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*Verwendung und Funktion des Dialogbegriffs im sowjetrussischen Diskurs der 1920er Jahre,
insbesondere bei Jakubinskij und Vygotskij.*
*The use and function of the notion of dialogue in the Soviet-Russian discourse of the 1920ies,
especially with Yakubinsky and Vygotsky*

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1. Introduction: The motive and the historical context of the discussion

Two points are especially relevant to the Soviet-Russian approach to language. On the one hand, the special way of using the notions, especially that of „dialogue“; on the other hand, the “linguistic approach” to be found in Yakubinsky. Yakubinsky talks about a „purely linguistical approach to dialogue“. What this means to Yakubinsky is at the centre of this explanation. In order to put Yakubinsky’s text into a proper perspective, the context of the discussion in the Russia of the 1920ies is to be presented briefly. For this purpose, I mainly rely on the article by S. Romashko (2000), which excellently illuminates the historical background of the dialogue analysis proposed by Yakubinsky.

Yakubinsky's text appears in a 1923 collection entitled „Russian Speech“ (*Russkaja reč*), edited by Ščerba.¹ In the introduction, Ščerba contrasts the German tradition, which sees language in terms of a correspondence between word and thing, with the Russian conception, which equates language with living speech expressing „our Russian“ thinking and „our Russian feeling“. The interest in the relationship of words and things prevailing in the

¹ Lev Vladimirovič Ščerba (1880-1944): Soviet linguist and literary scholar, active in the fields of general linguistics and slavonic and romance languages. He studied with Baudoin de Courtenay. In his thesis about the Sorbian dialect (1915), Ščerba already advocated the contrast of monologue and dialogue, which he further developed in the following years (cf. Ivanova 2000: 118ff.).

German tradition is compared to language as a living action, which Russian linguists are interested in. This interest is nurtured by three sources: poetry, References, and theatre. In theatre in particular, language proves to be alive and creative. It creates actions, is at the same time action itself and breaks up the automatisms of everyday language. Here, language appears as a living activity.

As precursors of this thinking, interested in living speech, are to be mentioned: Vladimir Dal', who locates the source of language facts, above all, in conversations (where an anti-institutional notion of conversation is to be presupposed); as well as Alexander Potebnja, for whom the linguist's most important task is "to listen to speech"². It needs to be remarked that in the Russia of that time, the slavonic dialects were only spoken and not written; language could only be investigated by listening, by experiencing speech as a language created in the presence of the listener.

The written, institutionalized language of authorities and churches (the language of power), which mainly existed in monological form, is contrasted with dialect (the language of the people), conversation, the oral communication, and is discussed as a cultural value. Here lies the root of the contrast of monologue as an artificial form of language with dialogue as a living one advocated by Yakubinsky. The studies of dialogue carried out in the 1920ies are thus a continuation of the interest the Russian philology had in the living Russian language in the 19th century.

2. L.S. Jakubinskij *Über die dialogische Rede (About Dialogical Speech)* (1923/2004)

The text begins with three statements:

1) The starting point of every linguistical investigation ist the „diversity of speech“ („Vielgestaltigkeit der Rede“). *Language does thus not have a unified form*, but exists in many shapes such as poetry, prose, as common speech or as a scholarly lecture.³ When referring to Yakubinsky, Vygotsky mentions first of all this thought, which he regards as central: „In linguistics, this problem of the *variation in speech functions* has recently attracted a good deal of attention. It turns out that even from the linguist's perspective, language is not a single form of speech activity but a collection of varied speech functions.“ (Vygotsky, 1934/1987 p.270; emphasis in the original⁴). The variety of language, the fact that language consists of an ensemble of verbal functions is, in Yakubinsky's view, the real object of the linguist's research.

2) The question arises how language, structured in such a way, is to be studied. Yakubinsky regards *language as a phenomenon which is immediately subject to living perception* and thus privileges a kind of phenomenal empiricism. The object to be studied therefore has to be

² Vladimir I. Dal' (1801-1872), writer and linguist, author of a „Dictionary of the living Russian Language“ (1863-66), also built up a large collection of Russian proverbs (cf. Romashko, 2000). Alexander A. Potebnja (1835-1891): Russian philologist and theorist of language, who supported the historical school of linguistics according to Humboldt and Steinthal; Influence on Vygotskij. Cf. Naumova (2004).

