often indicated several affiliations. **1980**: 2855 members, 3935 seats and 4168 affiliations. **2000**: 1891 members, 2213 seats and 2189 affiliations. **2010**: 2030 members, 2290 seats and 2348 affiliations.

** Including the federal, cantonal and communal levels.

*** Including identity groups

Ad hoc participation to administrative consultations

The second indicator of access to the administrative venue is the participation of interest groups to administrative consultations. Like in the Danish law-making process, bills are also sent out for comments in Switzerland. The major aim of this external consultation is to "test" the political acceptability of a legislative proposal by the main policy stakeholders. Interest groups, political parties and cantons scrutinize the objectives, instruments and logic of action of the policy, but also the practical feasibility of its implementation (Papadopoulos 1997). If key actors voice a strong opposition to the proposal, then the bill will (probably) be revised to avoid an ex post optional referendum.

Table 6 shows that 39% of the 1,193 answers submitted during the 45 consultations procedures organized in 2010 were produced by business groups. Public interests groups follow with 22% of all comments, while occupational groups wrote one out of five answers. This distribution of comments during administrative consultations is not so different from the distribution of seats in extra-parliamentary committees for the business groups (i.e. 42.4%) and the public interest groups (i.e. 27.9%). By contrast, the occupational groups, which have no privileged access to extra-parliamentary committee (with only 4% of the seats), are more present during the ad hoc consultations. The reverse is true for unions, which clearly have a higher privileged access to committees (i.e. 23%) than to ad hoc consultation procedures.

*Table 6. Answers to administrative consultations and group type, Switzerland 2010**

Group type	% of answers to administrative consultations 2010
Unions	4
Business groups	39
Institutional	5
Occupational	20
Identity	7
Hobby/leisure	1
Religious	1
Public Interest	22
<i>Total</i>	<i>100 (n=1,193)</i>

* On the basis of 45 consultation reports (~ 50% of total consultations for 2010).

3.2. Parliamentary venue

The parliamentary venue is also important for interest groups for several reasons. At the end of the day, Parliament passes the legislation. Parliament therefore also has the power to amend proposals put forward by the government. Consequently MPs will be of interest to groups in pursuit of influence on legislative matters. Some groups may have special relations to political parties, for instance because they share a present or previous class affiliation, or to MPs because they have a present or previous relation such as an employment relation. Groups may also be interested in the parliamentary venue because of its interaction with other venues (Binderkrantz, Christiansen, and Pedersen 2015). Interest groups that failed to affect decisions through the administrative venue may compensate by trying to affect decision makers in the parliamentary venue. The more resourceful and powerful groups may maximize their efforts through a high level of activity in all venues.

We distinguish between privileged access created by past or present close relations between interest groups and MPs and policy related mobilization. As regards privileged access, MPs may in their past have been employed by or held leading positions in an interest group. Such historic relations may create special opportunities for access by and receptiveness towards interest groups. When such relations are still intact – by a leading position or by a kind of employment – the relevant groups are even more privileged in access and potential influ-

ence. As regards policy related access we look at the type of contacts that are created in relation to specific decision making processes or specific attempts to affect the policy agenda of MPs and parliaments.

3.2.1 Denmark

Danish politics was heavily affected by alignments between strong interest groups and political parties during most of the 20th century. The peasants' movement mobilized strongly during the 1860s and 1870s and they were the foundation for the Liberal Party, which has been part of all center-right governments in Denmark since 1901. The labor movement also gained power from the late 19th century and was the backbone of a rather strong Social Democratic Party, which has been part of all center-left governments since 1901. Industrialists and shop keepers were also known to have strong relations to the Conservative Party.

During the late 20th century, party-interest group relations largely crumbled. The Liberal Party had to look for new voter groups to replace the strong decline in the number of peasants, while the Social Democratic Party looked for replacement for the shrinking manual working class. At the same time the formal organizational ties with the unions disappeared (Allern, Aylott, and Christiansen 2007; Christiansen 2012).

We see a shadow from these alignments in Table 7. In 1975, 47% of the Danish MPs had at some point held a leading position (e.g. as board chair or member or as elected shop steward) and 19% still held such a position while in parliament. That has changed somewhat in 2010. Much fewer had previous experience from economic interest groups, while more had previous experience with leading positions from citizens' groups. When we look at MPs' positions while in parliament, the picture has also changed. Leading positions have gone from few (8%) to almost none (2%) for economic groups, while the level has increased slightly for citizens' groups (from 11 to 13%).

