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Chapter Eight

The Global Justice Movement in Switzerland

Nina Eggert and Marco Giugni

In this chapter, we depict the main characteristics of the Swiss global justice movement (GJM) as manifested since its emergence into the public domain in the late 1990s. Following the definition given in the introduction to this volume, we characterize the GJM as “the loose network of organizations (of varying degrees of formality, and including even political parties) and other actors, engaged in collective action of various kinds, on the basis of the shared concern to advance the cause of justice (economic, social, political, and environmental) among and between peoples across the globe.”

Our discussion is based on the four main elements of what Doug McAdam et al. (2001) have called the “classic social movement agenda” for explaining contentious politics: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, collective action frames, and repertoires of contention. These four aspects are seen as mediating factors between social change (the ultimate origin of all contention) and contentious interaction (the “dependent variable”). *Political opportunities* include the signals that encourage social and political actors to form social movements (Tarrow 1996). More specifically, they refer to all those aspects of the political system that affect the ability of challenging groups to mobilize effectively. Here we focus in particular on the structure of national cleavages that are reflected in the Swiss GJM, the alliances of the movement

with institutional actors such as political parties, and the state responses to the movement's mobilization. *Mobilizing structures* are the formal and informal vehicles through which people engage in collective action (McAdam et al. 1996b). We can distinguish between two basic types of mobilizing structures: formal organizations (for example, Attac) and informal networks (that is, the web of interpersonal contacts and exchanges among movement activists and participants); we analyze both types within the Swiss GJM. *Framing processes* define the symbolic and meaning construction by social movement activists and participants (but also other parties) relevant to the interests of social movements and their challenges (Snow 2004). Here we address in particular the main claims made by the Swiss GJM and on the identification with the movement. Finally, *repertoires of contention* refer to the limited sets of claim-making routines available to social movements at a given historical moment (McAdam et al. 2001)—in other words, the array of available means of action through which social movements mobilize. Here we focus on the forms of action displayed by the Swiss GJM.

No less than other social movements, the structure and mobilization of the GJM is influenced by certain aspects of the political opportunity structure stemming from the national context in which it evolves. In other words, the national context plays a crucial role even for an eminently transnational movement such as the GJM. As two among the leading students of transnational contention and global activism put it, “[b]ecause we do not believe in a distinct transnational sphere, we think that these domestic factors are crucial determinants of the strategies of movements active transnationally” (Tarrow and della Porta 2005, 242).

Three aspects of the political opportunity structure are likely to exert an important influence on the mobilization of the GJM in Switzerland: 1) the national cleavages and conflict lines that are reflected in the movement's mobilization, 2) the alliances with institutional actors, and 3) the state responses to the movement's mobilization. Concerning the first aspect, two main features of the social and political context play an important role for the structure and mobilization of the Swiss GJM: the weak imprint of the class cleavage and traditional social conflict line carried by the union sector (although unions do participate in the movement), and the strong presence of the new social movements (NSMs). In particular, we must stress the strong presence of the ecology and solidarity movements (the two strongest and most resourceful NSMs in Switzerland during the 1980s and 1990s) within the GJM.¹ These two movements, and the NSMs in general, have represented the main extra-parliamentary force in Switzerland since the 1970s (Kriesi et al. 1995), as compared with countries such as France in which the class cleavage has remained more salient and in which the labor movements and other more traditional movements have been dominant. In this respect,

Switzerland resembles countries like Germany, in which the NSM sector has displayed a strong level of mobilization. As a result, the characteristics of the GJM reflect in part its inheritance of the actors and claims of these movements, as we shall see in more detail in what follows.

The main allies of the GJM within the institutional arena are obviously to be found on the left. More specifically, the small parties of the Left and extreme Left (both old and new) actively support the movement's claims and activities and can often be considered as part of the movement in a broader sense. The same holds for the labor unions, especially the smaller and more radical ones as well as the public sector unions. Although not opposed to it, the main leftist party, the Socialist Party, is less supportive of the movement, especially of its more radical wing and actions. This attitude resembles the one traditionally taken by the socialists toward the NSMs (Kriesi et al. 1995) and can be explained by the party's quite ambivalent position within the government (minority member of the governmental coalition). Given the federalist structure of the country, the movement might find more Socialist Party support in the cantons in which the party is not in government—although such a situation is rare.

The state's responses to the mobilization of the GJM have departed radically from the tradition of protest policing in Switzerland. Although the Swiss state, in cross-national comparison, has traditionally been characterized by a generally inclusive strategy and low levels of repression (Kriesi et al. 1995), it has often taken a repressive and less facilitative stance in response to GJM actions. This approach can clearly be seen in the impressive policing apparatus deployed every year for the World Economic Forum (WEF) meetings in Davos—when both police forces and the army are engaged to secure the site of the meeting—or during the summit of the G8 held in Evian, when the Swiss government asked for the support of police forces from Germany to help local police, police forces from other cantons, and the army in ensuring that the summit went well. This repressive stance holds especially for the movement's early emergence, when authorities were probably taken by surprise by the level of disruption of the protest. More recently, the overreaction that characterized the early phases has been replaced by more targeted and differentiated measures.

In the next section, we outline the main focal points of the mobilization of the Swiss GJM (origins and turning points). We then address the other three aspects of the classic social movement agenda, which correspond at the same time to the three main components of the movement's definition mentioned earlier: organizational networks, movement identity and frames, and action repertoires. We illustrate our arguments by means of original data on organizations involved in the movement (organizational data) and on participants in activities promoted by the movement (survey data). In the

conclusion, we try to put the main characteristics thus outlined into both national and international perspective.

Origins and Turning Points

The heritage of the NSMs has been very important for the emergence of the Swiss GJM. Although organizations and activists of the peace, ecology, and solidarity movements have contributed to its rise, the movement is not simply a continuation of the NSMs, but has emerged in a particular historical context. First, as in other countries, the international context of neoliberalism and its impact on the national level has brought new issues such as unemployment and neoliberalism into the public debate and created new opportunities for collective action, both at the national and transnational levels. In Switzerland, the discussion about neoliberalism moved from the extreme-left circles to the public space after the publication in 1995 of the "White Book" (De Pury et al. 1995), in which the authors advocate ultra neoliberal policies as a way to reduce state debt. As a response to this, the "Black Book of Neoliberalism" (VV. AA. 1996) was published one year later; it did not have the same impact on public opinion, but nevertheless opened the debate on neoliberalism in Switzerland.