³ The Russian term for „functional language shapes“ („funktionale sprachliche Gestalten“ in the German translation by Hommel & Mengl 2004) is *funkzional'noe mnogoobrazie retchi*. In the German translation of Vygotskij (1934/2002), the term is translated by „funktionale Vielfalt des Sprechens“ („functional diversity of speech“). I would like to point out that the word *obraz* in the Russian text hints at something like crystallization, both regarding the *process* and the *result*.

⁴ With this emphasis, Vygotsky refers to Yakubinsky's term which is translated as *functional diversity of speech* in this text.

available in its immediacy, so that it can be perceived by our sensory organs. In Yakubinsky's case, the perceived is living speech. The perceived is recorded, or just written down. So, the description of language directly refers to the perception made possible by the sense organs.

3) *Language always is a kind of human behaviour.* It needs to be emphasized that, for Yakubinsky, language is *not* prior to behaviour, it cannot be separated from behaviour. Language is a constitutive element of human behaviour and is always created anew by the “organism” (the human being) itself. If language is considered a kind of human behaviour, two conclusions are obvious: Language is psychologically and sociologically determined. Language is determined psychologically insofar as the speaker has a certain psyche. In some situations, he is influenced by emotional motives and states, in other situations he is influenced by rational ones. Here, Yakubinsky also distinguishes the normal and the pathological situation. The speaker's whole psychological state influences his speech. The sociological determination results from the speaker's living together with other human beings. Out of this, certain conditions of communication, and forms and purposes of communication arise for every speaker, which he takes into account while organizing his speaking.

2.1. The concept of functionality of speech

What does it mean to consider language functionally? What does Yakubinsky mean by functional study of language?

For Yakubinsky, this means, above all, to take the preconditions and purposes of an utterance into account. The notion of purpose, which is linked to language shapes by Yakubinsky, is not construed as the mental intention of a speaker, but socially. The typology which Yakubinsky suggests for the shapes of language builds, first of all, on the purposes of communication. It is a typology of functional shapes of language, which was standard practice in the linguistics of his time and which draws upon Wilhelm von Humboldt, whose works were available in the Russian language.

Apart from the distinction between poetry and prose, which Yakubinsky mainly discusses, Humboldt refers to, among others, common speech, scientific prose, and rhetorical speech (cf. Jakubinskij, 1923/2004, §7). Yakubinsky confirms Humboldt's distinction between poetry and prose, which is based upon the differences of their purposes, he criticises Humboldt, however, for “not having carried out this distinction sufficiently clearly and for not having added a linguistic analysis” („Differenzierung nicht hinreichend klar durchgeführt und nicht von einer sprachlichen Analyse begleitet“) (ibid., p.386). The differences between poetry and prose can, of course, be deduced from extra-lingual facts, prose possesses a different way of thinking and a different orientation of the mind than poetry. Yakubinsky nevertheless suggests to begin the analysis at the aspect of the peculiarities of language. These peculiarities of language show in the choice of words, in the grammatical forms used, in the syntactic linking of the words, and in the phonetic properties. According to Yakubinsky, the language shapes can be distinguished by their purposes (or: by their objectives) and by their linguistical means. Here, Yakubinsky privileges a purely linguistical approach.

By analyzing the purely linguistical means, Yakubinsky opposes Humboldt, for whom the specific connection between thought and language takes precedence in distinguishing language shapes. Yakubinsky's approach entails that every functional shape of language can be considered as a language of its own, which has its own conventions, i.e. a certain syntax, choice of words etc.