The development in previous employment in interest organizations is a little different. Here we find an overall increase from 17 to 19%, of which economic groups are responsible for 14 and 17% respectively. This is probably more a sign of new types of recruitment channels for MPs than for strengthened ties between groups and MPs/political parties. In the early 20th century, elected positions in some of the large agricultural or labor market groups were a common recruitment channel for MPs. In the late 20th century, it became more common to earn a university degree and have some years of experience as employed in an interest group before entering parliament (cf. Christiansen and Togeby, 2007).

Table 7. Previous employment and leading position and present leading position in interest organizations for MPs, Denmark 1975 and 2010

	Previous employment in organization			Previous leading position in organization			Present leading position in interest organization		
	1975	2010	Diff.	1975	2010	Diff.	1975	2010	Diff.
Economic groups	14.0	16.8	+ 2.8	31.3	15.1	- 16.2	8.4	2.2	- 6.2
Unions	7.3	8.9	+ 1.6	16.8	7.8	- 7.0	5.0	.6	- 4.4
Business	3.9	4.5	+ .6	5.0	2.2	- 2.8	2.2	.6	- 1.6
Institutions	2.2	3.4	+ 1.2	6.7	4.4	- 2.3	.6	1.0	+ .6
Professional	.6	0	- .6	2.7	.6	- 2.1	.6	0	- .6
Citizen groups	3.4	2.2	- 1.2	13.4	18.4	+ 5.0	10.6	13.4	+ 2.8
Civil society	1.1	.6	- .5	9.5	11.2	+ 1.7	7.3	7.3	0
Public interest	2.2	1.7	- .5	3.9	7.3	+ 3.4	3.3	6.1	+ 2.8
Total	17.3	19.0	+ 1.7	44.7	33.5	- 11.2	19.0	15.6	- 3.4

Altogether, the structural privileging of interest groups at the parliamentary level has not been strong and has become less so in the period studied. Finally, there has been a movement from economic groups towards citizens' group. To the extent that there is a logic of privileging it is related to citizens' groups rather than to economic groups.

The last indicator for the parliamentary venue is the mobilization that relates to the bills processed by parliament. The indicator is number of letters written to parliamentary committees in the two parliamentary years. Danish parliamentary committees scrutinize bills and discuss general matters regarding relevant issues. The committee or its individual members ask questions to the minister, and many of them appear to originate from letters from interest groups (Pedersen, Christiansen, and Binderkrantz 2014). We have identified all letters sent from nationwide interest groups in the two years (359 letters in 1974/75 and 1,071 in 2009/10).

Table 2 shows that the mobilization pattern in 1975 – not surprisingly – was dominated by economic groups, but not more than their share of the population. However, unions and institutional groups are heavily overrepresented compared to their population share while professional groups are underrepresented. The picture has changed almost dramatically in 2010. Economic groups are now underrepresented, and particularly public interest groups are heavily overrepresented.

In sum, neither the privileged relations nor the competitive policy mobilization of interest groups towards parliament appear to have had or to have the same strength as the corresponding relations to the Danish administration. A further difference is that while economic groups kept their lion's share of access to the administration during the period under investigation, citizen groups conquered a relatively much larger share of access to the Danish administration.

3.2.2 Switzerland: The transformations of the parliamentary venue

Because of its lack of resources and its militia character, the Swiss Parliament was generally considered as a “rubber stamps” in the legislative process, which only ratified agreements reached during pre-parliamentary negotiations between the government and the main economic associations. The few studies on Swiss MPs (Gruner 1970; Kerr 1981; Wiesli 2003) all emphasized the MPs’ strong dependence on economic interests, especially through leading positions in business associations and trade unions, or through board memberships or as directors of companies. As mentioned above, Parliament underwent some institutional reforms in 1992 that reinforced its role. Since the reform, involving the creation of specialized parliamentary committees, different authors have underlined its increasing role in the decision-making process since the 1990s (Jegher 1999; Lüthi 2007; Linder 2013; Sciarini 2014).

Different reasons explain this change. After the reform, MPs have become increasingly specialized and competent in some policy fields and might thus be less dependent on the expertise and pressure of interest groups. In addition, the Parliament used different adjustments not subject to an optional referendum to increase remunerations of MPs, despite popular opposition, to reduce the militia character of the Swiss Parliament. MPs have become more professional and less dependent on revenues stemming from other professional activities, e.g., membership of cantonal or communal executive authorities, or boards of directors, or paid positions in interest groups. It is not rare to find real professional MPs without a main profession besides their political mandates (Pilotti 2012).