The remobilization and radicalization that occurred in the social movement sector in Switzerland in the late 1990s can be linked to a large extent to the rise of the GJM. The most important event staged by the GJM in Switzerland during the 1990s is probably the demonstrations against the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Geneva that took place in May 1998 (Rossiaud 2001). These demonstrations have had both a symbolic and substantial impact on the further development of the movement. Incidentally, it is worth noting that this event occurred before what many see as the spurring event of the movement on the transnational stage, namely, the protest in Seattle in 1999 against the third ministerial meeting of the WTO.

In February 1998, activists from the Zapatista movement met in Geneva for the foundational conference of the Peoples Global Action network. The welcoming committee was organized by Geneva squatters and composed of local urban autonomous groups, solidarity organizations, and labor unions. These actors reflect the composition of the GJM in Switzerland in the following years. This foundational conference also led to the organization of the demonstrations that took place during the WTO conference in Geneva in May 1998 (part of a global day of action across the world called by the Peoples Global Action).

Although it is always difficult to precisely locate the beginning of a new movement or movement cycle in time, the four days of demonstrations that

took place in Geneva in May 1998 can be seen as the starting point of the emergence of the GJM in the public domain in Switzerland and as the opening event of a cycle of protest spurred by the movement. These events marked a radicalization of the social movement sector, which had already started at the local level a few years earlier with a series of actions by the squatters and with a 1995 protest against a Swiss Army parade that witnessed some violence on the part of demonstrators. Forms of actions more common in the late 1960 and in the 1970s (especially perpetrated by the peace and antinuclear movements), such as direct actions and civil disobedience, were resumed after having been put on hold during the 1980s and early 1990s, at least at the national level. These forms of action were largely inspired by Reclaim the Streets, an important actor in the Peoples Global Action Network, which organized the 1998 demonstrations and “imported” these forms of action in Switzerland.

Unexpectedly, at least for those inclined to think that collective action in Switzerland takes mostly if not always a peaceful path, the 1998 demonstrations in Geneva turned violent. This turn has had important consequences for the future of the GJM in Switzerland, both positively and negatively. First, they had a symbolic impact, proving to opponents of globalization that the movement was indeed capable of mounting a significant challenge. Second, however, the turn to violence created the basis for an internal division of the movement, which would later deepen, precisely on the issue of violence. Third, the violent actions had large resonance in the Swiss media, largely overshadowing the peaceful direct actions. The impressive media campaign in the months before the demonstration against the 2003 summit of the G8 in Evian (a few kilometers from Geneva across the French-Swiss border) is perhaps the most striking example of this focus (Commission extraparlamentaire d'enquête/G8 2004): Most of the attention of the press was directed at the threat of violence during the meetings. Fourth, they influenced the future reactions of the authorities and the repression that protests against the WEF in Davos and other GJM demonstrations would face in the following years.

In the years following the Geneva events, the stance of state authorities vis-à-vis the movement was characterized by overreaction, an attitude often shown by political authorities when they face a new social movement or form of protest (Karstedt-Henke 1980). This can perhaps be best seen in the 2001 demonstrations against the annual WEF meeting in Davos. These events can be considered as another turning point, or at least a significant moment, of the Swiss GJM. Because the Davos authorities had declared a general demonstration ban in the town during the WEF, demonstrators trying to reach the site were stopped by the police and the army in Landquart; only a few could reach the station. In reaction, some demonstrators blocked the high-

way in Landquart, while others left for Zurich, where violent demonstrations and confrontations with police forces were followed by many arrests. These demonstrations received great media attention, as the material damages were very high. But in addition, it opened the polemics about the militarization of the station (as not only the police but also the army were mobilized to protect Davos from demonstrations) and about the right to demonstrate and freedom of expression.

Another crucial event of the movement, at least in terms of popular participation, was the mass demonstration against the G8 meeting in Evian. This was the largest demonstration organized by the movement in Switzerland and perhaps the largest ever in this country. As mentioned earlier, media attention focused on the possible violence even before the summit began. The Geneva authorities called for a coordination of the demonstration with the Lemanic Social Forum, more or less created for the event. The main authorized demonstrations took place without major violence, but with the presence of police forces from other cantons and countries, especially from Germany. According to the Lemanic Social Forum, about one hundred thousand people took part at the demonstration.

Participation in the demonstrations opposing the annual meetings of the WEF in Davos gives us a partial but significant indicator of the evolution of the movement's mobilization. Participation was at its highest in 2001. At the same time, this was also the year the protests took a more violent stance. Both participation and the level of violence then declined over the next four years. In January 2004, for example, no more than two thousand people took to the streets in Chur to protest against that year's meeting. To be sure, the anti-G8 demonstration held in Geneva in June of the same year gathered an impressive number of people, but this is largely because this event occurred only a few weeks after the U.S. intervention in Iraq, it captured much media attention, and it attracted a wider spectrum of demonstrators. In addition, protests against the G8 traditionally attract a higher number of participants.

In summary, although preceded by a phase of organization and consensus building, the Swiss GJM made its first striking appearance in the public domain in 1998 during the protest against the WTO in Geneva. From that moment and up to 2001–2002, the movement increased its activities, enlarged its public support (which has nevertheless remained quite limited in international perspective), and radicalized its action repertoire. After 2001–2002, participation began to decline (with the notable exception of the 2003 Geneva demonstration against the G8, which represented the highest moment in the movement's history in Switzerland), and the process of radicalization seemed to stop or at least to relent. Parallel to this evolution, however, the movement has remained stable in terms of mobilizing structures

and less protest-oriented events such as social forums. We address this aspect in more detail in what follows.

Organizational Networks

As a result of the importance of the new cleavage that emerged with the NSMs and their strong mobilization throughout the 1970s and 1980s as well as the early 1990s, NSM organizations are very much present in the Swiss GJM. Among them, organizations of the ecology movement, such as Pro Natura, and of the solidarity movement, such as the Déclaration de Berne or Aktion Finanzplatz Schweiz, predominate. Of course, more recent organizations created during the emergence phase of the GJM movements are also very active in the movement. Among them, the most important (or at least the most active) are perhaps Attac, the Coordination anti-WTO, the Gipfelblockade, the Other Davos, and the two main social forums (the Swiss Social Forum and the Lemanic Social Forum). Traditional leftist organizations (parties and labor unions) are also involved, but to a lesser extent than in countries where the class cleavage is less pacified than in Switzerland. Nevertheless, the GJM has certainly contributed to remobilizing these actors.