Yakubinsky's idea is expressed in the theses of the Prague Circle of Linguists in the following words: „Every functional language has a system of conventions (a system of rules) – the language in the proper sense, it is therefore wrong to identify a functional language with „language“ (*langue*) and another one with „speech“ (*parole*) (in Saussure's terminology)“ (*Thèses*, 1929, p.15). Language (*langue*) is thought about differently by Yakubinsky and the Prague Circle of Linguists. For Yakubinsky, there is not only *one* language (*one* system *langue*), but every shape of language possesses its own structure, its own *langue* having its own grammar. There are as many *langues* as there are language shapes. It is important here that the particular language conventions remain a structuring element for the different uses, so that language is not dissolved in speech.⁵ Language cannot be detached from its realization in speech, at the same time the analysis of the functional shapes of speech always contains an analysis of the structure of language.

This way of looking at language has, above all, an effect on the teaching of language: We are used to illustrate the peculiarities of the grammar of, e.g., the German language by using examples from various functional shapes (prose, poetry, everyday language etc.). Following Yakubinsky, these are incomparable entities, because each of them has its own “grammar”. Thus, the traditional division of linguistics into semantics, grammar, phonetics and forms of discourse would also have to be questioned.

Yakubinsky's way of discussing the functional shapes of language from a purely linguistical point of view entails a second consequence, which was mainly discussed by Vygotsky. Yakubinsky himself does not use the term inner speech. Vygotsky, however, relies on Yakubinsky's demonstration of the diversity of speech in order to introduce inner speech as a shape of speech of its own in the seventh chapter of *Thinking and Speech* (1934/1987). From this point of view, inner speech can be maintained to be a language shape of its own, alongside with poetry, prose, and everyday speech. Inner speech has some peculiarities which distinguish it from other functional shapes. This is in marked contrast to the behavioural view of inner speech (e.g. Watson).

The transition from the notion of function to the notion of form:

In paragraph 13⁶, Yakubinsky amends the the notion of function, which is connected to language shapes, by the notion of form. Both aspects are interlinked in the diversity of speech as conceived by Yakubinsky. Thus, Yakubinsky classifies language shapes firstly according to function and secondly according to form. The first classification is special in that it mainly relies on factors outside language, such as the purposefulness of the various language shapes. „Denn wenn wir Klassifikationen im Zweckbereich durchführen, grenzen wir in Wirklichkeit nicht sprachliche Phänomene ab, sondern den Einfluß dieser Phänomene, und wir können nicht sofort eine wenn auch grobe Projektion dieser Klassifizierung in den Bereich der Rede selbst vornehmen. Dagegen schlagen wir in unserem Falle, wenn wir von einer Klassifikation der *Formen der Rede* ausgehen, sofort eine Brücke vom Bereich der außersprachlichen Faktoren zu den sprachlichen Phänomenen [...]“ (ibid., p.393, emphasis added by J.F.). (Paraphrase: „For, if we classify by purpose, we do not delineate language phenomena, but the effects of these phenomena, so that a projection into the realm of speech cannot be done immediately. If we start by classifying *speech forms*, however, we build a bridge from extra-linguistical facts to language phenomena [...]“) In the following, Yakubinsky discusses dialogue and monologue as „forms of verbal utterance“.

⁵ For a more precise discussion, refer to Friedrich (2005).

⁶ Cf. the appendix.

2.2. The notion of dialogue

2.2.1. The reduction of the language factor in dialogue

As opposed to monologue (mediated mutual action), dialogue is characterized by Yakubinsky as an immediate mutual action. Regarding the meaning of “immediateness of dialogue”, Yakubinsky refers to the visual and auditive perception of the partner and its role in the semantization of speech (its influence on the constitution of communicated meaning). In particular, this means that the perception of tone and timbre of the speech, of its dynamics and intonation, as well as the perception of the speaker's mimics and gestures decisively influences the listener's comprehension. If these visual and auditive indications emanate from the listener, then they also act upon the speaker. The visual and auditive indications have “a common ‘source’ in the shape of a specific bodily state” (Jakubinskij, 1923/2004, p.398: “gemeinsame ‘Quelle’ in der Form einer bestimmten körperlichen Verfassung”).