Second, the increasing difficulty of corporatist actors in reaching compromises during the pre-parliamentary phase in a context of “welfare retrenchment” has led to a more important role for the debates in Parliament. Deadlocks in the pre-parliamentary phase have often been overcome during the parliamentary debates (see Kriesi and Jegen 2000 on energy policy; Häusermann et al. 2004 on social policies, Fischer 2005 as well as Sciarini 2014).

Finally, increasing polarization in Parliament, related to the electoral success of the UDC (Swiss People’s Party), rendered the parliamentary debates more uncertain. Among the right-wing parties, the traditional cohesion of the ‘bourgeois bloc’, linking the main business associations and right-wing political parties, was called into question because of the increasing tensions among business associations (between internationalized and home market oriented companies and between the financial and the industrial sector), but also through the electoral success of the populist-conservative UDC to the detriment of the PRD and the PDC. The PRD, which maintained very close links to business circles, lost much of its leadership in the political arena. This change in the power balance undermined the traditional channel of influence of business interests via the PRD, rendering their lobbying activities more difficult. The UDC reinforced its ties to the USAM, organizing the small and medium sized companies, whereas Economiesuisse remained more connected to the PRD.

How have these changes affected the connections between interest groups, especially corporatist associations, and MPs? We investigate how and to what extent interest groups have

access to the Parliament through their connections with MPs. We first look at interest groups' access to Parliament through their connections to MPs, that are either paid officials of or occupying a leading position in interest groups. In a second step, we analyze the composition of specialized parliamentary committees and analyze whether interest groups tend to focus their presence in specialized committees relevant for their domain of activities.

Interest groups' connections to MPs: the declining presence of corporatist actors

The first dimension refers to the presence of paid officials of interest groups in Parliament, such as general secretary or director of an interest group at the national or cantonal level. Gruner (1977) showed that at the beginning of the 1970s around 12% of national councilors were "associative officials" (salaried by an interest group). Since then the proportion has slightly decreased (Table 8). In 2010, 14 national councilors (out of 200, 7%) could be considered as paid officials of interest groups. These paid officials are mainly active in the major corporatist associations (trade unions, business associations and farmer associations). Trade unionists appear to be by far the most represented category, mainly among social democratic MPs (a few from the Greens and the social wing of the Christian democratic party), with a slight decline since the 1970s. These were mainly general secretary of some trade union federations. Second, the number of paid officials of business associations (including farmers' associations) has declined to only 4 in 2010. Finally, the category "others" includes paid officials from non-corporatist associations, such as public interest groups (consumer associations or tenants' associations) or institutional groups. This category remained quasi inexistent in the 1970s. Even though the numbers are relatively low, there is a clear increase in the presence of paid officials caused by non-corporatist groups during the last forty years. This evolution can be explained by the increased professionalization of the Parliament through better remuneration of MPs since the beginning of the 1990s.

Table 8: Number of paid officials of interest groups in National Council, Switzerland 1971-2010

	1967-71	1980	1990	2000	2010	Total
Business associations	9	5	10	7	4	35
Trade unions	14	9	8	7	6	44
Others	1	3	2	5	4	15
TOTAL	24	17	20	19	14	92

Sources : Gruner (1977: 172-173) ; Pilotti 2012; Registre des liens d'intérêt 1990, 2000 and 2010.

In a second step, we analyzed the total number of interest ties of MPs. Since 1985, data on MPs ties to interest groups and memberships in boards of directors of companies are gathered in a "Registre des liens d'intérêts/Register der Interessenbindungen", published on the website of the Parliament (www.parlement.ch).³ The exact formulation of the law on Parliament requires all MPs to declare: "les fonctions permanentes de direction ou de consulta-

³ We do not consider MPs' board membership of companies, which represent by far the largest proportion of ties. Rather, the analysis focuses on their leading positions in interest groups.

tion qu'il assume pour le compte de groupes d'intérêt, suisses et étrangers". Holding a leading position in an interest group can mean being president, director, member of the central committee or member of the large committee. Many MPs have several interest ties. We did not take into account the instances of simple membership indicated in the register.

Even though the register is not 100% exact, it is a reliable source concerning MPS' formal connections with interest groups or companies. We have coded all ties of MPs of the National Council in 1985, 2000 and 2010 according to the different categories of interest groups (Table 9). There is a large variety of interest groups in the register that differ on number of characteristics. Some are rarely politically active, some are purely regional associations, and some hardly qualify as interest groups. We also find the "usual suspects", i.e. the most resourceful corporatist associations, which often recruit MPs to leading positions.