The strong imprint of the NSMs provides the GJM with a strong presence of quite formalized and professionalized organizations of the environmental and solidarity movements. We have an indirect indicator of this if we look at the data on thirty-five organizations among those active within the movement that we gathered as part of the Demos project. Based on Web sites and internal documents of these organizations, we observe a higher presence of formal organizations in the movement. For example, on an additive index of formalization, nineteen organizations can be considered as formal, whereas only seven organizations are informal.² However, just as the NSMs include formalized and professionalized organizations (for example, in the environmental and solidarity movements), together with much more informal and loosely structured organizations and groups (for example, in the peace and squatters' movements), the mobilizing structures of the GJM are made up of both formal organizations and informal networks. Furthermore, the organizations born during the emergence of the GJM are much less formalized and professionalized than certain organizations typical of the NSMs, especially those of the ecology and solidarity movements, which is not surprising as the former have been created only recently.

Although we do not have direct information on the relationships among the organizations involved in the movement (for example, about their collaboration or joint presence in protest events), we can try to assess the movement's organizational network indirectly. Figure 8.1 shows the network




Figure 8.1 Hyperlinks Network of the Swiss GJM

Key to Figure 8-1:

Subnetworks	Organizations
○ Traditional left	Communistes, JUSO, PS, PST, SIT, Solidarités, SSP, Unia, Verts
■ New social movements	Aktion Finanzplatz Schweiz, Alliance Sud, Cetim, Le Courrier, Déclaration de Berne, GSsA, Magasin du Monde, Pax Christi, Pro Natura, Réalise, SOSF, WOZ
▲ Squatters/autonomous	Antifa, Chiapas, Augenauf, Gipfelblockade, Lora, MPS, OSL
□ Global justice movement	Anti-WTO Coordination, Attac, FSL, FSS, Gipfelblockade, Indymedia, l'Autre Davos, MMF

Note: See the appendix to this chapter for a list of organizations.

Source: Data collected within the Democracy in Europe and the Mobilization of Society (Demos) project.

of hyperlinks found on the Web sites of the thirty-five organizations studied in the Demos project.³ A network is made basically of nodes and ties. The nodes in the figure are organizations participating in the movement and having an Internet presence; the ties (arrows) represent references to other organizations made on an organization Web site. This gives us at the same time a proxy of the centrality and the prestige of the organizations, not only of the degree of affinity among them (it is unlikely that an organization's Web site would mention another organization without some kind of affinity between them).

The picture provided by the network analysis of the hyperlinks in organizations' Web sites is quite straightforward. Three organizations receive the highest number of arrows and therefore of mentions: the *Déclaration de Berne*, *Attac*, and *Indymedia*.⁴ Interestingly, they represent three different types of actors involved in the movement. The *Déclaration de Berne* is one of the most active organizations of the Swiss solidarity movement, that is, one of the most important NSMs in the Swiss context. *Attac* is the GJM organization almost par excellence, although it is much less developed in Switzerland than in other countries (most notably France and Germany). *Indymedia*, a very decentralized network, is perhaps the most well-known alternative media network active in the movement in many countries. Thus, at least as far as references to Web sites are concerned, one national organization of a traditionally strong NSM as well as two international organizations of the GJM seem to be central to the movement and have the most prestige. According to our data, organizations such as these seem to link the different branches of the highly divided Swiss GJM. This picture is to be taken with caution, as it is limited to the links between the organizations of our sample, taking into account only the hyperlinks among them. Nevertheless, it gives an indication of the credibility these organizations grant to each other and could be taken as an indicator of the collaboration potential among them.

The organizational network of the Swiss GJM can thus be divided into subnetworks. Two of these stem from the heritage of the NSM in Switzerland. We find on the one hand the environmental and solidarity movement organizations, which are very centralized and professionalized (for example, the traditional environmental organization *Pro Natura* or *Alliance Sud*). On the other hand, we find more loosely structured direct action networks, in particular the networks of informal groups mainly belonging to the squatters' and autonomous, anarchist, and new left milieus, especially those active locally in the major cities (Zurich, Lausanne, Geneva, Bern, Basel). To these two subnetworks, we must add a third one, namely, actors from the more institutionalized arenas represented by left-wing parties and labor unions (especially the more radical ones). However, these actors are less important than in other countries, such as for example, France. Finally, also less important

in the Swiss context in international perspective, there are the organizations created during the emergence of the GJM in the 1990s (for example, Attac, the Swiss Social Forum, or the Lemanic Social Forum).

The two main subnetworks work relatively independently from each other. In particular, they tend to participate in different types of events, or at least some organizations are more involved in certain events than others. The larger and more institutionalized organizations, such as those belonging to the NSMs, display a stronger presence in social forum types of events, whereas the most typical GJMOs are more active in mass demonstrations and protest activities—although the former are not absent from this type of event either. In addition, there is hardly any permanent network. Instead, varying ad hoc coalitions are formed, depending on the place or event. On certain occasions, however, we observe a joint participation of organizations belonging to the two subnetworks. This occurs above all in the most important events, such as the 1998 anti-WTO and the 2003 anti-G8 demonstrations. On other occasions, such as the anti-WEF events in Davos, different organizations take part, but using different forms of actions (demonstrations, parallel forums, etc.).

The hyperlink network gives us some insights into the interrelationships among the four subnetworks of the Swiss GJM, as the organizations belonging to each subnetwork are represented with a different symbol (see the key to figure 8.1).⁵ The type of organizations to which the three central actors (the Bern Declaration, Attac [GJM], and Indymedia) are linked differ considerably. For example, Attac has no inbound or outbound tie to the groups or organizations from the squatters/autonomous milieu; it is only linked to the traditional left organizations and the NSMs. The same holds for the Swiss Social Forum, another GJM organization. Indymedia has links mainly with the squatters/autonomous and the GJM organizations, except for Solidarités and WOZ.⁶ The third, more central actor in this network, the Bern Declaration, is the only one of the three core actors with links to all types of organizations. It is therefore the only one linking all the subnetworks of the Swiss GJM, although the link with the squatters/autonomous organizations exists only through GJM organizations stemming from the squatters/autonomous milieu. Although we should be careful in extrapolating from this analysis, which is only based on hyperlinks, it nevertheless shows that the different subnetworks work quite independently. Indeed, if a hyperlink can be considered as an indicator of the potential collaboration between organizations, the fact that even this type of tie between the different subnetworks does not exist or is sporadic casts doubts on their actual collaboration.