As dialogue always proceeds via perception, this entails that tone, timbre, dynamics, intonation, gestures, and mimics play a decisive role in speech. All these phenomena are immediately perceptible in dialogue and, being immediately perceived, they influence the perception of the other's speech. Intonation can, e.g., modify the meaning of what is said. It is also possible to communicate by gestures and mimics alone, with a word occasionally thrown in. This is how the reduction of the language factor in dialogue comes about. Language factor, according to Yakubinsky, is something like the semantics of a word. If intonation modifies the meaning of what is said, the role of the semantic factor (the word's meaning itself) is reduced.

Yakubinsky's interest was to find out what happens when these phenomena, which accompany an utterance, occur. As dialogue is immediate, these factors are perceptible for the listener and determine the perception of the other's speech. Following Yakubinsky, the perception puts the listener into a certain attitude (“Einstellung”).⁷ Even more: An orientation is always realized in dialogue by this perception. The utterance is perceived on the basis of a certain attitude, which is produced by the factors perceived while listening. „Die allgemeine Wichtigkeit der Apperzeptionsgebundenheit der Wahrnehmung der Rede als eines Faktors, der die Wichtigkeit der sprachlichen Reize verringert, zeigt sich in der dialogischen Rede im allgemeinen [...] viel deutlicher als in der monologischen Rede [...]“ (“The general importance of the fact that the perception of speech is dependent on a change of orientation⁸ generally shows itself in dialogical speech [...] more clearly than in monological speech [...]”) (ibid., p.418). That means, there are “language facts” (“sprachliche Fakten”) in a narrow sense – such as syntax, phonetics, and semantics – and there are constitutive language facts in a wider sense: tone, timbre, intonation etc. Thus, a problem arises for the notion of reference in language theory, which suggests that a word, regardless in which situation and in which way it is uttered, still „hits the target” which is meant.

This relativization of language factors in a narrow sense is also discussed by another theorist of language of that time. Karl Bühler occurs to me and his contribution to the development of phonology (cf. Friedrich, 2004).

⁷ Cf. appendix, §22.

⁸ For the sake of clarity (e.g., to avoid confusing coincidences of ‘perception’ and ‘apperception’), and acknowledging that every translation is an interpretation, we deliberately chose to translate „Apperzeption“ as *change of orientation*, since this is what actually happens *and* what matters to Yakubinsky.

2.2.2. Connecting piece: A notion of form following Bühler

In his *Theory of Language* (1934/1990), Bühler extensively discusses the results of the incipient science of phonology and makes a contribution to it. With the determination of phonemes, Bühler uses the notion of the “acoustic shapes of the sound images”. According to Bühler, the words of our language possess both a set of descriptive phonemic features and an acoustic shape (“Gesicht”, face). We are thus within the area of spoken language. The set of descriptive phonemic features is not sufficient to guarantee the necessary diacritical function during the formation of sounds (cf. Bühler, 1934/1990, p.320).

By “acoustic shape of the sound images”, Bühler means the modulation of articulation, the accent of the word, the intonation, which clearly contribute to the recognition of the sounds and which sometimes are the only means of recognizing. The „substantive” („stoffliche“) qualities of the words belong to the diacritically relevant elements of language. This claim, however, entails that the conventional conception of the form-substance-relationship, which prevails in phonology, has to be revised. „The phonologically imprinted, formed structure *ich* (I), which is distinguished clearly enough from all other words of the German language, resounds with the same phonological form from millions of mouths. It is only the vocal material, the auditory shape that individuates it, and that is the meaning of the answer *I* given by my visitor at the door: the phonematic impress, the linguistic formal factor in his *I* points out the vocal character to me, the questioner.“) (Bühler, 1934/1990, p.129)

The phonological side of the locutional forms remains the same for every word, independent of the speaker, because phonemes are abstractions and hence idealizations. The locutional form of a word does function diacritically on its own but requires, in certain situations, the substantive qualities of the word, the word accent, and the character of the voice. The locutional form of the word *ich* thus changes its function and points to the substantive qualities of the same word, which take over the diacritical function. So, the form causes a perception of the tonal peculiarity of the word, which results in the word's so-called individualization. The form refers to the substance in order to function. Bühler also demonstrates a reduction of the language factor in the practices of speech, in the immediate dialogue. The locutional form hands over its diacritical function to the substance (tone, timbre, dynamics). This orientation towards materiality shows a common feature in Yakubinsky's und Bühler's thought.⁹