We observe a clear decline in the proportion of ties referring to either trade unions, business associations or farmers' associations (included in business associations). Whereas almost 50% of interest ties referred to business associations or trade unions in 1985, the proportion of ties to these corporatist associations has declined substantially to around 25% in 2000 and below 20% in 2010. The proportion of ties to public interest groups has increased considerably, from around 10% to more than 50%. This seems to illustrate a clear trend of diversification in the types of interest groups with connections to the Parliament.

Table 9. Interest group's affiliations of MPs in National Council, Switzerland 1985-2010

Types of interest groups	1985			2000			2010		
	N Aff.	% Aff.	N MPs*	N Aff.	%	N MPs	N Aff.	% Aff.	N MPs
Unions	17	9.4	9	7	3.0	6	19	2.4	17
Business groups	69	38.1	48	49	21.3	34	111	14.2	64
Institutional associations	32	17.7	25	16	7.0	12	49	6.3	36
Occupational associations	5	2.8	5	27	11.7	25	55	7.0	48
Identity groups	21	11.6	17	25	10.9	22	62	7.9	47
Hobby/leisure groups	4	2.2	4	6	2.6	6	41	5.2	32
Religious groups	1	0.6	1	5	2.2	4	15	1.9	9
Public interest groups	20	11.0	17	94	40.9	64	413	52.7	145
NA	12	6.6	11	1	0.4	1	18	2.3	16
Total	181	100.0	201	230	100.0	200	783	100.0	197

Sources: 1985: Registre des liens d'intérêt 1985 + Database on interest ties of MPs (2000-2011).

* N MPs refers to the number of MPs with affiliations to interest groups. Since MPs can have several affiliations, the addition of all lines can exceed the total number of MPs.

The strong increase in the number of affiliations between 2000 and 2010 from 230 to 783 ties can be partly explained by the reinforcement of the law on Parliament in 2004. Whereas MPs had to declare all *important* interest ties before 2004, all interest ties had to be declared with the 2004 law. However, this alone cannot explain the steep increase. We can also observe a deliberate strategy of interest groups to recruit public personalities as leaders and to intensify their connections to the Parliament.

The relative decline in the proportion of MPs' formal connections to corporatist associations does not mean that these powerful associations are not increasing their efforts to become more influential at the stage of the parliamentary debates. In absolute terms, the number of ties between MPs and business associations and trade unions has increased since 2000, reaching a number much higher than in 1985. If we take into account the number of MPs connected to economic associations, the decline should be nuanced. Whereas almost 60 MPs (30% of the National Council) were connected to either trade unions (9) or business associations (48) in 1985, more than 80 MPs occupied leadership positions in trade unions (17) or business associations (64) in 2010.

These contradictory tendencies can probably be explained by two contradictory dynamics. The rising importance of public interest groups and the professionalization of the Parliament should weaken the connections between MPs and corporatist organizations. On the other hand, the revalorization and increasing importance of the Parliament in the legislative process might induce resourceful associations to reinforce their connections to the Parliament.

Targeting specialized committees?

Stressing the overall stability of the neo-corporatist character of the Swiss political system in a comparative perspective, Armingeon (2011) also underlined the strong presence of corporatist associations in the Parliament: "In 2010 the parliamentary commission on economy and taxes in the Swiss parliament – arguably one of the most important and powerful parliamentary commissions – is composed of members of leading representatives of interest groups representing the workforce, small and medium enterprises, farmers, employers and big business." (Armingeon 2011: 179). Following this reasoning and in order to check for the mobilization of interest groups in the parliamentary venue, it is interesting to analyze more precisely the composition of the specialized parliamentary committees.

Since the establishment of standing, specialized committees in Parliament,⁴ both chambers of the Federal Assembly have 9 specialized legislative committees and 2 supervisory committees. How have interest groups adapted their strategy to access the Parliamentary venue in this new institutional context? Since the reform, decisive debates about legislative proposals by the government are considered to take place in the specialized committees, composed according to the strength of the different parliamentary groups. The plenary debates generally do not profoundly modify the solutions adopted by the specialized committees. It is thus crucial for interest groups to intervene in the deliberations of the committees.