Another way to grasp the weight of certain types of mobilizing structures within the Swiss GJM is to look at the individual level by means of survey data. Table 8.1 shows the distribution of organizational networks of participants

Table 8.1 Organizational Networks of Participants in Two Protests against the WEF Meeting in Davos in 2004 (Percentages)

Organizational Networks	% Responses
Environmental Organizations	27
GJM Organizations	19
Parties	17
Humanitarian Organizations	16
Unions	15
Human Rights Organizations	14
Welfare Organizations	11
Antiracist/Promigrant Organizations	11
Peace Movement Organizations	10
Autonomous/Squatters' Movement Organizations	9
Youth Organizations	9
Tenants' Rights Organizations	5
Students' Organizations	5
Women's Organizations	3
Neighborhood Organizations	3
Consumers' Rights Organizations	2
Farmers' Organizations	2
Religious Organizations	2
Gay and Lesbian Organizations	1
Unemployed Rights Organizations	1
N	411

Note: Respondents were asked to mention the organizations/groups in which they participate or have participated. Percentages do not add up to 100 owing to multiple responses.

Source: Author's data.

in the GJM (regardless of their level of involvement in those networks). The data come from research conducted during two protest events against the WEF meeting in Davos in January 2004 and followed an approach similar to the one adopted in recent studies carried out in other countries (Andretta et al. 2002; della Porta 2003a, 2003b, and 2005a; della Porta and Mosca 2003; della Porta et al. 2006; Fillieule et al. 2004; Passy and Bandler 2003), using a questionnaire distributed to participants in the two events.⁷ Although these figures should be taken with some caution and cannot easily be generalized, because the survey is not based on standard random sampling and the sample is relatively small, they allow us to show the main tendencies of the organizational networks in which participants in the GJM are embedded. Furthermore, although the sample cannot be seen as representative of the whole universe of participants, it gives us a picture of the most active participants, because some of the questionnaires were handed out en route to the meeting points.

Concerning the issue at hand, respondents were asked to mention organizations or groups in which they participate or have participated from a finite list of items. As we can see from the table, the largest proportion of participants in the two events are or have been members (or at least supporters) of environmental organizations (27 percent). Obviously, GJM organizations are also well represented, but they are ranked only second (19 percent). Many respondents also mentioned membership in humanitarian and human rights organizations. Together with antiracist/pro-migrant organizations, the latter can be considered as part of the solidarity movement (Passy 2001). If we add up the percentages for all three items, the solidarity movement clearly emerges as the most important organizational network of participants in the two events at hand (41 percent). In fact, perhaps stretching a bit the definition of this movement, we could add welfare organizations, making the solidarity movements even more central (52 percent). Also important for the participants in the two anti-WEF protests are more institutional actors such as parties (17 percent) and unions (15 percent). Among the former, quite understandably, leftist parties are virtually the only ones mentioned.

In spite of their limitations, these findings offer us a clue as to the organizations and networks underlying the mobilization of the GJM in Switzerland. First, the mobilizing structures of the Swiss GJM reflect the strength of a previous cycle of contention carried out by the NSM, hence largely reflecting the importance of the national traditions of contention. Second, more specifically, the organizations and networks of the environmental and solidarity movements play a central role. Third, at the same time, the presence of NSM organizations and networks is accompanied by that of more institutional actors such as left-wing parties and labor unions. However, these more institutionalized actors, although indeed present, are less important, reflecting the weakness of the class cleavage in Switzerland and, again, the national traditions of contention.

The impact of national traditions of contention on the structuring of the GJM in Switzerland can also be seen in a similar survey conducted by a team of French and Swiss social scientists (Fillieule et al. 2004) on participants in the protest against the G8 summit in Evian in June 2003. This survey, based on the same approach as the one mentioned earlier, was conducted on both sides of the French-Swiss border near Geneva, where the protest events took place over about one week. As a result, the sample includes the same number of French and Swiss participants (about 40 percent each), allowing for a direct comparison of the two groups. The survey shows that Swiss and French participants were embedded in different organizational networks—specifically, that GJM organizations were more present on the French side. This can be explained by the fact that France is one of the birthplaces of the GJM in Europe, as attested by the founding and strong development of Attac there. No equivalent social movement organization

exists in Switzerland in terms of size, although environmental organizations, for example, are much larger in Switzerland than in France (Kriesi et al. 1995). Furthermore, NSM organizations (that is, environmental, humanitarian, human rights, and peace organizations) were much more present on the Swiss side. Again, here we see the impact of the national context. In particular, the mobilizing structures in the protest against the G8 in Evian reflect the strength of the NSM in Switzerland, as opposed to its weakness in France (Kriesi et al. 1995).

In summary, the mobilizing structures of the GJM in Switzerland consist of four main types of actors, or subnetworks: first, NSM organizations, especially those active in the environmental and solidarity movements (which have mobilized most often in the recent history of Swiss protest politics) and having a high degree of formalization and professionalization; second, a more informal and loosely structured network of organizations and groups belonging to the squatters' and autonomous, anarchist, and new left milieus; third, but less important, the more institutionalized leftist sector made up of left-wing parties and labor unions; fourth, and perhaps even less important in the Swiss context, the organizations created during the emergence of the GJM in the 1990s. More generally speaking, the movement relies on previous organizations that have become involved in global justice issues in addition to their traditional and more specific issues (NSM organizations, but also unions and leftist parties), as well as on more recent organizations specifically created during the protest wave brought about by the movement.

Movement Identity and Frames

The framing perspective has taught us that a process of construction of the "problem" is necessary to activate the identities and motivations of actors to form a social movement (Snow 2004). However, this process is constrained and limited by previous mobilizations and ideas already expressed by previous social forces, most notably by previous social movements. Therefore, the collective action frames put forward by the GJM are likely to resemble in large part those of the cycle of contention that has preceded it, namely, that carried by the NSMs. Indeed, although there are certainly several novelties in the nature and mobilization of the GJM (in particular, concerning the scope of mobilization and the targets addressed), its claims are not entirely new and have been to a large extent brought about by the NSMs. This holds in general, as the NSMs have mobilized strongly all across Europe and beyond, but especially in Switzerland, where they have formed the major movement family during the past three decades or so (Giugni and Passy 1997; Kriesi et al. 1995).