It needs to be remarked that – as mentioned above – the role of the language factor (the locutional form) is reduced but does not disappear entirely. Without the locutional, form no reference to the substance of the sign could take place, and language would not work. Here, Vygotsky's discussion of inner speech (1934/1987), which relies heavily on Yakubinsky, should only be mentioned in passing: The language factor also remains here and does not dissolve despite all the abbreviation and condensation, but it works in a special way.

2.2.3. The naturalness of dialogue

In contrast to monologue, Yakubinsky points out the naturalness of dialogue. This naturalness can be taken as a theme in many ways. On the one hand, „naturalness“ is understood in the sense of reflexes. Dialogues are just voluntary acts, i.e. spontaneous, not reflected.¹⁰ The

⁹ See also Bühler's explanations (1934/1990, p.309ff.) as well as Friedrich (2004).

¹⁰ Cf. Jakubinskij (1923/2004: 400), §24, in the appendix. 20th century language theory is characterized by

utterances produced in dialogue often occur outside the control exerted by attention and consciousness. Dialogue presents itself like a living relationship with the world, it appears to be a quick succession of actions (action-reaction), which almost have a reflex-like character (Yakubinsky calls this a “language urge”) and which do not leave time for thought (reflection). In this context, Yakubinsky's claim that the social is closest to the biological in the language phenomenon of dialogue becomes comprehensible (cf. the dialogue of six drunken craftsmen in Dostoevsky, which is quoted by Jakubinskij, 1923/2004, p.398-399). On the other hand, this “naturalness” lies in the description of dialogue given by Yakubinsky. In dialogue, no act of speaking is closed, the speaker begins a sentence and waits for an interruption which can occur at any moment. The speed is high and while a speaker prepares an utterance he perceives the other's utterance at the same time. There often is no time left for the speaker to choose his words carefully, the speech possesses an elliptic character and is often characterized by a question-answer-play.

Monologue is, however, characterized as a complex voluntary act, in which the subject consciously turns to what he wants to express. The speaker ponders what to say, there can be a struggle of motives, there is a selection. „Monolog bedeutet nicht nur Adäquatheit der Ausdrucksmittel in bezug auf den jeweiligen psychischen Zustand, sondern er stellt auch die Anordnung, die Komposition der sprachlichen Einheiten als etwas Eigenständiges in den Vordergrund. Es kommt zu einer Bewertung der rein sprachlichen Beziehungen [...] Hierbei werden die sprachlichen Beziehungen zu Determinanten, zur Quelle von im Bewusstsein entstehenden Eindrücken mit Bezug auf sie selbst.“ (paraphrase: “Monologue does not only mean appropriateness of the means of expression with regard to the particular state of mind. It also lets the composition of the language come to the fore as something independent. The relationships within language are valued. [...] The relationships within language become the sources of impressions about language generated in consciousness”) (ibid.,p.407). Monologue is therefore characterized by a linguistic self-reflection and by a certain organization and structure, which provides it with the character of a piece of work. It is interesting to note that Yakubinsky uses the notion of the will, which occurs only rarely in the linguistics of his time, to distinguish between dialogue and monologue.

2.2.4. Conditions for dialogue

In the last chapters of his text, Yakubinsky deals with the conditions for dialogue (§§43-62). The idea of the so-called *Apperzeptionsmasse* (“conglomerate of orientation”) needs to be emphasized.¹¹ To enable communication, the conglomerates of orientation of the partners have to approach each other. One partner has to think about what the other talks about, in order to understand the other's speech. By elaborating the speech's *dependence on a change of orientation* („Apperzeptionsgebundenheit der Rede“), Yakubinsky arrives at an almost fatalistic model of communication, which could also be named a negative model. For it is implied that in the case of conglomerates of orientation which are not similar enough, or which are even completely different, a communication could not take place. A positive model of communication would give priority to decoding, which presupposes only knowledge of the code and which therefore can abstract from the content of the psyche (the common conglomerate of orientation) of the partners.

rationalism; biology and biological aspects are rejected. Employing biological notions means narrowing the gap between human being and animal and the inclusion of non-rational components such as feelings.