How are interest groups' ties distributed across different specialized parliamentary committees? For corporatist actors, two committees are of particular importance: the economy and taxes committee and the social and health affairs committee, often considered as the most important specialized committees (Table 10 and 11). Similarly to the overall evolution, we find a decline in interest ties to economic associations between 1985 and 2010 (from 30 to

⁴ In fact, permanent committees have existed since 1979, but their resources were limited, and ad hoc parliamentary committees remained very important.

28% and from 50 to 17%), and an increase concerning public interest groups. However, the decline is less pronounced than the overall average (Table 9). The economy and taxes committee it is still more connected to unions and business associations. The proportion of ties to economic associations remains above the average of the whole National Council (Table 9). The number of MPs with leading positions in economic associations peaked in 2010. The presidents of USS, USAM and USP (three main peak level associations, besides UPS and Economiesuisse, whose presidents are not MPs) were member of the economy and taxes committees in 2010. In comparison, the social and health affairs committee has a higher presence of public interest groups. The less relevant committees for business associations and trade unions, such as the legal affairs and the political institutions committees (data not presented here), are composed of MPs much less connected to economic organizations.

Table 10. Affiliations of MPs in the Economy and Taxes committee of the National Council, Switzerland 1985-2010 (only economy in 1985)

Types of interest groups	1985			2000			2010		
	N	%	N MPs	N	%	N MPs	N	%	N MPs
Unions	0	0.0	0	3	7.7	2	4	3.7	3
Business groups	9	30.0	7	8	20.5	6	27	24.8	11
Institutional associations	8	26.7	7	4	10.3	3	6	5.5	5
Occupational associations	2	6.7	2	6	15.4	5	10	9.2	9
Identity groups	3	10.0	3	6	15.4	5	3	2.8	3
Hobby/leisure groups	0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0	4	3.7	4
Religious groups	0	0.0	0	1	2.6	1	0	0.0	0
Public interest groups	6	20.0	4	11	28.2	5	55	50.5	23
NA	2	6.7	2	0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0
Total	30	100.0	23	39	100.0	25	109	100.0	25

Table 11. Social and health affairs committee National Council (only social affairs in 1985)

Types of interest groups	1985			2000			2010		
	N	%	N MPs	N	%	N MPs	N	%	N MPs
Unions	3	11.5	2	1	2.5	1	6	5.5	4
Business groups	10	38.5	9	5	12.5	5	12	11.0	8
Institutional associations	6	23.1	5	4	10.0	3	2	1.8	2
Occupational associations	2	7.7	2	5	12.5	4	5	4.6	5
Identity groups	0	0.0	0	3	7.5	3	5	4.6	4
Hobby/leisure groups	1	3.8	1	0	0.0	0	12	11.0	8
Religious groups	1	3.8	1	0	0.0	0	3	2.8	1
Public interest groups	1	3.8	1	22	55.0	10	61	56.0	19
NA	2	7.7	2	0	0.0	0	2	1.8	2
Total	26	100.0	23	40	100.0	25	109	100.0	25

Sources: 1985: Registre des liens d'intérêt. Database on MPs' interest ties (2000-2011).

4. Comparison and outlook

After these empirical analyses in Denmark and Switzerland, we can attempt to synthesize the main results in a comparative perspective. Table 12 provides an overview of the main empirical findings for both countries.

Table 12: Summary of the main empirical findings

Institutional venue	Administration		Parliament	
Policy phase	Pre-parliamentary consultations (agenda setting/formulation)		Parliamentary committees and Plenum (adoption/decision)	
Denmark	Share of seats in public committees In 1975, Business: 39.1%, Unions: 30.3% Public int.: 2.7% In 2010, Business: 40.9%, Unions: 25.2% and Public int.: 8.6%	Answers to administrative consultations about bills In 2010, Business: 41.1%, Unions: 20% and Public int.: 7.7%	Present leading position of MPs in organizations In 1975, Business: 2.2%, Unions: 5.0% Public int.: 3.3% In 2010, Business: 0.6%, Unions: 0.6% and Public int.: 6.1%	Letters sent to legislative committees In 1975, Business: 31.5%, Unions: 27.0%, Public int.: 6.4% In 2010, Business: 24.1%, Unions: 15.8%, Public int.: 23.3%
Switzerland	Share of seats in extra-parliamentary committees In 1980, Business : 51.0%, Unions: 22.3% Public int.: 18.9% In 2010, Business: 42.4%, Unions: 23.0% Public int.: 27.9%	Answers to administrative consultations about bills In 2010, Business: 39%, Unions: 4% and Public int.: 22%	Affiliations of MPs to interest groups Paid officials (Table 8): In 1980, Business: 2.5%, Unions: 4.5% Public int.: 1.5% In 2010, Business: 2%, Unions: 3% Public int.: 2% Leadership positions (Table 9): In 1985, Business: 24.0%, Unions: 4.5% Public int.: 8.5% In 2010, Business: 32.0%, Unions: 8.5% Public int.: 72.5%	Members of two major legislative committees who are affiliated to interest groups (average of both committees) In 1985, Business : 34.2%, Unions: 5.8% Public int.: 11.9% In 2010, Business: 17.9%, Unions: 4.6% Public int.: 53.3%