Table 8.2 Thematic Priorities of Selected Organizations Involved in the Swiss GJM (Percentages)

Principles	% Responses
Democracy	80
Another Globalization/Different Form of Globalization	77
Anti-Neoliberalism	77
Solidarity with Third-World Countries	77
Social Justice/Defense of the Welfare State/Fighting Poverty/ Social Inclusion	74
Ecology	69
Workers' Rights	66
Human Rights	63
Sustainability	63
Critical Consumerism/Fair Trade	60
Ethical Finance	60
Immigrant Rights/Antiracism/Rights of Asylum Seekers	60
Global (Distributive) Justice	57
Peace	57
Nonviolence	54
Women's Rights	51
Anticapitalism	43
Alternative Knowledge	34
Gay and Lesbian Rights	23
Socialism	23
Autonomy and/or Antagonism (Disobedients)	14
Religious Principles	9
Communism	6
Animal Rights	6
Anarchism (Traditional Anarchism and/or Libertarian Anarchism)	3
Other	31
N	35

Note: The data refer to support for principles explicitly declared by the organizations. Percentages do not add up to 100 owing to multiple responses.

Source: Author's data.

Four aspects of the identity of the GJM in the Swiss context are of particular interest here: 1) the ideological cleavages as expressed in the issues and frames addressed by the movement, 2) the breadth of the movement's issues and frames (multi-issue versus single-issue), 3) the territorial dimension of the movement's issues and frames, and 4) the identification of people to the movement. To get some purchase on the first three aspects, let us first look once again to our thirty-five organizations studied in the Demos project. Table 8.2 shows the thematic priorities of the selected organizations

as stated in their internal documents and statutes.⁸ Without going into all the details, we can see that issues typical of the NSMs have high priority. In particular, issues traditionally addressed by the ecology movement (ecology, sustainability, animal rights) and, above all, the solidarity movement (human rights, immigrant rights, antiracism and rights of asylum seekers, solidarity with Third World countries) are all ranked very high on the list of issues addressed by the organizations.⁹ If we include peace issues and recalculate the percentages over the total responses (rather than the total cases, as in the figures shown in the table), they add up to about 32 percent of all issues. This amount becomes even higher if we include the other NSM-related issues such as women's rights or gay and lesbian rights.

The importance of NSM issues should not cause us to overlook that issues brought about specifically by the GJM, such as alternative views of globalization, global justice, anti-neoliberalism and anticapitalism, have very high priority, perhaps even more than NSM issues. In addition, we observe the presence of issues belonging to the ideological repertoire of the traditional Left. In particular, social justice and the defense of the welfare state, but also workers' rights, are mentioned as principles by many of the selected organizations. This is hardly surprising—first, because we are analyzing statements by organizations involved in this movement, and second, because these organizations include unions and leftist parties. What should be noted, however, is the importance of NSM issues over both issues typical of the GJM and issues of the traditional Left, which we expect to be higher, for example, in a country such as France in which the NSMs have mobilized less and in which the ideological cleavage structure keeps a strong class imprint.

Thus, the structure of social and political cleavages that characterize a given country, as well as its national traditions of contention, affect the ways in which global issues are framed in that country. In Switzerland, the pacification of the class cleavage that has historically occurred during the twentieth century, the strong degree of institutionalization of the system of industrial relations, and more generally the consensual character of the political system (reflected in neocorporatist arrangements in the administrative arena), together with the strength of the NSM sector, has produced a GJM more oriented toward claims typically made by the NSMs than toward claims of the traditional Left. At the same time, those relating specifically to the GJM are obviously among the central issues and frames addressed by organizations involved in this movement.

The second aspect relating to the movement's identity that we would like to address refers to the breadth of its thematic priorities. Perhaps in a somewhat too simplistic and reductive view, the NSMs have often been characterized in the literature as single-issue movements. The GJM, in contrast, is characterized by the breadth and heterogeneity of the actors involved. As we

saw earlier, this holds for the Swiss GJM as well. Do we find a similar breadth and heterogeneity when it comes to the issues and frames addressed by the movement? To answer this question, we can refer to the same information that we just discussed, looking at the number of principles mentioned by the thirty-five selected organizations. In order to simplify the analysis, we have grouped them into four sets of five items.¹⁰ The data suggest that the Swiss GJM is clearly not a single-issue movement, as most of the organizations (43 percent) address between sixteen and twenty different issues, and less than a fifth of them address fewer than five issues. Furthermore, the highest percentage (17 percent) is found for organizations addressing nineteen issues. Of course, these figures, like the others that we show concerning the organizations studied in the Demos project, acquire significance when compared with those referring to the other countries included in the project. However, even without a systematic cross-national comparison that would allow the singling out of Swiss peculiarities, our data suggest that the GJM in Switzerland has a strong multi-issue dimension.

The third identity-related aspect considered here is the territorial dimension of the movement's issues and frames. We assess this aspect through the territorial level of the organizations themselves, which we can take as a proxy for the territorial dimension concerning movement identity. Given that we are dealing with a "global" movement, one would expect the international level to be the most important. Our data on the two 2004 anti-WEF protest events, however, partly contradict this assumption, pointing again to the relevance of the national context even for the GJM. Although most of the thirty-five selected organizations are present on all four levels, most also have a local, regional, or national presence. Most important, contrary to expectations, the international level has the lowest score (63 percent, against a proportion ranging between 83 percent and 91 percent for the other levels).¹¹ This confirms what students of social movements have been warning us about, namely, that behind the fashionable labels of global activism, global civil society, and others, there is a reality made of nationally and even locally anchored actors and claims (Tarrow and della Porta 2005).

We can strengthen our analysis of the movement's identity by referring once again to the research conducted on participants in two protest events against the 2004 meeting of the WEF. Table 8.3 shows the distribution of the most important claims as stated by participants in these events. Respondents were asked to mention the three most important claims from a finite list of items. The findings are very straightforward. Three claims clearly emerge as central for participants in the movement: suppress the Third World debt (61 percent), grant-free access to drinking water (59 percent), and favor fair trade (45 percent). All other items are much less important, with the exception perhaps of generalizing freedom of speech (32 percent). How-

Table 8.3 Most Important Claims for Participants in Two Protests against the WEF Meeting in Davos in 2004 (Percentages)

Claims	% Responses
Suppress Third World Debt	61
Grant Free Access to Drinking Water	59
Favor Fair Trade	45
Generalize Freedom of Speech	32
Make Bretton Woods Institutions (WTO, IMF, WB) Democratic	21
Create a Tax on Financial Transactions ("Tobin Tax")	21
Grant Unions Freedoms and Rights	18
Favor Access to Studies for Women in the South	17
Realize Demining	10
Acknowledge Adoption and Marriage for Homosexual Couples	2
N	411

Note: Respondents were asked to mention the three most important claims from a finite list of items. Percentages do not add up to 100 owing to multiple responses.