¹¹ Cf. appendix, §43.

A further idea, which Yakubinsky developed in this connection, pertains to the so-called patterns of everyday life: „Unser tägliches Leben ist voll von Sich-Wiederholendem und Festgeprägtem; in der Gesamtheit unserer wechselseitigen Handlungen mit anderen Menschen gehört ein außerordentlich großer Teil zu den festgefügteten wechselseitigen Handlungen [...]“ (paraphrase: „Our daily life is full of the repetitive and the firmly established; within our interactions with other people, an extraordinarily big share belongs to the firmly established interactions.“) (ibid., p.419).¹² The patterns of everyday life correspond to certain, firmly established sentences, ways of using sentences, sentence patterns, “fossilized” words. Certain answers are so firmly embedded in certain everyday situations that they are produced automatically, without any thinking. In many social contexts there are firmly established linguistical patterns of exchange, in which words and sentences are used are used “unconsciously”. Here, the “naturalness” of dialogue shows itself again. The words and collocations used like that are not broken down and not grasped consciously. Rather, they work like a signal, like something which has been rehearsed.

Here, a cross-reference to Bühler is appropriate, who, in my view, discusses the same phenomenon in his explanation of the sympractical use of language. In this connection, Bühler investigates the so-called ellipsis problem and underlines that the abbreviations observed in ellipses are not at all unfinished sentences. The half sentence „Einen Schwarzen bitte“ („A black one please“), uttered in a Vienna Café, is practically sufficient speech. Bühler talks about language islands which emerge in mutual actions. It is not necessary to complete this groups of words to understand them. The examples put forward by Yakubinsky, such as the sentence „Hast du heute die Zeitung gekauft?“ (“Have you bought a newspaper today”), repeated every morning, work in a similiar way. They are firmly established sentences, the structure of the sentence is blurred, it works like a pattern.¹³

All these linguistical phenomena described by Yakubinsky can be subsumed under the notion of *sprachlicher Automatismus (language automatism)*. The eighth chapter of his book is dedicated to just this topic. Here, Yakubinsky emphasizes again that a theory of language cannot (paraphrase of the following quotation) “disregard those language activities which are neither complex nor characterized by exceptionality and with which language facts do not (fully) become the object of conscious attention. In the latter case language is used ‘unconsciously’, automatically.” („auch jene sprachliche Tätigkeit nicht außer Acht lassen [kann], die weder durch Kompliziertheit (d.h. Momente des Kampfes der Motive und der Auswahl) noch durch Ungewöhnlichkeit (des Sprechens oder der Wahrnehmung) gekennzeichnet ist und bei der die sprachlichen Fakten entweder nur ganz minimal oder überhaupt nicht bewußt werden und nicht Objekt der Aufmerksamkeit sind. In diesem letzten Falle gebrauchen wir die Rede gleichsam »unbewußt«, automatisch.“ (ibid., p.427)

If these sentences are produced without a so-called „language intention“, without language facts becoming conscious, without the sentence being broken down or completed, the „causes“ of their production cannot be located in the linguistical consciousness. Yakubinsky points to psychophysiological laws, which determine the use of language in these situations characterized by a lack of consciousness and attention. Thus, this lack of control locates dialogical speech outside any theory of intentional language. A cross-reference to Pierre Janet would seem to be appropriate here.

¹² Cf. appendix, §§44, 45.

¹³ See Jakubinskij (1923/2004) §45, see Bühler (1934/1990) §10 in part III.