Concerning the administrative venue, we observe in both countries a significant decline in the number of extra-parliamentary committees. The administrative venue in the legislative

process seems thus to lose importance. Concerning the composition of these traditional corporatist structures, the changes are not very strong. In Denmark, economic groups (i.e. business and unions) still dominate the administrative venue as they had privileged access both in 1975 and 2010. There is no major change over time in the Danish case, except for a small decrease for unions. This also holds true for ad hoc participation in consultation procedures on bills. By contrast, the business groups' presence in extra-parliamentary committees is declining in Switzerland, even if these groups are still dominant (42.4% of affiliations in 2010). Public interest groups are clearly much better represented over time, while the position of unions remains stable. Furthermore, business groups are the most active type of corporatist actors during the administrative consultations organized in 2010. Nevertheless, public interest groups formulate about one fifth of all comments on specific bills. It is worth noting that Swiss unions are almost absent from this key step of the pre-parliamentary phase. Such developments largely confirm our first hypothesis, stressing the declining presence of corporatist associations (mainly unions), in the administrative venue and increasing presence for public interest groups.

In the 1970-80s, the composition of extra-parliamentary committees clearly distinguishes the social version of corporatism in Denmark, with the much stronger presence of trade unions, and the liberal version in Switzerland dominated by business associations. The differences are less clear 30 years later since the balance between business associations' and trade unions' presence in extra-parliamentary committees seems more similar in both countries. However, this observation is not true for the ad hoc participation of unions to administrative consultations. The ad hoc mobilization of unions is much higher in Denmark than in Switzerland.

Concerning the revalorized parliamentary venue, hypothesis 2 about the increased presence of both corporatist and public interest groups seems to be supported as well. In Denmark, public interest groups gained more access in the parliamentary venue, as more MPs have a trust link to such organization. In addition, there is a significant increase in the proportional numbers of letters sent to legislative committees. In Switzerland, there is also a very clear shift in the privileged access to Parliament: Business loses ground while public interest groups increase their share if we look at the proportion of interest groups ties of MPs. However, this observation should be nuanced, since the absolute number of MPs connected to economic associations has increased, illustrating the more active strategy of corporatist associations toward the parliamentary venue. Finally, corporatist associations are particularly attentive to being present in the specialized parliamentary committees (economy and taxes committee) relevant for their interests.

In both countries, public interest groups have clearly become much more present and active in the parliamentary venue. This emerging "parliamentary corporatism" (Armingeon 2011), enlarged to public interest groups, can be explained by a logic of venue specialization: Economic groups tend to privilege the traditional corporatist arena of the administrative venue where they are better represented and probably more influential (Culpepper 2011), whereas

public interest groups follow a strategy of conflict expansion at the parliamentary level (link to political parties). Since the pre-parliamentary administrative phase has lost importance in relation to the parliamentary venue, traditional corporatist actors have lost influence, and public interest groups have become much more present and influential (Hypothesis 3).

In sum, the present longitudinal study provides some first evidence of important changes in the presence and mobilization of interest groups in both venues of the law-making process. This finding is very promising and paves the way to innovative studies focusing on the “multi-venues” strategy of interest groups. Concretely, it would make sense to compare, for specific law-making processes in Switzerland and Denmark (see Pedersen et al. 2014), if and to what extent different (types of) interest groups participate in both the administrative consultation (bill preparation) and the parliamentary committee activities (bill treatment). Such a process-tracing design should demonstrate if interest groups “venue-shop” and, consequently, if there is a clear trend towards parliamentary corporatism; or, on the contrary, if some interest groups still cumulate a privileged access to both the administration and the Parliament.

Finally, further investigations are required to know more precisely how such venue shifts are (causally) related to the cumulative pressures affecting the traditional functioning of corporatist system that were briefly presented in the theoretical framework of this paper (i.e. Europeanization of public policies, party polarization, mediatization, welfare state retrenchment, revalorization of the Parliament, “pluralization” of interest representation).

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