Source: Author's data.

ever, when respondents were asked to say what they think should be done to change society (again with three possible choices out of a finite list of items), the two principal items mentioned are establishing democratic forms alternative to the state and abolishing capitalism. These, indeed, are core issues of the GJM everywhere. Strengthening international law and breaking radically with current models of economic development come next in the priority ranking.

What do these figures tell us about the claims made by the GJM in Switzerland, with all the caution that should be used in interpreting them? They suggest, first, that participants in the GJM make a variety of claims. In other words, this is not a single-issue movement, but a heterogeneous one—not only in terms of the organizations and networks involved, but also with regard to the issues addressed. Second, the Swiss GJM seems to emphasize issues and frames traditionally put forward by the NSMs and, more specifically, by the environmental and solidarity movements (the two most important NSMs during the 1980s and 1990s). Taken together, these are issues relating to sustainable development, which can be seen as bridging the environmental and solidarity movements. Third, some of the central issues of the GJM worldwide (for example, fair trade) are also important, whereas others (for example, democratizing international institutions) are more marginal.

To be sure, the focus of the mobilization of the GJM is on transnational and global issues. However, the movement also deals with national issues,

and the degree to which the latter enter the movement's agenda varies across countries. Given the relatively lower presence of unions in the mobilization of the GJM in Switzerland, national social issues seem less central than in other countries. Therefore, the movement tends to focus on global issues and to be less linked to the national situation and conflicts. Even national issues are often framed in global terms. For example, the issue of bank secrecy is framed in terms of global justice and the issue of immigration in terms of global migration.

The fourth and last aspect of movement identity that we would like to address concerns the degree to which participants identify with the movement. For an empirical grasp on this aspect, we can look once again at our data on the two protest events against the 2004 meeting of the WEF. Always with the necessary caution in interpreting them, the findings suggest that more than three-quarters of respondents identify either strongly (31 percent) or at least to some extent (49 percent) with the GJM; only a very small proportion (2 percent) do not identify with it at all (18 percent identify a little). These figures are very much in line with those found in the survey conducted among participants at the European Social Forum in Florence in 2002 (della Porta 2005a).¹² Thus, we can say that over a few years' time, people active in the movement have come to create important identity bonds in spite of the fact that they belong to organizations of other movements or that they make claims that preexisted the emergence of the GJM in the public domain. This could form a basis for the survival of the movement in times of lower mobilization due to more unfavorable political opportunities or other external and internal factors.

In summary, the framing processes within the Swiss GJM are characterized by the importance of NSM issues and frames, especially those previously made by the environmental and solidarity movements. Typical frames of both the old and new Left, as well as frames that reflect core issues of the GJM everywhere, are also present, although to a lesser extent; they probably play a smaller role than in other countries. This can be seen both in the thematic priorities of organizations involved in the movement and in the claims of participants in activities promoted by the movement. Finally, participants' strong identification with the movement should also be stressed.

Action Repertoires

Since the 1998 demonstrations against the WTO meeting in Geneva, an unprecedented police apparatus has been organized by the authorities at every event that could be the target of GJM protests, and confrontations with demonstrators have become more frequent than in the past. In particular,

virtually all annual meetings of the WEF in Davos have witnessed a violent or at least a confrontational opposition (the first time in 1999), both near the site of the meeting and in other Swiss cities (even in 2002, when the WEF meeting was held in New York). Furthermore, the protests against the summit of the G8 in Geneva and Lausanne witnessed confrontations with the police (although they occurred before and after the main demonstrations, which went peacefully). The anti-WEF demonstrations of 2004, in contrast, were characterized by both lower participation and more peaceful behavior, perhaps marking a decline of the movement or at least a new phase more centered around consensus building (for example, through social forums and other reflexive events) than around overt protest activities.

The action repertoire of the GJM in Switzerland presents two main forms: mass demonstrations and protest activities addressed against major international governmental or private institutions or organizations, on the one hand, and parallel summits and social forums on the other. The former are protest-oriented and have taken a radical or even violent turn when the more radical sectors of the movement have been involved (and also when the authorities have made use of repression). The latter are more self-reflexive and are aimed at identity formation, consensus mobilization, and public sensitization (Passy and Bandler 2003). Furthermore, to somewhat simplify a more complex picture, the latter see the involvement of the less institutionalized and more radical sectors of the movement (for example, the autonomous, anarchist, and new left milieus more inclined to direct action and participatory democracy), whereas the former include the participation of institutional actors and more moderate sectors of the movement (left-wing parties, unions, and the more formalized organizations of the environmental and solidarity movements more inclined to conventional and media-oriented strategies).

The radical organizations and groups were more important and visible in the early phases of the Swiss GJM. They were very active and contributed, for example, to the creation of Peoples Global Action and the organization of the anti-WTO protests in 1998; they were also actively involved in the first anti-WEF demonstrations. However, during the past few years, the moderate wing of the GJM seems to have gained in importance: Radical or violent actions have decreased as compared with the late 1990s and early 2000s, in particular in the anti-WEF demonstrations, but also during the protests against the G8 summit in 2003. Similarly to the evolution observed for the NSMs, the most radical sectors of the GSM are losing visibility and are increasingly criticized by the dominant, more institutionalized organizations. The *Déclaration de Berne*, for example, took an explicit position against violence in 2001 after the anti-WEF demonstrations, as did the Lemanic Social Forum before the anti-G8 demonstrations in Geneva. Although the

attitudes toward violent repertoires have until recently been ambiguous within the movement, with some actors clearly condemning it from the beginning and others being less straightforward in this regard, most of the GJM organizations and those close to it are now more inclined to condemn the use of violence and to opt for more moderate and deliberative forms of action. A significant indication of this is the creation of the Swiss Social Forum.

Social forums, as one of the principal characteristics of the GJM, can be considered as actors (see above), but also as a particular form of action. Chronologically, this kind of activity came after the rise of protest in the streets.¹³ The two principal social forums, the Swiss Social Forum and the Lemanic Social Forum, were set up more or less at the same time, in the early 2000s. The first Swiss Social Forum took place in 2003 and the second in 2005. The Lemanic Social Forum, a regional forum, was created in 2002, in the wake of the demonstration organized in November 2001 against the WTO ministerial conference and of the Porto Alegre appeal. It was particularly active in organizing the protest activities against the G8 summit in Evian. Like its national counterpart, however, its activities consist basically in informing the public about global issues and mobilizing consensus for the movement. Other forum-like events taking place more or less regularly in Switzerland include the yearly meeting of the Other Davos, the Summer University promoted by Attac, and the Public Eye on Davos. This parallel summit has been held every year in Davos since 1999 and is coordinated by the *Déclaration de Berne* and *Pro Natura*.