3. Résumé

Yakubinsky's precise distinction between monologue and dialogue shows that these forms cannot be equated with each other. Dialogue cannot be explained by resorting to monologue, it is an independent and special phenomenon of speech. Retracing Yakubinsky's line of argument, it becomes evident that he points out two seemingly conflicting characteristics of dialogue. On the one hand, he talks about a diminishing role of the linguistic stimulus, to be precise: In the process of speaking, little attention is devoted to the actual language-like. On the other hand, he refers to certain language elements such as timbre, tone, intonation, and firmly established sentences, which are used by the speaker, so to speak, automatically and unconsciously. In my view, he thus proposes an extension of the notion of language. The functioning of language is not reduced to the intentional, conscious, reflected use of language by the speaker, which can typically be observed in monologue and, above all, written language, but it is also addressed as a process occurring quasi-naturally. There is no doubt that the naturalness of dialogue is a socialized one, as the patterns of speech used in everyday life are learned. Talking about language as a natural, automatic, or, in Yakubinsky's terms, simple act of the will, hints at the fact that language cannot merely be understood as an intentionally controlled action. Language is thus embedded into the living relationship which the speaker maintains with the world and with the Other and cannot be explained outside this relationship. The latter entails that the functioning of language cannot be deduced from itself and its characteristics, but only from the features which language shows and produces in this living relationship. A theory of *language* which wants to do justice to the *linguistical* phenomenon of dialogue has to extend its notion of language, or, to put it differently, cannot merely be conceived as a *theory* of language. The notion of language has to find its place in the conceptualization of the speaker's constantly renewed relationship with the world. The notions developed for this purpose will necessarily not be purely linguistic ones, but they will overlap with physiological, psychological and sociological notions, as is clearly shown by Yakubinsky's thoughts.

4. Appendix: Selected passages from Jakubinskij's *Über die dialogische Rede (About Dialogical Speech)* (1923/2004)

Jakubinskij (1923/2004: 393), §13:

„Der Frage nach den Formen sprachlicher Äußerungen sind die folgenden Seiten meines Artikels gewidmet. Ich habe mich aus folgenden Gründen auf diese Frage konzentriert: Erstens, sie blieb bei der Diskussion des Faktums der Vielgestaltigkeit der sprachlichen Äußerungen in der letzten Zeit gleichsam im Schatten und war vom Moment des Zwecks verdeckt (das, was in der Terminologie des Moskauer Linguistenkreises mit »Funktionalität der Rede« bezeichnet wird); zweitens, die Klassifikation, die sich auf die Unterscheidung von Äußerungsformen gründet, muß aus methodologischen Gründen anderen vorangehen, besonders den zweckbezogenen. Denn wenn wir Klassifikationen im Zweckbereich durchführen, grenzen wir in Wirklichkeit nicht sprachliche Phänomene ab, sondern den Einfluß dieser Phänomene, und wir können nicht sofort eine wenn auch grobe Projektion dieser Klassifizierungen in den Bereich der Rede selbst vornehmen. Dagegen schlagen wir in unserem Falle, wenn wir von einer Klassifikation der Formen der Rede ausgehen, sofort eine Brücke vom Bereich der außersprachlichen Faktoren zu den sprachlichen Phänomenen und gewinnen die Möglichkeit, sofort z.B. über den Unterschied der Mitteilungsmittel dieser oder jener Unterart zu sprechen oder Monolog und Dialog als sprachliche Phänomene einander gegenüberzustellen.“

paraphrase: „The following passages are dedicated to language forms. I concentrated my discussion on this question for the following reasons: Firstly, this question was overshadowed while dealing with the diversity of language and was eclipsed by the element of purpose (which is called functionality of speech in the terminology of the Moscow Circle of Linguists); Secondly, for methodological reasons, the classification which is based on the distinctions of shapes of utterances has to precede the other classifications, especially those based on purpose. For, if we classify by purpose, we do not delineate language phenomena, but the effects of these phenomena, so that a projection into the realm of speech cannot be done immediately. If we start by classifying speech forms, however, we build a bridge from extra-linguistical facts to language phenomena and we are immediately enabled to talk about the differences of communicative means of this or that subgroup or to compare monologue and dialogue as language phenomena.”

Jakubinskij (1923/2004: 399), §22:

„In Verbindung mit dem oben Gesagten über die Bedeutung von Ton und Timbre möchte ich folgende Bemerkung machen: Ton und Timbre der Rede des Sprechers zwingen uns bereits zu ihrem Beginn, eine bestimmte Position einzunehmen, uns in bestimmter Weise auf den Sprecher und seine Äußerung einzustellen; wir rezipieren seine Äußerung auf der Grundlage dieser »Einstellung«. Manchmal zwingen uns die ersten Worte durch ihren Ton, auf eine bestimmte Weise zuzuhören – feindselig oder voller Mitgefühl oder in einer anderen Richtung, das heißt, sie bedingen die Apperzeptionsgebundenheit der Wahrnehmung, schaffen in uns einen Standpunkt, von welchem wir das Weitere sehen [...]“

paraphrase: „In connection with what is mentioned above about the significance of tone and timbre: the speaker's tone and timbre force the listener into a certain position to adapt to the speaker and his utterance. His utterance is received on the basis of this “attitude/setting”. Sometimes, the first words force us to listen in a special way – hostile or full of compassion or in a different direction, i.e. the perception is dependent on a change of orientation so that the first words create a point of view, from which everything that follows is seen.”

Jakubinskij (1923/2004: 400), §24 (excerpt):

„Alle diese Überlegungen weisen darauf hin, daß eine Äußerung in der unmittelbaren sprachlichen Kommunikation unter sonst gleichen Bedingungen in stärkerem Maße als eine einfache Willenhandlung außerhalb der Kontrolle durch Bewußtsein und Aufmerksamkeit verläuft als eine Äußerung in der mittelbaren Kommunikation.“

paraphrase: „ All these reflections point to the conclusion that an utterance in the immediate linguistical communication is, all other things being equal, much less controlled by consciousness and attention than an utterance in mediated communication.”

Jakubinskij (1923/2004: 417), §43 (excerpt):

„Die Apperzeptionsmasse des jeweiligen Gesprächspartners »besteht« zu Beginn des Gesprächs aus der ihm generell eigenen beständigen Apperzeptionsmasse, die durch die je momentane Apperzeption sowie durch die Wahrnehmung des Gesprächspartners und der

Umstände erweitert wird, außerdem aus einer gewissen mehr oder weniger konkreten Vorstellung über das Thema des Gesprächs, diese apperzeptionelle Ausgangsbasis des Dialogs wird darüber hinaus im Zusammenhang mit dem wahrgenommenen Inhalt der Beiträge des Gesprächspartners kompliziert und verändert; somit vollzieht sich jedes nachfolgende Sprechen auf dem Hintergrund der Apperzeptionsmasse, die letzten Endes durch den gerade wahrgenommenen Beitrag bestimmt wird.“

paraphrase: „The conglomerate of orientation of the respective partner ‘consists’ of his own, permanent conglomerate of orientation at the beginning of the conversation, which is modified by the perception of the other partner and the circumstances, furthermore, of a more or less concrete idea of the starting point of the conversation. This orientational starting point of the dialogue is modified and made more complex by taking the perceived content of the partner's contributions into account; Thus, every subsequent speaking takes place against the background of the conglomerate of orientation, which is determined by the contribution just perceived.”

Jakubinskij (1923/2004: 418), §44:

„[...] das in der sprachlichen Kommunikation wirksame Moment der Entsprechung der Muster des Alltags und der Rede.“

paraphrase: „ ... the correspondence between patterns of everyday life and speech which is effective in linguistic communication ...”

as well as (1923/2004: 419), §45:

„Unser tägliches Leben ist voll von Sich-Wiederholendem und Festgeprägtem; in der Gesamtheit unserer wechselseitigen Handlungen mit anderen Menschen gehört ein außerordentlich großer Teil zu den festgefügteten wechselseitigen Handlungen [...]“

paraphrase: „Our daily life is full of the repetitive and the firmly established; within our interactions with other people, an extraordinarily big part belongs to the firmly established interactions.”

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