Social forums are an innovative and important aspect of the action repertoire of the GJM, not only because they facilitate the mobilization of consensus and creation of organizational networks, but also insofar as they are vehicles for elaborating conceptions of democracy (della Porta 2005b). This function holds for any country in which the movement is active, but takes a particularly interesting signification in Switzerland, where direct democracy forms one of the fundamental pillars of the country's political culture.

Another indicator of the action repertoire of the GJM is the forms of action used by the organizations involved in it (both those preexisting and those born during the rise of the movement). In order to measure this variable, we can take the sample of thirty-five organizations whose network of hyperlinks we analyzed earlier.¹⁴ Table 8.4 shows the forms of action adopted by the selected organizations.¹⁵ As we can see, nearly all the organizations (97 percent) have among their objectives spreading information, influencing the mass media, and raising public awareness. In this sense, the GJM does not differ very much from the NSMs, which also stress this kind of activity, at least in Switzerland (Giugni and Passy 1997; Kriesi et al. 1995).

Table 8.4 Forms of Action of Selected Organizations of the Swiss GJM (Percentages)

Forms of Action	% Responses
Spreading Information/Influencing Mass Media/Raising Awareness	97
Protest/Mobilization	89
Political Education of Citizens	60
Legal Protection and Denunciation of Repression	34
Representation of Specific Interests	31
Advocacy	26
Lobbying	26
Political Representation	20
Offer/Supply of Services to Constituents	17
Self-Awareness/Self-Help	11
Other	51
N	35

Note: The data refer to the functions/objectives explicitly mentioned by the organizations. Percentages do not add up to 100 owing to multiple responses.

Source: Author's data.

Yet perhaps the most significant finding for our present purpose is the importance of protest actions and tactics aimed at mobilizing the public (89 percent), as compared with the lower share of organizations using lobbying activities (26 percent) or political representation (20 percent).¹⁶ This gives us a picture stressing social movement-like activities, all the more so if we note that included in our sample were six parties (including a party youth organization), three unions, and three media (see appendix to this chapter), which typically do not engage in protest or mobilization activities.

Finally, the repertoire of contention of the GJM can also be assessed at the individual level using the data from the survey of participants in two protest events against the 2004 meeting of the WEF described earlier (always keeping in mind the limitations of these data). Table 8.5 shows a selection of the unconventional forms of action that respondents have already used previous to their participation to these two events.¹⁷ Demonstrative forms are quite predictably those that have been most often used. The most striking result, however, is the high proportion of respondents who have made use of confrontational actions and also the relatively important share of violent actions (as far as damaging goods is concerned). If we compare these findings with the action repertoire of social movements in Switzerland, which apart from some exceptions at the local level is typically quite moderate (Kriesi et al. 1995), we realize to what extent the GJM displays a repertoire of contention that significantly departs from the main trends of other movements. Furthermore, although the comparison is somewhat difficult, given the different types of events, participants in the 2004 anti-WEF protests in

Table 8.5 Unconventional Forms of Actions Previously Used by Participants in Two Protests against the WEF Meeting in Davos in 2004 (Percentages)

Forms of Action	% Responses	N
Demonstrative Actions		
Signing a Petition	87.0	368
Boycotting Certain Products, Stores, or Countries	87.4	373
Distributing Leaflets	73.3	374
Participating in Symbolic Actions	69.7	373
Participating in a Demonstration	96.3	381
Confrontational Actions		
Participating in a Building Occupation	34.7	369
Opposing Resistance to the Forces of Order	55.0	360
Participating in an Action Blocking Traffic	57.9	373
Violent Actions		
Damaging Goods or Property	23.7	367
Exerting Physical Pressure on Persons	7.6	369

Source: Author's data.

Switzerland seem even more prone to use violence for political purposes than participants in other events such as the demonstrations against the 2001 G8 summit in Genoa 2001 or the 2002 European Social Forum in Florence (della Porta et al. 2006).¹⁸

In summary, the repertoire of contention of the Swiss GJM presents two main forms not always linked to each other: mass demonstrations and protest activities (often taking a radical or even violent turn) addressed against major international governmental or private institutions or organizations, on the one hand, and parallel summits and social forums (more moderate and self-reflexive), on the other. However, the movement's radicalness, which at times has been particularly marked, seems to have declined over time.

Conclusion

Although the GJM, which emerged in the Swiss public domain in the late 1990s, certainly represents a new form of contention insofar as the scope of the conflict and its main targets are concerned (transnational or global rather than national), it did not come from nowhere. Quite to the contrary, it relies largely on previous movement families and traditions of contention. In a way, the central conflict on which this movement mobilizes combines those of the labor movement and of the NSMs. As a result, both new collective actors and actors that were formed during previous

cycles of contention are present within the movement. Among the previously existing actors, those belonging to the NSM family and those of the more institutionalized Left (leftist parties and unions) predominate. Furthermore, the GJM combines new and preexisting issues and collective action frames. Among them, those put forward by the NSMs and the Left are particularly important.

Although this is true everywhere, each country presents a different mix of these elements, depending on the political opportunities for the movement's mobilization. More specifically, in each country, the GJM reflects the structure of social and political cleavages as well as the country's national traditions of contention. In the case of Switzerland, the main features of the national context that influence the emergence and mobilization of the GJM are a strong degree of pacification of the class cleavage (accompanied by the institutionalization of the system of industrial relations reflected in neo-corporatist arrangements in the administrative arena) and the imprint of the important NSM sector. The main characteristics of the Swiss GJM result in part from these features of the social and political context. In addition, the movement's political alliances with institutional actors and the state responses to the movement's mobilization determine its strength and action repertoires.

The characteristics of the GJM in Switzerland owe much to the social and political context in which it has emerged. In particular, certain aspects of the political opportunity structure, such as state responses and the configuration of power, influence the levels and forms of the protest carried out by the movement. In international perspective, we can speak of a relatively weak and moderate GJM. In addition, the Swiss GJM reflects the conflict lines and traditions of contention that have characterized the country in recent decades, in particular the weakness of class-based mobilization and the strength of the NSMs. Finally, the picture that emerges is one of a particularly heterogeneous, if not divided, GJM. Two main branches, or subnetworks, coexist within the movement, each with its own strategies and means of action: a moderate, relatively institutionalized branch relying mostly upon organizations and activists of the ecology and solidarity movements as well as institutional actors such as small left-wing parties and unions, and a more radical and less institutionalized branch pivoting around the autonomous, anarchist, and squatters' milieus.

How can these characteristics be put in a broader international perspective? In other words, how can we expect the Swiss GJM to resemble or differ from its counterparts in other European countries? The heterogeneity of the GJM does not seem to be a Swiss characteristic, but more a characteristic of the movement. The distinctiveness of the Swiss GJM is to be found in its composition—that is, in the two main branches that coexist because of the pacification of the class cleavage and the strong heritage of the NSMs.

Appendix

Table 8.6 List of Selected Organizations

Organization Name	Organization Type
Aktion Finanzplatz Schweiz	Single organization (solidarity)
Alliance Sud	Network/federation (solidarity)
Antifa	Network/federation (solidarity)
Attac	Network/federation (global justice)
Augen auf	Network/federation (solidarity)
Centre Europe—Tiers Monde (Cetim)	Single organization (solidarity)
Solidarität mit Chiapas (Chiapas)	Single organization (solidarity)
Communistes	Single organization (party)
Coordination anti-OMC	Ad-hoc umbrella organization (global justice)
Courrier	Single organization (media)
Déclaration de Berne	Single organization (solidarity)
Forum Social Lémanique (FSL)	Ad-hoc umbrella organization (global justice)
Forum Social Suisse (FSS)	Ad-hoc umbrella organization (global justice)
Gipfelblockade	Ad-hoc umbrella organization (global justice)
Groupe pour une Suisse sans Armée (GSsA)	Single organization (peace)
Indymedia	Network/federation (media, global justice)
Jeunesse socialiste suisse (Juso)	Single organization (party youth)
L'Autre Davos	Ad-hoc umbrella organization (global justice)
Lora	Single organization (media, urban autonomous)
Magasins du Monde	Network/federation (solidarity)
Marche mondiale des femmes (MMF)	Ad-hoc umbrella organization (women)
Mouvement pour le socialisme (MPS)	Network/federation (global justice)
Organisation socialiste libertaire (OSL)	Single organization (anarchy, libertarian)
Pax Christi	Network/federation (peace)
Pro Natura	Single organization (ecology)
Parti Socialiste Suisse (PS)	Single organization (party)
Parti Suisse du Travail (PST)	Single organization (party)
Réalise	Single organization (welfare)
Syndicat interprofessionnel de travailleuses et travailleurs (Sit)	Single organization (union)
Solidarités	Network/federation (party)
Solidarité sans frontières (SOSF)	Single organization (solidarity)
Syndicat des services publics (SSP)	Network/federation (union)
Unia	Single organization (union)
Verts	Single organization (party)
WochenZeitung (WOZ)	Single organization (media)

Notes

1. We follow Kriesi et al. (1995) in considering the ecology and solidarity movements as part of the NSM family. Whereas this is quite clear and straightforward for the ecology movements, the solidarity movement often has a strong religious component, and Switzerland is no exception to this rule. However, both movements rest on new—rather than traditional—cleavages and share a similar social basis.

2. To create this index, we used the following variables: presence of a constitution, presence of a document of fundamental values, presence of a formally adopted program, presence of formal membership, and presence of a fee-paying membership. Organizations ranking from 0 to 0.4 are considered as informal, organizations ranking from 0.6 to 1 as formal. These results are to be taken with some caution, as the organizations were selected also because of their Internet presence. As an Internet presence requires a minimum of resources, the more formal the organization, the higher the chance it will have a Web site. Many networks or organizations active in the movement could not be selected because they have no Web site.

3. The objective of this part of the research is to draw a general picture of the use of the Internet by GJM organizations in terms of quality of communication, identity building, transparency, and offline as well as online mobilization in relation to the formal character of the organizations, the presence of formal members in the organizations, the territorial scope of the organizations, and the age of the Web sites. The organizations were selected according to two criteria: the type of organization and their importance within the movement. See the appendix to this chapter for the complete list of organizations studied.

4. In the jargon of network analysis, these three organizations rank highest in terms of in-degree. The network has a mean in-degree of 4.1, which is low given that the network is composed of thirty-five actors. The in-degree of the three organizations equals eleven, which is largely above the mean.

5. The attribution of organizations to the four subnetworks is not always clear-cut. For example, the Gipfelblockade and the Anti-WTO Coordination are here considered as GJM organizations, as they were established in the 1990s and mobilize on typical GJM issues, but these organizations stem directly from the squatters/autonomous milieu. The two media organizations (*WOZ* and *Le Courrier*) are here considered as NSM organizations. These two newspapers are now close to the GJM, but they were created before its breakthrough into the public domain. For example, although *Le Courrier* has strong religious roots (its original aim was to defend Catholics' interests in Protestant Geneva), it was already close to the NSMs.

6. It should be stressed that Solidarités has a hybrid status. We define it here as belonging to the traditional Left because it is a political party to the extent that it competes for elections. However, this organization defines itself as a social movement.

7. The two events are a social-forum-like event held in Zurich on January 17, 2004, and a protest demonstration that took place in Chur on January 24, 2004.

8. The data refer to support for principles explicitly declared by the organizations. Each figure in the table represents the percentage of organizations mentioning a given principle.

9. Ethical finance as well as critical consumerism and fair trade could perhaps be included in solidarity movement issues, although in this calculation we left them out in order to be on the conservative side.

10. The total number of principles equals 26.

11. Percentages do not add up to 100 because of multiple responses.

12. Although the distributions vary significantly depending on nationality, 63 percent of the participants in the 2002 European Social Forum in Florence displayed either a lot or some identification with the movement, although only 19 percent declared only little or no identification (della Porta 2005a, table 8.5). The stronger identifiers, in this case, were the British.

13. For example, on the world scale, the first World Social Forum took place in 2001, two years after the Seattle events.

14. In addition to examining the organizations' Web sites as described earlier, in another part of the Demos project we study their organizational ideology.

15. The data refer to the functions/objectives explicitly mentioned by the organizations.

16. Of the four organizations using protest or mobilization tactics, three are media (newspaper, radio, or alternative media). Of the nine organizations using lobbying tactics, two are unions and one is a party. Of the seven organizations using interest representation tactics, six are parties (including a party youth organization).

17. We have selected the forms of action that have most often been mentioned by participants and the most radical ones. Here we include signing a petition among the unconventional forms, although this can be debatable.

18. Both in the demonstrations against the 2001 G8 in Genoa and at the 2002 European Social Forum in Florence, the share of people who admit to having made use of violent forms (della Porta et al. 2006) are lower than among participants in the 2004 anti-WEF protest. This comparison, however, should be taken with some caution, as the events are not the same, and the indicators are also partly different.